DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 22, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE. OF
INTELLIGENCE?
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
i .r1
22 February 1973
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information aU of 1500)
Both sides are reportedly trying
harder to honor the cease-fire. The Com-
munists have officially protested the
South Vietnamese air attack on Duc Co in
Pleiku Province. Prices are still
declining in Saigon.
Communist forces retook Paksong just
as the cease-fire went into effect. The
rightists are grumbling about the new peace
agreement; the Communists claim it marks a
turning point. The government has already
begun to organize the supervisory mechanism.
Insurgent activity is increasing along
Routes 2 and 3.
_ The provincial capital of Kompong
Thom is now virtually a refugee camp. Cam-
bodians don't like American rice,
22 February 1973
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Both sides seem to be reducing the level of
fighting in response to the Joint Military Com-
mission's appeal last weekend to honor the cease-
fire. On 21 February, the number of Communist
cease-fire violations claimed by the South Viet-
namese declined to the lowest number since 28
January.
South Vietnamese military commanders reportedly
have been instructed by the Joint General Staff to
honor the appeal? Some commanders, notably in the
two southern regions of the country, have expressed
their intention to continue "defensive" military
operations, but so far no major new government ac-
tions have been reported.
On the northern battle frontier in Quang Tri
Province, both sides hove ceased artillery attacks.
The South Vietnamese Marine commander there on 21
February said that such engagements had stopped the
day before, but that some fighting was still going
on between government forces and Communists units
that had infiltrated behind the marine forward posi-
Government efforts to recapture the area around
Sa Huynh village reportedly have progressed to the
extent that South Vietnamese units now have opened
Route 1 to within a mile of the border with Binh Dinh
Province.
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Communiata' O fic'iaZZy Protest Attacks on Duc Co
The Communists have strongly protested to the
Four-Party Joint Military Commission (JMC) a South
Vietnamese bombing attack against the Duc Co airfield
in Pleiku Province, which they claim occurred on 19
February. According to the US Embassy, the chief
Viet Cong delegate told the JMC on 21 February that
air strikes by four government aircraft inflicted
casualties and damaged buildings being prepared for
use by the ICCS at Duc Co, one of 12 entry check-
points provided for under the agreement. The Com-
munists complained that the incident not only violated
the cease-fire agreement and the recent JMC appeal to
stop the shooting, but also violated the agreement
reached by the two South Vietnamese parties on 19
February designating Duc Co (along with Gio Linh and
Xa Mat) as a Communist point of entry.
The South Vietnamese claim that the Communists
attacked South Vietnamese forces in the Duc Co area
and
No
that the air strikes were in "self-defense."
South Vietnamese troops are believed closer than
ten
may
miles from Duc Co, however. The South
have bombed the site to discourage or
Vietnamese
prevent 25X1
its
use by the Communists.
Prisoners captured during fighting east of Duc Co also
claim that tanks had been coming through this area.
The Economy
Reflecting the return of more normal economic
conditions, retail prices continued to move downward
this week, and the Saigon consumer price index now stands
only about five percent above the level prevailing before
the cease-fire. Nearly all major commercial routes
interdicted during the early days of the cease-fire have
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been reopened, although the level of harassment along
some of them is higher than in the months prior to the
cease-fire. There have been no significant reports of
commodity hoarding anywhere in the country.
In general, the economy continues to reflect the
sluggishness that has been evident since the North Viet-
namese offensive last spring. No significant new trends
are likely to emerge until the political and military
situations clear up considerably. Blackmarket gold
and currency prices have been extremely volatile recently,
but this has been more a function of international devel-
opments than a reflection of domestic confidence.
Blackmarket dollar prices, for example, which plummeted
last week at the peak of the international currency crises,
are rapidly climbing back to the levels of early February.
Gold prices continue to rise slowly, reaching $79 per troy
ounce on 21 February, only minimal activity is reported
in this market, however. 25X1
22 February 1973
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North Vietnamese forces have driven government
units from Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau. A pre-
liminary report indicates that the attack came 15
minutes after the cease-fire wens into effect. One
government battalion was still holding on high-
ground just east of the town, but it is likely to
join the other government units retreating to the
west along Route 23. Only heavy US air support had
allowed the irregulars to reoccupy the town earlier
this month. Elements of at least one North Viet-
namese regiment remained nearby, obviously intent
on driving the government off the Bolovens prior
to a stabilization of cease-fire lines.
In the north, the Communists launched numerous
attacks against irregular positions around the Plaine
des Jarres on the eve of the cease-fire. Initial
reports indicate that although a few outposts were
lost, not much territory changed hands.
Rightists Reaction
The publication of the cease-fire agreement
has sparked considerable criticism in some quarters
in Vientiane. A number of civilian rightists and
senior Lao army officers continue to grumble that
Souvanna has "sold out" to the Communists. Despite
the complaining, however, there are no signs as yet
that these elements plan to challenge the accords.
Ngon Sananikone, a powerful rightist leader,
has said that his family is not happy with the
agreement--but will live with it.
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Communist 'Re'a'c'ti'on' to the Agreement
Lao Communist radio broadcasts have instructed
units in the field to adhere to the cease-fire agree-
ment signed in Vientiane. A message from the Central
Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front claimed that the
agreement was a victory for the Communists and stated
that the "armed struggle of our people will change its
characteristics." It urged the cadre "to make the
liberated zone a strong rear for the tasks of develof,i',ig
and constructing Laos."
A Vietnamese commentary, published as a Nhan Dan
editorial and aired by Radio Hanoi on 22 February
specified that "all military personnel and forces of
foreign countries" would withdraw within 60 days of
the formation of a new government. In commenting on
the political consultative council provided for in the
pact, Nhan Dan said that it would "handle state affairs"--
an interpretation which, if shared by the Lao Communists,
could be a major point of contention. Vientiane has
indicated that it considers the political consultative
council an advisory body. 25X1
Government Gets Going on Supervisory Commission
The government has begun to line up personnel
to serve under the "joint commission," which is tasked
with carrying out important provisions of the Lao cease-
fire agreement. Besides a joint central commission,
there will ba subordinate commissions for military and
political matters. The military commission will, in
turn, have surordinate commissions at the regional and
local levels that are supposed to work with the Inter-
national Control Commission in monitoring the cease-fire.
Although the military commission may meet for the first
time on 22 February to discuss the composition of its
subordinate commissions, it may be some time before
agreement is reached on the teams required at the local
level. Prior to the signing of the cease-fire, the govern-
ment had proposed that the ICC teams and the joint Lao
commissions be placed at 45 locations--including some
along the Ho Chi Minh trail network. This prop sal was
not included in the final agreement, however.
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vcrnnu'nt tHISrtl nts \~
- '~ --/ C. Frey Vong
6 V . Banam
Government ositions oak Leong
n
stt76nts
occupied by r
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Route 1
PHNOM PEN interdicted
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CAMBODIA
Khmer insurgent activity along major highways
south of Phnom Penh continues to increase. On Route
2, two government positions about 15 miles from Phnom
Penh fell to the insurgents on 20 February, and other
government positions north and south of this location
apparently are still under heavy pressure. To the
west, several Cambodian positions about 15 miles from
the capital have been isolated by insurgent attacks.
The government commander in, the threatened Route 3
&rea has asked for reinforcements, but only a few units
are available from Phnom Penh's military reserves
because of other commitments along Routes 1 and li.
Government forces on Route 1 are still making
slow progress clearing the few miles of roadway still
in anemy hands. If the road is not reopened in the next
few days, elite Khmer Krom troops will be added to the
operation. On the east bank of the Mekong River,
other government units trying to regain control over
Route 15 between Neak Luong and Prey Veng remain bog-
ged down. Meanwhile, the insurgents are continuing to
harass Cambodian outposts along the river north and south
of Neak Luong. 25X1
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Tough Times at Kompong Thom
US Embassy officials who recently visited the
beleaguered provincial capital of Kompong Thom, north
of Phnom Penh, have reported that the once-thriving
town is now little more than a refugee camp. About
half of Kompong Thom's 15,000 imhabitants are refugees--
the rest are soldiers and their families. The scarcity
of rice, medicine, gasoline, and other essential items
has demoralized the civilian population and has caused
some refugees to return to their homes in insurgent-
controlled areas.
The local government commander believes that if
he receives adequate amounts of military supplies he
can withstand any efforts by the Khmer insurgents to
capture Kompong Thom. Such supplies must be delivered
in limited quantities by air drops and by helicopter,
however, because the town's airfield has been closed
since December. Although the commander acknowledged
that the supply situation would improve considerably
if the airfield were reopened, he indicated a reluc-
tance to begin the necessary clearing operations
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around the airfield.
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US Rice Hard to SwaZZow
Cambodian consumers have been unwilling to eat
the American rice being sent to Phnom Penh to alle-
viate this year's critical domestic rice shortage.
No American rice at all is being distributed through
civilian outlets, and the military is using less than
expected. US and Cambodian officials had hoped that
the three months the rice has been on the market would
be sufficient to familiarize consumers with its dif-
ferent taste. The long-grain Thai rice imported through
commercial channels, however, is still preferred to
the short-grain, PL-480 - financed US rice, and large
stocks of the latter have been accruing in Phnom Penh.
The problem is not yet acute because the 10,000 tons
of US rice on hand account for only 20 percent of cur-
rent supplies, but Cambodia is scheduled to receive
some 70,000 tons more of US rice this year. Consump-
tion of the US rice will no doubt increase as Thai
rice itself comes into short supply. 25X1
22 February 1973
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