WEEKLY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070033-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 29, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Weekly Review
Top Secret
Copy
N2 649
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, repor is and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. it
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic;
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring mole comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
carrtents.
CONTENTS (November29, 19/4)
I Breaking the ice at Vladivostok
2 Ethiopia: The Blood Flows
MIDGL_E EAST
A!-RICA
8
9
10
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
13
14
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
19
20
21
22
Palestinians: After the Vote
Angola: Competition Growing
Iran-USSR: Frank Talk in Moscow
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Vietnam: Le Duc Tho; Thieu's Men
Laos: Storm Warning; Subside
Iceland: Another Fishing Dispute
EC-Ar? b Dialogue Stalled
World Food Conference Concludes
RYAD Computer Production Lays
Soviet Military: Forbats
Romania: On a Noie of Defiance
23 Argentina: The Government Scores
24 Mexico: Listening to the Public
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Hreaking the ,ice at lIfaditiostok
Moscow is obviously pleased with the
Vladivostok summit. General Secretary Brezhnev,
delivering a speech on November 26 in Mongolia,
characterized his first meeting with President
Ford as confirming and reinforcing the trend
towarc: improved Soviet-American relations. He
referred specifically to a "considerable step for-
ward" in the quest for curbing and reducing
nuclear arms, and, in an unusually explicit com-
mitment, stated that he and the President had
agreed to conclude an arms limitation pact in
coming months.
Not surprisingly, Soviet and East European
media have echoed Brezhnev's high praise for the
summit and have implied that the two leaders got
along well personally. Pravda on November 25 ran
the joint communique on the front page and also
carried the US-Soviet statement on strategic arms
limitation.. Another mass-circulation daily,
Sovetskaya Rossiya, sr.id them had been "great
progress" toward a new arms control agreement,
adding that cooperation has become the political
norm between the two states. On Wednesday,
President Ford's "thank you" message to Brezh-
nev for playing host at the summit was front page
news in the Soviet Union. Several comment,+ors
stressed the value of summit-level meetings; one
desci ibed such personal contacts as essential to
detente.
Moscow has publicized heavily the favorable
reaction to the meeting, both domestic and for-
eign, including US media articles, especially those
on the significance of the SALT elements. This
positive coverage was tempered by only
occasional references to obstacles still to be over-
come before detente becomes irreversible. Most
of these zeroed in on the efforts of "certain
circles" in the US to block normalization of com-
mercial relations.
There has been no public discussion by the
Soviets of the details of the SALT understanding
nor any hint of misgiving over the terms of the
accord. These could surface later, however. A
persistent theme of earlier Soviet articles on
SALT, althogh less in evidence recently, was
that US "forward-based systems" and other
asymmetries must be taken into account to
ensure "equal security."
During his address in Mongolia, Brezhnev
made a point of mentioning the participation of
the US and Sovie' foreign ministers in the
Vladivostok deliberations. His reference to
Gromyko, a fellow Politburo member, may have
been a way of sharing some of the responsibility
as well as the credit for the Vladivostok deci-
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Ethiopia: The Blood Flows
in a sudden and bloody climax to the con-
flict that had developed between the ruling mili-
tary council and General Aman, the head of the
provisional government, the council last weekend
shot Aman along with 59 military officers and
former high civilian officials who had been in
detention for several months. This extreme
action, which seems sure to have far-reaching
repercussions, came after the council had con-
cluded that Aman was bent on challenging its
authority and becoming Ethiopia's strong man.
The council has announced that the remain-
ing former officials being detained on charges of
corruption, maladministration, and counter-
revolutionary activity will be tried shortly by
military tribunal; many of these may also be
executed. Nothing has been said officially about
former emperor Haile Selassie, but his life is
almost certainly in jeopardy.
No one has been named yet to replace
Aman. His removal leaves Major Mengistu, who
last week was appointed first vice chairman of the
council, the ranking government official. The
council has said, however, that the new head of
government will come from outside its ranks.
The council's differences with Aman came
to a head last week over his refusal to go along
with a council decision to send army reinforce-
ments to Eritrea Province to begin an offensive
against insurgents of the Eritrean Liberation
Front. On November 22, the council placed
Aman under house arrest; the next day, his
removal as head of government was announced.
Within hours, Aman was dead. The council
announced on November 24 that he had been
executed along with the 59 detainees, but later
acknowledged he had died in a shoot-out at his
house.
The other victims were killed, reportedly in
groups of 20, in a courtyard of a prison in Addis
Ababa. The bloodbath was apparently intended in
part to cow military supporters of the popular
Aman and in part to counterbalance his removal
with a dramatic action against the discredited
luminaries of the Haile Selassie era. The decision
to move against Aman and carry out the mass
executions appears to have had broad support
within the council, although previously only a
minority of the -nembers had favored such sum-
mary treatment of leaders of the old regime.
A serious split, however, may be developing
between the council and some military units in
the field. The units were not consulted about the
executions, and some had already been complain-
ing about being left out of decision making. The
units may demand that they be allowed to send
new representatives to replace those now serving
on the council-a move that the present council
members will probably resist.
The executions mark an abrupt change from
the military's previous policy of avoiding blood-
shed, and most Ethiopians will probably conclude
that the revolution has entered a new phase. The
arbitrary nature of the killings and the council's
refusal to allow relatives to claim the bodies have
probably alienated some segments of the popula-
tion that until now had generally supported the
council.
There is particular uneasiness in Asmara, the
capital of Eritrea, over the council's decision to
send additional forces there. The Eritreans believe
the council will follow the execution of Amen, an
Eritrean who favored a peaceful solution to the
insurgency, with the imposition of tighter con-
trols over the province.
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JORDAN: NEW CABINET
Late last week, King Husayn acted on his
intention to reorganize his government. The
King's rre ve came in reaction to the decision of
the recent Arab summit confer' nce to back the
claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization to
the Israeli-occupied West Bank territory. In a
message to Zayd Rifai, who was reappointed
prime minister, the King indicated that hence-
forth greater emphasis would be placed on East
Bank concerns. At the same time, however, he
attempted to reassure the local Palestinian com-
munity that it will receive fair treatment.
On November 23, Husayn dissolved parlia-
ment, appointed a new cabinet, and accepted the
resignations of a number of major palace advisers.
A principal immediate effect was a significant
reduction in Palestinian participation in Jordan's
government with the number of Palestinians in
the cabinet dropping to four from ten. The new
cabinet is largely a mixture of technicians with a
reputation for efficiency and of traditional East
Bank personalities; an exception is the minister of
information and culture, Salah Abu Zayd, a long-
time adviser to the King who is expected to play
an important role in the formulation of foreign
policy. Husayn also apparently made a conscious
effort to achieve regional balance: four ministers
each are from the northern, southern, and central
sectors of the East Bank, and four are from the
West Bank.
The replacement of five powerful palace
advisers-including Bahjat Talhuni, the chief of
the King's personal secretariat, and Abd-al-Munim
Rifai, the King's aide for international affairs-is
apparently Husayn's response to continued pres-
sures from hard-line East Bankers to "clean out"
the unpopular palace crowd who have been the
object of public criticism for corruption or bad
policy advice to the King on the West Bank issue.
The appointment of Mudhar Badran, an East
Bank conservative, as chief of the secretariat wii!
give the palace staff a decidedly more tradi-
tionalist character. 25X1
Prior to the announcement of the new gov-
ernment, reports were circulating that the King
would choose his uncle, Sharif Husayn, to be
prime minister. Widespread criticism of the
anticipated choice-Sharif Husayn is both ailing
and ineffectual--apparertly persuaded the King to
change his mind and reappoint Rifai. Rifai's
retention is sure to displease East Bank conserva-
tives for whom he has become a symbol of both
corruption and neglect of East Bank interests.
The Palestinian community, on the other hand, is
likely to be reassured by the reappointment of
Rifai, who can be expected to move slowly in
making domestic changes. Despite the King's
assurances of moderation, the Palestinians have
been apprehensive about their status following
the Rabat conference.
Husayn and Rifai
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PALESTINIANS: AFTER THE VOTE
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman
Yasir Arafat is striving, in a flurry of diplomatic
activity since his recent appearance before the UN
General Assembly, to maintain what he sees as
steadily building momentum toward wider inter-
national recognition of the PLO. His trip to the
USSR this week follows visits to Cuba and seven
Arab states. He will probably make at least one
stop in Eastern Europe before returning to the
Middle East.
In Moscow, Arafat is almost certainly seek-
ing to temper the Soviets' cool reaction to his UN
speech as well as to elicit more vigorous backing
for Palestinian political goals. He wants an
unqualified statement of Soviet support for he
PLO as the sole 'epresentative of the Palestinidns
and a reaffirmation of the Soviet position that the
PLO should participate as an equal partner in any
future peace negotiations.
The Soviets, who are trying hard to carve
out a direct role for themselves in Middle East
diplomacy, undoubtedly welcome Arafat's visit.
Moscow seems likely to offer more explicit recog-
nition to the PLO than it has in the past in view
of the backing Arafat and the PLO won at the
Arab summit in Rabat and at the UN. Arafat may
meet publicly for the first time with General
Secretary Brezhnev.
The Soviets, however, will probably stop
short of giving Arafat a full endorsement. They
Will almost certainly caution him against repeat-
ing his more extravagant demands and will con-
tinue to stress their recognition of Israel's right to
exist. The Soviets have publicly sought to dis-
sociate themselves from Arafat's call for a secular
Palestinian state.
Neither Arafat nor representatives of the
Arab states have shown uneasiness over the fact
that support for the Palestine resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly late last week was
confined to the nonaligned bloc and the Cim-
muu;Iist states. PLO spokesmen have said only that
the number of those who abstained or voted "no"
means teat "we must do more to make them
understand our cause."
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The PLO's momentum was threatened last
weekend by the hijacking in Dubai of a British
Airways airliner. Prompt condemnation of the
incident by Arafat, however, minimized the
repercussions for the PLO, which has a policy of
condemning international terrorism while con-
doning or approving strikes directly at Israel. The
hijacking-carried out by Palestinian radicals who
in the past have operated from Libya and Iraq-
was the first directed against an Arab state other
than Jordan. It was immediately condemned by
virtually all Arab governments, including Libya
and Iraq.
The ultimate fate of the hijackers is un-
settled. The PLO, the Tunisian government, and
the other Arabs, for the moment, are all claiming
that the hijackers should be forced to "pay the
price,` although none will be eager to shoulder
responsibility for exacting that price.
25X1
Angola's three liberation groups, whose
rivalry has stymied progress toward decolc-iiza-
tion, are each attempting to improve their mili-
tary and political positions inside the territory.
Their efforts are likely to increase suspicions and
could lead to violent clashes.
The Zairian-based National Front for the
Li ,eration of Angola is taking the lead. The Front
is believed to have over 2U lightly armed troops
in the city of Luanda md another 2,000 or so in
the countryside. Some of these troops were in
Angola before the coup in Portugal last April;
others, along with political organizers, have been
brought in ovar the past few months with the
help of the Zai' ian government. During the recent
outbreak of vioience in Luanda, the Front helpod
local Portuguese forces restore order. Although it
was rebuffed in its attempt to assume a major
security role, the Front has continued to publi-
cize its willingness to assist in the maintenance of
order.
The Front's chief rival, the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola, has few troops
inside Angola. The Movement's president, Agos-
tinho Neto, still faces a stiff challenge to his
leadership from a rebellious faction v.;thirn. the
organization. This faction reportedly intends to
move its own troops ;nto Angola from camps in
Zambia. Neto seems, nevertheless, to enjoy strong
support in Luanda. Clashes between his sup-
porters and members of the Front accounted for
a large part of the recent disturbances.
The smallest of the three insurgent groups,
the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, shares with the Front the advantage of
operating from long-established bases inside
Angola. It has not, however, been able to match
the strength of its rivals. In order to improve its
position, Union officials have been seeking addi-
tional assistance from Zambia. Uganda, and
China.
Both Front leader Holden Roberto and
Union leader Jonas Savimbi believe that the Por-
tugu'se privately favor the Popular Movement
and that they are working covertly to facilitate a
take-over of Angola by that group. Roberto and
Savimbi also maintain that the Movement, which
has long enjoyed Soviet support, will turn Anqola
into a Communist state.
Last weekend, Savimbi and Roberto dis-
cussed prospects for Angolan decolonization with
President Mobu'cu, who shares their feelings about
Neto and the Movement. They also talked with
Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares, who was
visiting Kinshasa. A press report from Lisbon
early this week stated that Savimbi and Roberto
had signed an agreement to cooperate.
As the rival nationalist groups strengthen
their positions and maneuver against each other,
the likelihood of their resorting to force to settle
their differences will increase. Even now, it is
questionable whether the Portuguese could halt a
military clash between the liberation groups. The
Portuguese already realize that locally recruited
troops cannot be relied on to quell disturbances
involving fellow Africans. As time goes by, troops
from Portugal are also likely to refuse to risk the
dangers of trying to maintain order. F_
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The meetings between Soviet and Iranian
leaders in Moscow last w.:ek led to some frank
talk, but both countries appear satisfied with the
results. In effect, they chose to continue their
cool but correct relationship and to further de-
velop economic cooperation despite their dif-
ferences on some major political issues.
Moscow to back its position on the border
dispute with Tehran and apply pressure on the
Shah to stop supporting the Kurds. In an appar-
ent gesture to assuage Baghdad, Moscow an-
nounced shortly after the Shah's departure that
Brezhnev will visit Iraq as part of his grand tour
of the Middle East next January. Egypt and Syria
are also on the itinerary.
Moscow's close ties with Iraq complicate its
relationsf-ip with Tehran, and this fact was never
ftr from the minds of either the Shah or his
Soviet host,. Moscow made clear that it would be
more comfortable if Iran and Iraq composed their
differences, while the Shah, who apparently
exhibited considerable assertiveness, forcefully
statec his resistance to outside pressures.
Moscow and Tehran reported agreement in
principle on "big cooperation projects." This may
refer to the oft-discussed project to construct a
gas pipeline from Iran through the USSR to West
Germany. The details still need to be ironed out,
however, and will apparently be discussed next
month in Moscow.
The Shah's visit probably did not go down
well in Baghdad, particularly since Iraq wants
Meanwhile, Soviet chief of staff Kulikov
arrived in Iraq on November 27. He apparently
will be followed early next month by Defense
Minister Grechko. The military ieaders pre-
sumably will discuss Moscow's reluctance to meet
all of Baghdad's requests for additional military
supplies, particularly ammunition, and will ex-
amine the war effort a ainst the r fir
hand.
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A North Vietnamese delegation headed by
Politburo member Le Duc Tho arrived in Paris on
November 25 for a ten-day visit at the invitation
of the French Communist Party. Tho's delegation
left Hanoi on November 18 and made a brief
stopover in Peking before heading on to Moscow
and then Par;;. While in Moscow, the North Viet-
namese met with Soviet Politburo member Suslov
and party secretary Katushev. In what appears to
be a routine reaffirmation of Soviet policy,
Moscow pledged to give "all-round and effective
support" to Hanoi's "just struggle."
Le Duc Tho received lower level treatment
from the Chinese during an overnight stop. A
middle echelon member of the Chinese Politburo
held a banquet for Tho and his party, and the
Chinese press barely mentioned the visit. During
his many stopovers in Peking on previous trips to
Paris for the Vietnam peace talks, Tho was
NORTH KOREA: MORE HELICOPTERS
The North Koreans have received addi-
tional MI-4 helicopters, ossibl fro
USSR.
32 o the aircraft at four airfields, an
increase of 12 over the known inventory. The
MI-4s, which carry 16 men each, can be used
for parachute drops of men or supplies, recon-
naissance missions, or in a ground attack role.
The Soviets have previously supplied Pyong-
yang with about a dozen of the larger, 24-man
MI-8 helicopters.
The North Koreans have about three
times as many helicopter pilots as they have
helico ters.
usually received "y Premier Chou En-lai and
senior Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao.
While in Paris, Tho can be expected to meet
with various French Communist and leftist
groups. He probably will use these meetings to
denounce the Saigon government and the US for
failing to implement the 1973 Paris Agreement.
A NEW CABINET IN THE SOUTH
President Thieu has selected replacements
for the four cabinet ministers who resigned last
month, but he is not ready to make the list
public. There have been rumors that more minis-
terial resignations are in the offing, and it is
possible that Thieu may want to complete these
moves before publicly announcin the c(rn
ttion of his new cabinet. 25X1
three of the new ministers come from LOA I
government ranks, and the fourth is a prominent
bank official.
Istration and management.
Replacing the controversial and unpopular
Hoang Duc Nha as minister of information is the
present minister of veterans affairs, Ho Van
Cham, who is in turn being replaced by Ma.")tiy1
General Hoang Van Lac, the deputy comman(25X1
of Military Region 1. Thieu named Le Quang
Truong as minister of finance and Nguyen Van
Diep to the Ministry for Commerce and Industry.
Truong served as secretary general of the Finance
Ministry and Diep was the deputy director of the
Bank of Vietnam. The new minister of agricul-
ture, Nguyen Van Hao, was director of the Na-
tional Economic Development Fund.
Thieu had difficulty finding qualified re-
placements. Several persons, including a leader of
the moderate opposition and a newspaper pub- 25X1
lisher, reportedly turned down cabinet positions.
Although the four new appointments will do little
to appease those in the opposition who have been
calling for major changes in government policy, it
will provide some additional experience within
the cabinet and, overall, should strengthen admin-
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Tensions have apparently eased following
the disturbances in Vientiane last week that
threatened to undermine the fragile stability of
the eight-month-old coalition government. Never-
theless, both the Communists and non-Commu-
nists remain inherently suspicious of each other,
and this will almost certainly complicate Lao ef-
forts to achieve unity and national reconciliation.
The precise reasons for the full-scale alert
last week by military forces on both sides are still
unclear, but there is no evidence of serious coup
plotting by either side. It seems more likely that
the unrest was related to the threat of large-scale
demonstrations by war veterans in Vientiane, and
that both the Communists and the non-Commu-
nists heightened their military posture to deal
with anticipated disorders.
The latest war of nerves in Vientiane was
doubtless exacerbated by the absence of key
political leaders who would have been able to
counsel moderation and restraint. Prince Sou-
phanouvong, Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi
Vongvichit, and other senior Lao Communist
leaders were in Sam Neua for a reported meeting
of the central committee, while non-Communist
Deputy Prime Minister Leuam Insisiengmay and
Defense Minister Sisouk were in Europe. Prime
Minister Souvanna was convalescing in the royal
Lao capital of Luang Prabang, and both sides
were probably reluctant to involve -iim in a terse
c!tuation that might prove detrimental to his
failing health.
Non-Communist politicians have become in-
creasingly frustrated in recent weeks by what
they perceive as a concentrated effort by the
Pathet Lao to subvert student, labor, veteran, civil
servant, and other groups throughout the non-
Communist zone. In their frustration, the non-
Communists are beginning to look on the Royal
Lao Army as the only organized and unified force
on their side L.pable of countering such subver-
sion. The army did in fact move swiftly against its
own veterans, making it unmistakably clear both
to the protest leaders and to the Pathet Lao that
demonstrations by former non-Communist sol-
CHINA: ICBM LAUNCH PREPARATIONS
The Chinese may oon launch their first
.CSS-X-3 ICBM inthreeyears. 25X1
The two-stage CSS-X-3, which has a
range of more than 3,000 nautical miles, has
been launched only four times, but all firings
apparently have been successful. Two
launches were missile tests from the develop-
mental silo at Ching-yu to western China and
the other two were satellite launches from
Shuang-cheng-tzu using the CSL-1, a CSS-X-3
with a small third stage added.
Because of the lack of tests since 1971,
the program's status has been unclear. Two
operational silos for the CSS-X-3 are nearing
completion, one of which could be ready
within a :cw months. They are among only
three known sites-all begun before 1971-
now under 'onstruction for the system. If a
CSS-X-3 launch does occur soon, it may be a
final test before the missile is installed in a
small number of silos.
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THE CYPRUS EQUATION
Acting President Clerides went to London
last week to apprise Archbishop Makarios of the
situation in Cyprus and, possibly, to persuade him
to delay his return. Clerides is concerned about
his own status, but he is also known to believe
that Makarios' insistence on a multiregional fed-
eration as a solution to the Cyprus problem is
unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, who prefer
a biregional geographic federation. Clerides also
believes that Makarios' return will harden the
negotiating position of the turkish Cypriots be-
cause of their distrust of the archbishop. Clerides
had earlier announced his willingness to consider
the Turkish Cypriot demand for a biregional geo-
graphic federation.
Makarios apparently remained adamant in
his opposition to the Turkish Cypriot proposal.
He reiterated his call for a multiregional fed-
eration in a press conference on November 22,
following a meeting with Clerides and British
Foreign Secretary Callaghan. He also announced
that he would return to Cyprus on or about
December 6.
Clerides and Makarios
Makarios' tough negotiating position may
well be toned down at the Athens summit this
weekend, where Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis
is likely to urge an approach that lies somewhere
between the uncompromising stance of Makarios
and the accommodating position of Clerides. At
the meeting, the Acting President is likely to
insist that he will continue as negotiator for the
Greek Cypriot side only if he is given a wide
measure of freedom to conduct the negotiations
as he sees fit.
On Cyprus
Preparations are being made in the Greek
sector of Cyprus for Makarios' return. The gov-
ernment is trying to deter possible violence
between pro- and anti-Makarios groups by coun-
seling moderation and pointing to the Turkish
threat to the Greek Cypriot community in the
event that the Greek Cypriots begin fighting
among themselves.
While Turkish Cypriots have voiced their dis-
pleasure over Makarios' return and have rejected
his call for a multiregional federation, Turkish
forces are not likely to move against the Greek
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De
Cypriot sector unless violence between Greek
Cypriot factions threatens the security of Turkish
Cypriots living within the Greek Cypriot sector of
the island.
In the meantime, the Turki?h Cypriot sector
is fast assuming the character of a de facto state.
Denktash announced recently that a constituent
assembly will soon be convened to establish the
constitutional basis for a "Turkish Cypriot wing"
of a federated state. Various government posts
have been upgraded to ministries, and foreign
companies are required to register with Turkish
Cypriot authorities. Turkish Cypriot officials also
announced recently that Greek Cypriot properties
in the Turkish Cypriot sector will be temporarily
"leased" to Turkish Cypriots and will be turned
over to them in the event of a settlement.
After successfully completing the exchange
of over 5,000 prisoners, Clerides and Denktash
have now turned their attention to other "human-
itarian" issues. Thiy agreed to the exchange of
certain categories of aged, infirm, and isolated
individuals, which will affect some 2,000 Turkish
Cypriots and an equal number of Greek Cypriots.
The two also agreed to make a renewed effort to
solve the island's educational problems, and to try
to improve the living conditions of the Greek and
Turkish inhabitants in their respective sectors. In
addition, they said they would make a special
effort to locate the several hundred people,
mostly Greek Cypriots, reported to be missing.
The lack of movement on political questions
can be partly attributed to Clerides' lack of a
clear mandate as a result of Makarios' planned
return and the unsettled political situation in
Ankara. Following the Athens summit, the Greek
side will likely be ready to focus on political
questions. The talks are not expected to gain
momentum, however, until the political situation
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ICELAND: ANOTHER FISHING DISPUTE
A long-simmering dispute between Iceland
and West Germany over fishing rights developed
into a skirmish last weekend when the Icelandic
Coast Guard seized one West German trawler and
chased another from its unilaterally declared
50-mile fishing zone. Bonn, charging piracy, de-
manded the release of the trawler and closed one
of its ports to an Icelandic ship.
The two incidents are the first between Ice-
land drid West Germany since a compromise
agreement ended the 15-month-long "cod war"
with the UK in 1973. Since the spring of 1972,
Iceland and West Germany have held intermittent
negotiations on a similar agreement. That agree-
ment reduced the UK's annual fish catch and gave
Iceland limited jurisdiction over British craft in-
ride the 50-mile fishing zone. This compromise
agreement was not reached, however, until after
many Icelanders questioned the value of their ties
with NATO and the US. The Icelandic govern-
ment charged that both the US and NATO should
have done more to help end the conflict.
The UK-Iceland dispute revolved around
what areas would be open to the British and how
large a catch they would be allowed. The main
issue between Reykjavik and Bonn is the type of
fishing boat that would be allowed to operate
within the 50-mile zone. Iceland would like to
limit, if not completely ban, West German trawl-
ers to prevent massive catches that would deplete
resources. Large factory and freezer trawlers
make up the bulk of the West German fleet.
During a round of talks last month, Iceland
and West Germany reached a tentative agreement
permitting some freezer trawlers to operate
within the 50-mile zone. Iceland later canceled
this agreement because of opposition within the
governing Independence-Progressive coalition. Al-
though the canceled agreement was more restric-
tive than the one negotiated with the UK last
year, critics claimed that the presence of even a
limited number of trawlers was unacceptable.
Iceland's past disputes over fishing rights
have evolved into contests among its political
parties. They have vied with one another in advo-
cating an aggressively nationalistic line to protect
Iceland's most important industry. The current
government, formed last August, is anxious to
prove that it can be just as tough as the previous
center-left coalition. Even though Iceland is ap-
parently determined to crack down on fishing
violations, Prime Minister Hallgrimsson has not
ruled out negotiations with Bonn, and the recent
incidents could lead to an earl resum tion of
talks.
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EC-ARAB DIALOGUE STALLED
The Nine have been unable to agree thus far
on a response to an Arab League demand that the
PLO be given observer status in the EC-Arab talks
on economic cooperation initiated early this year.
As a result, the Arabs refused to attend the first
meeting of the joint general commission, which
had been scheduled to meet in Paris last week to
set up working groups. The EC is likely to pro-
pose a compromise that might permit an organiza-
tional meeting with' the Arabs before the end of
the year.
erate their demand that the PLO also have ob-
server status in the working groups.
The EC Commission expects the dialogue to
continue tc develop slowly. It has proposed draft
guidelines that attempt to make the proposed
cooperation of practical value to the Arab states,
some of which are very poor and in need of the
kind of technical and commercial assistance that
the EC could provide. The guidelines include:
The EC foreign ministers, at their political
consultation meetings last week, agreed that they
would not accept Arab conditions that would put
a "political burden" on the dialogue. If, as ex-
pected, the Arabs introduce political subjects at
an eventual general commission meeting, the EC
president has been authorized to reiterate the
EC's declaration on the Middle East of November
1973, and to note that the present dialogue is not
concerned with issues related to a political settle-
ment in the Middle East.
The Arabs' refusal to hold the Paris meetings
is clearly a pressure tactic designed to exploit the
EC's eagerness to establish a closer relationship in
the hope that this will help protect oil supplies
and aid in recycling petrodollars. Arab obduracy
will lead to intensified efforts by the Nine to
reach a compromise among themselves that would
permit PLO attendance while preserving the EC's
intention to keep the dialogue from becoming a
political forum for Middle East problems.
Attitudes toward granting the PLO observer
status vary within the EC-France, in particular,
has tried to accommodate the Arabs-and the
matter may have to be resolved at the EC summit
next month. It is unlikely that the general com-
mission meeting will take place until after the
first of the year. The Nine may, in fact, propose
an indefinite postponement of the general com-
mission meeting-and thus put off the question of
PLO observers-but suggest that the two sides get
together next month, in an as yet undecided
forum, to set up working groups. By such a tactic,
they apparently count on the Arabs not to reit-
? giving priority to a few relatively modest
agricultural projects that can be implemented
quickly and primarily in the poorer Arab
countries;
? financing of initial projects by the oil-
producing countries, with the Nine providing
technical assistance;
? vocational training of young Arabs in
the EC countries;
? priority for "inter-Arab" projects in-
volving more than one country;
? possible establishment of an ad hoc com-
mittee for mineral exploration In the Arab
countries.
Meanwhile, EC solidarity on the PLO ques-
tion held up reasonably well during UN votes last
week. The Arabs made a strong pitch for the
Nine's support of the UN resolution affirming the
rights of the Palestinians, going so far as to soften
somewhat the text at the last minute. Although
some EC members-including the West Germans
and the British-felt strongly that the final res-
olution still demanded a negative vote, a common
position supporting abstention was maintained.
On a second resolution giving the PLO observer
status at the UN and at all UN-sponsored ton-
ferences, however, the French broke ranks by
voting in favor while the other eight members
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WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE CONCLUDED
The UN World Food Conference ended on
November 16 with general agreement on long-
term goals to meet world food needs. A World
Food Council was established to deal with the 22
resolutions adopted by the 130-nation conference.
Key recommendations include:
? a food aid program of at least 10 million
tons of grain a year;
? an internationally coordinated system of
national grain reserves;
? an international agricultural develop-
ment fund;
? a global information and early warning
system on food and agriculture.
Official reaction to the results of the World
Food Conference from both developed and de-
veloping states has been marked by cautious
optimism in spite of critical press reaction to the
alleged failure of the conference to deal with
immediate food aid problems. Much of the press,
however, did acknowledge that the conference's
aim was to set the stage for worldwide coopera-
tion on long-term food supply problems and that
it was not intended to deal with immediate food
needs. 25X1
Most states are still analyzing the impact of
the conference's rnyriad resolutions and are wait-
ing for follow-up initiatives to begin. Although
current food needs were not on the agenda, Food
and Agriculture Organization Director Boerrna
has called a meeting on November 29 to discuss
the immediate grain needs and financing problems
of the larger grain-d-ficit nations, particularly
India, Bangladesh, and other Asian countries.
Major grain exporters, including the US, will
participate. The meeting will again test the
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willingness of the major grain exporters and the
oil-rich states to provide aid. In separate initia-
tives, the US is working to convene a grain ex-
porters' planning group in London in January.
This group would review grain production plans
in light of the resolutions passed at the World
Food Conference and lay the groundwork for a
plan for longer term food assistance and for a
follow-up meeting of a larger international co-
ordinating body to discuss national reserve
policies.
at the Rome conference are unlikely.
Although most of the conference delegates
returned home in a positive and conciliatory
frame of mind, the generally well-balanced and
constructive resolutions and provisions for follow-
on organizations and committees must still be
formally cleared by the UN Economic and Social
Council and by the General Assembly. Radical
states among the developing countries' Group of
77 could try to impose extreme positions that
many developed states would oppose. Food
issues, however, are of such great concern to the
poorer developing countries that support for
USSR: RYAD COMPUTER PRODUCTION LAGS
The Soviet program to build modern third-
generation computers is off the ground but
moving slowly. Last year, the USSR and Eastern
Europe together produced an estimated 100 to
150 RYADs, far below the 3,000 to 4,000 units
per annum implied in earlier forecasts by Soviet
officials. The Soviets have produced most of
them, and they are overwhelmingly the slow
speed, low capacity ES-1020 type. Higher
capacity models are being produced in very small
numbers or are still in prototype. Moreover,
speeds of models in production are 25 to 50
percent below original design goals. The fastest
and highest capacity machine-the ES-1060-is
still in the design stage.
At the principal Soviet RYAD manufac-
turing facility, RYADs compete with MINSK-
32s-a second generation computer that is
obsolete by US standards-for production time,
space, and resources. Both systems are produced
on the same line, and by the same labor force,
during alternate days or weeks. Assembly opera-
tions are largely manual and lack modern high-
productivity machinery and techniques. Further,
because uncompleted or defective parts and sub-
assemblies are replaced or repaired only after all
assembly operations have been completed, up to
three RYADs are cannibalized to produce one
workable machine.
In the USSR most high quality integrated
circuits are pre-empted by the military. The
Soviets do not yet produce in commercial quan-
tities the more advanced type of integrated cir-
cuits needed for the largest systems in the RYAD
family. East European production of RYADs is
dependent upon hard-to-get components and
parts from the USSR and the West.
Shortages of modern peripherals, or input-
output devices, are also delaying production of
RYADs. Some necessary peripherals are in limited
production, and others depend upon Western
imports for critical parts.
RYADs that have been produced and de-
livered have limited usefulness owing to shortages
of software programs and the absence of efficient
maintenance support services. IBM-360 series
software, which the Soviets had hoped to use
directly, cannot now be run on RYADs without
costly modifications. Moreover, because of tech-
nical variations among RYAD models, the same
IBM programs may require separate modifications
for use with each RYAD system. Soviet develop-
ment of software needed to make all RYADs
compatible with each other is apparently still
several years away.
Without massive Western help, the RYAD
program will continue to limp along, further de-
laying Soviet plans for a nationwide data process-
ing network and for improving efficiency in
Soviet plants. The Soviets already have indicated
that the Minsk plant, which could boost RYAD
output by as much as 600 units annually, even
with existing outdated manufacturing methods,
will continue to produce mainly MINSK-32s at
least through 1975.
25X1
25X1
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3' MiG-25 Foxbat interceptors at Vasil-
kov, an air defense airfield in southwestern USSR
near Kiev. As of July, only 17 Foxbats were
located there. The unit at Vasilkov is the fifth air
defense unit to receive enough Foxbat inter-
ceptors to equip a regiment.
The Foxbat, a long-range, high-altitude inter-
ceptor capable of speeds up to Mach 3, was first
assigned f:, air defense forces in 1970. Because of
its high cost and limited capability against low-
altitude targets, the -hxbat interceptor has thus
far been delivery ~ only to air defense units
located in the industrial heartland of the USSR.
Soviet air defense forces now have five opera-
tional, Foxbat-equipped regiments, or about 175
aircraft.
A reconnaissance version of the Foxbat is in
service with Soviet tactical aviation forces within
25X1
25X1
the country, as well as with Soviet forces in
Poland and East Gei many. 25X1
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ROMANIA: ON A NOTE OF DEFIANCE
President Ceausescu opened the 11th party
congress on November 25 with one of the most
forceful reaffirmations of Romanian national
policy and independence since 1964. Sneaking to
an audience that included Andrey Kirilenko,
Brezhnev's unofficial deputy in the Soviet party,
Ceausescu called for a new order both in inter-
national relations and iii the world Communist
movement. He repeatedly emphasized the need
for equality, sovereignty, and noninterference in
the internal affairs of other states pointing out
that these needs are nowhere greater than in the
Communist movement i self.
Ceausescu indicated that Romania would
participate in preparatory meetings for a con-
ference of European Communist parties, but
rejected Moscow's claim to hegemony in the
movement. In language scarcely calculated to
please the Kremlin, he asserted tho`:
? absolutely nothing must be undertaken
to weaken the unity of any Communist party;
? no interference by any party in the af-
fairs of another party can be tolerated;
? other parties should not be discussed,
criticized, or condemned;
? Romania will not become involved in
censuring other parties;
? a world Communist confe,?ence is "not
of topical interest."
In his treatment of international issues,
Ceausescu expressed "great joy" over Romania's
improved relations with Peking, and +ioted that
relations with Yugoslavia are progressing. He also
pointed to the joint declaration signed with the
US in 1973, noting that it incorporates many of
his principles for building confidence and trust in
international relations. He even acknowledged a
role for the middle class in the struggle to build
new relations between nations.
The Romanian leader came down hard on
the need to do away with "antagonistic military
blocs." His call to dismantle foreign military bases
and to withdraw all foreign troops fron the terri-
tory of other states strikes equally at NATO and
the Warsaw Pact.
On the domestic side, he held out little hope
of relief from the hectic pace of forced industrial-
ization. In a move that enables him to undercut
critics of his so-called personality cult, Ceausescu
put on an unusual display of modesty in turning
down a proposal that lie be elected as the party's
secretary general for life.
Ceausescu's stubborn restatement of Roma-
nia's independent positions probably came as no
surprise to Moscow. If past practice is any guide,
the Soviets will focus their commentaries on
Ceausescu's recognition of the importance of cul-
tivating close relations with the USSR and his
praise for Soviet initiatives in pursuit of detente,
thus keeping relations with Bucharest at their
present level of chilly politeness.
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ARGENTINA: THE GOVERNMENT SCORES
The Argentine government has taken strong
action against political leftists and terrorists in
outlying provinces. Early this week, President
Maria Estela de Peron ordered the dismissal of the
leftist Peronist governor of Salta. In Cordoba,
security forces captured a large number of ter-
rurists and several arms caches.
The removal of Governor Raul Ragone of
Salta concludes a "corrective" process begun by
Juan Peron to replace leftist governors, who came
to power under Hector Campora, with more con-
servative Peronists. Seven provincial governments
have been overturned--the remaining 15 provinces
were already under "orthodox" leadership.
National security forces are having a measure
of success in their drive to stamp out leftist guer-
rillas. The capture in Cordoba last weeK of a large
number of extremists working for the People's
Revolutionary Army and the retrieval of weapons
there and elsewhere could deal a setback to the
subversive cause.
Evidence is still fragmentary, but improved
communication between the army and police
probably accounts for the government's headway
in finally getting the counter-terrorist program
under way after a number of embarrassing false
starts and failures. Press reports suggest that the
police, acting under a stage of siege that gives
them broad search and arrest powers, have
improved their intelligen-e capahiiity and are
scoring major successes for the first time.
The tide, however, has probably not turned
yet. The two principal guerrilla groups, which
may now be cooperating with each other, have
withstood reversals in the past and have resumed
the offensive with a vengeance.
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This rationale has not convinced middle-class
Mexicans, the country's most disparate, under-
represented group. Citizens of all political persua-
sions are especially rankled by the steep (50
percent) tax on gasoline, questioning such a hike
at a time when important oil discoveries have
been made.
Echeverria, evidently anticipating resistance
to the taxes, invited comment. Although Mexican
congresses rarely tamper with a president's legisla-
tive proposals, congressmen-including several
The liveliest debate was in the press, which
the Echeverria government has g:ven a somewhat
freer rein during the last year or so. The com-
plaint most often expressed is that the urban
middle class was being asked to Liar a dis-
proportionate burden. The left faulted the gov-
ernment for allowing foreign-dominated busi-
nesses to escape new taxes. What is needed, said
the left, is radical fiscal reform to shift the weight
of development to those reaping the profits. The
right asserted that the government is wasteful and
corrupt, and called for more austerity and
integrity. One middle-of-the-road columnist
sneered: "If Mexicans are going to pay taxes like
Frenchmen and Americans, I assume they will
also enjoy similar benefits, like free elections, a
representative congress, and an end to bureaucrats
who enrich themselves at the public trough."
Mexico's authoritarian political system is
hardly likely to undergo that sort of reform, but
the government's hdr filing of the tax legislation
demonstrates that, when pressed, it is willing to
heed public opinion, debate issues on their merit,
and concede to Congress some degree of the
lawmaking power assigned to it by the constitu-
tion. 25X1
MEXICO. LISTENING TO THE PUBLIC
The Echeverria administration, faced wi,h an
c:atcry over recent tax proposals, has shown a rare
willingness to listen and respond to public opin-
ion. The urban middle class, hardest hit by thu
taxes, made its discontent known through the
media and the congress. Although all of the taxes
originally proposed will be in effect by the first of
the year, public pressure forced the government
to make some significant accommodations.
The tax on low-grade gasoline was reduced,
public transportation was exempted from the
gasoline tax, and taxes on restaurant tabs will
apply only to luxury restaurants. Heavy taxes on
sales of automobiles, boats, and beer will remain
as originally p used. An additional income tax
will be levied la.er on higher wage earners. The
government is billing the package as essential to
control inflation and to reduce the country's
dependence on foreign credits. It argues that new
revenues are needed to stimulate the lagging pro-
duction of food and to develop long-neglected
rural areas.
from the governing party-for once delved into
substance and expressed their misgivings. Opposi-
tion spokesmen condemned the government for
penalizing middle-class wage earners for its own
ineptness and dishonesty in managing the
economy.
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