WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 2, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
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CONTENTS (August 2, 1974)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
EUROPE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
- INTERNATIONAL
1 Cyprus
5 Israel: Challenging Rabin
6 The Middle East: Soviet
Diplomatic Activity
8 Portuguese Africa: The Nod
from Lisbon
11 Spanish Sahara: Dispute Growing
12 Arabian Peninsula:
Dispute Resolved
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13 USSR: Meetings; Satellite; Economy
15 Romania: Party Congress Ahead
15 Harassment on the Autobahn
16 Eastern Europe: A Soggy Harvest
16 The EC Nine and Foreign Policy
17 UK: Labor Party Split over EC
18 South Korea: Political
Instability; Economy
20 Laos: Devaluation Denied
20 South Vietnam: More Military Action
22 Chile: Payments Prospects
22 Argentina: Ominous Portent
23 Peru Loses Free Press
24 Cuba: Castro Looks to the South
25 Bolivia: Banzer's Position Improved
25 World Communist Conference
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CYPRUS
The first phase of the Geneva peace talks
was successfully concluded on July 30 when the
foreign ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey
sig.ied an agreement formalizing the cease-fire on
Cyprus. The accord was reached after five days of
hectic negotiations during which both the Greek
and Turkish representatives threatened to walk
out of the conference. More difficulties lie ahead
in the negotiations when the ministers meet again
on August 8 to begin discussions of the island's
political future. Representatives of the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot communities will participate in
the next round of talks.
The wording of the accord reached at Ge-
neva indicates that Athens accepted Turkey's
principal demands. The question of Turkish troop
withdrawal?opposed by Ankara?was resolved by
a statement calling for measures that will lead to
the "timely and phased reduction" of the number
of armed forces on Cypruz. Ankara had
adamantly refused to accept the word "with-
drawal," suggesting that the Turkish military
fnrces will remain on the island for some time to
come.
The agreement also recognizes the existence
in practice of two autonomous administrations in
Cyprus, but it notes that such recognition would
not "prejudice the conclusions to be drawn from
this situation." The ministers agreed to discuss
this matter during the next phase of the talks
along with the "constitutional legitimacy" of the
Turkish Cypriot vice president. The agreement
also notes that all Turkish Cypriot enclaves oc-
cupied by Greek Cypriot forces must be evac-
uated immediately. The Turks will reportedly call
for the establishment of a federal state in the next
round, with almost tol'al autonomy for the Turk-
ish Cypriot community. The Greeks are likely to
oppose initially the concept of a federal state but
will probably concede eventually and focus in-
stead on limiting the Turkish role in Cyprus and
the powers of the Turkish Cypriot administration.
The countries directly involved in the
Cyprus crisis have welcomed the cease-fire accord
with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Greece's
relief at averting war with Turkey has been
tempered by the realization that Ankara has won
far-reaching concessions. The Greek Cypriots have
also been dismayed by what has been asked of
them in the accords.
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GREEK REACTION
Although Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis
has publicly described the agreement as a "start-
ing point" for a just solution.
Karamanlis also expressed concern ove25X1
the economic burden resulting from the con-
frontation, noting that it was costing Greece over
$16 million per day. He has since announced the
gradual demobilization of some 130,000 reservists
called up for duty.
Karamanlis can expect some backlash for
"selling out" the Greek Cypriots in the agree-
ment, but he probably can deflect criticism by
laying responsibility for the turn of events at the
door of the old junta since they engineered the
coup that ousted Makarios and precipitated the
Turkish invasion. The Greek military is in no
position to criticize the accord.
TURKISH REACTION
Ankara views the agreement as a dear-cut
victory for Turkish arms and diplomacy. Prime
Minister Ecevit has highly praised the perform-
ance of the Turkish army?hardly praiseworthy,
at least in the initial stages of the invasion?calling
it a new chapter in Turkey's military history.
The US embassy in Ankara believes that
Turks of all political views are united in their
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intention to squeeze all possible gains from the
situation. Prime Minister Ecevit has emerged with
his domestic position greatly strengthened, at
least in the short run. The embassy notes that,
while there are undoubtedly shades of differences
between the civilian government and the military,
there are no conflicts of serious proportions.
Moreover, the embassy does not believe the mili-
tar are dra alon a reluctant Ecevit. T i
Ankara, undoubtedly, wants to keep inde-
finitely a secure territorial base on Cyprus that
includes a portion of the northern seacoast and
the port of Kyrenia. This base not only will
increase Turkey's bargaining chips in the future
negotiations, but also will put it in a stronger
position to ensure a double enosis if efforts are
made in the future to link Cyprus with Greece.
Moreover, that portion of Cyprus commands
approaches to three major southern ports, which
Ankara is determined to shield from future
threats by Greeks on Cyprus. Beyond this general
strategic thinking, the embassy does not believe
that the Turkish leadership is certain what it
wants for a long-term settlement, excer t to bar a
return to the 1960 London-Zurich arrangement;
give Turkish Cypriots greater autonomy; and pre-
vent, if possible, the return to power of Arch-
bishop Makarios.
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CYPRIOT REACTION
In Cyprus, President Clerides welcomed the
Geneva accord as a step toward peace, but ex-
pressed dismay at the concessions asked of Greek
Territory controlled
by Turkish. forces
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Cypriots. He accused the Turks of intransigence,
but noted that the longer the fighting went on,
the more difficult it would have been to arrive at
a peaceful solution.
The accord was well received by Turkish
Cypriots. They have already moved their adminis-
tration from Nicosia to Kyrenia, which reportedly
will serve es the "capital" of the Turkish Cypriot
sector. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash
told a US embassy official that a cantonal
arrangement might emerge from the present situa-
tion, with a federal government based on an
amended ver.;ion of the 1960 constitution. He
foresaw a continuation of the arrangement for a
Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice president, but the Turkish canton would
enjoy almost complete autonomy. Not all Turkish
Cypriots would be required to live in the canton,
according to Denktash, but those outside?in-
cluding Greek Cypriots?would have freedom of
moveme, it throughout the island.
In London, Archbishop Makarios gave
guarded approval to the agreement, but criticized
the vagueness of the clause dealing with the Turk-
ish troop withdrawal. Makarios reportedly told
Greek Foreign Minister Mavros he had no inten-
tion of going to Geneva and would not cause any
"problems."
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CYPRUS
Glakos uerides now claims to be the r.f...htful"
president of Cyprus and not "acting" pr1/44ident.
Clerides believes that Makarios' return at this time
would spark civil war within the Greek Cypriot
Community. Clerides has reportedly contacted
Athens' new political leaders to generate support
for his candidacy and was scheduled to meet
yesterday with a Karamanlis emissary.
After conducting a survey of sentiment
within the Greek Cypriot community, the US
embassy concludes that most individuals with
whom it has contact agree that Makarios must not
return to Cyprus anytime soon because of the
danger of civil war. According to the embassy
assessment, this sentiment becomes more
THE MILITARY SITUATION
Turkish forces broadened their Nicosia-
Kyrenia corridor on July 27, pushing westward
from Kyrenia and Nicosia along the mountain
range near the coast. They also moved eastward
toward the besieged Turkish Cypriot enclave at
Chatos, but were stopped by a UN contingent.
Greek Cypriot forces subsequently built up de-
fenses in the area and apparently deterred any
additional Turkish movements.
Major military operations have been halted
since July 27, althouqh numerous minor clashes
continued through mid-week, as the Turks con-
solidated their positions and Greek Cypriot forces
reorganized their defenses. The Turkish force is in
control of an area north of Nicosia that stretches
to a point near the town of Myrtou in the west
and near Kythrea in the east. The US embassy in
Nicosia reported that most of the troops, tanks,
and vehicles that had been concentrated around
the Turkish military headquarters at Bogaz were
gone by July 31. Embassy officials assume that
the Turks had pushed their forces outward to
have the widest possible perimeter before the UN
inspection of the cease-fire lines.
Turkey has sent an estimated 20-25,000
troops and about 130 tanks into this expanded
enclave so far. Ships and helicopters continue to
ferry supplies, and there are reports that th25xi
Turks may still be sending limited reinforcement,.
On the mainlaiid, the Turks apparently con-
tinue to maintain a high level of military alert
readiness. The Greeks, on the other hand, ordered
a limited demobilizution early in the week by
placing some 80,000 reservists on indefinite leave.
Plans call for an additional 50,000 reservists to be
demobilized by August 10. Forces in northern
Greece and on the islands adjacent to Turkey
remain in an advanced state of readiness. The US
defense attache in Athens reports that the ma-
jority of ships stationed at the main Greek naval
base at S I
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qualified as one moves away from the political
right, but even the Communist Party hedges on its
support for Makarios. Only the leftist Lyssarides
faction persists in demanding Makarios' reinstate-
ment.
In an effort to consolidate his position,
Clerides reportedly plans to make some changes
in his cabinet soon to placate centrist and leftist
elements who support his candidacy on condition
that he rid the cabinet of persons directly associ-
ated with the coup on July 15.
THE SITUATION IN GREECE
Prime Minister Karamanlis has added some
representatives of the moderate left to his govern-
ment, thus broadening its support. This step prob-
ably will be viewed a, tokenism by the extreme
left, one of whose principal spokesmen?Andreas
Papandreou?plans to return to Greece soon.
Papandreou has already denounced the new gov-
ernment as a tool of NATO and the US and
announced that he will form a new po!itical party
that wil! be to the left of the Scandinavian social-
ist parties. The rest of the Greek left is apparently
divided over the posture to adopt toward the
Karamanl is government.
The 113 embassy in Athens, in evaluating the
new Karamanlis cabinet, believes that the Prime
Minister has vindicated the old Greek political
establishment by honoring those who resisted the
military regimes. His cabinet includes a large num-
ber of those who stood in consistent and rational
opposition to the juntas, but he has denied posi-
tions of influence to those most inclined to seek
revenge against the military. While some minis-
tries were assigned to men perhaps better suited
to other offices, key posts?interior, defense, for-
eign affairs, public order?are in the hands of
loyal and proven leaders. Nevertheless, the com-
position of the cabinet suggests that family ties
and respectable connections were helpful in
obtaining appointments.
SOVIETS BACK AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS
Moscow last week demonstrated its interest
in preserving an independent Cyprus and in
staking out a role for itself in the negotiations
over the island's future.
In a strongly worded statement on July 28,
the USSR expressed its suspicion that "certain
circles" in NATO (an apparent allusion to the US)
zro seeking to exploit the situation in order to
consolidate their military and strategic position in
the eastern Mediterranean. The government state-
mext noted that Moscow was firmly behind the
participation of the "legitimate" Cypriot govern-
ment in the Geneva talks. To underline its con-
cern that London, Athens, and Ankara may agree
to change the island's politica! status, Moscow
sent Victor Minin, an expert in eastern Mediterra-
nean affairs who has the rank of ambassador, as
an observer to Geneva.
Early in the week, the Soviets unsuccessfully
sought to have the Security Council send a special
mission to Cyprus immediately to verify imple-
mentation of the UN resolution. Although the
Soviets seemed to welcome the signing of a cease-
fire accord in Geneva, they later vetoed a pro-
posal to expand the role of UN peace-keeping
forces on Cyprus. allegediy for "procedural"
reasons.
The USSR did not directly condemn Ankara
for its cease-fire violations, nor did it respond
directly to Clerides' call for Moscow to exert
pressure to get Turkey to stop its violations. This
was consistent with Moscow's other efforts during
the crisis to remain in fairly close touch with the
Turks and to cast itself as sympathetic to them.
Despite its opposition to enosis or partition,
Moscow apparently has a flexible attitude toward
an eventual settlement on the island and is seek-
ing to sort out its attitudes toward Makarios and
Clerides.
Moscow will support Clerides, but only a25X1
long as he is committed to the archbishop's re-
turn. the Soviets are 25X1
highly suspicious of Clerides' links with Athens
and Washington. the Soviets be-25X1
lieve Clerides will run or tne presidency and that
he will win the election.
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Despite suspicions about Clerides, Moscow
has avoided criticizing him publicly. The Soviets
would prefer to see Makarios return, but they
clearly do not want to burn their bridges to
Clerides should he survive as head of an independ-
ent and nonaligned Cyprus.
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ISRAEL: CHALLENGING RABIN
Zealous Israeli nationalists have again chal-
lenged Prime Minister Rabin's new government on
the sensitive issue of government policy toward
Jewish settlement in occupied Arab areas. Last
week. 150 would-be settlers illegally occupiGd the
site of the capital of the ancient kingdom of Israel
near Nablus, the largest Arab town on the West
Bank. They were accompanied by sore 1,000
sympathizers, including leaders of the opposition
parties and prominent rabbis.
Backed by a unanimous cabinet decision to
break up the attempt, Defense Minister Shimon
Peres took a tough line with leaders of the opposi-
tion Likud Party in negotiating the removal of the
squatters. Initially, he ruled out using the army to
evict them on the grounds that Arab preparations
for a new attack on Israel required the defense
forces' full attention. Afier the squatters' intransi-
gence forced several extensions of the deadline
for their departure, however, unarmed soldiers
moved in on July 29 and forcibly loaded the
protesters on buses for transportation to Jeru-
salem.
This is the zecond time in less than two
months that the Rabin government has been chal-
lenged by demonstrators seeking to focus atten-
tion on the future of Israeli settlements in The
occupied areas. In early June, troops were also
used to remove a smaller group from an illegal
settlement near Nablus.
In condemning the squatters' action as
illegal?only the government has the authority to
establish settlements in occupied territory?the
cabinet side-stepped the larger issue of its overall
settlement policy, just as Mrs. Meir's cabinet did
when faced with a settlement attempt in the
Golan Heights during the Syrian disengagement
negotiations.
The settlement issue is an explosive one,
both internationally and domestically. Settle-
ments in former Arab lands, by those determined
to re-establish the ancient borders of Israel, have
fueled Arab charges of Israeli expansionism lnd
have especially disturbed Arab residents of the
Squatters arguing with Israeli soldiers
West Bank. Although the settlers do not have a
large grass-roots following, the principal opposi-
tion party?Likud?and the Labor Party's former
coalition partner?the National Religious Party?
are ri ?dicated to the settlers' policy of maintain-
ing and consolidating Israel's present frontiers.
The government, on the other hand, has
tried to keep its official settlement policy deliber-
ately vague, making annual budget allocations for
new settlements, but withholding official authori-
zations for their creation. Rabin is trying to build
a consensus for negotiations with the Arabs that
would include recognition by the Israeli people of
the necessity to give up some of the occupied
territory, including areas in which Jewish settle-
ments have already been established.
This latest challenge to his efforts comes
immediately after the cabinet's carefully hedged
offer to Jordan of terms for talks on the ultimate
disposition Of the West Bank. The debate
generated by the latest occupation will increase
pressure on the government to state specifii:ally
its settlement policy at a time when Rabin woul
refer to main . -gotiating latitude.
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The Middle East
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE
Moscow is conducting what appears to be a
major effort to counter any further erosion of its
position in the Middle East. Much of the Soviet
activity seems aimed at isolating Egyptian Presi-
dent SAat in the Arab world and at creating
pressure within Egypt to force Sadat to recon-
sider his shift away from Moscow. There are
indications that the Soviets view the Egyptian
military as the best source of such pressure.
The Watch on the Nile
The Soviets have harshly criticized Sadat and
have sought to embarrass him by such tactics as
the recent postponement of Fahmi's visit to the
USSR. They have nevertheless continued to hold
out the promise of assistance?particularly mili-
tary aid?should Egypt adopt a more acceptable
policy toward the USSR. Indeed, thr USSR may
have opened its arms spigot a bit. Since JuIy 16,
three Soviet AN-12 transport aircraft have flown
to Cairo. These were the first such flights since
April and may have carried needed spare parts to
the Egyptian military. There is no evidence, how-
ever, of any Soviet seaborne military deliveries
since April.
In employing these tactics, Moscow ap-
parently calculates that there is still support
within Egypt for a more pro-Soviet policy. Yet
the Soviets seem to see no alternative to Sadat at
this time and want to maintain some. commu-
nication with .iim. Soviet officials, for example,
have suggested that a summit is still possible,
although they have rejected Sadat's demand that
General Secretary Brezhnev go to Cairo.
Arms Deal with Libya
Evidence is accumulating that Moscow has
concluded a major arms deal with Libya. Ap-
parently, the package includes modern equipment
not heretofore seen in Libya's arsenal.
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Both the USSR and Libya appear to have an
eye on the it.ipact a substantial arms deal Wiil
have on Egypt. Tripoli and Moscow remain sus-
picious of each other and are basing their coop-
eration on a common antipathy to Sadat.
The Soviets may think that, in view of their
suspended arms shipments to Egypt, a large flow
of weapons into Libya will create unrest in the
Egyptian military. At the very least, Moscow
probably welcomes the opportunity to receive
hard cash for its arms; Qadhafi will most likely
pay outright to a..oid building up any sort of debt
to the USSR.
Qadhafi's desire to acquire a sophisticated
arsenal is weIl established. Despite his deep dis-
trust of Moscow, Qadhafi apparently wants Soviet
weapons not only to impi?ove the Libyan in-
ventory, but to make it more compatible with
other Soviet-equipped Arab states. More specifi-
cally, Qadhafi may believe he now has a chance to
make Libya an attractive patron for the Egyptian
military. Believing that another war with Israel is
inevitable, Qadhafi may hope that this time he
will be better able to serve as an arsenal for
Egypt's army.
Arafat in Moscow
The chairman of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, Yasir Arafat, arrived in Moscow this
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week seeking assurances of support for the Pales-
tinians in the next round of the Geneva Middle
East talks.
Arafat is particularly eager to win an explicit
statement of Soviet backing at this time since he
is under heavy fire in fedayeen councils for his
relatively conciliatory policies toward a nego-
tiated settlement. Arafat became more vulnerable
to such criticism when Saciat. with whom. he nail
been cioseiy c.00perating, recently agreed with
King Husayn that Amman should represent Pales-
tinians resident in Jordan.
Although Moscow will pledge support to
Arafat in hopes of widening the rift between the
Palestinians and the Egyptians, it seems unlikely
that the Soviets will grant him and the PLO
official recognition as the sole representative of
all Palestinians. The Soviets continue to be frus-
trated in dealing with the splintered fedayeen
movement. In a major press article on July 29,
Moscow criticized the P:-:estinian factions for
their divisive tactics and said the fedayeen will be
successful only when they achieve unity of direc-
tion and purpose.
Courting Aden and Algiers
Moscow's concern with forestalling any ex-
pansion of Egyptian, Iranian, or Western in-
fluence in the Arabian Peninsula may have led it
to promise additional military assistance to South
Yemen. The communique on the reent visit of
South Yemeni Secretary General Ismail to Mos-
cow said that "measures were outlined" to
strengthen Aden's defensive capability.
Aden has been concerned over Iran's mil,
tary involvement in cr.rshing the rebellion in
Oman, which has been 'aacked by South Yemen,
as well as over the intrditions of the new military
regime ;n North Yemen. The Soviets, however,
probably again cautioned Aden against rash
actions.
MINE-SWEEPING AT MIDPOINT
The Soviet mine-sweeping operation that
began in mid-July in the Strait of Gubal
between the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea is
evidently about half completed. The target
date for winding up the operation is August
15. The possibility that the Soviets might
?...4?theit stay by taking on salvage opera-
tions was lessen:A when a heavy lifting ship
left soon after placing mooring buoys near the
areas of operations.
The helicopter ship Leningrad joined the
mine-sweeping group at the Egyptian port of
Hurghada a week ago. On July 26, one of the
Leningrad's normal complement of light-
weight helicopters?the Hormone class?was
sighted flying over the mined area in what
appeared to be survey operations. Bad
weather ard heavy haze may have hampered
other ielicopter activity Or observation of it.
When the Leningrad entered the Red Sea,
large-diameter cable and a pontooned sled-like
device were seen on its deck as well as two
MI-8 heavy-duty helicopters. This equipment
has not yet been observed in operation, but it
is expected to be used in the
activity.
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Last week, Soviet leaders received a high-
ranking Algerian defense official in Moscow. It is
not yet clear what occurred during the visit, but
the Algerian apparently came to di,cuss Moscow's
military aid as well as to deliver a message to the
Soviet leaders from Algerian President Boume-
diene. The visit appears to be a follow-up to
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's visit to Algiers
last May. At that time, Grechko apparently tried
.3 revitalize Moscow's military aid program as
well as to undei line Moscow's continuing prom-
inent role in Arab affairs des site its et
Egypt.
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PORTUGUESE AFRICA: THE NOD FROM LISBON
President Spinola's announcement on July
27 that the process of granting independence to
the African territories can begin immediately has
given a much-needed impetus to Lisbon's efforts
to move toward a settlement of the African prob-
lem. Spinola added iater that Portuguese Guinea
would be the first to be granted independence.
Shortly thereafter, Luis Cabral, head of thE rebel-
prlclaimed state of Guinea-Bissau, said that all
obstacles to a settlement have been removed.
Spinola's announcement marked a retreat
from his earlier insistence on a referendum to
decide the future of the African provinces and the
end of his hope for a confederation. His failure to
spell out exactly how or when the territories
would make the transition to independence
appears to indicate that negotiations with
rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique are tai
from bringing about a settlement in these two
territories.
Spin?la maintained that Portugal is open to
any initiatives for the planning and execution of
decolonization. Lisbon's new policy should
encourage several African leaders who are at-
tempting to mediate between the rebels and the
Portuguese?particularly presidents Senghor of
Senegal, Kaunda of Zambia, and Nyerere of
Tanzania.
Spinola's popularity in the metropoie has
reached a new high following his speech, and the
principal political parties have expressed un-
qualified approval of his new policy. Only the
right-wing Portuguese Federalist Movement dis-
sented.
The popularity of the move has obscured the
fact that the new pulicy is a defeat for Spinola,
who had pressed hard for referendums in the
territories and for a federal solution. The situa-
tion in Portugal and the territories, however,
made these goals unattainable. Heavy pressure
from the Armed Forces Movament and the po-
litical parties in the provisional government, as
well as opposition from African nationalist
groups, forced Spinola to back down.
Independence for Guinea-Bissau
The favorable comments by Luis Cabral in-
dicate that the way now appears clear for the
independence of Portuguese Guinea, and a public
announcement may come soon. There has been
substantial evidence for some time that both sidPs
were close to a settlement, particularly on the
nettlesome issue of the Cape Verde Islands, which
the rebels claim and the Portuguese want to re-
tain. A solution to this problem may not be
spelled out in the final a.3reement, but probably
will be covered by vague language that will in
effect allow Lisbon to keep the islands without
requiring the rebels to withdraw their claims.
The actual transfer of power to the rebels
should not be difficult. The rebel government of
Guinea-Bissau, which Lisbon would simply
recognize, already has an embryonic administra-
tion in the rural areas it now control-..... This ad-
minictration could be extended to other areas as
the Portuguese leave.
A Cease-fire in Mozambique
Spinola's offer of independence and his will-
ingness to abandon his demand for a referendum
remove two major obstacles to further talks with
the Mozambique insurgents. When Portuguese
Foreign Minister Soares met briefly in Zambia in
June with leaders of the Front for the Liberation
of Mozambique, the insurgents insisted on these
two points as conditions for further negotiations.
The Zambians, who have been acting as a go-
between on Mozambique negotiations, claim the
two sides will meet again sometime this month.
The rebels, however, have not indicated they will
retreat from the position they took at the meet-
ing in June that they will only negotiate for a
direct turnover of power.
Meanwhile, the establishment of a military
junta in Mozambique last week, following by a
few days a similar move in Angola, clearly in-
dicates Lisbon intends to take firmer control of
the territory's administration. Lisbon especially
wants to calm the white inhabitants, dampen
urban violence, and end labor unrest.
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It is unlikely, however, that the new govern-
ment can overcome the recent reluctance of local
military forces to carry out offensive operations.
In fact, an informal cease-fire seems to be in
effect in some areas of the teffitory, and troops
from both sides have been fraternizing and co-
operating. Diplomatic sources of the US consul
general in Lourenco Marques assert that an of-
ficial cease-fire is near at hand. Taken together,
these bits and pieces suggest an informal cease-fire
could be shaping up similar to the one that
developed in Portuguese Guinea when fighting
between Portuguese and insurgent forces tapered
otf following the Lisbon coup.
The military officers who arrived in
Mozambique from Lisbon last week to set up the
junta publicly asserted that the Portuguese are
still officially seeking an immediate cease-fire. It
is not clear, however, if the rebels would agree to
one before further negotiations on a political
settlement are held, or if they intend to keep up
the military pressure tc: force concessions from
Lisbon.
Competim, Rebels in Angola
In Angola, the Portuguese seem anxious to
bring the territory's competing insurgent groups
to the bargaining table. After arKving in Angola
last week, Vice .Amiral Rosa Coutinho, the new
head of the territory's military government, said a
coalition government probably including mem-
bers of the insurgent groups would be formed
soon. Although such an arrangement shows
promise, until now there has been no single na-
tionalist group with enough authority to nego-
tiate with the Portuguese. The three Angolan
insurgent organizations have been in competition
for more than a decade, and the resulting hostility
has ki,vt thein from forming a united front. None
of them has been able to wage effective mil:tary
operations.
Last weekend, how6yer, a meeting took
pace in Zaire between leaders of the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the
Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile,
the most important of the insurgent groups. Also
Spinola
attending were the OAU Secretary
four African presidents who have long backed the
insurgents and have tried to bring them together.
A communique was issued stating that the two
groups would set up a joint front to negotiate
with Lisbon, but no details on the reported agree-
ment are yet available. The effectiveness of any
agreement between the two rivals will depend on
a fmthcoming congress of the Pcpular Movement
in Lusaka, where the group's long-standing leader-
ship struggle may be resolved. If the Popular
Movement has indeed pulled itself together, the
prospects for talks between the insurgents and
Lisbon would be brighter.
General and
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FRANCE
ITALY
PORTUGAL
Ceuta,
ISPAI ) ??????,- ?
RABAT (5PPINI
/ *Meknes
ALGIERS
TU SIA
EL AAIUN
MAURITANIA
NOUAKCHOTT
SENEGAL
UPPER
VOLTA
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NIGERIA
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SPANISH SAHARA: DISPUTE GROWING
Morocco is using both diriornatic and mili-
tary means to press its claims to Madrid's overseas
province of Spanish Sahara. The Moroccan
government hopes to win Third World support for
its position on Spanish Sahara and to pressure
Spain to abandon its plans for increased au-
tonomy for the province. Rabat suspects that
Spain's objective is to create a puppet state in the
phosphate-rich territory.
On the diplomatic front, Moroccan emis-
sarils left this week for various Arab and African
capitals as well as Asian and East European
countries to seek support for Rabat's position.
The Arab and African states will back Morocco's
demand that Spain leave, but they are not in-
clined to support Morocco's territorial ambitions,
especially in view of Mauritania's claims to
Spanish Sahara and Algeria's insistence on a role
as an interested party. Arab countries are re-
luctant to take sides in this quarrel for fear of
weakening Arab unity on the far more important
issue of a Middle East peace settlement.
In just such an effort to exert continuing
pressure on Spain, the Moroccans placed their
armed forces on alert on July 25, canceled all
leaves, and mobilized some reservists
The US defense
attache in Rabat also has reported that some of
Morocco's F-5 fighter aircraft were recently trans-
ferred south from Meknes to Marrakech.
additional troops are being sent to
southern Morocco and near the Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla in the north. Although these
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enclaves have not been an issue in the current
controversy, King Hassan apparently wants to
remind Madrid that the two cities are vulnerable.
25X1
The US embassy in Rabat believes King 25x1
Hassan's campaign to "recover" Spanish Sahara is
the first phase of a strategy to use Moroccan 25x1
nationalist and irredentist aspirations to achieve
internal unity. While the King considers Spain
the adversary until colonial rule is ended, the 25X1
embassy thinks that if Madrid decides to
withdraw, he would make concessions to obtain 25x1
Spanish cooperation in opposing the rival terri-
torial claims of Mauritania, which are backed by
Alaeria
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ARABIAN PENINSULA: DISPUTE RESOLVED
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi settled their
long-standing border dispute on July 29. The pre-
liminary agreement was signed by Prince Fahd,
who has been in charge of the Saudi effort to
work out a settlement since March, and Sheikh
Zayid, Abu Dhabi's ruler and head of the seven-
member United Arab Emirates. Sheikh Zayid will
sign the final accord in Saudi Arabia soon?
perhaps shortly after King Faysal returns from his
current trip to Cairo. The way is now paved for
King Faysal to exte? diplomatic recognition to
the emirate federation.
The two sides have not
of the settlement,
released the details
it provides for: 25X1
? Abu Dhabi to meet a long-time Saudi
demand for a corridor to the Persian Gulf
between Qatar and Abu Dhabi.
Border Arooment
ER S:1 ' .111scal
- Khaimah
UI
tharIal:/-'' 4 h
6'11*
Ilrubl