WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 12, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

('/4n.r.1 C/tt//
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
OkSFILE COPY
OETUi N TO 111-1107
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Weekly Review
State Dept. review
completed.
DIA review
completed.
Approved For Release 2009/04/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003 9 .~,
Top Secret
12 April 1974
Copy N2 421
a1e~Sr,.tE'Al~eFfSCR!~r~~r~'yRSA'ASV.7l+SPCCU.'~3R3~C~,5'iF:`~'s..~,,..~yLCr:.'2til.'!4~;:CFI;r_?;:C:.rt~,^t^:~, a,~r
 .. w*~ -err-, -. .
Fitf-ale llwYr. ? 41W 4^3rW'S4.R. ~l iY Se4i 4'V': r.. 4. i'. ,??.~?. U^tn M,\` '+M..rW .,
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
Conference hall in Vienna
East-West Talks Adjourn
I10e Cooferet cco on ScurrIt y and Coupera-
hrrn ii; i_ impe (CSCL) III Geneva amI the Mutual
I;al,u0~.r.d I orr t? R1:ductii n (ML'F 11) talks III
Vi nrra have Muth acllmuoned for L;rslci ,0iter ses-
ons a ,lr lard by st0hstant al prurfrc,ss in Geneva
but little he delay in Vi11ona.
Nixi ris to show snore tangible results
he- the L.urop(1arr ser:toily conferinc.e reusrud
ml April ), the Soviets agreed to a last-manrte
cnrrrf>ron0ise nil the principle u0 inviol,ibility of
frontiers. -111e Soviets evidently were motivated
by r desire to hove the negotrahuns along toward
a concluding thud stage at a meeting of heads of
state, ill July. Lilo hnev has taken a close personal
interest ir, winding tip the confereoceu this
srnruncr.
Ii vu >hiu lit y of fl III lier5 (1 CariS, for the So-
vrets. Western arce;pt,uncc of the postwar hoUnd-
,irres nn Laster ii Lurope and, by in0plicitiorr, of
Soviet hcr_fel0ony in the area. Moscow initially
sought an all-encompassing statement on the in0-
111ulahility Of frontiers. This was objectionable to
Page I
some Western delegations, particularly the West
Our ii (dOS, who (lid mtt want lu foreclose the pos-
sibility of eventual Ge(rnan0 reunification by
peace ful nneans. In the end, the Soviets got a
.t,ilr~rnient that was worded in such a way as to
n0rply a hall on changes of hontiers by forcible
nie,rris. I'mthernone, a separate principle in the
,0gree10eot acknowledges the right of states to
r h,nige their borders by peaceful means.
Ilaving passed this hurdle, the conlcoence
ran move un to the cor0hoversial problem of beer
movement of people and ideas when it reconvenes
can April 22. The West has stressed that an agree-
ment most include some specifics 10 this area so
that the corrfereur.e can produce inure than plati-
tudes on detinle. i-he Soviets have been holding
Dark until the question of inviolability of fron-
tiers was resolved. They may now argue that,
since they retreated from their nraxirtrunr de-
mands on that principle, the West should recipro-
cate a11(1 relax pressures for heel n0overnent.
Thera is (0010 for acconunoclation on the part of
both sides, and it seems likely that wording will
be found to satisfy both the West's nnlerest in
"concrete" results and Moscow's desire to avoid
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
any "meddling" in what it considers to be the
USSR's internal affairs.
An Italian plan for a separate document on
European-Mediterranean relations has been tenta-
tively approved by the EC but not yet introduced
into the conference. The Mediterranean issue
could disrupt or delay a successful completion of
the conference by introducing the contentious
Middle East dispute into the negotiations and into
any follow-up arrangements th't are adopted.
Both the US and Soviets can be expected to
oppose the plan, and the EC political directors
will take another look at the Italian proposal at
their April 18-19 meeting.
Ultimate acceptance by the West Europeans
of a summit-level finale is likely, but there will
still be some uneasiness about thus consecrating
the conference results, especially if it seems that
little has been gained in the force-reduction talks
by that time.
The West Europeans alsc hope for progress
on the so-called confidence-building measures in
the area of military security through adoption by
the conference of a plan for prior notification of
major military movements. Fears have been ex-
pressed that the Soviets may try to win support
from neutrals and some allies for a partial solu-
tion of this question in order to isolate the US,
which would prefer to discuss this issue at MBFR.
The EC Nine generally remain cautious on ar-
rangements for follow-up procedures to the con-
ference, but may be moving toward acceptance of
proposals made by the neutrals that would entail
limited formalization subsequent to the con-
ference.
MBFR: Little Headway in Vienna
The force reduction negotiations recessed
with the NATO and Warsaw Pact participants still
far apart on how to achieve a reduction agree-
ment. Neither side has made substantive conces-
sions, but informal meetings have helped shed
light on the issues to be resolved and the need to
develop common data as a basis for further nego-
tiations.
Each side now understands the other's posi-
tion better, but there are no signs of a meeting of
minds. The Warsaw Pact accepts the fundamental
NATO thesis that there is a ground force imbal-
ance favoring the East, but argues that, while
NATO has fewer ground troops and tanks, it has
an advantage in air and nuclear forces. The pact,
therefore, does not acknowledge the need for
asymmetrical reductions to reach a common ceil-
ing, as NATO has proposed. The East contends
that there is thus an over-all balance in central
Europe.
The proposals put forward by NATO and
the pact both embody a concept of phasing, but
the resemblance ends there. NATO believes that
only US ..-.rd Soviet forces should be reduced in
the first phase, while the Warsaw Pact wants the
forces of all direct participants to be involved in
each of three stages of reductions. The Soviets
have interpreted the NATO position as indicating
a reluctance on the part of the West Europeans to
reduce their forces. During the current recess,
NATO members will discuss ways to assure the
Soviets of their willingness to reduce forcrs with-
out abandoning their basic desire to reduce US
and Soviet forces first.
In recent informal meetings, the Soviets have
pushed for Western acceptance of a symbolic re-
duction to take place in 1975. In an effort to
make this proposal more attractive, they have
hinted that air and nuclear forces could be frozen
during this phase rather than actually reduced.
The Soviet concept, however, still embodies equal
numerical reductions by each side as well as re-
ductions by all direct participants. This has been
rejected by NATO, which suspects that the So-
viets' apparent eagerness to conclude a symbolic
reduction may trap them into accepting prece-
dents that will be difficult to overcome in subse-
quent stages of negotiation.
The question of establishing agreed data on
force strengths was raised at the final informal
meeting. The two sides attempted to reach com-
mon definitions, beginning with ground troops.
This is another topic that both wi!l mull over
during the recess.
Page 2
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
Syria-Israel
As shelling of Israeli positions on the Golan
Heights entered its fifth straight week, Syria's
delegation to the Washington disengagement
talks-led by army intelligence chief Shihabi-
finally arrived in the US. A day later President
Asad set down in Moscow for consultations with
Soviet leaders; an economic delegation had pre-
ceded him by a few days. Asad may be seeking
additional economic and military aid, but his visit
seems timed primarily to assuage Soviet sensi-
tivities about being excluded from the Washing-
ton talks.
Syrian leaders, meanwhile, continued to take
a tough public stand on peace negotiations with
Tel Aviv. On the 27th anniversary of the Beath
party last Sunday, Asad emphasized o',ice more
that Syria would settle for nothing 'less than
Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab ter-
ritory and implied that the shelling would con-
tinue until this objective is obtained. In a veiled
reference to Egypt and other Arab moderates,
Asad also criticized "some Arab brothers" for
characterizing Syria's position as "inflexible."
Relations between Cairo and Damascus have
in fact become strained as a result of the lifting of
the oil embargo and the postponement of the
Arab League summit con-
ference until September.
Syria had sought to have
the summit held this
month in order to obtain
the endorsement of other
Arab states for its nego-
tiating stance. Although
Asad believes that Cairo
has frequently acted uni-
laterally to Syria's detri-
ment, he is unlikely to
break publicly with Presi-
dent Sadat as long as he
sees some advantage in
maintaining the appearance of a united front with
Egypt against Israel.
Syrian Defense Minister Talas struck an even
more belligerent note in remarks on April 5 to a
visiting delegation of Arab parliamentarians that
included some Egyptians. Talas told the group
that while Syria was not opposed to peace, it was
"now prepared to launch an all-out war against
Israel to ensure the liberation of all occupied
territories."
At least some Israeli leaders are apparently
not taking Talas' threat too seriously. An Israeli
Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy of-
ficer in Tel Aviv last weekend that Israeli analysts
did not expect Syria to increase the current level
of fighting. Instead, the official thought the
shelling is designed to put pressure on Israel as
Egypt had done during its disengagement talks, to
satisfy Syrian hard liners who oppose Asad's ef-
forts to seek a disengagement accord, and to
impress upon the Soviets the seriousness of the
situation prior to Asad's visit to Moscow.
Recent reporting from the US defense
attache in Beirut tends to support this interpreta-
tion. According to the attache's sources, the
Syrians seem to be deliberately avoiding inflicting
"unacceptable" losses on the Israelis in order to
keep tensions within controllable limits. The
Syrian shelling has been scattered rather than
concentrated and has passed up vulnerable targets
such as Israeli troops at mess. The shelling also
has begun at almost the same time every day,
giving the Israelis time to take cover.
These interpretations may not be shared by
the Israeli military commanders, however, who
have shown that they are prepared to strike hard
at anything that looks like a Syrian intention to
attack. Controlling the level of violence in the
Golan Heights could be a difficult exercise for
25X1
Page 3
Apr 12, 74
"*'-"qi".?"'7 u . R??^'7i?:v,,.",'..'H~:'w.=..::?^:.> -r. ~'.:.-~^:~?.,, w~.o.:s.:u,a..,va.~.:r.?,uwvmar.>+a+r.:.acn;nax "
1975 1980 1985
'Excluding US preproduction stocks. Such stocks amounted to 17.1 million
separative work units an 1 July 1973. are expected to reach a maximum at 33.7 million
separative work units during fiscal year 1978, and to be completely exhausted
by the end of 1982. 55562: 4 14
25X1
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9 '
Page 14 WEEKLY REVIEW
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
YUGOSLAVIA: POLEMICS ON TWO FRONTS
Belgrade is continuing its war of words with
Rome on the issue of Yugoslav sovereignty in
Zone B, but there are some signs that Yugoslav
leaders want to wind down the controversy. At
the same time, increased polemics with Bulgaria
may herald a shift of Yugoslav concern over "ir-
redentism" to the south.
Belgrade is showing its concern over Zone B
by the continued presence there of the regular
army units placed on alert early this month.
Moreover, Yugoslav media continue to protest
Italy's questioning of Yugoslav sovereignty in
Zone B, and to reiterate Belgrade's determination
"to defend every inch of Yugoslav territory."
Among the signs that the Yugoslavs may be
ready to tone down the controversy is the deci-
sion to release reservists who were called up
especially for the Trieste "crisis." Furthermore,
there are hints that Belgrade may be thinking
about resuming quiet bilateral talks with Rome.
Stane Dolanc, the front runner to succeed Tito in
the party, said his country "will do everything
possible to settle the situation," though he barred
any "unprincipled concessions." A Yugoslav For-
eign Ministry spokesman implied privately that
Belgrade is indeed thinking about resuming a dia-
logue with Rome.
As the Zone B affair simmers, a renewed
flare-up of the Macedonian dispute is drawing
Belgrade's attention southward. Yugoslavia has
been denouncing Sofia's refusal to recognize
Macedonians as a non-Bulgarian nationality-
newspaper in the capital of Yugoslavia's
Macedonian Republic has also criticized Moscow
for its alleged support of Sofia's position.
Yugoslavia's concern with the Macedonian
question may also reflect anxiety over reported
plans to hold a Warsaw Pact exercise in Bulgaria
in late May. This activity, the first in the Balkans
since 1967, is scheduled to take place at the same
time that Yugoslavia holds its tenth party con-
gress. Having sharply criticized the NATO exer-
Page 15
Ljubljana.
l~l
-"--International boundary(1970'L _
O MHAS a 1.
?Rijoka
cise in the northern Adriatic last week, Belgrade
may feel equally compelled to protest the pact's
plans for maneuvers in Bulgaria. Belgrade may
feel that both of Europe's major military alliances
support countries having designs on Yugoslav ter-
TALKS ON DISARMAMENT
The 26-member Conference of the Commit-
tee on Disarmament will convene in Geneva on
April 16. The US still backs the committee-
which is a non-UN body under the co-chairman-
ship of the US and USSR-as the best forum for
the consideration of multilateral arms control
measures. Its lack of any substantial progress on a
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
broad range of issues considered over the past
years has undermined the confidence of partici-
pating states, however, and possibly threatens
further continuation of the CCD. Another sterile
session at this time, coupled with the increasingly
vocal demands of the nonaligned for real progress
in disarmament negotiations between the super
powers, could generate new pressures For transfer-
ring the debate to a UN forum which would be
more amenable to nonaligned control.
An agenda for the conference has not yet
been drawn up. The two Germanies have indi-
cated their interest in joining the committee; to
balance their admittance, the nonaligned have re-
quested additional slots for Asian, African, and
Latin American representatives. The expansion of
membership to 31 is likely to meet with little
opposition.
A potentially divisive issue, however, is the
Japanese draft treaty on chemical weapons, which
has been submitted for consideration at this ses-
sion. A perennial submission, the chemical-
weapons issue has received much attention in the
committee over the years, but the insistence of
the US and other Western powers on the necessity
of verification procedures has blocked any at-
tempts to draft a new protocol. The US has
meanwhile come under increasing criticism for its
research and stockpiling of chemical-warfare
agents; the discussion of chemical-weapons con-
trol may be pushed by a number of delegations. It
can also be expected that the super powers will
again be taken to task for lack of progress on a
comprehensive nuclear test ban.
The status of the committee as a forum for
disarmament debates has been increasingly eroded
in recent years by the proliferation of simil-ir
conferences and groups under the aegis of a vari-
ety of international organizations. Soviet initia-
tives for a world disarmament conference and an
experts group to discuss the reduction of military
budgets have attracted nonaligned support and
are being pursued at the UN. The Law of War
Conference sponsored by the International Red
Cross, which recently concluded in Geneva, has
scheduled a follow-up conference to be held in
June specifically to discuss certain weapons, such
as incendiary and napalm devices. The first pre-
paratory committee for the 1975 Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty Review Conference has just adjourned
in Geneva, and in New York nuclear and disarma-
ment questions have recently surfaced in connec-
tion with discussions of the Indian Ocean " z o n e
of peace."
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
25X1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
cross-service capability, and reduce unit costs.
This goal has bee~i strongly endorsed by all except
Belgium.
EUROPE: F-104 REPLACEMENT BLUES
The competition over what aircraft will re-
place the US F-104G Starfighter in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark has been nar-
rowed to the French Dassault Mirage Super F-1
and three American contenders of which the Nor-
throp Cobra P-530 is currently the favorite. The
decision will channel billions of dollars into the
manufacturing country and could have ramifica-
tions that significantly affect US-European rela-
tions. The choice underscores the dilemma of
NATO allies who want to preserve defense links
to the US while supporting "European" under-
takings. It is particularly difficult for such
staunch Europeanists as the Dutch and the Bel-
gians, who feel trapped in a position where any
decision must antagonize either France or the US.
Defense ministers of the four will meet soon to
discuss the matter further.
The French argue that selection of the
Mirage would reduce European dependence on
the US while strengthening the European aircraft
industry. A decision in favor of the US aircraft
would encourage continuation of military ties be-
tween America and Europe, and would provide
for transfer of the latest US aircraft technology to
Europe. It would also demonstrate the willingness
of the four countries to cooperate in offsetting
the US balance-of-payments deficit incurred' by
stationing US forces in Europe.
The Secretary General of NATO has urged
all NATO count; ies requiring new aircraft to seek
a common replacement, as standardization would
enhance cooperation among NATO forces, ensure
Leaders of Belgium's caretaker government-
including the prime minister and the ministers of
defense and economic affairs-have denied recent
rumors that the cabinet has already made a uni-
lateral decision to buy the French Mirage. Belgian
officials have conceded that they have narrowed
the choice to the Mirage and the Cobra, and they
have further admitted that Dassault made "very
interesting proposals on compensation and coop-
eration." They insist, however, that no formal
decision will be taken until a new government is
formed.
Belgium's attitude is critical because it is
likely to be the first of the four to commit itself
on a replacement. Since Belgium could be the key
to world-wide sales that might amount to as much
as $10 billion, the French have applied intense
political, economic, and personal pressure on
Brussels to choose the Mirage. There is apparently
fierce disagreement within the Belgian Bureauc-
racy, but most of the signals that have appeared
so far suggest that the Mirage is the front-runner.
The Dutch, referring to an "agreed position"
of the four countries to consider all competing
offers before making any decision, have expressed
concern that the Belgians are attempting to limit
the choice. There are indications that high-
pressure French sales tactics have been counter-
productive in the Netherlands. The Dutch de-
cision will b' delayed until a crucial defense
White Paper has been approved by :'!e cabinet,
which may not occur before next fall. The Nor-
wegians and the Danes have privately expressed
their preference for an American replacement,
but their final decision may not be made this
year. Although the Germans are not directly in-
volved, they are interested in keeping the US
engaged in Europe. They have agreed to attempt a
bit of discreet prodding 'n the Scandinavian and
Benelux capitals, where they are not without in-
Page 17
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
Negotiations on at least five other subjects
are currently in progress. Talks on a cultural
agreement remain deadlocked because of differing
interpretations over what constitutes the cultural
traditions of the "German" nation. Pankow wants
to restrict cooperation in this field as part of its
policy of establishing a German state that has
little in common with the political and cultural
traditions of the Federal Republic. Many officials
in Bonn are skeptical that an agreement will ever
be concluded. Negotiations on a legal assistance
agreement also pose many difficulties because of
the large number of political snares in providing
such aid to West Berliners.
Commerce between the two Germanies will
remain under the aegis of the Interzonal Trade
agreement. West Berlin officials are pleased by
Pankow's agreeing to let the Interzonal Trade
administrative office remain in West Berlin rather
than requiring that it be transferred to Bonn's
new mission in East Berlin.
The right of West Berliners to visit East
Berlin and East Germany remains the most
troublesome issue in inter-German relations.
West Berlin officials complain that Bonn has not
done enough to press Pankow to rescind its de-
strate that it is an effective defender of the city's
in`e..e
st
WARSAW PACT SUMMIT
The pact's Political Consultative Committee,
composed of Soviet and East European party
chiefs and government leaders, will convene in
Warsaw next week to discuss detente. The session
may well issue a call for faster movement in the
European security and force reduction talks. An
East European diplomat claims that special atten-
tion will be given to the effects of detente on the
East European countries.
The gathering may also discuss the renewal
of the Warsaw Pact treaty, which formally expires
next year but is automatically renewable for a
ten-year period unless renounced by May 14,
1974. In this connection, the session could also
revive an old propaganda theme designed to por-
tray the pact as a champion of peace. The partici-
pants might express some willingness to dissolve
the pact upon the conclusion of the European
security talks and then call on NATO to respond
in kind. The Warsaw Treaty provides for its auto-
matic dissolution after the establishment of an
appropriately vague "European collective security
system," part of which is a general European
security treaty.
The session was evidently initiated by Mos-
cow and is expected to last only a day or two.
The last such meeting, held in Prague in January
1972, issued a maior statement on force reduc-
GERMANS EXPANDING TIES
Bonn and Pankow are making progress in
fleshing out their bilateral relations despite differ-
ences over Berlin issues. The two states will take a
major step toward recognizing the division of
Germany for the foreseeable future when they
exchange missions in early May.
Their agreement last month on this step
opened the dam, and since then the two sides
have agreed on additional bilateral accords regu-
lating "practical and humanitarian" matters. A
sports agreement was tentatively concluded on
March 20, and negotiations on health and non-
commercial payments agreements were concluded
last week. The details of the latter two agree-
ments have not been made public, but both con-
tain clauses extending their provisions to West
Berlin. All three accords will probably be signed
later this month.
cision to double the minimum currency exchange
requirement for visitors. This step has reduced by
nearly half the number of visits by West Berliners
since last fall. Egon Bahr, Brandt's chief foreign
policy adviser raised this issue with Brezhnev re-
cently, but few in Bonn expect Pankow to lift the
new currency exchange requirement. The Social
Democratic - controlled city government in West
Berlin, nevertheless, faces elections early next
year, and intends to harp on the issue to demon-
Apr 12, 74
Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW
t ta~.w'+`n.. ':d. ta:'.?_U'~ 7w:rS,:'az~r.^?.^.r.'~c'd+rsca~crcntovxn?aa.-.nrr..a ~rv_cnnun.:>.:a~.r....,wr.~..xr~mu+~xma~.~s...~a.> .. ......+~.,..,
r+..:nr~cnerie~xmaIIn,..trxo:u-,,vaa~.mm~:~r.r~-:: _, ^t
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9 Y=y
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
King Husayn campaigned for support of his
approach to the West Bank problem in a round of
visits to Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia during the
past week. Although the King is clearly willing to
concede a role to the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation at the Geneva peace talks, he appears as
determined as ever that Jordan be the agent for
the recovery of the territory from Israel.
While in Cairo on April 5-6, Husayn did not
fulfill predictions in the Arab press that he would
align Jordan with the other Arab states by pub-
licly recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation as the "sole representative of the Palestin-
ian people." In an interview with the semi-official
Egyptian newspaper Al-Alrram, the King said only
that he did not oppose the Palestinian organiza-
tion being represented at Geneva and that he had
offered it places on the Jordanian delegation.
Husayn's position apparently was tougher than
Cairo had anticipated. This may make it more
difficult for President Sadat, who wants both the
organization and Jordan represented at Geneva,
to persuade the Palestinian group to attend the
talks.
Nevertheless, from all indications, the
Husayn-Sadat talks took place in a friendly at-
mosphere. According to the official communique,
Jordanian-Egyptian contacts will continue, and
the Jordanian press has indicated that Sadat
agreed to visit Amman in the near future for the
next meeting between the two leaders.
Husayn arrived in Saudi Arabia on the 11th.
It is unlikely that King Faysal raised any opposi-
tion to Husayn's position on the West Bank, but
he may pres< Husayn to hold fast against making 25X1
any territorial concessions-especially on Jeru-
Responding to criticism by Egyptian Presi-
dent Sadat, Moscow last week quickly began de-
fending its record as a reliable ally. In broadcasts
to the Arab world, Soviet commentators attacked
"some quarters" fcr spreading doubt among the
Arab people about the value of Soviet support,
and for sowing distrust of basic Soviet policy in
the Middle East. Moscow contradicted Sadat's
charge that it had opposed the Arabs' use of
armed force and stated that it had given firm
military support to Egypt and Syria during the
war.
The Soviets may be doing more than making
propaganda to show their displeasure with Cairo.
Sadat reportediy said on April 6 that the USSR
had "just" ceased delivery of all military equip-
ment under "old" contracts, adding that eco-
nomic aid shipments had also been halted. The
deputy Tass director in Cairo has privately told
US officials that supplies had been "cut off," but
implied there is nothing immutable about the
Soviet decision. The last reported Soviet arms
carrier arrived in Egypt two days after Sadat is
said to have made his comment, and he may have
been referring to a Moscow decision to halt ship-
ments after deliveries under specific contracts
have been fulfilled.
The Soviets are evident;y prepared to take a
tougher line with Cairo, anti might cut back or
Page 20 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
threaten to stop aid deliveries to the Egyptians. It
seems likely, however, that Moscow will try to
weather the current storm in the hope that Egypt
will not soon get what it wants from Israel and
will again see the need for close ties to the Soviet
Union.
A rumor was floated in a Cairo newspaper
last week that an Egyptian-Soviet summit is in the
works. This is almost certainly not true, but the
rumor itself may be evidence that Cairo is having
second thoughts about pushing the Soviets too
far. Moreover, Cairo has indicated that it expects
Foreign Minister Fahmi to meet Gromyko Burin
ISRAEL: GOLDA QUITS
Prime Minister Meir's resignation on April
11, barely a month after she had laboriously
patched a coalition cabinet together, opens up the
prospect that Israel may have to limp along with a
caretaker government for an extended period.
Page 21 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
GREECE-TURKEY: NEW AEGEAN FRICTION
The prospect of extensive oil deposits in the
Aegean seabed has fueled a dispute between
Athens and Ankara over conflicting offshore ex-
ploration rights. Turkey is pressing for bilateral
talks, but so far the nationalistic junta in Athens
has ;own no inclination to negotiate and may
welcome the controversy as a diversion from
domestiL. orcblems and a means of unifying the
army.
Offshore oil rc ves recently discovered
near the Greek islal.d of Thasos, which may yield
some 500,000 barrels per day, are not in dispute,
but have encouraged the Turks to plan prospect-
ing activities in areas that Greece considers to be
part of its continental shelf. This week a spokes-
man for the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced
a cabinet decision giving Turkey's national petro-
leum company the go-ahead to explore near four
other Greek islands. The official said this will
begin after the decision is published in his govern-
ment's official gazette.
Ankara's action, probably designed to smoke
out a response from Athens to an unanswered
Turkish diplomatic note of late February, could
well be viewed by the Greek junta as a challenge.
The Greek military regards the Aegean seabed as a
vital economic preserve and has been taking a
touqh stance on the dispute, presumably to con-
vince the Turks to take seriously Greece's claims
to exclusive oil exploration rights. Even before
Ankara's announcement this week, the Greek
armed forces reportedly had readied contingency
plans that include discreet augmentation of army
units near the border with Turkey ana increased
naval patrolling of northern Aegean waters. Greek
military activity in the border area has in fact
increased recently.
Athens is saying that the issue should be
resolved on the basis of the 1958 Geneva conven-
tion on the continental shelf, which would give
Greece extensive rights in the Aegean, and that no
political negotiations are necessary. The chairman
of the committee preparing for Greek participa-
tion in the Law of the Sea conference this week
confirmed the Greek position to the US Embassy
in Athens, stating that the Greeks and Turks
would continue to talk, but there was "nothing to
negotiate," as "no country could negotiate its
own sovereignty." The chief of the Greek Army
also reportedly stated this week that an agree-
ment by Greece to talk would be an admission
that Turkey had a valid case to present. There are
some indications, however, that more moderate
Greek officials, including the foreign minister, are
trying to cool the controversy.
Official Turkish pronouncements have been
relatively moderate, but the Turks seem deter-
mined to get what they believe is their share of
Aegean oil. They are not a party to the 1958
convention and apparently maintain that, in any
event, the Aegean is a special case and agreement
should be reached on a basis of equity.
Since oil exploration is still in an early stage,
there is time for further assessment and maneu-
vering by the two sides. The US Embassy ir.
Ankara believes, however, that with possible new
sources of wealth and a historic rivalry involved 25X1
Loth governments are probably prepared to run
Tirana
GREECE
Mlles )1:50
0 KII?metcrs 150
555655 4-74 CIA
Page 22 WEEKLY REVIEW
,Sofia
BULGARIA
GRAIN
SAM0THRACE0
LEMNOSr 7
Disputed oil
4Xplaratioo am
?oo.tEGEAn?LE TURIIEY
S EA ?
ylthen cHIM
00
o a?~
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS STALLED
The six-year-old UN-supervised talks on a
system to govern relations between the majority
Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish Cypri-
ots were adjourned abruptly last week without
setting a date for the next meeting. None of the
parties involved appears bent on ending the nego-
tiations, but the talks are in a difficult phase
caused by a recent hardening of positions and
President Makarios' heightened concern about
Athens' intentions toward his regime.
The current impasse was precipitated by the
Greek Cypriots, who chob,: to make an issue of
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's public statement
in late March advocating a federal system for
Cyprus. Federalism is anathema to the Greek
Cypriots, who insist that talks are pointless unless
the object is the creation of a unitary, independ-
ent Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot Vice President Denk-
tesh and the Turkish ambassador in Nicosia have
tried to play down Ecevit's statement, claiming he
was misinterpreted and denying that there has
been any change in Turkish policy toward Cy-
prus. The issue of federalism was apparently not
raised directly in the talks, but the spokesmen for
Ankara and Athens reportedly were both taking a
harder line shortly before the negotiations were
suspended.
Although Ecevit and his party are on record
as favoring federalism for Cyprus, this presumably
represents Ankara's maximum bargaining posi-
tion. Similarly, the Greek Cypriots' decision to
stall the talks at this time is probably essentially a
tactical gambit, although they are obviously de-
termined to bury the idea of a federal solution.
President Makarios has declared that if the dead-
lock is not broken, the Cyprus issue should be
returned to the UN Security Council. The UN's
special representative on Cyprus is trying to work
out a formula that will allow early resumption of
the intercommunal talks.
Athens last week repeated its standard
policy line of support for the talks and for an
independent, unitary Cypriot state. President
Makarios fears, however, that the nationalistic,
anti-communist junta in Athens may be plotting
against him and clandestinely supporting enosis,
which aims at the union of Cyprus and Greece.
He has recently tried to increase his control over
the Greek-officered Cyprus National Guard,
which has been implicated in pro-enosis incidents.
The US Embassy in Nicosia also suspects that
Makarios, in order to shore up his position, en-
couraged recent Soviet demarches-delivererl to
Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the US-that pro-
fessed to see Cyprus' sovereignty endan-
gered.
IRAQ: KURDISH AUTONOMY SIMMERS ON
The government has made little progress to-
ward winning Kurdish support for the autonomy
plan announced a month ago, but Baghdad ap-
pears determincc ',,) push ahead. A substantial
military force has been moved into the Kurdish
area to assure government control of urban and
industrial centers. The rebels have largely aban-
doned these areas for more defensible positioi:s in
the mountains to the north and east. Reports of
intermittent clashes-sorne involving artillery,
mortars, tanks, and even aircraft in limited num-
bers-remain mostly unconfirmed, but skir-
mishes will probably continue. Kurdish claims of
heavy government losses probably are exag-
gerated.
Both sides have launched propaganda cam-
paigns designed to win support for their positions
on the autonomy issue. The government has
played up alleged progress in implementing its
autonomy plan for the Kurds. The Kurds have
reactivated a clandestine broadcasting station and
have sent representatives abroad to explain their
cause and seek foreign aid. The rebels' continuing
attention in domestic propaganda broadcasts to
the specific issues in dispute suggests they may
yet be willing to negotiate their differences with
the government.
Page 23 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
Baghdad has two main options, neither of
which has much prospect for early success. It can
move to consolidate its hold on the urban Kurd-
ish areas it now controls, while launching limited
military operations designed to whittle away the
territory held by rebel leader Barzani. Alter-
natively, Baghdad can try to break the impasse
with an all-out military offensive. The govern-
ment probably still regards this as a last resort,
but it may feel compelled to follow such a course
if a more gradual approach ties down a large
military force in prolonged and unproductive skir-
mishing in the north.
Although the government might be able to
subdue the Kurds with the forces and weapons
already available in the area, any such attempt
could drag on inconclusively as in the past. An
unsuccessful military campaign against the Kurds
could strain relations between the Baath govern-
ment and the armed forces, which would bear the
brunt of intensified Kurdish resistance.
SOUTH ASIA: TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS
The agreement reached in New Delhi on
April 9 by the representatives of India, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh, resolves the most serious prob-
lem standing in the way of a normalization of
relations among the adversaries in the December
1971 war. Some thorny issues remain, however,
and will be the subject of further hard bargaining.
Although the accords contain face-saving
ele.nents necessary to satisfy domestic political
requirements, particularly in Bangladesh, Pakistan
achieved its major objective in the trilateral ne-
gotiations. Dacca agreed to the unconditional,
speedy repatriation of 195 Pakistani prisoners of _
war who have been held in India for possible war
crimes trials in 3angladesh. In return, Islamabad
made what amounts to a public apology for "any
crimes that may have been committed." Pakistan
also agreed to re-examine the cases of some
Biharis-non-Bengalee Muslims-seeking to emi-
grate from Bangladesh to Pakistan, whose ap-
plications had previously been rejected. Addi-
tional Biharis will prn)ably be admitted to Pak-
istan as a result, but the total numbei finally
accepted will remain a fraction of the some
400,000 who still wish to relocate.
The accord moves reconciliation between
what were, before the 1971 war, the two "wings"
of Pakistan, an important step beyond the simple
recognition Islamabad accorded Bangladesh last
February. The two nations can now begin ne-
gotiations on various bilateral matters apart from
the Bihari issue, including the establishment of
trade and communication links and the division
of pre-war Pakistan's assets and liabilities. At
some point, diplomatic relations will be estab-
lished.
Indo-Pakistani relations also made limited
progress at New Delhi. India, which successfully
played a mediatory role 'n the trilateral dis-
cussions, concluded a separate bilateral agreement
with Pakistan defining priorities for future dis-
cussions to implement the 1971 Simla agreement
between Prime Ministers Gandhi and Bhutto.
Talks will begin shortly on the resumption of
postal and telecommunications links and the res-
torrtion of travel facilities, particularly for pil-
grims. Presumably, discussions will come later on
the restoration of diplomatic relations, which Is-
lamabad had once insisted must come first, and
on economic ties.
The New Delhi accords should pave the way
for Bangladesh's early entry into the UN. The
Chinese, who were committed to keeping Dacca
out of the UN until the issue of the 195 POWs
was resolved to Pakistan's satisfaction, may now
recognize Bangladesh and no longer oppose its
Page 24 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
- Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
ARGENTINA: SUCCESSION POLITICS
President Peron's age and fragile health,
along with the turbulent nature of the internal
political situation, seem to be fostering concern
and anxiety over the presidential succession. The
mood of uncertainty in the country encourages
pulling and hauling among the Peronists as they
struggle for position in the event of Peron's
absence or death.
]Her reluctance to assume greater responsi-
bilities despite Peron's prompting is reinforced by
her perception of the serious internal conflicts
that beset Peronism and of the likelihood that
extremists will step up violence in the President's
absence. The Vice President's failure to attend
several recent official functions may be a sign that
she is not holding up well under pressure.
Some Peronists are trying to convince her
that she has the stature and backing to rule in
Peron's place, despite indications that she would
be unable to muster a following among key
groups such as labor, the armed forces, and youth.
Another factor possibly contributing to Mrs.
Peron's distressed state is her reportnd falling out
with Social Welfare Minister Lopez Rega, an in-
fluential adviser to Peron whose ambition for
power appears to be souring the formerly close
relationship he enjoyed with Mrs. Peron. Lopez
Rega's son-in-law, Raul Lastiri, is constitutionally
next in line, after Mrs. Peron. As head of the
Chamber of Deputies, Lastiri held the provisional
presidency after Hector Campora stepped down
last July.
A number of Peronist factions are appar-
ently busy trying to build up independent power
bases. Peron is aware of the politicking and re-
portedly has said that certain government leaders
Mrs. Peron
Under stress
are playing games" to enhance their positions
before he dies. Peron reasons that some of these
leaders have tolerated left-wing extremists out of
fear that the left might come to power after his
passing. While Peron did not pinpoint his sus-
picions, reports of an impending cabinet shuffle
may indicate that officials out of favor will be
purged.
Meanwhile, it is still unclear whether Peron
will go to Spain before the onset of the Buenos
Aires winter. He probably would like to seek
medical attention and rest and to escape the
damp inclement weather, but he obviously is
trapped by the political entanglements caused by
terrorism and the quarreling among his fqllowers.
His hesitancy may also stem from a conviction
that his departure would create a dangerous vac-
uum. His doubts are not unfounded, since it is
highly probable that politically inspired violence
assumed his mantle.
Page 25 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003 9 t--_ ~-~
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050003-9
BOLIVIA: BANZER'S PLOY
President Banzer has postponed elections in-
definitely in the name of achieving the national
unity he claims will enable the country to nego-
tiate access to the sea. While this initiative in-
volves long-term risks, Banzer seems to have
strengthened his position for the short term by
raising popular hopes of regaining the outlet to
the sea that Bolivia lost nearly 100 years ago.
Last week, Banzer held a carefully orches-
trated conference in Cochabamba with repre-
sentatives of the armed forces and various pres-
sure groups to obtain their approval for sweeping
political changes. Banzer began by stating that
Bolivia should project an image of strength in the
face of growing tensions between its Pacific coast
neighbors, Chile and Peru. A military spokesman
then announced that elections, which had been
scheduled for May 1975, would be postponed to
remove political pressure on the government, and
he presented a declaration that gives Banzer a free
hand to restructure his cabinet. The tone of the
meeting suggested that Banzer believes his talks
last month with Chilean junta President Pinochet
hold promise for regaining access to the sea-
perhaps through the north Chilean port of A: ica.
The declaration, which was justified as nec-
essary to improve Banzer's diplomatic negotiating
position, was signed by most of the delegates.
Although th :re was no open dissension during the
tightly controlled meeting, a few participants re-
fused to sign. So far, the government's only re-
action to this recalcitrance has been to refuse to
reimburse them for their lodgings and travel
expenses.
While the meeting gives Banzer the patina of
public approval, the long-range effect of his
moves will probably be to heighten discontent
unless his negotiations with Chile produce results.
Political leaders can be expected to be less co-
operative, and those plotting against the regime
may attract more supporters once the illusion of
Cuba:
PREPARING FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS
Although the Cuban Communist Party's
first congress will not be field until some time
next year, the Castro regime is already involved in
vigorous activity aimed at ensuring the event's
success. Success in this case means maintaining
undiminished Fidel's hold on power-by no
means a sure thing. Creeping institutionalization,
brought about both by Soviet pressure and by the
demands of efficient government, is rapidly reach-
ing the point where Fidel's old free-wheeling style
of rule, were he to attempt to revert to it, would
Page 26 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
meet significant organized opposition within the
regime leadership. Fidel's ultimate authority in
the decision-making process is still unchallenged
(in large degree because he has voluntarily re-
treated from many of his more extreme posi-
tions), but he apparently is determinedly carrying
out meticulous preparatory political work to pre-
vent the congress from being a vehicle by which
he is kept in a high position as "revolutionary"
window dressing but deprived of his supreme
authority.
Ever since 1970, Castro has been reducing
his interference in day-to-day administrative and
economic matters, and thus reducing the da-
maging impact of his injudicious meddling in
affairs best left to better-qualified subordinates.
In the past four years, he has inclined much more
toward the appearances of group leadership, and
he has delegated responsibility and authority to a
greater degree than ever before during his admin-
istration. At the same time, he has relaxed his
resistance to the creation and development of
political, legal, and administrative structures that
are the prerequisites of efficient and successful
government-the same structures that could be
used to limit his heretofore unchecked authority.
The party congress, of course, will be a key event
in this process of institutionalization ane it is
there--where a new political bureau, secretariat,
and central committee probably will be se-
lected-that the forces opposed to Castro's total
domination are most likely to attempt to place
formal restraints on him.
Fidel-working primarily through his
brother, Raul-is determined to prevent the in-
stitutionalization process, and the congress in par-
ticular, from being used against him. He has
turned to his main source of strength-the mili-
tary-which held its third party organization
meeting from April 3 to 6. The sessions were
dominated entirely by members of the Sierra
Maestra guerrilla elite-those who s- ved in
combat with the Castros during the revolution-
and by those who owe their position to Fidel or
Raul. By guaranteeing the continued loyalty of
the party leadership in the armed forces, the
Castros will be assured of considerable control
within the party itself because the military has
overwhelming influence in the party central com-
mittee and, through it, the entire party rank and
file.
Similarly, the seventh national conference of
the Young Communists League (the party's youth
arm) held from March 31 to April 4 was domi-
nated by those owing their allegiance to the Cas-
tros. Ir these political organizations remain la:gely
in FiJel's camp, those hopeful of placing re-
strair,ts on his rule will have an uphill battle in
engineering a political turnabout when the con-
gress is eventually held.
In less than two years, Quito's fiscal position
has changed dramatically. Last year, the first full
year after completion of the trans-Andean pipe-
line, central government revenues increased by 49
percent to about $312 million. About half the
increase came directly from the petroleum in-
dustry, and much of the rest was from secondary
effects of the larger oil income, mainly taxes on a
much larger volume of imports. At the current
reference price of oil, the government's petroleum
revenue will increase to over $600 million this
year, bringing total revenues to an estimated $900
million. Foreign-exchange reserves, which were
down to only $12 million in 1972, have climbed
to about $250 million. To most Ecuadoreans,
however, these new riches have meant little more
than higher prices.
The consumer price index rose 17.5 percent
last year, a sharp increase in a country where
economic stagnation and conservative monetary
policies had kept prices stable. Inflation has been
aggravated by a slump in agricultural production,
resulting in the need to import high-priced food.
Fiscal policy has not been geared to stabilizing
prices-the 1974 budget calls for increased spend-
ing of 36 percent above the 1973 budget. New
measures decreed on March 25 are unlikely in the
short run to dampen inflationary pressures. In an
effort to increase agricultural production, the
PagE. 27 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9
government raised prices paid to farmers, which
should transfer about $120 million from con-
sumers to agricultural producers, and modest
wage increases were decreed for low- and middle-
income workers in both the public and private
sectors. The new measures also included a price
freeze on a wide range of consumer items, efforts
to discourage foreign borrowing, and measures to
increase credit available to the agricultural and
housing sectors.
While the government has been aware of the
danger of inflation, it has been slow to attack
basic causes. The government is apparently
seriously divided on the issue of whether to grant
wage increases to compensate for inflation, or to
deny them for fear of starting an inflationary
spiral. Token wage increases decreed last month
have done little to satisfy workers. Further in-
creases in food prices, coming after increases of
about 25 percent in 1973, will be felt particularly
by the politically volatile urban classes. The new
price freeze is likely to be ineffective because
Quito does not have the ability to supervise
present price controls. Aware of the need to deal
with popular discontent, the government will
probably placate the demands of workers who
complain the loudest, but this will only further
add to inflationary problems.
Page 28 WEEKLY REVIEW
Apr 12, 74
Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050003-9