THE NAXALITES: INDIA'S EXTREME LEFT-WING COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090048-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: October 26, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Naxalites: India's Extreme Left- Wing Communists
Secret
-87
26 October 1970
No. 1477/70
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defcnsr: of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its tra-,ismission or revelation of' its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
CROUP I
L %CLl i,,n 1'IIOAI ACTOMATIC
flOANUI,A VINO ANTI
n1:1;1401$IFICAT1OII -~
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.V1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Naxalites:
India's Extreme Left-Wing Communists
Iz,troduction
For the last four years India has been plagued
by the violent activities of an amorphous group of
self-proclaimed "Maoist" revolutionaries known collec-
tively as Naxalites. Dedicated to the armed over-
throw of the existing system of government, their
use of violence has taxed the resonrces of the secu-
rity forces, and law and order is shaping into a
major campaign issue in the national elections sched-
uled to take place by February 1972.
The violence was originally confined to the
countryside, but within the last seven months Naxa-
lite operations have spread to the cities and have
attracted national attention. Terrorism in Calcutta,
capital of the Communist-oriented state of West Ben-
gal, is a growing irritant in an already unstable se-
curity situation. Bengal police arrested Kanu Sanyal,
a top Naxalite leader, in August 1970. His followers
responded with street violence, and the Bengal secu-
rity authorities-.-few of whom doubted the Naxalites'
ability to unleash a campaign that would grow to
major proportions--let it be known that they would
not hesitate to call on the Indian Army to maintain
order.
The Naxalite movement contains several often-
competing organizations that are tied together only
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA, It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and
the Directorate for Plans.
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vi~vJ .Ca 1
by mutual rejection of the existing social and
gcvernmental systems in India and reliance on vio-
lence to achieve their goals. The stated political
aim of the Communist Party of India/Marxist-Lenin-
ist (CPI/ML), the largest Naxalite organization,
is to form a united front of peasants and workers
and to provoke a violent revolution that will lead
to the establishment of a dictatorship of workers,
peasants, and certain middle-class elements. The
party urges the creation of a People's Liberation
Army and foresees eventual guerrilla warfare on a
national scale. The modus operandi of the Naxalites
typically consists of organizing the very poor and
the landless and goading them into acts of terror-
ism or the forceable occupation and cultivation
of land held usually by large, but sometimes by
small landowners. Peasants are encouraged to "an-
nihilate" class enemies and to engage in other ac-
tivities to "render ineffective the state apparatus"
in their areas. The Naxalites refuse to participate
in the parliamentary process and denounce all groups,
including other Communist parties, that do. In their
thinking, "the only way to achieve liberation is by
force of arms to overthrow the four main enemies--US
imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism, their bu -
reaucratic,and bourgeoise lackeys, and the feudal
landlords."
Naxalites have thus far concentrated their
efforts in two primary areas: (1) party work in
the countryside to bridge the gap between urban
leaders and peasant followers; and (2) organi-
zation and education of student groups. Recently,
particularly in the Communist-oriented state of
West Bengal, they have begun to proselytize among
urban workers. The number of India's youthful,
educated unemployed continues to increase, and,
paradoxically, the success of the "green revolu-
tion" in agriculture has pointed up the growing
disparities between landed peasants who are bene-
fiting from better harvests and poor peasants whose
prospects for acquiring land are practically nil.
Both students and peasants have become increasingly
impatient with the unfulfilled promises of the
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traditional political parties and, by the same
token, are more easily seduced by the call to vio-
lent revolution and the immediate, tangible rewards
it seems to offer.
The Naxalites have made a calculated effort
to demolish national heroes--Mahatma Gandhi in
particular--as a demonstration of their contempt'
for "bourgeois ideas." These iconoclastic actions
plus their hit-and-run tactics and their spectacu-
lar exploits--bombings; murders; book burnings;
attacks upon police stations, movie houses, and
libraries--have given the Naxalite movement news-
paper headlines from which it derives both inspira-
tion and new recruits.
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Many Bihar. Naxalites are
ects- in Robbery Cas Teenage
S p axalate Reci
In connection with the rob Sa1e ?
of theihio?l, HAMABI
JAMSIIEDPUR, May. 36?ht nt `ho dr tho NatWn?o nlastGyea : rho ttsenn A ~8llurt, Tun. 1,(~~
to
t~
claimed I at rIt Arrested Naticeltles confess m;? e; ~~aal'tj? "h? bed .of
entIre BrouP after the a I., Dmdut'.dd ~I a the'lotg
nnxa111es tho ; to bank rn herLeS dlslROalon? was one of heC Dssepart --C
Lion in Bl) 1.18 of their whole renclty l doubtmany tatemra~
Hoa the ~ Und nlcuM" r w ydear,covprcdego ats eed
Etissa r
ld ns is d nd I urin
CS g h?~!Y had
alIeasur' Into the bank ob? for;nta? I'e0tlte Urge
,W ~enga lender wns arrersted nl tot p (~
? Is year In this con- dea is
ls, 1' t0 1Z
roes here had some e8i8t
Naxa rtes
eek tascribed the acct dter going N'axatit set
to ~? rgenlantlon" serving rip In the e 8
l //1~~ r robberies, It, top r had sp111
ffaENG~L nev. ehellerJn r~_~ CALt (j~pAt June is
ALLOWS POLICE TO CHA rga~ ,%
axailte van.ero
E Iedng h
Bengal tiOVGrnm?. N~~~LI ~Iilt~ S Gandtdsm
n l 32 Actrt
efon of Terrorist
IIOOL
l with th
S ?LLEGES o~~ot the
r ,
r
t
lo
dea
I A hun*. Naxt __ CnlcultA r..,_ - T? ~o~?~ to put uo
Naxalite wr~r....~ .
APO
S
-?? forest, near rnment, he Sala in
It., more -?
from venge u rampage
I ire W 1 C,IL ' enter its cam? Inca orreated were from Calcutta. (( ehg
Police Exchange aid the Stato 11!I?Chosh saafdraWcet PBengal'eye otanilfe
?
? R;har Forests ment would GI1,000-strong police force had beentgng cltl.
Ice-Cho^mcllora fully mobilised" on law and or-lcY?'
. a._ a..... r_
Naxalites _L
itlon, seven b-'Is organl
Calcutta Naxalites on tral Reserve Po?utta Cltl-
CHAHIA5A (Bihar), M?Y nits of the Eesteddresaed
?n... notice exchanged bias hnd_ been Congress
etttae L- a all e Ica regal
~
1~ $e
I:' ice Q
i t ml
ooolca, they worse
Ctllentt - t?7 u.
os
Farmer
?
1f:, ha. of )oln-
Naxalites bury .~.f.t,,."?` K Bed
3A Nes puxo-
al-
ace t t
p
edpur bye,ed ute or the
? nlno niured yetore )on? lp "01V ftY
rl ate onal fj ?? soranl. W'thle'e top echo rrich (rmor R? June
lro( Naraln and '^?'-?
I received ' aspect her I oil Cr ? ,,.
1W r
ra IQ, rFel.-- Naxalites'
_ ? `Mi 23 .Naxalites
Ba
k
l
n
H
47 9NIQ 111 in Hazaribai h . jail 'Wanted
(~,li`? J. otiip-r Nnx 4V C1LA16ASA, Juno 2?
the Jnduaod axalikill he g.l nxaliea,
C,g hBihnr Police
? trnneferred~111
h?
~~ I
li
i
ig
n
ng
after ca a If forest In S
$~r~r
ro'atlon. ? abxcondera
of Naxalites
thers t>n ?r with the
,o ccu
fir? p be a'jotedarntcutta tot m~
atrJ,riet' nllcgedly 1? ml bank robbe
Calcutta. 4_of dacolt A bona htOt1Q Bengal Poll the
Ice o s
' ( ^ .. laBC.tn. ai?wner NYR'. Alt story
hacked to deaf xaliteS
achia = A7 C ea ^` ~n Mast. B for Peaonlln? them P tag of ed 1? 1I-. yester V Wit palghat :
i d
,according .r
so
i11age. an dlo r-dt
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Formation and Fragmentation of Naxalite- Parties
1. The Naxalite movement in India was born
out of the frustrations of the radical young over
the inability of the existing leftist parties to
make immediate, thoroughgoing changes in Indian
social and economic life. The pro-Moscow Commu-
nist Party of India (CPI) has promised far-reach-
ing change; but, although it has been active in the
subcontinent since the mid-1920s, the dictator-
ship of the proletariat remains a long way from
reality, and CPI leaders contest for political
offices alongside members of the traditional
nationalist parties. The Communist Party of
India/Marxist (CPI/M) split off from the CPI
in 1964 with the avowed purpose of reforming
the Communist movement and returning the party
to its true revolutionary values. Three years
later, however, it too had failed to make an
appreciable dent in the Indian status quo. By
1967 it was participating as the leading member
of a coalition government in West Bengal, thus
becoming a part of the system it had promised
to overturn. Early support from Communist China
for the CPI/M evaporated.
2. Inside India, disillusionment with the role
of the CPI/M soon developed into open revolt, and
in early May 1967 a Committee to Resist Revision-
ism within the Party, which attracted, most of the
left extremists, was set up. Almost Immediately
it found an issue around which it could build na-
tional support--the Naxalbari revolt.
3. The Naxalbari revolt broke out in the spring
of 1967 in a remote northern subdivision of West Ben-
gal's Darjeeling district. Eventually it spread to
cover a 100-square-mile area of highly strategic
territory located at the point where a corridor
only 13 to 14 miles wide connects the main portion
of India with its northeastern states and territories.
Originally the revolt was promoted by CPI/M extremists
whose emissaries traveled to the Naxalbari area to
propagandize among the landless peasants and the
8anthal tribals and eventually roused them to open
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revolt against area landowners. By the end of May,
the situation in Naxalbari was completely out of
control;' landowners were forced off their lands,
and they and all those who incurred the displeasure
of the Naxalites were subjected to continual harass-
ment. The clamor for intervention by the state gov-
ernment became incessant.
4. The state government, dominated by the CPI/M,
was most reluctant to move openly against a "people's
uprising" and thereby antagonize the more revolu-
tionary young people still in the CPI/M ranks. Fin-
ally, however, the government, pressed by the cen-
tral government in 1-few Delhi, was forced into action.
,Over 1,000 people were arrested, and the revolt, which
from the beginning had little chance of success,
was crushed. The violence, however, had attracted
national attention, and the peasants and their ex-
tremist leaders--called Naxalites after the location
of the revolt--were lionized by the left-wing ex-
tremists as dedicated fighters for social justice.
Naxalite groups began forming in other states, and
small-scale outbreaks of violence along the Naxal-
bari model broke out sporadically in widely separ-
ated areas.
5. From the beginning the Naxalites were a het-
erogeneous group, poorly equipped to found a united
all-India movement. An attempt to promote some
kind of nationally unified group resulted in the
formation of an All-India Coordination Committee
of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCR), which met
throughout 1967 and 1968 to discuss strategy and
tactics. Factionalism soon developed within this
body, however. The West Bengal Naxalites looked to
a young revolutionary named Kanu Sanyal for leader-
ship, but Sanyal was unacceptable to many of the
Naxalites in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.
On 22 April 1969, therefore, the Naxalites of West
Bengal decided to launch their own party, the CPI/ML;
it has remained the most prominent group among a
myriad of similar but competing extremist organizations.
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6. The CPI/MJ, has been plagued by ideological
and tactical disputes and also by personal rival-
ries. The organizer of the operation in Naxalbari
was a dedicated revolutionary named Charu Pazumdar,
now generally recognized as the CPI/ML's leading
theoretician. The leader in the field, however,
Kann Sanyall
Chairman, CPI/ML
was Sanyal, who is the party tac-
tician and its chairman. Both
are considerably younger than the
leaders of the two older Commu-
nist parties; Mazumdar, at 50, is
the oldest member of the CPI/ML
politburo. In mid-May 1970 the
CPI/ML held its first congress.
Internal disputes immediately
surfaced, with approximately one
third of the delegates opposing
the policy put forward by Mazum-
dar. This group accused Mazumdar
of promoting terrorism rather than
Maoism and questioned the practicality of his pro-
gram aimed at fomentin immediate revolution. Ma-
party cadre who are increasingly questionin
h
hi
g g
s
integrity and
judgment. Sanyal had spent about
i
s
x
months in detention in late 1968 and early 1969,
and was again arrested by the West Bengal police in
August 1970. His capture is having a demoralizing
effect upon his followers, and, perhaps more ?.mpor-
tantly, his absence may lead to increased dissen-
sion and further factionalism within the party.
7. Other Naxalite organizations are doing no bet-
ter than the CPI/ML in welding themselves into co-
hesive bodies. Most are small local groups with
fluctuating memberships and irregular activity pat-
terns. In Calcutta, where there are an estimated
4,000 Naxalite supporters and about 201 hard-core
activists, as many as eight different Naxalite groups
are in existence. Some place emphasis on peasants
and students while others cor';entrate on urban
workers. Where the CPI/ML stresses compact "Red
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INDIA: Centers of Naxalite Activity
*1ABUL. JLAYMU
IAMMU
nLA~I eAB*'
Bombay i
State or Territory having lower level of
Naxaiite activity
Oarleeling District
Includes Naxalbarl;
site of original uprising
CHINA
SfRRlM
iNIYPr A S S A M
suu'~;.:ll~ NADALANO
AMINOIVI ISLANDS:
IINOIAI
L
.m Lows
ISLANDS,
a eAgol
SNj
,tb
W lSi l4
saNU I P IISx,~H`.
cda.l /
) ~
intense urban
aORISS i ( terrorism
1 ~
Srfkakuiam Boy of &'ngeI
/Oislrlcl
iAMYANDU
: -400 Mil
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Guard" units in the towns and small guerrilla squads
in the villages, a smaller Naxalite group calls for
mass organizations. Charges of "adventurism" and
"revisionism" are hurled back and forth among the
various extremist organizations. In January 1970,
Naxalite parties opposed to the CPI/ML in West Ben-
gal and other states began attempts to unite. Even-
tually their efforts led to the creation of the
People's (Preparatory) Struggle Committee (PPSC).
This body, however, remains little more than a loose
confederation whose activities have been limited to
sloganeering against the CPI/ML.
Strength and Capabilities in the States
8. The Naxalite movement today is so highly
fragmented that it is misleading to speak of "members"
on an all-India basis; nevertheless, there are prob-
ably some 26,000 people who, in some manner and at
some time, have considered themselves allied with
the Naxalite cause. Naxalites have been most active
(and violent) in the states of West Bengal, Kerala,
and Andhra Pradesh, but their slogans and wall posters
have surfaced in almost every s tats in the country.
9. West Bengal: Estimates of Naxalite strength
in the traditionally leftist state of West Bengal
range from 5,000 to 12,000. The CPI/ML is the domi-
nant Naxalite organization in the state, and to be
certified for membership, individuals are expected
to participate in some sort of "armed action." The
membership is weighted toward young people of middle-
class upbringing who are either students or among
the educated unemployed. CPI/ML strength now appears
to be centering in the urban areas, where the party
has demonstrated an ability to mount successful hit-
and-run attacks. Of late, police officers have be-
come prime targets for elimination as "enemies of
the people." Several have been killed by terrorists
during the month of October alone.
10. Party theorist Mazumdar calls upon his
followers in Calcutta to attack schools, movie
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houses, and other centers of "bourgeois culture. "
He sees these actions as weakening the established
system and provoking police repression that could
discredit the government. Such spectacular exploits,
he believes, will attract fresh recruits from the
student population who can eventually be formed into
"Red Guard units to go out to the countryside to
educate the rural masses in Maoist thought." "We
should not use any kind of firearms," said Mazumdar,
as "they will only fall into the hands of the police....
The guerrilla unit must rely wholly on choppers, spears,
javelins, and sickles." The few youths who have ven-
tured into the rural areas, however, have found the
going rougher than anticipated. Many of these young
people have drifted back into the cities where Ma-
zumdar's theory that "the more books you read the
more ignorant you become" has led them into the less
dangerous pursuits, such as ransacking libraries.
11. Although it still insists on the theoretical
primacy of rural guerrilla warfare, the CPI/ML has
begun to develop justification for its increasing
emphasis on urban terrorism. At its all-India Con-
gress held in Bombay in May 19 70, party leaders as-
serted that efforts should continue in both large
urban areas and in the countryside . Party workers,
however, were urged henceforth to concentrate cn
gaining control of the village peasant committees
rather than wasting time and personnel on the land-
seizure movement. In this manner, it was argued,.
the rural masses would become politicized and made
ready for the violent struggle to come. Urban CPI/ML
cadre were admonished to continue to press students
to participate in the disruption of educational insti-
tutions so that eventually all universities and col-
leges would be closed and their student bodies po-
larized.
12. The situation in the countryside remains
potentially explosive. Although the Naxalbari agi-
tation has been suppressed, unrest persists, and
over the past two years there have been hundreds
of incidents involving tribals and peasants attempt-
ing to seize land. Much of the land-grab effort,
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however, involves West Bengal's larger and longer-
established leftist parties, and the Naxalites' ac-
tivities have been largely confined to sporadic--
albeit spectacular--terrorist exploits.
13. Andhra Pradesh: The south Indian state
of Andhra Pradesh has been not only th?: scene of
some of the most recent Naxalite activity, but also
the locale of one of the movement's most serious
setbacks. The high point for the Naxalites came in
the summer of 1969, when for a time tribal extremists
led by Vempatapu Satyanarayana were able to set up a
secure base in the state's depressed northern Srikaku-
lum district. "People's courts" were organized, and
landless peasants and tribals settled down to the
cultivation of "repossessed" lands. Landowners who
did not acquiesce were brutally murdered, and the
Naxalites of Srikakulam soon attracted countrywide
attention. By October 1969, however, the revolu-
tion was in trouble. The tribesmen's bows and
arrows, spears, explosives, and muzzle-loading guns
were no match for the modern weapons of the security
forces and successive police expeditions. Improved
communications and government land redistribution
programs gradually succeeded in demoralizing the
extremists. The slaying by police of Satyanarayana
and a close associate in July 1970 appears to have
dealt the movement a crippling blow. Two remaining
bands of Naxalites are reportedly sending out feel-
ers on terms for surrender.
14. The Naxalite defeats in Andhra were abet-
ted by the internal confusion and dissidence that
divided the movement. Basically, two main extrem-
ist groups--Saty anarayana's pro-CPI/ML party and
the Revolutionary Communist Party led by Tarimela
Nagi Reddi--had competed for domination of the move-
ment in the state. The Reddi group claims to be
working for the "Indianizai:ion of Maoism," faults
Mazumdar's CPI/ML for failure to build a sound
political base before launching guerrilla warfare,
and condemns the party's blind violence as "Che
Guevaraism." For a time the Reddi group managed
to occupy lands in the Anantapur district, but in
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September 1969 Reddi was arrested by the Andhra
police. Deprived of their dynamic leader, his
followers were unable to consolidate their gains,
and the landlords were able
to
take
back
their
lands with little struggle.
By
June
1970
approxi-
mately 1,400 Naxalites had
been
arrested
in Andhra
Pradesh; the Srrkakulam Naxalites were reduced to
about 2,000, and the Reddi extremists to about 1,000.
15. Sporadic acts of violence nevertheless con-
tinue in Andhra Pradesh, and Naxalite propaganda
claims that the movement has merely entered the
second tactical phase--that of widening the area
of operations in order to disperse the police forces
and hinder their effectiveness. In June 1970 a
clandestine transmitter, called Indian Liberation
Radio, was reportedly broadcasting Naxalite propa-
ganda weekly from the Srikakulam district.
16. Bihar: In Bihar, the CPI/ML dominates
the extremist scene, but there are at least three
competitors. Volunteers, mainly from West Bengal,
crossed the border to proselytize as early as 1968,
when 20 agrarian clashes were reported. In 1969
the number of Naxalite-inspired incidents rose to
46. Naxalites are also reported to have set up
"centers" in the thick forests bordering Nepal
and West Bengal. The Naxalites have concentrated
their attention on depressed tribal groups in the
rural areas, but they are also active in industrial
areas and in the universities.
17. The situation deteriorated until mid-1970,
when a special squad of Bihar Military Police
rounded up a dozen ringleaders. Working in con-
nection with security officers from West Bengal,
the state government began to make inroads into the
Naxalite areas. Strength estimates vary, but there
are probably no more than a few thousand Naxalite-
influenced peasants in the state. Nevertheless,
Bihar is far from calm, and as late as May 1970 press
stories reporting a "reign of terror" in certain
districts were common.
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18. Kerala: The history of the Naxalite move-
ment in the Ccmmunist-dominated state of Kerala is
one of dissension and division. There are at least
five groups that are identifiable as Naxalite, and,
although CPI/ML leader Mazumdar has visited the
state in an attempt to unify the various factions,
his efforts have met with little success. By May
1970 it was estimated that there were some 4,000
extremists in the state.
19. The particularly
brutal turn that the movement
has taken in Kerala has an-
tagonized many people. In
addition, the state govern-
ment recently has devoted
considerable effort to a iand
reform program, to some ex-
tent cutting the ground from
under the extremist organiz-
ers. Moreover, effective po-
lice action has kept the Naxa-
lites on the move; in April
1970 they were reported to be
surviving only as scattered
groups, mainly in the Wynaad
forest area of northern Kerala.
20. Leaders like Mazumdar
have not entirely given up on
the state, however, and in late
1969 plans were under way to
train squads, consisting of
five to seven extremists, to go to villages, prop-
agandize against landlords, and await an appropri-
ate time to expropriate their lands. In April 1970,
Kanu Sanyal visited Kerala on a ten-day inspection
tour and reported that the state's CPI/ML was not
yet defeated. He said that the members were secretly
organizing for attacks against the police and other
"class enemies." The party appeared to be making
headway among university students in May
"Class enemy" eliminated by
Naxalites.
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In July and August 970
several particular y ruta murders were carried out
by Naxalites, possibly indicating that at least some
groups were attempting to follow the plan Sanyal had
outlined.
21. Uttar Pradesh: Naxalite activity in Prime
Minister Gandhi's home state of Uttar Pradesh--the
most populous state in India--is generally considered
to carry little threat, although recently the exploits
of a few extremists have begun to receive attention
in the press. Extremist groups are active primarily
in the border districts, and illicit arms are alleged
to enter the state alon the 100-mile-lon border with
Nepal.
22. The police have had some success in moving
against the extremists, and in June 1970 the arrest
of Bishwanath Tiwari, allegedly the chief organizer
of the Naxalites in northern Uttar Pradesh, was re-
ported in the press. Mazumdar has attended one of
the state's four regional conferences, but for the
most part the violenca he advocates has not occurred.
The Naxalites thus far appear to be concentrating on
ro a andizing.
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23. Assam: There are about 500 Naxalites and
potential Naxalites in the strategic northeastern
border state of Assam. The hard core of the move-
ment appears to be located in the Brahmaputra valley,
but there are also bases in the border districts
ringing the state. The Assam Naxalites are divided
into at least two camps, neither of which demon-
strates much ideological similarity to Naxalite
groups in other states. For example, aside from
rather pro forma demands for land reform, they have
eagerly espoused the causes of the area's secession-
ist-minded tribal groups and have sought to foment
trouble among the illegal Pakistani squatters on
the Assam - East Pakistan border--pursuits rather
far removed from the usual Naxalite concerns.
24. The movement appears to be basically in
the propaganda stage, although the Naxalites may re-
cently have begun to step up their activities. Al-
most 300 Naxalites are reported to have been arrested
in Assam this year.
25. Other States: Naxalite activity in the
other Indian states is mostly limited to propaganda
campaigns, accompanied occasionally by violence.
In the west Indian state of Maharashtra, CPI activist
Dr. Chaudhary has broken with the party and is likely
to set up a Naxalite-like group in his home district
of Dhulia, an area heavily populated by disadvantaged
tribals. Miss Sunder Nawalkar, another alleged ring-
leader is presently being held for trial for her Naxa-
lite activities and during July 1970 a number of other
actual and suspected Naxalites in the Bombay area of
the state were rounded up. Anti-Naxalite operations
have subsequently been extended to Nasik district in
the northwestern part of the state and the Osmanabad
district in the southeast. "Naxalite visitors" from
West Bengal reportedly were active in the Osmanabad
area in April 1970
26. The Naxalites in strategically important
Jammu and Kashmir are functioning in a few border
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areas of Jammu, where they have created "pockets of
influence," but the Democratic Conference--the state
unit of the CPI/ML---is divided within itself and shows
few signs of being able to mount an effective campaign.
In Haryana, Orissa,Madhya Pradesh, and the south Indian
state of Tamil Nadu and more recently in Punjab, spo-
radic Naxalite activities have also been reported.
27. The Naxalite movement in New Delhi was
launched more than a year ago, but has made little
headway. Activities are concentrated on the Delhi
University campus, where approximately 100 Naxalites--
about 20 hard-core--have been identified. There is
no effective extremist leader on the Delhi scene,
although Naxalite leaders from Calcutta and else-
where regularly visit the campus. The Delhi city
government, run by the conservative Hindu Jan Sangh
party, maintains a strict watch over Naxalite activi-
ties, and the larger and better organized conserva-
tive student groups are actively working to combat
the Naxalite influence. Despite the university chan-
cellor's intention to admit more students from West
Bengal, a move that will tend to increase the number
of radicals on campus, New Delhi is likely to remain
a relatively uncongenial area for the Naxalites.
Foreign Support
28. Peking Radio outdid itself in applauding
the work of the Naxalbari revolutionaries in a
June 1967 broadcast; "the emergence of this struggle,"
it said, ",signifies a new state in the Indian people's
surging struggle against reactionary rule...with
armed struggle as its major force,...using the vil-
lages to encircle the cities, and finally taking over
the cities." Subsequently, the Chinese recognized
the CPI/ML as the "only Communist Party in India."
Naxalite leaders have stated publicly that they
fully expect the Chinese to supply them with money
and arms, but firm evidence of significant Chinese
aid is sketchy at best.
29. From the Chinese vantage, the Naxalites
primarily represent a propaganda ally against the
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CPI and CPI/M, wh:Lch--to Peking's mind--are Soviet-
dominated revisionist parties. Peking has no de-
si,e to identify completely with a losing cause, how-
ever, and the Naxalites have yet to prove that they
are able to end factionalism within their groups,
consolidate their gains, or establish a permanent
safe haven. Nevertheless, to the extent that they
are capable of disrupting the orderly functioning of
the Indian political system, they are worthy of some
aid and moral support, and accordingly, the Chinese
have provided them with propaganda, occasional fi-
nancial aid, and training.
A group of some 15 Naxalites went to China
after the 1967 Naxalb ari uprising and spent six months
touring the country and taking courses in Maoism and
guerrilla warfare, according to an article published
in the Peking Review in January 1970. The CPI/ML
later stated that a second group had gone to China
in late 1969, but this visit has not been confirmed.
31. The government of India, long fearful'of
Peking's designs on the subcontinent, may be inclined
to overemphaGize the amount of support the Naxalites
receive from the Chinese. In early January 1970 the
acting director of India's East Asia division in the
Ministry of External Affairs told a US Embassy offi-
cial that in March 1969 a Communist Chinese Embassy
official traveled to Calcutta and passed "sizable sums
of money to extremists in both the Naxalite CPI ML
and the CPM."
In fact, there is considerable evidence that
t e Naxalit(a weapons are homemade or stolen from gov-
ernment ordnance: plants and arsenals.
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32. It is possible that CPI/ML leaders such as
Maz,umdar and Sanyal have, on occasion, been able to
establish contact with Chinese Communists resident in
Nepal, but there is no solid evidence to substantiate
rumors to this effect. Press reports that a small
number of Chinese-made arms have made their way into
India across the India-N al border are also unveri-
fied.
In March 1969, then Home Minister Chavan an-
nounce that some weapons of Chinese origin that had
been in the possession of dissident Naga and Mizo
tribesmen had turned up in Naxalite hands. There is
no evidence that the Chinese Government arranged for
the shipments, however, and any arms that have en-
tered the country have probably been smuggled in by
private parties.
33. The CPI/ML has been mildly successful in
its efforts to establish international links with
other Maoist parties. In addition to an alliance
with the very small East Pakistani Communist Party/
Marxist-Leninist, the CPI/ML has made contact with
the pro-Chinese faction of the Burmese Communist
Party, although contact with the latter group ap-
pears to be mainly useful for propaganda purposes.
T e Pa is tans Naxalite group
is relatively new--it was founded in April 1970--and,
although it may have received money from the Indian
CPI/ML, hard evidence regarding the flow of funds
is currently unavailable.
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Reactions of Older Communist Parties
35. The two other Communist parties, the pro-
Moscow CPI and the more militant CPM, have condemned
the Naxalite "adventurers" on ideological grounds,
and have warned that the new movement will mean the
dissipation of revolutionary energy into self-defeat-
ing channels. The CPM is a particularly bitter critic
because were it not for the existence of the CPI/ML,
the CPM might reasonably expect to fall heir to the
allegiance of all the extremist Communist forces. In
West Bengal, the CPM is treated almost as the party's
main enemy, and friction between the two groups has
often led to violence, chiefly among the protagonists'
youthful supporters. In August 1970 the CPM decided
to found the Students' Federation of India to counter-
act the growing Naxalite success in gaining student
adherents, The CPM has already lost a number of its
members to Naxalite factions and is apprehensive that
the heavy-handed tactics used to suppress Naxalite
terrorism will also be directed against CPM activities
and so enrage other CPM cadre that they too will de-
fect to the Naxalite cause.
36. Nevertheless, leaders of the older Commu-
nist parties probably have mixed emotions over Naxa-
lite activities. For one thing, the Naxalites may
be giving the traditional Communist parties a new
chance for respectability. As the extremists in-
creasingly serve as collecting points for antisocial
behavior and as lightning rods for moderate and
right-wing criticism, the CPM--and more especially
the CPI--have tended to be accepted as less dangerous
members of the political establishment. Furthermore,
there is a strong feeling among tho traditional par-
ties' leaders that they should take a tolerant view
of youthful dissenters. Any action to expel those
members who sympathize with the Naxalites, or even
take part in some of their activities, would, they
argue, cause unnecessary disruption of their parties
and could easily lead to further widespread defec-
tions. Far better,. they point out, to allow inner-
party debates carried out in public to provide a
safety valve that could at least slow and perhaps
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prevent additional withdrawals from the traditional
parties.
37. The older parties also plan direct action
programs to counter the extremists' charge that they
have lost revolutionary fervor. Borrowing a page
from the Naxalite text, the CPI organized a massive
all-India "land-grab" movement in .July-August 1970.
At its national council meeting in New Delhi in May
1970, the CPI committed itself to revitalize its stu-
dent fronts.
38. In sum, the tactics of the traditional par-
ties seem to be paying off as both the CPI and the
CPM continue to field numbers of dedicated political
activists who seek changes more or less within the
parliamentary system. The emotional appeal of the
:Taxalites to students and politically conscious young
people continues to be strong, but the older parties,
with their well-established power bases in the labor
movement and in the state and national parliaments,
still have much to offer an ambitious young revolu-
tionary.
Government Reaction to Naxalite Threat
39. For its part, the government has adopted
a two-pronged strategy to counter the Naxalite threat.
The first is the "get tough" approach, and so far it
has been quite effective. State police forces, with-
out the assistance of the army, have been given pri-
mary responsibilit:Y for dealing with Naxalite vio-
lence, and--except in West Bengal--they have needed
no outside assistance. The extremist groups have not
yet been subjected to all-out police control and re-
pression despite repeated calls by right-wing parties
to ban the CPI/ML. Where Naxalites have surfaced to
engage in open terrorist activities, they have been
sought out; but generally the police have tried to
conserve their energies for coordinated district-wide
sweeps where the presence of terrorists has been sus-
pected. Intra-state cooperation has usually been good
and
police
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camps have been established in the border areas to
stem the movement of Naxalites from one state to the
other. Police units have also been alerted to the
movement of Naxalites across the Bihar border into
Nepal, where they are suspected of obtaining weapons.
There has been talk of re-enacting the Preventive
Detention Law which expired at the end of 1969, pro-
viding that any person whose behavior is judged pre=
j.udicalto the security of India can be detained for
up to one year without trial, to curb the Naxalite
menace. So far, Prime Minister Gandhi has not had
sufficient parliamentary support to push through
re-activation of the law. She is, however, reported
to be looking for ways to strengthen existing security
legislation and is quick to point out that individual
states are free to enact preventive detention legis-
lation on their own. Some have already done so and
West Bengal is re-examining laws already on the books
with a view to applying them as makeshift preventative
detention measures.
40. Mrs. Gandhi has condemned extremists who
take the law into their own hands, but in order to
steer clear of identification with the "forces of
repression" she has become one of the main exponents
of the second prong of the government's anti-Naxalite
strategy--that of.fighting Naxalite politics with
strenuous efforts to remove the frustrations on
which the extremist movement feeds. In keeping with
the progressive image she is seeking, Mrs. Gandhi has
repeatedly expressed sympathy for the landless and has
urged the states to implement existing land reform
laws on an emergency footing and to work toward al-
leviating the frustrations of the educated urban youth.
In a few states, such as Kerala and Andhra Pradesh,
the governments are increasing land re-distribution
in an attempt to reduce Naxalite activity. Most
states, however, continue to rely on the effective-
ness of their police forces, and there is little to
suggest that they will make any serious effort to
implement a thoroughgoing land reform program.
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Prospects for Expansion
41. The Naxalites have achieved nationwide
notoriety, but--aside from West Bengal and, to a
more limited degree, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and
Bihar--their successes in the countryside have not
been widespread. Over the next few years, however,
they can be expected to make progress where corrup-
tion is rampant, where rural and urban poverty is
at its worst, where employment opportunities for the
educated young are deteriorating; and where regional
parties have failed to establish strong organizations
to meet local needs. India's disadvantaged tribal
groups will remain particularly fertile fields for
extremist exploitation. The Naxalites appear likely
to continue, therefore, as a disruptive element in
Indian political life, but, given the capability of the
security forces, it is difficult to imagine that their
threats to create "instant revolution" have much chance
of success.
42. The Naxalites look forward hopefully to a
period of increased political instability and eco-
nomic chaos. With the country increasingly divided
into warring political and economic factions, they
anticipate that, with Chinese assistance, their guer-
rilla bands will eventually become a people's army
which will "sweep the country." it is far more likely,
however, that before the country could degenerate into
such a state of chaos, the highly institutionalized
and essentially conservative military forces would step
in to restore order. The Naxalites' hope for Commu-
nist China's support may also be badly misplaced.
43. Nevertheless, the Naxalites are a decided
liability for Prime Minister Gandhi because their
highly publicized exploits suggest that the govern-
ment is not fully in. control of the situation. Their
presence produces a sense of insecurity among the peo-
ple--an insecurity that could work against the ruling
Congress Party in the next elections. Moreover, to
compete with the Naxalites, whose radical action pro-
gram has a demonstrated appeal to the young and to
the disadvantaged, both the Prime Minister's party
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and the traditional leftist parties--whose support
she frequently seeks--may perceive the need gradually
to move government policies toward the left.
44. At present, the Naxalite menace is being
curtailed if not controlled. Much of the activity
attributed to Naxalites in the Ind;;. an press is not
ideologically motivated but rather stems from stu-
dent rowdyism, from hooliganism, and from gangster-
ism. The true Maoist is in a minority as the per-
petrator of violent acts in India. As the national
elections required by February 1972 approach, ter-
rorist activity, particularly in urban areas, will
probably increase, but--based on past performances--
it does not appear likely that the Naxalites will
be able to coordinate their actions on an all-India
basis. For the foreseeable future, the movement ap-
pears destined to remain confined to separated and
often competing geographic pockets and, barring
the emergence of a charismatic national leader,
will be unable to launch effectively "the revolu-
tion."
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