DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 12, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090029-7
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
125
12 February 1973
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000090029-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000090029-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000090029-7
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCITINA
(information as of 7000)
The Communists are firmly resisting
efforts to dislodge them from the Sa
Huynh area. Several prominent Saigon
politicians and some of the press are
criticizing the cease-fire.
Page
1
Government troops have reoccupied
Paksong and arc holding their ground
west of Muong Philane.
Government forces trying to retake
positions on the east bank of the Mekong
and reopen Route 1 are stalled. In
Tam returns to the government as special
counselor to the Pxesiaent
12 February 1973
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090029-7
SOUTH VIETNAM
There has been no appreciable change in the
military situation in South Vietnam. Both sides
are continuing harassing actions in widely scattered
areas. Communist units in southern Quang Ngai Prov-
ince are still firmly resisting South Vietnamese ef-
forts to dislodge them from the Sa Huynh area. The
government troops are being reinforced from other
regions, and the South Vietnamese commander for
the five northern provinces has given the 2nd
Division seven days to clear Route 1 to the south
and to retake Sa Huynh.
South Vietnamese "security operations" have
opened several additional roads in the highland
provinces. In the provinces ringing Saigon, govern-
ment forces now appear to be largely in a defensive
posture. The commander of Military Reg.i.on 3 has
reportedly decided that reconstruction of war-
damaged communities and consolidation if the people's
support is more important than retaking land held
by the Communists. In the delta, the commander of
Military Region 4 reportedly is concerned about
keeping government officials operating at the fairly
high rate of efficiency they showed just after the
cease-fire. With enemy pressure easing, local of-
ficials are said to be slipping back to their normal
routines, and are now heavily engaged in preparing
their year-end reports.
South Vietnamese Attitudes Toward the Cease-Fire
Several pro-government and opposition political
figures are pessimistic about the terms of the cease-
fire and the continued fighting. Pro--government
Senator Le Van Dong told the US Embassy that many
South Vietnamese regard the agreement as a "defeat"
12 February 1973
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090029-7
and characterized the mood among some of his Senate
colleagues as susceptible to a "psychology of defeat."
The senator cited as one depressing factor a widespread
feeling that public opinion in the US, and in the
West generally, is unsympathetic toward the Saigon
government.
Tran Van Tuyen, an opposition leader in the
Lower House, wrote in the Saigon press over the week-
end that while the cease--fire agreement has brought
peace to North Vietnam, it has not really changed
the situation in the South. Tuyen noted that the
fighting and casualties continue and that North Viet-
namese troops remain. He observed that past experience
offers little hope that the Communists will abandon
their goal of uniting Vietnam under their banner and
expressed doubt that the great powers will guarantee
the peace. Another opposition politician, Nguyen
Ngoc Huy, told the US Embassy that while he believes
the Soviet Union is interested in making the agree-
ment work, he is unsure about the Chinese.
Some Saigon papers are also concerned over the
agreement. One opposition journal states that al-
though it clearly constitutes a victory for the US,
the agreement is less satisfactory for South Viet-
nam Other papers question the strength of the non-
Communists in a political struggle with the Viet
Cong and call for greater political unity.
12 February 1973
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000090029-7
Dan Nape!
Pass
Mu Gla
Pass
Dong Hal
Ban Karol
,^Pass
Bolovens
Plateau
5iem Pang
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000090029-7
Government irregulars met little opposition on
12 February as they reoccupied most of Paksong on
the Bolovens Plateau.
Heavy air
strikes apparently forced North Vietnamese troops
from the 9th Regiment to pull back into the jungle.
In the central panhandle, small units continue
to probe government defenses three miles west of
Muong Phalane, but the North Vietnamese have made
no serious attempt to drive off the irregulars.
To the north, a Lao Army task force is pushing
cautiously up Route 13 from Thakhek in an effort
to reopen the 111.
Fat least three North Viet-
namese infantry battalions plus some Pathet Lao
units are north of Thakhek. Lead elements of
another government force--spearheaded by four
crack irregular battalions--moving east from
Thakhek, have advanced to within 15 miles of Mahaxay,
an important Pathet Lao administrative center.
Mahaxay has been under enemy control for over ten
years, and the Communists are sure to offer strong
resi to any overnment effort to seize the
town
12 February 1973
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000090029-7
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