WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Copy
N2 658
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developments of the week through noon on Thursday, It ire. EAST ASIA
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the PACIFIC
Office of Economic Research, the Office. of- Strategic
? Research, the office of Geographic and Cartographic 7 Cambod;a: Double Jeopardy
?Research,.and the.Dlrectorate cf Sclence and Technology. 8 Laos: Jittery Rightists
The WEEKLY-REVIEW,'Issued every, Friday morning by- the.',; 5 South Vietnam: A Bleak Picture
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatftzlnt ` and 9 China. Earthquake
therefore published separately.as Special Reports are listed 10 Australia: No Elections Snnn
CONTENTS (March 28, 1975)
12 China-USSR: Border Negotiations
13 Portugal: Leadership Changes
14 Cyprus. Talks Delayed
15 Italy: Communist Congress
25X1 16 UK: Labor and the EC Issue
17 France-USSR: Chirac Visit 25X1
18 Romania: Personnel Changes
18 Hungary Reaffirms Kadar Leadership
West Germany: On the Downgrade
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
26 Panama: Successful Summit
27 Mexico-Venezuela: Economic organization
28 Venezuela: Setting the Terms
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They me be directed
the editor of the Week
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The Middle East: Dangerous Stalemate
The collapse-for now at least-ot the step-
by-step approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement
has produced a new polarization in the positions
of the two sides that is being reinforced by an
outburst of mutual recriminations. The reduced
room for political maneuver has correspondingly
heightened the danger of hostilities, particularly
by miscalculation. As part of their public re-
actions to the changed situation, both Cairo and
Tel Aviv have raised the specter of a military
alternative, but they also appear to be focusing
on exploring and exploiting their remaining
diplomatic and political courses of action.
Negotiations Abort
The round of indirect bilateral negotiations
between Egypt and Israel ended abruptly on
March 22. The negotiations apparently found-
ered because both Cairo and Tel Aviv were
operating under constraints that prevented a
satisfactory bridging of the gap between Egypt's
territorial conditions and Israel's political ones.
President Sadat, who needed to obtain a sub-
stantial Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai to justify
his taking a separate step in the face of strong
Syrian and Palestinian opposition, had re-
peatedly made the point that he could not give
Israel any formal, direct guarantees except as
part of a final, comprehensive settlement. !'rime
Minister Rabin's government, as its political
quid pro quo, continued to insist that Cairo
agree to end the state of belligerency. To do
otherwise, the Israeli leaders apparently decided,
would leave them too vulnerable to the charge
that they had unnecessarily jeopardized the
country's vital security needs.
The Arabs React
The Egyptians have been chiefly concerned
to put the best face, fir Arab audiences, on
their failure to negotiate an agreement under US
auspices. Emphasizing that the breakdown in
talks ,i,"es the lie to earlier Arab charges that
Sadat would sacrifice Arab interests in favor of
negot'ating a bilateral settlement with Israel,
Egyptian spokesmen have leaned heavily on the
increased need for solidarity among the Arabs.
Continued reliance on this line-even without
concrete action-could result in a hardening of
Egypt's stance ir, any future dealings with Israel.
Sadat's stock has, in fact, gone up ap-
preciably in much of the Arab world, judging
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ti
71' 7 another arena for political "confrontation"confrontation" with
Israel. Al; editorialists raise the threat of force as
x W.-
an alternative the Arabs are ready and able to
use if the Israelis "procrastinate" further.
In a speech on March a meeting of
Arab League foreign ministers that had been
scheduled before the talks aborted--Egyptian
Foreign Minister Fahmi dwelt at length on the
need for Arab solidarity in the aftermath of the
negotiating breakdown. He concluded with a
call on all Arabs to join forces to isolate Israel
from the "international community and at the
United Nations and international organi-
zations."
from the praise he is getting from press com-
mentators in other Arab countries for refusing
to commit Egypt to a non-belligerency pledge.
Congrat.~latory telegrams have reportedly
"flooded" in fr;jm Arab leaders. The favorable
reaction has given Sadat and his advisers a sense
of confidence, at least temporarily, for what one
Egyptian official called the critical decisions of
war and peace in the coming weeks.
Egyptian press and radio commentators
have reflected this confidence, portraying the
outcome of Egypt's negotiating efforts not as a
failure but as a victory for the justice of the
Arab cause and as proof of Israeli iniquity. The
commentators call unanimously for a return to
the Geneva conference, emphasizing Geneva's
merits less as a forum for negotiations than as
Much of the Egyptian rhetoric can be at-
tributed to an effort to use the current adula-
tion being accorded Sadat to reassert his waning
position of le rfership among the Arabs.
Throughout, most Egyptian spokesmen have
been careful to avoid blaming the US for the
diplomatic stalemate. Early in the week, one
influential newspaper editor did bluntly suggest
that any Israeli intransigence is basically the
faun of the US, but most commentators have
gone no further than to urge that Washington
make it clear to the world that the impasse is
Israel's fault. Fahmi stated, during a press con-
ference, that US-Egyptian relations will con-
tinue on an amicable course.
Syrian reaction has thus far been relatively
restrained. Damascus radio this week called for
holding the Geneva conference as soon as pos-
sible, claiming that "most world circles" are
agreed that Geneva is now the only alternative.
In a speech on March 24, Defense Minister Tales
noted that President Asad's belief that Secretary
Kissinger's mission "was doomed to failure from
the very beginning" had been justified. Asad
himself has not yet offered any hints as to
Syria's next course of action. Neither Tales not
Damascus radio raised the prospect of an
immediate resumption of hostilities.
The Palestinians are, of course, pleased
about the collapse of the step-by-step negotia-
tions and are eagerly following up the oppor-
tunity it provides to repair relations with Egv^t,
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whit: have been strained in recent weeks by
danger in the present context but an obvious
their squabble over negotiating tactics. The
voices of Palestine Liberation Organization
leaders stood out in the chorus of praise for
Sadat's refLsal to make greater concessions to
Israel, and the PLO sent a high-ranking official
to Cairo immediately after the indirect Egyp-
tian-Israeli talks broke down. In the past, both
the Egyptians and Syri - is have threatened that
they would not go bac,, to Geneva without the
PLO, and the prospect of a possible early re-
sumption of that multilateral conference may
force the Arabs, Israelis, and major powers to
focus soon on the question of Palestinian par-
ticipation.
In his initial public response, Prime Min-
ister Rabin sought to justify Tel Aviv's position
by pointing out that Israel had made two offers
of Sinai territory to Cairo: one in exchange for a
public statement ending the present state of
belligerency; the other in exchange for some
concrete signs of Egypt's peaceful intentions.
Rabin charged Sadat with failing to show "any
readiness to advance in any area relating to
progress toward peace." In a special session on
March 24, the Knesset passed a resolution-by a
vote of 92 to 4-blaming Egypt for the "sus-
pension" of the talks. Nearly all the Israeli
parties expressed satisfaction with the cabinet's
stand in the final phase of the negotiations.
Israeli media continue to focus on the
uncertainty clouding the negotiating picture,
coupling hopeful speculation about reopening
some form of the step-by-step approach with
cynicism about the Geneva conference. On the
other hand, a persistent press theme is that
whatever form any future negotiations might
take, Israel will not be dictated to by any party
on matters jeopardizing its vital security
interests.
Israeli military spokesmen also have been
careful to note that they are monitoring all Arab
military exercises, although they have avoided
any threats of pre-emptive action. Israeli over-
reaction to a perceived Arab threat is a real
,
constraint is Tel Aviv's overriding need to deter-
mine the nature and extent of US support in the
various circumstances under which hostilities
might resume. 25X1
Uncertainty over the future cuursn of US-
Israeli relations appears to be Prime Minister
Rabin's immediate preoccupation. He told the
Knesset that cooperation with Washington re-
mains a cornerstone of Israeli foreign policy.
o launch a major campaign in the US to expla;n
its position to the American public. Early this
week, Israel's ambassador to Washington flew to
New York to brief hurriedly assembled Ameri-
can Jewish leaders and reportedly to enlist their
help in the campaign. 25X1
The Israelis clearly anticipate immediate
pressure from various quarters to move toward
an overall settlement on all fronts on Arab
terms. The breakdown in the negotiations with
Egypt, however, has demonstrated that the
Rabin government's scope for concession and
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Tel Aviv plans
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compromise is severely limited. Tel Aviv's re-
fusal to give way on its insistence on a com-
mitment of some sort from Cairo to end the
state of belligerency underscores the Israelis'
inability to meet demands for resolution of
broader issues-for example, the Palestinian
question-that are included in the Arabs' overall
settlement package, A flexible approach by Tel
Aviv would be even less likely if political pres-
sures rise in Israel to form a national unity
government to better cope with the anticipated
exigencies of multilateral diplomacy or renewed
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South Vietnam : A Bleak Picture
The government's remaining positions in
the northern two thirds of South Vietnam are
collapsinr rapidly following President Thieu's
decision to shift abruptly to a strategy of mili-
tary retrenchment.
Thieu had concluded that his forces in the
highlands were not only overextended and un-
dersupplied but were facing a greatly superior
North Vietnamese force. He decided two weeks
ago to concentrate his troops along the northern
and central coasts and around Saigon, where
they could protect the bulk of the population.
Thieu clearly wanted to take the communists by
surprise, extracting his forces before the com-
munists could tie them down or block their way
out. He appears to have given no thought to
preparing the ground with his own generals,
however, and he caught them completely by
surprise. too. In any event, the enemy has
moved quickly to disrupt the South Vietnamese
withdrawals, while the government's senior mili-
tary leaders have reacted with dismay. Their
lack of confidence has been reflected down
through the ranks. With no prior planning or
preparation, the withdrawals have not been or-
derly. Most of the government forces have been
cut off from each othe,? and have been seized by
an evacuation mentality, moving in disarray
along routes choked with civilian refugee traffic.
The South Vietnamese have not stood and
fought, and most casualties have been suffered
by units fleeing heavy contact on the coast or
trying to escape past communist blocking posi-
tions on the edge of the highlands.
The situation in Military Region 1 is partic-
ularly bleak for Saigon. Governmera forces have
evacuated virtually the whole region, attempting
to 'd only an enclave around Da Nang. Per-
haps, aver a million refugees have poured into
the city during the last week, however, and law
and order and essential services are breaking
down. Stragglers from retreating units are
staging shootouts with police amid panicky mob
scenes at the airport. The government has two
of its better divisions deployed to defend the
city, while remnants of two others are coming in
from nearby, but it is questionable whether even
the Marines and the still intact 3rd Division will
fight well when they learn of the extent of the
collapse of all the forces around them. Two
fresh communist divisions west of the city are
preparing to attack, and a third appears to be
coming south to join them.
The picture in Military Region 2 is only
slightly less bleak. The forr.:s attempting to
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1l?TNi+'I M
'~OLMILITAMZCO ZON[
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Refugees near Nha Trang flee southward
escape the highlands have been badly mauled,
and the communists have an enormous local
advantage, with five divisions facing just over
one effective division on the government side.
Nha Trang and th other enclaves will probably
fall soon; unless reinforcements are sent, and this
seems unlikely in view of the high priority the
government: gives to the defense of Saigon.
The government enjoys 4r overall advan-
tage in forces around Saigon and in the delta, at
least for Cie moment, and it is possible that
some of the forces currently in Da Nang will be
extracted and regrouped to help defend the
southern heartland. The government, however,
must soon make a decision whether to allow the
25th Division to remain around Tay Ninh City
to defend that symbolically important town or
to pull it back to strengthen a somewhat con-
tracted defensive arc closer to Saigon.
The collapce of South Vietnam's armies in
the northern two thirds of the country has
occurred with such speed that the full magni-
tude of the disaster has not yet registered in
Saigon. Thieu has proposed a cabinet reshuffle
of a kind that might have served to broaden the
base of his government in more normal times,
but such measures fall far short of the mark in
the light of present realities. Immediately fol-
lowing an announcement by former vice presi-
dent Ky that he was coming out of retirement
to engage in political activity again, a number of
political figures were arrested amid charges in
the press of coup plotting. It seerns unlikely that
any of the individuals involved would have the
clout to mount a serious coup plot, and the
arrests may have been intended by Thieu as a
warning to others. There is presently no evi-
dence of coup plotting among those who do
have the power-the senior military leaders-and
indeed there seems to be some recognition of
the dangers that a coup attempt would entail.
Thieu is undoubtedly already discredited
with many of his senior commanders, however,
and the mood in Saigon is likely to turn ugly as
news from the north continues to spread. The
communists are beginning to try to sow add-
itional seeds of discord, with the Provisional
Revolutionary Government offering amnesty to
those who take even limited steps of accommo-
dation with them-for example, by sumortina
third-f
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CAMBODIA: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The vital US airlift came under new attack
from an unexpected quarter. Leading officials in
the new Thai government told newsmen -in
Bangkok of their reservations over the use of
Thai soil for the transshipment of military
equipment to Phnom Penh. So far, Bangkok has
t&ken no official actiot, against the airlift,
indicating that the press statements may have
been meant only for public consumption while
Thai officials continue to look the other way as
the ammunition flights go on. This strategy
could unravel, however, if Bangkok's free-
wheeling press or the new government's politi-
cal opponents cl,ase to make the airlift an issue.
A more direct threat to the airlift material-
ized at midweek as Cambodian army units aban-
doned the town of Tuol Leap, aliowing the
Khmer Communists once more to move within
artillery range of Pochentong airport. Rocket
attacks halted the airlift last weekend, but the
resumption of more accurate artillery fire poses
a serious possibility that the communists may be
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able to damage aircraft and facilities at Pochen- Proeung. The new ministerial announcements
tong to the degree that airlift operations will went largely unnoticed amid the increasing spec-
become impossible. 1 t'
u
t
Government forces also gave ground on
other battlefronts around Phnom Penh this
week. Along the Mekong River, two government
battalions withdrew from positions opposite the
main navy headquarters, following several weeks
of steady insurgent attacks, and the navy evac-
uated ground units from two garrison towns
farther upstream. Communist units on the east
bank continue to hit downtown Phnom Penh
with daily rocket attacks. Southeast of the
capital, government units have abandoned a
Along the lower Mekong, communist
gunners are continuing to pound the govern-
ment enclave stretching between the towns of
Banam and Neak Luong. So far, the 4,00')
government defenders have repulsed insuur
ent
g
On the political front, the government has
announced the completion of the cabinet re-
shuffle. The major change was the namir'g of
armed forces chief of staff Sak Sutsakhan as
defense minister. Sutsa'