CHILE'S ELECTION--THE CANDIDATES AND THEIR PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: July 26, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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~?ecret
D?R.E~TORATE OF
11.JTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Chile's Election--the Candidates and 'heir Programs
Secret
G July 1970.
No. 0525j70
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8'7
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WARNING
'I'bis document contains information a(fectinb the national
defense of the United Statca, within the meaninb of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission ar revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibitul by law.
onovr i
C%CLUOLD 1'IION :'.VTOYATIC
UUN'Nll11AU1NO ANU
UL(i1.AANIFILATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 July 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Chile's Election--The Candidates And Their Programs
Summary
Chileans will go to the polls on 4 September
to elect a new president. The three candidates
presently in the race are: Jorge Alessandri, an
independent conservative; Salvador Allende, who is
supported by the extreme left; and Radomiro Tomic,
a Christian Democrat. Alessandri is stressing the
benefits of his previous term as president (1958-64)
and of "reform with tranquility." He gives comfort
to those conservatives who dislike the direction in
which Chile now is moving, but he has no consistent
ideological program. Allende's program leans heavily
on Marxist and Eastern European models, and he is
a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro. Although he per-
sonally does not believe that violent revolution is
the solution to Chile's problems, many in his party
do. Tomic has not moved to claim the political cen-
ter; in fact, his program is in many respects identi-
cal to that of Allende. He praises the record of the
past six years of Christian Democratic government but,
like President Frei in 1964, claims that his social
and economic reforms will be instituted under a non-
capitalist system. The armed forces have gone out
of their way to emphasize support for Chilean democ-
racy; so it seems 1?.kely that one of these three men
will be inaugurated president in November, particu-
larly if the two are close in voting strength.
Note: TT Z~orandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research,
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Central
Reference Service, the Office of National Estimates,
and the Di.?ectorate fvr Plans.
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Introduction
1. A crucial element in the presidential elec-
tion is the constitutional provision for a congres-
sional run-off if no candidate wins an absolute ma-
jority of the popular vote. In such an event, con-
gress, meeting in joint session, will elect the pres-
ident from the top two contenders. Congress tradi-
tionally has elected the candidate with the plurality,
but there is no certainty that th~.s tradition mill be
followed this year.
2. The Chilean armed forces remained largely
apolitical from the 1930s until 1969, when low pay
and lack of equipment led some officers to resort to
political pressures. Last month the commander in
chief of the army, General Rene Schneider, said the
armed forces would support the right of the congress
to elect the presidential candidate with the second
largest vote. Although Schneider said he was merely
emphasizing that the military would uphold the con-
stitution, this statement was interpreted as support
for Tomic and a blow to Alessandri, who is generally
considered to be the front runner. Schneider stirred
up some adverse comment within the air force and the
navy for implying that he spoke for all the armed
forces.
3. The campaign this year so far lacks the sharp
left-rigYit polarization that existed in 1964 when Chris-
',:ian Democrat Eduardo Frei was elected presid~,it by a
majority of the popular vote. The 74-year-old Ales-
sandri,who was president from 1958 through 1964, has
the support of the conservative Nai:ional Party and many
independents. Salvador Allende, a Socialist senator
and a three-time presidential loser, is supported by
the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Radical
Party, and an assortment of other leftist groups, in-
cluding the ex-Christian Democrats who left the party
in 19ti9. After an unsuccessful bid for Communist sup-
port, Radomiro Tomic is running with only the backing
of his own Christian Democratic Party (PDC).
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4. Jorge Alessandri is viewed by many conserva-
tives a:, Chile's only hope for salvation from the
leftism of Tomic and Allende. These conservatives
are disillusioned by the unsettling economic and so-
cial reforms of President
Frei, for whom many of them
voted in 1964 as the only al-
ternative to Allende's radi-
calism. Alessandri has en-
deavored, however, to avoid
becoming tarnished by associ-
ation with the extreme right.
He is running as an independ-
ent, although he has the of-
ficial support of the conserv-
ative National.Party (PN),.,
Indeed, it was his associa-
tion in the public mind with
the PN that helped that party
to run second in the congres-
sional elections of March
1969. His campaign is being
supported by various other
inde endent groups
This mixture is inherently unwieldy,
an A essan ri s c ances have been weakened by bicker-
ing among his backers.
Alessandri's Background
5. Alessandri's father was President of Chile
twice. In 1924 he was ousted by conservatives but
the next year was recalled by a liberal junta to
serve out the rest of his term. This background has
given Jorge a strong sense of national pride and of
personal responsibility.
6. Some of Alessandri's political appeal un-
doubtedly comes from his name; his father, Arturo
Alessandri, is one of the national heroes of Chile.
He professes to view himself as a national leader
above party politics. Although he has few close
friends, he is able to establish a rapport with
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crowds, particularly the lower classes, from whom
he receives much of his support.
7. Alessandri received a degree in civil en-
gineering from the University of Chile in 1919. He
was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1925. In
1927, his father's government was overthrown and the
family was exiled to Argentina. Jorge served as min-
ister of finance from 1947 to 1950, and in 1957 was
elected to the Senate. His popular vote margin over
Salvador Allende in the presidential election of~1958
was extremely slim, and during his administration in-
flation continued to be a serious problem.
8. A major question iii the 1970 election is
that of the 74-year-old Alessandri's health. Al-
though he has seemed vigorous through much of the
campaign, in a recent television program he appeared
old and feeble. His hands shook, his voice quavered,
and backers of Tomic and Allende were greatly en-
couraged. If he can project a strong appearance
through the rest of the campaign, however, he should
be able to reassure the voters.
Alessandri's Program
9. Unlike Tomic and Allende, Alessandri has
no formal program. He is said to believe that pro-
jecting his image is the important thing and that
he will worry about his program after he is elected.
His speeches combine praise of his former adm~.nistra-
tion with promises to improve the economic situation.
Alessandri has supported copper agreements drawn up
last year under the Frei government and has said
that if "national circumstances" and world copper
prices permit, he will exercise the option to buy
the remaining 49 percent of the Anaconda Company
operations sometime after January 1972. Despite his
commitment to private enterprise, however, Alessandri
probably would not veto nat~.onalization legislation
if it were passed by congress.
10. Thexe is some evidence that Alessandri is
bitter toward the US, but Yie certainly would be
friendlier than Allende. Some of his backers have
been hurt by programs of the Alliance for Progress.
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AlessG:~dri has said that he was forced into brea]v-
ing relations with Cuba in 1964, and he probably
would not stop the small agricultural shipments to
Cuba that were recently resumed. Like his opponents,
Alessandri has criticized the present constitutional
structure of Chile, suggesting in particular that
the president be given more power over the budget.
Aless andri's Campaign
11. Early in 1969 most observers concluded that
Alessandri planned to run for president in 1970. It
was generally believed, however, that he would delay
an official announcement until a groundswell of popu-
lar opinion once again "called" him to the political
arena. A mutiny by an army regiment in October 1969
and pressure from his advisers caused him to advance
his timing. Even before he had made his entry offi-
cial, Alessandri was considered to be well ahead of
any rivals. His campaign may have peaked too early,
however, and his appeal may decrease as tYie election
nears.
12. Alessandri appears to have little control
over his own campaign. Although he stresses that
he does not want to turn back the clock, some of his
advisers are drawn from the-.most reactionary sectors
of society. He has failed to rely on the National
Party's existing organization, working instead througn
the individual independent groups. An additional
complicating factor is the support of old-guard Radi-
cals who refuse to back their party leaders, who sup-
port Allende. Alessandri's backers are already quar-
reling over the division of cabinet posts and other
patronage, and some of his advisers seem to believe
that simply involving his name is enough to win the
elections.
Alessandri and the Military
13. The military's attitude toward Alessandri
is somewhat ambivalent, although he claims to have
close relations with armed forces leaders. High-
ranking conservative officers probably believe he
is the person best suited to lead the country at
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Outlook
14. At present, the crucial questions confront-
ing the Alessandri campaign are the candidate's health
and his backers' organization. If Ale,~sandri can
.project a vigorous image throughout the rest of the
campaign, he will have a good chance of being elected
president. More bickering among his supporters, how-
ever, could cause such chaos in his campaign that he
would be unable to overcome it aimply by force of
personality. Alessandri must win a plurality~in order
to be elected. If he comes in second, he could not
get enough congressional support to be elected. More-
over, running second in the popular vote probably
would be such a blow to his pride that he would not
want to try to break the tradition that congress
elects the person with the highest popular vote.
15. Senator Salvador Allende is running for
the presidency for the fourth time. He is a member
of the Socialist Party
(PS) , which advocates
armed revolution, and is
supported by the Commu-
nist Party (PCCh) , but
many political moderates
in Chile will vote for
him because they do r_ot
consider him a violence-
oriented leftist--as in-
deed he is not. Allende~s
lengthy exposure 'to na-
tional politics has gi~r~en
his candidacy a bourgeois
"old-shoe" cast. This
familiarity is a two-
edged sword, however, and
in the 1970 campaign Al-
lende has fought to over-
come the image of a three-time loser.
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16. At the beginning of the campaign, Allende
appeared to be running a strong second to Jorge
Alessandri. His unstable coalition, .l1or~Tever, failed
to coalesce, and this campaign at times seemed un-
directed despite the organizational strength of the
Communists. By the beginning of June, many reports
discounted the possibility that he could finish
second. On 2 June, however, his campaign received
a shot in the arm when a rally in downtown Santiago
drew between 60,000 and 100,000 people. Initial
assessments indicate that the rally may have stimu-
lated strong popular enthusiasm for Allende in the
Santiago area, cutting into Tomic and Alessandri
strength. If Allende can capitalize on this new
momentum, he may be able to turn the election once
again into a close three-man contest.
A1lende's Background
17. Allende is 61 ye~~rs old and has been ac-
tive in the Socialist Party since the 1930s. Most
of his early career was spent working as a lawyer,
but he received a degree in medicine from the Uni-
versity of Chile in 1932. In 1937 he was elected
to the Chamber of Deputies from Valparaiso, and he
served as ministe r of public health from 1939 through
19 42 .
18. The PS has suffered innumerable schisms
and reunifications, the most recent in 1967. Allende
has been involved in the splits, but he has always
remained prominei:~ :~n some identifiable political
group. As a result of the political maneuvering of
the last 35 years, he has made a number of enemies
on the left. Important members of. the present So-
cialist Party believe that he is too much a member
of the political estab iishment to be an effective
leaner of the revolution they deem n~.cessary. He
was by no means pertain of the presidential nomina-
tion of the Socialist Party, although the Communists
had virtually promised him their backing. His Popu-
lar Unity (UP) coalition. has been hammered together
by the Communists and is unstable at best. Allende
remains, however, the Marxist most able to run a
strong campaign in a free democratic election.
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A1lende's Program
l9. ~~In December 1969, before the official des-
ignation of Allende as standard-bearer for_ the UP,
a Popular Unity Program was adopted by the Communists,
Socialists, Radicals, and assorted leftist splinter
groups. Allende ras ignored portions of the program,
especially ?:hcse that m~ ght frighten or alienate
Large numbers of uncommitted voters. On 2 June, how-
ever, he enunciated a program of "Forty Points," which,
he claims, will be enacted as soon as he takes office.
His program ranges from such bread-and-butter issues
as ending sales taxes and freezing montage interest
rates to imposition of stiff penalties for "ecanomi c
crimes." In a special jab at Alessandri, A11~nde
promised that the holdings of wealthy famili.t~;;, in-
cluding those of the Alessandris, would be tu:c~?ied
over to the stat.P. Allende plans to nationalize
basic resources now in the hands of "domestic and
foreign monopoly interests"--the large copper com-
panies; the iron, nitrate, iodine, and coal indus-
tries; private industrial monopolies and other large
companies; and enterprises that affect economic and
social development, such as electric power, trans-
portation, communications, petroleum and liquid gas,
steel, cement, petrochemicals, cellulose, and paper.
20. A1lende's program calls for a number of re-
visions in the Chilean political system. Like Tomic,
he proposes the creation of a unicameral legislature.
Although the program itself includes a restructuring
of the judicial system, Allende has ignored this as-
pect. A Soci,3lis?'t senator caused some consternation
by stating that after A1lende's victory, "paredones,"
or execution w2:lls , would be used to eliminate the
exploiting classes. P.llende has been quick to "explain"
that this was only a figure of speech.
21. As expecte3, Allende has emphasized f~reign-
policy issues. 23e calls for closer relations with
Socialist countries, denounces the OAS as a tool of
US imperialism, and says he will revise or denounce
treaties that "compromise" Chilean sovereignty. His
dir.?ect attacks on the US have been muted, however,
pr~~bably in order to avoid the situation that
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occurred in 1964 when he was cast as the villain ;n
a struggle between Communism and democracy.
AllPnde's Campaign
22. Allende's campaign so far has bP.en an un-
easy combination of Socialist rhetoric and Communist
organization. Allende, who himself does not advocate
violent revolution, has at times been put on the de-
fensive by his extremist Socialist supporters. The
Chilean Communist Party leaders, on she other hand,
are strong advocates of peaceful revolution, and a
strong showing by Allende is imperative if. the PCCh
is to retain its attractiveness to young leftists,
Therefore the Communists, despite grumbling about the
lack of enthusiasm on the part of. the Socialists, are
mustering all their forces behind Allende.
23. Early in May, A1lende'S campaign received
a setback when it was rumored that he had suffered a
heart attack. He appeared o~.i television shortly
thereafter, however, and claimed that his illness
was merely a severe case of the grippe and accompany-
ing heart difficulties. Since then he has campaigned
vigorously and has not presented tY~e image of an ill
man, although he apparently does have some severe
medical problems.
24, Because the Socialist Party espouses vio-
lent revolution, Allende has been placed on the de-
fensive on the "law-and-order" issue. Violence in
the countryside over the agrarian reform program and
even bank robberies have become associated in the
popular mind with Allende's Socialist supporters.
Alessandri in particular is hammering at this theme.
The discovery last month of a guerrilla training camp
in southern Chile has intensified public apprehension.
Three of the six persons arrested have been identi-
fied as Socialists, and Allende has already been
forced to answer questions about their connection
with the party Allende and members of the UP have
complained bitterly. about what they refer to as a
"campaign of terror" against them that seeks to
emphasize leftist violence. and differences within
the UP.
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Outlook
25. Allende's campaign got off to a good
start, and he was considered py most to be running
well ahead of Tomic. He entered a slump about a
month ago, but his rally ~n 2 June has provided
renewed momentum, and the Communists' organiza-
tional ability is bo~xnd to produce results. If he
should finish a strong second to Alessandri; the
vote of the Christian Democrats in 'congress would. .
be crucial. All the votes of the UP and a signifi-
cant portion of the PDC would be enough to ensure him
the presidency. If AlesSandri received much more
than 40 percent of the popular vote, he probably
would be elected, but if the candidates are closer,
Allende will be strongly tempted to try to strike a
deal w~.th those leftist Christian Democrats he might
be able to woo .
26. Radomiro Tomic is the presidential candi-
d~~te of the Chilean Chri:~tian Democratic Party (PDC) .
Eduardo Frei, a founder cif the party, has been presi-
dent of Chile since 19 64 . He cannot: succeed himself ,
and Tomic, who served as ambassador to the tJS from
1965 until 19 ~8, hopes to continue Christian Democra-
tic control of the government. When Tomic was nominated
RADOMIRO TOMIC WITH FAMILY
late in 1969, he was generally considered to be running
a poor third behind Alessandri and Allende. Despite
his initially poor prospects, Tomic's campaign has been
gathering momentum during the past months.
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To,;~ic's Background
27. RaZomiro Tomic, 56 years old, is a self-made
man who has played an important role in the develop-
ment of the Christian Democratic Party. He received
a law degree in 1941 from the Catholic University in
Santiago and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies
the same year. He worked with Eduardo Frei to change
the National Falange from the reform-oriented youth
group of the Conservative Party to the Christian Demo-
cratic Party, which was able to elect a president the
second time it entered a candidate.
28. Some of Tomic's social and economic ideas
undoubtedly are a result of the relative poverty in
which he spent his youthful years. His father was an
immigrant Yugoslav, which probably explains Tomic's
admiration for Tito and the Yugoslav system.
29. Tomic is ambitious, and for years he has
been regarded as Frei's chief competitor within the
PDC and as his successor as president. Nevertheless,
he had to wage a battle for the party's nomination
and at one point last year withdrew his nai~le from
consideration. His attempts to woo the Communist
Party were probably made only part~.y because he saw
an ideological affinity--he is well aware of the
organizational power of the Communists.
30. One of the chief drawbacks to Tomic's cam-
paign has been his own personality. Many Chileans
refer to him as "Mister Blah-B1ah" because of his
non-stop volubility. But non - Christian Democrats
are attracted to him because of his association wiih
Frei and the fact that he offers a non-Marxist aiier-
native to the conservatism of Alessandri.
Tomic's Program
31. In May the PDC Plenary Council, which has
128 members including the National Council, PDC mem-
bers of congress, and provincial chiefs, adopted a
platform for Tomic's presidential candidacy. The
thrust of the program is socialist and statist, with
heavy reliance on Christian Democratic "communitarian"
ideas. Known as the Cartagena Document, the program
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is very much in line with the philosophy Tomic has
expressed privately and publicly for the past several
years. It stresses "the new economy," a Tomic concept
i:hat foresees the coexistence of private and of "popu-
lar" enterprises, carried on by the state, sma1.1 in-
dividual producers, cooperatives, and workers.
32. An important part of Tonic's program that
is echoed in the Cartagena Document calls for the
immediate nationalization of the large US-based cop-
per companies. Although Tomic has praised Frei's
"Chileanization" program, he has left no doubt that
as president he would support nationalization legi~-
lation. An acceptab le form of compensation probably
could be worked out, however.
33. Tomic, along with Frei, Allende and Ales-
sandri, has criticized the present constitutional
arrangements. Like Allende, he would like to see
a unicameral legislature so that legislation would
not be stalemated in congress, as it has often been
during President Frei's administration. Tomic has
stated that "in order to get laws p"
34. Tomic has criticzed the Frei administration
for not moving fast enough in certain phases of eco-
nomic and social reform. Recently, however, he has
changed his line. He is now emphasizing the achieve-
ments of the past six years and is promising to build
on this foundation to bring even greater benefits to
the Chilean people. His relationship with Frei has
been strained; the President has disapproved of Tomic's
desire to negotiate for Communist support. Within the
last two months, however, Frei has begun a concerted
effort to transfer some of his popularity to Tomic.
In his annual message to Congress last month, Frei
indirectly endorsed Tomic's candidacy, although at
the same time opposing complete nationaliz~ition of
copper and PDC unity with the left. Following the
speech, Tomic and Frei appeared together at a PDC
celebration. Tomic apparently has given up on his
attempt to gain support for his presidential candi-
lacy from the Communists and other leftists, and he
may try to move more closely to the center of the
political spectrum in the expectation of picking up
moderates from both camps.
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Tomic and the Left
35. When Tomic returned from the US and began
his pre-campaign, he hoped to split the Chilean Com-
munist Party (PCCh) from its Socialist partners and
run for president with Communist support. The PCCh
itself received nearly 16 percent of the total vote
in congressional elections last year. This strer~gth
is firm as the party can mobilize its adherents in
a relatively solid bloc behind the candidates it en-
dorses. Tomic believed that he could use the Commu-
nists' voting strength and organization, while main-
taining his independence after the election.
36. The Communists, however, refused to go a-
long with Tomic. They may have been motivated in
part by a belief that he would be less malleable
than Allende . In addition, they probably believed
that prospects for Allende's election in 1970 were
excellent, and ?trey were reluctant to pass up the
opportunity. FL?rthermore, cooperating with the PDC
would have laid the PCCh open even. further to attacks
by extremists from the Socialist Party and the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left on the party's "revolu-
tionary zeal."
37. Tomic seems finally to have reconciled him-
self to a campaign without the Communists, and indeed
has begun to attack the Communist-Socialist-Radical
coalition. He is now stressing the theme that when
those parties last controlled the Chilean Government
(1938-1948), they accomplished little. This shift
probably has helped his political rapprochement wi~.,h
Frei.
38. Tomic is campaigning without the Communists,
but he probably is still counting on their support in
Congress should he run second to Alessandri. A1?~hough
in such a case some leftists might boycott the elec-
tion or even vote for Alessandri--hoping, thereby,
to send the country into chaos from which the left
could then rescue it--Tomic is optimistic that he
can strike a deal with the more pragmatic Communists.
As in the case of Allende, the combined votes of the
PCCh and the PDC would suffice to give him the presi-
dency. If Alessandri received much more than 40 percent
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of the popular vote, he probably would be elected
presideizt in any event. If the three candidates are
closer, however, the political logrolling in Congress
is likely to be intense.
~ut1OOk
39. After a faltering start, Tomic's campaign
now is swinging into high gear. It is widely ac-
~knowledged that he is running the best campaign of
the three candidates. He has access to substantial
government funds ar~d the support of most of the gov-
ernment ap;~aratus, and is using modern campaign tech
piques of radio, television, and newspaper publicity.
Experienced PDC politicians who have been working in
the government since 1964 now are returning to party
affairs to help his campaign. For example, PDC work-
ers claim to have enrolled 60,000 new voters in the
countryside, using the facilities of the agrarian re-
form program.
40. It is not beyond the realm of possibility
that Tomic could be the leader in the election, espe-
cially if the health problems of Allende and Ales-
sandri become more pronounced before September. If
he runty a strong second, he will be under great tempta-
tion to strike a des] with the Communists, hoping to
ensure himself of the presidency.
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