EAST PAKISTAN: AN INDEPENDENT NATION?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
EAST PAKISTAN: AN INDEPENDENT NATION?
Secret
8
1 March 1971
No. 1270/71
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, Within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its tre,usmission or tuvclation of its contents to or re
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1 March 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
East Pakistan: An Independent Nation?
Introduction
Chances of a separation between East Pakistan
and West Pakistan have increased sharply since the
beginning of 1971. East Pakistanis, who for years
have complained of alleged West Pakistani exploita-
tion and dominance of the nation's political and
economic life, gave overwhelming electoral support
last December to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami
League (AL). The AL will hold an absolute majority
in the national constituent assembly originally
scheduled for 3 March. On 1 March, however., Presi-
dent Yahya Khan announced the indefinite postpone-
ment of the assembly's opening. Mujib, who since
1966 has campaigned for extensive provincial auton-
omy, has called for a constitution based on a six-
point program that would leave the central govern-
ment with responsibility only for defense and foreign
affairs. The AL, however, has no elected representa-
tives from the West wing, and Z. A. Bhutto, head of
the major political party there, has declared that
his party will boycott the constituent assembly ses-
sions because, he claims, the AL is unwilling to com-
promise and has put West Pakistan'in a "take-it-or-
leave-it" position. Several other West Pakistani
delegates have fallen in behind Bhutto's position,
and it is doubtful that either the West Pakistani -
dominated establishment or the military would allow
a document based on the AL platform to be promul-
gated in the absence of concurrence from Bhutto's
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within
the Directorate of Intelligence.
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party. In recent weeks, AL spokesmen have sounded
out possible foreign support for an independent
East Pakistan, stating that a unilateral declara-
tion of independence would be the result if the
AL's goal of provincial autonomy were thwarted.
This memorandum examines some of the more
important assets and liabilities that an indepen-
dent East Pakistan would possess, but offers no
judgments on the chances for separation or on the
viability of an independent East Pakistan. Empha-
sis is given to political and social aspects.*
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Economic Factors
1. An estimated 73-75 million East Pakistanis
are jammed into a major portion of the subtropical
Bengal Plain, a land area about the size of Florida.
The average population density is about 1,300 per-
sons per square mile. Based on a conservative
growth rate, the population could reach 115 million
by 1.985 and 180 million by the year 2000, a figure
that would entail the staggering average population
density of 3,275 persons per square mile.
2. Other factors contribute towara making
East Pakistan, whether independent or not, one of
the world's greatest potential nightmares. In
recent years East Pakistan has not been agricul-
turally self-supporting, and its estimated future
population will further diminish the land's capac-
ity to sustain. Jute has been the major cash crop,
and the manufacture of jute products is the main
industry in East Pakistan, employing about 45 per-
cent of the industrial work force. Recently, how-
ever, jute products have encountered increasing
competition in world markets from synthetics, mak-
ing the ?uture of this important source of foreign
exchange somewhat uncertain.
3. Agriculture--and therefore the province's
economy--is geared to an annual cycle of flooding
by the region's many rivers, especially the Brahma-
putra and the Ganges. Flooding that occurs too
early or too late, however, can wreak disaster.
Occasional simultaneous peak flood periods have
had catastrophic results, dramatizing the need for
massive and expensive flood-control projects. On
the other hand, reduced flows during the year-end
dry season in the southwestern portion of the prov-
ince necessitate extensive irrigation projects.
Furthermore, East Pakistan is subject to saliniza-
tion of its seaward edge and to devastating cyclones,
originating in the Bay of Bengal, that frequently
cause extensive property damage and loss of life.
Rarely, however, are such storms as disastrous as
the one in November 1970, in which as many as
500,000 people may have been killed.
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4. East Pakistan lacks mineral resources and
power for the development of a modern technology.
A natural gas field near Sylhet in the northeast
is the only available major resource for the pro-
duction of thermal power and for the manufacture
of chemical fertilizers. There are no easily ex-
ploitable coal fields in East Pakistan, although
coal is abundant within a few hundred miles to the
west in neighboring India. An independent East
Pakistan might have better trade relations with
India and therefore better access to its coal; at
present, politics dictate that East Pakistan im-
port coal from Communist China at a price approxi-
mately three times what it would cost from India.
Hydroelectric power possibilities in East Pakistan
are limited. A nuclear power plant scheduled to be
constructed with Belgian aid at Roopur near Khustia
should help to expand the power supply, but it
will take five years to complete the plant once
construction has begun. At present, power shortages
and frequent outages impose a major restraint on
economic growths
5. Lack of an adequate transport system also
inhibits economic growth. Waterways provide the
primary mode of transportation, but movement along
the delta rivers is hampered by seasonally inade-
quate depths, meandering courses, and shifting
channels. The riverine nature of the land and the
annual flooding make the construction of roads and
railroads very expensive, and the supply of con-
struction materials is inadequate. The use of three
track gauges for the railroad system adds to the
transportation problem. A system of STOL aircraft
transport is presently in its infancy in East Paki-
stan.
6. The annual per capita income of East Pak-
istan is about US$60, in real terms not much higher
than the level in 1948, and far below that in West
Pakistan. The population is 90 percent rural and
only about 20 percent literate. According to the
1961 census, only 4.3 percent of the East Pakistani
labor force was engaged in manufacturing, and this
almost entirely in small-scale industry. Private
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enterprise is generally very inefficient in East
Pakistan, where numerous small, uneconomic shops
produce similar products, using outdated methods
and without sufficient capital for expansion.
7. In comparison with the West wing, there
has been little private investment in East Paki-
stan, In recent years, despite governs" nt incen-
tives, private investment in the East has averaged
only about 25 percent of the nation's total. Cap-
ital is largely in the hands of a few wealthy fam-
ilies who migrated from India and Burma after par-
tition of the subcontinent in 1947 or who have
moved over from West Pakistan in subsequent years.
Much of the managerial class resident in East Pak-
istan is composed of Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees
from India, who have never been accepted by the
Bengalis and who would probably move to West Paki-
stan if the East wing became independent. There
is, furthermore, a shortage of workers with tech-
nical skills. To promote the development of an
independent East Pakistan, many of those who are
now trained would have to spend considerable time
in teaching others, at the cost of efficiency and
productivity at least in the short run.
Social Factors
8. An independent East Pakistan, which would
probably be called Bangla Desh ("Bengal Nation"),
would be largely a homogeneous ethnic entity, com-
posed overwhelmingly of Bengalis. The 1961 census
indicated that only 0.66 percent of those resident
in East Pakistan claimed a language other than Ben-
gali-or some insignificant local languages as their
mother tongues. Presumably most of the West Paki-
stanis now resident in East Pakistan would return
to the West wing should East Pakistan become inde-
pendent. There are also about 500,000 members of
various tribes in East Pakistan, living relatively
peacefully in rather primitive conditions, mostly
in the.Chittagong hill tracts along the Burmese
border.
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9. Among the native Bengalis of East Pakistan,
however, is a sizable Hindu minority, about one-
sixth of the province's total population. Tradi-
tionally these Hindus have had no significant voice
in the government, have not been able to compete on
equal terms for jobs, and have often been subject
to reprisals for anti-Muslim incidents in indi_a_
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13. East Pakistan lacks a strong indigenous
middle class, The pre-partition middle class,
which provided East Bengal's artisans, entreprenr,:urs,
and professionals, was primarily Hindu. Most of
this group hrs since migrated from East Pakistan,
The vacuum has been only partially f4.lled by about
one million Biharis, Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees
from India. (In East Pakistan the term "Bihari,"
which indicates an origin in the Indian state of
Bihar, has become confused with the Urdu word
"Bahri," meaning "outsider," and is applied to
these Urdu-speaking refugees.) TLS Bengali-speaking
majority views the Biharis as a foreign element and
discriminates against them, perhaps partly because
the Bengalis resent the fact that these non-Bengali
Muslims have succeeded in dominating such a large
portion of the business community.
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14. The Biharis in turn have identified with
the West Pakistani - dominated central government
rather than with Bengali political and economic
interests. As a result, in the event of East Pak-
istan's independence those Biharis who could afford
it would probably join West Pakistani businessmen
who reside in East Pakistan in leaving of their
own accord. They might even be expelled from the
country. In either event, they would take with
them much of the technical, administrative, and
commercial know-how presently in East Pakistan as
well as their own liquid assets.
Political Factors
15. When India and Pakistan were partitioned
in 1947, many factors. pointed to a major political
role for East Pakistan in the new nation. The East
had (and still has) a'larger population than West
Pakistan, and the Bengali traditionally have pro-
duced some of South Asia's literary and intellec-
tual leaders. Its jute crop accounted for the
largest portion of Pakistan's foreign exchange
earnings. The Bengal region of pre-partition India
had a long history of political organization and
agitation, in sharp contrast to West Pakistan,
where petty personal feuding and rivalries among
different linguistic and tribal groups blurred
political life.
16. East Pakistani politicians, however,
gave way to West Pakistanis and the refugees from
India. Even When Bengalis such as Kwaja Nazimuddin
and H. S. Suhrawardy, who se:,:ved as prime ministers
of Pakistan in the early 1950s, headed the govern-
ment, they tended to concentrate on mending and
defending their political fences with West Paki-
stani leaders ani.. on building West Pakistani -
oriented political machines. Gradually East Pak-
istan slipped into a virtual semicolonial political
status.
17.
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forces of undivided India or of independent Pakistan.
Thus, they were deprived not only of the ability to
apply military pressure against the West wing but
also of any voice at all when the military inter-
vened to take over power in the central government.
Furthermore, the central government was largely suc-
cessful in its efforts to prevent the Bengalis from
forming major, distinguishable political parties.
With a -few exceptions , for almost two decades East
Pakistani politicians were relegated to minor and
largely ineffectual roles in national politics?
18. This situation began to change in 1966,
however, after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman developed his
six-point program for provincial autonomy. Mujib
called for a federal, parliamentary government,
with the national administration responsible only
for defenso and external affairs. The federating
states would: be in charge of their own fiscal pol-,
icies, maintain their own foreign trade accounts,
and raise and control their own militia or para-
military forces. Finally, there would be two
separate currencies mutually or freely convertible
in each wing. Although the campaign launched by
his Awami League (AL) was halted from mid-1966 to
early 1969, while Mujib was in prison, Bengali re-
sentment of the central government was rekindled
in 1968 by a badly organized "show trial" of a
number of Bengalis accused of plotting East Paki-
stan's secession. This resentment became inter-
twined with the anti-Ayub movement, which had
erupted in both wings of Pakistan in 1968, and
the imposition of martial law in March 1969 merely
slowed the mounting drive among East Pakistanis
for provincial autonomy. As the leading champion
of autonomy, Mujib's AL steadily gained popular
support, culminating in its sweep of elections in
East Pakistan in Dccember 1970.
19. Today, an independent East Pakistan
would begin its existence as essentially a one-
party state, that of the AL and Mujibur Rahman.
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the one theme uniting the masses of East Pakistan--
Bengali nationalism.
3puted leader of East Pakistan. He is probably
the most effective Bengali leader at playing on
Mujib appears for now to be the un-
20. Mujib, a man of action, appears to rely
more on his own instincts than on advice from others.
He has numerous advisers and listens to them, but
feels no compulsion to act counter to his own inclina-
tions. Below Mujib is an upper echelon of AL
leaders, most of whom are lawyers by training.
Generally they have been "seasoned" by years in jail
under previous regimes and have emerged as hard-
bitten, professional politicians. Their average age
is about 50. Mujib also has a coterie of "experts"
who are called upon to give advice in areas of their
professional competence. At present no one has been
identified from within the leadership of the AL who
could easily succeed Mujib.
21. The AL is a well organized party that in-
corporates many disparate groups--ranging from poor
peasants to wealthy businessmen and industrialists.
Although linked primarily by intense anti - West
Pakistani feelings, the AL would probably manage to
maintain its basic unity in the early years of East
Pakistani independence. It is not certain, however,
that this unity could long endure should the AL fail
to solve rapidly East Pakistan's considerable eco-
nomic problems. Furthermore, the AL has had no
experience in recent years in governing.
22. Current alternatives to the AL in East
Pakistan are dismal. The conservative religious
parties, dedicated to a strict Muslim ideology,
would be totally incapable of guiding East Pakistan
through the maze of problems it would face. Other
conservative and moderate political parties have
failed in the past and offer little to East Pakis-
tanis. On the left is a jumble of disunited Com-
munist and other radical groups, split among them-
selves by their leaders' personal differences and
by different views on the timetable for violent
revolution in East Pakistan. Nevertheless, it
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could be to one of these groups that many Bengalis
might turn in the event of dissatisfaction with
the AL.
23. Although East Pakistan would begin its
independent existence with almost exclusive polit-
ical reliance upon the AL, it would not be totally
without the basis for some governmental infrastruc-
ture. Recent statistics on Pakistan's civil serv-
ice--the elite group of careerists who man the top
governmental posts--are not available, but the trend
since 1962 has been for a greater role for Bengalis
in this still predominantly West Pakistani body. In
1965 there were 151 Bengalis in the c:,.vil service
out of a nationwide total of 461, and after 1966 more
were presumably added. Although the proportion of
Bengalis has apparently increased, most of the top
posts are still held by West Pakistanis, and the
over-all quality of the Bengali civil servants is
unknowii. Under Mujibur Rahman, however, a civil
service might not have as great a role to play.
In a united Pakistan, the AL called for a restruc-
turing of the civil service apparatus and its re-
placement by a smaller, less powerful organization.
Presumably such plans might also apply to an inde-
pendent East Pakistan.
24. Below the elite civil service level, many
Bengalis have held lesser positions in the govern-
mental bureaucracy. As of late 1970, however,
only a few government agencies drew as many as half
their employees from East Pakistan.
25, Some Bengalis have also held top politi-
cal jobs in previous regimes--including five mem-
bers of the nine-man martial law cabinet recently
dissolved by President Yahya Khan. Bengalis with
cabinet experience, however, might be judged as
"tainted" by their collaboration with the West
Pakistani establishment.
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Foreign Relations and Security
26. Complete statistics on the total number
of Bengalis in the Pakistani foreign service are
not available, but a year ago out of a total of 53
Pakistani heads of mission, 11 were Bengalis. Ben-
gali assets for the conduct of an independent for-
eign policy cannot be assessed realistically. Mujib
is relatively well traveled and has expressed him-
self on certain foreign policy aspects. He favors
the restoration of trade relations with India and
the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes.
Although independence for Eaet Pakistan might gen-
erate among some Bengalis on both sides of the
Indo-Pak border dreams of--and in New Delhi concern
over--a "Greater Bengal," the long-seated Muslim-
Hindu rivalry extends to Bengalis and would be a
strong obstacle to the realization of such a con-
cept.
27. The AL does not appear to be particularly
sympathetic to Communist China, and some AL lead-
ers seem suspicious of Chinese intentions. The US
is apparently held in high esteem by several senior
AL leaders. At the same time there have been fre-
quent contacts between Soviet diplomats and AL lead-
ers, and Soviet assistance after the cyclone of 1970
was substantial.
28. Militarily, East Pakistan would be weak.
About ten percent of the current 350,000-man mili-
tary establishment are East Pakistanis. The high-
est ranking East Pakistani is Lieutenant General
Khawaja Wasiuddin, II Corps commander, cne of the
very few to reach general officer or flag rank. In
the regular army, only the battalions of the East
Bengal Regiment would presumably revert to Bangla
Desh as complete units.
29. Even ten percent may be an overestimate
of the strength likely to accrue to East Pakistan.
Only about five percent of the present army's offi-
cers are East Pakistanis. Moreover, many of them
might well opt to stay with West Pakistan. Gen-
eral Wasiuddin, for example, is descended from
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Kashmiris. An estimated half of the East Pakistani
officers and NCOs in the East Bengal Regiment are
not actually Bengalis, but are immigrants or de-
scendents of immigrants from other parts of the
subcontinent. Moreover, ambitious officers might
well feel that their careers would be better served
by remaining in the large, well-equipped army that
would accrue to West Pakistan.
30. Equipment would be another problem. East
Pakistan might end up with no more heavy equipment
than five PT-76 tanks, and even a distribution on
current planned levels would give it at most two
fighter squadrons, a few small patrol vessels, and
a minimum of armor. Thus, East Pakistan would come
into existence with an army of far less than 50,000
men, largely disorganized, badly equipped, and with-
out the resources to improve soon.
31. In addition to regular armed forces,
Bangla Desh would inherit a paramilitary force com-
posed of the 10,000-man East Pakistan Rifles, which
has internal security, antismuggling, and border
patrol missions. There is also an estimated
800,000-man Ansars (helpers) force, a voluntary
militia-type body that has helped the police when
needed and has assisted in antismuggling operations.
Only 100,000 of the Ansars have received any train-
ing at all, however, and possibly only 50,000
regularly participate in the activities of the
force. Transportation available to the Ansars is
minimal, and their arms consist of obsolete surplus
army and police equipment held for them in the
police stations. They would be of help, however,
in supplementing the East Pakistan provincial police,
an almost entirely Bengali force now numbering about
32,000.
Conclusion
32. Although an independent East Pakistan
would begin with some assets, notably in the politi-
cal realm but also including an ethnically homo-
genous population, it would face economic problems
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of staggering proportions because of its dearth
of natural resources, its burgeoning population,
and its lack of capital, economic infrastructure,
and entreprenurial and technical skills. The domi-
nant agricultural sector could make little headway
unless flood waters Were controlled, a process
that would require considerable capital, most of
which would have to come from foreign sources, and
that would take many years to complete. In the
meantime, if the volatile Bengalis became disen-
chanted with the rate of economic progress made
under the AL, or if Mujib were suddenly removed
from the political scene, they might turn to rad-
ical extremist groups. In that event, Communist
China might find fertile ground for expanding its
political influence in an area of considerable
strategic significance. Finally, the economic
and social problems are of such magnitude that
Bangla Desh could disintegrate into' continuing
political chaos, the victim of the liabilities
it inherited at its birth.
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