GUATEMALA'S POLITICAL TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 11, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Guatemala's Political Transition
Confidential
87
11 March 1970
No. 0479/70
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 March 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Guatemala's Political Transition
Summary
If he is installed in office on 1 July, Colonel
Arana will be the first opposition candidate in
Guatemala ever to receive the reins of government from
another elected president. Guatemala's long search
for stability and political maturity, however, is
far from over. Arana will begin with more assets
than his predecessor, but his prospects in office
depend on the unpredictable future course of action
and reaction among Guatemala's intensely antagonistic
subversive and political forces. The Communist
terrorist threat is likely to increase, and the new
political line-up promises to revive the raucous
politics not seen in the country since the 1963
coup.
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and the Clandestine Service.
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The Present Situation
1. Two phases of Guatemala's political obstacle
course have been hurdled clumsily but successfully
now that the campaign is over and the elections have
been held. The campaign was marred by Communist
terrorism and partisan mudslinging, and the vote on
1 March was indecisive. There remain several
pitfalls between this immediate post-electoral
period and the presidential succession, but right-
wing standard bearer Colonel Carlos Arana is expected
to take office as Guatemalan president on 1 July.
2. Government, presidential candidate Mario
Fuentes Pieruccini, who came in second in the popular
vote, has publicly released the deputies in congress
from partisan responsibility in the second-stage
legislative election rer;uired when no candidate
attains a popular majority. Some factions of his
governing Revolutionary Party were tempted earlier
to use their legislative majority to vote Fuentes
into office, but general recognition that a chaotic,
violent reaction would follow such a move has prompted
acquiescence to Arana's victory.
3. The thorniest problem during the inter-
regnum is security. The kidnaping of the foreign
minister on the eve of the election and the abduction
last week of a US Embassy officer testify to the
capability of Communist terrorists to engage in bold
acts that weaken public confidence in the government.
In view of Guatemala's history of political insta-
bility and the extended time frame between the
elections of 1 March and the succession on 1 July,
subversive activity could yet sabotage a transfer
of power. If he is installed in office, Arana will
be the first opposition candidate ever to receive the
reins of government from another elected president.
Arana and his Assets
4 Arana will take office with advantages
rightist control of the new legislature, give Arana
that outgoing President Mendez lacked--firm military
support and the backing of those who control most
of the country's wealth. These assets, along with
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a real opportunity to achieve a forceful administra-
tion and executive independence. His own personal
resources and political experience, however, are
limited. He seems to, combine a tough, caudillo
image, strong nationalism, and a reputation for
relentless anti-Communism with political naivete,
a simplistic point of view, and a willingness to
adopt extremist solutions when he feels they ure
necessary.
5. Colonel Arana, running on a law-and-order
platform, received nearly 43 percent of the popular
vote despite continued wrangling within his rightist
coalition, lack of funds, his own political inex-
perience, and his notoriety in center and left circles
as the strongman of Zacapa. No one dismissed his
law-and-order campaign as rhetoric, because he had
been in command in the heavily infested Zacapa area
during the violent campaign against the Communist
guerrillas in 1967-68. To clear the area of sub-
versives, Arana had employed an extralegal army of
rightist civilians, whose cutthroat methods terrorized
"suspects" as well as known guerrillas.
6. A number of these civilian extremists remain
part of Arana's entourage and act as his security
force. They tend to see an identity of interest
between themselves and Arana. With their history of
violent, irrational activity, they could become an
embarrassment to Arana as president or, worse, an
encouragement to other parties to organize their
own private security forces. The young secretary
general of the outgoing government party has already
organized a band of partisan toughs. Despite his
strong influence over civilian followers, Arana will
probably be unable to control all of them.
7. It seems unlikely that Arana will be com-
fortable in the presidential role. As a participant
in political discussions during the campaign, he
displayed little political acumen and seemed generally
out of his element. His instincts often serve him
well, however, and his behavior in victory has been
generous, nonpartisan, and reassuring to the legal
opposition parties.
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8. Arana's views on administration appear to
favor limiting the government's role in public
affairs to promoting order, ensuring personal safety,
and protecting private property. He believes in
free enterprise, the unrestricted play of economic
laws, and a restoration of "old moral values." His
intended tax reform calls for the prosecution of a
few prominent tax evaders in order to encourage the
majority to pay. He seems unlikely to make my
significant moves against the massive and entrenched
socioeconomic problems of the nation. Throughout
the campaign and as president-presumptive, he has
spoken on a variety of domestic issues, but his in-
terest clearly focuses on the need to end the rampant
crime and subversion in the country. The political
experts on whom he will probably lean are unlikely
to be interested in reform outside the spheres of law
enforcement and the judicial process.
The Communist Threat
9. Arana will almost surely find the Communists
more difficult to handle from the presidency than
from the command of the Zacapa brigade. The extra-
legal military and police operations against the
subversives were staged with the protective connivance
of the Mendez administration and the approval of the
rightist forces then in opposition. Arana's present
opposition, the center Revolutionary Party of the
outgoing government and the leftist Christian Demo-
cratic Party (DCG), fear persecution from a rightist
regime and will loudly protest any unleashing of
the civilian counterterrorists. Arana will probably
find that his support from the armed forces is
not so wholehearted when he is in the presidential
chair as it was when he was a military commander.
10. The Communists consider Arana their primary
enemy. If Arana becomes president, they will be
sure to harass his administration severely and may
become less selective in their violence. Should he
carry out his plan to suppress them and those who
he believes support them, the perennially divided
Communist movement may be forced into a semblance
of unity. He will remain a prime target for assassi-
nation during his tenure.
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11. The Cuban-oriented Rebel Armed Forces, one
of the two'major Communist factions, seems fairly
well organized for a significant guerrilla effort.
Its members have displayed willingness to take the
risks involved in spectacular acts of terrorism, and
their motivation will be higher with Arana as national
leader. They have small but well trained contingents
in most regions of Guatemala and have been preparing
to engage the security forces on more than one front.
Having learned the near impossibility of penetrating
the political apathy and fear of involvement of the
illiterate, withdrawn Indian peasantry, they have
stressed the development of self-sufficiency. They
appear to be well armed, and they have been highly
successful in collecting large ransoms for the release
of wealthy kidnap victims. They cannot threaten the
government's stability directly, but they are capable
of serious disruption.
12. The other main group, the Communist Party,
has traditionally preferred quasi-legal activity,
such as infiltration of registered political parties.
Its current penetration target is the Christian
Democratic Party, which appears to have won about
five seats in the congress. The DCG's strong
dependence on far-left groups in last week's
elections will probably make it vulnerable to any
strong anti-Communist program that develops. The
Communists will receive a strong psychological boost
if they can incite government persecution of an
ostensibly legitimate political organization.
Politics
13. Aside from the problem of subversion, the
new political line-up promises to bring forth the
kind of active, polemical partisanship not seen in
Guatemala since a coup ousted President Ydigoras in
1963. The outgoing Revolutionary Party's forte is
opposition, and its old vigor is likely to revive in
its more traditional'role, particularly with the
prodding competition of the now legal and partic-
.ipant DCG.
14. The euphoria of achieving an unprecedented
succession will not sustain stability for long. A
return to the old raucous politics will test Arana's
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promise of nonpartisanship and his desire for free
democratic political play. Broad tolerance on
Arana's part could easily lose him the respect of
the military and put him under pressure from his own
rightist coalition.
15. The Communist threat, which is likely to
increase with Arana's accession to office, will be
difficult to eliminate without resorting to heavy-
handed political persecution. Arana is and will
remain restricted in his personal movements and
isolated by the need for tight physical security.
His assassination before the transfer of power or
early in his term could create chaos in the country.
16. The room for slippage as Guatemala gropes
for a workable political system and effective nation-
hood remains great. The Mendez administration pri-
marily wanted to survive and thus provide at least
a constitutional base on which to build. President
Mendez opened a real opportunity for a new political
beginning by holding honest and open elections, and
especially by permitting victory to the opposition.
Arana seems to understand the significance of this
development and obviously wants to be an effective
leader who can provide his successor with a more
bountiful store of political assets. His prospects
for doing so, however, depend on the unpredictable
future course of action and reaction among Guate-
mala's intensely antagonistic subversive and polit-
ical forces.
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