RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST CHINA AND BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100070007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 29, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST CHINA AND BURMA
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29 January 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Relations Between Communist China and Burma
Summary
Relations between Peking and Rangoon have been
deteriorating steadily since last summer and are
now worse than at any time since the border settle-
ment in 1960. This agreement ended a long period
of tension marked by Chinese subversion in Burma
and repeated small-scale clashes along the Sino-
Burmese frontier.
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Peking's shift in line last June--in large part-
a reflection of domestic Cultural Revolution extrem-
ism--has aroused increasing Burmese anxiety over
Chinese intentions. A full scale propaganda cam-
paign in July denouncing the "fascist Ne Win clique"
and a public declaration of Chinese support for
Burmese Communist insurgents have apparently sparked
new fears in the Burme:_;e Government that Peking is
planning an intensified campaign of subversion or
even military intervention of some sort.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research.
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Peking is probably now committed to a policy
of hostility toward Burma and can be expected to do
what it can to exploit the manifold domestic prob-
lems besetting Rangoon. The Chinese appear, how-
ever, to have a sober and realistic view of diffi-
culties they face in the situation and the evidence
now available points to a long-range campaign con-
ducted on a limited scale. This could make serious
trouble for Burma but would probably not threaten
the existence of the regime.
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The Background of Sino-Burmese Relations
1. Prior to last summer, relations between
Peking and Rangoon were outwardly harmonious, re-
flecting a modus vivendi that had gradually deve-
loped since 1960. Burma retained its freedom of
action without undue interference from the "co-
lossus of the north" and was able to practice a
foreign policy of neutrality and isolation. China,
for its part, benefited from an almost total exclu-
sion of Western influence and presence in Burma,
which served to create a buffer zone on China's
southwest flank. Ever mindful of a Burmese pro-
verb that states, "When China spits--Burma swims,"
Rangoon has traditionally taken great pains to
avoid actions which could be construed as hostile
to Peking, and has stoically accepted China's tend-
ency to deal with Burma more as a vassal than as
a sovereign equal. In 1961, Burma allowed Chinese
military units to operate within Burmese territory
against Kuomintang remnants that were eventually
driven into Thailand. The same year, Rangoon ac-
cepted a credit of $84 million from Peking which
made China Burma's primary source of foreign aid.
The Chinese were probably further encouraged in
1962 when Ne Win's new military dictatorship em-
barked on a locally colored but highly inflexible
variant of Marxist authoritarianism--the "Burmese
road to Socialism."
2. Although Peking was, no doubt, initially
satisfied by its accommodation with Ne Win, Chi-
nese hopes for further benefits were quickly dis-
appointed. Under a facade of harmonious relations,
repeated, and at times heavy-handed, Chinese ef-
fort: to persuade Rangoon to lend itself to Chinese
political and propaganda lines were almost com-
pletely frustrated by Burmese xenophobia and devo-
tion to noninvolvement in international affairs.
Burma consistently refused to take an anti-US stand
on Vietnam, limiting itself to a statement in July
1964 of "concern" over the "grave situation" there.
Rangoon was among the first to adhere to the par-
tial nuclear test ban treaty, which Peking vehemently
opposed, and also stubbornly refused to participate
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in the abortive Afro-Asian Conference of 1965 which
the Chinese had hoped to dominate.
3. Peking also became increasingly dissatis-
fied with the Burmese Government's internal pol-
icies. Among the first targets of Ne Win's drive
to achieve state socialism were the approximately
400,000 overseas Chinese in Burma. In 1963 the
two Chinese banks in Burma were nationalized and
the assets of Chinese businessmen were seized. Pe-
king, however, adopted a tolerant attitude toward
these moves and did not make a major issue over
the plight of the overseas Chinese in Burma. A
far more serious point of friction emerged later
in the year involving the pro-Peking Burmese Com-
munist Party (CPB), which has been in insurgency
against the government since 1949. Although it
withheld open support for the party, China had long
harbored much of its leadership in Peking and had
strongly advocated a settlement between Rangoon
and the Communists which would provide for their
participation in a coalition government.
4. In September 1963, Ne Win entered into
talks with the Communist leadership, flown in from
Peking by the Chinese. His military regime, how-
ever, had no intention of sharing governmental au-
thority and the talks quickly broke down. Pledg-
ing complete destruction of the Communists, Ne Win
began massive arrests of virtually every above-ground
pro-Communist political figure in the country. A
few months later Rangoon, fearful of possible Chi-
nese support for the Communists, closed down Peking's
consulate in Mandalay for violation of propaganda
restrictions while allowing the US consulate to re-
main.
5. In spite of these affronts Peking continued
to withhold public support for the Burmese Commu-
nists and maintained the facade of close and friendly
relations with Rangoon. In July 1965, Ne Win paid
a state visit to Peking and a month later hosted
Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai in Rangoon. In April
1966, Liu made another trip to Rangoon accompanied
by Foreign Minister Chen Yi. The Chinese must have
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viewed these junkets, to some degree, as diplomatic
failures since the discussions during the three
visits produced bland and innocuous communiques at
a time when Peking was making a concerted effort to
win public support for its foreign policies from
Asian "third-world" states.
6. In 1966, Chinese misgivings were probably
strengthened by Burmese actions which indicated
a desire to cultivate a more active relationship
with the West. Rangoon's new tactics, reflected in
Ne Win's visit to the US in September 1966, were
probably originally intended simply to reaffirm
Burmese neutrality. By early 1967, however, the
Burmese Government was seriously considering the
purchase of substantial quantities of relatively
sophisticated US military equipment--a step the
Burmese almost certainly realized would result in
a deterioration in Sino-Burmese relations. By the
summer of 1967, Peking had few remaining illusions
concerning the reliability or future usefulness of
the Ne Win government.
The Events of Last Summer
7. Last summer's sharp disruption in Sino-
Burmese relations followed a general pattern of Chi-
nese activity abroad that has marred Peking's rela-
tions with most of the underdeveloped world during
the past year and a half. In Burma's case, the
trouble stemmed directly from the Chinese Embassy's
political activity among the local overseas Chinese
population--a reflection of the Cultural Revolution's
impact within the Foreign Ministry and on Chinese
missions abroad. Since early 1967, the embassy had
been sending propaganda teams into the interior of
Burma promoting the Cultural Revolution and distri-
buting Mao Tse-tung books and badges. Such overt
interference among a local Chinese population repre-
sented a major tactical shift in the conduct of
Chinese diplomatic missions, since Peking, hitherto,
had been extremely tactful in its involvement with
Chinese residents of ostensibly friendly nations.
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8. When the Chinese Embassy ignored Rangoon's
initial discreet complaints on the Mao propaganda
issue, the Ministry of Education on 19 June banned
the wearing of Mao Tse-tung badges at Chinese educa-
tional institutions. When the order was defied,
apparently with the encouragement of the Chinese
Embassy, various Chinese schools were closed as a
disciplinary measure. At this point, clashes be-
tween Chinese and Burmese student groups quickly
led to nation-wide anti-Chinese demonstrations and
rioting. The Burmese Government, which appeared
to give silent approval to the demonstrations, was
slow in restoring order and acted only after a
member of the Chinese mission in Rangoon was killed.
Although probably dismayed by the sudden turn. of
events, the Burmese apparently wanted to impress
upon Peking that the political activities of the
Chinese Embassy were unacceptable.
9. Peking was quick to charge the Burmese Gov-
ernment with responsibility for the anti-Chinese activ-
ity and demanded protection for Chinese diplomats and
nationals in Burma. This was followed by massive
demonstrations against the Burmese Embassy in Peking.
The Burmese quietly rejected the Chinese protests,
apparently hoping that Peking would eventually allow
tensions to subside. At this crucial moment, however,
the Chinese launched a full-scale propaganda offensive
against the "fascist Ne Win clique" and, most impor-
tantly, for the first time gave public support for
the Burmese Communist insurgents, By taking such a
step, Peking made it clear that its policy of accom-
modation with Rangoon was being scrapped'in favor of
an openly hostile stance toward "Burma's Chiang Kai-
shek."
10. Relations between Rangoon and Peking grew
steadily worse. Approximately 450 Chinese aid tech-
nicians were withdrawn from Burma in October at Ran-
goon's initiative. Only skeleton diplomatic staffs
now remain in the two capitals and relations are
virtually suspended. Chinese propaganda since then
has continued to call for a "people's revolution" in
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Burma. In addition to supporting the Burmese Com-
munists, Peking has directed its propaganda at all
discontented Burmese elements, hoping to capitalize
on Rangoon's economic mismanagement and unpopular
minority policies. Faced with such hostility on the
party of Peking and an increasing numb,:r of reports
of Chinese support for both Communist and ethnic
insurgents, the Burmese Government has resigned itself
to the prospect of a complete break with Peking.
The Impact of the Cultural Revolution
11. Peking's actions in the disruption of Sino-
Burmese relations should probably be assessed within
the context of the Cultural Revolution and the Impli-
cations it held at the time for Chinese foreign policy.
Last June the Foreign Ministry in Peking had been lit-
erally taken over by Red Guards and many of its respon-
sible officials had been replaced by Maoi3t extrem-
ists--fervent revolutionaries but inexpeir.enced in
foreign affairs. This development was reflected in a
series of similar disturbances provoked by Chinese of-
ficials in several other Asian countries.
12. Although Chou En-lai and the more moderate
elements still remaining in the Chinese Foreign Min-
istry probably would have preferred a more restrained
response to Burma's "anti-Chinese" activities, thus
preserving the status quo in Sino-Burmese relations,
the long-growing disenchantment with Ne Win probably
undercut their opposition to the then dominant ex-
tremists. The destruction of the rdodus vivendi pre-
viously existing between China and Burma can, therefore,
be viewed primarily as a by-product 'of the Cultural Rev-
olution. It probably did not signal a conscious, pre-
meditated change in Chinese foreign policy and, in
particular, does not seem to represent a new Chinese
timetable for insurgency and "people's war" in South-
east Asia.
Chinese Support of Communist Insurgency in Burma
13. Peking has made it clear that the "people's
war" it advocates in Burma is to be Communist-led. The
Communist Party of Burma (CPB)'s 4,000-man guerrilla
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force, which operates primarily in the interior of
Burma where government control and military capa-
bility are greatest, has to date been little more
than a nuisance to Rangoon. Unlike Burma's ethnic
insurgents, who fight for autonomy or independence
from Rangoon, the CPB has,had no success in de-
veloping a popular base. In fact, the open Chinese
support for the party since last summer has prob-
ably further lessened its appeal to the average
Burmese peasant, who is generally anti-Chinese.
14. Despite the CPB's inef:E~ ctual record,
Rangoon reacts with alarm to Communist insurgency
since the Communists are ethnic Burmese who oper-
ate in Burma's rice producing heartland. It has
been easier for the government to tolerate far
more serious insurgency in the remote and sparsely
populated minority areas.
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The Chinese would find it extremely difficult to
deliver aid to the CPB in that area because Bur-
mese territory there is largely under the control
of anti-Communist ethnic insurgents. If the Bur-
mese party can gain a significant level of coop-
eration with these ethnic insurgents--something
they have been unable to do in the past--and thus
gain access to the Chinese frontier, the potential
Communist threat to Rangoon would be significantly
increased.
15. The relatively cautious approach Peking
has taken with regard to the CPB since last sum-
mer, however, indicates the Chinese see little
prospect of developing an effectiv', Communist in-
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probably given the CPB only limited financial sup-
port and some paramilitary training.
and probably hopes that such low-keyed assistance
will lead to a gradual strengthening of the Bur-
mese organization.
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Peking recognizes CPB's limited capa ilitie
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16. A New China News Agency year-end status re-
port on the CPB underscored this realistic assessment
of tte party's immediate prospects. While hailing
a series of "brilliant victories," by the Burmese
Communists, Peking stressed the lony-term nature of
their struggle. The Party was lauded for its 20-year
effort to build a popular political base necessary
for a successful "people's war." It probably derived
little comfort, however, from Peking's admonition that
further "protracted struggles" lie ahead or from the
implication that the CPB's bleak years of isolation
and "self-reliance" were the correct environment for
"party-building." Peking's rosy picture of an "excel-
lent revolitionary situation" in Burma seemed designed
to cloak China's reluctance to commit itself to more
active support of the party.
in the Burmese Border Area
Chinese Support for Ethnic Insurgency
17. Peking's potential for fomenting insurgency
in Burma is much greater in the ethnic minority areas
adjacent to the Chinese border. This rugged and inac-
cessible terrain is inhabited primarily by Kachin and
Shan tribesmen who cling to a traditional animosity
to Burmese rule. In addition, there are a number of
minor tribes in the area all of which resist Burmese
rule to some degree. The China Burma border has not
been in dispute since the conclusion of a Sino-Burmese
border agreement in 1960. The boundary, however,
winds through extremely rugged terrain and is virtu-
ally impossible to police. As a result, the tribal
inhabitants of the area are able to come and go across
the frontier with relative freedom. Except in major
towns, Rangoon has never established control over
this area, and much of the ter:itory has long been
under the de facto control of insurgent armies. Many
of these insurgents, particularly some of the Shans,
have degenerated into gangs of bandits or opium runners.
The Kachin insurgents, however, have maintained a
relatively high degree of political motivation and prob-
ably represent the most effective insurgent group in
Burma..
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21. There is no evidence, however, to suggest
that the Chinese are trying to woo the ethnic insur-
gents, such as by attempting to engineer the creation
of a "liberated area" in northern Burma. Even if
Peking had the disposition and assets to undertake
such action, the explosive political situation which
now exists in Yunnan Province would probably seriously
hamper such an ambitious 'undertaking.
23. Peking now appears committed to a policy
of hostility toward Rangoon. The Chinese may believe
that the actions during the Summer and Fall have
strained relations with Rangoon so severely that a
return to the previous status of "friendly neutrality"
is not possible in the near future. There are indi-
cations that moderate elements in the Chinese Foreign
Ministry are trying to get Peking's foreign policy
back into pre-Cultural Revolution channels. They
probably calculate, however, that even if they were
free to adopt a conciliatory approach to Burma--which
has recently affronted Peking again by ordering the
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expulsion of two New China News Agency officals from
Rangoon--such a policy would offer little opportunity
for Chinese exploitation.
24. The Chinese, however, do not appear as though
they will embark on an adventurous course involving
them in a major confrontation with the Burmese. Peking's
most recent public assessment of the situation in Burma
took a sober view of the prospects for insurgency and
avoided any explicit commitment to support the Bur-
mese Communists. The kind of small-scale assistance
reportedly supplied by the Chinese suggests that they
regard Burma's present mixed bag of insurgent groups
as something less than a reliable and effective in-
strument. Peking is, moreover, diverted by serious
domestic problems and by its efforts to support the war
in Vietnam.
25. The evidence now available points to a long--
range Chinese campaign conducted on a limited scale.
The Me Win regime, like its predecessors over the
pa: c0 years, has always faced widespread insurgency.
Al. ,,-,...gh a small Chinese-inspired and supported es-
calation of subversive activity could impose a serious
additional burden on the already thinly spread Burmese
security forces, it would probably not pose a criti-
cal threat to Rangoon.
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