COMMUNIST CHINA: THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090054-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: December 4, 1970
• Content Type: IM

 /A/(Y/ I'll 1. n l J1 09 J Y* L.
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist China: The Open Door Policy
State Dept. review completed
Secret
4 December 160
No. 1496/70
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 MEWS,
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'A. R N I N G
'I his (locuuucnt contains information affecting thc. national
clcfensc of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, w;tions 793 and 79-1, of the US Co(h.k, as anw[Wed.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized bosom is prohibited by law.
-- GROUP i
R%t'I.1!I,rI, I IIIIM At; rl'`MA1 IC
INI'A N1111.11r1!1(1 ANII
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SWAMI,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 November 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist China: The Open Door Policy
Introduction
Viewed from almost any perspective, the sequence
of events that began with Canada's recognition of Pe-
king in mid-October and ended with last'week's vote
on the China representation issue in the UN seems
likely to prove a watershed in the development of
Communist China's relations with the world at large.
The successful conclusion of the long-drawn-out ne-
gotiations in Stockholm was at once symbolic of a
general trend and itself a powerful impetus toward
further intensification of that trend. For unlike
French recognition of Peking in 1964, Ottawa's re-
cent move was clearly not an isolated act. Other
states are already lining up at Peking's door. And
that door now seems open, or at least ajar. More-
over, Canadian recognition of Peking, followed by
that of Italy, almost certainly played a role in
garnering for Communist China a plurality in the
UN General Assembly in favor of the traditional "Al-
banian" resolution calling for the admission of the
mainland regime and the expulsion of the Nationalist
Chinese from the world body. Clearly Peking's for-
mal position in the community of nations is under-
going a change. It is less clear, however, to what
degree this formal change will be translated into
real and fundamental changes in Communist China's
foreign relationships or, indeed, to what extent
these formal changes are the result of significant
modifications that may have already occurred in Pe-
king's foreign policy and to what extent the changes
themselves are likely to induce modifications in
the future.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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1. Movement on the recognition issue alone
is now occurring at a rate that would have seemed
scarcely believable as recently as two years ago.
Rome has followed Ottawa in concluding its extended
negotiations on the question, and Italian diplomats
indicated that the Canadian move made a rapid wind-up
of the talks imperative. Austria has announced that
it too expects to enter into negotiations leading
to recognition, and the Belgian Government, which
has toyed with the idea for some time, is obviously
inclined to follow suit in short order. Luxembourg
has indicated that it does not intend to be relegated
to the end of the queue and will probably follow
Belgium into talks with Peking. Although Belgium has
some bilateral problems with mainland China, none of
these nations has expressed any reservations concer-
ning the recognition formula worked out with Ottawa,
and as a result this series of talks, when they occur,
should be relatively brief., In that case Portugal,
Spain, Greece, Turkey, Ireland, and West Germany would
be the only nations in Europe lacking formal diplomatic
ties with Peking; of these West Germany is an impor-
tant trading partner of Communist China.
2. In Africa, Equatorial Guinea's recognition
of the mainland regime followed hard on the heels
of that of Canada. Ethiopian probes on the possi-
bility of establishing diplomatic relations have
received a positive response from Peking, and nego-
tiations should begin soon. It is hard to see how
Libyan Premier Qaddafi, with his aspirations to
play a major role among "progressive" Arab states,
can expect to maintain relations with Taipei very
much longer. Several other African states are likely
to continue to recognize the Nationalist Chinese
only if they are handsomely subsidized by Taiwan--and
this must be balanced by the possibility that France
may suggest to some of its former colonies that they
move in the direction of Peking. In Latin America,
Chilean Preside"c Allende has already announced that
he plans to recognize Peking; when this occurs Peru
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and probably Bolivia might find it difficult not to
follow suit. Should either or both recognize Communist
China, still other South American countries could
find themselves under pressure to move in the same
direction. This list is by no means exclusive. In
Lebanon the recognition question has again become
a "hot" one in domestic politics; Mexico and perhaps
some Caribbean states appear to be rethinking their
China policy,
In s ort, a recogni.-
ti.on snowball is rolling and may still be gaining
momentum.
3. In the United Nations a similar situation
prevails. The Important Question Resolution, requir-
ing a two-thirds majority on the China representation
was passed again this year, thus precluding an imme-
diate substitution of Peking for Taipei in the world
body. But the vote on this resolution was 66-52--down
from last year's 71-48--and even this result was
achieved only because a number of nations had made
an early commitment to vote "yes." Several states
are likely to be most reluctant to repeat this vote
next year, since it appears to "frustrate the will of
the majority"; some have already indicated that they
expect to change their position. In fact, the use-
fulness of the Important Question tactic is probably
at an end. Moreover, as a result of the vote in favor
of the Albanian resolution, psychological pressure
for the admission of Communist China is almost certain
to increase perceptibly in coming months. In fact,
there is in New York virtually a universal feeling--
shared by the US mission at the UN--that this is the
last year that the present situation can be maintained.
The Warming Trend
4. Moreover, the issue of China's "place in
the world" is not confined simply to the twin ques-
tions of "chirec" and "chirep," as the cable short-
hand would have it. The bare announcement that Chou
En-lai planned to visit Southern Yemen--at an un-
specified date--led to the extraordinary spectacle
bEUKKE'l
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earlier this autumn of a covey of nations in Europe
and Africa all but lining up hat in hand in the hope
that Chou would include their capitals in his itiner-
ary. Nor is this all. A wide array of states, most
of which, while maintaining formal relations with
Peking, have been to a greater or lesser degree
estranged from Communist China in recent years, are
now in the process of patching things up or cementing
ties with the mainland regime. Relations with Hanoi,
which had improved since the dark days after the
start of the Paris talks, have clearly grown closer
in the past six or seven months; those with Pyongyang,
which certainly were very bad, have warmed remarkably
in the past year. In Eastern Europe a parallel move-
ment has taken place. All governments in the region
except Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have now received
Chinese ambassadors after the hiatus of the Cultural
Revolution, a steady stream of visitors from Romania
continues to travel to Peking, and--most remarkably--
Yugoslavia, long engaged in a violent slanging match
with China, has not only exchanged ambassadors but
is actively embarked on an effort to gain Peking the
Chinese seat in the UN.
5. But the warming trend is not confined to
socialist states. High-level delegations from Arab
states--notably Sudan, Libya, and Southern Yemen--
were so numerous in Peking last August that they
were all but tripping over each other. Zambia, a
terminus of the Chinese-engineered Tan Zam railroad,
has improved its ties with Peking; Tanzania at the
other end of the rail line, now relies exclusively
on Chinese military advisers. France has dispatched
two emissaries, one official and one unofficial, to
Peking in the past few months, and President Pompidou
is clearly exploring the possibilities of an active
Far Eastern policy based on friendship with Communist
China. Britain is repairing relations at a more
cautious pace. A high-level foreign office official
has just completed a visit to Peking--the first at
this level in many years--and while no real break-
through resulted, London did explore the possibility
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of mutually raising the level of diplomatic repre-
sentation between the two countries to ambassadorial
level. In addition, the Pope is planning a visit in
early December to Hong Kong, where he is expected to
make a conciliatory statement addressed to "all
Chinese people."
6. Developments in South and Southeast Asia
have been even more intriguing. Major movement in
this area has focused on Burma. Ne Win has step by
step fulfilled all Chinese "conditions" for improve-
ment of relations between the two countries except
for an unconditional public apology for the anti-
Chinese riots of 1967, and has capped this pilgrimage
to Canossa by dispatching an ambassador to Peking.
Since taking office this autumn, Malaysian Premier
Razak has made a number of conciliatory statements
about the desirability of improving relations with
China.
India
has discreetly explored the possity o restoring
diplomatic representation between the two countries
to the ambassadorial level. The Philippines are
apparently considering sending an "unofficial" trade
delegation to China. Even the Thais have made some
gestures toward Peking. 25X1
in ividual Thai ministers have sent persona emis-
saries to Peking to explore grounds for easing the
present enmity between the two countries. Moreover,
Foreign Minister Thanat has publicly expressed a
desire for better relations with China. Of course,
there is probably more smoke than fire in most of
these gestures. The Indians and Thais, for example,
can certainly have few illusions about the possibility
of significant, early improvement of relations with
China. The point is that each of these governments--
and the Burmese as well--have felt it politic, and
perhaps necessary, to make the gestures.
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7. The causes of this warming trend, and of
the changes on the recognition and representation
issues, are not hard to find. Some are, of course,
rooted in the immediate needs and concerns of indi-
vidual governments, but four in particular have a wider
application. The first is the generalized feeling that
China, a "nation of over 700 million people" possess-
ing an atomic capability, should be and indeed is
entitled to play a significant role in the world
community; artificially to exclude her from such a
role is dangerous. This line of reasoning applies
primarily to those states considering recognition
or desirous of China's admission into the UN. This
is a familiar argument, but it is not for that
reason simply a rationalization. Indeed, it would
be very hard to overestimate its weight in present
circumstances, for it not only influences govern-
ments themselves but is also persuasive to various
pressure groups, particularly in Western Europe and
Latin America, which in turn shape the environment
in which governmental decisions are made. In fact,
the sentiment that "China should be brought into the
world community" has been in the process of crystal-
lization for some time; the convulsions that accom-
panied the Cultural Revolution in China blunted the
feeling briefly but apparently it did no permanent
damage, and as a semblance of order and tranquility
has returned to the mainland a wide variety of govern-
ments--the Burmese, the French, and the British, for
example--have been quick to seize on signs of growing
domestic stability as an indication that China was
prepared to play a constructive role in world affairs.
8. A second factor is the familiar one that
many want to climb on a bandwagon. Several states in
Western Europe and to a lesser extent in Africa and
Latin America believe that both the representation
and recognition issues are on the verge of a consid-
erable transformation, and none wants to be the last
to "recognize realities." Luxembourg is a case in
point: the government is afraid that it will soon
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be the only Benelux country that does not recognize
Peking. Of course this sentiment makes the likelihood
of a breakthrough on these issues that much greater.
A third factor is the desire of a good many states
to make common cause with Communist China in dis-
tancing themselves or fending off pressures from
the superpowers--the United States or the Soviet
Union or both. This factor is clearly operative
in the policies of North Korea, North Vietnam, the
east European states, and France. Finally, the
countries of South and Southeast Asia are faced, as
always, with the problem of dealing with their giant
neighbor to the north. The possibility at least exists
that the US presence in the area will decline in the
foreseeable future, and in these -ircumstances the
possibility of some modus vivendi with Peking is an
obvious one to explore.
Chinese Initiatives
9. This general movement toward Peking is not
taking place in a vacuum. In most, but not in all,
cases there have been reciprocal moves on the part of
China, and in some instances it has been the Chinese
themselves who have taken the first step. Indeed, if
states in Western Europe and elsewhere have exag-
aerated the degree of domestic stability the mainland
regime has achieved, they have been accurate in noting
that changes are underway in Comm?inist China's foreign
policies. Some of these changes are obvious; some are
more subtle. In the first instance they seen designed
to clear away the accumulated debris of past failures
in Peking's foreign affairs, to put a, new face on
things. In this respect they frequently involve more
a change in style than a mutation in the substance of
policy. With certain notable and significant excep-
tions Peking is smiling at the world. Indeed, this
can literally be said to be true. Mao Tse-tung's
affability to foreign diplomats on the reviewing
stand during the 1970 May Day parade set the foreign
colony in Peking abuzz and caused raised eyebrows in
chanceries around the world.
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10. From the Chinese point of view, the first
important step in creating a new international image
has been to end the isolation, largely self-imposed,
in which China found itself at the end of the Cultural
Revolution. At the height of the "revolution" all
but one of Peking's ambassadors stationed abroad
were recalled and nearly all embassies largely denuded
of lesser staff members. In the early summer of 1969
diplomats began to return to the field. Some 28
ambassadors are now in place, ad rumors circulating
in Peking suggest that more will soon join them;
junior diplomats are returning at a more rapid pace.
Most of the emissaries being sent abroad are experi-
enced diplomats with long tenure in the foreign
ministry, and all have clearly been instructed to
"circulate" and generally to appear amiable.
have in fact engaged in fairly extensive convec.,;a-
tions with such ostensible "enemies,' as Americans
or Indians--occurrences that would have been incon-
ceivable a few years ago--as well as with a spectrum
of nationals in the host countries to which they are
accredited. In addition, an impressive number of
Chinese delegations--economic, cultural, and politi-
cal--have travelled abroad in the past year, while
China has played host to numerous foreign delegations,
particularly from North Korea, North Vietnam, the
Middle East, and Eastern Europe. A number of foreign
political prisoners, particularly West European na-
tionals, have recently been released in an obvious
gesture of "good will."
11. This public posture has been complemented
b
y the private remarks of Chinese officials
In conversation'the Chi-
nese nave stressed Peking's desire to have good
relations with "everyone" and have taken pains to
appear "reasonable" and flexible on forei
n
li
g
po
cy
issues. Occasionally the Chinese desire to emphasize
the "open door" approach has been carried to re-
markable lengths. The recent visit of the British
foreign office official was undertaken at London's
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initiative, but Chinese diplomats in Britain leaked
to the press the suggestion that Peking had originally
issued the invitation for the visit.
12. At the same time, Peking is pursuing an
aspect of traditional, state-to-state diplomacy and
economic aid on a scale greater than ever before.
in addition to its major investment in the Tan-Zam
railroad, China has since early summer extended aid
to Pakistan, Sudan, Southern Yemen, and perhaps
Congo (Brazzaville). Thes3 commitments amount to
more than half of all economic aid China has extended
to less developed countries during the past 15 years.
Additional aid agreements have also recently been
signed with North Korea and North Vietnam, and Peking
has in passing also doles: out small sums to Nepal,
the Philippines, and Peru. The Peruvian and Philippine
gestures, billed as earthquake relief and cyclone
relief respectively, were made to countries with
which China has no formal relations.
13. In keeping with this general approach,
Chinese propaganda has for the most part been
played in rather low key. Joint communiques marking
the visits of foreign delegations, for example,
have usually stressed coo0Aration and mutuality of
interest, rather than revolutionary rhetoric. This
relatively low-key propaganda line has been par-
ticularly noticeable in connection with the Sino-
Soviet dispute--recriminations against Moscow have
been few and far between since the start of the
talks in Peking--but other traditional whipping
boys of the Chinese have also received relatively
mild treatment in the past six months: India is
a case in point. In particular, attacks on national
leaders such as Mrs. Gandhi, Burma's Ne Win, and
Philippine president Marcos have virtually ceased.
Although there have been exceptions to this rule--
statements regarding Japan, the Middle East and the
Indochina war, particularly in the wake of the US
incursion into Cambodia, have remained bellicose--
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it seems clear that Peking wishes to avoid brandish-
ing its revolutionary sword :;.n public too obstreper-
ously.
First Things First
14. All of these actions are, of course,
primarily an effort to improve atmospherics. But
even this effort has its limits. China does not
appear anxious to clear away the rubble of past,
outworn policies all at once. There are obvious
shadings in this approach; some matters and some
areas clearly have priority over others. One
high-priority item on the agenda is the campaign
connected with China's seat in the UN; another area
of obvious importance is the cementing of relations
with the socialist states , both in Asia and in
Eastern Europe. Improvement of relations with
Western Europe also appears to rank relatively
:sigh on the list; rel-itions with African and Mid-
dle Eastern states may `ie of lesser importance.
Closer to home, however, Peking seems prepared
to move with great deliberation.
15. The case of Burma is instructive in this
regard. As relations have gradually improved in the
past seven months, the Burmese have consistently
shown themselves to be eager for rapprochement, and
the Chinese have equally consistently expressed
reserve--but not complete disinterest. This policy
has wrung the maximum conce ss4,ons from Ne Win: re-
lease of ethnic Chinese prisoners held by Burma, re-
opening of trade with China at Burmese initiative,
compensation of the victims of the anti-Chinese riots
of 1967, and permission for the Chinese embassy to
resume "cultural and organizational" activities among
the Chinese population in Burma. These are four out
of the five long-standing Chinese "demands" or pre-
conditions for improvement of relations; and Ne Win
has partially fulfilled the fifth--public apology for
the riots--with a statement that could be construed
as a back-handed apology. Nevertheless, Peking's
eventual agreement to Burmese requests for an ex-
change of ambassadors was merely verbal, rather than
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wr,' '-,ten , and in fact the Chinese have not reciprocated
Rangoon's dispatch of an ambassador to China. Nor have
they given any sign that they would cease support for
the Burmese Communist Party and other insurgent groups
operating in Burma--No Win's cardinal aim in attempt-
ing rapprochement. The Chinese interest in all this
was not only to extract from the Burmese whatever the
traffic would bear but to make it crystal clear pub-
licly that it was Rangoon that had moved toward
China and not the reverse. Nevertheless, the Chinese
have given something. Trade has been resumed, a new
char&je of higher rank has arrived in Rangoon, and
rumors are circulating that an ambassador will
eventually be appointed,
16. This pattern is likely to be repeated at
a still slower pace all along China's southern
flank. Tun Razak's public statements have not
required a Chinese reply, and none has been forth-
coming. Indian and Indonesian probes, which may
well have been half-hearted in any event, have been
fended off--both were apparently told "the time is
not ripe"--but not rejected out of hand. Thai ges-
tures also require no reply, and movement in this
area, if any, obviously depends on developments in
Indochina. Indeed, this cautious approach has been
used even further afield. Ethiopian overtures to the
Chinese were initially parried, but after a hesitation
of three months Chinese diplomats in Khartoum were
instructed to begin negotiations leading to recognition.
Peking clearly kept this particular card "in reserve,"
to be played when advantageous to keep up momentum
on the recognition question.
17. This cautious, fairly tough, but pragmatic
and flexible line obviously costs Peking little and
is generally in keeping with the more open, "reason-
able" image the Chinese are attempting to create for
themselves. Elsewhere in Asia, however, pragmatism
has led in a somewhat different direction. Peking
believes there is little chance the policies of the
Japanese governments vis-a-vis China will change in
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the immediate future, and acting on this assumption
the Chinese are conducting a propaganda campaign of
vilification against the Sato government. China may
hope that this campaign will marginally influence
governments and peoples in Southeast Asia that are
suspicious of Japanese motives and fearful of future
Japanese expansionism. More to its purpose, however,
Peking is clearly attempting to exploit such sus-
picions and fears closer to home--specifically in
North Korea. Indeed, the show of "solidarity" both
countries have displayed in the past year has been
largely constructed on an anti-Japanese--and anti-US---
platform. Much the same is true with respect to
Indochina. Here Chinese "revolutionary" militance,
particularly in the wake of the US incursion into
Cambodia, has emphasized common ground with North
Vietnam. In both cases the gains have been immediate
and real, and the costs have been minimal.
18. It should be recognized, however, that
Peking is attempting to wean both Hanoi and Pyong-
yang further from the Soviet Union and to draw them
closer to China. Insofar as this is possible, this
aim has already been achieved; it is unlikely that
the Chinese believe that either North Korea or North
Vietnam is contemplating putting all its eggs in the
Chinese basket. Thus, in both cases this "hard-line"
approach is unlikely to produce further significant
gains. Peking may well recognize this fact and may
be tailoring its propaganda accordingly. The volume
of Chinese propaganda on the Indochina situation has
dropped considerably in recent weeks; references to
an Asian "anti-imperialist front"--a North Korean
invention apparently adopted by Peking at Pyongyang's
behest--have also become infrequent. This is not to
say that China is becoming dovish on these issues,
particularly the Indochina war, but merely that
these militant themes are no longer so prominent
in the picture Peking paints of the world. Indeed,
there have always been light streaks in this somber
picture. Trade with Japan has not been hampered by
China's verbal posturing, and Japanese businessmen
have had little difficulty circumventing Chou En-tai's
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"threat" of last spring that firms trading with Tai-
wan could not trade with China. Moreover, statements
by Chinese leaders suggest that Peking is far from
willing to underwrite any North Korean "adventurism."
Policy Changes
19. In many respects this rather mixed approach
to the world--emphasis on bilateral relations with
many nations, a cautious, tough but not wholly un-
reasonable attitude toward outstanding differences
with certain other states, militancy in areas where
there is little prospect of accommodation--resembles
Chinese foreign policy in the period preceding the
Cultural Revolution. But the differences are even
more striking than the similarities. The present
shadowy "Asian anti-imperialist front" is a far
cry from the "Peking-Pyongyang-Phnom Penh-Djakarta
axis." Revolution in Africa and Latin America is in
the back rather than the front seat. The dog fights
with the Soviet Union in Communist front organizations
have ceased. Accommodation has been mooted with a
much wider range of nations, and the focus of this
activity appears to have shifted to Europe from the
third world. No attempt is being made to build a
separate, exclusive UN of "anti-imperialist, pro-
gressive" states. In short, China no longer is
trying to lead a "revolutionary," doctrinally pure
world of its own, but seems bent on playing a part
in the world as it exists.
20. In pursuing this end Peking has introduced
into the mix of its foreign policies a number of
specific changes quite separate from the general
effort to improve atmospherics. The most obvious of
-hese changes relates to its new attitude toward the
UN. China now seems intent on assuming its "rightful
place" in that body. The campaign to secure this place
is being led by third parties--Algeria, Yugoslavia,
and Romania--but it has been orchestrated from Peking.
The Chinese have let it be known that they "really"
want to enter the world body; they have also dis-
creetly made it clear that the "preconditions" for
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S1E,C,IZI;'1'
UN entry enunciated by then foreign minister Chen I
in 1965--revocation of the Korean War declarations
condemning China, abolition of the UN Korean commis-
sion, changes in the UN structure and the like--no
longer apply. Expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese
remains the sole condition for entry. Chinese in-
ter:--at in the UN issue has been expressed in a va-
rietyof concrete ways. For example, the Chinese
charge in London very recently informed foreign of-
fice officials that in his "personal opinion" a
negative British vote on the Important Question is-
sue, coupled with a declaration on the Taiwan ques-
tion paralleling the Canadian and Italian recognition
formula (which is in itself a major retreat from the
Chinese position taken at the start of negotiations
with Ottawa and Rome in 1967) would permit diplomatic
relations with London to be raised to the ambassadorial
level--even if Britain failed to comply with long-
standing Chinese demands to close its consulate on
Taiwan.
21. A second area of change concerns China's
relations with the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties
that sprang up around the world when the Sino-Soviet
dispute surfaced. These squabbling, ineffective and
often unreliable groups, particularly those in West-
ern Europe and Latin America, are now being very
lar ely written off by Peking. China
has not renewe its
abortive attempt to capture international Communist
front organizations from the Soviet Union. For the
most part this new policy is merely a cutting of
losses. The attempt to establish Peking as the
fourth Rome was quixotic at best; moreover, the
"Marxist-Leninist" groups in Western Europe were
frequently an embarrassment to eking. But more
importantly, the effort to draw a sharp international
organizational line between Moscow and Peking led to
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unno^cessary difficulties with the socialist states
of Eastern Europe as well as with Hanoi and Pyongyang.
22. A third area of movement and charge is
much more shadowy. This relates to the Chinese
attitude toward possible negotiations in Laos. Pe-
king has made no public statement regarding the
Pathet Lao offer of talks with Prince Souvanna
Phouma, but in private discussions with both West-
ern diplomats and Laotians in Vientiane Chinese
officials have indicated that Peking not only does
not oppose such talks but actively looks with favor
on them. This, of course, is a far cry from the
signs of public pique China displayed when the
Paris talks first began. This change of front
may mean nothing more than that the Chinese are
at this point more certain of attitudes and motives
in Hanoi than they were in the summer of 1968, but
it does raise questions regarding Peking's apparent
commitment to the idea of "protracted war." For
that matter, even the more bellicose Chinese state-
ments on the subject of the war could be motivated
by considerations apart from a simple desire to keep
the fighting going. For example, Chinese verbal
militancy at the time of the Cambodian incursion
may have been more related to tactics, that is, the
problem of cementing relations with Hanoi, than with
strategy, that is, the Chinese reading of the overall
situation in Indochina and in Southeast Asia in general.
23. Of course, even taken together these changes
cannot be considered a radical reordering of Chinese
foreign policy. They do, however, represent a sig-
nificant change of emphasis. They are, moreover,
substantive changes, something more than a welcoming
smile. Nevertheless, it might be noted that each of
these changes has been made quietly: none has re-
quired a public statement by the Chinese--or indeed
any major new commitment on their part. Thus, should
present policies fail or be abandoned, Peking can
easily retreat without much loss of face. And perhaps
equally important, Moscow would find it difficult to
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accuse the "anti-revisionists" of practicing a form
of revision themselves.
Peking's Motives
24. This sensitivity to the Soviet factor points
to a major motive force in the shaping of current
Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, the whole problem of
relations with the Soviet Union appears to lie very
near the center of Chinese thinking on questions of
foreign policy at present. In this respect the
clashes on the Ussuri River in the spring of 1969
may have been something of a catalyst. They served to
draw the attention of Chinese leaders in Peking from
strictly domestic concerns to wider issues of foreign
policy. The situation they confronted was not a re-
assuring one. Not only was China militarily inferior
to the Soviet Union, but it was also diplomati(;ally
isolated, partly as the result of the failure of the
policies of the early 1960s and more importantly as
a result of intense preoccupation with internal con-
vulsions. It was clear by the summer of 1969 that
Moscow hoped not only to prolong that isolat, )n but
if possible to deepen it through such device: as
Brezhnev's proposal for an "Asian collective security
pact." The Chinese had set themselves the task of
frustrating this aim.
25. Thus, the Chinese return to the interna-
tional arena is designed, in the first instance, to
counts Soviet attempts to perpetuate and if possible
increase the self-imposed diplomatic isolation into
which China had drifted during the Cultural Revolution.
This relative isolation in itself made China vulnerable
to Soviet pressures, and its termination was obviously
to Peking's advantage. But in addition, more extensive
and closer contacts abroad have probably allowed Pe-
ki.ng to gain greater insight into Soviet intentions
by assessing the views of third parties, while at the
same time they have given China a wider forum in which
to present its own case.
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26. In most respects, then, Chinese policy is
essentially defensive. In Africa and perhaps in Latin
America Peking hopes to provide a counterweight to
current or potential Soviet influence, and where
possible to circumscribe it. In Western Europe the
idea is to "build bridges," to gain a degree of
leverage, and to demonstrate that China, as a great
power, cannot be isolated. In South and Southeast
Asia circumstances dictate a waiting game, but a
diminution of Soviet influence and leverage in such
countries as India is obviously a long-term goal.
In Eastern Europe and the Middle East, however,
Chinese policy, while strategically defensive, is
tactically offensive. By cementing ties to the East
European states Peking can demonstrate that Moscow
cannot afford to concentrate on pressuring China
while ignoring developments in its own back yard.
The obvious mutuality of interest that exists be-
tween China and certain of the East European states,
particularly Romania and Yugoslavia, however, has in
turn dictated some of the terms under which the duel
with the Soviet Union is being conducted--at least
insofar as cosmetics are concerned. Thus, the dra-
matic downplaying of polemics since the start of
the Peking talks makes it easier for the East Euro-
pean states--and for North Korea and North Vietnam--
to seek common ground with Peking, since they are
not being forced to choose one side or the other;
as noted above, this factor was probably decisive
in China's decision to set the Marxist-Leninist
splinter "parties" adrift.
27. In t.'.ia Middle East Peking's aims are even
more transparent: to cause trouble for the Soviet
Union (and secondarily for the United States) by
outflanking Moscow on the left. In this area, as in
Eastern Europe, the Soviets are, from Peking's point
of view, a status quo power. This fact has dictated
China's tacti s, which have been to play on the fears
of the fedayeen and the more radical Arab states
that the Soviets might sell them out in the interests
of accommodation with the US. This has required a
sEC;xEA
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hard propaganda line more reminiscent of Peking's
fulminations against Japan and the Indochina war
than the gentler approach used elsewhere, but in
practice this hard line costs China little, since
it is essentially an onlook::r in the Middle East.
indeed, Chinese motives and tactics in this area
are sometimes very graphically illustrated: at the
moment when Soviet diplomats were attempting to
persuade Syria to accept the US-sponsored cease-fire
early this autumn, Peking suddenly dispatched a
delegation to Damascus, presumably to "buck up" the
faltering Syrians.
28. The most dramatic event in this gradual
process of reducing China's isolation, however, was
the resumption of the Warsaw talks with the US last
January. Although the Chinese were almost certainly
interested in obtaining a reading on what the Nixon
doctrine, with its implications for both Southeast
Asia and Taiwan, would mean in practice, Peking's
overriding concern in resuming the talks was un-
questionably the effect that a renewal of the
dialogue might 'lave on the triangular relationship
between Moscow, Peking, and Washington. The Chinese
hoped that the. Warsaw dialogues would heighten
Moscow's nervousness and suspicion over the prospects
of a China-US rapprochement, while, by appearing to
hold out an olive branch, diminishing any desire in
Washington to "gang up" with rloscow against China.
Indeed, the idea of an understanding between the
two "superpowers" regarding China seems very real in
Peking, if not elsewhere, and in fact some aspects
of the relationship between the two--such as SALT--
could be read as confirmation of Chinese fears.
Nevertheless, the US incursion into Cambodia made
it imperative, from the Chinese point of view, to
suspend the highly visible talks--but not to break
them off entirely. In fact, the immediate aftermath
of the Cambodia operation produced a situation in
which the Chinese saw the possibility of early and
real gains, in terms of cementing relations with
Hanoi and Pyongyang in an anti-American atmosphere,
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at the c pense of longer term and more problematic
gains inherent in the Warsaw dialogue.
29. It has been, however, precisely since the
suspension of the Warsaw talks that Peking has made
the most rapid strides in improving its relations with
other countries, not only with its Asian Communist
neighbors but also in Europe. The oppressive sense
of isolation obvious in Peking at the beginning of
the year has consequently faded; and at the same time
acri-aony between Washington and Moscow has appeared
to increase, primarily over the Middle East problem,
but also over a number of lesser issues. As a result
a resumption of the talks probably has a lesser
priority in Chinese eyes than it had last spring,
when the discussions were suspended. If it were
possible, the Chinese leaders would probably prefer
to keep both of the superpowers at arms length.
Peking may therefore believe that it would be better
to allow the talks in Warsaw to remain on ice while
it pursues and consolidates further gains in Europe,
Africa, and Latin America, thus placing China in a more
advantageous position when the dialogue is resumed.
Nevertheless, the strategic situation in which Peking
finds itself vis-a-vis Moscow on the one hand and
Washington on the other has not essentially changed,
and the logic that led China to resume the talks in
January is as valid as ever. Indeed, if it were to
appear that Moscow could step up pressure on Peking
as a result of easing tensions with the US in the
Middle East or through progress in SALT, the Chinese
would probably be quite anxious to resume the Warsaw
discussions.
The Middle Kingdom
30. If the Soviet problem remains at the cen-
ter of Chinese foreign policy thinking, this need
not mean that Peking does not see other benefits in
pushing forward with its current "open door" campaign.
As time goes on, these additional benefits may prove
to be an end in themselves. It is possible--even
likely--that Peking has been somewhat startled by
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the range and depth of positive response to the
relatively slight and frequently subtle changes in
its foreign policy stance, but there can be no
question that it sees in this response a means of
asserting its long-standing claim to be a great power,
with the privileges and prerogatives that go with this
status. This cardinal aim of Chinese policy is of
course of such importance to Peking that it hardly
needs the goad of Soviet pressure to make it attractive.
31. In this respect the current movement on
both the representation and recognition issues is
mutually reinforcing. Canadian and Italian recogni-
tion helped achieve a favorable vote on the "Albanian"
resolution in the UN; that vote will probably increase
the chances that additional states would consider
recognizing Peking. Given the number of states which
are already considering this move, the Chinese prob-
ably can, if they are willing to settle for the rec-
ognition formula worked out with Rome and Ottawa,
orchestrate and therefore reinforce the trend in this
direction by maintaining a sense of momentum on the
issue. This in turn, of course, makes a transformation
of the representation issue n the UN that much more
likely, while at the same time it enhances the "legit-
imacy" of the Peking regime at the expense of that
on Taiwan.
32. In nurturing this trend Peking can be ex-
pected to press very hard to counter widespread sen-
timent for a "two Chinas" solution to the UN repre-
sentation issue. Its recent public and private
statements suggest that it is extremely sensitive
on this matter and that it may fei!r that some states
presently supporting the "Albanian" resolution will
line up in the future behind a resolution calling for
the seating of both Peking and Taipei. Indeed, not
all nations favoring the admission of Peking to the
UN necessarily wish to see Taipei expelled. A number
of states now reconsidering their position on the
.representation issue would probably favor a resolution
adopting the principle of"universality"put forward
at the Lusaka non-aligned conference last summer
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(which in practice would mean the admission of all
the divided states, Germany, Vietnam and Korea, as
well as both Chinas, with Peking represented in the
Security Council)--particularly if the United States
moves in this direction. Others might prefer to vote
on the "Albanian" resolution clause by clause, voting
up the admission of Peking but voting down expulsion
of Taipei.
33. But any "solution" along these lines depends
on the attitude of the two Chinese parties and, quite
apart from Communist China's own adamant position on
th,a question of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan,"
tLere are few if any indications that the government
in Taipei would accept the "humiliatioi." of remaining
in the UN along with the mainland regime. Indeed,
should such a "solution" be adopted in the United
Nations, Chiang Kai-shek might find the situation so
distasteful that he would simply withdraw from the
world body, thus paving the way for Peking's entry
on its own terms; this in any event appears to be
Chiang Kai-shek's present position. Yet, even if an
impasse should develop on the "two Chinas" question,
the present log-jam would have been broken, and
pressures for the admission of Peking on the simple
terms of the "Albanian" resolution--but without the
cushioning effect of the Important Question motion--
would hardly be likely to abate for long. Furthermore,
"two Chinas" sentiment exists primarily among those
states which either abstained or voted against the
"Albanian" resolution this year, and this fact may
help Peking protect its present plurality on the is-
sue. In fact, no matter how this issue is approached,
the moment when Peking will replace Taipei in all
the organs of the UN may well be only a year or two
away--barring the unlikely event of a drastic change
in the policies of the Nationalist Chinese government.
34. Quite apart from the representation question,
however, the ongoing series of recognitions of the
mainland regime is bound to weaken and erode the
international position of the government in Taipei.
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There is not a great deal the Nationalist Chinese
can do about this, except to ask the US to apply the
maximum pressure on governments considering recognition
of Peking. Given the present momentum in the direction
of Peking, this probably would not be overly effective,
even if it were attempted. Nevertheless, this situation
is not necessarily wholly favorable to Peking. As the
rather frozen situation of the past 20 years thaws
out, international sentiment has grown--and is likely
to continue to grow--for a formal "two Chinas" solu-
tion to the Taiwan problem. Such a "solution" is
hardly in Peking's interes':: the mainland regime is
nearly as worried about the possibility of growth of
the "Taiwan Independence Movement" as is the govern-
ment in Taipei, and it is equally concerned about
Japanese investment and interest in Taiwan. Nor does
Peking appear to believe a "military solution" to the
problem is possible; it is well aware that the US
treaty with the Nationalists is still operative. In
this sense, then, time is not necessarily on Peking's
side.
35. Nevertheless, a "two Chinas" solution to
the Taiwan issue is almost certain to founder on the
opposition of the Nationalist government. This op-
position is not likely to fade even if Peking enters
the UN and additional governments recognize the main-
land regime . Indeed, the Nationalists claim to be the
sole government of China provides the rationale by
which the regime is able to maintain a monopoly of
power on the island, and to relinquish that claim
would be to invite the native Taiwanese to overturn
or swamp the existing power structure. In this
respect, like that of the UN representative issue,
then, the Nationalist government is in effect an
ally of Peking: its views on the "two Chinas" ap-
proach to the Taiwan problem are indistinguishable
from those of the mainland regime. For this reason the
Chinese Communists probably do not believe it is
necessary to press at once for a "solution" of the
Taiwan issue. If time is not on their side, it is
not wholly against them; and it may therefore be
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NEENESOMM
possible to allow the situation to "ripen" further
as international support for the Nationalists slowly
erodes.
A New Bandung?
36. Although this may be a logical reading of
the situation, it is nevertheless one fraught with
dangers for Peking. From the mainland's point of
view there are far too many imponderables involved:
the US may apply great pressure on the Taipei gov-
ernment to acquiesce to some sort of "two Chinas"
formula; Chiang Kai-shek is now in his eighties, and
when he dies his successors might possibly move away
from the adamant positions he has staked out; either
the US or Japan might encourage the Taiwan Independ-
ence Movement even at the expense of the Nationalist
government. In the UN overwhelming sentiment may
develop for some kind of "two Chinas" formula, and
the Nationalist government may not be so obliging
as to withdraw at once. None of these possibilities
can be entirely written off. Moreover, Peking's re-
cent political gains in the international arena, while
going a long way to forestall Soviet attempts to iso-
late Communist China, are by no means so spectacular
that they neutralize the ever-present military threat
from the north. Given these circumstances, it might
seem fruitful deliberately to step up the pace of
events, to stack the cards by making a series of
highly visible conciliatory gestures that would
"prove" Peking's reasonableness while further under-
cutting opposition to the mainland regime. In other
words, it might be useful, from Peking's point of
view, to revive the "Bandung era" of the mid-1950s.
37. Although such a course may superficially
seem quite attractive, it is almost certainly not
in the cards. A great deal of water has gone under
the bridge in the past 13 years, and a return to
"Bandung" at this juncture would mean wholesale
abandonment of a wide range of positions that China
has staked out in the interim. Moreover, "Bandung
diplomacy" was in part made possible by the alliance
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with Moscow, which of course was still operative in
the mid-1950s. The military protection the Soviets
supplied at that time gave Peking much more room to
manuever than it has at present; in Mao Tse-tung's
view China is now caught in a "nutcracker" between
the Soviet Union and the US, and this makes the
free-wheeling diplomacy of the "Bandung" period vir-
tually impossible to duplicate. Indeed, it, is all
too obvious that a profession of amity to one and
all--a hallmark of "Bandung diplomacy"--is simply
a nonstarter while the threat from the north persists
and the Indochina war drags on. Finally a full-
fledged return to Bandung would imply at least a
temporary end to Chinese support for "people's war."
Although Peking has reduced the volume of its revo-
lutionary rhetoric and continues to give relatively
meager support to insurrectionary movements in South-
east Asia (apart of course from the Indochina war.) ,
much less in the Middle East or Africa, it has by no
means abandoned such support entirely. in fact, the
Chinese leaders probably view such aid as a means
of keeping states on its southern border "honest"--
either at present, in the case of Burma, or in the
future, in the case of Thailand and perhaps Malaysia.
38. Indeed, as noted above, splashy public
declarations of policy intent are precisely the sort
of thing that Peking has avoided in the present
diplomatic phase. This gives China a flexibility
quite different from that of the Bandung era but
perhaps just as useful: relations with individual
states can be improved or cemented fairly quietly
and at a pace suitable to Peking, allowing the
Chinese to extract the maximum possible advantage
from any given situation. This careful attention to
pace is another hallmark of Chinese policy at
present; it permits Peking to defer difficult and
sticky problems in bilateral relations until an
advantageous moment while pushing forward in
si -.:uati ons where the pickings are fairly easy.
39. The sticky problems remain, however, not
only b!~!cause Peking hopes to deal with them when
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its leverage is greater, but also precisely because
they are sticky. Such problems involve difficult
ctioices, and these choices are probably the sort
of thing the still unsettled leadership in Peking
would prefer to avoid at present. What, for example,
ought Poking to do if the Sato government in Japan
shows signs of interest in exploring the possibility
of establishing diplomatic relations? Should China
discuss the border issue with India? Is it worth-
while exploring a settlement or easing of the Taiwan
problem with the US? Above all, is any accommodation
with the Soviet Union possible? Some of these ques-
tions may answer themselves if addressed, but as yet
there is no sign that they have really been addressed
in Peking. Indeed, as the debris of past policy
failures are finally cleared away, as China's in-
ternational position becomes more "legitimized" and
it gains at least some of the trappings of a "great
power" it has so long desired, Peking will probably
be faced with a set of problems it has been able to
ignore while the log-;am of the past persisted. In
this respect, then, the more difficult decisions
still lie ahead.
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