DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: February 25, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
OSD review completed
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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25 February
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information as of 1500)
Page
LAOS
The level of military activity began
to taper off during the weekend, but
both sides continued to maneuver to
expand their holdings. A Pathet Lao
broadcast has given a clear indication
of the territory the Lao Communists
consider under their control at the
time of the cease-fire.
CAMBODIA
The government reportedly is in contact
with a key Khmer insurgent leader. In
Tam has officially refused to accept the
post of special adviser co Lon Nol. A
Mekong River convoy was harassed near
Neak Luong as military activity remains
focused south of Phnom Penh.
OSD review completed
SOUTH VIETNAM
There is little change in the military
situation, A US Embassy officer
describes the war damage in the Sa
Huynh area. The two sides have
opposing territorial claims in Quang
Tri Province. There were violent
anti-Communist incidents in Hue and
Da Nang. A close ally of President
Thieu calls for a stepped-up effort
against corruption.
25 February 1973
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Paksong
? Government controlled
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The level of military activity began to taper off
during the weekend, but both sides continued to ma-
neuver to expand their holdings. in the south, govern-
ment forces moving along Route 13 north of Thakhek
were dispersed following a sharp ground attack and
are now retreating toward the town. On the Bolovens
Plateau, the Communists rebuffed an initial govern-
ment effort to push back into the Paksong area. In
the north, government forces near the Plaine des Jarres
were pushed back from several high ground positions
they have been trying to establish overlooking Xieng
Khouangville and also lost several small outposts near
Bouam Long.
In a Radio Pathet Lao broadcast on 25 February the
Lao Communists provided a clear indication of the ter-
ritory they consider under Communist control at the
time of the cease-fire. The Communists laid claim
to the entire "Bolovens Region," to specifically in-
clude Saravane, Paksong, Lao Ngam, and Thateng. In
the central panhandle, Muong Phalane was the only
area of any significance mentioned. In the north,
the broadcast noted that prior to the cessation of hos-
tilities, Pathet Lao forces controlled the "Plaine des
Jarres - Xieng Khouang Region," Muong Soui, Sala
Phou Khoun and, in the far northwest, Muong Mounge
and Nam Yu. The only areas not now in Communist
hands are Muong Mounge and Sala Phou Khoun in the
north and Thateng in the south.
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the Commu-
nists appear anxious to get talks in Vientiane
started on implementing the cease-fire. Communist
negotiator. Phoun Sipraseuth said that he expected
the military subcommittee to produce a "protocol
of implementation of the cease-fire" no later than
28 February. Pathet Lao spokesman Soth Phetrasy
added that at the first session, scheduled for
26 February, the Communists will table four items:
application of the cease-fire, withdrawal of for-
eign forces, POWs, and supervision and control of
the cease-fire. For its part,the government has
drawn up a list of proposed cease-fire violation
checkpoints. The bulk of them are in the north and
several are placed along the Chinese constructed
road network.
International Reaction to Peace Pact
International reaction to the ccasL-fire announce-
ment has been strongly positive. Peking's Peoples
Daily extended warm congratulations,hailing the agree-
ment as a "tremendous victory for the Lao p;:ople."
From Moscow, President Podgornyy has praised the
agreement in a personal message to the King.
North Vietnamese leaders Ton Duc Thang and Pham
Van Dong sent official congratulations to Lao
Communist leader Souphanouvong, calling the set-
tlement a "success of the militant solidarity of the
three Indochinese peoples" and pledging North Viet-
namese support. French President Pompidou promised
as much assistance in reconstructing Laos as his
country's resources would permit, and the British
Government, in its capacity as co-chairman of the
1962 Geneva Accords, called upon both parties to
abide by the cease-fire.
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CAMBODIA
The government reportedly has made contact
with a key Khm,;r insurgent leader.
First Minister
Yang Thun Hak has told Ambassador Swank that he
has obtained several letters recently--via an
intermediary--from Sihanouk's in-country "Minister
of Interior" Hou Youn. Although Hak did not
disclose the specific content of these letters,
he claims that Hou Youn is opposed to a Communist
system for Cambodia and anxious to stop the
fighting, provided the government demonstrates
its sincerity by naming trustworthy negotiators.
Hou Youn left the impression, however, that pro-
Sihanouk and pro-Hanoi elements of the insurgency
did not share his interest in negotiations and
support a prolonged conflict.
The intermediary, a Cambodian doctor in Phnom
Penh, has given a similar story to a US Embassy
officer. In a rather confused report on two
meetings with Hou Youn in an insurgent-controlled
area in the countryside, the intermediary told
the American that Hou Youn had insisted that
any negotiations will have to be arranged under
the auspices of Washington, Peking, and Moscow
and be held in a neutral third country. Of the
three powers, Hou Youn apparently indicated that
he distrusts the Chinese but i-- more favorably
disposed toward the US and the Soviet Union.
The intermediary also claimed that the two other
ostensible leaders of the Khmer insurgency,
"Defense Minister" Khieu Samphan and "Information
Minister" Hu Nim, were present at the first contact,
but that Hou Youn dominated the meeting and was
the only "minister" present at the second contact.
If the intermediary is indeed competent to
recognize the three insurgent leaders, this would
be the most tangible evidence of their actual
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existence since they disappeared from Phnom
Pehn in 1967.
The fragmentary nature of the accounts by
both Hak and the intermediary, makes it difficult
to give them complete credence. Even if sub-
stantially correct, they serve to underscore
the fact that political factionalism within
insurgent ranks is certain to impede any quick
or easy settlement of the Cambodian problem.
The accounts do little to dispel the confusion
that surrounds the question of who really
leads the insurgency and where the loyalties of
those leaders lie. If Lon Nol allows Hak to
keep this channel open, subsequent contacts may
shed more light on all these matters.
In Tam Resigns
Former Democratic Party Meader In Tam has
officially refused to accept the post of special
adviser to Lon Nol, citing the President's
refusal to delineate the scope of his authority
to deal with the Khmer insurgents as his reason
for turning down the appointment. A statement
issued by the Democratic Party on 23 February
disassociating the party from In Tam's
tentative acceptance of the position earlier
this month probably had a bearing on In Tam's
decision. But the rea' reason apparently was
Lon Nol's continued refusal to give in Tam
special privileges in connection with his
duties as a special counselor on "national
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Mekong River Convoy Harassed
A Mekong River convoy from South Vietnam report-
edly received some harassing fire during its transit
of the Neak Luong area on 24 February, but all ves-
sels eventually arrived safely in Phnom Penh. Khmer
insurgent elements continue to probe government out-
posts north and south of Neak Luong and three of these
small positions have fallen since 21 February. Mean-
while, government troops supported by US air strikes
are still trying to retake the village of Banam a
few miles north of Neak Luong. At last report, they
were within a mile of Banain. Elsewhere, there has
been little change in the situation along Routes 2
and 3 south of Phnom Penh, but the insurgents are
keeping up their harassment of scattered government
positions on both highways.
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Territorial Claims in Quang Tri
IL
NOF? H VIETN
Cam Loo -
QlANGy' TRI
DLMILItAHIZCD
ZONC
Oio Linh
Tri
l")
PSB Am:9 S"
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w?II 7
-- " Government front line
------ Communist front line
THUA THIEN
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SOUTH VIETNAM
There was little change in the military situa-
tion over the weekend. The level of combat activity
continues to decline. In the northern coastal re-
gion, Route 1 is now open throughout Quang Ngai and
Binh Dinh provinces. US and South Vietnamese mem-
bers of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission
(JMC) traveled without incident along the road on
22 February, and the Quang Ngai Province chief has
scheduled a commercial convoy from Quang Ngai south
for the first time since last April.
A US mbassy officer who accompanied the JMC
members to Sa Huynh reports that evidence of the
recent heavy fighting there is visihie throughout
the area. A 14-mile stretch of Route 3, near the
village is pock-marked with artillery and bomb
craters, hundreds of shell casings are strewn by
the roadside, and most of the major bridges have
been destroyed. Sa Huynh itself is also heavily
damaged. South Vietnamese survivors told the em-
bassy officer that the Communists preceded their
attacks with intense, but often 1ndis,;riminate,
artillery shellings.
the Communists still hope to retake Sa Huyn ,
but recently captured prisoners indicate most North
Vietnamese units in the area are severely under-
manned and, therefore, unlikely to move against
Sa Huynh.
in the highlands, South Vietnamese troops along
Route 14 in Darlac Province reportedly have cleared
most'of the area seized by the Communists when the
cease-fire went into effect. The road between Pleiku
and Ban M. Thuot is expected to he open within the
next, two days; it is the last major interprovincial
highway in the country to be cleared
Opposing Territorial Claims in Quang Tri Province
A comparison of South Vietnamese and Viet Ccng
territorial claims in the nor'hernmost province in-
dicates that the Communists hope to maintain their
foothold south of the government's defense line
along the Thach Han River in any future bargaining.
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According to a Viet Cong map provided the ICCS on
22 February, the Communists claim to control sev-
eral. hamlets close to Quang Tri City, behind what
the government maintains is its current front line.
The Communists also claim they have toeholds in
several other "contested" hamlets south of the
line, and that government-occupied fire support
bases Anne and Barbara, which guard the western ap-
proach to the Quang Tri lowlands also belong to
them.
More Anti-Communist Incidents
Government-sponsored demonstrations in Hue and
Da Nang on 25 February apparently got out of hand
and resulted in injury to several North Vietnamese
members of the Four-Party Joint Military Commis-
sion (JMC). According to the US Embassy, the most
serious incident occurred at Hue, where some 120
demonstrators entered the JMC compound and stoned
the North Vietnamese in their quarters. This is
the second incident in less than two weeks in Hue
and may have been provoked in part by a Communist
refusal to accept a petition demanding that the
North Vietnamese account for all South Vietnamese -
held prisoners or provide information on burial
sites. South Vietnamese military police made some
effort to restrain the crowd and did quickly restore
order.
At Da Nang, some 100 demonstrators broke into
the JMC compound and pelted the North Vietnamese
housing area with stones. South Vietnamese civilian
and military police managed to clear the compound
in short order. US JMC members :;ay that the
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government's chief delegate and his staff were instru-
mental in getting the demonstrators out of the com-
pound. The embassy reports that both the Hue and Da
Nang affairs were carefully organized but poorly con-
trolled, particularly the Da Nang demonstration. (-I
Ngai on Corruption
One of President Thieu's closest political allies
is privately calling for a stepped-up effort against
corruption. Senator Nguyen Van Ngai, one of the
main organizers of the Democracy Party, told the US
Embassy on 22 February that if South Vietnam did not
make progress in the struggle against corruption,
the government would be "finished." Ngai, who had
previously taken the position that personal power
considerations made it necessary for Thieu to
tolerate corruption at high levels, indicated that
the cease-fire and the impending political struggle
with the Communists have changed the situation. The
senator said he has received many reports on cor-
ruption among leading generals and cited, in par-
ticular, Military Region 4 Commander General Nghi
and General Ninh, a cousin of Thieu's who is the
commander of the 44th Special Tactical Zone. Ngai
claimed he told Thieu that if these two generals
were fired, it wculd add significantly to the
President's own personal prestige. Ngai expects
some action before the President's trip to the US.
According to the embassy, Ngai's remarks
reflect a currently prevalent anxiety throughout
the country about corruption among the leadership.
On occasion, Thi-;: has replaced senior generals
who have come uni;er fire for corruption, but there
usually has been another reason as well. If the
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two generals cited by Ngai are replaced, it might help
Thieu's image somewhat, but it would probably only
partially offset the recent assignments given to
General Dzu and the continued presence of General
Quang on Thieu's staff. Dzu and Quang have particu-
larly bad reputations for corrupt activities.
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