WEEKLY REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070034-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
31
Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Sequence Number:
34
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 6, 1974
Content Type:
REPORT
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Weekly Review
25X1
6 December 1974 25X1
Copy N2 649
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the WEEK'.Y REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current !nteIIigence, reports and analy;_es significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes mate iil ccordinafed with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office cf Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topir.s requiring more comprehens've treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports arc listed in the
contents.
1 Tensions Rise u,i Cyprus
3 The Middle East
5 Palestinians-USSR: The Wandering Ar
6
7
8
9
10
10
13
14
UK: Labor Party Confer,nce
Turkey: Impasse Continue;
Spain: Regime Moves Cautiously
NATO Reviews Its Problems
European Communism: Moderation
EC: Par:, c Ir'imit; Trade Preferences
The Apollo-Suyuz Program
17 Iraq: Offensive Stalls
18 Ethiopia: More Trouble Ahead
19 India-Pakistan: Another Agreement
20 South Asia: Grain Situation
21 Japan: Prime Minister Miki
22 Vietnam: Increased Fighting;
Le Duc Tho
23 Cambodia: Maintaining Momentum
24 Laos: Discussing Strategy
25 Colombia: Out on a Limb
26 Mexico: Breaking With Chile;
Cabanas Dead
27 Chile: Junta-Party Tensions Grow
28 Brazil: The Congressional Elections
28 Latin America: Meeting at Ayacucho
CONTENTS (December' 6, 1974)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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Makarios with Clerides
Tensions Rise on Cyprus
Concern has mounted on all sides over the
possibility that Archbishop Makarios' scheduled
return to Cyprus this weekend will trigger vio-
lence between pro- and anti-Makarios factions in
the Greek Cypriot sector of the island. Greek
Cypriot :acurity authorities have taken ex+ra
precautions to curb possible hostilities, and
Turkish inilitary forces are prepared to intervene
should the fighting become widespread and
threaten Turkish Cypriot civilians in the south.
Meanwhile, the results of a summit meeting
between Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders have
provided a ray of hope for prospects cf an
eventual negotiated settlement of the Cyprus
problem.
In a communique released on December 1,
following two days of talks, Archbishop
Makarios, Acting President Clerides, and Greek
Prime Minister Karamanlis noted that agreement
had been reached on a negotiating position and
that written instructions will be drawn up and
given to Clerides so that he may begin substantive
negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. Clerides
told a British official that Makarios had agreed to
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sign a protocol setting a negotiating framework
for Clerides along the lines of a geographic federa-
tion comprising one major Turkish Cypriot zone
in the north and possibly one or two additional
cantons. Clerides is reportedly pleased with the
Athens agreement, but is not certain that
Makarios will honor it. The meetings were
stormy, according to a US embassy source, with
Makarios moderating his position only after
strong pressure from Karamanlis.
Clerides returned to Nicosia on December 2
and two days later held another of his weekly
meetings with Turkish Cypriot Vice President
Denktash. While they continued to focus on
humanitarian issues, Clerides doubtlessly gave
Denktash some hint of what transpired in Athens.
At Denktash's request, however, no date was set
for another meeting pending Makarios' return and
a further clarification of the Greek Cypriot posi-
tion.
In Ankara, Turkish officials warned that
Makarios' return to Cyprus could torpedo the
talks between Clerides and Denktash and could
lessen the chance for a negotiated settlement.
They also warned that Turkish forces on Cyprus
would take "necessary measures" to protect
Turkish Cypriots living in the Greek Cypriot
sector should their safety be endangered by an
outbreak of intercommunal fighting. As a pre-
cautionary measure, martial law was extended
another month in four of Turkey's provinces.
Turkish forces in Cyprus as well as some mainland
air force units were placed on alert. In addition,
some 5,000 Turkish commandos in the Mersin
area--on the southern cr-- t of Turkey near
Cyprus-have been placed in a state of readiness
for transfer to the island by helicopter and ship
should large-scale military action be required.
While the Turkish moves reflect a genuine
concern about the safety of Turkish Cypriots on
the island, they are probably intended to en-
courage Makarios to accede to the more moderate
positions of Clerides and Karamanlis or even to
cancel his return to the island. Makarios has
restated his intention to return on December 7,
however, although the timing could change for
security reasons.
Pro-Makarios groups in the Greek Cypriot
sector are preparing to give Makarios a rousing
welcome. Once on the island, the archbishop is
expected to limit his movements for security
reasons, holding a series of consultations with
leading members of the Greek Cypriot com-
munity at his residence. Eventually, he is likely to
make some personnel changes in the government
to consolidate his position.
In the meantime, national guard and police
officials have instituted strict security measures
and are bracing for the po. sibility of violence.
These officials reportedly believe that EOKA-B,
the terrorist organization that participated in the
July coup against Makarios, has bean weakened
and that responsible EOKA-B leaders now realize
that Greek Cypriot unity is essential in the
months ahead in view of the Turkish threat. At
the same time, they do not discount the pos-
sibility that an extremist splinter group or in-
dividual might attempt to assassinate the arch-
bishop.
In the long run, the level of violence will
depend on the willingness of Makarios to seek
reconciliation with his opponents and the extent
The security officia!s also expect that at
least some anti-Makarios activity, including bomb-
ings, may occur, particularly in the Larnaca and
Limassol districts, but that it is likely to be
limited. Moreover, a number of killings are ex-
pected in the coming weeks as members of op-
posing factions seek revenge for the death of
friends and relatives during the July coup. 25X1
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The Middle East
RASIN'S NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
Israeli Foreign Minister Allon, who is
scheduled to hold talks with Secretary Kissinger
in Washington next week, apparently will not be
empowered to make any commitments regarding
the next stage in the Middle East peace nego-
tiations. The Israeli press has referred to Allon's
mission as a "listening brief" to learn the Secre-
Liry's assessment of the prospects for another
round of talks with Egypt. The cabinet reportedly
has not held any substantive discussion on Allon's
visit.
Prime Minister Rabin's own concept of
Israel's long-term negotiating strategy with the
Arabs was outlined in an interview published on
December 3 in Israel's leading independent daily.
Stressing that there is no realistic prospect of a
s;iort cut to an immediate, final settlement, Rabin
indicated that the next several years will be par-
ticularly critical because of the growth of Arab
power based on oil wealth. Israel must stall for
time and find a way to live in peace while the US
and Western Europe free themselves from Arab
oil-a process he thought could take seven years.
Rabin believes the only realistic way tc
avoid renewed hostilities is to obtain partial set-
tlements in separate negotiations with the Arabs,
a view he says is shared by the US, Egypt, and
Jordan, but opposed by the Soviet Union and
Syria. Rabin thinks, however, that General Secre-
tary Brezhnev's visit to Cairo in mid-January is a
sign that Egypt may shift to a more intransigent
position if President Sadat cannot point to some
progress in the peace negotiations. To give Sadat
his progress, Rabin said Israel is prepared to agree
to another military withdrawal in the Sinai
provided:
? the Egyptians do not occupy the evacu-
ated area;
? the passes in central Sinai remain under
Israeli control;
? the withdrawal does not occur before
the mandate for UN troops is renewed next
spring, and that the renewal period is for
much longer than the present six months.
The Israeli leader seemed to back off from
his earlier insistence that agreements with the
Arabs must be clearly political. He indicated that
in another military agreement with Cairo, Egyp-
tian political concessions for Israel could be con-
veyed to the US.
Rabin did not discuss negotiations with
Damascus and left his interviewer with the
impression that a resumption of hostilities with
Syria is a real possibility sometime next year. He
seemed to suggest that the important thing for
Israel is to prevent Egypt from joining in, at least
initially, thus allowing Israel to fight on only one
front for the first crucial days.
The Prime Minister remained adamant that
Israel will not negotiate with the Palestine Libera.
tion Organization. He had earlier told a group of
Israeli editors that, if Israel persevered in this
opposition for a year or two, it would become
clear that no alternative to Jordan existed for
negotiations concerning Israel's eastern border
and that King Husayn would then return to the
negotiating table.
The Egyptians have so far reacted to Rabin's
remarks essentially with a "no comment."
Rabin's widely publicized statements will make it
more difficult for President Sadat to justify any
separate negotiations with Tel Aviv to the other
Arabs, particularly the Syrians, because he would
be open to charges that he is falling for Israel's
stalling tactics.
Sadat's position will be even further com-
plicated by Foreign Minister Allon's statement to
the Knesset on December 3 that at the time of
the Egyptian-Israeli troop disengagement pact last
January, Cairo gave the US private assurances that
it would allow Israeli cargoes through the Suez
Canal.
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A Syrian spokesman labeled Rabin's state-
ments "provocative" for suggesting that Syria
should be isolated from the negotiations because
it is trying to drag the Arabs into a new war.
UN Mandate Extended
With the blessings of Syria and Israel, the
UN Security Council last week formally extended
for another six months the mandate of the UN
observer forces stationed on the Golan Heights.
Apparently at Syria's behe>i. the council's re-
newal action included a reference to last year's
cease-fire Resolution 338. That resolution calls on
the concerned parties to begin peace negotiations
under "appropriate auspices," which the Syrians
interpret as a clear reference to the Geneva peace
conference.
The newspaper of the Syrian Baath Party
claimed this week that the extension of the
mandate was directly linked to the immediate
implementation of guarantees concerning Pales-
tinian rights and to the complete and uncondi-
tional withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied
Arab territory. The paper's exaggerations will
serve to justify the renewal of the mandate
domestically and to deflect criticism from hard
liners in the Baath Party and the fedayeen move-
ment.
Having saved face, the Syrians may now be
willing to allow Egypt to negotiate another Israeli
withdrawal in the Sinai. It seems most unlikely,
however, that President Asad would accede to
this without seeking solid assurances that similar
talks would begin at the same time, or shortly
thereafter, between Syria and Israel. In any event,
Damascus will continue to push for an early
resumption of the Geneva talks.
Much will turn on the outcome of Soviet
General Secretary Brezhnev's trip to the Middle
East in January. The Syrians will try to coordi-
nate their strategy with the Soviets during Brezh-
nev's visit. Geneva will be a key topic of discus-
sion, but Asad may also seek Soviet assurances of
support for another war of attrition on the Golan
Heights, perhaps next spring, if negotiations
should remain
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Palestinians-USSR: The Wandering Arab
r
h
e Soviets won some concessions from
Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Arafat during his visit to Moscow last week, but
Moscow rhade clear that it is not yet ready to
reciprocate with unqualified support for the PLO.
In the final communique, Arafat moved a step
closer to committing the PLO to accept a trun-
cated Palestinian state and, indirectly, to ac-
knowledge Israel's right to exist.
In a tortuously constructed passage, Moscow
and the Palestinians said that the PLO should
assume responsibility for any Palestinian territory
"liberated by the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the seized Arab lands, as demanded by well-
known UN decisions." By endorsing this ref-
erence to Israeli-occupied territory, rather than to
Israel itself, Arafat indirectly conceded that Israel
proper will continue to exist. Although Arafat
privately accepts the reality of Israel, he will
probably withhold a more explicit acknowledge-
ment until Tel Aviv offers major concessions.
Arafat's approving reference to "well-known
UN decisions" in the same breath as "with-
drawal" is also a first. He was obviously alluding
t
S
o
ecurity Council Resolution 242, which calls
for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in
1967 and guarantees the "territorial inviolability"
of all states in the area.
The Soviets, nevertheless, refrained from ex-
plicitly recognizing the PLO as "sole" representa-
tive of the Palestinians. They again did not spell
out what they meant when they endorsed the
right of the Palestinian people to "statehood." In
the communique, the Soviets called for the par-
ticipation in the Geneva peace conference of the
"Arab people of Palestine," but did not specif-
ically mention the PLO. Undoubtedly upset over
Moscow's continued equivocation, the PLO
refused to associate itself with this part of the
statement.
Moscow did accord Arafat some of the
trappings normally given a chief of state. Premier
Kosygin, for example, is the highest ranking So-
Arafat laying a wreath at Lenin's tomb
Page 5
viet official ever known to have met with the PLO
leader. Arafat's apparent failure to meet party
boss Brezhnev, however, was another sign that
Moscow is still keeping some distance between
itself and the PLO. On the plus side, the USSR
and Arafat announced that a previous!;' eutho-
rizLJ PLO office will open in Moscow i" +ho
"nearest future." 25X1
The Soviets may be concerned that an an-
nouncement now of the formation of a Pales-
tinian government:-in-exile could disrupt progress
toward reconvening the Geneva conference-a
prime Soviet goal. Before showing its hand, the
Kremlin undoubtedly also wants to be sure that
any such government has broad support among
Palestinians and the Arab states. Moscow may
also hope to influence the composition and pro-
gram of any future P1 n government
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UK: LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE
At the annual party conference last week,
left-wing Laborites pushed through several resolu-
tions designed to limit the government's flexibil-
ity on a number of issues, particularly the EC
membership question. Despite this demonstration
of left-wing strength, moderates led by Prime
Minister Wilson pretty much held their own at the
conference, and the balance of power between
militants and moderates appears essentially un-
changed.
The government's "social contract" came
under fire from trade union delegates who
charged that workers have borne the brunt of
inflation and are entitled to substantial pay raises.
Foreign Secretary Callaghan, acting as conference
chairman, reminded the delegates in his opening
speech that the three main elements of the ccn-
tract-greater social justice, regeneration of in-
dustry, and wage restraint-are interdependent.
He urged union leaders to moderate their wage
demands.
The conference passed two resolutions
critical of the government's foreign policy. The
first overwhelmingly approved a decision made in
October by the party's administrative organ, the
National Executive Committee, to censure the
government for authorizing joint naval exercises
with the South African navy. The delegates
Wilson and Scnmidt at the Labor Party conference
demanded implementation of a resolution
adopted at last year's conference to terminate
military relations with South Africa. Although
this latest resolution is certainly a minor embar-
rassment to Wilson, government officials have
already agreed that the Simonstown Pact, the
agreement providing for the recent naval maneu-
vers, will be allowed to "wither on the vine."
The second foreign policy resolution crit-
icized the government for its policy toward the
Chilean junta and for extending the repayment
schedule on a substantial portion of Chile's debt
to the UK. Wilson is likely to be responsive to the
left wing on the Chilean issue in order to win
support for what he regards as more important
legislative battles.
As expected, the conference was the forum
for strong anti-EC sentiment. Apparently tearful
that Wilson or Callaghan might campaign for a
"yes" vote in the coming referendum on EC
membership, the delegates unanimously
demanded assurances that the government would
present both sides of this issue. A second, more
controversial, resolution, passed by a slim margin,
called for "safeguards" before the government
accepts new conditions for continued member-
ship. Some delegates also demanded that a special
party convention be held in addition to the
referendum.
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EC supporters at the conference got a
psychological boost when West German Chancel-
lor Schmidt addressed the delegates, urging
Britain to remain in the community in the in-
terest of European solidarity. Despite threats that
anti-marketeers might stage a walkout, Schmidt
was warmly applauded.
Moderate Laborites received additional
encouragement from party elections last week.
Cabinet member Shirley W;!liams and trade union
leader Tom Bradley, both strong supporters of EC
membership, were re-elected to their posts in the
National Executive Committee despite strong op-
position from the left. The Parliamentary Labor
Party, the influential organization of backbench
Laborites, elected four moderates and only two
militants to the organization's committee respon-
sible for liaison with the government. Tom Dal-
yell, a pro-marketeer, finished first in the com-
mittee election and, as a result, becomes vice
TURKEY: IMPASSE CONTINUES
The search continues for a formula that will
break the political stalemate that has existed since
the governing coalition was dissolved on Septem-
ber 18. The most recent effort-a nonpartisan
government headed by the politically neutral Sadi
Irmak-was stillborn when parliament refused
Irmak a vote of confidence last week.
The political parties were nearly unanimous
in rejecting the Irmak government by a vote of
358 to 17. The fact that Irmak's cabinet was in
large part drawn from outside parliament was its
greatest drawback, although former prime minis-
tar Ecevit's Republican People's Party voted
against Irmak because his program offered no
precise language on the Liming for new elections.
Negotiations have been in process since the
no-confidence vote, as the political parties try to
narrow their differences and put together a gov-
ernment that can deal with the nation's growing
list of problems. In the meantime, Irmak is con-
tinuing as head of a caretaker regime, and Presi-
dent Koruturk is waiting to see what develops
before designating someone else to try to form a
government.
The principal sticking point still appears to
be the timing for new elections, although person-
ality clashes and political vendettas also play a
role in the continuing stalemate. The Democratic
Party reportedly was prepared to go along with
Ecevit-agreeing to the elections in exchange for
some choice cabinet posts in a coalition govern-
ment-but it appears to be having difficulty in
overcoming some deep-seated hatreds. Such a
coalition would need all the votes of both parties,
but a small Democratic faction controlled by the
son of former prime minister Menderes holds
Ecevit's party responsible for the execution of the
elder Menderes in 1961 and has refused to co-
operate. 25X1 25X1
The most recent suggestion for breaking the
impasse was Justice Party leader Demirel's call for
a conservative coalition that would include his
party, the Democrats, and the National Salvation
Party. Demirel claims that there would be no
need to hold new elections if such a coalition
were installed, since the parties are in general
ideological agreement and would have a majority
in parliament. In the past, however, the Demo-
cratic Party has refused to join any government
headed by Demirel, who a few years ago expelled
several members from his Justice Party. This
group provided the nucleus for the Democratic
Party, and to this day bears a strong grudge
against the Justice Party leader.
The National Salvation Party has already
signaled its willingness to join with Demirel in a
coalition, but without the Democrats they would
fall short of the needed majority in parliament.
Thus, the Democratic Party is in the position of
power broker-able to give a majority to either of
Turkey's two leading political figures-Ecevit or
Damirel--but so far it has been unable to make a
choice because of old personal and political
grudges. The time for deciding may be fast ap-
proaching, however, as the military is increasingly
dissatisfied with the performance of the civilian
politicians and may begin to apply some pressure
to break the impasse.
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SPAIN: REGIME MOVES CAUTIOUSLY
Prime Minister Arias' astute defense this
week of the newly issued draft law allowing for-
mation of political parties in limited form should
stem reports of his resignation or dismissal. There
is, however, considerable disappointment with the
long-awaited draft among many Spaniards who
favor wider public participation in their political
system. This comes at a time when growing labor
unrest is troubling the government.
The draft statute legalizes "political associa-
tions"--a form of political party-but limits their
scope by making them subservient to Franco's
National Movement. The Movement is a collec-
tion of largely rightist groups that have supported
Franco since the Spanish Civil War. The new law
authorizes the Movement to recognize, suspend,
or dissolve the associations. Approved associa-
tions could take part in municipal elections and in
voting for one fifth of the national parliament.
The Prime Minister wanted a bill that would
permit the associations to be independent of the
Movement, and strong rightist opposition to this
idea led to reports that he would resign or be
fired. Franco himself allegedly amended the
ministerial draft by insisting that the associations
be placed under the control of the Movement.
Arias' decision to acquiesce in the draft law
and remain in office became clear when he de-
fended the law in a nationwide speech earlier this
week, calling it "an agreement with Spanish
reality" and a hopeful new step. The law is not
likely to ease the grove;ng demands for increased
civil liberties. Many opposition groups regard the
proposed legislation as a farce and will refuse to
apply for association status.
Last week, 14 opposition leaders represent-
ing seven Christian Democratic and socialist
groups were arrested at a meeting in Madrid. They
had assembled to discuss the launching of a
"Democratic Ccnference" as well as the attitude
they should take toward the Commun'st-
sponsored "Democratic junta" formed in Paris
last July. All 14 were released the next day. The
participation in the meeting of a former cabinet
member and the son of the ex-chief of the armed
forces general staff has boosted the concept of a
"Democratic Conference."
The inability of the government's syndical
organization to cope with serious labor conflicts
is demonstrated by the rash of illegal strikes,
which has now reached a four-year high. This
month, strikes and strike-related violence have
centered in Barcelona, Madrid, the Basque prov-
inces, and Valladolid, where clandestine labor
groups have clashed with the police.
For the first time, non-Communist clandes-
tine ` ;r groups outside the Communist-dom-
inate.. 'rVorkers Commissions have emerged as the
principal advocates of violence. Efforts of the
Workers Commissions to moderate the violence
may reflect the influence of exiled Communist
leader Santiago Carrillo in Paris. He wants to
create a moderate image in Spain by promoting
the participation of more non-Communists in the
new "Democratic Junta" coalition.
Tension with the government increased with
the intervention this month by top church offi-
cials led by Cardinal Jubany of Barcelona. He
issued a pastoral letter that placed most of the
blame on government authorities for labor prob-
lems in Barcelona and called for recognition of
the right to strike and social justice for workers.
Even the official workers' organization felt
the need to call for various labor reforms, in-
cluding the granting of a modified right to strike,
but the authorities are divided over how to handle
labor and are unlikely to respond. Instead, the
government continues to arrest strikers and is
proceeding with the trials of clandestine labor
leaders. The regime made a concession of sorts,
however, when the trial of five prominent mem-
bers of the illegal socialist labor union-scheduled
for last October 28-was postponed indefinitely,
reportedly because of protests from European
socialists. In this case, moderates concerned with
Spain's image abroad prevailed.
The strikes and labor unrest will probably
continue at a high level at least until next Febru-
ary. Many collective bargaining agreements expire
be accompanied by violence.
on December 31, and renegotiations are likely to
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NATO REVIEWS ITS PROBLEMS
When the foreign and defense ministers of
NATO meet in Brussels next week, they will
debate many of the alliance's most serious prob-
lems, but no dramatic results are likely. At the
heart of their discussions will be the question of
the viability of the alliance itself, as the last six
months have seen two of NATO's members
become less than full participants.
Greece's withdrawal from the integrated
military command has damaged NATO's defenses
on the southern flank. The most important con-
sequence is that the full support of Greek forces
can no longer be counted on in the event of an
attack on the alliance. Beyond that, there remain
innumerable unsettled details arising from the
Greek withdrawal. The NATO ministers will be
assessing the damage already done and deciding
how to deal with Athens in the future.
The Portuguese situation may be only the
first case in which NATO will be confronted with
the problem of how to treat a member with
Communists in its government. For the time
being, NATO has cut off the flow of nuclear
information to Lisbon and has eased the Portu-
guese out of the nuclear planning group, which
will hold a special meeting concurrently with the
ministers' gathering. An anti-NATO reaction in
Lisbon, with possible consequences for Portu-
guese membership, is still a possibility.
The spe,,?:er haunting the ministerial meet-
ings will be th,i steady deterioration of the e^.o-
nomies of the member countries. The national
defense programs of a number of members have
already been affected, and many observers feel
that this is only the beginning. The foreign and
defense ministers will be discussing the danger
that economic difficulties pose to the main-
NATO Headquarters
tenance of NATO defenses, and they may also
give some attention to possible solutions.
One item on the agenda will be The Dutch
suggestion that NATO's defense programs could
be made more e;fcient if member countries
specialized in certain tasks. NATO has already
begun to take a closer look at the Dutch sugges-
tion, but several members have problems with it.
The ministers are not expected to act decisively
on the proposal.
The ministers' perception of the threat to
NATO's defenses will be colored by reports that
point to a growth in Soviet military strength. The
goals of detente will continue to receive strong
support from the allies, but the West Europeans
remain concerned about US-Soviet bilateral deal-
ings, exemplified recently by the agreement on
SALT principles at Vladivostok. The West
European ministers will be anxious to question
US spokesmen about the principles and will be
especially interested in how developments at
SALT might affect the two negotiations-the
European security conference and the force
reduction talks-in which the West Europeans,
along with the US, are involved. The security
conference has shown some signs of fnrward
movement within the last few weeks, and del-
egates are talking about finishing substantive
work by spring. The force reduction talks remain
stalled, with both sides holding fast to their basic
positions despite certain new variations.
The NATO ministers will also be mindful of
the threat of renewed conflict in the Middle East,
which could again split the alliance. The West
Europeans will be interested in the US assessment
of the situation and may seek guarantees that
the, will be consulted about US activities in the
event of a new Middle Fart crisis.
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European Communism:
SOVIETS URGE MODERATE COURSE
Nobody questions that the Soviet Union
would be delighted if Pc.,rtugal pulled out of
NATO, but Moscow has to balance this goal
against the risks that abrupt action would pose
for the Portuguese party and for broader Soviet
interests. Recent evidence suggests that the So-
viets have come down in favor of the longer term,
more moderate course.
It is possible that the Portuguese were
merely embroidering on an internal party dispute
in an effort to establish their credentials as an
independent party. There is evidence, however,
that Moscow has accepted the Portuguese ap-
proach. The Soviet party's theoretical journal re-
cently ran an interview with Portuguese Commu-
nist Party chief Cunhal, in which Cunha[ made it
clear that he inter !cd to go slow on NATO and
on the use of Portuguese bases by the US. The
appearance of this line in the journal, in effect,
gives Moscow's ideological green light to Cunhal's
+actic.
The cautious Soviet line on Portugal is in
keeping with Moscow's advice to the Italian Com-
munists and with the general Soviet position that
Western Communist parties can increase and
entrench their influence only if they avoid serious
disruptions of the domestic political and eco-
nomic status quo.
Ever since Paris first proposed holding an EC
summit by the end of the year, France's partners
have been markedly unenthusiastic and pessi-
mistic about its prospects for reaching significant
decisions. It is now scheduled to convene next
week, and many still profess to see it essentially
as an attempt by President Giscard to enhance his
prestige. Italy and Ireland openly set a condi-
tion-establishment of a regional assistance fund-
as a price for their attendance, while other mem-
bers demanded and got limitations on the agenda.
The flurry of last-minute consultations
among the principal leaders of the Nine-Chancel-
lor Schmidt, Prime Minister Wilson, and Giscard-
how-3ver, testifies to the dangers the European
leaders perceive in another unsuccessful summit
that wou!d merely confirm the stagnation of the
community. The diplomatic activities this week
have made it possible to reduce substantially
chances that the summit might conclude in
disarray. 25X1
Bonn's agreement to set up the ' egional
fund-to which it will be the main donor-re-
moved the Italian and Irish threat not to attend
and represents a sharp turnaround from Bonn's
earlier tough talk against any marked increase in
German EC expenditures
the decision is viewed
by Schmidt as a concession of considerable mag-
nitude, made because it is now "vitally impor-
tant" to show progress in European cooperation.
In return, the Germans probably received conces-
sions-perhaps relating tr, energy matters-during
the pre-summit negotiations.
For its part, Britain has asked that a mem-
ber's budget contribution be directly related to its
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gross national product. The French aie now alone
in resisting this concept, but Wilson and Giscard
may have worked out a mutually face-saving com-
promise during their meeting this week.
Despite the cautious optimism about the
summit outcome generated by these develop-
ments, some EC leaders have publicly cautioned
against expecting dramatic results. French For-
eign Minister Sauvagnargues, for example, said
this week that "what we must avoid is, first, great
expectations and then profound disappoint-
ment." The Nine hope to avoid such recurrent
post-summit disillusionment by holding meetings
several times a year in the future so that the
summits can be treated in more routine fashion.
Beyond its function of promoting a commu-
nity identity, the summit's success will be viewed
by each of the Nine in terms of the degree to
which national objectives are advanced. Thus,
Bonn particularly seeks agreement on common
energy policies, and London a reduction in its EC
budget contribution. The British and the Danes
arc not in favor of the development of suprana-
tional institutions, while the Benelux states hope
that the possibility for movement in this area will
at least not be killed.
The French initiative 'for EC institutional
reforms-including enhancing the political coordi-
nation process-has focused attention on the in-
adequacies of the community's decision-making
process. If the original French proposals have
been greatly watered down, it is not because the
institutional debate is irrelevant, but because it
touches the heart of the community problem:
how much sovereignty the members are willing to
surrender in the cause of European integration.
Giscard told American journalists this week that
France, at the summit, intends to propose fixing a
date for elections for the European Parliament
and that ground rules be set up for future EC
decisions by majority vote. The Belgians have
suggested establishing a working-group-possibly
headed by Belgian Premier Tindemans-to study
institutional reforms and to make definite pro-
posals within a year. Although Schmidt is re-
portedly lukewarm toward the idea, it will prob-
ably be discussed further at the summit.
Or~-:~ of the most ser;:,us issues dividing the
Nine is the community's response to international
cooperation on energy matters. France's partners
all want a reconciliation of Paris' and Washing-
ton's views on cooperation among consuming
countries, but they are aware that any such rap-
prochement may have to await the Franco-US
summit in mid-December. The Nine may never-
theless attempt to agree on guidelines to prevent
another fruitless debate on EC energy policy,
which will be discussed in greater detail at a
council meeting on December 17.
The call for a summit has had the important
beneficial effect of forcing new discussions of
how the critical economic problems can be dealt
with on a community-wide basis. In fact, given
the complexity of the problems and the diver-
gencies in their economies, the Nine are not
expected to reach substantial agreement at the
summit on community-wide measures. The meet-
ing may, however, give an impetus to expan-
sionary policies in certain countries. Chancellor
Schmidt will presumably try to get his partners to
pursue anti-inflationary policies in return for his
pledge to relax West Germany's tight monetary
and fiscal measures.
Meeting last August of EC heads of state
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EXPANDING TRADE PREFERENCES
The EC is re-examining its trade and aid
policies for developing countries, but a clear
policy line does not seem likely in the near fu-
ture. While the community is expanding the pref-
erential treatment accorded the manufactured
and semi-processed exports of all developing
states, it is also widening the network of preferen-
tial access to the EC market granted the develop-
ing associates in Africa, the Caribbean, the Pa-
cific, and the Mediterranean. Many EC members
believe the oil-producing states should assume a
larger share of the burden of direct financial as-
sistance, even though the EC has made a gesture
toward helping those developing states "most seri-
ously affected" by high oil prices.
In line with its declared intention of further
stimulating the economies of the developing
states, the EC Council recently approved an in-
crease in benefits available under the commu-
nity's system of generalized preferences. EC
tariffs on processed agricultural goods will be
reduced substantially, and the volume of indus-
trial exports for which preferences are given to
developing countries will be increased by 15 per-
cent. Quotas for textile imports, treated sepa-
rately under the system, are scheduled to increase
by 5 percent, while the EC's list of "sensitive
goods"-for which the EC market is protected by
import quotas-was cut from 51 to 16.
In view of Britain's announced intention to
renegotiate the terms of its membership in the
community, EC officials have taken care through-
out these negotiations not to demand terms that
would worsen Britain's economic problems. In
compensation for trade losses resulting from Brit-
ain's EC membership, the new preference agree-
ment will include concessions for Hong Kong and
Asian Commonwealth countries, primarily India.
The expanded system of generalized prefer-
ences will cover products with a total value of
$4.1 billion in 1975, as compared with $3.6 bil-
lion this year. Latest EC figures, however, indi-
cate that under the existing scheme developing
countries have taken advantage of only 40 per-
cent of the trade preferences offered by the com-
munity. Less than half of the 104 eligible coun-
tries have used the preferences. A lack of under-
standing of the intricacies of the preference sys-
tem-especially the complex rules for defining the
origin of goods in order to qualify for a prefer-
ence-prevent more effective use of the system by
the developing countries. Only relatively ad-
vanced areas such as Yugoslavia, Brazil, Hong
Kong, and Singapore have taken full advantage of
the preferences, and these account for 50 percent
of the industrial goods exported under the
system.
At the request of the Netherlands, which has
recently criticized preference benefits as illusory,
the EC Council has agreed to conduct an overall
review of the system in early 1975. Particular
attention will be paid to measures that would
facilitate and encourage greater participation in
the system and offset the impact of inflation. The
EC is unlikely to extend the scope of its prefer-
ence scheme substantially, however, until the US
adopts a similar system. The pending US trade bill
contains provisions for establishing such a pro-
gram.
Negotiations are scheduled to resume later
this month with 44 African, Caribbean, and Pa-
cific countries for a long-term association agree-
ment to replace the Yaounde Convention, which
expires in January. The new agreement will in-
clude Commonwealth countries who became eligi-
ble for association when the UK joined the com-
munity. The most innovative aspect of the new
arrangement will be a scheme to guarantee export
earnings for 12 basic commodities produced by
developing countries-a concept that the EC may
eventually seek to generalize between all de-
veloped and developing countries. The new con-
vention will also provide financial and technical
aid commitments.
Last month, the EC was able to provide
$150 million through the European Development
Fund for the states most seriously affected by
high oil prices. In January 1975, a decision will be
made to release an additional $350 million in
direct assistance, contingent upon similar efforts
by the US.
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The Soviets launched Soyuz 16 on Decem-
ber 2-their first manned spacecraft mission
directly related to the joint Apollo-Soyuz project
scheduled for next July.
According to a Tass announcement, the
Soyuz 16 spacecraft is virtually identical to the
one that will be used for the joint mission. The
Soyuz 16 crew is the primary back-up team for
the joint project. A major task of the current
mission is to test the environmental control and
docking systems, both of which have been
modified for the joint venture. In addition, the
cosmonauts are also to carry out a scientific pro-
gram that includes photographing the earth and
biological research. The mission will probably last
six days with deorbit occurring early on Decem-
ber 8.
The environmental control system has been
modified to allow the Soyuz to lower cabin
atmospheric pressure and increase oxygen con-
centration when docked with Apollo so that the
crew members can safely transfer between the
two spacecrafts. Depressurization to the desired
level was achieved during the second day of the
mission.
The current mission will also be the first
flight test of a new type of docking system.
Because the Soviet and US space programs have
used different docking equipment and proce-
dures, a docking system compatible with both
spacecraft has been developed.
The Soviets have conducted a number of
tests of the new docking system. A series of
ground tests were conducted over the past year,
both in the Soviet Union and in the US, to test
the compatibility of the Apollo and Soyuz cap-
sules. In addition, two unmanned Soyuz flights
this year tested the functioning of the new dock-
ing coupling in space. These flights, however,
were limited to simply extending and retracting
the coupling and did not involve actual docking
exercises while in orbit.
In the past, the Sovi.4c had repeated dif-
ficulty in achieving a workabit docking system
that permits crew members to transfer from one
spacecraft to aoother without having to walk in
space. In the first docking and transfer operation
in their manned space program-Soyuz 4 and
5-the crew had to walk in space between the two
capsules. Soyuz 2 and 3 and the group flight of
Soyuz 6, 7, and 8 had rendezvous problems, and
docking attempts failed. Soyuz 10 was unable to
dock successfully with the Salyut 1 space station
in April 1971, and no crew transfer was at-
tempted. The first successful docking and internal
transfer was made two months later by the crew
of Soyuz 11 to the Salyut 1 space station. A
pressurization failure, however, resulted in the
death of the three-man crew during descent.
The first completely successful Soviet mis-
sion to include docking and internal transfer was
made this July, when the two-man crew of Soyuz
14 transferred to Salyut 3 and returned to earth
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after approximately three weeks in space. The
Soviets still had problems with their docking
techniques, however, because Soyuz 15 was also
intended to dock with Salyut 3 one month later,
but returned to earth without accomplishing
ROMANIA: THE CEAUSESCU CONGRESS
A confident Nicolae Ceausescu rang down
the curtain on the 11th Romanian party congress
on November 28. The congress, which elected
Ceausescu to another five-year term as party boss,
buttressed his personal power and overwhelm-
ingly endorsed his independent path to socialism.
Ceausescu tightened his hold on the party's
top executive bodies-the permanent bureau and
the executive political committee-but made no
dramatic personnel changes. The permanent bu-
reau, created last March to coordinate party-state
activities, was pared down to five of his closest
advisers, including some of the nation's top eco-
nomic experts. Five more staunch supporters be-
came full members of the executive political com-
mittee, and four were named candidate members.
The party Central Committee was expanded
from 319 to 361 members, and Ceausescu engi-
neered a major turnover in its personnel: 35 per-
cent of the full members and 80 percent of the
candidates are newcomers. The changes reflected
Ceausescu's desire to get rid of deadwood and,
more important, to find individuals with the cor-
rect blend of te'hnical expertise and political
loyalty.
The congress, as expected, adopted the
party's new program-a forceful reaffirmation of
Romanian national policies and independence.
Moscow reportedly has "undefined" problems
with the program. The Soviets may be partic-
ulzrly displeased with the historical section,
which criticizes the Comintern's "mistaken"
orders to the Romanian party in the interwar
period and has some kind words for the monar-
chy and the middle class.
Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav reactions to
the congress reflect their different attitudes to-
ward Romania and the Communist movement:
? The Chinese and Yugoslavs paid tribute
to Ceausescu by name, but the Soviets made
no mention of him.
? Peking praised the Romanians for
"maintaining independence, keeping the initi-
ative in their own hands and working hard."
Moscow stressed that "cooperation" and
"deepening unity" in the Communist move-
ment guarantees the "continual flourishing"
of Romania.
? Belgrade strongly echoed Bucharest's
line that international relations must be based
on respect for independence, equality, and
noninterference in the internal development
and pol;cy of others."
For the average Romanian, the congress held
out little hope of a better life. Although lip serv-
ice was paid to improving the standard of living
and increasing the availability of consumer goods,
the congress endorsed the continued forced
growth of industry and priority production for
the export market.
Agriculture moved up on the list of eco-
nomic priorities, reflecting Ceausescu's concern
over two bad harvest years. Investment in agricul-
ture for the 1976-80 plan will be 37 percent
higher than during 1971-75 and 25 percent more
than had previously been announced for the next
Five-Year Plan.
With the congress behind him, Ceausescu is
now turning his attention to the government.
Two cabinet posts have already changed hands,
and rumors abound that party secretary Stefan
Andrei will soon replace Gheorghe Macovescu as
foreign minister. The Grand National Assembly
usually meets within two weeks of a party con-
gress, and any further changes in the government
will probably be unveiled at that time.
25X1
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The offensive against the Kurds in northeast-
ern Iraq is coming to a halt, according to the US
consul in the northern Iranian city of Tabriz. The
Iraqis have been unable to make significant
advances since they took two Kurdish towns in
late August, and the arrival of winter rain and
snow is hampering air and armor operations.
Most of the recent action h-is centered
around Rawanduz, where the Iraqis have been
trying to break out of the surrounding basin
toward the Iranian border. D3spite some limited
success, the army has keen unable to move more
than a few kilometers from the town.
The consul, who toured the border last
week, reports that Kurdish morale is good. The
rebels continue to control most of the area
around Qalat Dizah and are supplied regularly
over a new road from Iran. Iranian artillery has
driven Iraqi regulars from the town, leaving be-
hind a light force of mercenaries.
Local observers expect the present Iraqi
campaign to proceed much like those in the
past-gains by the army during the summer
months, followed by setbacks and stalemate with
the onset of winter. 25X1
Baghdad is !making some effort to break this
cycle. The army, for example, has constructed
winter fortifications in hopes of withstanding ex-
pected Kurdish counterattacks. Moreover,
the Iraqis intend to maintain about
100,000 well-equipped regulars in the area. This
force is augmented by a large number of irreg-
ulars, who are also well supplied for the win-
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The ruling military council, already appre-
hensive about its relations with some army units
and fearful of reprisals from its enemies, now is
confronted with what may be the beginning of a
terrorist campaign in the capital.
Four bomb explosions in Addis Ababa dur-
ing the past week prompted the council to tighten
security and alert its forces to expect terrorist
at.acks by the separatist Eritrean Liberation
Front. Publicly, the council blamed the bombings
on relatives and supporters of the 59 former offi-
cials executed in the bloodbath of November 23.
Early thi, week, the council announced the arrest
of an additional 17 persons. Most of them were
associates of old regime officials or of former
council chairman Aman, who was :tilled resisting
arrest on November 23. Many suspected Eritrean
Front sympathizers in the capital have probably
also been arrested.
Last week, the council chose Brigadier Gen-
eral Teferi Benti as its new chairman, but he is
likely to be little more than a figurehead. At this
time, it is still unclear who, the dominant figures
on the council are. Major Mengistu Hailemariam,
the first vice chairman and a member of the
important Amhara tribe, wields considerable in-
fluence, but apparently does not control the
group. He seems to have little standing among the
military as a whole.
The council continues to be rent by complex
divisions based on military rank, tribal affiliation,
and rivalry between graduates of Ethiopia's elite
military academy and of a less prestigious officer
training school. Council members appear united,
however, in no longer considering themselves
mere reF,.esentatives of the units that selected
them last summer. Major Mengistu, for example,
is reported to have defied an order to return and
explain his recent actions to his former parent
unit.
Opposition to the council's increasingly
authoritarian rule is widespread within the mili-
tary, but it still lacks leadership, organization, and
purpose. Opposition factions are beginning to
form, however, drawing their membership mainly
from the ranks of younger officers. Previously,
only general officers and senior officials felt di-
rectly threatened by the revolution. The possi-
bility of further excesses by the council is appar
ently encouraging the younger officers to work
toward gaining control of the armed forces.
The outcome of the efforts of these opposi-
tionists is uncertain. If they can gain enough
support among armed forces units in Addis
Ababa, they may well seek an armed showdown
with the council and its supporters. Alternately,
they may try to undercut the council through a
political action program designed to get impor-
tant military units to withdraw their support.
The attitudes of two major units outside
Addis Ababa-the Second Division in the north
combating the Eritrean insurgents and the Third
Division in the east facing Somalia-will be impor-
tant in any attempt to oust the council. They are
known to resent- being excluded from the
council's decision making. Although their reluc-
tance to leave their sectors unguarded reduces
their ability to directly influence events in the
distant capital, a declaration by these units that
they no longer supported the council would
strengthen the hand of opposition groups nearer
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Shah of India (1) and Naik of Pakistan
The commerce secretaries sign
INDIA-PAKISTAN: ANOTHER AGREEMENT
India and Pakistan agreed last week to re-
store trade links, broken since their war in 1965.
Although trade between the two countries will
probably be modest, its resumption is an impor-
tant step toward normalizing relations.
Funccr discussions are to be held early in
January to conclude a formal trade pact covering
specific commodities. The agreement last week
listed a number of possible items for trade, such
as Pakistani cotton and rice and Indian jute
products, manufactured goods, and iron ore. At
present, the Indians seem interested in purchasing
surplus Pakistani cotton, but for the most part
neither country appears able to offer large quan-
tities of goods needed by the other. Prior to
1965, commerce between the two made up only a
small fraction of their foreign trade and was
primarily between India and Ease Pakistan, now
Bangladesh.
According to the agreement, trade will be
conducted on a most-favored-nation basis, with
payments to be made in hard currency. Initially,
it will be conducted only at the government-to-
government level.
The agreement is the latest in a series of
accords reached by India and Pakistan under the
Simla Agreement of 1972, in which they resolved
to settle their differences peacefully through
bilateral negotiation. Although the two countries
remain wary of each other and differ strongly on
a variety of issues, they have managed to nego-
tiate settlements of many of the problems left
over from their 1965 and 1971 wars.
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In 1972 and 1973, India and Pakistan
agreed to withdraw troops from each other's ter-
ritory and to exchange prisoners of war and
stranded civilian minorities. This fall they re-
stored telecommunications and postal links,
establisher1 a liberalized visa system, and began
discussions aimed at restoring air links and over-
flights. The two sides are meeting this month to
discuss resumption of shipping links, and they
may hold talks early next year on restoration of
rail traffic.
The agreement to resume trade could pave
the way for talks on re-establishing diplomatic
relations, broken at the time of the 1971 war.
Pakistan has favored an early restoration of diplo-
ti
ma
c ties, but India ha:; held that significant
SOUTH ASIA: GRAIN SITUATION
The four major grain importing countries of
South Asia-India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka-face at least another year of serious short-
ages. These countries have arranged for imports of
:about 9 million tons of grain in fiscal 1975, and
they will probably seek at east an additional 2
million tons. Practically all of the grain supplies in
fiscal 1975 will be consumed, leaving little to
rebuild depleted stocks. Crops in all four coun-
tries will be extremely vulnerable to adverse
weather during the first half of 1975.
India-The major grain harvest-normally two
thirds of annual grain product on-is now t,nder
way. Because the summer rains were below
normal, a harvest of 58-60 million tons is pro-
jected for the current crop yea-, compared with
67 million tons last year. New Delhi has already
arranged grain imports of 6 million tons for fiscal
1975 and is expected to seek another million tons
or more.. These imports should be sufficient to
maintain government distribution in urban areas,
but grain reserves will be almost completely
depleted.
Even with favorable weather, 'ndia will need
further grain imports early in fiscal 1976.
Requirements could increase sharply if poor
weather again hurts the winter grain crops -
harvested in April and May-as it did last year.
Fertilizer consumption, which proved to be a key
element in raising grain output in the last decade,
is expected to remain at about the level of the
past two years,
Bangladesh-The major rice harvest row under
way normally provides 60 percent of annual grain
production. Because of beneficial rains last sum-
mer, this harvest is estimated at 7 million tons,
slightly above the 6.8 millior tons of last year.
Bangladesh depends on annual grain imports of
about 2 million tons, largely for urban distribu-
tion. Dacca has already arranged for 1.4 million
tons of imports for fiscal 1975, but acquisition of
the balance is contingent on additional foreign
aid. 25X1
25X1
Pakistan-While the current rice and coarse grain
harvest-30 percent of annual grain production-is
down slightly from last year because of a poor
summer monsoon, rice exports of nearly 500,000
tons probably will be maintained. Concern is
being voiced over water supplies for irrigation of
the winter wheat crop, harvested in April and
May, because rivers and reservoirs are far below
normal for this season. Favorable rains between
now and February could alleviate this situation,
but Islamabad, anticipating difficulties, recently
raised its fiscal 1975 wheat import requirement
from 1.14 million to 1.5 million tons in hopes of
securing additional aid. Pakistan has arranged
650,000 tons of wheat imports for fiscal 1975.
Aid and commercial purchases will probably total
about 1.2 million tons-short of government
targets but adequate for fiscal 1975 needs.
Sri Lanka--The major rice harvest-two thirds of
annual grain production-begins in February and
is dependent on rains from the northeast monsoon
during N ovember-February. The government
hopes for a repeat of the record harvest of last
year-75,000 tons-which would permit 1975
grain imports to be reduced by 100,000 tons
from the 850,000 tons of 1974. Colombo so far
has arran e r 1975
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25X1
himself. It is not clear whether he will serve a full
three year term as party president or act as a
caretaker until the party convention next July. As
the first minor-faction leader to head the party,
his personal power base is relatively weak. Much
will depend on whether Miki is able to restore
public confidence in the Liberal Democrats and
halt erosion of the party's electoral base. Miki will
try to regain public trust by reforming the party--
reducing its dependence on financial contribu-
tions from big business, picking the party presi-
dent in a way that lessens the importance of party
factions, and building a stronger grass-roots orga-
nizitinn. In view of powerful entrenched interests
in the party it is questionable whether Miki will
soon be able to proceed along such a course-and,
even if he does, whether party reform will lead to
quick electoral gains. Should the party fare
poorly in a series of important local elections
next spring, disaffection with Miki could set in
rapidly, both within and outside the party.
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Takeo Miki will be named prime minister
when the Diet convenes on December 9, after
having been chosen to succeed Kakuei Tanaka as
president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
earlier this week.
Miki emerged as the party's new leader when
it became apparent that a showdown between the
two principal contenders-Masayoshi Ohira and
Takeo Fukuda-might split the party. Even so, his
selection came as a surprise; as one of Tanaka's
strongest critics, he was considered too contro-
versial to be a compromise candidate. Tanaka,
how-'ver, apparently acquiesced in order to kill
th, .nances of Fukuda, a more potent rival over
Ine years. Miki's reformist image commended him
to party elders anxious to counter the corruption
charges that forced Tanaka's resignation early last
week. Indeed, the press and public have reacted
favorably to the choice.
A career politician for the past 37 years,
Miki was instrumental in the formation of the
Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. He has held a
variety of party and ministerial positions, but was
repeatedly passed over for the top leadership posi-
tion. As a result, he gradually assumed the role of
party critic and gadfly. Socially and financially
tied to the Japanese elite, Miki is nevertheless
identified as a "progressive," more concerned
with social welfare and environmental problems
than with safeguarding the interests of big
business.
The national policies of a Miki administra-
tion, however, are unlikely to take significant new
directions. The twin pressures of inflation and
recession in Japan provide little leeway for
domestic experiments. In the past, Miki has
advocated a more "independent" foreign policy.
Whatever this may entail in practice, he will un-
doubtedly proniotc better relations with China
while continuing basic cooperation with the US
based on the Mutual Security Treaty.
One uncertainty is whether his cabinet will
have the political resolve to make tough policy
decisions. Another is the staying powrr,; of Miki
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25X1 25X1
CALLING FOR INCREASED FIGHTING
g - eve ie
ong instructions calling for widespread fightin
to begin as early as this month. The fighting
would be aimed primarily at disrupting Sdigon's
pacification effort and inflicting heavy losses on
government forces.
These instructions appear to prescribe a level
of fighting below that of the 1972 offensive.
They suggest, however, that the Communists may
be prepared to commit the forces and firepower
already in the South more fully than they did
during he fighting ;ast summer in the hope of
achieving some quick and dramatic victories.
Specifically, the inscructions call for "intense"
fighting in central South Vietnam and the com-
mitment of all Communist units in Military
Region 3 to offensive action in the provinces
around Saigon.
LE DUC THO SEEKS SUPPORT IN PARIS
While Communist military forces continue
to prepare for a new round of fighting in the
South, a North Vietnamese delegation led by
Politburo member Le Duc Tho has wound up a
ten-day visit to France. During his stay, Tho met
with various French leftist groups and French
Communist officials. On November 27, he held a
press conference in which he repeated recent
Communist denunciations of the Saigon govern-
ment and the US for their failure to implement
the 1973 Paris Accords. While in France, Tho also
reportedly planned to meet with a group of
potential Vietnamese "Third Force" leaders. 25X1
Analysis of Tho's statements in France and
Hanoi's commentary on his mission suggests that
he also hoped to use his trip to mobilize Western
public opinion and the overseas Vietnamese
community behind Hanoi's current propaganda
campaign demanding President Thieu's ouster
before the Paris agreement can be implemented.
In hi3 public statements, Tho not only praised
anti-Thieu opposition elements in the South, but
repeatedly called on the French people and the
overseas Vietnamese for "more active" support of
the Communists' struggle to force Saigon's "cor-
rect" implementation of the 1973 accords.
Privately, he is reported to have expressed con-
fidence that it is just a matter of time before
President Thieu is forced to leave office and is
replaced by a more "democratic" successor
willing to make political concessions to the
Communists.
25X1 25X1
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Trying to Maintain Momentum
Government leaders in Phnom Penh have
welcomed the close but favorable vote at the UN
with a mixture of pleasure and relief, and have
used the occasion to renew their bid for peace
negotiations. In an address late last week, Presi-
dent Lon Nol stressed that the General Assem-
bly's ratification of the Asian-initiated resolution
was, above all, a call for peace talks, and lie
reaffirmed his governor' nt's offer to negotiate
without preconditions. Lon Nol also voiced hope
that the UN would carry out its new mandate to
play an active role in promoting a peaceful settle-
ment, sentiments he repeated in a personal letter
to UN Secretary General Waldheim.
The other side's reaction has been swi t and
negative. In a statement issued in Peking on
November 28, Sihanouk denounced the UN ac-
tion and firmly rejected any possibility of nego-
tiations "even under UN auspices." The Khmer
Communist news agency followed with a state-
ment that took oblique note of the UN vote and
reiterated the Communists' refusal to "negotiate
or compromise." Peking and Hanoi supported the
insurgents' position with strongly worded news-
paper editorials.
Corn nunists Stress Economics
This new evidence of Communist intran-
sigence toward a negotiated settlement is in line
with other signs that the insurgents are digging in
for the long haul. For the f, J six weeks, a Khmer
Communist "economic and financial" delegation
headed by "special adviser" leng Sary-whose
innocuous title belies his standing in the Com-
munist hierarchy-has been touring Asian Com-
munist countries with the apparent aim of lining
up nonmilitary aid for the insurgency. Although
no new aid agreements have been announced
leiG, Sary 11) meeting with Le Duan
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from Hanoi or Peking-where the delegation has
spent most of its time-Sary appears to have had
some success, mo.,t probably in obtaining tech-
nical assistance to exploit rubber-20,000 tons
after processing last year-still produced in the
Communist zone of Cambodia.
Sary's delegation is the first of its kind, and
its mission coincides with a noticeable shift of
stress in Communist propaganda from military to
econornic matters. Taken as a whole, these de-
velopments suggest the Khmer Communist leader-
ship has concluded that prospects for a military
victory in the near term have diminished con-
-iderably and that emphasis must now be placed
on building an econornic base within the country
to help sustain the insur he long term.
25X1
LAOS: DISCUSSING STRATEGY
The tempo of political activity quickened
late this week as both the coalition cabinet and its
advisory council met in the royal capital of Luang
Prabang. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma inter-
rupted his convalescence to chair the cabinet
meeting-his first appearance on the political
firing line since suffering a serious heart attack
last July. Souvanna's half-brother, Lao Commu-
nist leader Souphanouvong, presided over the
council, which will remain in plenary session for
the next month.
Both conclaves came on the heels or an
extraordinary two-week conference of the Lao
Communist Central Committee at Pathet Lao
headquarters in Sam Neua, which was almost cer-
tainly called in part at least to chart Communist
political strategy for the coming months. Al-
though the results of the Sam Neua gathering are
still unclear, its importance was underscored by
the fact that neither Deputy Prime Minister
Phoumi Vongvichit nor Souphanouvong was able
to break away to meet in Vientiane with a high-
level Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Foreign
Minister Firyubin; Moscow subsequently post-
poned the visit indefinitely.
There has been considerable speculation in
Vientiane about the Sam Neua conclave. Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma and non-Communist
Finance Minister Ngon Sananikone have theo-
rized, for example, that the meeting may have
been convened to resolve serious policy differ-
ences between so-called coalition "moderates"
like Phoumi and Souphanouvong and the ardent,
hard-ccr- revolution:,ries who remain behind in
Sam Neua. The latter, according to Ngon, are
wedded to the concept of an all-Indochina Com-
munist Party that must remain vigilant and belli-
cose until the conflicts in Cambodia and Vietnam
have been resolved. Phoumi and Souphanouvong,
on the other hand, are-in Ngon's view-national-
ists who believe that with the establishment of
the coalition government, the Pathet Lao should
work toward national reunification and not con-
cern themselves '?,'ith the problems of other Indo-
chinese states.
25X1 25X1
For its part, the US embassy in Vientiane
has speculated that in addition to ironing out
possible disagreements within the Lao Communist
leadership itself, the conference may have been
There are several possible areas of disagree..
ment between the North Vietnamese and the
Pathet Lao. Hanoi might be displeased with the
Lao Communists' lack of success in securing coali-
tion government recognition of the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government and, possi-
bly, Sihanouk's government as well. Hanoi ;night
also be pressing the Pathet _ao to take a mi:ch
harder line on the presence - f US bases in Thai-
land and to link any improvement in Lao-Thai
relations to further reductions in American force
levels and aerial reconnaissance activity.
It is possible that the Sam Neua conferees
focused primarily on internal political problems
facing the coalition government, particularly
Prime Minister Souvanna's health and the ques-
tion of succe~:;uii. The problem of refugee reset-
tlement, which will shortly be considered by the
liti
'
coa
on
s Joint Central Commission, may also
25X1
25X1
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The Colombian Congress is continuing to
review the anti-inflation measures decreed by
President Lopez in September and October, while
violent demonstrations against the measures per-
sist in many parts of the country. Lopez has
placed several cities and towns under modified
martial law, and troops have been called in to
help police quell demonstrations elsewhere.
The President has quietly abandoned the
campaign of television appearances that he and
members of his cabinet were making to rally
public support for his economic moves. There has
been little action on the congress'tnnal review as
the legislators keep an eye on public opinion and
the political barometer.
Thus far, Lopez has not wavered from the
stringent economic program his decrees outline,
although the unexpected tension engendered by
the decrees is likely to produce some accommoda-
tion eventually. The President has remained
adamant in the apparent hope that an early turn-
around in cost-of-living statistics would vindicate
his program. The effect of his economic measures,
however, will be felt only in the longer term.
If the combined weight of tha demonstra-
tions and the unsavory image of martial law be-
comes a significant factor in the congressional
review process, Lopez can be expected to change
his tack. He can most easily do this without losing
face by throwing his economic team to the wolves
and negotiating with Congress for changes in his
decrees.
A far less likely option would be to declare
another state of economic emergency and bypass
Congress again. In fact, Lopez has asked Congress
for additional emergency powers, but this is a
marked departure from his earlier use of such
powers without even token congressional
authority.
Police move in on demonstrators with tear gas
In the midst of this gathering economic and
political storm, Lopez mounted a low-key cele-
bration of his first 100 days. Speaking to Con-
gress and the nation late last month, he was able
to point out the considerable forward movement
his administration has already made in such areas
as women's rights, labor relations, and student
affairs. Nevertheless, these salutary aspects remain
in the shadow of his economic programs, whose
positive values are largely invisible to most
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MEXICO
BREAKING WITH CHILE...
The Echeverria administration has said little
to explain why it curtly severed diplomatic rela-
tions with Chile last week. Foreign Secretary
Rabasa noted to the press that sometimes reasons
for foreign policy decisions are "never stated"-a
strong hint that the actual causes of the break
may never be revealed.
Some officials in the Mexico City diplomatic
community believe that the sudden action may
lead to a feeling in other countries that Mexico
acts irrationally. Reaction in the hemisphere has
so far been muted, however. The conservative,
military-dominated regimes of Brazil, Paraguay,
Bolivia, and Uruguay are likely tc be the most
annoyed at Mexico.
Even Chilean officials profess to have no
clue as to why the decision came at this time. The
two countries, however, have been sniping at each
other since the overthrow of President Allende in
September 1973. Mexico withdrew its ambas-
sador in April 1974. President Echeverria, who
was friendly with Allende, has been decidedly
cold toward the Pinochet government, but there
was no outward sign of any recent incident that
might have precipitated the break.
Defending the decision, Rabasa said only
that it was not capricious, but came after months
of observing the Chilean situation. He noted that
Mexico had felt it necessary to keep its Santiago
embassy open to receive refugees. Since the coup,
Mexico has accepted nearly 700 Chileans who
wished to leave their country. The Mexicans now
may have concluded that the junta government
was not going to release more Chileans, including
two whom the Mexicans especially wanted freed-
Allende's foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda,
and his sister, Laura-and that it was high time to
sever relations.
gained power through foreign intervention
Some speculation, originated by a right-
wing, sensationalist newspaper in Santiago, cen-
ters on a Mexican scheme to sponsor and then
recognize a "Chilean government in exile" com-
posed of figures from the Allende era. Many
Chileans, especially those with technical skills
have been given government jobs in Mexico, but
the Mexican government has kept a close watch
on their outside activities. They have reportedly
been warned to stay out of politics. Only a few
exceptions to this rule have been made-Allende's
widow, for one, has been given a loose rein to
express her views.
25X1
Other press reports link the break to alleged
CIA involvement in Allende's overthrow. They
suggest Mexico reached the conclusion that the
Chilean military junta was illegal because it had
believed were insults directed at him by Chilear25X1
officials in Rome while he was attending the
recent World Food Conference. In addition, more
than one local observer, according to the US
embassy, has commented on the possible role
25X1
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played by Mrs. Echeverria, who is widely con-
sidered to be on very friendly terms with Chilean
exiles and Cubans.
Less than a week after the break with Chile,
security officials announced the death of Lucio
Cabanas-Mexico's premier rural guerrilla leader-
and some 20 of his followers in a skirmish with
army troops. Cabanas had eluded authorities for
years but the army began to close in after he
kidnaped a well-known senator last May. The
senator was freed during a gun hattle in
September.
Many peasants in the southwestern state of
Guerrero, Cabanas' area of operation, sympa-
thized with him.
Cabanas' death
will be a severe blow to his arty of the Poor,"
but bitterness over harsh treatment by the army is
likely to linger for some time, and new guerrilla
and bandit leaders will probably attempt to take
up where Cabanas left off. Cabanas' second-in-
command remains alive and commands a guerrilla
band somewhere in the wilds of Hidalgo and
Veracruz states.
Relations between Chile's military govern-
ment and the Christian Democratic Party again
neared a breakdown last week and continue tense.
The government and the party have been close to
a break before, but former president Frei's direct
involvement in the latest dispute has made it the
most serious.
The controversy began on November 26,
when left-wing party leader Renan Fuentealba
was expelled from the country for violating the
ban on political activity. Frei's signature topped
the roster of Christian Democratic luminaries
from across the party's ideological spectrum who
protested the expulsion in a strongly worded
public statement.
The government respinded by declaring that
Fuentealba's statements on human rights to a
foreign news service constituted a "lack of pa-
triotism" that placed him "beyond the limits the
government can reasonably tolerate." The gov-
ernment was clearly in no mood to listen to
criticism. One official spokesman reminded
"politicians" that they were dealing with "an
authoritarian government that will impose its
authority even if it has to be harsh and ruthless,"
and Junta President Pinochet declared that "this
government is strong and will make itself
respected."
There have been no further moves by either
side since the government's verbal blasts, but this
may be only a lull before the storm. Some within
the government, especially right-wing civilian
advisers w'io would like to see a split between the
armed fo~'ces and the Christian Democrats, prob- 75X1
ably :,,; pushing for vigorous action, such as out-25X1
lawing the party. Cooler heads have prevailed in 25X1
the past, but Fre;'s participation has given the
party's protest are aura of direct challenge that
comes at a particularly inopportune moment.
Recent international criticism and unfavorable
events, such as Mexico's severing of relations,25X1
have bred a siege mentality in Chile's military
leaders. They may be sorely tempted to strike
back at any critics within reach.
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BRAZIL: THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
The electoral victory of the opposition
Brazilian Democratic Movement marks a percep-
tible turning point in the development of the
post-1964 military governments. By encouraging
open campaigning and abiding by the results of
the election, President Geisel has reaffirmed his
commitment to a legalist-if not classically lib-
eral-approach to government. In the process, the
military-backed "revolution" has displayed a new
degree of matur%f?,.1 and self-confidence by resist-
ing the tendency to allow security concerns to
influence the conduct of the election.
By presiding over a freewheeling election,
Geisel has taken a significant step in his policy of
gradually opening the political system. Right-wing
military pressures, however, continue to be a
potentially inhibiting factor. The opposition
party's attitude and behavior, therefore, will have
much to do with how much conservative pressure
is brought to bear on Geisel when the legislative
saason opens next March.
Thus, opposition leaders continue to stress
their desire to play a constructive, rather than a
"negativist," role. Clearly, they seek to vindicate
Geisel, whose policies allowed them to contest
the elections seriously, and to deny ultra-cooser-
vatives any pretext whatsoever for opposing the
election results. The party leaders also intend
their remarks as guidance-if not a warning-for
potentially outspoken members of their own
party. Exultant, vindictive outbursts could prove
counterproductive. The call for moderation also
stems from the realization that a good many votes
cast for the opposition represent not so much an
endorsement of the party itself as a protest
against economic conditions and government
policies.
Nevertheless, the enlarged representation of
the opposition party increases the prospects for
more substantive debate it congress and state
assemblies. Legislators chosen at least partly in an
expression of economic discontent can be ex-
pected to focus their attention on government
policies in this area. Indeed, party leader Franco
Montoro has indicated that "shadow cabinets"
will be set up to monitor federal and state govern-
ment performance. The party could also follow
up on another of its effective campaign issues, the
need for greater scrutiny of multi-national firms.
In those state legislatures it now controls, the
party may attempt to bargain with the federal
government by offering to help rather than hinder
the work of the state governors, who are, in
effect, chosen by the President.
In the final analysis, the regime has all the
power it needs to ignore or even suppress the
legislatures, if it should choose to do so. The price
in public resentment would be high, however,
now that the election results Ilowed +^
stand. 25X1
LATIN AMERICA: MEETING AT AYACUCHO
Five chief executives and numerous lower
ranking officials from hemisphere countries begin
a four-day meeting in Lima on December 6 to
commemorate the sesquicentennial of Simon
Bolivar's defeat of the Spaniards at Ayacucho.
The heads of state of Bolivia, Chile, and Ven-
ezuela, along with Panamanian strong man Tor-
rijos, are scheduled to join Peruvian President
Velasco for a discussion of regional problems. The
presidents of Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador
will send representatives to the meeting.
While Chile reportedly has lobbied against
formal consideration of political problems. at the
meeting, preferring instead to limit activity to
protocol and historical discussion, the partici-
pants are likely to debate a variety of general
topics, such as:
? Bolivia's desire to regain access to the
sea;
? a regional arms moratorium;
? structured regional economic coop-
eration;
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? alleged "economic" aggression;
? interference in th^ir countries' internal
affairs by other governr,,ents.
I n addition, the question of Cuba's inter-
American role is almost certain to crop up in a
variety of circumstances.
President Velasco would like to use the
meeting as a forum to boost his prestige both
domestically and in tl:e hemisphere. The luster of
the gathering already has been dimmed some-
what, however, as a result of the Argentine, Co-
lombian, and Ecuadorean presidents' decisions
not to attend. In addition, the current restive
atmosphere in Peruvian domestic politics is likely
to detract from the statesmanship of the meeting.
Political unrest and terrorist activity in Lima
probably influenced the three leaders who de-
cided not to attend.
The Peruvian government is concerned about
violence during the meeting. Such activity would
come from civilian middle-class dissidents and dis-
gruntled navy officers as part of an effort to
embarrass and weaken President Velasco. Anti-
Chilean leftists might also protest the presence of
Junta President Pinochet. Security during the
conference will be tight, but terrorism remains a
distinct possibility.
The recent charges of CIA interference in
Peru may be raised during the meeting, particu-
larly if the Peruvians need a pretext to seize the
limelight. The presence of US Assistant Secretary
of State Rogers, however, may help to temper the
rhetoric on this issue.
The meeting will also afford Velasco an
opportunity to discuss bilateral problems face-to-
face with Chilean General Pinochet. While no
solutions are expected, the meeting of these two
men is likely to help ease tensions for the time
being.
Venezuelan President Perez' attendance will
complicate Velasco's effort to emerge as a leading
spokesman for hemispheric affairs, since both
presidents view themselves as leaders in this area.
President Perez would .: -e to use the Lima gather-
ing to build support for the planned meeting of
all Latin American presidents next year in ('ara-
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