DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 28, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~ ~ S /s/a ~o Top Secret
llIRLC1URAT1's OF
INTLLI.IGLNCL'
Develv~ment
r in Indo~hin~
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State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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2 8 Fek+ruary 19 7 3
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCH.iNA
(Information as of 1500)
Page
SOUTH VIETNAM 1
The Viet Cong radio charges that Saiuon
forces have killed Vietnamese Communist mem-
bers of the truce teams. COSVN has provided
additional guidance on its new Directive.
Big Minh and Ky are re-emerging on the polit-
ical scene. There is little change in the
military situation.
The two sides are still skirmishing.
The joint commissions have met for the first
time. The rightists in Vientiane are grum-
bling about the terms of the cease-fire. The
Japanese have donate3 their first foreign
assistance.
Sirik Matak is concerned about the
procrastination on the vice presidency. In-
surgents are still harasGing government units
near Banam. The teachers strike continues.
NORTH VIETNAM
I~han Dan is being spruced up.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 12
The World Conference on Vietnam held
in Rome failed to make much of a splash.
28 Februar?~ 1973
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SOUTH VIHTNAM
The Viet Gag's Liberation Press Agency, in
a story beamed to outlets abroacl on 27 and 28 Feb-
ruary charged that.. a South Vietnamese "civil
guard" company attacked a Viet Cong military dele-
gation to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in
Dalat at a "reception" point, }tilling four men
and wounding two others o A UPI sto::y from S~i.igon
on 28 February reports that Radio Hanoi has broad-
cast a similar story, claiming that the in~:ident
took place on 25 February and. is an "extremely
ser9.ous violation" of the cease-fire agreement.
So far P~BIS has monitored no Hanoi broadcasts on
the alleged incident and official US sources in
Saigon have received no confirmation of the Vies:
Cong charges. The charges may have been fabricated
to document PRC claims in recent sessions of the Four-
Party JOln'i. Party M.:.litary Commission that Saigon troops
have been ai;tacking sites the Viet Cong designates as
pick-up points for its members of the JMC field teams.
On the other hand, Saigon could conceal incidents of
this sort if no outside observers are along on pick-
up helicopter flights into Viet Cong Zones.
Further Communist Guidance on New COSVN Po'Li ~ticaZ
Directive
In late February high-level Communist cadre
provided their subordinates further guidance on
COSVN Directive No, 2, which. was issued in late
January to announce the beginning of the political
phase of the .revolution
that the struggle would now be waged by peaceful
means within the framework of the cease-fire agree-
ment, the cadre 5tresse d that military tactics might
be initiated in order to gain a final victory if
Although the latest briefings reiterated
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Saigon proves "treacherous and intransigent" in ne-
gotiations. The briefers asserted that the armed
forces must therefore continue to be supplied, re-
inforced, and developed as before the cease-fire.
COSVN did not expect the negotiations
with Saigon to solve the political situation and
that general fighting might resume by the end of
April--the expiration of the 90-day period in which
some progress is called for under the Paris agree-
ment.
Stirrings Amon,q OZd Thieu foes
Speaking out for the first time since the cease-
fire, Big Minh this week addressed an "open letter" to
the participants in the Paris conference and hosted a
28 February 1973
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cocktail party for opposition legislators and the press.
Tn his letter, Minh stressed familiar themes, asserting
that the majority of the South Vietnamese people support
a "thirc? entity" and implying that he represents this
group. Minh also emphasized the need to ensure "demo-
cratic freedoms" in South Vietnam, as called for in the
cease-fire agreement. He told newsmen that South Viet-
namese exiles should be permitted to return home and
said he was opposed to the Thieu government's position
that Saigon and the Viet Cong should each choose half
of the National Council for National Reconciliation and
Concord. Minh remarked that he and his followers would
never have a place in the council under such a formula.
Several prominent opposition figures, including An
Quang Buddhist Sana_,tor Vu Van Mau, were present at Minh's
gathering, but no anti-Thieu front was announced despite
rumors ~.~.hat such a move was in the works. Instead, Minh
is following his usual cautious strat.~gy of avoiding any
real action while trying to keep his name in the news
and clearly signaling his availability.
Former vice president Ky, meanwhile, is taking an
even more low-key~:d approach. Ky, who has been inactive
politically since he left office in 1971, was not pres-
ent at Minh's gathering, but he repor~edly has been in
touch recently with Minh and other political and mili-
tary leaders. Ky approached the US Embassy last week
and suggested that he would like again to play an active
role in the affairs of the country. Coupling criticism
of President Thieu's policy with a suggest~.on that he
would be willing to work with the President, Ky claimed
that Thieu is unable by himself to organize the coun-
try properly for the political struggle with the Viet
Cong. The former vice president said Thieu should be
prevailed upon to set up a collective leac?ership. Ky,
who does not have much support of his own, apparently
realizes that Ize cannot regain political influence unless
he has outside help--such as the backing of the LTS.
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The Mi Zi tart' Si ~uation
There has been little change in the over-al].
situation during ?the past few days, although there
has been some increase in Communist shellings. Most
of the artillery fire has been directed against
South Vietnamese paratroop positions south of the
Thack Han River line in Quang Tri Province
Binh Dinh Province, a light Communist ground attack
was reported close to a South Vietnamese coastal
radar site that was briefly overrun when Sa Huynh 1~X~
was captured by the Communists in late January.
28 FEbruary 1973
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I
CH~NA
Ab;uulonrcl by yovrrnnu:nt ~~
uong Mounge ~uong Sai ~~
~am Yu ,off'
,_PaMp~ ng ~~. ,~ -~ ~tuang Bouam
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redone
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~dyoboury Ban No' Kh~ouaenflvlll<
long Tfong~
~ Tholeng
Lao N ?m
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Bolovens
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CAMBODIA , _~ ,. ~a .
1dGol~crnment controlled
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Communist units are persisting in their effor'cs
to clear government irregulars from the northern,
Bolovens Plateau One government battalion along
Route 23 several miles south of Thateng was dis-
persed b~~~ a mortar attack on 27 February, while
on the same day enemy ground attacks drove other
irregulars from positions farther south of Thateng.
Preliminary reports indicate that fighting continued
in this sector during the morning of 28 February.
In the Palcsong area, i:ield commanders reported sev-
eral
shelling incidents as lead elements of an
800-
man
the
Lao Army force edged to within three miles
town.
of
Elsewhere in the south , Communi s t i:roops
harassed a government force along Route 13 north
of Thakhek on 27 February. Lao Army units south
of Thakhek claim that they have been hit by sev-
eral company-sized enemy attacks in the past few
days. No positions have changed hands, and no
government casualties have been .reported. Mean-
while, Lao Air Force T-28s are continuing to fly
tactical missions throughout the :south.
In the north, no cease-fire violations oc-
curred in the Plaine des Jarres :,ector on 27 Feb-
ruary. In the northwest, belated reports indicate
that Communist s;iellings forcer? a Lao Army battalion.
on 26 February to abandon Muong Mounge, a village
some 30 miles north of Ban Houei Sai.
Joint Commissions Meet~nr First 1'i me
After. a delay of several days, the two joint
commissions charged with implementing the political
and military provisions of the Lao peace agreement
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met for the first time on 28 Fek~ruary. The meetings
were conducted in a cordial atmosphere. A govern-
ment spokesman stated that the political group had
discusse~~ forming a Joint National Political Council.
Accordin_~ to the agreement, the council-?-to be s~~t
up by 23 March--will advise the new provisional
government on elections. The military group dis-
cussed procedures and jurisdiction related to the
cease-fire. Both commissions will meet at least
three times a weelc.
Critics Findin?g Their Mark
Journalists in Vientiane continue to circulate
stories of grumbling among Lao rightists. One re-
port recently carried iri a Bangkok newspaper quoted
a "leading rightist" as sa~~ing that Souvanna had
not. listened to his ministers, had obtained no
concessions in the agreement, and had signed just
what the ocher ~:i.cle imposed on him. These charges
prompted Souvanna's chief envoy, Pheng Phongsavan,
to issue a fcrmal denial of such accusations on
28 Fefruary, He presented a detailed, but not too
convincing, account of cabinet meetings o:, the
negotiations to justify his assertions that he con-
sulted with the ministers whenever he had "a prob-
lem. "
Japanese Aid
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has announced
that the Japanese have donated $540,000 r"ar refugee
centers in Vientiane and elsewhere. This is the
first co.~nmitment of foreign economic aid since th?e
cease-fire agreements were signed. Tokyo, which
annually contribui.as $4-r5 million in project aid
and also provides support for the multinational
Foreign Exchange Operations Fund, ranks third,
behind the US and France, as Laos' major bene-
factors,
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CAMBODIA
Republican Party leader Sirik Matak i.s grow-
ing concerned over Lon Nol's rocrastination on
the vice residency.
Matak's criticism of Lon Non's opposi.ti.on is
well foundec-. Last week, far example, Lon Non told
a French journalist that Matak had taken "certain
positions" that would make a "return to the past
difficult." Besides making negative public state-
ments, Lon Non apparently is resorting to some
arcane political tactics to undermine Matak's ap-
pointment.
Lon Non's latest anti-Matak machinations appear
to be in direct defiance of Lon Nol's wishes and in
violation of an earlier presidential injunction that
such activities must ceUse. If Lon Nol does not soon
rein in Lon Non on the Matak issue, it is quite likely
that Matak will not only reject the vice presidency
but also will make a pzrmanent political }creak with
the President. Should that happen, the flickering
prospects far any semblance of political unity in
Phnom Penh would all but be extinguished.
28 February 1973
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i,>ree~s little my I ficuccupictl ~f3anam
I / I", i~('ivcrumcr~'
'' 2;'Chambak .Neale Leong
;'
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Z'he Military ~>ituation
Khmer insurgent forces east of the Mekong River
are continuing to harass government units iii the
vicinity of Banam, which was retaken by the Cambodians
on 27 February. Four under-strength ,government bat-
talions are still being pinned down by the insurgents
north of the village. Thus far, no plans have been
made to try to relieve these units or to regain con-
trol over Route 15 between Banam and Prey Veng. The
government also has not yet organized an operation to
~~lear sections of the Mekong's east bank below Neak
Llong.
South of Phnom Penh, three Cambodian battalions
linked up with local units on 27 E'ebruary on Route
3 near Tram Khnar, reopening the highway between that
town and the capital. The government forces mec no
resistance. Meanwhile, there has been no significant
change in the situation along Route 2. Cambodia para-
troops are continuing their clearing operations north
of Takeo. Othex government troops south of Takeo that
the higc-way are still trying to regroup.
were recently forced out of several positions along
The Strike is StiZZ On
mhe government has tY~us far reacted negatively
to demands by striking teachers and students in Phnom
Penh for a roll-back in recent price increases and
for n;ore effective action against off~.cial corruption.
was all about and how the government could resolve it.
Whin the spokesman explained that the teachers wanted
higrer salaries in order to live d,cently, Lon Non
reportedly became angry and threatened to arrest the
:,pokesman and to invoke martial law. Lon Nol and Lon
Non later met with student leaders and offered vague
and Brigadier General Lon Non called in a spokesman
for t,ne teachers last week to ask him what the strike
president Lon Nol
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inducements to end the strike. When the students
would not back down, Lon Non again threatened to n~pose
martial law.
28 February 1973
First Minister Hang Thun H~;k, Lon Non, and other
governmen+; officials met again with student leaders
on 24 February. In the course of their discussions,
Hak reportedly stated that the rise in prices was
the result of US insistence that economic reforms be
instituted. Another official commented that the gov-
ernment's effort to develop the economy over the last
two years had been thwarted by i~isufficient aid from
the U5.
Both the students and teachers reportedly have
decided to continue their strikes until the govern-
ment satisfies their demands. To prevent tPie strikes
from leading to demonstrations and other forms of
agitation, the government on 28 February banned all
meetin s iii the ca ital.
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NORTI.1 VIETNAM
Hanoi seems acutely aware that public relations
is going to be an important. arena of competition b~-
the leadership de-
ci a ast Octo er to permit. roader and more com-
prehensive coverage of the news. An important part
of this policy was to be a face-lif tang for Nhan Dart
itself. Once the fighting stops, the regime reasoned
in October, tYie North Vietnamese will have access to
a wide variety of information, and Nhan Dan cannot be
expPCted to hold its audience if it sticks to the
standard fare of dialectical homilies, reports of
meetings, and agricultural bulletins. Instead, the
first page of the paper is to be devoted to world and
domestic; news. More reporters are being recruited,
and the paper's management has been ordered to buy
the most up-to-date printing equipment.. By instiscu-
ting these changes, the North Vietnarnese hope to catch
up with the Soviet Vietnamese media, whose journalistic
superiority the Nhan Dan official candidly acknowledged.
tween the Communists and their opponents.
North Vietnarnese journalists have on rare occa-
sions displayed considerable reportorial flair--most
notably in a seriES of reports from the Ho Chi Minh
Trail d!iring Operation Lam So.n 719 two years ago. It
will be an uphill struggle, however, to change the at-
titudes responsible for the dreariness of Nhan Dan's
day-to-day output . every- 25X1
one from the Politburo on own is set .Ln t e o ways
and that North Vietnamese media would naturally have
to maintain a "firm party political line." As if to
drive this point home, First Secretary Le Duan visite~3
Nhan Dan's offices earlier th~.s month to deliver some
exhortations that sound very much as though Hano.~'s
journalistic wine will b and lar a be a earin in
the same old bottles . 25X1
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Rome meeting of the World Conference on Viet-
nam on 22-24 February turned out to be a polemical
exercise, rehashing standard anti-war positions. The
conference, which four to six hundred delegates attended,
issued aii appeal to the US to stop violating the cease-
fire agreement, condemned the U5 for wreaking various
forms of destruction on Vietnam, and demanded that
Saigon immediately release its political prisoners.
The meeting was dampened by the decline in public
interest in Vietnam following the signing of the cease-
fire agreement. Although a large delegation from US
anti-war organizations was present, the traditional
position of the Americans as the center of attention
apart from the Vietnamese themselves was reportedl
usurped by the very large Japanese delegation
28 February 1973
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