WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: November 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
I up Secret
XWeekly Review
-4efr9ftret-
1 November 1974 25X1
`'Py N2 649
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
i Irc [_f'.!_Y kr._V!.11r, issued evrtry Friday rooming by the
Ofii--c of Guir~'nt In;ellin:~rce, n~poas anti ~tnr foeo ~ugnificant
{.,,;r,!it;,nto-nt; iI1H Weed, thnougli noon on Thurx~ay. It
;? Iacnil./ i ii:!cnae s material co n'di rated eiith or prepared by
the C iii?cc of is cr aortic Research, the Office of 5trate.)ir,
ite;.rr!rch, a:d iite Uiructorato of Sciurice and Technology.
`o;pico I nd more cxunprchen:,ivc ti ca trnenl and therefore
puLii::i'ri :?epo eteIv ti,; Special Reports era listed in tire2
~ntc
CONTENTS (November], 1974)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
4 UK: Wilson Sets Policy
5 Spain: Franco Acts as Arbiter
6 Italy: Fanfani Out; Moro In
8 Cyprus: Slow Progress
9 Canada: Courting Europe
10 EC: Preparing for a Summit
11 Albania: Government Shifts
12 The Soviet Union: Pacific Fleet; Grain
13 Israel: The Coalition Returns
13 Ethiopia: Trying To Govern
15 Bhutto's Moscow Visit
16 Sri Lanka: Going Nowhere
17 Japan: Corruption Controversy
18 Philippines: Military Morale
19 Vietnam: More of the Same
22
23
24
24
25
Venezuela: New Dialogue. with US
Cuha Drafts a Constitution
Brazil: Economic Policy Changes
Argentina: Focus on Terrorism
OAS: A Touchy Issue
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0 25X1
The Arab Summit: Turning Point
The Arab heads of state who ccnvened at
RaL,at last weekend made the crucial decision to
endorse the P4lesdine Liberation Orgr.nization as
the sole authority over the Palestinians in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank. This action forecloses
any early negotiations over the West Ban!< With
the Israelis, who at present will have nothing to
do with the PLO, and casts a shadow over the
Arab approach toward the entire range of isst+es
involved in a Middlo East peace settlement.
The summit decision, taken after t[.ree days
of intense closed deliberations, brushes aside King
Husayn's argument that only Jordan can nego-
tiate with the Israelis and that the ultimate
fate of the West Bank should he determined by
plebiscite. Husayn's acceptance of the decision
thus acknowledges that Jordan is effectively
barred from taking the lead in obtaining a mili-
tary withdrawal on the West Bank. Husayn prob-
ably also believes that there is now no active role
for Jordan to play at a reconvened Geneva con-
ference.
Husayn had threatened to walk out of the
summit if his position was rejected. He apparently
concluded, howeve , that such an action would
only draw the wrath of Arab conservatives and
radica;., alike, risk cessation of the Saudi and
!Kuwaiti financial subsidies to Jordan, and-should
the summit decision p,ove unworkable-preclude
any future acknowledgement by Egypt and Syria
that his approach is the only realistic course.
Moreover, the Arabs offered Husayn new finan-
cial inducements, including a $300 million annual
contribution to his defense budyc+.
Page 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0 25X1
Sadat (I) and Husayn at the summit
The official announcement of the summit
decision did not specifically grant the PLO au-
thority to negotiate the return of the West Bank.
Instead, in an apparent bow to Husayn, it called
on '.jypt, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO to co-
ordinate a negotiating strategy. In practice, this
may mean that Egypt and Syria will carry the
burden for the Palestinians. During the summit,
various PLO spokesmen hinted that the organiza-
tion would be willing to accept Egypt, Syria, or
even the Arab League speaking on its behalf with
the Israelis. Neither Egypt nor Syria, however,
want a break with Jordan, and Morocco's King
Hassan noted in his press conference at the end of
the summit that Jordan and the PLO still have
complementary roles to play.
By acceding to the PLO's demands, the
moderate Arabs have chosen to limit their room
for maneuver in negotiations and will now have to
decide what their next step will be in dealing with
Israel. The key Arab leaders will meet again in
Algiers on November 2-3, presumably to map out
new strategy in anticipation of Secretary Kis-
singer's next visit.
The one-sided summit outcome apparently
marks the end of Egyptian President Sadat's ef-
forts to restore momentum to the negotiating
process by getting some movement on a West
Bank disengagement. His rationale for reversing
his earlier position of support for Jordan and
swinging over in favor of the PLO is not entirely
clear. The Syrians, however, appear to have been
determined to secure a full-fledged endorsement
of Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank,
presumably as a means of refocusing attention on
their own demands for movement on the Golan
front.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddarn reportedly
said last week that the Syrians had abandoned
their previous agreement with Egypt that a pleb-
iscite should determine the area's sovereignty and
were now going to give their full support to the
PLO. Khaddam claimed that this decision was
taken after Secretary Kissinger told the Syrians
during his last visit to Damascus that Israel would
not give up the Golan Heights. Hence, the shift in
the Syrian position Was designed "to add smoke
to the fire" and to increase the pressure on Israel
to make concessions in the Golan.
Indeed, it seems highly likely that a principal
purpose of the Arab action at the summit was to
raise the level of tension in the Middle East in
hopes of spurring Washington to apply more
pressure on the Israelis. This was clearly a Syrian
objective, and Sadat may also have concluded
that he can use the united Arab stand as a means
of pressing the US. He may even have been per-
suaded that, in the absence of further withdrawals
on any front, his support of US policy was under-
mining his credibility.
Sadat and Syrian President Asad may have
also concluded that the possibility of negotiating
Page 2
WEEKLY REVIEW Nov 1, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070028-0
a limited West Bank disengagemenL--w;iich would
offer little, if any, benefit to Egypt, Syria, or the
PLO-was not worth the price of a protracted
wrangle at the summit. Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin's difficulties in selling a West Bank disen-
gagement to his own constituents, and doubts
about the effectiveness of US leverage on Rabin,
could have contributed to such a conclusion.
Whatever the reasoning of Sadat and Asad,
the decisi 1 of the Rabat summit signals a more
frontal as wel! as a more collective approach to
Arab-Israeli issues, which could limit tt,' flexibil-
ity of Arab leaders in dealing with the :1S and
Israel. Sadat, for instance, may now feel it neces-
sary to try to clear any future staged withdrawals
in the Sinai with Syria, Jordan, and the PLC
Sadat may be personally unhappy with the
decision, but the apparently pivotal role played
by the Syrians at the conference suggests that
Sadat believes his own future effectiveness
depends on his ability to coordinate with Syria.
For their part, the Syrians appear to have con-
cluded that only a tough stand by the Arabs now
will be sufficient to induce the US and Israel to
make the concessions necessary to avoid a pro-
longed stal imate or a resumption of hostilities.
The PLO .)bviously emerged as a victor at the
summit, but it still remains with Egypt and Syria
to determine where the Arabs go from here.
Again, the Oil Weapon
Although the PLO-Jordanian issue dom-
inated the summit, the chiefs of state found some
time to talk about ways of using oil money to
advance the political, social, and defense interests
of the Arab states. At the conclusion of the
conference, it was announced that the oil pro-
ducers would contribute approximately $2.35
billion annually to help build up the armed forces
of Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO. Discussion
of other basic problems-how to use the oil
weapon without jeopardizing the world financial
structure, and long-term relations between the oil
producers and Europe-seems to have been post-
poned.
The Arabs reported!y did decide that invest-
ment priority will be given to less-well-endowed
Arab countries, though no specifics were wor!