WEEKLY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret 2511
Weekly Review
State Dept. review completed.
Top Secret
26 April) 1974
Copy
25X1
N? 636
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the 'week through noon. on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Yopics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Spclel Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS A;iri126, 1974
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 Ode to Detente
2 Egypt-USSR: Adjusting Relations
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3 EC: Tensions Easing
4 Fran,:e: Party Dissension
11 Fighting on the Golan
12 USSR Offers More Aid to Syria
13 Iraq: Fighting the Kurds
14 Ethiopia: Taking a Stand
15 Sri Lanka: Muzzling the Opposition
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
18 South Vietnam: Keeping the Lid On
19 Cambodia: The Rural Campaign
20 China: Campaign Target
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
22 OAS in Atlanta: A Positive Mood
23 Chile: On Trial
24 Colombia: Liberal Party Sweep
25 Bolivia- Banzer Yields
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Review
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Romania: Wrestling with the Economy
Portugal: Military Uprising
Portuguese Africa: Lisbon's Black
Janissaries
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The Soviet "peace offen:,'ve" came in for
fresh attention in Kremlin pronouncements over
the past week. Moscow is saying that the road to
international detente is littered with obstacles,
but that patient pursuit of Soviet policies will
lead to new successes. The defensive quality of
some of these statements suggests, however, that
the Soviet leaders are concerned that the near-
term outlook is not so bright.
In a speech delivered earlier this week on the
occasion of the anniversary of Lenin's birth,
candidate Politburo member Ponomarev paid
customary tribute to Moscow's foreign policy and
to Brezhnev's personal role in formulating it. Mos-
cow's globalist policies, according to Ponomarev,
have produced concrete results, with the
Kremlin's voice now being listened to with
"massive attention" everywhere. Ponomarev
noted that further "stubborn efforts" will be re-
quired if the "systematic provocations" against
Moscow's peace offensive are to be overcome, and
detente is to become irreversible. In a defensive
aside, Ponomarev asserted that there was no
reason to charge Soviet foreign policy merely
because of "temporary political situations." Mos-
cow, he said, will continue to implement the
"peace policies" adopted at the 24th CPSU Con-
gress.
Party leader Brezhnev also found an occa-
sion this week to speak out in behalf of detente.
Addressing the Soviet Communist youth congress
in Moscow, Brezhnev said that the words "peace
offensive" indeed aptly describe the Soviet for-
eign policy line, which is progressing steadfastly
though not without certain difficulties. Brezhnev
blamed the Maoists in Peking and imperialist
circles elsewhere for attempting to undermine
Soviet detente policies, but the Soviet leader
maintained that his gradualis+, step-by-step ap-
proach would produce positive results.
A more-qualified assessment of the prospects
for detente was offered by Moscow's leading
Washingtonologist, Yury Arbatov, in a recent
article written especially for United Press Interna-
tional. Addressing US-Soviet relations, Arbatov
said that the improvement so far in bilateral rela-
tions may not prove to be lasting if sttps are not
taken soon to give it more substance. Arbatov
argued that Soviet students of American affairs
regard the present US commitment to detente as
"very complicated and contradictory." He singled
out alleged US efforts to interfere in Soviet
internal affairs as endangering mutual trust and
confidence. If obstacles to trade and other eco-
nomic matters are not removed, Arbatov pro-
fessed, there may be a serious setback in relations.
In a possible allusion to Soviet preferences regard-
ing arms control issues that might be raised at the
forthcoming summit in Moscow, Arbatov warned
that the arms race may step up unless measures
are taken soon to go beyond the provisions of the
ARM tmatvi coxmWr e In Mav 1972
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tUSSR: Adiust'10
President Sadat publicly softened his tone
toward the Soviets last week, after several weeks
of belaboring them in speeches and interviews. At
the same time, however, he served notice on Mos-
cow that he wants to reduce the leverage it has on
him by virtue of Egypt's dependence on Soviet
military supplies. He is seeking, he said, to
diversify Egypt's source of arms.
Sadat's assertions of continued friendship
with Moscow, which have been absent in recent
months, raised the temperature of the relation-
ship only slightly above the frigid level. He con-
tinued to harp on points c: difference, chiefly
over Soviet failure to deliver 0e arms Egypt ex-
pects, although he termed these differences "mis-
understandings" between friends.
He made somethin7 of an attempt to mollify
Soviet misgivings over his new foreign policy
orientation, noting that he seeks "positive neu-
trality" between the US and the USSR and does
not intend to maintain ties with one at the ex-
pense of the other. He reasserted, however, his
categorical rejection of any Soviet attempt to
dictate his domestic policy; Egypt's policies are
Egypt's business, he said, and outside comment-a
reference to the criticism of Soviet propagan-
dists--is in "bad taste."
Sadat's emphasis on Moscow's alleged failure
to meet Egypt's arms demands is more an excuse
for his carping than the real reason for it, which
runs deeper. Sadat has always chafed at Egypt's
position as a Soviet client state. Egyptian military
achievements during the war have given Sadat a
sense of freedom from Soviet tutelage that he
could never before justify or successfully assert;
the role of the US in the negotiations since the
war has convinced him that Soviet political sup-
port is at present not necessary to reach a settle-
ment.
Sadat's continuing criticism of the Soviets is
also in part a reaction to charges from some
Egyptians and other Arabs that he has transferred
Egypt's dependence to the US. By characterizing
Rebtions
the Soviets as unreliable allies acid the US as a
new but still not fully tested friend, he justifies
his turn toward Washington without seeming to
place too much reliance on the US.
Finally, Sadat's portrayal of Moscow as a
friend that cannot be depended upon m'litarily is
designed to convince Syria, and other Arabs as
;yell, that political dependence on the Soviets also
does not pay off. Sadat suspects Moscow of
encouraging Syrian intransigence in disengage-
ment negotiations, and he is seeking to persuade
the Syrians they will achieve nothing by heeding
Moscow's advice.
The Soviets are not likely to take much
comfort from Sadat's most recent expressions of
guarded friendship, although they might hope
that he is prepared to tone down the anti-Soviet
rhetoric. Moscow will interpret Sadat's reference
to weapons diversification, as Sadat intends, as a
signal that he will not be blackmailed into
changing his policies in exchange for Soviet hard-
ware. Sadat's assertion of Egyptian neutrality and
his positive references to the US will be seen,
moreover, as evidence that he has no present
intention of arresting Cairo's move toward a more
balanced foreign policy.
The Soviets are continuing their indirett-
but nevertheless barbed-campaign to discredit
Sadat both within Egypt and among other Arabs.
Last week, for example, the Soviets apparently
were behind the publication in Beirut of "docu-
ments" defending the USSR against Sadat's
charges of lukewarm support during the October
war.
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meanings of European union and prepare a paper
for public debate. This proposal was not ac-
cepted, but the fact that it was made suggests that
the West Germans were successfui last weekend in
their basic purpose of getting Callaghan to think
in terms of the community. The ministers agreed
that work would resume on the Political Com-
mittee's report on European Union. Callaghan
may now realize the UK is in as good a position
to influence this report as any other country.
EC Foreign Ministers *
EC: TENSIONS EASING
At an informal meeting in West Germany
last weekend, the EC foreign ministers seemed to
make some headway toward easing tensions
within the community. The complexion of this
meeting was in sharp contrast to the EC Council
session earlier this month, which had dwelled on
the potential crisis over British demands for
"renegotiation" of its membership.
The improved atmosphere among the eight
ministers--the caretaker Belgian Government was
not represented-was most obvious in the dia-
logue on "European union." British Foreign Sec-
retary Callaghan, far from refusing to discuss the
goal, said he was not opposed in principle to
European union but really did not know what it
meant.
The response of the other foreign ministers
was vague. The notion was raised of retaining
national states and borders while, above the na-
tional level, there would be a "federal or con-
federal level." Mention was made of a European
government with independent powers having a
parliament composed of a house of states and a
house of the peoples. EC Commission President
Ortoli, who was present, argued that these con-
cepts would tend to substitute intergovernmental
cooperation for integration.
Callaghan proposed that EC officials should,
without prior commitment, examine the various
With respect to EC consultations with the
US, the French apparently gave way on their
previous insister :e that the Nine consult only
after unanimous agreement among themselves.
They agreed that the Nine shculd use bilateral
channels fully and multilateral channels on occa-
sion. A senior British official cautioned, however,
that the new EC attitude has not yet been tested
* (from left: Jobert, France; Callaghan, UK; Thorn, Luxembourg; Ortoli, EC
president; Vanderstoel, Netherlands; Scheel, W. Germany; Moro, Italy; Guldberg, Denmark)
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in action, and he believes it might be reversed if
the US should press for a more explicit commit-
ment. The EC members rejected the "organic"
link to the US suggested by Washington, but
remain divided on whether a requirement for con-
sultation should be incorporated into a US-
European declaration in the NATO context.
Little was said about EC cooperation with
the Arabs, reportedly because of the continued
Arab oil embargo against the Netherlands and
Denmark. Both Scheel and Callaghan told their
colleagues of increasing US interest in a European
role in support of Egyptian President Sadat's con-
structive positions.
The next steps in the European-Arab dia-
logue are likely to depend on an analysis of
Chancellor Brandt's recent visits to Algiers and
Cairo. Brandt publicly stated during his trip that
the organized dialogue will begin in the course of
the year, but there is still no clear picture as to
what the form and content of that dialogue will
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the official Gaullist
presidential candidate, still has not gained his
party's full support and continues to slip further
behind Valery Giscard d'Estaing as well as Social-
ist Francois Mitterrand in public opinion polls.
Staunch Gaullists who support Chaban have
threatened the dissidents, led by Interior Minister
Chirac, with expulsion from the party if they
explicitly endorse Giscard. Chirac is determined,
however, to continue meeting with the group of
di:.oiit 40 Gaullist mem1,ers of the legislature and
cabinet to plan behi,id-the-scenes support for
Giscard. He is personally funneling to Giscard
official ministry reports on the campaign. Last
weekend, Chirac leaked to the press a confidential
poll that showed Giscard more likely than Chaban
to defeat Mitterrand in a run-off second round on
May 19.
Interim President Alain Poher also is helping
Giscard. Poher, who is president of the Senate,
shares that body's sense of gratitude for Giscard's
opposition in 1969 to De Gaulle's referendum
proposal, which would have taken away most of
the Senate's powers.
Prime Minister Messmer on April 21 gave
Chaban a lukewarm endorsement hut added that
he would not campaign for him before the first
round of the election. The Prime Minister, who
joined Chirac in two well-publicized effort25X1
force Chaban to withdraw from the race,
warned Chaban not to attack Giscard in the
campaign.
The continued Gaullist dissidence-as well as
his own problems as a campaigner-precipitated
Chaban's slippage to several percentage points
behind Giscard in the latest series of public
opinion polls. Giscard's advisers expect Chaban's
well-organized campaign machinery to enable him
to pull ahead again in the polls, but they are
confident Giscard will beat him in the first round
on May 5. Giscard's improved performance in the
polls has stimulated contributions that have
begun to ease his campaign's financial problems.
On the left, Mitterrand's campaign is
advancing smoothly, but the Communists are
irritated over his efforts to appear more moder-
ate. Mitterrand had not consulted with the Com-
munists on his platform, and they were particu-
larly unhappy out his announced intention to
name a fellow Socialist as prime minister.
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WARSAW PACT SUMMIT: NO CHANGE
The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative
Committee met in Warsaw on April 17-18 and
reiterated its support for detente, but the gather-
ing of party first secretaries and top government
officials did not sig,ral any change in the pact's
position on the European security or the force
reduction talks. Instead, the participants called
for a summit-level finale to the CSCE and once
again suggested that the conference establish a
"permanent organization" to oversee European
security. They also agreed to observe the pact's
20th anniversary in Warsaw in 1975.
The leaders repeated the support for force
reductions in Europe that they had first jointly
expressed at their January 1972 meeting in
Czechoslovakia, and said that successful con-
clusion of the talks would be a "significant con-
tribution to detente." While not formally en-
dorsing the Soviet force reductions proposal, the
communique summarizing the meeting claimed
that a "constructive agreement" was possible
without damaging the security of "either side."
The session also renewed an old propaganda
gesture by again offering to abolish the Warsaw
Pact in conjunction with the liquidation of
NATO. The communique added, however, that as
long as NATO existed and no effective dis-
armament measures were taken, the Warsaw Pact
states would continue to strengthen their military
potential.
For the first time since 1969, the com-
mander of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Forces, Soviet
Marshal Yakubovsky, briefed the Consultative
Committee, reporting on the activity of the pact's
Joint Command. He may also have given a review
of the activities of the pact's military organization
since it was restructured in 1969.
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Brezhnev used the occasion to hold separate
meetings with the East European party chiefs.
The official characterization of his session with
Romanian leader Ceausescu suggested that rela-
tions between Moscow and Bucharest are still
cool.
Marshal Yakubovsky and Pact
Chief of Staff Shtemenko
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President Ceausescu, already faced with
hard-currency deficits and bureaucratic inability
to cope with high-pressure growth policies, is
additionally confronted with a drought and with
shortfalls in the output of major industries.
Partially in an effort to find solutions, he is shift-
ing personnel and further centralizing policy-
making.
The ambitious agricultural plan is in serious
trouble. Ceausescu, hoping to make up last year's
5-percent drop in production and expand export
earnings this year, called for a record 22-percent
increase in output. Low soil moisture-about half
of normal levels--threatens a further fall in crop
production. The drought is causing problems all
over Eastern Europe, and if it continues, grain
imports to Eastern Europe will rise. ; ra hedge,
the Romanians are seeking a prelimim.~; commit-
ment from the US for a million tons of grain.
Some key industrial sectors-especially steel,
textiles, and chemicals-have failed to meet either
the January or the February plan. The call for
completion of the 1971-1975 plan in four and a
half years has apparently been quietly dropped by
all regions, except that of Bucharest. Ceausescu,
however, remains committed to plan "prefulfill-
ment."
Ceausescu is not yet ready to downgrade this
year's economic plan. Instead, he has launched a
strong attack against the bureaucracy, arguing
that the practice among middle-level managers of
passing the buck is a prime cause of the present
difficulties. He has taken more responsibility on
himself and his few close economic advisers.
If the drought and the problems with in-
dustry continue, the heaviest impact will be felt
on exports and the balance of payments. Ceau-
sescu had hoped to expand the value of exports
to the West by 76 percent this year. Although
much of the increase was to come from higher
prices for petroleum and agricultural products,
NN.i+VYhi9Yb64NkSkWM, 6;V;
exports of industrial products, particularly ma-
chinery, were slated to rise sharply. Now, petro-
leum is the only sure prospect. 25X1
Bucharest shows no sign of cutting back its
buying spree in the West. Decreased export earn-
ings would add to its burdensome debt service,
already about 40 percent of its hard-currency
exports. Ceausescu would then be forced to
appeal to his major creditors-most likely the
West Germans--for iescheduli.ig assist-
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PORTUGAL: MILITARY UPRISING
By noon on April 25, dissidents calling
themselves the "Armed Forces Movement"
announced the formation of a provisional govern-
ment and claimed to have captured the Portu-
guese Legion headquarters, major radio stations,
the Ministry of Army headquarters in Lisbon, and
a few military installations outside the capital.
They also reported that President Thomaz, Prime
Minister Caetano, and some other ministers were
surrour.ded by rebel fcr cos at National Repub-
lican Guard headquarters, and that they had been
given an ultimatum to surrender.
Earlier this month in the wake of the mili-
tary unrest over Portugal's overseas policy, the
yovernment arrested nearly 80 leftists and ap-
peared determined to discourage political demon-
strations, especially on May Day. Lisbon also
cracked down on some clergymen who were
advocating a less repressive overseas policy.
Sc far, there has been no response from
Portugal's African territories, although the mili-
tary there will be watching the situation very
closely. Support for Spinola and Cost-i Gomes is
sizable ;r! the territories, particularly among
junior officers, but it has been held in check by
strong conservative elements in the military, civil-
ian, and security structures. The Rhodesian and
South African governments also are watching the
situation closely since events in Lisbon will have a
strong bearing on their support for Portuguese
counter-insurgency efforts in Mozambique, where
fighting has been on an upswing since the first of
the year.
The outcome of the current situation will
depend primarily on the military--whether most
choose to remain loyal to the Caetano gov-
ernment or to support the dissenters j
this time, there is no evidence that civil At
ian ~pposi-
Portuguese Africa:
LISBON'S BLACK JANISSARIES
The pop"d-image of the Portuguese African
insurgencies a. ,'ruggles of nat've blacks against a
white minority government has tended to obscure
the fact that significant numbers of black Afri-
cans are fighting for Lisbon. Some of these Afri-
cans are better armed, better trained, and better
paid than rank-and-file white Portuguese troops.
Africans in all three Portuguese territories
are subject to conscription into the regular army.
They receive the same pay and allowances as
soldiers from Portugal, although very few have
risen above the enlisted ranks. At present, almost
a third of the 150,000 regular Portug:'ese Army
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I I
African Troops
in the Portuguese Territories
,.;-(Total African
{ troops: 22,500)
Total troops:
45,000)
f ngola Mozambique Portuguo e
Oncluding Guinea
forces in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese
Guinea are Africans.
The regular army units operate from fixed
positions in cleared areas anJ alone well-estab-
Iiahed routes of communication. In addition, the
Portuguese have developed two special counter-
guerrilla forces that work effectively in he
"bush." Both are made t-.p almost exclusively of
African volunteers.
First 'n the field were the "Flechas" (Ar-
rows) of the Directorate General of Security.
Created in 1965 as a corps of bodyguards for
agents of the security service, the force was later
expanded into a paracorrimando force led by Afri-
can officers and directed by a regional security
Number of
Ahiran troops
70,000- - -
___(Total African
troops: 63,200) (Total African
(Total coops: troop:': 60,300)
102.200) (Total troops:
Ohs 102
300)
,
Spacial Forces
Army
50,000 -- -
Regular Army
Page 9
Many Flechas are recruited from tribes hos-
tile to the insurgents, but at least half are rebel
defectors whose guerrilla expertise has been ably
exploited by the service. They enjoy an
reputation and are paid almost twice as much as
regular soldiers. At present, there are some 1,200
Flechas in Angola and about 300 in Mozambique.
The other bush force is the army's Special
Group, which numbers ab-3ut 9,000 men, most of
whom are in Angola. It also includes many former
insurgents, although the arm j has not exploited
their potential as w?II. Because Special Group
units are attached to the army, they have less
flexiLility than the Flechas. Special Group troops
are assigned to defend a specific locality, where
they also engage in civic action projects.
Additional tens of thousands of Africans
serve in militia units in all three territories. These
units play a more limited role; probably no more
than a third of the militiamen have even rudi-
ment-.fry military training err modern weapons.
I hey are charged with defending their villages,
serve as guides and sources of intelligence for the
regulars, and perform local administrative duties.
Lisbon believes that the be-lefits of using
African troops outweigh the potential dangers.
Through their security rol3, a lar'ae -umbet of
Africans have acquires' an interest in preserving
the status quo in the territories, 'o-. they have a
position they could not attain through ur.ne limited
economic are educational openings available to
them. Moreover, Lisbon is able to advertise the
African troops as evidence of the multi-racialism
of Lrasitanian society.
Many white settlers in the territories are not
enthusiastic, hcwever. They fear that the Africans
whom Portugal has armed and trained may
eventually turn against them. The s ;ttlers' ap-
prehension is aggravated by a shnrtace of arms for
civilian use in the territories, which makes it
difficult for whites to defend themselves against
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FIGHTING FLUCTUATES ON THE GOLAN
Fighting between Syrian and Israeli frrces
on the Golan front over the past week flared,
then abated, and then flared up again at mid-
week. The Syrians are likely to keep tensions high
on the front through Secretary Kissing' is visit
next week, but neither side is expected to take
any military action that would endanger the
chances of concluding a disengagement accord.
Most of the fighting centered around Mount
Hermon, where both sides appear bent on con-
trolling 'the dominant peaks. In the process, the
scope of the fighting has grown frorr small com-
mando actions to clashes involving large ground
units as well as substantial numbers of aircraft
and surface-to-air missiles.
The level of the fighting on April 19 was the
most intense since the cease-fire went into effect
last October. Israeli aircraft struck Syrian targets
both on Mount Hermon and opposite the Israeli-
held salient. Damascus claimed to have downed
17 Israeli aircraft, but Tel Aviv admitted to the
loss of only two. One Israeli helicopter was
destroyed in a mid-air collision. Two Syrian
MIG-21s apparently were shot down during the
day's fighting.
After the incnse exchanges on April 19, the
level of the fighting tapered off over the weekend
and into the early part of the week. The conflict
was basically confined to tank, artillery, and
mortar fire, although Tel Aviv conducted limited
air strikes against Moi-nt Hermon on April 21 and
23.
Fighting flared again, however, on April 24.
Intense artillery fire occurred along several sectors
of the front, and Israeli aircraft struck positions
on Mount Hermon. Both Israeli and Syrian air-
craft attacked targets in the southern sector of
the front.
Israeli tank on newly built Mt. Hermon road
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The Israelis apparently occupy most of the
main peaks on Mount Hermon-including the
highest one. These positions afford excellent
observation into Syria, southern Lebanon, and
the northern portion of the Israeli-occupied
Golan Heights. The Israelis have already con-
structed a rcad up the southwestern ridge of
Mount Hermon, facilitating the resupply of their
forces. The Syrians also are attempting to build a
road to the top, and much of the action has
resulted from Israeli efforts to prevent its
completion.
Israeli military authorities have officially
denied a story in a Lebanese newspaper that
Israeli forces are occupying a hill on the Lebanese
Medieerrenenr'
Snn
Resonrch ;
Center
I erfilize
Dayr an Zawr ?~?
USSR OFFERS MORE AID TO SYRIA
President Asad apparently returned from his
visit ;.; Moscow with commitments of new eco-
nomic aid and promises of continuing military
support. The new economic credits could total as
much as several hundred million dollars.
Beyond any political motivation that can be
read into Moscow's gesture, the new assistance is
needed for several major Soviet projects, in-
cluding ancillary facilities for the nearly
completed Euphrates dam. Credits are required to
finance irrigation systems and transmission lines
connected with the dam, for oil exploration, and
for railroad construction, a long-standing Soviet
aid undertaking. The USSR may also assist in the
construction of a small dam and a steel mill.
Soviet officials may have renewed their
pledge to aid Syria's war-reconstruction effort.
Any new undertakings, however, would depend
on extensive feasibility studies.
Between 1957 and 1973, Moscow extended
Syria more than $315 million in economic aid and
was Damascus' principal source of foreign capital.
Western bilateral aid deliveries were only half the
25X1
Soviet level during this period. Today, however,
Moscow is facing increasing competition from
Western and Arab states. Syrian interest in ex-
panding ties with the West reflects Presi; ent
1
Asad's continuing efforts to balance Moscow's
economic presence.
Soviet economic aid is already being dwar~'ed
by the large amounts of money transferred to
Syria since the October war by rich Arab oil
states. Kuwait recently pledged $500 million to
the confrontation states; Syria will receive a
major share of this pledge. This aid is advan-
tageous to Syria because it is not tied to specific
projects and can be used where needed. In addi-
tion, the World 8ank and its affiliate, the Inter-
national Development Association, have com-
mitted $98-million worth of credits this year to
finance irrigation and electric power projects.
More offerings are expected from a variety
of donors. Japanese official and private sources
already have offered a $100-million aid package
to build an oil refinery, with promises of addi-
tional aid for po:I: and railroad construction.
Other Western nations are investigating economic
arrangements with Damascus as part of their
over-all effort to curry favor with the Arabs and
assure a continuing supply of oil, even thou h
Syria is still a minor oil producer.
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Cotten under
Pleppu ,~ Resanreh consfc.l
5 Euphrnfes~Tnbngo), -:`
Dam
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IRAQ: FIGHTING THE KURDS
Fighting between government forces and
Kurdish rebels led by Mulla Mustafa 3arzani is
intensifying in northern Iraq. So far, however, the
government has not launched a general offensive
against the Kurds.
Ira-,r forces appear to be concentrating on a
few key targets such as the rebel-held town of
Zakhu, which controls the main route into
Turkey, and strategic mountain passes in the east
through which supplies flow to the Kurds rom
Iran. Baghdad is also trying to relieve several of its
beleaguered garrisons. Air strikes have been par-
25X1 ticularly heavy against both Zakhu and the
Rawanduz area, where Barzani has his head-
quarters.
The government continues to reinforce its
already substantial military force in the north,
and is committing more armor, heavy artillery,
and aircraft.
The government apparently still hopes to
control the situation by measures short of full-
scale military operations. Baghdad is trying to
Page 13 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 26, 74
maintain a posture of calm confidence while
implementing the limited autonomy plan for the
Kurdish minority that Barzani has rejected. Gov-
ernment propaganda claims that all is quiet in the
north except for a few areas of what it terms
"mutiny."
Along with its military measures, Baghdad is
continuing to press political efforts aimed at
isolating Barzani and splitting the Kurds. Having
earlier replaced several Kurdish provincial gov-
ernors and cabinet ministers-who had already
defected to Barzani-with Kurds loyal to the gov-
ernment, Baghdad this week named Taha
Moheddin Maaruf, a Kurd who has recently been
the Iraqi ambassador to Italy, to fill the vacant
vice presidency of Iraq. The clandestine Kurdish
radio immediately attacked the move as part of
the government's facade of Kurdish autonomy
and branded Maaruf a traitor.
The Kurds, for their part, have declared "all-
out war" against the central governmentfl
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Prime Minister Endalkatchew's government
this week made its most 'rigorous attempt to end
two months of turmoil that has partially para-
lyzed central and local government and threatens
to cause serious damage to the economy. The
government's threat to use force if necessary
against strikers and demonstrators poses a major
test of its ability to survive.
On April 23, the government banned un-
authorized demonstrations, threatened striking
government employees with prosecution, and
directed the armed forces and police to take "all
necessary steps" to maintain law and order. So
far, however, the strikers have not complied; in-
deed, additional private and public employees are
threatening to go out. Students in Addis Ababa
took to the streets on April 24 in a direct chal-
lenge to the government's announcement.
Endalkatchew's move was prompted by the
continued spread of labor unrest despite the mix-
ture of concessions and promises that have been
offered by the government in recent weeks. Par-
ticularly disruptive have been strikes by civil ser-
vants in some provincial capitals, by railway
workers in the eastern town of Dire Dawa, and by
dockworkers in the Red Sea ports of Assab and
Massawa.
Police in Asmara and in some other towns in
Eritrea Province are continuing to demand the
ouster of the national police commander, General
Yilma Shibeshi. The governmt.A has decided for
the time being to keep Yilma as commander,
since he is supported by police unit- outside Eri-
trea.
Widespread unrest continues in rural areas.
Townspeople are demanding the removal of cor-
rupt officials, and farmers are demonstrating for
land reform. In some areas, district officials have
abandoned their posts under this pressure.
Public secondary schooling in much of the
country is apparently finished for the remainder
of this school year. University students decided
on April 22 to withdraw from school, and the
faculty council has recommended the closing of
Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa.
A huge but peaceful demonstration on April
20 by the country's sizable Muslim community,
and attempts to organize a Christian counter-
demonstration have contributed to unease in the
capital. The Muslims, who feel they have been
relegated to second-class citizenship by Ethiopia's
Christian rules abandoned their usual submis-
siveness to march in support of equal rights for
their community, separation of church and state,
and an end to religious discrimination.
Muslim leaders attempted to forestall a
Christian backlash by avoiding overtly political
demands and by emphasizing their loyalty to
Ethiopia. Many leaders of the Ethiopian Ortho-
dox Church, however, view the Muslims' action as
a direct challenge. They want to crganize a coun-
terdemonstration, but most Christians are evi-
dently heeding Prime Minister Endalkatchew's
recc emendation against such a move.
Endalkatchew probably decided he had little
to lose by adopting a tough posture. He and other
ministers can shift responsibility to the police and
military. The government can claim that it is
doing about all it or any other civilian admin-
istration could do under the circumstances, and
that the reforms demanded by the military can
only he carried out if the disorders end.
Most elements of the security forces will
probably attempt to carry out the government's
orders. Such action, however, wall put moderatei;
within the military in the difficult position of
opposing civilians whose interests they claim to
champion and on whose behalf the army is press-
ing for broader reforms. The military moderates
had hoped that their influence woula he decisive
in bringing about step-by-step change in Ethi-
opia's feudalistic society, but they have been un-
able to control events in the face of the con-
tinuinq agitation.
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SRI LANKA: MUZZLING THE OPPOSITION
Prime Minister Bandaranaike clamped down
hard on the major opposition party last week. Her
action apparently reflects a decision to try to
silence her opponents before they can capitalize
politically on the country's bleak economic
prospects.
In a public address on April 20, the Prime
Minister denounced the activities of the United
National Party-a generally moderate opposition
group. She claimed to perceive a direct threat to
law and order in the party's announced plan to
hold ? 10 public rallies on April 21 to protest the
government's handling of economic policies and
to call for its resignation.
Mrs. Bandaranaike accompanied her charges
with stern measures to meet the alleged threat.
These included:
Y a curfew enforced by the army, f;om
midnight Saturday to 4:00 a.m. Monday;
e an indefinite ban on ail United National
Party public meetings;
. imposition of press censorship and clo-
sure of the only remaining anti-government
newspaper chain.
To provide legal justification for the meas-
ures, two emergency regulations were promul-
gated. One gave the Prime Minister the power to
prohibit political meetings and the other made
incitement to violence or disobedience of the law
punishable by confiscation of property. Earlier
last week, Mrs. Bandaranaike had pushed through
a law under which anyone making statements
"likely to cause public alarm or public disorder"
could be detained without bail for up to 20 years.
The various m9asuros invoked by the Prime Minis-
ter c.ccomplished their immadiate purpose: the
opposition rallies were not held.
The moves against the opposition indicate
that Mrs. Bandaranaike is presently being heavily
in`luenced by the radical wing of her party-
including influential members of her immediate
Mrs. Bandaranaike
family-and to a lesser extent her Trotskyite coa-
lition partners. These groups apparently have con-
vinced the Prime Minister that opposition forces
are indeed conspiring to foment disorders. There
is no evidence to support such a charge, although
tension and dissatisfaction with the government
over economic issues are reportedly rife through-
out the country.
It is not yet clear whether the United Na-
tional Party will proceed with a planned civil
disobedience movement, scheduled to begin May
1. Should the party decide to follow through,
attempts by the government to suppress the activ-
ity would greatly increase the likelihood of
violence.
Although security forces could probably
maintain order, the army commander has ex-
pressed concern over the ability of his troops to
contain widespread and simultaneous outbursts.
He is also worried about the possible reluctance
of his troops to move against countrymen with
whose grievances they may well sympathize
25X1
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Both the South Vietnamese and Viet Cong
are making the same assessment of what the fight-
ing will be like in the next several months: con-
tinued military activity, but nothing that will get
out of hand. President Thieu stated unequivocally
at a National Security Council meeting on April
19 that he would not authorize any large-scale
increase in the fighting by government forces. For
the Communists, new orders on strategy from
COSVN contain the most specific evidence to
date that they do not plan to launch a country-
wide offensive for some time to come.
The Communists' latest instructions give a
sober view of their near-term prospects. COSVN
noted that while some improvement in the Com-
munist military position had occurred since the
cease-fire, it had not been enough to guarantee
that an offensive would be successful. In addition,
COSVN saw little if any near-term improvement
in the Communists' politica' position. Thus, they
could not now "destroy" their opponents and
would have to defer an all-out effort until "cer-
tain of victory," a point COSVN estimated would
be reached in "about two years." For the foresee-
able future, however, COSVN envisions a series of
limited military campaigns designed to test the
South Vietnamese Army and put political pres-
sures on Saigon.
The South Vietnamese are currently reading
Communist intentions in this same vein. Saigon
does not expect the diet Cong to launch an
offensive anytime soon, despite the fact that the
Communists now have a greater military capa-
bility than they had in 1972. President Thieu
anticipates military pressure, sometimes intense,
in all regions of the country, and he is directing
his commanders to hold their present positions,
ensure the security of the population, and prevent
further economic deterioration in areas under
their command.
The type of military pressure that each side
envisions was reflected in last week's action in
Military Region 3, where the Communists con-
tinued their pressure on South Vietnamese forces
following the capture of the Tonle Cham Ranger
base northwest of Saigon.
Present attention is focused on Hau Nghia
Province and the besieged Duc Hue Ranger base.
All regiments of the North Vietnamese 5th Divi-
sior. are committed to forcing the Rangers to
withdraw from Duc Hue, which is astride a major
infiltration corridor to Saigon and the Delta. In a
successful effort to prevent the ARVN 18th Divi-
sion from moving to Hau Nghia, two North Viet-
namese regiments have stepped up attacks near
Xuan Loc along the border of Long Khanh and
Phuoc Tuy provinces; the Communists have also
cut Route 2 in this area and appear to be trying
to connect two of their base areas.
Government forces in the central highlands
met little opposition when they reoccupied the
Ranger fire-support base southwest of Pleiku
City, which had been overrun last week. Commu-
nist units remain in the area, however, and more
fighting is expected. To the north, reinforced
government units are planning to step up pressure
on Communist units northeast of Kontum City.
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Similar attacks last month precipitated a sharp
response by the Communists.
CAMBODIA: THE RURAL CAMPAIGN
Khmer Communist units northwest of
Phnom Penh have followed up last month's suc-
cess at Oudong by forcing a 1,900-man Cambo-
dian! Army force from beachhead positions on the
Tonle Sap River at the town of Kompong Luong.
At mid-week, 1,300 of these troops had reached
government lines around the nearby base at
Lovek. Many of the missing may still be working
their way south toward Phnom Penh.
The setback at Kompong Luong was more
the result of familiar Cambodian Army shortcom-
ings than overwhelming Communist pressure. In
an effort first to relieve and then to retake the
former royal capital of Oudong, the high com-
mand poured men and equipment into the beach-
head at Kompong Luong. But the operation was
plagued from the beginning by the lack of any
clear-cut tactical plan and by poor field leadership
compounded by shifting and confusing command
responsibilities. In addition, Phnom Penh's in-
creasing preoccupation with the defense of Kam-
pot resulted in the diversion of vital air support.
Having lost the initiative by default, the govern-
ment force retreated ti the beachhead, where the
Communists harassed it with steady shellings and
ground probes.
Besides guaranteeing that the Khmer Com-
munists can move supplies freely across the Tonle
Sap in the vicinity of Kompong Luong, the loss of
the beachhead will undoubtedly give fresh im-
SOUTH V1E1 ~tAlLt ?I
o Miirs
25 \\.
petus to the insurgents' present strategy of attack-
ing similarly isolated and exposed government
enclaves in the countryside. Thus far, this effort
has produced only the downfall of one minor
provincial capital-Oudong-and a standoff at
Kampot. 25X1
The Communists' next target will probably
be the provincial capital of Prey Veng, 30 miles
east of Phnom Penh.
Government conim-inders are aware of Com-
munist designs against Prey Veng. The garrison
there has been reinforced and the local com-
mander is planning operations to disrupt Commu-
nist plans. Government preparations notwith-
standing, the 'errain around Prey Veng and the
city's proximity to insurgent base areas ive the
Communists some advantage.
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I I
The anti-L''/anti-Confucius campaign is no
longer the tightly controlled movement it was in
its initial stages. The ban on criticism of individu-
als has either been lifted or is being ignored,
resulting in a flurry of personal attacks. In the
process, the struggle to control the campaign has
intensified factionalism in the provinces. As the
campaign enters its ninth month, events in Pe-
king, Fukien, and Kirin illustrate its changing
nature.
Peking avoided singling out targets in the
early months of the campaign, but now the cam-
paign seems on'the verge of claiming a major
victim, Politburo member and party vice-chair-
man Li Te-sheng. Wall posters have appeared
throughout the country attacking Li as a follower
of disgraced Defense Minister Lin Piao. The
charge is hardly credible-Li was praised for his
loyalty to Mao during the Lin crisis-but that
doesn't change the apparent verdict.
The real reasons for the attacks on Li can
probably be found in the factional infighting that
has come to characterize the campaign. Fukien
Province, where yet-unnamed party leaders have
been accused of complicity in the Lin plot, is a
good example. The charge appeared in the latest
issue of the party's theoretical journal and may
have been brought by supporters of Yeh Fei,
Fukien's civilian boss before the Cultural Revolu-
tion. The targets seem to be supporters of Han
Hsien-chu, who headed Fukien until his transfer
to Kansu last December. Bad blood has existed
between them since Han replaced Yeh during the
Cultural Revolution, and Han has reportedly long
fought Yeh's return. Factions in other provinces
are also using the opportunities afforded by the
campaign to try to reopen old cases, settle old
scores, and bring back persons of varied ideologi-
cal hues who were purged during the Cultural
Revolution.
The campaign puts all provincial leaders in a
difficult position. Peking has ordered them to
arouse the masses and accept their criticisms, but
to still maintain order. The leaders in Kirin Prov-
ince, and in some other provinces, are struggling
to maintain complete control over the movement.
At a criticism meeting called with their approval,
Kirin party leaders submitted to mild mass criti-
cism for going too stow in the campaign to deni-
grate Lin and Confucius. The speaker, not one of
the party's top leaders, then admonished the audi-
ence to maintain discipline under the party, to
increase production, and to avoid dividing into
factions. The whole affair is reminiscent of the
"sham power seizures" of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, when leaders in the provinces made a show
of bowing to sympathetic mass groups in order to
pre-empt their real opponents. In the end, that
tactic was not particularly successful.
In any event, the campaign seems to be
moving rapidly forward. Li Te-sheng is obviously
in serious trouble, and others are likely to join
him. One group that stands to benefit is the
veteran cadre who were purged by the Red
Guards during the Cultural Revolution and were
replaced by the militar i in the aftermath, but
who now seem to be rec wining some of their lost
provincial roles. Military men who hold political
positions in the provinces seem headed for a par-
ticularly rough time.
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OAS IN ATLANTA: A POSITIVE MOOD
The positive mood of revived hemispheric
partnership still dominates the OAS General
Assembly now meeting in Atlanta, but underlying
Latin American frustration with the organization
as the principal vehicle for inter-American coop-
eration continues. The open exchanges at earlier
meetings of the foreign ministers outside the OAS
framework served to highlight the rigidities and
slow responses of the more formal structure.
The Latin American and Caribbean foreign
ministers reacted favorably to Secretary Kis-
singer's ePiorsemeint of most of their p, nciples
and positions regarding the relationships between
the US and the less-developed countries of the
hemisphere. But they were quick to express their
dissatisfaction with such matters as the restrictive
aspects of US trade policy, the lack of real prog-
ress on the transfer of technology, and the con-
duct of large corporations abroad. The ministers
also expressed grave concern over the resolution
by 34 US senators opposed to ceding control of
the Panama Canal. The general feeling among the
ministers is that while their talks with the Secre-
tary have been promising, the new spirit of coop-
eration remains fragile, anO the lack of rapid
delivery on commitments will reactivate the
former adversary relationship with he US.
Division over Cuba remains, but the issue is
no longer a burning one. Those countries pressing
for Cuban re-entry into the inter-American
OAS General Assembly meets at
State Capitol in Atlanta, Georgia
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system feel that they won a round when the U5
relaxed trade restrictions in the Argentine case
and are pleased as well by the proposal to invite
Cuba to the next foreign ministers meeting at
Buenos Aires in March 1975. The countries still
hostile toward Cuba, on the other hand, are
gratified by the basically unchanged position of
the US toward Cuba and are convinced that
Washington will not alter its Cuban policy without
consulting them.
The OAS meetings, which will continue
through the end of April, are characteristically
bogged down in a series of issues of concern only
to individual countries. Almost no progress has
been made in the effort to restructure the organ-
ization, and efforts to broaden the membership
remain stymied by territorial disputes and other
The first major public trial for leftist
prisoners got under way in Santiago last week and
is expected to last at least a month. Verdicts and
sentences for the 64 defendants will be handed
down only after all the individual trials are over.
Most of the defendants are military men, but
socialist civilians Carlos Lazo and Erick
Schnake-the latter a senator at the time of the
military coup last year-are charged with pro-
moting insubordination in the armed forces and
stealing military secrets. The prosecution has
requested death sentences for several military
defendants, a life sentence for Lazo, and 30 years
for Schnake.
Defense attorneys for the first military
defendants to be tried argued that the wartime
court-martial set up to hear the cases lacks juris-
diction. They claimed that since the alleged of-
fenses were committed prior to the coup and the
junta's declarations of states of siege and internal
war, the trials should be conducted under peace-
time provisions of the military justice code.
Decisions of peacetime military tribunals may be
appealed to the civil Supreme Court, but appeals
from the ;udgments of wartime courts-martial
may be made only to higher military authorities.
THE JURIDICAL MEASURES CON-
SIDERED NECESSARY AND PROPER
MAY NOT COMPLETELY MEASURE UP
TO INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED
STANDARDS
The government takes a different view of
jurisdiction. Under a decree law issued soon after
the coup, it has construed the military justice
code to hold that the date of the initiation of
judicial proceedings against a defendant, not the
date of the alleged offense, is the determining
factor. Military prosecutors at the trial cdded a
new wrinkle by arguing that an undeclared state
of internal war existed before the coup.
The court refused to declare itself incorr,
petent, but did not allude to the proposition that
the state of war began with the organization of
extremist paramilitary units and their clandestine
procureme.it of illegal arms. The issue of when
and against wl-om the armed forces were at war is
central to charges involving the passing of military
secrets to "the enemy."
The government has announced that trials
for its most prominent leftist prisoners-including
party leaders and cabinet officers in the Allende
government-will begin before the end of April.
These defendants are also likely to be brought
before wartime courts-martial and charged with
pre-coup violations of the military justice code.
Defense attorneys undoubtedly will raise the
jurisdictional issue, but their arguments will prob-
ably be in vain. The junta will take international
public opinion into account in planning for these
trials, but this will not be an overriding considera-
tion. The junta does not appear to be greatly
swayed by arguments that the juridical measures
it considers necessary and ;roper under what it
sees as a continuing emergency situation may not
completely measure up to internationally
accepted standards.
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25X1
COLOMBIA: LIBERAL PARTY SWEEP
Liberal Party candidate Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen won a landslide presidential victory in
this week's general election, and his party gained
control of both houses of congress. Lopez' 55-
percent showing exceeded pre-election projec-
tions, while Conservative Alvaro Gomez Hurtado
polled 32 percent, approximately as expected.
The standard-bearer of the populist National
Popular Alliance, Maria Eugen'a Rojas de MorenD,
fared worse than anticipated, with 10 percent of
the vote. Two other candidates spl*-t the re-
mainder.
In a victory statement, Lopez pledged to
uphold the one remaining provision of the Na-
tional Front coalition agreement that is applicable
to his term in office. According to the agreement,
Liberals and Conservatives are obliged to share
cabinet, gubernatorial, and mayoral posts in equal
numbers until 1978. Nevertheless, his party's ab-
solute legislative majority will give Lopez virtual
carte blanche after the inauguration on August 7.
Although Lopez refers to himself and his
future government as "center-left," he is ideologi-
cally only slightly to the left of the incumbent
Conservative government of Pi sident Pastrana. In
foreign relations, Lopez will continue the policy
of "international pluralism" followed by all Na-
tional Front administrations. He is likely to be
somewhat more aggressive than his predecessors
in initiating new trade relationships with Commu-
nist governments, particularly China, but he will
be in no hurry to elevate any new trade missions,
or existing ones, to diplomatic status.
Lopez has criticized some aspects of US
policy toward Latin America, singling out seem-
ing inconsistencies between friendly overtures by
the Department of State and strict enforcement
of protective trade regulations by the Department
of Commerce. The President-elect has also ex-
pressed the view that US policy on Cuba is out of
date. Lopez apparently considers his criticism of
the US constructive, and certainly his administra-
tion will not on the whole be unfriendly toward
this country.
Domestically, Lopez will concentrate on the'
economy. He has announced his intention to
"balance" prices and wages to combat inflation,
which reached 24 percent last year and will be
higher still this year. He will call on industries to
reinvest profits to bolster both production and
employment. The new President will also seek a
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formula to streamline the country's very expen-
sive but generally unsuccessful agrarian reform
program.
Two of the earliest bills Lopez sends to the
Liberal-controlled congress will propose lowering
the voting age i:o 18 years and guaranteeing equal
rights to women. These were major campaign
promises, and their enactment will go far toward
counterbalancing poss;5le disappointment with
the more cautious pace of economic leciisla-
BOLIVIA: BANZER YIELDS
President Banzer has shelved plans to reor-
ganize his administration in the face of strong
opposition from political parties and his own mili-
tary advisers. His failure to sustain the forceful
image he attempted to project earlier this month
at a meeting with representatives of the armed
forces and various civic groups points up his lack
of popular support and his restricted ability to
maneuver successfully on controversial issues.
One of the main purposes of the recent
meeting was to give Banzer carte blanche author-
ity to revamp his cabinet. Political leaders sup-
porting the administration, however, have subse-
quently learned that the President intends to re-
place politicians by technical experts and are ob-
Banzar's decision to postpone major cabinet
changes probably was dictated more by fe.ir of
losing military support than by political criticism.
While he has managed to stay in office by sending
his enemies to prison or into exile, these tactics
have weakened his political coalition and forced
him to rely increasingly on the armed forces.
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