DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090036-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: February 21, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
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Top Secret
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21 Februar 197
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(Infor>iactio (r.r, of 1500)
Foreign Minister Lam hopes to
talk with the North Vietnamese in Paris
next week about establishing mail ser-
vice and permitting family visits. The
government finally moved a convoy over
Route 14 to Kontum City. A new COSVN
directive spells out political talks for
Communist cadre in the coming months.
The government is reluctant to allow
refugees to return to lands now under
Communist control.
The cease-fire goes into effect
on 21 February and within the next
month the country should have a new
provisional government. There is no
major fighting on the eve of the cease-
fire.
The government intends to send
a former defense minister to Paris to
monitor the international conference.
The insurgents are keeping up the pres-
sure against several kev highways.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Before departing from Saigon on 20 February,
South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam told
Ambassador Bunker that he hopes to open talks with
the North Vietnamese-while in Paris for next week's
international conference. Lam said he would broach
the subject of establishing mail service between
the North and South and of permitting family visits.
The Saigcn press is also carrying reports that Lam
will meet with Viet Cong Foreign Minister Binh,
allegedly to try to sell her on a proposal to
make Singapore or Djakarta the site of the political
talks that are to be held between the two South
Vietnamese rivals under the Paris areement.
The War
A South Vietnamese military convoy of 68 trucks
carrying ammunition, diesel fuel, and gasoline reached
Kontum City over Route 14 late on 20 February, losing
only four trucks en route. Province officials are
claiming the road is now under government control,
with only isolated sections being contested. Else-
where in the country, no significant military action
has been reported.
A New Directive From COSVN
The Viet Cong's Central Office for South Vietnam
(COSVN) reportedly has issued a new directive that
stresses the importance of political tasks over mili-
fire "Directive 2" issued in late January relegates
military forces to a secondary and defensive role in
support of the coming "political struggle." The d.'cu-
ment also indicates that the Communists intend to
participate in national elections in accordance with
the cease-fire agreement.
21. February 1973
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A primary task in the initial stage of the cease-
fire period is, according to the directive, to
strengthen the communist grassroots political position.
As outlined .iii the document, the steps to accomplish
this are standard communist tactics. Cadre are to
concentrate on rebuilding their infrastructure, step
up proselyting efforts against government troops and
officials, conduct extensive propaganda campaigns to
proclaim the Communist "victory," and motivate the
people to participate in mass rallies against the
Saigon government. Initially, cadre are to concen-
trate their efforts in areas the Communists control,
then spread out to the "belt areas" that surround
the major population centers where neither sid( has
firm control, and "eventually" move into the cities
themselves. With the progression of political opera-
tions from the rural to the urban areas, the Viet
Cong are to increase their emphasis on the use of
legally documented clandestine cadre. COSVN apparently
envisages, in the early stages at least, a large under-
cover network operating in the cities, while a more
exposed group of cadre perform their varied tasks in
the countryside.
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The directive) I does not
rule out military action. In fact, it specifically
warns cadre not to rely solely on "political struggles"
to accomplish their tasks. Armed forces should be em-
ployed "in local actions to support the mass movement
when necessary" and "to stop enemy provocations." To
this extent special attention will 1?e given to local
guerrilla forces "both in their number and their effec-
tiveness." COSVN feels that because these units are
closer to the people, they will bear the brunt of the
responsibility for eliminating "tyrants" that try to
disrupt the "mass movement."
The new dir7tive-is similar to information pre- 25X1
viously reported 25X1
sive and complete accounts at the COSVN level of plans
and tactics being passed to cadre that has yet been
obtained. 25X1
21 February 1973
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Ref'ugeee--A Potential Dilemma
Since last April, over 1.5 million people
throughout the country have left their homes as a
result of fighting in their area. Most of these
refugees fled from the heavy combat during the
enemy's spring offensive last year, but an estimated
238,000 more have been forced to flee their homes
since the surge in fighting that accompanied the
cease-fire. Of the 1.5 million, possibly as many
as 650,000 either returned to their homes after the
fighting in their areas subsided, or found temporary
shelter. with friends and relatives. Another 627,000,
most of whom were displaced by the spring offensive,
are still living in government-supported camps. To
date, there are no reliable figures to show how many
of the 238,000 new refugees have entered the camps
since the cease-fire began. Tentative assessments
by the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare
indicate that of the estimated 238,000, most will
probably return home soon after the fighting has
lessened.
With a few exceptions, reports over the past
months have shown that the government has gone to
considerable effort and expense to house and feed
the refugees. So far, there have been few instances
of refugees trying to leave the camps, but as news
of the cease-fire has spread, there are reports that
a growing number are beginning to express an inten-
tion to return home.
While the government obviously would like to
be rid of the need to support large numbers of refu-
gees, it is understandably reluctant to let people
return to some homelands that have come under at
least partial influence of the Communists. Recent
instructions from Saigon have ordered camp officials
to restrain anyone who tries to leave the camps to
return to areas where the government has not re-
established control.
21 February 1973
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The Communists, clearly aware of the refugees
as a potential source of additional population in
areas they influence or control, have maintained a
strong propaganda program aimed at trying to en-
courage the people to leave the government camps.
Such efforts so far have apparently met with only
limited success.
21 February 1973
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0S
The military aspects of the comprehensive peace
agreement signed on 20 February between the govern-
ment and the Lao Communists call for a bombing halt
and an in-place cease-fire effective midnight Wash-
ington time on 21 February, the withdrav a.~ of all
"foreign troops" within 60 days of the .formation of
a new provisional coalition government, and an ex-
change of prisoners "regardless of nationality."
The implementation of these measures will be super-
vised by the International Control Commission--using
the 1962 Geneva Accords as terms of reference--and
by a mixed commission made up of government and Lao
Communist representatives.
On the political side, the agreement provides
for the formation of a provisional government within
30 days--by 23 March--to be composed of an equal
number of ministers from each side plus two others
mutually agreed upon. There apparently will be no
deputy prime ministers in the new government. A
political consultative council, with equal represen-
tation from the two sides, will advise the new govern-
ment and will assist in establishing procedures for
the election of a new National Assembly. No specific
date for the new elections was mentioned in the agree-
ment.
The comprehensive nature of the agreement came
as a surprise to Souvanna's cabinet. Lao Communist
leader Souphanouvong on Sunday proposed a relatively
simple interim cease-fiza arrangement which would
have allowed Souvanna more time to overcome rightist
objections to the terms of a political settlement
reached during private sessions. The rightists were
particularly opposed to an even split of cabinet
portfolios with the Communists. in initialing the
more comprehensive settlement, Souvanna presented
a fait accompli to the rightists.
21 February 1.9 7 3
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n..?.. N..na ,., Skirmishin
Douam /
.Lang /
Ban Dan
Muong J / _ ._ ~.. -..
Soul G
It IP' Xiang
Sala Ph.4--7-- Ilp.- J((iouangvilla
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Kiioun
Clalies i
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ha Dorig--.
Area of
maps
Government-held location
Communist-held location
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The Military Situation
Con:munist units in the central panhandle on 20
February continued to skirmish with elements of an
eight-battalion irregular force just west of Muong
Phalane. No positions changed hands, and neither side
seemed ready to mount any large-scale attacks.
To the south, enemy gunners on the Bolovens
Plateau shelled irregular positions around Paksong,
but government troops succeeded in clearing the last
small enemy unit from the southern part of the town.
In north Laos, Communist units near the Plaine
des Jarres on 20 February engaged elements of a 700-
man irregular force on a ridge overlooking Route 4
near Xieng Khouangville--but most of the irregulars
held their ground. Southwest of the Plaine, elements
of the North Vietnamese 174th Infantry Rc:;iment have
been informed of the impending cease-fire and have
been warned to be prepared to counter last-minute
government efforts to take additional territory.
21 February 1973
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Q Insurgent interdiction
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CAMBODIA
The Lon Nol government plans to send former de-
fense minister Major General Sak Sutsakhan as an "un-
official observer" to the Paris Conference on Vietnam,
according to the US Embassy in Phnom Penh. Sutsakhan
will lobby for the reactivation of the International
Control Commission (ICC) in Cambodia. As a first step
toward this goal, he will circulate an official gov-
ernment memorandum which argues that the ICC's revival
is essential to the maintenance of those portions of
the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords that pertain to Cam-
bodia. The memorandum will be passed only to the dele-
gations in Paris of states with which Phnom Penh has
diplomatic relations. China, North Vietnam, and the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam
will not be contacted.
The Mi Zitary Situation
Khmer insurgent forces east of the Mekong R?ver
are continuing to thwart government attempts to re-
open Route 15. Two Cambodian battalions that were
moving south along the Mekong toward the village of
Banam were halted by insurgents on 20 February. Other
government forces from Neak Luong are still stalled
just south of Banam. The inept officer in charge of
these forces apparently is largely responsible for
the government's poor showing in this sector. Al-
though the Cambodian Army chief of staff has tried
to have the officer removed, President Lon Nol has
insisted that he remain on duty until Route 15 is
cleared.
West of the Mekong, government forces have fi-
nally made some progress clearing Route 1 between
Phnom Penh and the river. At last report, only about
two miles of the highway were still under insurgent
control. Elsewhere, insurgent attacks on 20 February
against several government positions on Route 3 tem-
.porarily closed a section of that highway about 25
miles south of Phnom Penh.
21 February 1973
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