DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010068-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: September 20, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 State Dept. review
completed
Developments in Indochina
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ecret
Secret
122
20 Septennb
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I I
Developments in Indochina
This publication was prepared by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of
Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within
the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They
should be directed to the authors of the Individual articles.
CONTENTS
20 September 1973
CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sihanouk is complaining that Hanoi and
Peking are not keeping his military
forces adequately supplied. Lack of
ammunition, he says, is partly respon-
sible for the Communists' inability to
take Kompong Cham. Captured documents
indicate that the Communists did indeed
intend to take Kompong Cham in early
September and that. Khmer Communist and
Vietnamese units had some coordination
problems.
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The government is worried that possible
rice shortages in the next few months will
tempt the Communists to move their mili-
tary units out of base areas and into
conteste areas where rice is being har-
vested.
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LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NORTH VIETNAM. . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . 11
Castro had a fine time in Hanoi. He
was embraced by the leadership and whisked
down to Communist-held territory in the
South for a brief tour.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPIENTS . . . . . . . . . 12
Peking is still treating Indochina de-
velopments with restraint. NCNA gave
rather perfunctory treatment to the
stopovers of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong,
aid statements continue to stress eco-
nomic assistance rather than military,
and Chou En-lai skipped the Vietnam
National Day celebrations for the first
time since 1964.
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CAMBODIA 25X1
Sihanouk'o Latent Lino
Prince Sihanouk claims that Khmer Communist
military forces are being severely hampered by in-
adequate supply support from the North Vietnamese
and the Chinese. During an interview in Algier., on
17 September, Sihanouk stated that his "defense
minister" in Cambodia recently informed him that
lack of ammunition had kept the insurgents from
taking Ko'pong Cham or any other major city. Si-
hanouk said that he passed on the insurgents' plea
for more support to Hanoi. and Peking, but that "so
far we have had nothing--or very little."
Sihanouk contended that unless the supply situa-
tion improved, the insurgents could not hope for any
significant military victories. He was particularly
rough on Hanoi, saying that the North Vietnamese
are "no longer willing to help us by transporting
supplies from the Chinese to the borders of Cambodia."
He also asserted that the Vietnamese had withdrawn
their ammunition stocks from Cambodia. Sihanouk
claimed that these actions were taken because Hanoi
prefers a negotiated settlement in Cambodia, and be-
cause it fears US retaliation and wants US aid.
This is the second time in the past few months
that Sihanouk has spoken publicly on the supply prob-
lem. In late June in Romania, he said that he had
asked the North Vietnamese and the Chinese to resume
deliveries of ammunition to the insurgents--which he
said had been terminated in January of this year.
Late last month, Sihanouk announced that arrange-
ments had been made with the Chinese and the Viet-
namese Communists to resupply the insurgents from
existing Viet Cong stocks in South Vietnam.
20 September 1973
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More on Kompong Cham
There is new evidence that the Khmer Communists
were confident of gaining a quick military victory
at Kompong Cham. A Communist document captured
during heavy fighting for the city earlier this
month reveals that the insurgents believed it would
be difficult to take Kompong Cham, but that it would
fall within ten days after sustained attacks began
on 31 August. At the same time, however, the document
recognized that the 13 insurgent battalions committed
to the offensive were understrength, short of ammu-
nition, and unfamiliar with the terrain.
The document made no mention of any Vietnamese
Communist support to the insurgent drive on Kompong
Cham. Four Khmer Communist troops captured on 10
September, how,~'rer, have told Cambodian Army inter-
rogators that each of the insurgent battalions at
Kompong Cham had approximately six Vietnamese Com-
munist advisers. In addition, the prisoners claimed
that one unidentified Vietnamese Communist battalion
was to have provided 75-mm. recoilless rifle fire
in support of insurgent attacks from the south.
The battalion reportedly refused this support at
a critical stage of the fighting, however--on the
20 September 1973
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grounds that its personnel were needed to escort
civilian captives to enemy-controlled zones. (Ac-
cording to a US Embassy estimate, the Communists
may have carried off at least 10,000 to 15,000
civilians.)
Although the Communists have found the going
at Kompong Cham tougher than they had expected,
their attacks have caused considerable damage to
the city and a sharp deterioration in general living
conditions. One fourth of the city's houses were
destroyed, while another 60 percent sustained light
to heavy damage. This destruction was caused pri-
marily by point-blank Communist artillery fire.
Kompong Chani's military hospital was completely
destroyed. The civilian hospital was damaged and
is now being used to house some of the city's
numerous refugees. Although Kompong Cham's elec-
trical system was knocked out, its municipal water
supply is still functioning. Stocks of food are
running low with only a week's supply of rice on
hand. There is also a critical shortage of medical
supplies and equipment, and only two doctors in
the city. Phnom Penh is doing what it can to keep
Kompong Cham resupplied via air and the Mekong, but
the government is ,already overburdened with trying
to help several other isolated provincial capitals.
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SOUTH VIETNAM 25X1
A Pending "Rice War "?
25X1
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South Vietnamese officials, including President
Thieu, have been warning the population recently
that current food shortages may cause a "rice
with the Communists during the fall harvest.
COSVN has been preparing its military forces for a
possible major effort to get more food.
In early September, COSVN issued a directive
alerting its people to government intentions to
cut down the flow of rice into Viet Cong areas
from government market places. The directive pre-
dicted that if Saigon were successful in cutting
back the Viet Cong's "shadow supply system," the
"liberation economy would suffer unemployment and
famine." More recent instructions have ordered
Communist military units in Lhe southern half of
the country to prepare to move into "contested" rural
areas where rice is being harvested. COSVN ap-
parently sees double benefits in such a plan--keeping
large amounts of rice out of South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment hands could contribute to popular unrest
in government-held areas and increased food stocks
in Communist areas might persuade more people to
side with the Viet Cong. Because of the precarious
supply situation on both sides, any extensive Com-
munist military interference with the government's
rice harvest, especially in the delta provinces
where most of the country's rice is grown, would
be likely to provoke a strong government reaction.
In any serious "rice war" both sides would
probably lose. Rice must be harvested quickly
once it is ripe, and prolonged military engagements
the Communists have reacnea such proportions tha
20 September 1973
shortages among
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in a rice-producing area at harvest time could re-
sult in overripeness and falling from the stalk
that would make the crop useless for either food or
seed.
The US Embassy has reported that the domestic
rice supply in South Vietnam is in fact very tight,
with the situation over tha next few months heavily
dependent on scheduled imports from the US. More-
over, the embassy warns that the South Vietnamese
will find it difficult to supply additional rice
to Cambodia without triggering a major political
crisis.
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Preparing for a Pro-Government
Senate
Now that the Senate election has left pro-gov-
ernment forces in control of a solid majority in both
houses of the National Assembly, government strategists
are planning for the assembly's fall session `'iat be-
gins next month. Pro-government legislators and pres-
idential aides reportedly want to ensure the election
of loyal senators to all leadership positions and
give these senators control over all phases of Upper
House activity. Rumors have been circulating that
former foreign minister Tran Van Lam, the head of one
government slate in last month's election, will re-
place the independent Catholic leader Nguyen Van Huyen
as Senate chairman.
20 September 1973
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No matter who assumes the leadership positions,
it seems clear that all assembly activity will be
tightly controlled from the presidential palace through
Nguyen Van Ngan, President Thieu's chief aide for
legislative matters. NNgan is considering changes in
Senate rules that would restrict the privileges of
the remaining opposition senators and curtail their
opportunities for criticizing the government during
floor debate. The presidential aide also is study-
ing changes that would make it easier for the pro-
government majority in the assembly to amend the Con-
stitution. One of Thie::'s main motives in seeking con
trol of the Senate is to enable him to secure passage
of amendments that would strengthen his political
position.
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Toward a Withdrawal Deadline
Now that the peace protocol finally has been
signed, the next order of business in Vientiane is
the formation of the new coalition government. This
step may be achieved rather easily and will establish
a specific deadline for the withdrawal of "foreign
military forces" from Laos. According to the pro-
tocol, the withdrawal is to take place in three
phases at 20-day intervals and is to be completed
within 60 days of the establishilent of the new gov-
ernment and its advisory body, the Joint National
Political Council.
The withdrawal may be largely unsupervised.
Both the protocol and the February peace agreement
call for inspection and supervisory roles by teams
of the reactivated International Control Commission
(ICC) and the joint commission representing the two
Lao parties, the Joint Commission to Implement the
Agreement. After all the verbiage is cut away,
however, the key provisions provide for ICC in-
spection only after the approval of the joint com-
mission, which functions on the basis of unanimity.
If the North Vietnamese believe it advantageous to
make a show of removing their forces from Laos, they
can make use of the supervisory apparatus. If they
want to hide the fact that they are not pulling out
all of their troops, however, the unanimity principle
will work to their advantage.
Lao Communist negotiators have assured government
officials that Hanoi will abide by the withdrawal
provisions. The North Vietnamese press attache
in Vientiane has admitted to several foreign
journalists that North Vietnamese troops are in
Laos and claimed that they wc,?id be withdrawn in
conjunction with US and Thai E:n; sonnel . Many of-
ficials in Vientiane believe that some, if not most,
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North Vietnamese combat units in Laos will pull back
into the border area, but few anticipate a total
withdrawal. It seems likely that many North Viet-
namese logistic and administrative units will re-
main in Laos as long as there are Communist mili-
tary forces to maintain in South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia. Some reduction in the support strength may
occur now that the bombing has stopped. However,
ongoing construction work on a major now road which
will eventually run the length of the Lao panhandle
and the an-,iouncement ear;,ier this year of "aid"
agreements between Cdam Ne,ua and Hanoi, which would
provide a cloak of legitimacy to continued North
Vietnamese logistic activities, suggest a continuing
North Vietnamese presence along the infiltration
Also in June, a North Vietnamese defector claime
that the North Vietnamese units in the hills of th;.
northern panhandle had already disguised themselves as
Pathet Lao. More recently, another defector claimed
that the North Vietnamese 29th Regiment stationed in the
Muong Phalane area of the panhandle did not plan to
withdraw after the formation of a coalition govern-
ment. The defector also stated that troops of the
559th Group--the major logistic unit in the pan-
handle--would remain in Laos.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Fidel Caintro'o Vicit to
North Vietnam
Hanoi received Fidel Castro last week with more
warmth and enthusiasm than it had shown a visiting
leader in some time. During the 5-day visit, which
ended on 17 September, practically the entire North
Vietnamese leadership turned out. There were em-
braces and verbal and floral bouquets, and President
Ton Duc Thang went so far as to call the Cuban visi-
tor Hanoi's "closest friend." The Vietnamese Com-
munists have long felt a special affinity for their
revolutionary comrades in Havana, and their feelings
have warmed during the last year as Hanoi's relations
with Moscow and Peking become more troubled.
On 15 September Castro was whisked down to
Quang Tri Province--in the "liberated zone"--for a
well-publicized visit (the first by a foreign head
of government). This side trip was clearly part of
the continuing effort to boost the PRG's interna-
tional prestige. Cuba has always been the most
forthcoming of the Communist states toward the Viet
Cong. Havana had an envoy accredited to the National
Liberation Front even before the PRG was created in
1969. The rank_ng PRG figure to greet Castro was
the elusive defense minister, "Tran Nam Trung,"
whose real identity has never been revealed.
Talks between the North Vietnamese and Cuban
leaders apparently did not dwell much on substance.
Both sides were more interested in reaffirming their
warm ties and denouncing "US imperialist" involvement
in the Chilean coup. Hanoi radio announced that the
visit was cut short because of events in Chile, and
there is a possibility Castro may go on to the UN to
speak about Chile.
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peking on Indochina
Peking is still treating Vietnam developments
with great restraint, limiting its comments to expres-
sic,ns of Chinese support for the Vietnamese Communists
in the context of post-war economic and political re-
construction. China marked North Vietnam's National.
Day on 1 September more quietly than at any time dur-
ing the war years. It was Yoh Chien-ying who led the
Chinese delegation to the DRV Embassy reception in
Peking, not Chou En-lai, who had attended every year
since 1964. Brief toasts rather than lengthy speeches
were exchanged, and Peking's pledges of support at
the reception and in the congratulatory message signed
by the Chinese leadership were subdued and were con-
fined to civilian enterprises.
China's priorities and outlook toward Vietnam
were clearly reflected in its handling of the Chinese
aid shipment to the FRG in northern South Vietnam on
1 September. The Chinese have gone to some length to
stress that the shipment was for civilian, not mili-
tary, purposes and therefore consistent with Peking's
position that the war has ended and economic recon-
struction started.
Chinese restraint also was apparent during recent
stopovers in Peking by North Vietnamese party leader
Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong. NCNA did not go
into any details about Le Duan's meeting with Chou
En-lai in late August, and its description of Chou's
meeting with Dong in mid-August was perfunctory. The
North Vietnamese accounts also were less enthusiastic
than usual, suggesting the two sides encountered sev-
eral areas of disagreement, almost certainly including
Chinese military aid.
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20 September 1973
It has been clear for some time that Poking and
Hanoi liffe, over the composition and level of as-
siattanca that the Chinese should dispatch southward.
North Vietnam obviously wants more military aid than
China is willing to send. For example, Hanoi publi-
cized an account of a ceremony in Canton in which the
North Vietnamese ambassador decorated Chinese individ-
uals and units involved in transporting military aid
to North Vietnam during the war; the Chinese press
has not mentiored the ceremony.
Peking has also maintained a low profile with
respect to the situation in Cambodia. Foreign Minis-
ter Chi Peng-fei offered Peking's first authoritative
endorsement of the major statement by Sihanouk's t?xile
government in mid-August, but it came in a routine way
during the DRV National Day reception. Chou En-lai
barely mentioned Cambodia in his political report to
China's party congress. While continuing to replay
major statements of the Cambodian insurgents, Peking
recently has heavily edited out criticism of the US
and references to Thai and South Vietnamese support
for Phnom Penh. NCNA did broadcast a lengthy article
current thinking on the Cambodian situation.
Soviet polemic and offered no insights into Peking's
on current developments in Cambodia on 6 September,
but it apparently was primarily intended as an anti-
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