DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 24
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRIiCTORATE OF
INTI:LLIGLNCL'
Developynentr in Indochina
DIA and Army
reviews completed.
~..~
b
~~`~
Top Secret
x.25
29 January 197
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DEVI;LOPMENT5 IN INDOCI-iINA
(.Information as of 1500)
SOUTH VIETNAM
The intensity of the fighting is diminishing
throughout the country, In MR-1, the Commu-
nists are using artillery and tanks against
government posiL-ions in the two northern
provinces and along Route 1. In MR-2, the
fighting is concentrated or., Routes 1, 14,
and 19; in MR-3, it is along Routes 1 and 15.
The delta is relatively quiet. There are no
confirmed major relocations by NvA or Viet
Cong main-force units since the cease-fire.
The government is trying to restore a busi-
ness-.as-usual atmosphere throughout the
country. There are some demonstrations and
f.iag raising celebrations in areas controlled
by both sides.
NORTH VIETNAM
The rhetoric from Hanoi emphasizes what has
been accomplished; the Viet Cong are high-
lighting what still needs to be done.
There is a lull in the fiahtina in Cambodia
ormer rime finis er In Tam as proposed a
coalition commission of ten members to work
out a cease-fire and a new government of
national union.
?LAOS
Inconclusive fighting continues on several
fronts in Laos. Some members of the Communist
negotiating team have returned to Vientiane--
but not special adviser Phoumi Vongvichit.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Communist resupply activity continues and the
logistic apparatus in the Panhandle is being
main'Lained.
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SOUTH VII;TNANi
Fighting continues throughout the country, but
the intensity appears to have diminished somewhat
from the high levels immediately following the
v
e een initiated
by the Communists and how many are the result of gov-
ernment efforts to retake land lost before the cease-
fire went into effect. Much of the current fighting
involves government efforts to break Communist road-
blocks set up to disrupt government movement while
the Communists were attempting to penetrate the
countryside. The government, is also still trying to
push enemy .Forces out of hamlets and villages over-
run just before the cease-fire went into effect..
Sn Military Region, (MR) 1, light artillery fire
was reported on 29 January against Airborne units
near the Thach Han River. There is no additional in-
formation on the status of marine elements earlier
reported under attack at the Navy Base on the Cua
Viet River. Renewed fighting picked up northwest of
Fire Support Base (E'SB) Sally in the vicinity of the
An Lao Bridge. Two enemy tanks were reported de-
stroyed near FSB Veghel .in Thua Thien Province, and
skirmishes were reported near the district capital
of Phu Loc and in the vicinity of the Hai Van Pass
along Route 1. Farther south, fairly heavy fighting
was reported in the Que Son Valley on 28 January aj
enemy armor-supported attacks were made against units
from the South Vietnamese 3rd Division. In Quang
Ngai Province, fighting was still in progress along
Route 1. near Sa iiuynh. The highway was interdicted
in several places, and a nearby fire support base
was under attack.
b.- ~~..
accuracy how many of the incidents ha
In MR-2, government forces trying to clear
Route 14 south of Pleiku v;ere fired upon by units
from the North Vietnamese 320th Division, The
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highway remains interdicted at this locaticn and
.ear rSB 41 between Pleiku and Kontr~m cities.
There also are reports that the Communists a.re in
control of Route 19 at the Pleiku/Binh Dinh border.
fighting continues between South Vietnamese terri-
torial and Viet Cong troops in the three northern
distr.i.cts of Binli Dinh Province. Several hamlets
anu villages reportedly have changed hands during
the past few hours. Route 1 southwest of the
provincial oapital of Qui Nhon has been interdicted,
and farther south the highway has been closed just
north of the district capital of Ninh Hoa in Khanh
Hoa Province.
l;lsewhere in the region, opposing forces are
fighting outside Phan Thiet in Binh Thuar. Pz~ovince
and near Da Lat City in Tuyen Duc. Reportedly, the
government province chief of Binh Thuan, Colonel
Nghia, was contacted on the radio on 29 January by
an individual representing himself as the Communist
province chief. This is one of the first surfacing
of Communist governmental personalities. Colonel
Nghia agreed to let the Viet Cong forces withdraw
from the areas, and both parties decided to reduce
the level of fighting.
Fighting continues in most provinces ~f MR-3,
and General Minh, the government's regional commander,
said that by evening he had catalogued 207 Conununist
cease-fire violations. Fighting is still in progress
around Tay Ninh City. Ro~~te 15 remains blocked near
Long Thanh in Bien Hoa Province, and Route 1 is still
closed between Bien Hoa and the Long Khanh province
borders.
In the delta, activity is now on a relatively
small scale. The government claims S_t has driven
Viet Cong units out of 25 of the 50 places the Com-
munists overran before the cease-fire and that all
main roads and canals are open. American advisers
indicate, howeve.~, that the Communists have estab-
lished a foothold along Route 4 just north of Ca Mau
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City in An Xuyen Province and that security along
a major canal between the provincial capitals of
Can Tho and. Vi Thanh is "debatable." In Cau Mau
City, U5 observers report that the National Police
have quietly begun implementing a plan for arresting
"or otherwise neutralizing" known and suspected
Viet Cong cadre.
No Main force De Zoyments
There have been no confirmed deployments by
major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main forces since
th ~~ cease-fire went into effect on 28 January., ~
In t1~e western delta provinces of Kien Giang and
Chau Doc, it is possible that elements of th4~ Communist
"Phuoc Long Front" are attempting to infiltrate from
Cambodia into South Vietnam. At least three North
Vietnamese infantry regiments from this command. are
already in South Vietnam.
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Situation i?n the Dural ~lreaa
Almost .no information i.s yet available on the
situation in Communist-held areas. There are scat-
te,r?ed reports from various provinces of Communist
flag-raising efforts and aeaflet dissemination and
at least one report of the abduction and murder of
a government hamlet chief. Some hamlets in the
delta that are known to harbor numerous Communist
sympathizers or supporters have been almost entirely
free of overt enemy activity since the start of the
cease-fire.
In government areas, residents of larger cities
such as Hue and Da Nang are resuming a business-as-
usual attitude, but traffic in and out. of mayor towns
remains ligr.t and police controls are in effect. Most
cfficia~s and the public at large remain somewhat
wary, b~xt banners hailing the cease-fire are begin-
ning to be displayed, and in Quang Ngai City the
province chief is contemplating organizing pro-gov-
ernment demonstrztions to take place when the in-
spection teams arrive.
Government information cadre are reported ac-
tive ir. the delta posting signs and distributing
government fl?gs, and more than 2,000 new military
cadets have arrived to begin psychological opera-
tions covering several delta provinces. Some in-
dependent politicians in Saigon are specutating
that the fighting will die down shortly and that
the war wi.tl slide into a olitical hase ~
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NORTH VIETNAM
The Noy: tri Vietnamese party-goverrl;?nent appeal
and the NLF?~-PRG joint appeal, both o:l: which were
issued ovex? the weekend, follow a f:~.rmula that is
being adopted by other Vietnamese Communist pro-
nouncements--lavish praise for all those who con-
tributed to the "victory" and pledges to respect
the agreement in a spirit of brotherhood, with exhorta-
tions to the other side to do likewise,: The theme
that the struggle will persist is present., but it
is submerged in rhetoric about the "dawn of peace."
.;ome hint:. of Corununist priorities and tactics
do cone through. Language .n one passage of the
North Vietnamese statement, for example, .indicates
that reco:cistruction and "building socialism" in
the North will now be Hanoi'S primary conce~ns~
The slogans put out by the North to mark the oc-
casion seem to take the same tack by urging "eve:ry-
thing for the cause of socialist construction in
north Vietnam" before trey return to the usual call
for "everything for the blood-sealed South Vietnam."
Both the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong appeals
call for the establishment of "normal relations"
bAtw?:en Nor;:h and Scuth~. The North Vietnamese arF?
obviously interested in r.E~gularizing the con?acts
between the two zones su as to make their influence
as widely felt in the South as possible The PRG
seenia , i,n addition, to be trying to use the issue
to enhance its awn legitimacy; the Viet Cong appeal
emphasized that it Baas the "two parties" in South
'Vietnam that should hold consultations with the
North. With the legitimacy issue no doub+: again
in mind, the PRG/NLF prorounc:ement also urged other
countries t+u establish relations with the PRG.
There has been more than one h~.nt in the recent
pronouncements that the paths of the Northern and
Southern Communists are not entirely con~vergert.
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This appears in small ways--for instance, when the
NLF and PRG call for the establishment of ~ouncils
of reconciliation and concord "at all levels" and
Nhan Dan urges their establishment mat various
levels(emphasis sr:pplied) , Moreover, the over-
a11 tone of the statements .from the two parties
seems to differ. The NLF and PRG find it necessary
to express the "hose" that Saigon will not delay
the 'urmation of councils of reconc~.liatian; Hanoi
says it is "a certainty" that the Souther~ne;rs will
unite, although at the same time it calls fcr
vigilance against the remaining "reactionaries."
Nhan Dan comes out with the flat statement that
the "urgent demand" of the South is "national con-
cord"; indeed, it Puts words into the mouths of the
NLF and PRG by claiming that they have "affirmed
once again that the national concord policy is a
fundamental, clear-cut, and long-term policy." No
sia.ch formulation appears in the NLF/PRG statement.
In general, the rhetorio out of Hanoi tends to
emphasize what has been achieved, that from the
Viet Cong highlights what remains to be done.
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CAMBODIA
Khmer insurgent forces thus .far have made no
significant effort to take advantage of the govern-
ment's cessation ~f dll offensive ope.rations~ combat
activity throughout the country .remains at substantially
.reduced levels. The lull in the fighting may be only
temporary.
The movement of insurgent reinforcements into the
region southeast of. the capital over the past week has
increased Communist strength within a 25-mile radius
of Phnom Penh to between 7,000 and 8,500 troops, ac-
cording t~~ the US Defense Attache 's latest estimate.
Despite this increase, there is still no evidence
that the Communists are capable of launchin a ma'or
ground attack against Phnom Penh. ~
Political Developments in Cambodia
Former Democratic Party leader In Tam has floated
a proposal for the establishment of a small coalition
commission as a first step toward national reconcilia-
tion. In an article in a ].oval newspaper on 28 Jan-
uary, In Tam called for the formation of a ten-man
commission consisting of one representati?.~e each from
the old and new National Assemblies, the Senate, the
Council of the Repuh].ic, the army, the Democratic and
Republican Parties, youth, and the pro- and anti-
Sihanouk factions of the Khmer insurgency. After agree-
ing on the terms of a cease-fire, the commission would
become a "government of national union" charged with
revising the constitution and organizing free elec-
tions to be held within one year under the supervision
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o.f the International Control Commission. Following
the elections, government and insurgent military forces
would be merged.
In Tam's plan stipulates that Lon Nol would re-
main as president until the end of his present five-
year mandate. Sihanouk is exclt?ded from the scenario.
In Tam recommends that if the insurgents fail ?:o join
the commission immediately, the commission should be-
gin to work anyway and be given sufficient powers to
achieve its objectives.
Them evidently has been r~o government reaction
to the proposal as yet Although Lon Nol would prob-
ably object to some of its provisions, he at least would
agree that Sihanouk should Y~ave no role in any politi-
cal settlement of the war. In Tam's proposal may well
find a wi3e audience among Phnom Penh's war weary
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Communist shellings on 28 January damaged two
of the three howitzers at Bouam Long and killed some
civilians. Cher Pao Mua, the base commander, fears
that the increased shelling in the past few days is
a prelude to an attempt to overrun his stronghold.
The North Vietnamese still have elements of three
infantry regiments near the base, as well as artillery
and aYYtiaircraft units, bu.t they have been subjected
to numerous air strikes and have yet to mount any
significant ground attacks,
For the third consecutive d~~r, Communist gun-
ners used artillery to shell Long 7.~..ang. TY,ese brief
shellings have so far caused little damage.
Government forces in the Route 13 sector axe still
trying to clear Communist units north and south of Sala
Phou Khoun. This weekend lead elements of an irregular
task force pushed to within five miles of the road func-
tion from the north, but dispersed following an attack.
by a Pathet Lao company supported by artillery and heavy
weapons. Other government unity have pushed from the
south to within three miles of Sala Phou Khoun against
sporadic resistance. Government commanders believe that
most of the Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist units
that had been in this area have withdrawn to the east.
Communist military activity in southern Laos has
decreased markedly. The eight irregular battalions
just east and south of Muony PhalanE in the central pan-
handle rep~ited no si nificant enem activit on either
27 or 28 January,
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farther south, irregular forces near Saravane
and, at Thateng a,zd paksong reported no significant
enemy activity o;i 28 Januar .
The PoZiticaZ Situation in Laos
Communist chief negotiator Phoune 5ipraseuth
returned this weekend to Vientiane after ten days of
consultations in Hanoi and at the Lao Communist head-
quarters in Sam Neua~ On his arrival, Phoune said that
he was not able to say when Phoumi Vongvichit, the
high-ranking special adviser to the negotiating team,
would return to Vientiane, but he did hold open the
possibility of a cease-fire within 15 days.
Piime Minister Souvanna Phouma, meanwhile, has
completed his discussions in New Delhi on the future
Indian role in the International Control Commission
(ICC) .
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REG2ONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Communist resupply activity continues in the Laos
panhandle, and initial indications are that logistic
operations will be maintained there at lust for the
short term. Considerable numbers of vehicles have
been noted on the move since the cease-fire went into
effect, and preparations are being made to keep up
supply movements.
the passes entering the 25X1
Laos panhandle tend to corroborate the movement of
significant numbers of vehicles .s.~.nce the cease-fire went
into effect. On the first day following the cease-
fire, traffic levels remained about 25X1
the same as on three of the preceding four days. The
heaviest concentration of traffic was detected at the
Ban Karai Pass and probably included a number of tracked
vehicles.
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