THE SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 97
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1974
• Content Type: CH

 Approved For Release 1999/09/25~G1~~~P$5T008~~ R00 00030001-2
The South Asian Military Handbook
9te~re~-
August 197
No Foreign I~issem
i~? 314
Approved For Release 1999/09/25. ; CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
Nu Uissrrrr ~t brood/i3uckgruurui Usr Only
Cnnu?ulic~c! Ui.t?a?crrr
25X1A9a
This publication was prepared jointly by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, ~)efense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
It is anticipated that the Handbook will be updated, when
necessary, by issuing only relevant sections rather than re-issuing the
entire publication. For this reason, the Handbook has been punched
for insertion in a three-ring binder.
Comments or queries regarding the contents of this publication
are welcome. ~?hey may be directed to~Chief/South Asia
Branch, OCI/c~lA, Code 143, Extension 60G2.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized nisclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 014522
Exrmpt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?SB(il, (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible fo determine
,~
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 .CIA-RDP85T00875R001' 00030001-2
~'.~
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRE"T
August 1974
No. 0992/74
I. BACKGROUND 19~i7-1974
A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary
B. Pushtunistan
1
3
C. South Asia ar~d the Great Powers
. 4
D. Threats to Internal Stability
8
II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
A. India
1
B. Pakistan
. 6
C. Bangladesh
11
D. Afghanistan
13
E. Nepal
15
F. Sri Lanka
16
Tables: 1. Selected Armaments and Forces
20
2. Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border 24
3. India-Pakistan War Losses 25
4.
Military Advisers in Foreign Countries
26
Maps:
1.
India -Internal Administration
2.
India -Army Order of Battle
3.
India -Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
4.
India -Naval Order of Battle
5.
Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border
6. Jammu/Kashmir Area
7. Pakistan -Internal Administration
8. Pakistan -Army Order of Battle
9. Pakistan -Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
10. Pakistan -Naval Urder of Battle
11. Ground Forces on Afghan-Pakistani Border
12. Bangladesh -Internal Administration
13. Bangladesh -Order of Battle
14. Afghanistan -Internal Administration
15. Afghanistan -Order of Battle
16. Nepal -Internal Administration
17. Nepal -Order of Battle
18. Sri Lanka -Internal Administration
19. Sri Lanka -Order of Battle
SECRET
~ ..
Approved Fo.r Release 199/09/25 ~CIA-I~-DP85~~da875R00~1^10~030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1
A.
India .
2
B.
Pakistan
3
C.
Bangladesh
3
D.
Afghanistan
3
E.
Nepal
3
F.
Sri Lanka
i
Tables:
es
1. Military Expenditures, South Asian Countr
~
2. India: Gross Defense Expenditures
3. India: Distribution of Defense Expenditures
5
4. India: Percentage Distribution of
Defense Expenditures
5. India: Functional Distribution of
6
Defense Expenditures
6. India: Percentage Distribution of
6
Defense Expenditures
7
7. Pakistan: Military Expenditures
8
8. Bangladesh: Military Expenditures
8
9. Afghanistan: Military Expenditures
9
10. Nepal: Military Expenditures
9
11. Sri Lanka: Military Expenditures
9
IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION
1
A. India
G
6. Pakistan
7
C. Bangladesh
7
D. Afghanistan
7
E. Nepal
. 7
~=. Sri Lanka
8
Tables: 1. India: Defense Production
: 9
2. India: Aircraft Production
V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY
1
A. India
5
B. Pakistan
8
C. Bangladesh
. 9
D. Afghanistan ~ ~
10
E. Nepal
11
F. Sri Lanka
12
~i ablest 1. India: Foreign Military Imports
2. India: Soviet Military Supply Agreements
13
ii
SECRET
;~
Approved For Release 1999/,09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R0011 d0030001-2
~ ~ `ti ~ 4.~..e:~':u ~'-4' e.Ci ~3*~ ti.nn.~~.~~ k ~r ~ J.A~'iy n ~.; ilia .~. rti:~w, ?1 /.~ F ~d':
!iw "'4~iry5piii~~ASatiaw~e+ta~ew~.wrre~ea~7R{ ~t.:6Sf~.~s~~'Y2.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
3. Pakistan: Foreign Military Imports
14
4. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements with China
14
5. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements
with France
15
6. Bangladesh: Foreign Military Imports
15
7. Afghanistan: Foreign Military Imports
16
8. Afghanistan: Soviet Military
Supply Agreements
16
9. Nepal: Foreign Military Imports
17
10. Sri Lanka: Foreign Military Imports .
17
ANNEXES
A. South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capability
A-1
B. Biographic Sketches of Military Leaders
B_1
C. Chronology of Major Events in South Asia 1940-1974
C-1
GLOSSARY
Performance Characteristics of Selected South Asian
Military Equipment
G-1
SECRET
t~ .. ,. _ ~r ,~
Approved For Release 1999/09/25..: CIA-RDP85T00875R001~'1 b0030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
I. BACKGROUND 1947-1974
A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary
Partition and Kashmir
In August 1947, following years of agitation by the predominantly
Hindu Congress Party, Great Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same
time, as a result of Muslim agitation, Britain partitioned India, creating
Pakistan from the two largest predominantly Muslim areas.
The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and
were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition
became official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India, and
millions of Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both
sides encouraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's
population remained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistar~-
almost all in East Pakistan.
Large parts of the British Indian Empire h.~d been ruled by theoretically
sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether
their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances
where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did
not become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes
ruled predominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous ~ic~ Pakistan.
Although several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to
remain independent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into
India.
In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was
mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim
subjects rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this
point-on October 27-the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian
military assistance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The
Indians and the Pakistanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end
India held most of the state, including the strategically important Vale.
Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a
small part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad
Kashmir. The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the
future status of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. Acease-fire line
was delineated in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the
de facto boundary until 1971.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
.,
x .. ~;..~.: x.. ...r,.,;.M,:! C}. ~'"m:~A y'~ RrC'`, r~u"~v~u5 Lp w'.i il, ,k '. ..ii:'..
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, tine Awami League,
which advocated provincial autonomy, Enron enough seats in East Pakistan to
ensure an absolute majority in the projec`ed Pakistan National Assembly.
The assembly was to write a new constitu'i~n, and the leaders of the league
refused to compromise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would
eventually dissolve the union. In early March 1971, the Awami League iii
effect took over the administration of the province, and on March 25, the
army moved to restore central authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed
their independence.
For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between
India and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965,
however, serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the
Arabian Sea known as the Rann of Klatch, where India and Pakistan had
conflicting claims. loth sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a
decisior, was announced that vvas generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan.
In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian-
held Kashmir, India moved quickly to seal off the ~ccess routes, making
incursions into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for
rebellion developed among the Kashmiris. On September 1, Pakistan
launched an attack against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting
India's communications with its forces farther north iri the state. Five days
later, India began afull-scale attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The
Pakistanis field the Indians outside of Lahore, and with little or r~o resistance
captured extensive desert area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance
farther into Kashmir. By mutual agreement there was virtually Rio fighting
along the border between India and East Pakistan. After three weeks of
fighting in the West, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The
Pakistanis were running critically short of military supplies, while the Indians
believed that their gains would not be worth the considerable cost of
protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two countries reached an
agreement in January 1966 at Tu;'~kent that restored the border to that
existing before the war.
Bangladesh and Kashmir
The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan.
Abc;ut 10 million Bengalees eventually f.^d to India, creating major eco-
nomic proble~,ns and potentir~!ly serious political and social ones.
sECRE~r
SEC.'~ET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :-CIA-RDP85T00875R0011~00030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
s~,cRr~r
Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they
never became more than along-term potential threat to the moderates in the
freedom movement.
India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to
grant the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly
willing to risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade
strength, were conducting raids into East Pakistan.
On December 3, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western
India, and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on December 4,
India invaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of
fighting, and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main
Pakistani attack into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory
along the cease-fire line. In the strategic Lahore sector, thrre was relatively
little fighting, but in the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of
territory. The Indians proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western
border effective as of December 17, and the Pakistanis concurreu.
In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops
from occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control"
was established. The agreement was implemented in December.
In August 1973, India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangla-
desh, agreed to a three-way repatriaticr~ of Pakistani prisoners of war from
India, Bengalees from Pakistan to Bangladesh, and Pakistanis and some
non-Bengalee Muslims from Bangladesh to Pakistan. By February 1974,
Pakistan was willing to extend official recognition to Bangladesh and, at a
tripartite meeting in New Delhi in April, Bangladesh gave up all plans for
holding war crimes trials for some of thr Pakistani prisoners of war. The
repatriation of the POWs was completed b'; May 1.
A new factor in Indo-Pakistani relations emerged with the explosion of
a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974, New Delhi's public assurances
that the test was only for peaceful purposes did little to calm the strongly
negative reaction in Pakistan. Moves toward normalization of relations
between the two governments were expected to be more difficult in the
aftermath of the nuclear explosion because the government of Pakistan
could not afford to appear to be negotiating new agreements with India
under the threat of nuclear blackmail.
Pushtunistan is an Afghan term that generally refers to the two eastern
provinces of Pakistan: Baluchistan, grid the North West Frontier. Sparsely
SECRET
.. ._ .
"Approvec~~~For Release 1999/09125 : ~C~A-F~DP8~T~0875R00110003000'1-2
~rti.~~:rii.~+?w..t4nlr_:tLft~+.v'..,.,i m~'!~~ ~.,d:.'Ftir.S.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
s~,cRET
populated by tribesmen speaking Pushtu, Baluchi, or Brahui, the two
provinces comprise more than half of the land area of Pakistan and have an
extended Arabian Sea coastline.
The Pushtu-speaking tribesmen were separated from their fellow tribes
in Afghanistan in 1893 when aBritish-Afghan agreement esta~alished the
Durand Line as the international boundary between British India and
Afghanistan. This boundary was confirmed in a treaty between the two
countries in 1919.
When Pakistan became independent in 1947, Afghanistan stated that it
considered the 1893 treaty invalid because it had been signed under duress,
and further asserted that it did not recognize the line as tl~e border between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Continuing at varying levels over the years, the
dispute reached its peak in 19G0 and 1961 with oorder clashes, restrictions
on the seasonal migration of Afghan nomads into Pakistan, and Afghani-
stan's refusal to use its only railway link to the Indian Ocean at Karachi.
Relations improved after the resignation of prime minister Mohammad
Daoud in 1963.
In July 1Q73, when a military coup returned Daoud to the presidency,
he immediately reactivated the dispute and has since pursued it by diplo-
macy and propaganda. In response, Pakistan instituted an aggressive policy
th?t inclurJed an increased military and official civilian presence in tribal
areas bordering Afghanistan, and a firm iefusal to discuss its policies and
programs in the two provinces.
Afghanistan has never publicly gone further than demands for self-
determination for the people of Pushtunistan, but most Pakistanis are
convinced that incorporation is the Afghan goal. The Soviet Union has
backed the Afghan position since 1955, while the US recognizes the Durand
Line as an international boundary.
C. South Asia and the Great Powers
Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in
South Asia. In the 1950s US?Soviet tensions played an important part in
determining not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great
Powers, but relations among the South Asian nations themselves. The emer-
gence of China in the 1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet
relations in the 1970s have also had a significant impact.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
sECxE~r
Washington's policy of containment during t~~e 1950s put the US at
odds with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan:
-India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean
conflict and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the
Soviet intervention in Hunr ary, led to serious strains between
Washington and New Delhi;
-US efforts to contain the USSr~ resulted in the inclusion of
Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, a,~d in bilateral defense agree-
ments with the US in 19 ~4 and 195~~.
Moscow, after Stalin's deat~~ in 1953, placed a high priority on develop-
ing close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism.
In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, prin-
cipally Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid,
enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military
assistance agreement prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir
dispute.
China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for
international expression and also developed close ties with India. At the
same time, India emphasized its own nonalignment and acted as a leader of
the Third World.
Beginning in the late 1950s, tha growing power of China began to
change relationships in the sub-continent:
SErR ET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
-China and India began to see each other as rival;; for leadership
in Asia and in the Third World;
-Sinn-Soviet rivalry encauragr ~ close Indo-Soviet relations;
-Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and
as early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a
border agreement, which was finally signed in 19~?;
-The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in
New Delhi and to contain China, took some tentative steps
toward improving relations with New Delhi.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends tc
a Dead. The US and UK rushed arms to India to demonstrate their support
for New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was
badly shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility
of Pakistan and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a
Communist and anon-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms
shipments began arriving the following year.
The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when
the US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was
replaced by China.
Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both
reflected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in
South Asia:
-Both sought to contain China;
-Both worked for stability in the sub-continent;
-In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly
::ontributed to the receptivity of each country to the eventual
Soviet mediation at Tashkent;
-Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan.
Following the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with
Pakistan slightly, at minor cost to its relations with India.
In the early 1970s, there has been some swing back toward the relations
existing in the 195Us The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest ire
India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major
complication in Pakistan ~ foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain
relations with one of its Great Power allies without offending the other. US
and Chinese policy toward the sub^ontinent began to coincide. For example,
the policies of the two countries d;.~ring the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were
roughly parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry,
together with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations between
New Delhi and Moscow-symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Sovi;;t Friendship
Treaty.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
s:>~cRE~r
The independence of Bangladesh injected a new factor into the South
Asian equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel
India's. Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid
from the US. Its relations with the USSR were limited to some extent by
Soviet reluctance to undercut New Delhi's influence in Dacca. China origi-
nally refused to have any dealings with the new nation but was expected to
extend recognition itself following Pakistani's recognition of Bangladesh in
early 1974 and abandonment by Dacca of all plans to place Pakistani POWs
on trial for war crimes.
The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power -South Asian
relationship are already visible. By May 1974, there were hints that China
and India had begun moving toward rapprochement. Indo-US relations,
badly h~.irt during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, were improving. The'JSSR
wa:~ once again seeking better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan, for its
part, seemed to want a more amiable relationship with Moscow. The effect
on Indian and Pakistani relations with the Great Powers of New Delhi's
decision to detonate a nuclear device on May 18, 1974 was not yet clear as
this edition of the handbook went to press.
Regional Relations
Relations between India and Pakistan have influenced and been in-
fluenced by the policiF,s of the smaller nations of the area.
Iran has usually supported Pakistan, providing limited quantities of
military supplies and sanctuary for Pakistani civil aircraft during Pakistan's
wars with India and using its diplomatic influence on Islamabad's behalf. The
Iranian interest is in maintaining a stable and independent nation on its
eastern border and in limiting Soviet, Chinese, and Indian influence both in
South Asia and farther west. Iran has never, however, pressed its support of
Pakistan to the point of actual involvement in combat operations.
Sri Lanka and Nepal have pursued a policy of preserving their inde-
pendence and freedom of action by playing not only India against Pakista~~,
but the Great Powers against each other. India seeks, at a minimum, to have
no other power dominant in these t:~~o countries, and-especially in Nepal-
has made special efforts to increase Indian influence.
SECRET
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECIZE'T
D. Threats to Internal Stability
Afghanistan
Traditionally, the main threat to any Afghan regime has come from the
Pushtu-speaking tribes that have resisted the efforts of the central govern-
ment to impose its authority on them. At present, the tribes are quiescent.
Immediately after the Daoud coup of July 1973, communist sympathizers
reportedly assumed positions of influence in the government and military. In
mid-1974, however, President Daoud was said to be slowly removing these
indiviauals from their posts.
Bangladesh
Almost from its establishment, the Bangladesh government has been
plagued by general lawlessness throughout the country, including robbery,
political assassinations, and localized armed resistance to authority. Dacca is
hopeful that a campaign begun in Spring 1974 by its security forces,
spearheaded by the army, will reduce these threats to its internal stability.
There are several small radical groups identifying themselves as communists.
These groups hold no political positions and pose little threat to the
government. The communists do, however, exert some influence over radical
students and labor groups.
Widespread poverty and over-population together with language, ethnic,
and regional differences and political instability on the state level all con-
tribute to internal instability in India. In 1974, food riots erupted in the
states of Gujarat and Bihar, and the army was called upon to assist state
security forces to restore order. In the past, Naga and Mizo tribal elements in
eastern India have rebelled against the central government in their attempts
to gain independence. For the present, the two tribes are quiet, but their
basic discontent remains.
Although they do not pose a direct threat to stability, communists
exert an important influence on the political life of India. The communist
movement is presently split into two major parties and a number of small
splinter groups. AI':hough total membership is only 165,000, the various
parties have attracted 14 million voters, enabling them to win 49 of the 545
seats in the lower house of parliament as well as a number of state offices.
SECRET
~ Approved For Release 19,99/09L25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R00'~100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
s~c~z~~r
Nepal
What threat there is to Nepal's internal security comes from a small
group of Nepali Congress Party politicians led by former prime minister B. P.
Koirala, all 01 whom arc presently in exile in India. Although Koirala's
supporters have led student disorders in Nepal, they are not believed capable
of mounting a nationwide uprising against the government. Two terrorist
bombings occurred in early 1974, however, and more are likely. Communists
in Nepal number an estimated 8,000 and are split into pro-Soviet and
pro-Peking factions. Communists and their sympathizers have served in the
government and in parliament, but the party has its greatest influence with
urban groups, students, and educators.
The greatest threat to Pakistan's internal stability remains the possi-
bility of a further breakup of the country. Pushtu-speaking and related tribal
elements in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan are pressing
for a very large degree of autonomy, and in early 1974 aloes-level insurgency
existed in Baluchistan.
Civilian governments in Pakistan are also faced with the danger of a
military take-over. Military dictatorships have ruled Pakistan for 13 of its
first 27 years as an independent nation. At present, Prime Minister Bhutto
appears to have the situation under control and to have the loyalty of the
armed forces. The military, however, would probably step in to seize power
if it appeared that civilian government was unable to function effectively.
In April and May 1971, the Bandaranaike government was challenged
by a loosely organized insurgency spearheaded by educated, unemployed
youths dissatisfied with the government's failure to solve deep-seated eco-
nomic and social problems. The genesis and development of the insurgency
was indigenous and no material assistance was received from outside sources.
More than 15,000 dissidents or suspected supporters were eventually
apprehended, and the insurrection attempt was put down although isolated,
small armed bands were continuing to operate in the jungle areas in 1974.
Continuing social and economic problems could precipitate another insur-
rection at some pont in the future.
There are about 2,800 Communists in Sri Lanka. About 2,000 are in
the pro-Moscow party, which is a member of the coalition government; the
other 800 are members of the pro-Peking faction and oppose the
government.
Approved For Release ~1999~09/25 CYy4 RDPSvTt
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
The 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated India's pre-eminence as a
military power in South Asia. Although Pakistan's military capability re-
mained largely intact following the conflict, the country's leaders recognize
that their armed forces are no match for India's. There is little difference
between the two forces in terms of leadership, morale, or logistic capability,
but the Indian armed forces are much larger and better r:quipped, and would
ultimately overwhelm their foe. India's military strength has, in fact, evolved
to the point where it probably could defend itself successfully against a
conventional attack by China or a combined Chinese-Pakistani attack.
The key to India's strong position is its massive military expansion
program, including development of a domestic armaments industry, begun
after the 1962 hostilities with China. India is continuing to purchase sophis-
ticated military equipment from the Soviet Union as well as from East
European and Free World countries, and is arranging for production of such
items whenever feasible. Pakistan, in turn, has increased its efforts to develop
a domestic armaments industry and acquire sophisticated military equip-
ment, primarily through France and the People's Republic of China. Never-
theless, it is doubtful that military parity with India will ever be restored.
Of the remaining countries in South Asia, only Afghanistan has a
creditable defense establishment. Its military potential has traditionally been
low, however, owing to the lack of effective training and the poor quality of
its personnel. The armed forces of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have no
offensive, and limited defensive, capability.
Ground: The Indian army is capable of successful offensive and defensive
operations within South Asia. It could also constitute an effective expedi-
tionary force within the region, using its own resources, or elsewhere in
combination with a major power. The Indian army, in conjunction with the
paramilitary forces, is capable of maintaining internal security and meeting
any civil emergency. The army has a personnel strength of about 1,092,000.
Service is not compulsory. Enlistment is permitted between the ages of 17
and 24 for 10, 12, or 15 years of active service. Based on the availability of
organized reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and cadres, admin-
istrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without additional
logistic support, maximum mobilization ^ould be reached on M plus 90 with
1,175,000 troops. The manpower would come from the Reserve Force (a
pool of men who have completed active service), from the Territorial Army,
.SECRE'T'
. __
'Approved For Release 1999%0925 CIA'-RDP8'STQ`Q$?5R~001 ~`000~0001
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
and from the National Cadet Corps. Among the principal weaknesses of the
army are logistics problems stemming from a diversity of equipment and a
shortage :~f junior officers, especially those with technical backgrounds.
Combat and support units are divided into five geographic (territorial)
commands, with the majority of troops conceni~ated either on the western
border with Pakistan or in northeastern India. Maior tactical units include:
7 corps headquarters
15 infantry divisions
10 mountain divisions
2 armored divisions
2 (independent) infantry brigades
2 (independent) parachute brigades
3 (independent) artillery brigades
7 corps artillery brigades
5 (independent) armored brigades
4 (independent) air defense brigades
Ten infantry divisions, an armored division, and several independent
brigades are deployed against Pakistan, while six mountu~r divisions (in
northeastern India) and one infantry division (in Ladakh) are stationed
across the border from Chinese forces in Tibet and Sinkiang.*
Arms and equipment area mixture of imported and indigenously
produced or assembled equipment. The USSR supplanted the UK and the
US as the principal provider of military equipment after 1965. Foreign
technical assistance is minimal; the quality of maintenance is good. A small
number of personnel are sent abroad for staff or advanced technical training,
but the army itself conducts a program covering all requirements, from basic
individual through advanced unit and high-level command and staff training.
Many of the Indian army schools d~cept students from less-developed
countries.** On occasion, training missions are sent out of the country.
Despite problems stemming from a diversity of equiprrrent, the army
logistic system is capable of maintaining the forces. Vulnerable lines of
communication, however, could jeopardize Indian forces in Kashmir and
*Chir:ese forces along the borders with India include three infantry divisions, one
independent artillery regiment, and ten border defense regiments. No combat aircraft are
stationed permanently at airfields in Tibet.
**.~fghanistar:, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Chana, Egypt, Kenya, Iraq, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Nigeria, Tanzania, Singapore, Sudar:, the Republic of Yemen, and Zambia send
students.
SECRET
Approved For Re1e~~~"~~99/09125:-CtA-R~P85'FOfl875-R00'I~I00030001-=2
,
~` ,
,(, ,.r ~`~ 1?~t 4 }~ ~'~`k:4ae5~ r~?_ ,L,s.a1r.;,n~~'~.1'~ .~Xr.,trii:,~.S~~,tta ~:it::MaJ. ._,.,.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
northeastern India. The Banihal Road is the only major land communica-
tions link in Kashmir, and its severance would seriously hamper any opera-
tions in the area. An alternate but less satisfactory route is available.
Reliance on a single-track railroad from West Bengal to Arunchal Pradesh,
opposite China, has also been a significant loyis~lic weakness, but this has
been alleviated by the emergence of a friendly Bangladesh that would
probably give transit rights to Indian forces. An extensive system of depots is
maintained throughout India. Stocks of ammunition, POL, and other stores
are considered sufficient to support a maximum combat effort of at least 45
days.
Air: The air force is capable of providing air defense and engaging in strategic
and tactical operations within South Asia, as well as assisting in civil
emergencies. Its main strengths are:
? the availability of ample manpower;
? the high morale and individual capabilities of personnel;
? the ongoing program to acquire modern aircraft from outside
sources, while simultaneously developing an indigenous manufacture/
assembly capability.
The principal weakness is the diversity of aircraft (over 35 types). With such
variety, there is considerable difficulty in resupply, procurement of spare
parts, and training of qualified pilots and maintenance personnel. Other
weaknesses include the lack of an effective strategic strike force, fuel
shortages, maintenance problems with the MIG-21/Fish bed, easily disrupted
landline communications in the air defense system, and lack of an all-
weather air-to-air missile.
There are 105,000 men in the air force, of whom 2,300 are pilots. The
aircraft inventory totals 1,399, including 331 supersonic and 260 subsonic
fighters, 38 light bombers, 213 transports, 16 reconnaissance, 218 helicop-
ters, and 323 other aircraft. The air force is organized into 95 units: 8 day
fighter; 9 fighter/interceptor; 15 fighter-bomber; 3 light bomber; 1 strategic
reconnaissance; 1 maritime reconnaissance; 13 transport; 14 helicopter; 1
VIP; and 30 miscellaneous training and utility. Most of the major combat
units are strategically located along the border areas. More than half of the
flying units are based in the western portion of the country. Prior to any
hostilities, a wide dispersal of fo~~ces and aircraft to numerous forward
locations could be expected.
Tf-~~ air defense network is composed of radar, aircraft, missile, and
antiaircraft artillery units. The radar screen is oriented largely toward the
SECRET
/ Approved For Release 1.999/09125 :CIA-
RDP$5T00875R0011O0030'001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
north and northwest. The net provides radar surveillance over virtually all of
the common land frontiers shared with Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, the
People's Republic of China, Bangladesh, and Burma. This system operates
creditably, considering the limited resources available and the fact that the
system must defend a 2,400-mile border facing the Himalayan mountains.
The principal weaknesses are equipment shortages and vulnerable com-
munications.
The SA-2 SP.M system, used in the defense of significant military/in-
dustrial targets, includes five main complexes consisting of 19 active sites
(squadrons). The Fan Song F radar has been identified with the system,
enhancing its electronic counter-countermeasure and low-altitude capability.
Indian army antiaircraft weapons proved the most effective defense against
low-level ground attacks and strikes on airfields during the 1971 war.
The air force has a minor strategic bombing capability that would
permit it to strike all targets in Pakistan. MIG-21/Fishbed are used in the
interceptor or ground support role, depending on mission priority. Fifteen
fighter-bomber squadrons (S1J-7/Fitter, HF-24 Marut, and F-56 Hawker
Hunter day fighters) are also available for strike operations. Transport
capability is built aruund 13 squadrons of medium and light transports,
including aging C-47 and C-119G Packets, DHC-4 Caribous, AN-12 Cubs, and
MI-4 Hound and MI-8 Hip helicopters. It is estimated that the air force is
capable of transporting one of the army's parachute brigades on a single lift
under optimum conditions. Inadequate logistic support would preclude
sustained operations on this scale. Pilots are well trained and effective in
aerial resupply under visual conditions.
The air force sends students to the USSR for training on the various
pieces of Soviet-provided equipr~ient, and Soviet technical specialists in India
provide guidance in specialized fields. Students also attend staff colleges in
the UK and Australia on an ex:hange basis, and Egypt and France have
conducted training programs for air and ground crews. The Indian air force
also trains a limited number of students from other Asian and African
countries.
Air force logistics are hampered by the many types of aircraft. Mainten-
ance is further complicated by an inadequate number- of trained personnel,
shortages of test equipment, insufficient spare parts, and lengthy lead times
in the procurement of spare parts for foreign-made aircraft. The air force
normally has an operationally ready rate of 70 percent, but current fuel
shortages are probably degrading this rate.
II -4
SECRET
,Approved For Release 1999/09/~5~-:-~-IA-R~~S5T0~087vR001-400030001-2 -
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
Navy: The Indian navy, with 33,000 men (including air arm) and the largest,
most potent fleet in South Asia, is capable of successful offensive or
defensive operations in the region.
The navy has 1 antisubmarine warfare :support aircraft carrier, 2 light
cruisers, 6 submarines (Foxtrot class), 19 destroyer/destroyer-escort vessels
(including 9 Petya class and 1 indigenously produced Leander class), 8
Osa-class large guided-missile boats, 16 patrol vessels, 8mine-warfare ships, 3
amphibious ships, and a large number of auxiliary and service craft. The Osa
boats, equipped with the Styx missile, are unmatched in the area and were a
decisive factor in the naval engagements during the 1971 conflict.
While the navy's antisubmarine warfare capability is effective within
confined areas, the small number of antisubmarine warfare ships and aircraft
would preclude simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters. Another serious
shortcoming is the paucity of minesweepers.
The main operating bases and principal activities of the navy are in the
ports of Bombay on the west coast, Cochin in the south, and Vishakhapat-
nam on the east coast. The majority of ships and craft are based at Bombay,
with most of the remainder at Vishakhapatnam and a few at Cochin. The
Western Fleet, operating out of Bombay, consists of the aircraft carrier, the
2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers*, 12 destroyer escorts (including 4 Petyas), 17
coastal patrol ships/craft (including the 8 Osas), all 8 of the minesweepers,
and the majority of the auxiliaries. The Eastern Fleet, working out of
Vishakhapatnam, consists of 5 destroyer escorts (Petyas), all 6 Foxtrot-class
submarines*, 3 coastal patrol ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 5 auxiliaries. In
addition to operating along the east coast, some of these ships are based
temporarily at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Ships and craft based in
southern India report to the Southern Naval Command at Cochin. These
include 2 coastal patrol ships and 1 auxiliary. The navy sends a small number
of personnel to the UK, US, and USSR for training, while at the same time it
trains naval personnel from several Mideast, African, and Asian-Pacific na-
tions.
The logistic system of the navy has two major problems. First, the navy
must depend upon outside sources for most of its ships and craft, supplies,
and modern equipment. Second, Bombay is the only base capable of under-
t~.~king major repair and resupply of the forces afloat. Nevertheless, the
navy's logistic capability is increasing.
**In the future, some submari-ies may be based at Bombay.
II-5
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
Modest facilities at Cochin and the east coast ports of Calcutta and
Vishakhapatnam are being expanded in an effort to decrease reliance upon
outside sources for logistic needs. The Mazagon docks at Bombay have
successfu~ly undertaken the Leander project, and the Garden Reach work-
shops at Calcutta have built a number of small naval ships. Stocks of fuel and
ammunition could probably support a maximum rombat effort for two
months.
The Indian naval air arm has 1,500 men and 90 aircraft. During the
December 1971 war, Alize and Sea Hawk aircraft, in conjunction with the
surface blockade, effectively ensured the isolation of East Pakistan.
The Nav~d Aircraft Repair Organization at Cochin is responsible for
depot-level aircraft maintenance. Maintenance procedures are inadequate,
however, and must be supplemented by technical teams from Hindustan
,aeronautics, Ltd.
Paramilitary: India's numerous paramilitary forces, with occasional assist-
ance from the army, are capable of maintaining law and order, conducting
counterinsurgency operations, and functioning as light infantry under army
control during wartime situations. The principal organizations are:
Assam Rifles (AR) (21 battalions/30,000 men)
Central Reserve Police (CRP) (63 battalions/57,000 men)
Border Security Force (BSF) (80 battalions/76,000 men)
The AR, BSF, and CRP are normally controlled by the cent; 4! Ministry
of Home Affairs. The AR, BSF, and CRP battalions are equipped with
standard infantry weapons and equipment. The BSF also has indigenous
artillery units, a small naval force (two tugs an;; three small patrol boats),
and a small air wing (four Dakota transport planes).
Ground: In the event of full-scale war with India, the 390,000-man army
could initially defend Pakistan successfully, but it ultimately would succumb
to India's military superiority. Pakistan's offensive capabilities were rela-
tively unaffected by the 1971 war, but the army could not mount an attack
against India with any real expectation of success. Augmented by the
paramilitary Civil Armed Forces and Federal Security Force, the army can
maintain Pakistan's internal security.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
The 1971 war caused a morale problem within the ranks. There was a
general belief that senior military officaldom rather than the army was
responsible for the defeat and the loss of East Pakistan. Prime Minister
Bhutto retired several military officials and replaced them with generals loyal
to him. He has also sought to shift responsibility away from the army by
focusing the blame on former President Yahya Khan and his supporters.
There is a selective service system, but voluntary enlistments are more
than sufficient to mf;et the army's manpower requirements. Enlistment is
permitted from age 17 for aseven-yee:,r first term to be followed with
re-enlistments of three?year increments. There are no organized reserve units,
but personnel completir~rJ regular enlistment serve eight years on the reserve
rolls. Pakistan is creating a national guard under army control to assist in
internal defense and civic action tasks during periods of stress. Its present
strength is unknown. In the event of war, reservists and the national guard
would be called up, and should additional manpower be required, conscrip-
tion could be implemented. Also available for integration into the regular
forces is the paramilitary Civil Armed Forces composed of the Pakistan
Rangers. the Frontier Corps, and the Frontier Constabulary, with an esti-
mated combined strength of 38,500. No significant expansion of the army
would be possible without substantial outside assistance. At present, with
materiel assistance from abroad, the army mobilization capacity at M-plus-90
is estimated at 450,000 personnel.
The army has deployed the majority of its fighting force opposing
India. Eieven infantry divisions and two armored divisions are based in
permanent cantonments or in field locations from the Rann of Kutch
northward into the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state. Infantry divisions
are stationed near Peshawar and Quetta to meet any possible threat from
Afghanistan through the Khyber or Krrojak passes, respectively.
Major tactical units include:
5 corps headquarters
13 infantry divisions*
2 armored divisions
3 (independent) armored brigades
5 corps artillery brigades
5 corps armored reconnaissance regiments
1 special services group (Special Forces/brigade equivalent)
2 antiaircraft artillery brigades
* Another infantry divrsiv;t %s reportedly L?eing raised.
SECRET
Approved For Release, '~ 999/09/2,5.,..; CIA-RDP8.5TOQ875R001'~00030001-2
.. ,,. _ ..
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
The army is equipped with an assortment of arms from both commu-
nist and noncommunist nations. Because of inadequate inventories of spare
parts and a lack of trained logistic personnel, this diversity of equipment is a
major weakness for the army. Ground forces equipment requirements are
currently met through Chinese and European sources and by limited indig-
enous production.
Only a small number of military personnel are sent out of the country
for specialized training ~r attendance at senior military schools. The army
has provided, and is continuing to provide, limited training assistance to
several Middle Eastern and African nations, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, .Jordan, Libya, Nigeria, and Uganda. Most of this training is con-
ducted at the combat arms centers in the respective nations or at their senior
service schools.
The logistic system is the army's weakest area. Logistics support in West
Pakistan in 1971 appeared adequate, but toward the end of the fighting
supplies-especially ammunition and POL-ran low. Depots for all classes of
supplies are located near troop concentrations, and the army has sought to
maintain a 30-day level. Present supply levels are unknown, but considering
difficulties encountered during the war, it is anticipated that if the country is
once again blockaded and fails to control the air, the army would be unable
to carry on sustained combat operations for more than 30 days.
Air Force: The air force is capable of performing air defense, ground
support, and other tactical support tasks. Dependence on multiple foreign
supply sources and a shortage of spare parts, however, tend to impair
effectiveness. These logistic difficulties are offset to some extent by the
overall capability of Pakistani pilots and technical personnel.
The air force numbers 17,100 personnel, of whom 500 are pilots. The
aircraft inventory totals 511, including 12 light bombers, 179 supersonic
fighters, 93 subsonic fighters, 5 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 transports, 67
helicopters, and 145 utility/trainers. It is organized into 21 units: 1 light
bomber, 12 fighter, 1 transport, 1 search and re,cue, and 6 training and
miscellaneous.
Air defense is the primary role of the air force, The mainstay of the air
defense inventory is the squadron of all-weather Mirage III-E fighters. The
Chinese-built MIG-19 and tie aging F-86 are used to supplement the Mirages
but have no all-weather capability. While the shortage of all-weather aircraft
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
sECxrr
degrades the effectiveness of the air defense system somewhat, Pakistani
pilots, often reputed to be the best in South Asia, derive maximum effective-
ness from the available combat aircraft. Pakistan's air defense aircraft are
supported by contiguous radar coverage along most of the common border
with India, the only exception being the Bahawalpur area of central Pak-
istan.
Air transport consists of eight C-130 transports, two of them on loan
from civil airlines. The fleet of C-130s has a potential capability of lifting
about a battalion (800 men) on a single lift under optimum conditions. It
may also be configured to bomb area targets during hostilities. Pakistan
International Airline's 16 civil transport aircraft, including Boeing 707s and
DC-l Os and some 12,000 personnel, can readily be mobilized in an emer-
gency situation. Prior to and during hostilities with India, PIA aircraft were
used extensively to ferry troops from West to East Pakistan.
The serviceabiliiv of the air force inventory is not known. Although the
quality of maintenance is generally good, efforts to maintain a high state of
operational readiness of aircraft are plagued by a severe shortage of spare
parts and the diversity of sources of supply.
There are no k~iown aviation trainees in foreign countries. A consider-
able number of air force personnel were trained in the US prior to 1965. A
limited number of pilots and ground crew personnel have also received
training in France, and 60 personnel completed TU-16 training in the
People's Republic of China in 1973. No TU-16s are in Pakistan, but they
would ba available in the event of war with India. Pakistan has provided
aviation training to several Middle East and African countries. Exporting the
air force's technical expertise could continue to be one of Pakistan's major
foreign commitments.
Navy: The Pakistani navy is a small but expanding force capable of con-
ducting limited escort, patrol, and minesweeping operations. The primary
mission of the 9,900-man navy is the defense of coastal waters and the port
of Karachi. Although a program of expansion and modernization is under
way, the navy's regional importance will remain well below that of India. It
could not conduct sustained combat operations without outside assistance.
Its operational forces include 1 antiaircraft light cruiser, 3 attack submarines,
4 destroyers, 2destroyer-escorts, 13 motor gunboats, 4 hydrofoil torpedo
boats, 7 minesweepers, and 3 auxiliary ships.
Salient strengths include a small but relatively modern minesweeping
and submarine force, good individual training, and the military traditions of
25X6A its personnel. Selected personnel are sent to the -and the US 'for
II-9
SECRET
~pproved -For Release 1999/OJ/25 : C1~4-RDP85T00875R00110Q030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
specialized training. Weaknesses include the age of major surface combatants,
inability to defend against high-speed attack aircraft, inadequate shore-based
air support for naval operations, vulnerability to blockades, and a reliance
upon outside sources for most materiel and logistic support.
As a result of the 1971 conflict with India, the navy is seeking a variety
of weapons platforms to offset the striking power of the Indian navy. Twelve
Shanghai II -class motor gunboats and four Huchwan-class hydrofoil
torpedo boats have been acquired from the PRC. France may provide Exocet
cruise missiles, a fourth Daphne-class attack submarine, and a small n ber
of Breguet-Atlantique aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. The has 25X6
agreed to provide six Sea King helicopters and two Whitby-class destroyer-
escorts.
The navy'r principal logistic facilities are located in the Karachi area.
Progress is being made in the areas of supply, repair, and maintenance, but
the navy still relies on foreign sources for much of its equipment and
supplies. All of Pakistan's ships and craft can be overhauled or repaired at
Karachi, using the naval dockyard or commercial facilities. A joint naval and
commercial facility is under construction at Phitti Creek, 10 miles southeast
of Karachi. When work at this site is comraleted, it is expected to accom-
modate ships up to 50,000 tons, larger than any ship the navy is expected to
acquire.
Paramilitary: Pakistan's paramilitary forces, with the backing of the army,
are capable of maintaining internal security, cr.nducting counter-guerrilla
operations, and, during wartime, acting as light infantry. The principal
paramilitary units are:
Pakistan Rangers (8,000 men)
Frontier Corps (24,000 men)
Frontier Constabulary (6,500 men)
Federal Security Force (13,000 mien)
Under normal conditions, the paramilitary units arc subordinate to the
Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces are organized into battalions
and company units. The complete breakdown of uni is is not available
because of expansion of the forces, on the one hand, and the loss or capture
of personnel during the war, on the other. In time of emergency or war, the
II-1f'
SECRET
~;pproved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R00'1100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Constabulary remain subordinate to the
Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces units use standard light infantry
weapons, primarily British WW II models; however, there is a deficiency in
signal and transport equipment. The Frontier Corps also has some light
artillery and armored cars. The Federal Security Force units, raised in 1973,
are supplied with small arms, riot-control equipment, and sufficient motor
transport to ensure mobility.
C. Bangladesh
Ground: The Bangladesh army is not capable of waging successful offensive
or conventional defensive operations against neighboring countries. In con-
junction with paramilitary forces, however, it :ould wage an extensive
guerrilla campaign in defense of t'ne country. It is also capable of maintaining
internal security in urban areas. The army has an estimated strength of
25,000. Information on enlistment and terms of service is sparse. Mobiliza-
tion plans are unknown, but the potential for augmentation of ground forces
is good. The large number of former guerrillas constitute a source of troops.
Combat and support units are subordinated to five brigade head-
quarters, which have both administrative and tac:i.ical functions. The heaviest
concentration of troops is in the D%~cca area. Major tactical units include:
5 brigade headquarters
18 infantry battalions
3 artillery regiments
1 heavy mortar regiment
1 armored regiment
Arms and equipment inventories contain a mixture of equipment pro-
vided by India or captured from Pakistan. The principal weaknesses of the
arnry are a lack of modern equipment, an inadequate logistic system, a low
state of combat readiness, and a lack of experienced high-ranking officers.
The Bangladesh gover nmen?c has indicated aii interest in obtaining modern
military equipment for its army. SpeciGlized military schooling is being made
available in InJia, but the government is interested in training students
elsewhere as well. In-country training courses are few in number and poor in
quality.
Air: The mission of the Banglades+~ air force is to provide air defense and
tactical air support for grcund and naval forces, and airlift support for
national civic action and relief programs. Often described as an "air force in
training," the force has yet to demonstrate a capability to perform any part
of its assigned mission.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
There are between 1,000 and 1,500 personnel in the air force, including
approximately 60 pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. Some repatriated
Bengalees have probably been integrated into the force structure.
The aircraft inventory totals 43 aircraft, including 27 fighters, 3 trans-
ports, 7 helicopters, and 6 trainer/utility aircraft. Most of this inventory,
including 17 MIG-21/Fishbeds, was acquired during 1973. The aircraft
probably are organized into three squadrons: I fighter; 1 transport; and 1
helicopter. All aircraft are stationed in the Dacca and Chittago:~g areas.
Air force operations, maintenance, and other support functions are
severely degraded by a shortage of trained personnel. Extensive technical and
flying training programs have been established by the Soviet Union. In
addition to the programs conducted in the Soviet Union, training on the
MIGs, helicopters, and transport aircraft is carried out in Bangladesh under
the direction of Soviet advisers and instructors. Future operational effective-
nesswill depend on the success of these programs.
Navy: The Bangladesh navy is a small riverine and coastal patrol farce. Its
strength is in excess of 450 personnel. Missions include the prevention of
smuggling and other illegal activities, the protection of coastal maritime
traffic, the policing of inland waterways, and participatiun in disaster relief
operations. Naval headquarters is located at Dacca. Ships are deployed at
Chittagong and Khulna.
The naval ship inventory is m~-!~ up of four indigenously produced
river patrol boats and one 150-ton seaward defense boat provided by India in
April 1973. Future acquisitions may include an unknown number of Yugo-
slav gunboats of World War II vintage and a second seaward defense boat
from India.
As the navy expands, Indian influence will continue to predominate.
Approximately 100 personnel have been sent to India for training at
Bombay and Cochin on such subjects as sonar, radar, and telecommunica-
tions. The Indian navy has also sent an adviser to Bangladesh to assist in the
establishment of indigenous training facilities.
Paramilitary: Bangladesh's paramilitary :orces are capaole of coping with
sporadic cases of internal unrest, but n~~t with widespread organized dissid-
ence. They are not capable of policing the country's borders. In wartime
they could function effectively as light infantry or guerrillas. The Bangladesh
II-12
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
i
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
Rifles (13,000) and the National Uefense Force (16,000) are equipped with
small arms, mostly bolt-action rifles, and some signal equipment. National
Defense Force personnel have received some training From members of the
Indian Military Assistance Mission.
D. Afghanistan
Ground: The Afghan army is incapable of defending the country from
outside aggression. Ire conjunction with paramilitary forces, however, it is
capable of maintaining internal security, except possibly in a situation of
widespread tribal unrest. The army has a personnel strength of about 78,700.
Military service is compulsory, and personnel are selected by local leaders
and tribes for two years' active service. Based on the availability of reserves,
arms and equipment, training facilities and cadre, administrative machinery,
and economic considerations, but without outside logistic support, the
army's mobilization capacity is estimated to be 103,500 men at M plus 90
dais. The manpower would come from reserve officers and previously
conscripted personnel.
The principal weaknesses of the army include rudimentary administra-
tive, logistic, and maintenance systems; a shortage of trained leaders and
technicians; lack of adequate transportation and communication facilities;
and dependence upon the Soviet Union for almost all of its materiel.
Geographical areas of responsibility are assigned to three corps head-
quarters and four provincial divisions. The bulk of the army-seven infantry
divisions and all three armored divisions-is located around Kabul and along
the border with Pakistan. Major tactical units* include:
3 corps headquarters
10 infantry divisions
3 armored divisions
2 artillery regiments
3 mountain brigades
1 commando regiment (Special Forces equivalent)
1 republican guard regiment
1 airborne battalion
*The size of an Afghan infantry division is between 4,000 and 8,000 men; an Afghmi
armored division is equivalent to a reinforced US armored battalion. The i~tdepe~rdertt
regiments are comparable to an understrength US brigade.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
Almost all of the equipment in `he army's inventory is of Soviet origin.
While most items, notably the artillery, are of World War I I vintage, modern
equipment has been introduced in increasing amounts since the late 1960s.
The army logistic system is only marginally capable of supporting th.
forces. Shortages of spare parts and poor maintenance caused by technical
incompetence continue to result in low levels of operational readiness. In the
case of newer or more complicated equipment, Soviet advisers and tech-
nicians are required to perform essential maintenance. Large numbers of
personnel are sent abroad, primarily to the Soviet Union, for basic officer,
staff officer, and technical training.
Air: The air defense force is incapable of defendirig the nation's airspace and
supporting large ground-force operations. The air defense force can effec-
tively assist units conducting internal security operations, but its usefulness
is based more on its psychological impact than its tactical capability. Tactical
effectiveness is restricted by a lack ofair-ground communications, ashortage
of qualified maintenance personne~, few dispersal airfields, insufficient fuel
storage facilities and navigational aids, and inefficient logistical procedures
and practices.
There are 8,100 men in the air force, of whom 150 are pilots. The
inventory totals 267 aircraft, including 54 supersonic and 89 subsonic
fighters, 28 light bombers, 36 transports, 28 helicopters, and 32 other
aircraft. These forces are organizFU into six wings: 3 day fighter; 1 bomber; 1
transport; arc! 1 training. The aircraft are concentrated in the vicinity of
Kaul and at Shindand airfield, near the Afghan-Iranian border.
Air defense capability rests with the small force of supersonic MIG-21,
SU-7, and subsonic MIG-17 fighter aircraft, an antiaircraft artillery division,
a surface-to-air missile brigade, and a radar brigade. This modest capability is
keyed primarily to the defense of the Kabul area.
The overall effectiveness of the air defense components is generally low.
The force is capable only of relatively uncomplicated actions and is vulner-
able to low-level, high-speed attack from any direction. The SA-2 SAM
system, used in defense of the Kabul area, consists of three deployed firing
sites. The last known practice firing occurred in 1971. The combat effective-
ness of this force is probably limited.
Ground support capabilities are negligible; bombing and interdiction
can be carried out only under optimum weather conditions. Air transport
capaaility is slight because of the lack o. suitable aircraft and trained crews.
SECRET
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
The training establishment in Afghanistan is rudimentary. Some pilot
and aircraft technical training is performed in-country, and a technical
refresher course for officers is conducted at the technical school associated
with the Afghan Military Academy. Soviet advisers and technicians attached
to the air defense force provide on-the-job training for radar, missile, antiair-
craft, and aircraft maintenance personnel. Nearly all primary, advanced,
transition pilot training, meteorological, and enlisted technical training is
conducted in the USSR.
The air defense force's ability to maintain aircraft and other air defense
equipment is generally poor. The major deficiency is complete dependence
on the USSR and other Communist countries for replacement aircraft, spare
parts, armament, electronics, missiles, engineering, training, and POL. With-
out continuing Soviet assistance, even the small existing capability to sup-
portair operations would deteriorate rapidly.
Navy: None
Paramilitary: The Gendarmerie, Afghanistan's sole paramilitary force, is
capable of coping with low-level tribal dissidence and minor civil disorders,
policing the borders, and functioning as light infantry under army control
during wartime situations. The 14,200-man force is controlled by the Min-
istry of Interior. The organization's 13 regiments and 1 mobile unit are
equipped with bolt-action rifles and a minimum amount of signal equipment
and transport.
E. Nepal
Ground: The 20,000-man Royal Nepalese Army, the country's only military
service, is incapable of waging offensive or defensive operations against
neighboring India or the People's Republic of China. The army is capable of
maintaining internal security in the Kathmandu Valley and the plains area
across southern Nepal, but not throughout the country. There is no com-
pulsory military service. Enlistment is permitted from age 17 for a period of
ten years of active service. Mobilization capability at M-plus-90 is negligible.
Internal security considerations dictate the general deployment of army
forces. Three infantry brigades are deployed on the plains adjoining India,
while a palace brigade, an infantry brigade, and a parachute battalion are
located in the Kathmandu Valley.
5 brigade headquarters
12 infantry battalions
II-15
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09L.25 : ,CIA-RDP85T00875,R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
1 parachute battalion
1 artillery regiment
An airborne support transport wing, with two Short. Skyvan SRS 3 aircraft
and one Alouette III helicopter, provides the lift capability to the parachute
battalion.
The army is equipped with an assortment of weapons, mostly abso~ete,
obtained from either India or the UK, but an extensive modernization
program is under way. Modern small arms are being obtained from India.
Recent deliveries have included six 76-mm. howitzers and eighteen 120-mm.
mor ?rs. Additional communications equipment and motor transport is
under consideration. Basic military training is accomplished in Nepal.
Advanced officer and most technical training is undertaken in France, India,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
The army's logistic capability is extremely poor. Mobility and com-
munications are severely restricted by the country's rugged terrain and lack
of adequate transport. Staff planning at the highest levels frequently fails to
consider logistics, and procedures for timely resupply of materiel do not
exist. A scarcity of technically trained administrative and mainte~~ance
personnel further compounds these problems. Present supply levels are
unknown, but it is believed they are adequate to support the army's internal
security mission.
Air: None
Navy: None
Paramilitary: None '
F. Sri Lanlca
Ground: The Sri Lanka army is a rudimentary military organization, pat-
terned along British lines, with the missions o~f territorial defense and
internal security. The army has only a token capability for defense against
external attack; it is organized and trained primarily as an internal security
force whose responsibilities include prevention of smuggling and illicit
immigration, and participation in civic action and economic self-sufficiency
programs. The army is capable, in conjunctioi: with the police, of maintain-
ing internal security under normal conditions.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
.'..rx.v~a~u~,'~, ...o~Gims~:~l~~s'~~;x~~ailSi:..k~i~iai~d~sa'6~a~~Cxa~d~x~u!~.~...,s~~.:
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
The insurrection in 1971, however, underscored the inability of the
army to cope quickly and effectively with widespread insurgency. While it
acquired some combat experience in the insurgency, and has since received a
considerable amount of new equipment, the army still suffers from a
dependence on foreign sources for its materiel, and has not yet corrected the
serious command and control problems evident in its 1971 operations.
Presently more than half of the army is deployed near Colombo to protect
the city's vital port facilities and assist the police in maintaining order.
The army consists of the Regular Force backed up by three reserve
components: the Volunteer Force, the Regular Force Reserve, and the
Volunteer Force Reserve. The Regular Force, with a strength of 9,000, is
composed of three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, a reconnais-
sance regiment, and various support elements. The Volunteer Force, used to
augment the Regular Force, maintains about half of its 9,000 personnel on
active duty at all times. The Regular Force Reserve and the Volunteer Force
Reserve are inactive reserve manpower pools used to augment the Regular
and Volunteer Forces when necessary.
There is no compulsory service; enlistment is permitted from the age of
18 for five years of active service. At present, the army's mobilization
capacity, without external logistic support, is 25,000 troops at M plus 90.
External military assistance would increase the capacity to 29,000.
Arms and equipment are mostly of World War II British manufacture.
Some modern equipment, primarily armored personnel ~:arriers and field
guns, was obtained from the Soviet Union and the Pecple's Republic of
China, respectively, in 1971. Basic and some advanced training of army
personnel is accomplished in Sri Lanka. Training of technical and senior
officer.; is taken in India and, to a lesser extent, in the UK.
The army's logistic system is adequate for the accomplishment of its
internal security mission. Supply levels are believed sufficient to support
full-scale operations for 30 days. The island's road and rail networks meet
normal peacetime requirements.
Air: The air force effectively performs its assigned mission, which includes
provision of support to civic action projects, prevention of illicit smuggling
and immigration, internal securit;~ operations, VIP transport, liaison, and
air-sea rescue.
There are 2,300 men in the air force, of whom 43 are pilots. The
aircraft inventory totals 53, including 5 day fighters, 5 transports, 15
SECRET
~ __ ..
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :-CIA-RDP8.5T~0875R001.1'00030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
helicopters, and 28 miscellaneous aircraft. The air force is organized into five
units-1 fighter, 1 transport, 2 helicopter, and 1 training-which operate
mainly from two airfields: Bandaranaike International, near Colombo, and
China Bay, near Trincomalee.
The air force has a modest close air support capability lasing five Fresco
(MIG-17) day fighters and a small number of armed T-51 trainers and OH-13
Sioux helicopters. The transport inventory of one Convair 440 and four
DH-114 Heron light transports, together with Sioux, Bell 206A Jet Ranger,
and Hoodlum helicopters, is capable of supporting platoon (US-size) opera-
tions. This capability is considered adequate to meet Sri Lanka's modest
military transport needs. The helicopter force is also employed in short-range
search and rescue operations, and adequately assists in anti-insurgency and
anti-smuggling operations and prevention of illegal immigration.
The only air defense capability is the army's 4th Field Artillery Reg-
iment, which has antiaircraft batteries in the Colombo and China Bay areas.
Equipment is obsolete and inadequate.
The air force has instituted a successful and growing tourist flying
service, and this has provided a major impetus to improving the air force's
effectiveness. The operation has significantly increased pilot flying time,
with a corresponding improvement in pilot proficiency. It has also provided
a major boost to air force morale, and has created a foreign exchange earning
capacity which can support spare parts acquisition and an aircraft replace-
ment program.
Air force training programs have been upgraded substantially during the
past two years. Flight training now extends over a 24-month period, and the
attrition rate is high as a result of the rigid standards recently imposed. A
high safety record has been achieved through the development of a strict
flying standards program. Pilots generally average between 40 and 100 hours
per month; the tr,~nsportation and helicopter squadrons achieve the higher
figures. Nonflying :~~ining of officers and technical training of enlisted men
are increasingly being done at home. A few officers and enlisted men
continue to train in India and the UK, but returning students are immedi-
ately assigned as teachers. A good start has been made toward sei (-suf-
ficiency in technical training.
Supply and maintenance systems are rudimentary but are facilitated by
the fact that all aircraft are stationed at two easily accessible airfields. While
standards have improved, the air force remains capable of performing only
II-18
SECRET
~~Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
minor maintenance. Major overhaul of aircraft normally is done in the
country of origin, There is a shortage of spare parts in general, but parts for
the recently acquired US aircraft should be readily available through com-
mercial sources.
Navy: The 2,600-man navy is a small coastal patrol and internal security
force. Its operating inventory consists of a World War II -vintage patrol
destroyer escort, 5 Shanghai I I -class motor gunboats, 23 small patrol craft,.
2 auxiliaries, and 1 service craft. One hydrofoil patrol boat is in reserve.
The navy's small size precludes defense against even a minor naval
attack. Its antismuggling capability is also inadequate. It has had slightly
better success, however, in its operations against illegal immigration; these
operations are conducted in conjunction with army and air force units.
The navy's operational effectiveness has been severely restricted by a
number of factors, including shallowness of coastal waters, uncharted and
continually shifting sandbars, and lack of navigational aids in the Palk Strait
between India and Sri Lanka. The navy is further hampered by poor
seamanship and a lack of effective leadership at all command levels. Genuine
professional interest is absent throughout the officer corps, and sea duty is
considered a drudgery and a bore. Enthusiasm has increased somewhat with
the acquisition of the PRC gunboats, and the captain of the navy is
attempting to obtain a replacement for the aging patrol frigate. Inadequate
maintenance and training facilities will likely offset this transitory surge of
professionalism, however, and it is considered unlikely that the navy will
significantly increase its capabilities in the near future.
During 1973 the Soviet Union offered to supply Sri Lanka with a
Petya-class destroyer-escort, but the Sri Lanka government decided against
the offer. At present the navy is looking for a craft comparable to a 95-foot
US crass guard cutter.
Navy headquarters is located at Colombo. The principal operating base
is at Karainagar, with secondary bases at Trincomalee, Tangalla, and
Kalpitiya. The navy is constantly beset with supply problems caused by
antiquated and poorly maintained equipment, cumbersome material procure-
ment procedures, and poor administration. The problem of excessive delays
in procuring materiel, especially spare parts, is compounded by the fact that
the navy still has obsolete equipment for which spare parts are no longer in
stock; these must be manufactured locally or procured in the UK at con-
siderable cost. Spare parts for the Shanghai I I gunboats, however, are readily
obtainable from the PRC.
Paramilitary: None
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/x9/25 .C1A; RDP85TOQ~~~5ROp11~0~,00300Q1-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
:11{\I
India
1'
Pnltis(un
Bangladesh
Afghanistan
Ncpul
Sri
Lnnlcu
I'ersonuel ............................
'
I,UU2,UU(1
3UO,C"U
35,000
18,700
2(I,IIIIU
U,IIUO
(
outbat- ..........................
li?;i,l1UU
253,000
15,?'(IU
5(1,300
IG,(i0i1
fi
51)U
'I'u n l<
'
..
,
....
~I24 (
butte (US) ...................
....
....
....
...?
....
P'I'-ili (U3S12) .....................
15(1
'I'u(ul l.i~ht.........
'%IU
....
4
('euturiutt (UK) ....................
180
....
....
....
\I-?I tihernuut (U5) .................
....
I(iU
....
....
\I-4i,?IS Patton (l'N) ...............
....
36:1
....
....
'I'-3?I (PHC) .......................
'
....
:il)
....
20U(USS12)
I'-:i~l ............ .. .. .. .. .. ........
220(C' ecb)
:iU(USS[O
....
270(USSR)
'I'-55 ............ .. .. .. ............
1140(0 iSR~
lU(USSR)
....
54(USSR)
'I'-lit (USSR) ......................
Pa untl)
....
....
....
14
~'ickerxll'iju~?an(il(UI~IIn(II{;L'nOUti)...
4711
,,,,
,,,
??.?
Olhrr a ............................
20:1
ill
....
30
'I'ota! i~lediunt ...................
1 , 71:1
1 , 2115
....
:1118
....
Artillor~? ?~
IIIII-~ttn.:uul over ..................
82(1
7011
12
4(iU
(1
....
0
Up to l(111-uun......? .......... .. ..
1,8.10
UU5
(i
S1U
I(1
:i2
\lorlat:e
1(10-nuu. untl over...... ? ...........
1211
2i:i
2U
270
2l
I(1
l1p to IU0-nun .....................
8,81(1
?1,11(1(1
400
:i4U
23:1
5?I
AAA',
:ii-tu~n.:uui over ...................
0
2(1
(1
1 i0
0
0
2(1- Ut :i7-nt m ....... ? ..............
'
I , 2(1(1
-12:1
C
185
?
2.1
AP(
a ...............................
420
?111:1
U
330
(1
10
:lrnutred ' ...........................
i 10
2::11
0
4F
0
54
~ :Ill figurce me cslinralce: it alroulrl he aoled Kral the Pakislnni arutll is rnrrlcrrlaing rapid cxparrsimr; ittucnlorics ittchtrlc nutjor ilt ?n,e of cyu(pmrarl
ri!lrcr iu Nre hands of lrnops or serviccuhlc iu rlcpol.
"Coarlxil pcrsnancl arc dejincrl ns cilhcr conrbal, cornhul sapporl, nr comhnl sc:'t~icc supparl hoops serving wills rlfvisiort or separate Grigudc or
Galmlion fnrmalion.c.
hi,gurc inchules lacks ouljilled with bridge-lagiag, dazes, or n:iar.-Jlaifiap egaipntr.nl, pGrs recooer~ ve/ricles.
.t h'igure iachrrlc.e self-propelled arlillcrp, ascnull guns, anli-lartb? gurrx, arts! rarkcl lau>chers.
higure inchrde.c xclJ-propeller! :1 A:1.
't hiyure iar?lurles iaJanlr~ comhal achicles.
% 1'iyru?c inrlurlcs recoanaissaacc r~clricles.
~ ~ - 20
SECREr.C
;'Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
------ - Sri
India PukisU-n Bangladesh Afghanistan Nepal Lanka
AIR DE1~1~;NSls
Pcrsonacl? ........................... Unkauw^ Unknown (I ri,30(1 Il 0
Missiles
Sw?fucu-to-Air SA-3 ................. est d80 0 11 1311 (1 11
No. Launchers SA? ............... . est 13G G II `A 0 0
No, Sites 5r1-2 ..................... est IJ (1 ll 3 0 (1
AIR FORCI~.
I'crsonnel ............................ 105,00(1 li,l(1(1 I,ll(I(1 1,51111 5,111(1 Included 2,300
in Army
Aircraft
.let l3omhers (light) Canberra 13 (I) 55
((1 h, VCR' ~C:Llilild) . . . .. .. .. .. .. 35 11 G O O G
Cunboi?ra 13-ri713 (U K) .............. 0 i'-' Il 0 0 0
IL-2Sll3uaglu (I'R(') ................ 11 0 (I 28 0 (1
'Total ........................... a5 I?, 0 ?35 (1 11
Jut Fighters
5upursnnic
SU-711~ittcr (USSR)...... ?....... i0 II 11 31 ... ....
\IICi=3lll~ishbud (USS13).......... I55+ 11 li 33 ..?. ????
II1~-'l4 illurut (Indigenous)........ li?I 11 II .... .... ....
F-104A and 13 (US) ............... 0 :, _ 11 .... .... ....
\IIG-1!Ill~al?nuv D (1'R(')......... 0 138 ~+ 11 .... .... ....
\lirugr III-I'. 11'r;uu'o)............ 0 '-'I 11 .... .... ...
\) irugr ;i (I~ r:ulcc) .. . .......... . . . (1 35 (1 .... .... ....
Subtotal ....................... 331 1i0 17 bd .... ...
Subsonic
Gnat 1 (Ui~, Indigenous).......... lig 0 (1 .... .... ....
Iluwkcr llunta? 1~-5G (UK)........ lit II 0 ...' .... ....
Vampire F13-:i2 (UK) ............. 2U 11 0 .... .... ....
h-SUF Sabre (US) ................ 0 li IO(Puk) .... ... ....
S~tbrc i\lIC-G (1~-Sli) (1Vest Ucruutny), 0 41i 0 .... .... ....
\IIG-lill'resco (USSR)........... .... ???? ???? SG ""
Subtotal ....................... 21i0 03 10 50 ....
'1'otul ...................... . ri!)I 3i ~~ r id3 .... 5
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
:11R fUR('I: (C'unlinurdl
Rccunnaissuncc
Canberra PK-5"r (UK) ..............
~liruge 111-R (prance) ..............
1,1(14(1 Super Cunstcllution (US)......
'1'o t:t I .......................... .
Transports
~9ediun:
'1'U-1'L?1/Cookpot (USSR)..........
C-I lOG Purkct (US) ..............
r\N-121Cub (USSR) ..............
IL-18/Coot (USSR) ...............
C-13013 licrcules (US, Iran).......
Subtotal .......................
i,ight
1IS (Auto) 7.13 (l'K, Indigenous).....
C-47A Skytrain (CS, UK)...........
UIIC-4 C;u?ibou (Canada)...........
IL-I?IIC:atc (USSI;) ................
h ?7 (Ncthcrhuuls) .................
AN-'341Cokc (USSR) ................
AN-2(ilCut?I (USSR) ................
~lystcrc 2(1/falcon (IrllnCL). . . ......
1'ak-12/Creek (USSR.) ..............
('unt?air ?140 (US) ..................
Dll II?Illlcvz,n (('unucht)............
Short 5kyt?nn Sts 3 (UK)............
A\-3l ('alt (l'SSR) .................
Suhtuu:I .........................
'Total .........................
I Iclic?optcrs-'I'r:utspart
III-4/Ilound (USSR) ...............
illl-8/flip (USSR) ..................
1111-4313 (US) ......................
SubtoUtl .........................
I Iclicopters-Utility
:\lourttc I11 ........... . ...........
Alouettc II (f~nutcc) ................
OII-13F1 (US) ......................
Sikorsky S-:i5 (US) ? ................
UhI-19D (US) ......................
\Vestlund Wessex (UIi) .............
A91-I Illura (USSR) .. . ............. .
hA-2Gllloodlutn (USSR)............
13e11 20fiA Jet Ranger (US)..........
aA-315/Cheetah (Indigenous)........
Subtotal .........................
Total .........................
'I'ruiners ......... .. ..................
Utility ..............................
8 0
0 3
0 2
8 0
1(i 5
3 0
.i3 0
37 0
Sri
Bangladesh Afghanislnn Nepal Lunku
....
.... ..
..
8
1'10
2
3
35
2 5
213
10
3
3G
2 i
37(hrance) 30(Fruncc,
1 Saudi Arabia)
(1 2
8
12 ,.,.
107 52
21R G7
293. 85
80 (i0
~ lnclurles Golh d11C-~1A1 (h'ishhcd ./) and dIlC-21 /'L afrcrafl.
a 1 n sloragc.
~~ 80 of which are comhal-read.
^ Includes two C-130s on short Tenn loan jrom Saudi Ar?Gia.
SECRET
i,Approved For Release 1999/09/?5 :-CAA-R~E3P8-5Tfl087-5R00110,p030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
?JC! i. p. .n ,
Sri
NAVI'
Personnel .................... .......
33,000
9,!)0(1
950t
SI711)S
Carriers ...... . ...... . . ............
1
(1
0
Cruisers ........ ..................
2 ~
1 n
0
Destroyers ......... ................
2
4
0
Destroyer Cscorts ..................
lia
2
0
Submarines ........................
G
3 ~
0
Alissilc Patrol ......................
3
0
0
Other Catstul I'utrol ................
17
1 i
5
elircraft .............................
rJ0
0
0
t F,slintalcrl slrenglk.
FV IV /1 ulttla~e, one used as lraininq s/tip.
a lV iV 11 viulagc.
't lnrhules / I,eaudcr-rln.e.c Dl;'/1 anrl9 Pcl~as.
s Nol inclarlerl arc G S.C.Q.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
,~~vt
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
---- ----------------
India
Pakistan
Ground ................................
Current
DI -i-15 days
Current
17 + 1 ~i clays
Combat-effective personnel
Arm,,y ..............................
2G1,000
40~i,000
22A,000
253,00(1
Paramilitary
IIot der Security I' oree ..............
3.1 ,000
34 ,000
....
....
Central Reserve Force .............
3,000
5,000
....
....
Civilian Armed Forces .............
....
....
S ,000
'l0 ,000
7'otnl ........... . .............. 208 ,000 X147 ,OOU
232 ,000
273 ,000
Units
Army
Corps IIgs ........................
9
5
5
5
Dlvlslan5
Inflmtry .......................?
10
-I-ld
11
13
Mountain ........... . ..........
0
2
0
0
Armored ........ . ..............
1
'l
2
2
Independent Brigades
Armored ...........................
5
5
11
I
Artillery ............................
2
3
5
5
Infantry ............................
I
2
3
'3
Sp Svc Gp (Bde) (Abn) ..............
0
U
1
1
Parachute ..........................
0
1
0
(1
Air Defense .........................
2
~I
2
2
Paramilitary (Bas)
Border Security rorce ................
3G
3G
....
....
Central Reser?.c Police ...............
4
lU
????
????
Civilian Armed Forces ...............
Aircraft
....
....
]0
25
Current deployment of aircraft in both India and P tkistttn (sec
to transfer combat units to the border areas.
1 /n addition, eaclt armg carps Iteadquarlers has one armored r~cmutaissancc regiment (Gallal~on
equivalent) assigned to il.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
Ycrsonncl:
K1A ........................... 3,601 ri,0(]0 (csL.)
1\'lA ........................... 8,(iri0+ 11 ,(l0(1 (est.)
i\l l A ........................... 275 1,0(10 (est. )
't'otal ....... . ................ l2 ,(i 10 17,000
Lquipmm~t:
'funks- ........................ l25 187
Naeul Ships .................... I li
rlit?crttPt ~t .. . .................... i I -13
Crnbcrra 13(1)58 .............. ]0 .,..
SU-7/ 1~ incr ................... 2(l ....
ILnvkcr lluntcr r-5(i .......... 20 ....
i\IIG-21l]~ishbed .............. ti ....
Gnat I ....................... 5 .,..
\lystcrn IV r1 ................. 5 ....
Ilh-'~~I Altu?ut ................. 5 ....
13regucL 15(1 Alirc............ 1 ....
'I'otul ...................... 71 ....
I'-BfiI~ ........................ .... 2(1
Canbcrrn 13-5713 ............... .... 4
h-101 r\ . . ............. ....... .... 3
i\i[G-10/I~ttt?nu~r D............ .... 7
'1'-;i 3 r1 ....................... .... 2
U11-1S)U ..................... .... 2
? 13cech Queen ;U81~)............ .... I
'1'otttl r ...... . .............. .... X13
t appro:rirnalch/ 1,100 pcrsotu+cl rcrcircd rii.cahlin(1 utaunrlt;.
Snntc tanks lialerl ax "lo.cse.c" acre .cuhttequenUl/ rchrrucrl to
scruice after repair nl rlepol.c.
~+ ~lir-lo-air contlxN operations +ccrc rcladacly fcty during lltc
1771 cottflirl, anri rnacf. nircrafl lossex on Loflt ,cider resuhcrt front
grnt+rtd fire.
'+ /nchulcs rot rsiintalcrl cinl+l /'-SGT and one T-3,4 cnphu?ud and
now in U~c /3nnpladc,:h air forrc,
I I - 25
SECRET
A(!pproved For Release 1399/09/25 : CfA-RDP85TOa875R00110403.0001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
sECRE~r
MILITARY ADVISERS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES (ESTIMATED)
---------- - Air All
Country Army Nuvy Force Services
Pakistanis in:
Abu Dhabi......... 90 14 130 ....
Oman .............. I10 !)2 .... ....
Kuwait ............ .... .... 200 ....
Saudi Arabia......:. 110 14 900 ....
I r:tq ............... .... .... ~i ....
,lordun..... , '' .... .... ....
Syria .............. ..~. .... 2(i ....
L)bya .......... . . . . NA lfi 29f) ....
Nigeria ............. :3 .... ..,. ,...
Iran ............... .... .... 70 ....
Q:(t a r .............. 1 .... .... ....
Totals ........... 2G6 13fi 1 ,U i 6 1 ,9 i 3
lndinns in:
131(utun ~ ........... 3 ,100 .... ,... ....
13angladcsh~....,,,, NA NA NA ..,.
Nigeria ............. 12 O .... ....
Ir::q ............... .... .... :30 ....
APghunistun......,, 3 .... :30 ....
'I'otuls........... :3,915 (i GO 3,9fi1
~ Uocs rrol. i~)rludc scuernl ll(ouannd ~)ersonncl willt llac 13ordcr
toads Orgrnaisaliou.
~lpproxrmaleh~ /0 /nrlinn n)ilifnrt/ personv)c! serve as a(1-
ciscrs i)t l3?r:pladesh; Grcakdawn Gy service is anauoi.laGle.
I I - 26
SECRET
/#pproved f`~r~ Release 1~995t09/25 : CiA=RDP85T00875R00110~0030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
India
South Asian Military Handbook
0992/74
June 1,1974
Jnmmu and
Koshmir
r ~??~'~
~~ Himochlnl
Pradesh
Chnndigorlr.~~ ~?~
I Pun(ab r7'? ?
~,`F~aryana ~y
~.onnd
~?~~
~ Uttar
Rajasthan ~ ~
Arunachal
Pradash
~ ,~
Slkklm ~?
j ~??.~ Pradesh ~ ~
~,~ 5
2 ~ ~. ~ ~? l?~ Bihar ,j
Gujarat ~ Y Madhya '~ ~Jw?9i
y Pradesh ti ?onpa1
1; ~ f~?L?>T'~
~ ~ ?~
^ r Orissa
Dnm.S;~
?ir' ~ Maharashtra
D?dr? and'
Nagar Huvell / ~^?
~'' f Andhra
Pondlcharry ?\
Lnccodivc, Minicoy and
Amindivi Islonds
(Lakshndwcep)
~.....r
Tamil
Nadu
m~ .
.,..: ~.~
~ ~ J;~` r(N~agntand
f Meghnloya f? ~M?nipur
Tripura~~
Mizorartr
Andnm?n and
Nicobn? Islands
Approved For_Release,1999/09./.25 ,.CIA RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
? ,
,:~ ,~
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
Jodhpur?*
*.Ahmedobad
i
?Ranchl
T~V~i
2?Baramula 'Loh
~RuJeori
\
a
?.T~ J
mmu
11
~~
i?Pethenkot China f
~
Amritsar o
Arabian
Sea
~~.,,
Larcr+dive Sea
i
'Secunderabad
)sri Lanka
~ (CeY~on)~
INDIA
Army Order of Battle
'i Armored division
Infantry division
Mountain division
100 200 300 Miles
i ' _-T~
100 200 300 Kdomelcrs
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Approved For Release,1999/09/25...;, CIA-R~P85TOp875R001100030001-2
Bay of
Bengal
South Asian Military Handbo~ik
0992%,'4
lune 1,1974
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
South Asian Military Handbook
r- ~' ~ .... ?--
~
isLAMneAO
r
~ Pethankot
Adamputi 1 16 Gnat:
16(MIG-9t~ 1 16 HF-24
1~nunuiyarri
F-56 -iJ 32 MIG?21
__ _ Ambala
7 Hunter F?56~'~ l3erellly
16MIG-21 IaEW '~; ~'
Anra ,
1 fi {',: 11SR 1
Approved For Release 19J9/09~25
Afgf~anistan
0
KA9UL
CtA-RDP85Tfl0~875R001100030001-2
0992/74
June 1,1974
INDIA
Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
South Asian Military Handbook
June 1, 1974
0 100 400 300 Miles
0 100 400 300 Nilameters
Arabian
Sea
i 1.Aircrall Carrier
2 Light Cruisers
14 Destroyer/Destroyer Escorts
13 Palrol Escorts
~'6 Large Guided Missile Boals
6 Coastal Palrol Boats
t 8 Minesweepers
Bombay
Amindivi Islands; `Lacradivc
Islands
1 Patrol Escort Cochin
1 Smell Submarine Chaser
5 Destroyer/Destroyer Escorls?
6 Submarines
2 Small ~ubmarlne Chasers
3 Coaslat Patrol Boals~Vlshakhapatnam
Bay of
Bengal
~'lFtt Yt~+t~?Ff .7 ikt"Sa '4-+..e~'. "P 1R~`a ^Y '~, -
aa
~5 :---~af._ 141CLV ._.Ftti~9R~ies'..- -~~~'~=?-
Andaman (~,,
,?
Islands 'j,;
r,
1 Small Submarine Chaser;~Port Blair
,~c
Nicobar
Islands `~}
Secret
No Foreign Dissern
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
South Asian Military Handbook
Afghanistan
lalko
t
11 ~?pathenkot
yy
yy,,
Lahore* ~? Amritsar
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border
~ Indian armored division
Indian infantry division
7~ Pakistani armored division
Pakistani infantry division
Beam
Murreo?~ 1
0992/74
June 1, 1974
ISLAMABAD
Rawalpindiy y Iy?RaJaorl
JhTelumyyY `~ Y
Kha~lan_ y *?i If? Jammu
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
South Asian Military Handbook
0992/74
({/"rV
U20}}9tatl i~~
Baltlt
Nnin4ninni I
I'n~~ ~~
Boundary of former state
of Jammu and Kashmir
International boundary
International boundary, indefinite
Line of Control delineated(December
1972) under theSimle Agreement
(toad
Track or trail
`Approved For Release 1999%09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00'875R0011~b0030001-2
June 1, 1974
Jammu and Kashmir Area
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
Pakistan
South Asian Military Handbook
0992/74
June 1,1974
J
/ Gllglf (~
~--t Agency ` Bnlf(slan
North- ~
Selected Types of Isyuipmcnt Ordered
Isight A N-12 hcucy-transports ................................................
29 IL-19 medium transports ................. . ........................... . ....
Light ;\tI-9 hclicoptcrs .......................................................
11 11I-9 hclicopters .................. .......................................
1S A N-12 heuv~~trnnsports ...................................................
Plant facilities and license for production of 191i ~11C-211~L jet fighters; subsequent
contracts were for importation of raw autteriul anti coutponents for production.
('I'bis figure represents the total projected foreign exchange cost of the progrutn.)
(C)
(~~)
(~~)
(L)
(C)
(L)
c:.. ~ ~r ~ ~ ~------ ~---- -- : :....................................................
~r...._ o ~ n _.. e.._n_ r~__, _. _ ~ .. .. .......... . ...... .....
V-13
SECRET
~ Approved for Release 1999/09/25 : ClA-RDP,~~5T00875R0011 Q0030001-2
,..
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
1')n9-7:3
'I'c ut l ................... 1 .75 i
--_ __
I~rcc 1Corld C:ounu'ics........... I ,355
---
13cll;iunt ..................... 17
Canada ......... .......... S
I~runcc ...................... 280
1l'cst Certuun)' ............... 41
Iran ........................ S
Itul~? ........................ 21
'l'ttrkev .. . ................... 3:3
United Kingdom ............. I72
United SGttes ................ i0(1
Othcrt ...................... 18
Conuuunist C'ountrics........... 3(i!1
1'cople'.. Republic of Chinu.... 305
Crcchoslo~?ukiu ............... 2.1
USSR ....................... 24
North Fonu ................. Ifi
PAKISTAN: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS
(d/illion US S)
1954-G5
19Gfi-73
19fiG
i9G7
19G8
IvG9
197(1
19%
197:
1973
0(i0
i9"r
153
-
4:3
-
8!1
--
110
90
-
53
IrtS
151
1150
?1:38
8S
lU
.5(i
-- U~J
88
~_ ]r
~ 35
=~ 3~)
--
---
---
--
....
1i
l(i
....
1
Negl.
....
....
Negl.
..
..
Neal.
S
3
....
....
39
2'11
2
2
90
49
43
9
2G
75
8
33
21
1
4
1
1
1
1
3
????
8
??..
2
1
I
1
I
1
1
....
21
13
7
..
....
....
1
I7
'
1(i
10
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
Negl.
1(
i2
10
8
....
....
....
....
Ne ~I.
6
2
ill
-
73
4
9
8
l6
21
]0
9
G
r
1 1
...
....
2
2
2
1
2
2
10
3ri9
li5
2"r
33
41
22
3G
73
tit
IO
205
65
24
21
20
20
3G
64
45
....
24
....
....
8
7
I
....
....
E
....
24
....
3
9
14
1
....
1
1
....
1 G
....
....
....
....
....
....
8
S
tAYLSTAN: MILITAIY SUPPLY AI:REEMENTS Wfffi CHINA
(Million US E)
Scp 1965....,......
Jul 1966............
May 1'?ti7 ... , ..... .
Dec 19ti i .... , ..... ,
Nov 1970...........
Nov 1911...........
Feb 1912...........
Nov 1913........,..
Apr ! 974.......... .
Ist half 1974? ,...
Selected Types of E~aipme~t Unierera Stalus t
75 79 AfIG-19 jet fi,.,hters, 4 IL-2R jet, bombers, 192 medium tanks, and artillery....... (C)
42 ] ]0 medium funks, and urtillery ............................... .............. (C)
50 60 1f[G~l9s, 252 medium tanks, and artillzry ................................... (C)
3 Aircraft engines ............................................................. (C).
40 Ground-forces equipment for two army divisions ............ .. .................. (C)
60 Ground-forces eq,aipment for two army divisions, 30'v1IG-19s, 8 Shanghai IIs, other (U)
naval equipr.,ent.
6.5 Ground-force.; equipment for two army divisions, naval craft ...................... (U)
10 10 MIG-19s, naval end ground-forces equipment .. . . . . . ................... . ..... (U)
1 Tank engines, spares.. .............................................. (C)
20 50 M11IG-19s, FT-5 trnincr aircraft, naval and ground-forces equipment ............. (U)
SECRET
Approved -Far Release.-199.9/.0.9/25 ; .GIA_-RD,P85T~,Q$,Z5R0011 Q0030.001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRE"T
Table 5
(,lfi/lion US S)
3 Daphne-clusssubmarincs ..................................... ..............
2q ,Mirage IlI jet fighters .....................................................
7 Aloucttc III Ireliroptcrs .....................................................
111u1.r;: 530 air-tu-uir missiles ......................... . ....................... .
1 Aloucttc III helicopter .....................................................
Aircruft engines .............................................................
Aircruft rockets ............................... ............................ .
N uvulspares ................................................................
1 M ystcre trunsport .........................................................
28 Mirage 5 and 2 Dlirnge III jet fighters, ;1latns 530 uir-to-uir missiles, aircn~ft rockets
and nmmunition.
]0 Aloucttc III helicopters; license to assemble Aloucttc Ills ......................
"~tiruge flight simulator, 0 Aloucttc III helicopters, ammunition ...................
1 f u mu helicopter ....................................... .. ..................
Ammunition, support equipment ..............................................
50 1lfutr:~ .5.50 air-to-uir missiles ...............................................
Ammunition ............................................ ....................
9 Aloucttc Ili helicoptcrs .....................................................
3 I3requet-Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft .......... . ....................... .
Cmtule surface-to-uir missile system .............. . ........................... .
Oct 191i~?..... ...
Dc?. 19C5.........
.lun I!11i8...........
Feb- 19(i8.......... .
llec 1908...........
Feb lOfi!l...........
A1uy 1909..........
Feb 1970...........
.lun 1910......,....
.lun 1910...........
.lun 19i2...........
Sep 1912...........
Oct, Dec 19i2.......
Jttn 19i3...........
Apr 1973....... ... Negl.
Sep 1"i3........... 0
Jluy 19'i4....... .. 24
Mu:? 1974.......... ?]0
'~ - 15
SECRET
Approved For Release 1.999/09/25 ;CIA,-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
BANGLADESH: FORE2CN MILITARY IMPORTS,
1971-197:3
(dlillion US .S)
'T'otal ................ ................... 43.8
Free World Countries ................ ............ 1!I.8
Indi:r ........................................ 17.i
United Kingdom ...... .. ...................... 2.1
(C)
(C)
(C)
(C)
(C)
(C)
(C)
(C)
(C')
(C)
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
USSR ... ...... . .......... .
Czechoslovakia ..............
United States ~,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
1st half 1956........ 100
rlug 1959........... 23
2nd hull 1960....... 40
1st half 1961........ 1
Feb 1961........... ]6
Oct 1964........... 80
Nov 1966........... 44
Nov 1966........... 44
.fun 1911........... 40
blur 1971........... Negl.
Jul 1971............ 67
2nd half 1973....... 7
378 140 238 15 17 46
23 23 .... .... .... ....
4.s 2.9 I.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
(,lfillion US ~E)
Selected Tyres of lqu:pmenl Ordered
Aircraft, T-34 funks, small arms ............................................... (C)
Artillery, T-59155 tanks ...................................................... (C)
SA-2 surface-t.u-air missile system ........... ................................. (C)
Sparc parts ............................. .................................. (C)
Aircrnftspare parts .............................. ............................ ,C)
b1IG-21 jet fighters, a edium tanks, nntiaircn~fl artillery . . ....................... (C)
T-5955 funks, artillery, support equipment, Darnall arms, ammunition .............. (C)
SU-i jet fighter bomhr-s, MIG-2; jet figl:te:s, hfI-8 helicopters ........... ........ (C)
Tanks, APCs, artillery, small arms .......... .. ................................ (U)
5A-2 missile modifications .................................................... (C)
b1I-8 helicopters, tank transporters .......... .................................. (U)
b11G-17 jet fighters, replacement aircraft ..................................... (C)
V - ?'-
~.
SE~.?ZET
px~proved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
~~
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
NEPAL: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1951-197:3
(d/iUion US S)
Totul .............................. .. 9.b -
--------
Free 1Vorld Countries ................ . ............ 3.0
Frunce ........................................ 0.3--
Germnny ............ .. .. ...................... 1.7
India ......................................... 0.7
Israel ................. ........................ 0.1
Jupnn ......................................... 0.:3
United Kingdom ... .. .. ........................ :3.0
United States .................................. 1.0
Communist Countries ............................. 1 .5
I'ItC .......................................... O.G
USiR ......................................... 0.9
SRI LANKA: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS,
1954-1973
(Mill+~n US .R')
1'atitl ................................ ---37 . fi
tree World Countries ............................ 29.1
Austrnlia ..................................... 0.1
Cnnudu ...................................... 0.2
Indiu ........................................ ~ 0.2
Isruel ........................................ 11 .G
Itnly ......................................... .0.1
United Kingdom .... .. ........................ 13.1
United States ................................. 3.5
Communist County es ............................ R.5
PRC ......................................... ().0
USSR ......... ............................... 2.0
Yugosluvin ................................... O.fi
V-17
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
sECRE~r
ANNEX A
South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
1. India
India became the world's sixth nuclear power on May 18, 1974, when it
detonated a 10-15 kiloton device in an underground test. The nuclear
materials for the blast carne from the Canadian-built CIRUS reactor at the
Bhaba Atomic Research Center near Bombay. India. had promised the
Canadians in writing that the reactor and its products tnr~uld be used only for
peaceful purposes. The Indians, however, have never accepter; the Canadian
and US interpretation that any nuclear explosion is tantamount to a
weapons test. India has ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty but not the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The step from exploding a nuclear device to producing a primitive
bomb deliverable by aircraft is not great, and India almost certainly has the
technology to build such a weapon. Domestic pressure on the government to
develop a military weapon alrr?ost certainly will be ntense, but the cost of
creating an effective medium-range delivery system anc,' the loss of credibility
to a government which has consistently denied that it would develop a
nuclear weapons system would also be great.
The CIRUS reactor in Bombay h~%s been in operation for over a decade,
and the Indians probabl;~ have enough plutonium to make 15 ?~r 20 nuclear
devices or weapons, each with an approximate yield of 15 kilotons. Produc-
tion of plutonium would allow them to make about two more devices each
year.
A large Indian-built nuclear power plant at Kalpakkam, in south iodic,
is scheduled to be in operation sometime after 19?7. With current and
planned separation facilities, the plant, which will hav? ~~wo reactors fueled
by natural uranium. could produce enough plutonium to make from 50 to
70 low-yield bombs a year in the 1980s. A prototype for a nPw generation of
fast-breeder reactors producing U-233 from India's huge supplies of thorium
may be ready in the 1980s.
Current Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons them-
selves, are modest. A fleet of about 40 Ca, iberra light bombers, with a radius
of about 1,000 nautical miles and a payload of 5,000 pounds, could reach
India's closer neighbors, including much of western and southwestern China,
SECRET
Approved For Release 19:99/09/25 .: CIA-RDP85T00875R0011.00030001-2
,- , ~~, ,~
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
SECRET
but not tl~e heavily populated Chinese i;ities farther east. India has no
long-range bombers but could, with extensive modifications, use some of its
civil fleet of Boeing 707s ari,-i 747s to carry weapons several thous~~nd miles.
X111 of thesr~ aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defenses.
India's planned and :;lowly expanding capabilities in the nuclear and
space-related fields will eventually remove many of the obstacles to a
large-scale nuclear weapons program. In the late 1980s there will be enough
plutonium and U-233 to make a number of intermediate-yield weapons. The
Indian space program, which is still in its early stages, probably will have
borne fruit by then. To date, only sounding rockets have been tested.
A small test satellite was scheduled for launch in 1974, but the Indians
have been unable to develop a suitable launch vehicle. As a result, the Soviets
have agreed to orbit a satellite constructed in India. An Indian satellite
launch is still at least five years away, and even the ~ ~auite a few additional
years and ccnsiderable cost would be required to uavelop an operational
missile system.
India's nuclear test will spur a Pakistani effort to develop nuclear
weapons, but Islamabad is unlikely to have any effective nuclear capability
within the current decade.
The Pakistanis are just beginning their nuclear power program, and are
greatly dependent on foreign technological and financial assistance. They
presently have a 125-megawatt reactor acquired from CanadG that began
operating in December 1972. The reactor is sander !AEA safeguards, which
call for periodic inspections by UN teams.
Pakistan is constructing, with Canadian assistance, a fuel element fahri-
cation facility at Nilore that will be cornpleterJ in 1975. Islamabad is also
seeking to construct, with foreign assistance, a c.f,~.inical separation plant that
would take about four years to comp!et~: i~h~'se ac~iities, when constructed
and opQra'iona~, would enable Pakistan to rr,~, `u re plutonium and, after
irradiation, extract it from the fuel elements c ~eactor.
If Pakistan decides to undertake a nuclear weapons program, the
plutonium yielded by its present reactor will be sufficient to produre from
10 to 20 nuclear weapons a year, if safeguards are disregarded. Studies of
high-explosive development and nuclear d~+; ice design, however, could not be
completed before the end of this decade without considerable foreign
assistance.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2