WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Too Beast
~ekly Review
Top Secret
Copy N2 650
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CONTENTS (Bfarch 7, 1975)
1 The Middle East: Guarded Optimism
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
4 Cambodia: Life Line Threatened
4 Indochina: New Soviet Interest
5 Vietnam: Fighting Increases
6 Australia: Election Nerves
7 China: The New C: mpaign
9 China: More Missi!e Coats to Strait
L~;'.,, I i _;.1? '1!~ Iii 17Ce. iel; )rt ~-,ncl ,Li~: 3i/Jr;
?li\' ;ordinate with of pre f) zrcrt ,`''
)itiCr f Faun :rr)IC: ?-Irch. thfee COffice of ;tt
and
C:arEO,~r:y,
'~ilC. r..r'djftr (ii Cempr:he.n:.ivo trci;c1 ,ni f
/
ref : ) l)!; i r aei;/ o pe .ini F oft .r e li
15 Yugoslavia: New Soviet Equipment
16 Italy: Party Youth Defy Fanfani
17 Portugal: Cautious Optimism
18 Turkey: Political Woes Continue
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
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INTERNATIONAL
WESTERN
HEMISPHI.CRE
1S+ Ethiopia: Land Reform Announced
20 Rhodesia: New Roadblock
21 Violence in Lebanon
22 Jordanians to Oman
22 Iran: Dropping a Facade
23 India and the Big Powers
24 Foreign Investment:
The West Tightens lip
25 OPEC: Maintaining Gains
26 Latin America: Reactions
to Kissinger Speech
%7 Cuban Economy on the Upswing
28 Peru: Politics of Succession
29 Argentina: Terrorists
Target US Citizens
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekl 25X1
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l' rr { i ` rr t?rc 3 ~5 t ` ) ~ i"
1 Y (\
The political and military actions of IC;rael
and the Arab front-line states during the past
week suqgest that they hope and expect further
steps toward peace from Secretary Kissin ger's
current visit to the Middle East. In spite of this
optimism, there h&s been no relaxation of m`li-
tary tensions. Egypt, presumably to underscore
the need for early progress in negotiations and
to prep? for the possibility of renewed hostili-
ties in the future, is continuing efforts to aug-
ment and consolidate its military dispositiorc
along the Suez. Canal. The Israelis have reacted
to this activity only with public expressions of
concern.
In the brief period since Secretary Kis-
singer's last trip to the area, Egyptian media
have spoken daily-and with considerai le opti-
mism-of the prospects for concluding another
disengagement agreement during the Secretary's
current visit. President Sadat drew attention to
one area of flexibility by suggesting, albeit
obliquely, that the US can serve as a guarantor
of Egypt's pledge to refrain from war so long as
negotiations rer ain alive. Sadat Also demon-
strated his commitment to the negotiating pro-
cess and his crpectation that the results will
justify the risks he is taking by publicly defend-
ing Egypt's right to continue disengagement
talks against vigorous criticism from the Pales-
tinians.
To reassure the other Arabs, Sadat has
claimed that he will not grant any political con-
cessions to gain a further Israeli withdra',ral. In
the same vein, Egyptian press commentators and
government officials have stressed that another
Egyptian-Israeli agreement will not end Egypt's
obligations to the other Araos.
The Syrians, aware of Cairo's pivotal role
in negotiation, have tried to keep the pressure
on Sadat in hopes of preventing him from con-
cluding an agreement with Israel that does not
in some way take i IL,,) account Syrian and Pales-
tinian interests. At the same time, Syrian For-
eign Ministry officials are privately holding to
th positive note struck by President Asad when
he said in an interview published last week thL;
Damascus is ready, if and when i;ie terms are
right, to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel.
The Syrians probably hope this will encourage
Israeli leaders to consider a further withdrawal
on the Golan Heights as soon as the next Sinai
accord is reached. For bargaining purposes, at
least, Asad is still demanding a uniform Israeli
withdrawal alon;t the length of the current dis-
engagernnnt line; he continues to reject the idea
of a more limited pullback south of al-
Qunaytirah.
Israeli Prune Minister Rabin, meanwhile,
has formed a study group at the sub-cabinet
level to consider options and to draft working
papers covering a second-stage Israeli-Egyptian
agreement. The five-man group reportedly is
focusing on options for a broad agreement that
would involve an Israeli pullback from the Gidi
and Mifla passes and the Aou Rudays oil fields.
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Rahin faces considerable opposition to any
such agreement within his government and
among the public. Defense Minster Peres has
said that a straightforward Egyptian undertaking
to abandon war against Israel will be necessary
before Tel Aviv can satisfy Cairo's demand for a
pullback front the passes and the oil fields. The
rightist Likud bloc, with wide public support, is
planning a demonstration in Tel Aviv on March
8 to protest any concessions by Israel that are
not accompanied by a formal peace agreement.
Egyptian-Palestinian Cispute
Leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation were thrown off balance by Sadat's un-
characteristically strong reaction to their policy
statement of February 26, which condemned
step-bystep negotiations. They have been mov-
ing caitiously this week to repair the damage to
Palestinian-Egyptian relations. The Palestinians
are still leery of another agreement between
Egypt and Israel, however, and are continuing
quiet efforts to marshal Arab support for their
position. PLO delegations .re visiting eight Arab
capitals.
A PLO spokesman said on March 3 that
Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO political
department, will lead a delegation to Cairo in
the "near future" to meet with Egyptian For-
eign Minister Fahmi. The group can be expected
to minimize the importance of the offending
PLO statement and to argue that the Pales-
tinians were condemning the US rather than
Egypt. Palestinian broadcasts from Cairo have
already attempted to explain that the PLO was
nct attacking Egypt, and have claimed that both
sides have agreed to "contain the crisis for the
sake of Arab unity." A number of second-level
Palestinian leaders have spoken candidly in puh-
lic of the need for a return to normal relations
with Egypt.
President Sadat will he meeting with Secre-
tary Kissinger in Aswan when the Palestinians
are expected to arrive in Cairo, and he will
probably not meet personally with the delega-
tion. Sadat has given no sign that he has backed
down from his demands that the PLO either
RAID ON TEL AVIV
On the night of March 5, mecnbers of
PLr) leader Yasir Arafat's Fatah group,
coming from the sea, mounted a spectacJlar
raid on Tel Aviv, Israel's largest city. At
least ;3 persons were killed in the incic ent,
including, according to press reports, seven
of the eight fedayeen. In a tall< with news-
men on March 6, the leader of Fatah's ter-
rorist Black Set..tember Organization linked
the operation with Secretary Kiss'nger's
ii,it to the Middle East. He indicated that
the Palestinians' purpose was to empha-
size that peace in the area is unattainable
without their participation.
The raid should have no adverse effect
on Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Official
statements ;ssued b} both partie3 empha-
sized that efforts to reac;i a peaceful solu-
tion must co:itinue. The incident will, how-
ever, reinforce Tel Aviv's determination to
exclude the PLO from any peace negotia-
tions. More irr rnediately, the Rabin govern-
ment will be under strong pressure to strike
a ainst Palestinian bases.
withdraw its policy statement or send the entire
PLO executive committee to Egypt to iron out
Egyptian-Palestinian difference;. The Qaddumi
visit, however, will probably lead to a reduction
of tensions and clear the way for a subsequent
meeting between Sadat and PL.O chairman Yasir
Arafat.
Arafat has so far avoided nuhlic comment
on the contretemps with Egypt. He presumably
believes that Palestinian dignity requires him to
avoid a public apology, and that he must protect
his own position by denying his more radical
colleagues the opportunity to brand him a col-
laborator in Sadat's dealing; with the US. Arafat
may also believe that the current hue and cry
puts pressure on Sadat to keep Palestinian in-
terests in mind during the present round of
negotiations. Although Arafat is suspicious of
the step-bv-s+ o tactics employed by Sadat, he
still hope', the Egyptians can cone up with
something concrete for the Palestinians.
,);v -i
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so far as to tell he Egyptians and the Syrians
that, while they still prefer moving the nego-
tiations ;o Geneva, Moscow will not obstruct
Secretary Kissinger's efforts.
Sadat
Moscow probably calculates that if a new
Sinai disengagement is worked out, the next.
step in the negotiating process would have to
involve Syria. The Soviets probably believe that
the Syrians will be much more likely than the
Egyptians to bring them into the negotiating
process and may think that the US will be
interested in :-iaving Moscow use its influence in
Dan,ascus on behalf of a settlement. At a
minimum, Brezhnev and his regime will he
better able to save face from what has been a
protracted bad period for the Soviets in the
Middle East. The durability of the present So-
viet position, of course, will depend on progress
in the talks and the role Moscow is, in fact,
allowed to play.
Meanwhile, tl.e Soviets are taking scene
steps to keep their relations with Cairo which
are fraught with suspicion and recriminations-
from deteriorating any further. Last month,
they resunw_; shipments of fighter aircraft to
Egypt-the first deliveries since 1973. About tee,
MIG-23s and at least four SU-20 Fitter-C
fighter/bombers arrived in Alexandria in Febru-
arv, but hhecause the contracts for these aircraft
were signed prior to the 1973 war, the deliveries
do no'. satisfy President Sadat's demands for a
ne% arms agreement. Since last Augur., Moscow
has also been delivering spare parts, ammuni-
tion, and ground support equipment to Egypt.
F,^tual and anticipated Soviet deiiveries, how-
ever, will not compensate for Envnt'c 1 Q71 war
Should the Egyptian efforts ultimately pro-
duce nothing, or if the Palestinians are excluded
from the negotiating process, Arafat would
probably speak out forcefully against any agree-
ment with Israel and endorse an increase in
fedayeen terrorism. The PLO leader may alrea
Moscow Maker the Best of It
The Soviets are now saying privately that
they will not oppose a new Egyptian-Israeli dis-
engagemen' agreement and are even claiming
that they are actively working to abet the peace
negotiations. Moscow's public statcmcnts show
that it still resents US domination of the nego-
tiations, but it ha:. apparently concluded that it
cannot block the present process and that it is
better for the Kremlin to cast its lot with the
discussions-and claim some rile for their suc-
cess-th,.n to remain on the sidelines.
The Egyptian and Syrian ambassadors in
Moscow have ascribed the new Soviet attitude
to the meeting of Secretary Kissinger and For-
eign Minister Gromyko in Geneva two weeks
ago. Another knowledgeable Arab diplomat has
said that after the Geneva talks the Soviets went
Orly l
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Phnom Penh's worst fears were realized
this week as the Khmer Communists began artil-
lery attacks against Pochentong airport, briefly
halting the vital US airlift. The she lings fol-
lowed the Communists' capture of the town of
Toul Leap, which allowed them to move cap-
tured 105-mm. howitzers within seven miles of
the airport. At week's end, government forces
launched an all-out effort to retake Toul Leap
before the insurgent artillery eods the US airlift
and forecloses Phnom Penh's last hope for con-
tinuing resupply.
asserted that the agreement had been reached
white he was in Hanoi in mid-February. Pri-
vately, Sihanouk elaborated by saying that
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong and
Defense Minister Giap had agreed to facilitate
the transshipment of military equipment pro-
With governfiient attention focused west of
Phnom Penh, other Communist uni.s have been
edging toward the capital from the northeast.
Government troop have lost four riverside posi-
tions in this area, and insurgent mortar and
recoilless-rifle crews are now within range c f the
main navy headquarters. Rockets fired from the
Mekong River's east bank and from elsewheie
around the capital continue to take a toll of
civilian lives.
Communist attacks against government
holdings farther south along the Mekong are also
continuing without letup. Navy convoys from
Phnom Penh are still getting through to the
beleaguered enclave at Neak Luong and the re-
maining beachheads on the lower reaches of the
river, but at considerable cost: two landing craft
and a patrol boat were lost this week. The
navy's Mekong flotilla has been reduced by half
since the beginning of the year, and military
leaders have now postponed indefinitely any
further efforts to reopen the river in order to
conserve resources for the defenses of Phnom
Penh.
In a press interview last week, Prince Siha-
nouk claimed that Hanoi had agreed to increase
its arms deliveries to the insurgents in response
to the US airlift to Phnom Penh. The prince
The Soviets have sent Deputy Foreign Min-
ister ; iryubin on a hastily arranged trip to Indo-
china for a firsthand look at the situation.
Soviet army chief of staff Kulikov was also in
Hanoi in December, ostensibly for the celebra-
tion of the North Vietnamese army's anniver-
sary. Presumably, Kulikov sounded out the
North Vietnamese at that time regarding their
military intentions in South Vietnam during the
dry season. Firyubin almost certainly covered
this same ground, particularly in view of signs
that Hanoi is readying a new phase of its dry
season campaign in South Vietnam.
Cambodia-which did not loom so large in
December-was probably high on Firyubin's
agenda. In addition to getting a better apprecia-
tion of the situation, and of how Hanoi and the
Khmer Communists see it developing in the
coming weeks, Firyubin may have sought to
place Moscow ire a position to exert some influ-
ence in the event of a complete Communist
victory in Cambodia.
Until recently, the Soviets were openly
_,tating that a military solution in Cambodia was
not possible and were urging negotiatior.s. Now
they find themselves having diplomatic relations
with the Lon Nol government, weak ties with
the Khmer Communists, and tittle prospect of
working with Sihanouk, who i endent on
Peking.
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The surge in fighting in the central high-
lands this week suggests that the North Viet-
namese spring campaign has started in that area.
Communist units attacked and overran several
outposts in Kontum and Pleiku provinces and
interdicted strategic Highway 19, which links
the highlands to the coast. Two of the govern-
ment's important air bases-at Pleiku and at Phu
Cat in Binh Dinh Provirt:e-were shelled.
Stepped-up attacks were also reported in the
northern provinces and north of Saigon, but
these could have been in response to a recent
increase in South Vietnamese military opera-
tions.
NORTI?
VIETNAM
Demililnriud Z.-
The The government's first task in the high-
lands will be to reopen Highway 19 between
Pleiku City and Qui Nhon. The Communists
have succeeded in destroying at least nine
bridges and culverts, and have overrun two fire
bases guarding important mountain passes; they
apparently plan to step up the pressure gradu-
ally against the two highland capitals-Pleiku
and Kontum-while keeping the highway cut. If
Route ' 9 stays closed for any significant period
of time, the government would be hard pressed
to airlift sufficient supplies to hold these two
capitals. Even with the highway open, the South
Vietnamese face a difficult situat''on in the high-
lands. Kor turn City is especially vulnerable. It is
the last remaining stronghold in Kontum Prov-
ince and depends upon Highway 14 from Pleiku
City for resupply. The Communists can easily
cut this road, and it would be difficult for the
city's small airfield to handle the number of
flights needed to resupply the garrison by air.
The new fighting in the highlands has
caused the South Vietnamese regional com-
mander to defer earlier plans to shift govern-
ment units. Originally, parts of a division were
to be moved south from Pleiku to the Darlac-
Quang Duc province border area to offset the
suspected relocation of a North Vietnamese divi-
sion. The commander now believes that not
only will the government division be needed in
Pleiku and 'contum, but that additional units
should be brought in from the coast.
SOUTH
VJ,CTNAM
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Central ,.
I(ontum.
Highlands
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Much of the manpower has already arrived,
and other troops in the pipeline should reach
their destinations over the next few weeks. The
new troops appear to be more than sufficient to
replace Communist losses and strengthen units
in preparation for new fighting.
During the first three months of the cur-
rent dry season, the North Vietnamese concen-
trated on moving manpower to the provinces
around Saigon and to the highlands. Since mid-
February, troops have been going to the north-
central coast for the first time since last sum-
mer. As the dry season progresses, it is likely
that Hanoi will lessen the troop flow to the
southern areas and send an increasing number to
AUSTRALIA: ELECTION NERVES
Even though national elections. are not def-
initely in the cards, the edginess of both the
Labor government and the opposition coalition
was clearly evident last week in a series of parlia-
mentary sessions that were exceptionally dis-
orderly even by Australian standards of hurly-
burly. During one prolonged uproar, the govern-
ment forced the resignation of its own speaker
of the House of Representatives. At one point in
the debate, Prime Minister Whitlam, who felt
the speaker had been ineffective in handling
opposition needling of a cabinet minister, be-
littled him within earshot of opposition mem-
bers. Another indication of Whitlam's recent
testiness over his government's precarious politi-
cal position has been his frequent petty
denigration in public of opposition leader Billy
Snedden.
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During the parliamentary hassle over the
House speaker, some Laborites openly showed
dismay over what the\ considered the govern-
ment's undignified behavior. Three cabinet
members abstained on a government motion
that reflected adversely on the speaker's compe-
tence. This unusual public break in traditionally
tight party discipline could have ominous impli-
cations for Labor Party unity in the event of an
electoral campaign.
The government is also increasingly frus-
trated by its minority position in the upper
house. The Senate.last week voted down eight
bills the administration regards as essential. This
gives the government legal grounds for dissolving
parliament and calling elections. Even though
the government's popularity has recovered
slightly from an all-time low, Labor is still not
anxious to go before the voters. Nor is the
Liberal-Country opposition, despite its pos-
turing, sure that it wants to take on responsibil-
ity at this time for economic problems that have
no easy solutions. The prospect is thus for con-
tinuing bluster but no immediate moves for
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The Chinese are not comfortable unless
they are conducting some sort of campaign. Last
year's anti-Confucius campaign was terminated
prematurely after it led to widespread public
disturbances. This year's exercise-a nationwide
campaign to study the "theory of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat"-seems in part to be an
effort to correct last year's excesses.
Peking has not made its goals in this study
campaign entirely clear yet. Stricter enforce-
ment of party directives, especially as they re-
late to the troubled economy, certainly seems to
be one of its purposes, but the door has been
left open for possible new attacks on provincial
or national leaders as well.
The campaign was officially launched on
February 9th with an editorial in People's Dally,
the party's official paper. This artib le and others
that followed called on everyone to study a new
"Mao quotation" on proletarian d;~`. Lorship.
Besides demanding stricter adhered: io party
directives and an end to public disturbances, the
articles continue the strong attack on a number
of common economic practices the Chinese con-
sider bourgeois. Cadre who tolerate these prac-
tices are also criticized, but the tone is not
vindictive. One article, however, by Chou Ssu, a
pseudonym that suggests the views expounded
in the article may be close to those of CluoL!
En-lai, seems to warn cadre that they may be
purged if they persist in their errors.
The dominant themes of the campaign-
improvinn curial order and production-are gen-
erally associated with positions held by the
more moderate elements in the nationri leader.
ship, and these elements appear to be behind the
current campaign. Production and transporta-
tion problems almost certainly played a part in
the curtailment of the anti-Confucius campaign
last summer.
One of the more intriguing aspects of the
new campaign is a theoretical statement by
Politburo member and leftist ideologue Yao
Wen-yucn published in the latest issue of tie
journal Rcd Flag, which is obviously meant to
provide much of the ideological underpinning of
the campaign. Yao pays somewhat less attention
to economic issues than do most of the other
mcjor articles and editorials associated wish the
campaign, and elaborates on the new "Mao quo-
tation" by discussing at length the disparities jr
wage scales and living standards built into the
Chinese political and economic system at the
"current stage of socialism."
In the opening phases of his argument, Yao
strongly implies that these disparities can be
exploited and intensified by secret enemies of
communism nestled within the Chinese Commu-
nist Party, thus suggesting that these anomalies
must be eliminated, but the final third of his
article strongly endorses the current emphasis
on unity and order. Yao's strictures against
"shrewd and crafty old bourgeois elements"
who stay behind the scenes manipulating im-
pressioriable youngsters may well be a veiled
attack on those who attempte a to use the anti-
Confucius campaign last spring to stir up trouble
in the provinces. If so, it could be an attempt on
Yao's part to disassociate himself from such
people. Although an apparently unreconstructed
leftist, Yao in both 1967 and 1965 attacked
"ultra-leftism"; the 1967 article was, in fact, the
first salvo in a movement that led tnree years
later to the purge of Chen Po-ta, a leading civil-
ian "leftist" associate of Yao's.
The ambiguities contained in Yao's article
have been present in the current campaign since
it was first heralded at the National People's
Congress by Chang Chun-chiao, a vice premier
and Politburo standing committee member. The
question of disparities in the wage scale and
other aspects of China's economic system, for
example, remains very mu--.h open. The new
campaign could be used to reduce these dispari-
ties, but it could also be used to defend these
differences while China continues to develop
and modernize its economy. The latter course
was strongly sugnested by the publication of a
series of selective quotations on "bourgeois
rights" from the works of Marx, Engels, and
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Lenin, which occupied three of the four pages
of a recent issue of People's Daily.
In this ambiguous situation, the position of
Mao himself is, as always, of great importance.
The new "quotation'' could be interpreted as
either an attack on "bourgeois rights" or a de-
fense of them in the current Chinese context. In
his article, Yao makes pointed reference to the
practice of "waving the red flag to oppose the
red flag"-that is, the practice of distorting pol-
icy directives for factional political ends-an
emotionally charged catch-phrase that was
frequently employed during the Cultural Revo-
lution. It is not clear, however, if Yao was
referring to unnamed "enemies" who empha-
sized the wrong themes in the current campaign
or to those who attempted to exploit the fluid
political situation last year.
In the past several years, the Cnairman's
concerns seemed to have centered on foreign
policy, particularly on ensuring continued
opposition to Moscow, and on ensuring that the
political power of the military was firmly
curbed It is not yet clear whether his attention
has shifted to domestic matters in the aftermatt
of the National People's Congress. In any event,
he has been away from Peking for eight months,
and he attended neither the congress nor the
central committee plenum that preceded it.
Moreover, in the past week he has failed to see
two foreign visitors who normally would be
accorded an audience. If Mao continues to
remain inactive, questio,is regarding his status
are bound to be raised in China, and officials are
already attempting to minimize this incipient
problem-without a r f success thus
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Political meeting in Shanghai shipyard
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CHINA-. MORE MISSILE BOATS TO STRAIT
Stationing
Chinese Communist ships in transit and helps
keep open access to the South Sea Fleet area.
sas near the strait provides protection for
:nor Sin
nr[T
P'u-men-ch'eng
Saniu-ao
NOR rH
VC[TNAMnan
PEKNG
~c~viK {
?. 'r ~OAfL -~T
a - ~
.+~~.fcH.ra\
UIRTH
SEpr
F MEET
Shanghai
SOUTH SEA
!LEFT
Chinese naval production conti cues to
emphasize guided-missile patrol boats and sub-
marines rather than large surface warships.
Peking now :has about 135 guided-missile patrol
boats in service. Annual production has in-
creased substantially since 1969, reaching
around 35 last year.
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Peking began stationing Osas at the Pu-
men-che:ig naval facility more than a year ago.
Since thiit time, the Chinese have been gradually
adding Co their missile boat force in the strait
area.
The build-up of Osas obviously has aroused
some concern in Taipei. Military leaders there
consider that the deployment enhances Peking's
ability to support military operations against the
offshore islands and is a threat to Nationalist
vessels plying the str:,lt. There is not necessarily
any particular threat, however, as the deploy-
ments are part of a cortinuing pattern of
allocating missile boats to all three fleet areas to
provide a more balanced defense along the
entire coastline of Communist China.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080012-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080012-6
UK: VIQLSON CONFRONTS EC ISSUE
Prime Minister Wilson faces a tough tight in
Parliament and within his own Labor Party over
the government's proposed referendum on the
EC issue. Domestic political reaction to the
guidelines for the referendum set out in the
recent white paper has been largely negative.
Wilson is still expected to coma out in
favor of Britain's continued membership, but
the outcome of the referendum-which will
probably be held in June-pretty much hinges
oi. how strongly he and his principal cabinet
officers speak out it support. Both supporters
and opponents of continued EC membership
believe that at the moment the majority of
voters oppose continued affiliation with the
Community.
The government's major proposals for the
referendum are:
part of the ruling Labor Party, wants the votes
to be tallied in each of the country's 635 elec-
toral districts so that each Member of Parlia-
ment would know how his constituents viewed
EC membership. Government leaders recognize
that a single national count, on the other hand,
offers the best hope for staying in the EC.
Parliamentary debate will focus on the
advisability of holding what would be Britain's
first referendum and on the wording of the
questi= . The Tories have said they plan a line-
by-line debate, focusing on the cons' ' itutional
question of whether the referendum encroaches
on parliamentary sovereignty. The anti-
marketeers opposed to the wording of the ques-
tion, especially the term "stay in," prefer asking
the electorate whether Britain "should be" a
member of the EC.
? a simple majority will suffice to bind
the government;
? votes will be counted centrally rather
than by region or constituency;
? the referendum nuestion should read:
"The government have announced the re-
sults of renegotiation of the UK's terms of
membership in the EC. Do you think the
UK should stay in the EC?";
o an explanation of the results of the
renegotiations and the pros and cons of
continued membership will be mailed to
each registered voter;
? limited government funds will be avail-
able to both pro- and anti-market groups.
The most contentious proposal promises to
be the r.ethod of counting the ballots. Scottish
aria Welsh nationalises want the votes counted
regionally so that opposition to EC membership
in their areas would be clearly defined and not
lost in a national tally. They have threatened to
hold the it own regional r,'felendoirt II the gov-
ernment's national tally p'en prevails. The anti-
m~:r: