THE LEADERSHIP IN HANOI: FOUR MONTHS AFTER HO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 29, 1970
• Content Type: IM

 U~ ((,,
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF j
INTELLIGEI~ICE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Leadership in Hanoi: Four Months after Ho
Secret
29 January 1970
No. 0486/70
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 January 1970
The Leadership in Hanoi: Four Months After Ho
Introduction
In the four months since Ho Chi Minh's death,
a number of selected articles, statements, public
appearances by individual leaders, and, to a some-
what lesser extent, the trends of North Vietnamese
policy, have provided clues about the course of the
succession to leadership in Hanoi The evidence,
however, is not conclusive and, should the regime
be ~t?. =ying to throw up a smokescreen, could be mis-
leading.
This paper examines the evidence and offers
some tentative conclusions about the post-Ho lead-
ership. It does not try to answer conclusively
whether the politburo is locked in a struggle for
power or whether the question of succession has
been resolved, It nevertheless proceeds on the
assumption that these questions and how they might
affect North Vietnam's future course are the main
intelligence problems,*
Note: This memorandum was produced solely bz~ CIA,
It tvas prepared by the Office of Current InteZZi-
gence and coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates, the Office of Economic Research, and
the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairso
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The Funeral Period
1. The events surrounding Ho's funeral ex-
posed the new leadership to close public scrutiny.
No clear-cut successor emerged, but Party First
Secretary Le Duan, Chairman of the National As-
sembly's Standing Committee Truong Chinh, and
Premier Pham Van Dong seemed to be the dominant
figures They were the only members of the po-
litburo to partici~~ate ire all of the substantive
conferences with the key visiting delegations--
the Soviets, led bar Kosygin, and the Chinese,
headed by Chou En-lai and Li. Hsiennien. The three
received extensive publi.ci~y in the North Viet-
namese press throughout this period; a widely
distributed photo of Ho"s bier, far. example showed
Duan, Chinh, and Don stationed at three of its
four corners (aged Vice President Ton Duc Thang
was at the fourth),
2. Of the three figures, Le Duan was cast in
the leading role When an occasion for listing
arose, he was invariably ranked first and he was
the principal orator at the main funeral ceremony
on 10 September, where he read Ho's will and de-
livered the party central committee's eulogyo
3. Although events during the funeral
period seemed to identify the leading contenders,
neither the precise standing of these candidates
nor the distribution of power in the rest of the
politburo was established The pattern of ap-
pearances and the public conduct of North Viet-
nam's leaders seemed to conform strictly to
protocol and may well have had little bearing
on actual standing in the new regime. Except
for a few obvious slip-ups, the leaders were
usually ranked, in the order t-h at was formally
established at the last party congress in 1960?
Pham Hung, for e~cample, was listed fifth on the
state funeral ~o~nmittee, even though he probably
had not returned to Hanoi from his post as Com-
munist field commander in South Vietnam
4, The new leadership"s conduct during
the funeral period suggests that some prelimi-
nary decisions on succession and policy had
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been taken prior to Ho's death. There were no signs
of disarray at the funeral., and the North Vietnamese
tried hard to quash talk of significant policy
changes or a crisis of indecision? 1t is reasonable
to assume that the politburo anticipated that !:here
would be substantive discussions with key officials
who were sure to come to Hanoi when Ho died, and
that they had agreed on broad policy guidelines for
this eventuality.
Propaganda Drive to Hase Succession
5? Almost immediately after Ho'.s death, the
politburo launched a major propaganda campaign that
stressed the need for cohesion in the party and na-
tional unity behind the "collective leadership" of
a close-knit politburo determined to carry on with
Ho's policies?
6, The first official statement on the new re-?
yime termed it "a ;;table, collective leadership"
built by Ho and pledged to pursue his policies, The
funeral rhetoric dw~?slt on these themes, particularly
that of unity? Ho's will termed party solidarity
and "single-mindednE~ss" a must, and .the central com-
mittee's eulogy read by Le Duan promised that the
central committee would do its best to preserve the
unity of the party? In a major speech to the Na-
tional Assembly on 23 September,.Truong Chinh gave
added support to Hanoi's efforts to~promote a tran-
quil succession of power, He ridiculed expectations
of foreign observers that disunity and indecisiveness
might arise, asserting that the party would close
ranks around the politburo's leadership and would
"bring into full play the spirit of collectiveness
and socialist cooperation." A few days later, the
politburo announced the start of a nationwide polit-
ical indoctrination drive that called for "greater
efforts under present conditions" to forge the na-
tional unity that Ho had requested?
7, Coming in the first critical weeks after
Ho's death, this campaign seemed fashioned to assure
the North Vietnamese population and Hanoi's allies
that the new leadership was cohesive, firmly in con-
trol of the machinery of state, and that past policy
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would be preserved? The recurrent emphasis on unity
appeared at a minimum to reflect an awarenes:- by
Ho's successors that divis~.ve tendencies were present
in certain quarters and, if energized, could threaten
an orderly succession of power and even, in time,
could undermine the war effort? In what was a clear
attempt to enlist Ho"s popularity and immense pres-
tige on behalf of its programs, the new leadership
repeatedly claimed that it was continuing the policies
of the Ho era, The concept of collective leadership
has recently been advanced cautiously and infre-
quently--it has not been noted in the public press
since September,. Perhaps the new leadership found
it useful in the period immediately after Ho's death
to obscure the real locus of power bekiind a collective
facade
Pham Van Dong"s Tri~Abroad
8~ Premier Pham Van Dong embarked on a month-
long swing through China,. the Soviet Union, and East
Germany on 27 September? His trip was ap~~arently
designed to secure political and material support
for the regime and to impress upon Hanoi's allies
that the new leadership had firmly grasped the reins
of .power and was determined to press forwardo He
was accompanied part of the way by politburo member
and economic affairs specialist Le Thanh Nghi, who
went on to negotiate new aid agreements with North
Vietnam's allies in Asia and Eastern Europeo
9m Dong"s trip provided strong evidence that
the q~zestion of succession to power in North Vietnam
was not in open contention or even under serious
consideration in the politburo at that timee Be-
cause Dong long had been an influential and promi-
nent figure in leadership counsels, it is highly
unlikely that he would have left Hanoi while crucial
deliberations or debate were under ways It is
equally unlikely that he would have gone on such
an obviously sensitive and important mission with
significant disarray in the leadership as a back-
dropo Probably either the issue of succession al-
ready had been resolved or the politburo had reached
consensus on a temporary arrangement of power but
had postponed a final decision
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10~ It also Seems clear that Hanoi had settled
on certain basic policies before Dong and Nghi de-
parted~ They con erred at length with top-level
Soviet and Chinese officials on the war` the Paris
talks, and economic affairs? Indeedw it is possible
that Dong"s conversations in Peking were instru-
mental in bringing about the apparent reduction in
Chinese hostility toward Hanoi"s policy on negotia-
tions Peking"s seemingly softened attitude emerged
around the time of his visit there in late October.
Moreover, it was clear from the agreements reached
that Nghi negotiated the aid pacts with at least
the broad outline of a reconstruction plan for North
Vietnam in mind This appears to reinforce other
signs that the regime"s policymaking capacity was
not hamstrung by dissension in the period immediately
after Ho"s death;,
Le Duan?s Role in Post-Ho Hanoi
11~ First Secretary Le Duan, despite his ranking
as the top party official among Ho"s successors, is
not known to have played any significant public role
in North Vietnamese affairs since the funeralo This
has been one of the most striking features of the
post-Ho period and may be a key piece of evidence as
to the new arrangement of power
12~ Exccpt for two nonpolitical appearances,
there are no reports that Duan has been seen in public
since early October,. He attended none of a series
of mass rallies in mid-December that celebrated three
important Communist anniversaries, although the other
politburo members who were in Hanoi at the time put
in at least one appearance.
13~ The infrequency of Duan"s p~~blic appearances
since the funeral is by no means a solid indication
of his standing in the new regime _, There have been ,
reports hat he was touring the countryside--something
that Duan has done in the past--and, even while Ho
was alive, Duan generally appeared less often in pub='
lic than others in the politburo There has been no
evidence, however, that hE has exercised the formid-
able prerogatives of his position as party first
secretary
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14. Du~~n's extended absence inevitably raises
some questions about his role in North Vietnamese
affairs since Ho?s death, particularly in light
of the heavy rhetoric in September about the unity
of the central committee and the collective aspect
of the new leadershipo Amore visible public role
for figures of Le Duan's rank and prominence would
seem to be almost mandatory if the regime wished
to substantiate its initial claim of being a col-
lectiveo Likewise, calls for national solidarity
around a unified central committee seem empty in
the almost total absence of the ranking official
of the party,
15. Duan?s inconspicuous role in the post-Ho
period follows signs of h.is possible eclipse
nearly two years before Ho?s deatho He had once
been a pre-eminent figure in North Vietnamese
policy matters, but since the 1968 Tet offensive--
during a period when Hanoi has been slowly reversing
or modifying its policies for the war--he has hardly
been heard from,
16, The sole publicized statement that Duan
has made since the funeral contained hints that he
was out of step with others and that these differences
in policy had adversely affected his position in the
government. An "abridged" version of Duan"s speech,
given before a group of local party cadre in the
Haiphong area and broadcast by Radio Hanoi on 31,
October, contained an unusually frank plea for party
unity, Duan insisted that the principle of collective
leadership required discussion of opposing views He
complained that it was wrong for the party "to adopt
the opinion of one person and force all others to
follow ito"
17, Duari's speech was the first expression of
his views ~n the war in about two years By linking
references to divergent views in the party with
appeals for continued priority support of the war
and for moderation in restoring socialist authority
in the North, he left the strong impression that
there were deep divisions in Hanoio Moreover, his
remarks suggest that he was fighting an uphill, and
perhaps a rear-guard, battle cn behalf of his viewso
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Truo ~ Chinh's High Profile
18, In marked contrast to Le Duan"s low
profile, Tri~ong Chinh has appeared in public
with unusual frequency Along with Ph am Van
Dong, who normally has been in the public eye,
Chinh has been, by far, the most consFicuoias
of the top politburo f:igures~ In his appear-
ances, moreover, Cliinh generally has been cast
as an impor?~ant figure, pronouncing on party
doctrine and policy, dispensing advice and
sometimes instructions to gatherings dealing
with various aspects of North Vietnam's national
lifee
19, In October, Chinh visited an exhibition
of handicrafts in Hanoi and told party and gov-
ernment officials *o pay more attention to
encouraging and building this industrya In
November, he appeared at a conference of cinema-
tographerso In December, he assured a gathering
of intellectuals that they could play a role in
the post-Ho period provided they wholeheartedly
sacrificed and worked for "socialist construction"
and the war effort Later that month, he empha-
sized to a conference on Vietnamese music that
"music is a weapon for class and revolutionary
struggle,'" In January, he told a lawyers as-
sociation that North Vietnam was resolved to
make its constitution "a sharp weapon to carry
out the class struggle" so as to build socialism
and win the war, Also that month he spr~ke to
a meeting of correspondents from the party's
youth branch newspaper,
20, The especially frequent meetings of
the standing committee of the National Assembly
since Ho's death also have kep?c Crinh, its chair-
man, in the spotlights The committee conducted
five announced meetings in November and Decemberm
During a comparable period in 1968, it met twice
and then only once sar'''i month through August of
1969. Constitutionally, the standing committee
is one of the most powerful groups in North
Vietnam's government It is the secretariat
and executive body of the National Assembly and
acts with full assembly powers when that body is
not in session, which is most of the time,
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21~ The committee"s new prominence is by no
means conclusive evidence of Chinh"s standing in
Hanoi, however. The real roots of power lie in the
party, and basic policy decisions are made in the
politburo But, because in the post-Ho period the
new regime has used Chinh"s committee to expound
what must be party policies, Chinh has been kept
in the public eye in a way that emphasizes his role
in national affairs ~,
Truong Chinh`s National
Assembly Speech
22, Some two weeks after t~~e funer.~al, Truong
Chinh delivered ~?~hat still stands as onr.~ of the most
significant policy statements since Ho's death.
Chinh's address, given before a plenary session of
the National Assembly on 23 September, reaffirmed
some of the basic ideas that he had set forth in a
long treatise in May l96 8 on behalf of the politburo
and that subsequently had been adopted as national
policye He asserted that the party's energies and
resources should be primarily devoted to consolidat-
ing its control and "building socialism" (i.e. fur-
thering the communization of the North) and repairing
the physical damage and decline in morale caused by
the wary The struggle in the South took a decidedly
secondary place in the priorities he laid out, even
though he contended that strengthening the North was
the best way to s upport the war effort over the long
run.
23? To achieve a higher state of socialism and
rebuild the North, Chinh counseled a rigidly ortho-
dox program conducted under strict party control.
He urged the maintenance of a collectivized central
economy, heightened ideological fervor, and tighter
discipline of party cadres?
24? The address provided the first real indi-
cation of Truong Chinh"s power and authority in the
post-Ho hierarchy Unlike Le Duan"s funeral oration,
which was labeled a central committee statement,
Chinh's National Assembly speech was labeled in
Hanoi's press as his own, Its signif icance was fur-
ther underscored on 29 September when .the politburo
recommended the statement as one of a handful of
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study documents for their nationwide political in-
doctrination. drive. It was one of only two post-Ho
documents to be selected--the other was the party's
funeral eulogy--and ~.~as by far the most incisive
polic~r statement on the list.
Truong Cr~inh's Vietnam Pictorial Speech
25. Remarks made by Chinh at a meeting of North
Vietnamese journalists in mid-October, and broadcast
domestically by Radio Hanoi, provided more evidence
of Chinh's influence and authority in the post-Ho re-
gime. An address he subsequently delivered to the
staff of Vietnam Pictorials one of Hanoi's leading
foreign propaganda pub lications, suggested that thy;
party had officially adopted a policy that China
alone of the top politburo members had pub licly ad-
vocated--the devotion of~ more attention to internal
affairs and somewhat lees to the war in the South.
26. In blunt and unequivocal terms, Chinh told
the magazine staffers that their publication had
failed to reflect "the present new reality in our
country: that our people are fulfilling the two rev-
olutio.zary tasks: anti-U5 national salvation resist-
ance (i.e. the war in the South) and socialist build-
ing (i.e. internal consolidation and development in
:~~?~rth Vietnam)o" He charged that "since 1966, Vietnam
Pictorial had shown a definite preference" for cover-
ing remote battlefields" and had rarely dealt with
"building socialism." "By doing so, Vietnam Pictorial
has not firmly grasped ?che revolutionar~~ nes and
realities in our country," and its unbalanced cover-
age does not "conform with-the party lines, policies,
stand, and viewpoint."
27. There seems to be little doubt that Chinh's
speech and his pointed criticisms carried great weight
and perhaps reflected the official policy of the re-
gime. The broadcast report of Chinh's remarks indi-
cated th~~t two officials of the publication "promised
the party central committee to implement satisfactor-
ily President Ho's testament and comrade Truong
Chinh's solicitous instructions." Moreover, because
Chinh?s speech was broadcast domestically, it seems
clear that his remarks were not directed just at a
few journalists, but to the entire country.
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28. This speech, liY.e Chinh's address to the
National Assembly in late September, was an un~us ual
statement for a North Vietnamese leader, both be-
cause of its frank outline of the issues and bE~cause
of its authoritative tone. It suggested that (:hinh
had considerable self confidence in his position and
the policies he was espousing, much more than Yia~ been
publicly exhibited by any other politburo figure ;n
the post-Ho period. Moreover, by the end of October,
two months after Ho's death, Chinh's speeches were the
only significant policy statements by an individual
leader to be broadcast on Radio Hanoi.
History of the Au ust Revolution
29. The politburo announced on 26 November that
it was preparing an official new history of the August
Revolution (the period of. August-September 1954 during
which the Communists seized control of Hanoi and other
parts of Vietnam in the name of the "Democratic Repv.b-
lic of Vietnam" ) to commemorate its 25th anniversary
Such projects are almost routinely undertaken to cele-
brate important North Vietnamese anniversaries, But
this one, because of Chinh's acknowledged role as ar-
chitect of the August Revolution, his part in deter-~
mining the contents of the new history, and his appar-
ent use of this conference to press his views on cur-
rent war strategy, may carry implications for the
leadership.
30. According to the politburo's announcement,
various members of the central committee and repre-
sentatives from local party organizations met in a
six-day conference to discuss the party's line and
reasons for Communist successes during the August rev-
olution, presumably in order to provide guidelines
for those actually drafting the report. ChinYi was
the sole politburo figure present, and he clearly dom-
inated the proceedings.
31. The announcement said that "the conference
warmly applauded when comrade Truong Chinh rose to
express his views ... " on such matters as bui ldincr
armed forces, developing bases, and revolutionary
tactics. It went on: "Basing himself on lively
realities and using logical reasoning, he (Chinh)
helped the cadres better understand these problems
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(i.F:. , those cited above) and answered a number of
difficult questions raised during the past few years'
debates."
32. This is one of the clearest suggestions
seen in. the Communist media that there have been
differ