WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 8, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Weekly Review
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Top Secret
8 March 1974
Copy
N9 426
DIA review
completed.
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week Through noon on Thursday. I t
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
1 Israel: Syrian Intentions; New Governmer
2 USSR: Gromyko's Middle East Travels
3 Ethiopia: The Emperor's New Politics
CONTENTS (March 8, 1974)
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
6 Vietnam: A Spate of Spats; Delta
7 Indonesia: Stockholders Report
9 Cambodia: The Lull Goes On
10 Korea: Problems Persist
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
12 I ran-Iraq: Border Situation
13 Iran: Expanding Naval Forces
14 North Yemen: A New Cabinet
15 India: Election Returns
16 Tunisia: Propping Up Bourguiba
19 CSCE: Air of Optimism
19 EC: Attitude on Energy Coordination
20 Norway's Blue-Eyed Arabs
22 USSR-France: Patching Things Up
22 French Cabinet Streamlined
23 Italy: Putting It Back Together
24 Portugal: Clash Over African Policy
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
25 Belgium: A House Divided
27 Argentina: Cordoba Situation
28 Guatemala: A Stolen Election
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ISRAEL
Concern Over Syrian Intentions
Israeli reconnaissance flights over the Golan
Heights have had heavy fighter protection for the
past few days. On March 7, the Israelis refused to
permit a UN mail truck to pass through their
lines, suggesting that they may be making prep-
arations of their own. The Israeli press reported
on March 6 that Israeli units in the Golan Heights
are on alert.
National Religious Party's decision to participate
in the coalition, the new government emerged
with a majority in the Knesset.
Mrs. Meir told President Katzir on March 6,
just hours before her extended mandate was due
to expire, that she had formed a government. The
key development that opened the way was the
agreement, announced the night before, of Dayan
and his Rafi faction colleague, Transport and
Communications Minister Peres, to serve in the
new cabinet. They attributed their change of
heart to the new military situation on the Syrian
front, which they said necessitated the formation
of a cabinet as soon as possible.
Similarly citing the "serious situation" on
the Syrian front, the National Religious Party
reconsider, - its stand and voted to join the gov-
ernment. Some additional negotiations with the
Prime Minister are apparently planned, however.
Party leaders had been inclined all along to enter
the coalition on the basis of the compromise
worked out earlier on the disputed religious issue.
Until now, however, they had hesitated to over-
ride the objections of the party's orthodox youth
wing and the advice of Israel's High Rabbinical
Council.
Earlier in the week, Mrs. Meir angrily walked
out of an emotion-charged Alignment caucus
Prime Minister Meir finally succeeded in
forming a new government this week, more than
two months after general elections that reduced
the parliamentary strength of her Labor Align-
ment. With Defense Minister Dayan's last-minute
decision to join the new cabinet and with the
Israel and Egypt on March 4 successfully
concluded their disengagement agreement, 24
hours ahead of schedule. Israeli forces have
pulled back to a line 15-20 kilometers from
the Suez Canal, where they retain control of
strategic Mitla and Gidi passes. Egypt now has
control of the canal for the first time in
almost seven years. A UN buffer force pres-
ently numbering 2,000 men is stationed in a
narrow strip separating the two sides on the
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called to discuss her cabinet nominees. Upset over
the continued wrangling displayed at the meeting,
Mrs. Meir announced she was giving up her efforts
to form a government. Only repeated personal
appeals by other Alignment leaders persuaded her
to reverse her decision.
ernment will call for new elections before signin
No significant change in Israel's peace nego-
tiating position is likely to result from the forma-
tion of the new cabinet. Barring new fighting,
Mrs. Meir remains prepared to enter the projected
disengagement negotiations with Syria, but she
apparently believes that her mandate to conclude
far-reaching agreements is limited. She has already 25X1
publicly promised, for instance, that on issues
such as a Jordan West Bank settlement, the gov-
USSR: Gromyko's Middle East Travels
Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in Syria
and Egypt hard on the heels of Secretary Kis-
singer. A major purpose of the Russian's travels
was to give the appearance that, in contrast to
Kissinger's previous round of personal Middle
East diplomacy in January, this time Moscow was
in the thick of things. In both Damascus and
Cairo, Gromyko stressed that the Soviets expect
to be closely involved in future Middle East peace
negotiations and urged that the talks be returned
to Geneva, where the Soviets could play a major
role.
Gromyko's admonishments did not appear
to move Cairo. As they did after Foreign Minister
Fahmi's visit to Moscow in January, the Egyp-
tians made a bow in the joint communique to the
"importance and necessity" of Soviet participa-
tion in all stages of the Middle East peace talks,
but they did not appear to make any new com-
mitments.
Gromyko sought to stir Egyptian suspicions
of US intentions, warning that the Arabs should
be wary of those who want to substitute "partial
solutions" for a real settlement and who want to
drive a wedge between the Arabs and their
"allies." These sentiments were not echoed in the
communique, indicating that Cairo does not want
to set back its budding relationship with the US
or upset prospects for peace.
Gromyko sought to check the deterioration
in Moscow's relations with Cairo, but apparently
without success. He emphasized that a "drifting
apart must not be permitted" but implied that
the Egyptians should take the initiative to im-
prove relations. The communique made no
mention of bilateral economic or military
matters, suggesting that these questions remain
unresolved. The Soviets did pledge to assist with
opening the Suez Canal, but only "in principle."
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In Cairo, Gromyko also met with Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat. This is the first meeting be-
tween a top Soviet leader and a fedayeen to be
acknowledged by the Soviets. It represents a small
step toward formal recognition of Arafat as
representative of the Palestinians.
Information is scant on Gromyko's discus-
sions in Syria, but they were sufficiently difficult
as to require his return to Damascus for another
round of talks after his Cairo visit. Press reports
from Damascus state that Gromyko has been
urging the Syrians to go to Geneva rather than
Washington to conduct indirect disengagement
negotiations with Israel. Such a demarche would
be consistent with Soviet intentions to break the
US monopoly of the peace talks, and play a more
Ethiopia
THE EMPEROR'S NEW POLITICS
Ethiopian politics are undergoing a major
transformation as the regime attempts to cope
with continuing civilian and military unrest.
Emperor Haile Selassie on March 6 announced
plans to introduce far reaching constitutional
changes, including curbs on his own authority.
With the exception of a few scattered units,
rebellious troops have returned to their barracks
after forcing he appointment of a new govern-
ment of younger and more progressive members
of the Ethiopian hierarchy. The country remains
restless as rifferent groups, emboldened by the
military's success in gaining pay raises, press for
satisfaction of their special demands. Should this
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situation continue, the new administration's
ability to govern will be seriously challenged.
On March 7, 85,000 members of Ethiopia's
normally docile labor confederation began a gen-
eral strike in support of a 16-point list of de-
mands including a sizable wage increase and
greater protection for labor's right to strike and
organize. Labor leaders do not appear to be trying
to bring down the government and reportedly
have told strikers to stay off the streets. Militant
students, however, are taking advantage of the
strike to demonstrate against the government, and
their protests could easily lead to violence.
Striking teachers, meanwhile, continue to press
demands for salary increases and new educational
policies.
Haile Selassie, in a nationwide address on
March 6, said he had directed Prime Minister
Endalkatchcw to call a constitutional conference
to draw up new arrangements that will make the
prime minister responsible to Parliament, guar-
antee civil rights, streamline court procedures,
and clarify relations among the branches of gov-
ernment.
The promised constitutional changes would
curtail the virtually unlimited authority of the
Emperor and place Ethiopia on the way to
becoming a constitutional monarchy. The
Emperor and his closest associates have rec-
ognized that political change is necessary, but
hope to control its pace and general direction.
The writing of a new constitution will take time,
and the new arrangements may be resisted by
powerful nobles who fear a threat to their priv-
ileged position. Dissident groups will become
impatient if the process becomes protracted, and
iio3y will be sensitive to any signs that the regime
is not committed to establishing a more demo-
cratic form of government.
A majority of military dissidents still seems
willing to give the new government a chance.
Endalkatchew secured their support by appoint-
ing a cabinet of experienced, well educated min-
isters who are sympathetic toward the reforms
sought by the military. The new ministers have
held a variety of government and diplomatic
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posts. With few exceptions, they are not closely
identified with the discredited former govern-
ment.
Two of the most prominent representatives
of the progressive movement among the Ethio-
pian aristocracy received important posts at the
insistence of the military. Mikael Imru, Ethiopia's
representative to the European UN office, was
named minister of commerce and industry.
Zawde Gebre Selassie, Ethiopia's UN ambassador,
was appointed interior minister. Both have fre-
quently advocated reforms similar to those
I
The Emperor
Addressing the troops
demanded by the dissident troops, and as a result
have been at odds with Haile Selassie.
Dissident military leaders reportedly also in-
sisted on the appointment of Lieutenant General
Assefa, the former armed forces chief of staff, to
the post of minister of civil aviation and tourism.
The military wanted Assefa, a capable and
respected officer, to be in a position to monitor
cabinet activities. He and Lieutenant General
Abiye, the new defense minister, are the only
military men in the cabinet. In an effort to main-
tain some continuity, Endalkatchew reappointed
Minassie Haile as foreign minister.
The constitutional changes and the composi-
tion of the cabinet represent a serious effort by
the regime to begin dealing with the underlying
causes of the disorders. Many civilians, however,
are skeptical of the regime's intent to follow
through on its promises. Some junijr officers are
still dissatisfied with Endalkatchew's appoint-
ment.
Some troops have also called for freedom of
the press, the right to form political parties, and
better labor laws. A list of demands presented to
Haile Selassie by military leaders last week re-
flects the common interests of dissident groups.
The demands include: complete reorganization of
the educational system; realistic land reform; ef-
fective price controls; a cost of living allowance;
equitable salary scales for all government, mili-
tary, and industrial workers; and removal and
prosecution of all corrupt officials.
The new government must cope with several
immediate problems. Because of limited financial
resources, it is unable to meet economic demands
by workers and teachers, a constraint that was
instrumental in the regime's decision that it must
instead make political concessions. The pay in-
creases granted dissident troops to end their
revolt have already seriously strained the budget
and at the same time encouraged civilians to
assert claims for an improvement in their eco-
nomic condition.
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North Vietnam's relations with China and
the Soviet Union continue to be marred periodi-
cally by irritating incidents that reinforce Hanoi's
skepticism over the long-term reliability of its
Communist allies.
Perhaps the most serious problem arose
when China drove the South Vietnamese out of
the Paracel Islands. North Vietnam has never
clearly claimed the Paracels as Vietnamese terri-
tory, but Peking's action placed Hanoi in an em-
barrassing position: it could not openly condemn
an ally, but neither could it acquiesce in the
seizure of what many Vietnamese think of as
their territory. In the end, the North Vietnamese
merely urged goodwill on all sides and called for
negotiated settlements of all such territorial
disputes.
There have been other signs of friction with
Peking. China failed to send delegations to North
Vietnam's recent ? trade union and women's con-
gresses, though virtually every other Communist
state, including the Soviet Union and Albania,
Nor has the North appeared to fare any
better recently with Moscow. Soviet representa-
tives, for example, have tried to discourage the
convening of an anti-US Vietnam conference in
Stockholm, which Hanoi would like to exploit for
propaganda purposes.
Hanoi is unhappy both with Peking and Mos-
cow because of their positions on the conflict in
South Vietnam. On the first anniversary of the
International Conference on Vietnam on March 2,
North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry sent a note to
the conference members calling upon each by
name-including the Soviet Union and China-to
condemn US and South Vietnamese Government
actions in South Vietnam. On the same day
Hanoi's authoritative newspaper Nhan Dan edi-
torially demanded that "a nL,mber of countries
that are signatories to the act that have not yet
correctly implemented their obligations change
their attitude. ..to prevent the US-Thieu clique
from sabotaging the Paris agreement."
f nth the Foreign Ministry note and the
more pointed editorial seemed aimed at Hanoi's
principal Communist allies, the Soviet Union and
China. Both countries have muted their support
of Hanoi's propaganda campaign against the US in
favor of their own broader interest in detente.
Hanoi's Foreign Minister Trinh has aiso recently
voiced North Vietnam's dissatisfaction with the
lukewarm support from Moscow and Peking.
Such incidents, irritating as they are, do not
portend any fundamental near-term change in the
relationship Hanoi has with each of its principal
sponsors. Both the Chinese and Soviets appear
willing to continue to provide large quantities of
economic aid, though probably less than Hanoi
wants. Both still provide some diplomatic sup-
port. But these incidents do keep the North Viet-
There has been a marked step-up in Commu-
nist-initiated incidents in the delta provinces
south of Saigon, partly aimed at countering gov-
ernment efforts to establish a new district in an
area long under Viet Cong influence. The pro-
posed new district infringes on a Communist base
area in the tri-border area of Dinh Tuong, Kien
Tuong, and Kien Phong provinces. Fighting there
has been intense for the past two weeks. Commu-
nist losses appear to have been heavy, and a need
for reinforcements has caused the North Viet-
namese 5th Division north of Saigon once again
to move some elements back into the northern
delta.
In recent weeks, Communist support units
have been crossing into the western delta from
Cambodia and in some cases traveling farther
south to the U Minh Forest. A number of skir-
mishes with government troops have occurred
near known Communist infiltration routes in the
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INDONESIA: STOCKHOLDERS REPORT
President Suharto will have an opportunity
at a conference of the top 250 military officers
this week to determine how the military, and
particularly the army, rate his stewardship. The
meeting is especially important because of recent
displays of rivalry among Suharto's military sub-
ordinates and increasing signs of social discontent.
The officers, who gather periodically, will also
discuss the role of the military in the second
Five-Year Plan beginning in April.
Suharto seeks and needs assurance of firm
military support before he takes additional stops
to deal with student activists or to stop rivalry
among military leaders. He will also be trying to
patch up military unity to prevent the disagree-
ments that have recently appeared within the
Jakarta ruling group from extending further into
the ranks. Growing speculation among the public
about military disunity is ominous for Suharto
because it may lead to doubts about the long-
term stability of his government and encourage
dissenters.
Officers from the three Java divisions fill
most important government positions, and their
intradivisional rivalry has traditionally provided
the dynamics of army politics. Since assuming
power, President Suharto has sponsored several
military reorganizations aimed at dissolving these
Patrolling a delta river
delta, and several government outposts have been
attacked. Such incidents probably represent an
effort to screen the moves of the infiltrating rear
service units.
The flare-up in the delta has coincided with
a lull in activity in the central highlands. In Pleiku
and Kontum provinces, where heavy fighting con-
tinued from January through mid-February, both
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The Khmer Communists may not be able to
mount another major offensive against Phnom
Penh's defenses in the near future. The insurgents
evidently are having difficulty replacing personnel
they lost in the first two months of the present
dry season. Although more reinforcements ap
parently are being earmarked for the sector north-
west of Phnom Penh, their numbers may not be
adequate to offset steady casualties, sickness, and
desertions. Communist losses south of the city
have not been so extensive, but many units in
that area saw heavy combat elsewhere last fall.
The need to stockpile new munitions near
the front lines and to ovrrcome difficulties in
tactical coordination may also be affecting offen-
sive plans. In addition, the Communists may soon
have to divert some of the forces from the Phnom
Penh region to other areas where they have been
losing territory and population to aggressive
forays by local government units.
The Cambodian Army has sustained clearing
operations north and south of the capital against
spotty resistance. Government forces near the
center of Phnom Penh's southern defense line
received a brief barrage of insurgent 105-mm.
howitzer fire on March 4, but most of the shells
fell short on Communist-controlled territory. On
March 6, the Communists interdicted a section of
Route 1 some 15 miles southeast of the capital.
Twenty miles west of Phnom Penh, a multibat-
A Cambodian grenade launcher
One in the breach, one in reserve
talion government force continued its effort to
rt open a stretch of Route 4.
The sharpest fighting of the week occurred
around the isolated southwestern provincial capi-
tal of Kampot, where the insurgents launched
their most serious thrust against that city to date.
Before their advance was halted on March 3 by
government air strikes and fire from Cambodian
Navy patrol boats, the Communists moved to
within two miles of Kampot and its airport.
The military high command in Phnom Penh
reacted quickly to this new threat by airlifting a
substantial number of reinforcements to Kampot
from the capital and from the navy base at Ream.
By midweek, the situation at Kampot appeared to
be stabilizing as government troops becan trying
to extend the city's defensive perimeters.
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Attacks on South Korean fishing boats by
Pyongyang last month have helped intensify
polemics between the two Koreas, illustrating
their persistent antagonism and the formidable
obstacles to improving relations despite more
than two years of bilateral negotiations. South
Korea has gained the most politically from the
fishing incident so far.
posture in the North-South talks could also hurt
its standing in the UN as it begins the annual
campaign for support against Northern demands.
In recent years, the South has sought such sup-
port on the basis of its commitment to unifi-
cation through negotiations between North and
South.
The loss of the boats-one sunk and one
captured-has given Seoul a striking example for
its nationwide campaign about the increased
North Korean threat. The Pak government has
also been quick to make the incident the central
issue in recent talks with North Korean repre-
sentatives at Panmunjom, where-by employing
tough and uncompromising language-it was able
publicly to demonstrate firmness with Pyong-
yang.
This was pay :icularly evident at the February
27 meeting of vice co-chairmen of the South-
North Coordinating Committee. Seoul's spokes-
man laid down a five-point demand for satisfac-
tion regarding the incident. He warned that
Pyongyang's failure to comply would signal that
the North does not intend to continue the talks in
this forum. The South Korean also used this oc-
casion to reveal publicly that North Korean leader
Kim II-sung had admitted privately to certain top
South Korean officials in 1972 that Pyongyang
had indeed dispatched the commando team that
tried to kill President Pak Chong-hui in January
1968.
Seoul's actions appear to have had a favor-
able impact on the domestic situation from the
government's viewpoint, contributing to a re-
duction of overt political opposition and, thus, to
a better chance of avoiding serious unrest this
spring. Nonetheless, the South's hard anti-
Pyongyang line is not without pitfalls. By de-
liberately raising tension:, vis-a-vis the North,
Seoul runs a risk of scaring off foreign investment
at a time when South Korea is pressing its search
for new western capital. Seoul's toughened
Pyongyang Responds
Pyongyang's response to the South's tactics
has been guarded, suggesting an awareness that
the naval action was a political mistake. It has
predictably sought to divert attention from its
own involvement and to place the blame on Seoul
by alleging that the South Korean fishing boats
were actually on a spying mission. Pyongyang has
published confessions of crew members to sup-
port this claim and otherwise stepped up its pub-
lic criticism of South Korean domestic affairs.
Pyongyang has also recognized that Seoul's
effort to exploit the situation in the bilateral
negotiations could be turned to some advantage.
It has charged the South Koreans with provoking
the incident in order to frustrate progress in talks.
At the vice co-chairriien's meeting-as well as at a
February 25 session of North-South Red Cross
officials-Northern spokesmen tried to ignore the
naval incident, stressing instead Pyongyang's com-
mitment to unification. They offered proposals
for moving both sets of talks forward. Though
hardly concessionary, these were somewhat more
flexible than proposals tabled in previous meet-
ings of these groups. Premier Kim II-sung, in a
major statement on March 4, appeared to endorse
this approach.
The forth undoubtedly anticipates that the
South will reject its latest proposals, and that this
can be used as additional "proof" of Seoul's
determination to block progress in the negotia-
tions and perpetuate "two Koreas." The North
leans on this argument in propaganda efforts to
encourage disaffection in he South and will press
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this line in support of its strategy at the UN later
this year.
Despite the new tensions, both North and
South will continue to exploit their talks for
political and propagandistic advantage. Each has
offered proposals for additional meetings this
month. These are unlikely to be {productive, par-
ticularly as long as Seoul feels the need to focus
domestic attention on the Northern threat and
Pyongyang, to openly encourage unrest in the
South. The talks could take on more substance,
however, as UN consideration of the Korean issue
nears and each party feels a greater need to stress
to other nations its adherence to the concepts of
peace and national unification in the Korean Pen-
insula.
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Sporadic fighting again broke out On the
Iranian-Iraqi border this week, and forces oro both
sides remain in a high state of military readiness.
Tehran and Baghdad, however, are still endeavo-
ring to avoid serious clashes. Iran has played the
border problem in low key but has sent letters of
protest to Baghdad and the UN. Iraq, for its part,
has become increasingly preoccupied with the
Kurdish problem inside its own borders. The
scheduled arrival of UN Secretary General Wald-
heim's special investigator, whose name has been
sent to Baghdad and Tehran for approval, was
expected to help ease tensions somewhat.
Early this week, fighting erupted near
Mehran and Qasr-e Shirin, about 75 miles to the
north. Tehran claims the clashes were precipitated
by Iraqi forces who fired on a number of Iranian
border posts. Military spokesmen in Baghdad,
however, contend that Iranian troops started the
fighting by using artillery against Iraqi troops.
The fighting apparently became more inten-
sive by mid-week, and some casualties were in-
curred by both sides. A source of the US defense
attache in Tehran claims that the Shah has
ordered his troops to increase the level of their
fire and not to confine themselves merely to
suppressive fire. Radio Iran claims that several
Iraqi infantry attacks across the border were re-
pulsed and that "heavy losses" were inflicted on
the Iraqis. These claims have not been con-
firmed.
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IRAN: EXPANDING NAVAL FORCES
Iran's five-year plan (1972-1977) designed to
modernize and enlarge its navy is moving ahead.
Purchases this year of two destroyers from the US
and six large guided-missile patrol boats from
France at a cost of over $600 million indicate the
seriousness of the Shah's intention to improve his
navy vastly.
Since the British withdrawal from the Per-
sian Gulf in 1971, the Imperial Iranian Navy has
become the dominant naval force in the area. The
acquisition of modern war ships, additional per-
sonnel. and improved training, have enabled the
navy to extend its function from defending
coastal areas to providing protection for Iran's
expanding sea communications through the Per-
sian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The Shah
envisions a further broadening of Iran's defensive
frontier into the Indian Ocean to protect Iran's
vital oil lifeline.
Until the mid-1960s, nearly all of the ships
in Iran's modest navy were supplied by the US.
The buildup and modernization of the navy began
in 1966 when Iran ordered four British MK-5
destroyer escorts fitted with Seakiller surface-to-
sur face missiles and Seacat surface-to-air missiles,
and 12 hovercraft. Ten of the hovercraft have
Year
Supplier
Ships Ordered
Status of Delivery
1966
United
4 Mark-5 guided-missile
Arrived in 1973
Kingdom
destroyer escorts
12 Hovercraft
10 arrived in late
1960s
1967
United
1 Battle-class destroyer
Arrived in 1970
Kingdom
1972
United
4 Hovercraft
Scheduled to begin
Kingdom
in 1974
1972
West
2 Cargo/Tankers
Germany
1972
United
2 Multi-purpose support
Scheduled for 1974-
Kingdom
ships
1976
1973
United
2 used guided-missile
Scheduled for fall
States
destroyers
1974
1973
United
May have ordered a
Scheduled for 1979-
Kingdom
Through-Deck Cruiser
1980
1974
United
2 Spruance-class destroyers
Scheduled for 1978
States
1974
France
6 La Combattante I Is
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implernontation of modern personnel manage.
mont systrr-is, increased in-country training pro-
grams, and the increased use of computers, how-
ever, are brightening long-term pros poets for a 25X1
technical) competent nav .
arrived and are in service, giving Iran the largest
operational hovercraft fleet in the world. In 1967,
a British destroyer, armed with Seacat missiles,
was purchased.
In order to handle increasing logistic support
problems, contracts were signed with the UK and
West Germany in 1972 for support and resupply
ships. These ships will give Iran its first seagoing
supply capability for naval units stationed on
several Pe sign Gulf islands arid for the ports on
the Gulf that lack adequate road or rail connec-
tions.
In 1972, Iran began a five year naval buildup
program designed to quadruple the fleet by 1978.
Four more British hovercraft, each equipped with
guided missiles, were ordered. In addition, Lon-
don reportedly agreed to build a through-deck
cruiser, configured with a flight deck capable of
landing V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. Two
small guided-missile destroyers are being refur-
bished by the US for delivery to Iran this year,
and a contract was signed in January calling for
the delivery of two more destroyers in 1978; the
contract also provides for the training of 2,000
Most recently, the Shah ordered six French
built La Combattante II missile-armed large patrol
boats from France. The contract, valued in excess
of $100 million, calls for France to incorporate
several modifications, including the installation of
the US STAND, RD/HARPO ,N missile svstem,
Italian OTO MELARA gun-mountings and a
Dutch fire-control system. Once i i service, the La
Combattante Its will more than offset the thr' at
of Iraq's GSA-class guided-missile patrol boats
and provide added protection for Ir, n's offshore
oil facilities.
Although the Shah is sproding lavishly on
the navy, as well as on the other military
branches, problems still persist. Naval personnel
strength, which rose from 4,400 in 1967 to
13,000 last year, is scheduled to increase to
20,300 by 1976. The navy is having difficulty
assimilating the new equipment and the addi-
tional personnel. Selective recruiting programs,
NORTH YEMEN: A NEW CABINET
President Iryani appointed a new cabinet on
March 3 headed by Prime Minister - designate
Hasan Makki, a political moderate who has been
in charge of a caretaker government since the
remnoval of Saudi-backed prime minister i-fajri
three weeks ago. Although about half of the min-
isters are new appointees, the shuffle probably
does not foreshadow significant policy changes.
Makki has no personal following, and his
appointment caused little reaction in Sana. All of
North Yemen's important interest groups are rep-
resented in the nov. cabinet, probably ensuring
early confirmation by the legislative assembly.
More important, the Saudis, whose financial dole
helps to keep the North Yemeni economy afloat,
are not expected to oppose Makki. King Fay al
had vetoed Iryani's preferred choice, former
prime minister al-Ayni; a final effort by Iryani in
late February to get the King to agree to al-Ayni's
return was unsuccessful.
The appointment of I Makki
downgrades the prime minister's post. Iryani is
also said to be planning structural refoims that
would give the foul-man ruling Republican Cr.un-
cil greatly expanded iuthorky over the ministries.
Former prime minister Hajri retains his post
in the Republican Council, with new supervisory
responsibilities over financial and development
affa;:s. In this capacity, he will oversee the gov-
ernment's allocation of Riyadh's subsidy.
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INDIA: ELECTION RETURNS
Plinio Minister Gandhi's Puling Congress
arty managod to secure narrow Illdjorilies in the
two nl-1St important of five off-year slate elec-
tions held last month. The results are more a
reflection of the continuing al)serlce of a viable
political alternative than all endorsement of Mrs,
Gamlhi's patty or policies.
The present depresso(J stillo of the economy
and the government's forcco!,t of still worse oc:cl-
nomic: conditions slid riot permit Mrs. Gandhi to
woo the electorate with convincing promises of
early improvement. In fact, the opposition parties
had a field clay attempting to capitalize on discon-
tent over inflation, scarcities, and corruption in
government. Unclcr these circumstances, Puling
Congress leaders could not risk relying primarily
on Mrs. Gandhi's charisma, as they had during the
height of her popularity in 1971 and 1972.
Page 15
In Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous
state, the party !,pent lingo suite,, Carefully selec-
ted candidates with broad caste, community, and
nlinorily .1ppeal, and promised suhslanlial federal
vXpenditure!, that would benefit all segments of
the population. With a high turnout of GO percent
of the electorate and peaceful v'o0nq, the. f2uling
Congress gained a thin majority of 215 in the
425-seat assembly; defections from the opposi-
tion could add to this tot,11. I-Ile party is thus riot
dependent on :,upport by 'ho pio-Moscow Conl-
rnuklist Party of India, with which it had made m,
electoral alliance.
Ili Orissa, i1 much smaller state on the vast
coast, the Holing Congress eked out -. plurality
and is forming a govermnenI with support bolo
Communists and independents. This marks a per-
sonal victory for Mrs. Gandhi and the local
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Congress leader, Mrs. Nandini Satpathy. A former
chief minister, Mrs. Satpathy has now been given
a second chance, to hold together the factional-
ized Ruling Congress Party in Orissa.
The results in the throe other elections, less
favorable to Mrs. Gandhi, will have little impact
on the government in Now Delhi. Regional parties
won in tiny Pondicherry and in the northeastern
slate of Manipur. In Nagaland, bordering on Mani-
pur, a pro-Congress tribal party lost control to
another tribal party. Inasmuch as the new state
government will be less closely associated with
the government in New Delhi, it may have a
better chance of eventually ending the long-
simmering tribal unrest in Nagaland.
During the difficult economic period ahead,
political instability in the states is likely to in-
crease as the population faces continuing food
shortages and high prices. The fall of the govern-
ment in Gujarat last month proved that even
Congress governments with solid legislative ma-
jorities are vulnerable. For the moment, however,
Mrs. Gandhi's confidence has been boosted as she
turns her immediate attention to food deficits,
serious petroleum and fertilizer shortages, and the
selection of a new president of India in August.
She does not have to face national elections until
1976.
Prime Minister Nouira and o-ier key advisers
of ailing President Bourguiba are apparently at-
tempting to relegate hint to figLI.ehe. d status.
Bourguiba led Tunisia to independence in
1956 and has been the country's only president,
ruling in a highly personal style. The succession
question, as it becomes more urgent, conse-
quently is having a highly unsettling effect on
political life. Existing constitutional provisions
call for the prime minister to fill out any unex-
pired portion of a presidential term, but various
plans to modify this system have been discussed
from time to time. Nourra has a number of rivals
for the succession, and the matter could come to
a head at the party congress scheduled for next
fall. Cuurgiriba some time ago announced his in-
tention to run again in the December 1974 presi-
dential election.
Bourguiba's latest hospitalization came amid
the furor touched off by his signature on January
12, while Nouira was away, of an agreement with
Libyan President Qadhafi to merge the two coun-
tries. Nouira and others quickly succeeded in
backing the Tunisian Government away from the
proposed union and also in bringing about the
ouster of a leading rival for the succession who, ds
forcign minister, had helped arrange the merger.
There are a significant number of Tunisians, par-
ticularly among the intellectuals, who still believe
that Tunisia would benefit from joining with its
backward but richer neighbor.
The short-range prospect is for continued
behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the presidential
aspirants under a relatively calm surface. This
could change if Bourguiba's condition is adversely
affected by a strenuous schedule of public ap-
pearances, or if the general public becomes aware
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25X1
25X1
The pace has quickened at the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with
most delegates hoping they can have a "skeleton"
of the final documents ready before the Easter
recess. The US mission, however, has termed
these hopes somewh,rt over-optimistic.
There has been no evidence of substantial
movement toward agreement on the major issues
facing the conference. The Western and Eastern
delegations still disagree on such significant issues
as the possibility of future peaceful change of
Europe's postwar frontiers, freer movement of
persons and information between states, and
constraints on military activity to strengthen
security.
Some optimism may have been generated by
apparent progress in the sub-group studying de-
velopment of conference follow-up measures, a
goal sought by the East. Widespread support has
now been expressed in the sub-group for im-
plementing some kind of undefined follow-up
procedures to the conference, despite the argu-
ment that any Western concessions on this ques-
tion should be held in reserve. The Danes broke
ranks with their EC colleagues to support pro-
posals for follow-up measures even though the
Nine had agreed earlier to remain silent for the
present or, such proposals. The Danes were
careful, however, not to support specific
procedures.
Agreement on an over-all skeleton draft is
possible by Easter, but most major substantive
statements are likely to be bracketed to indicate
disagreement. Resolution of these differences will
remain a difficult process. If a final draft agree-
ment is to be reached by Moscow's self-imposed
deadline of mid-summer, it would have to be a
very general document, designed to allow: the
signatories to interpret its major provisions to suit
their own political purposes.
EC: ATTITUDE ON ENERGY COORDINATION
European preparations for the scheduled
meeting of th, 12-nation Energy Coordinating
Group in Brussels on March 13-14 are clouded by
concern over U:, -;iticisnr of the recently an-
nounced EC plan to explore wide-ranging coop-
erative projects with the Arab states. The Euro-
peans in general are likely to view with caution
their role in the US-sponsored Coordinating
Group; if this participation seems likely to become
politicized and is presented i s an alternative to
European moves for EC-Arab cooperation.
The Europeans have some reservations about
the scope of the energy discussions and the
proper forum for taking up particular issues.
Nevertheless, there has been little to indicate that
the Europeans regard the EC Nine's plan to sound
out the Arab states on economic and cultural
cooperation as a substitute for the br-lder US-
initiated proposals for cooperation among the
oil-consuming nations. The London i 'inancial
Times pointed out in an editorial on March 5 that
the community's endorsement of the French
desire for a special EC relationship with the Arab
world has not infringed on the energy problems
being tackled in the wider forum. Th% community
recognizes that it cannot, by itself, hope to deal
effectively with the world-wide problems of
energy.
Although the French decided some time ago
not to take part in the deliberations of the Coord-
inating Group, the other Europeans have been
hoping Paris might be brought along eventually.
The French have said publicly, however, that they
would participate in energy discussions if they are
open to all the 24 industrialized countries that are
members of the Organiza+ion of Economic Coop-
e;d`.ion and Development. They do not want
discussions restricted to the five larger EC
members, Canada, Norway, Japan, and the US, as
suggested for some topics in the terms of ref-
erence for the Coordinating Group. Out of self-
interest, the smaller EC members :,iso favor en-
largement of these discussioii gruuos.
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The Norwegians will soon become the only
net oil exporters in Western Europe. Eventually,
Norway might be able to supply nearly all the
petroleum needs of the Scandinavian nations, if
current production estimates are valid. Although
Oslo ha:, offered to share its abund,inco with its
neighbors, it is taking steps to ensure Norwegian
control of its off-shor^ petroleum and natural gas
resources.
Norway began developing its portion of the
North Sea fields in the late 1960s. It recovered
some 300,000 tons of oil in 1971, and nearly six
times that amount in 1972. The Norwegians
expect to produce five million tons in 1974, and
to level off annual North Sea production at 50
million tons of oil and 45 billion cubic meters of
gas in 1980. By holding to a production limit,
Oslo hopes to avoid the undesirable economic and
ecological consequences of hasty or uncontrolled
exploitation of energy resources.
Norway's ultimate recoverable North Sea
reserves are estimated at between one and two
billion tons of oil and between one and two
trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Norway's oil
consumption is currently running about nine mil-
lion tons annually. It does not use natural gas.
Petroleum consumpticn in the five Nordic states
totaled 73.6 million tons in 1972. If consumption
remains relatively stable, Norway's estimated
North Sea production, coupled with additional
planned exploitation of the Norwegian con-
tinental shelf north of 62 degrees, might satisfy
Scandinavian demands. Furthermore, at the
planned production levels, the Norwegian fields
might continue to yield well into the next
century.
Norway initially welcomed foreign invest-
ment, and numerous foreign companies are now
involved in oil exploitation. Most of these com-
panies have offices in Stavanger, on Norway's
southwest coast, which now has a sizable colony
of English-speaking oil company employees and
their families.
In line with Norway':, pl)Iicy of naintaining
maximum control over exploitation of its re-
sources, the Norwegian Government recently
proposed that parliament adopt stringent meas-
ures for the North Sea devclopment ar'a and the
region along the northern continental shelf. The
proposals, which would strengthen government
control and restrict private dons' stic and foreign
investment, are certain to generate considerable
domestic controversy. Private oil companies are
bitter over the small role assigned to thorn, and
the Conservative Party has called the move a
challenge to the non-Socialist majority.
5lockholm
AAl Tlr
U.K.
SEA
Notwecien fields DENMARK
' Ljopennagen
NORTH SEA }''^' l' ? ' POLAND
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The governrnr nt also proposes to ban the
granting of additional concessions to private cons,
panics south of the 62nd ,arallol. Instead, the
Norwegian State Oil Company would become the
Instrument for implementing the country's oil
policy. The continental shelf north of 62 degrees
would be opened to exploration, presumably
under stringent Norwegian regulations, but not
until certain international questions are resolved.
The demarcation line between the Soviet and
Norwegian portions of the shelf in the far north-
near the USSR's large naval base at Murmansk-
curr(,ntly is being negotiated. In addition, the
Law )f the Sea Conference may establish distance
and db th regulations for shelf exploitation.
The continental shelf may extend sev(,ril
hundred miles out to sea along the northern rur-
tion of Norway's coast. The Svalbard Archipelago
is on the northern edge of the European undersea
massif. It is not clear whether this area can be
claimed by Norway, along with the closer and
shallower areas of the shelf. Norway has sover-
eignty over the archipelago, however, by virtue of
the Svalbard treaty of 1920. The USSR and the
US are tv,o of the more than 40 signatories, but
only Norway and the USSR have maintained per-
manent settlements and installations on Svalbard.
Norway has constructed an all-weather air-
field near Longyearbyen, the archipelago's main
settlement, and the Norwegians have agreed to
allow the Soviets to station five or six permanent
aircraft maintenance personnel at the facility.
Perhaps to prevent further exploitation in certain
areas, Oslo recently set aside portions of the arch-
ipelago as wildlife sanctuaries and national parks.
The undersea area around Svalbard may have oil-
',earing potential and the islands could provide
the most convenient staging area for off-shore
operations.
In addition to its recommendations govern-
i~ng oil exploitation, the government also suggests
that Norway play an expanded role in interna-
tional energy policy. Norway may eventually seek
affiliation with oil-producing countries, pre-
sumably through OPEC. In the early stages of the
NORDIC PETROLCUM STATISTICS
(In millions of tons for 1972)
country
U)(~ tlon
consumption
refining
ca )ecit
Ihnun.n1.
02
1119
11.0
I nrl.nrcl
1;30
9.3
Iculancl
O 'r'
5wcvlen
:17.0
17. 1
Ncrrwiiy
1.7
0.2
(1.6
'tonal Arno
1
73.6
41.0
?A rr/rn rx fans!e
oil crisis, Norway' offered to mediate, believ;ng
that its unique position as both a consumer and
producer provided special leverage.
Oslo recently offered to permit other Scan-
dinavian countries to share in the benefits of its
oil development. At a Nordic Council meeting in
Stockholm last month, Prime Minister Bratteli
suggested that Sweden exchange its industrial
know-how fo?, Norwegian oil. Oslo hopes that the
Swedes will help ;--xpand Norway's steel industry
as well as its ref;r#inq capacity. If North Sea oil
eventually is brought ashore in Norway, Oslo also
will want to develop a petro-chemical industry,
probably with the help of its Scandinavian
neighbors.
The oil-hungry Swedes have responded
eagerly to the Norwegian offer, but at the present
rate of development it seems unlikely any Nor-
wegian oil will reach Sweden before 1980. The
Norwegian offer is also good news for Finland
and Iceland; both import the bulk of their oil
from the Soviet Union. Despite Denmark's grow-
ing off-shore oil exploration and development in
the North Sea, the Danes must import vast quan-
tities of oil and welcomed Norway's ges-
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President Pompidou will rneot with General
Secretary Brezhnev at a Black Sea resort next
week. The two leaders apparently intended to
meet earlier, but Middle Eas; developments and
strains in Soviet-French relations led to postpone-
merits. It was only during Foreign Minister Gre-
myko's visit to France late last month that final
arrangements for the trip were made.
Brezhnev and Pompidou will have a variety
of problems to discuss, but their main purpose
will be to revive the once-vaunted "special rela-
tionship" which has become somewhat frayed
over the :ast few months. Whatever private differ-
ences emerge, the two leaders will try to present a
public image of harmony.
The French believe the USSR failed to con-
sult adequately during the Middle East war, while
the Soviets have serious reservations about French
statements last year expressing interest in West
European defense cooperation. The Soviets have
a;:o been disturbed by France's unwillingness to
participate in MBFR, and may feel that this atti-
tude is spreading to other Wesi. EL..-opean
county ies.
On the Middle East, the Soviets may attempt
to dissuade Pompidou from using arms sales as a
lever fcr French influence in the area. This is a
touchy subject, however, and is an area where the
Soviets are not likely to have much impact. It
seems likely, therefore, that whatever representa-
tions they make will be low key. In his prelimi-
nary talks in Paris, Gromyko seems to have
steered clear of any specifics, although his defense
of US policy in the Middle East might have been
meant as a way of indicating that French involve-
ment in the area would not be helpful.
The Soviets will try to get the French to
urge Wes; Germany to refrain from establishing a
federal environmental office in West Berlin. This
is not likely to work because Paris' position is
that Bonn cannot back down now that the office
has become an issue with the Soviets. By pressing
the matter, however, Moscow may :strengthen the
French view that the Western allies should re-
strain future initiatives by Bonn in West Berlin.
European security issues have generated an-
other set of irritants to bilateral relations. The
French are unenthusiastic about Moscow's pri-
mary goal of obtaining an unambiguous declara-
tion on the inviolability of frontiers, and are
disturbed by the Soviet drive to cripple the "freer
movement" ..incept by appending restrictive
clauses. Paris also h.s been unrespon.,ive to Mos-
cow's overtures on a summit-level finale for
CSCE. Pompidou, in particular, is reluctant to
attend an international gathering that he fears
would be dominated by the superpowers.
On the positive side, Moscow has applauded
France's stand at the Washington energy confer-
ence. The ill-will and distance between the French
and their European allies that emerged during the
conference must have given Moscow some addi-
tional reassurance that a French-promoted Euro-
pean defense arrangement is not going to reach a
serious stage in the near future.
President Pompidou reshuffled his cabir.et
last week in an effort to form a more cohesive
government capable of dealing with the myriad
problems facing France and to reassert his own
authority in an atmosphere of continuing uncer-
tainty over his health. There are no new faces in
the cabinet, but the manner in which Pompidou
handled the deliberations leading to the reshuffle
suggests that he used the occasion to patch up his
differences with the orthodox Gaullists.
The new cabinet, smaller by one third than
its predecessur, combines several technical func-
tions and eliminates other less important ones.
The major portfolios did not change, and Justice
Minister Taittinger, Finance Minister Giscard, and
Housing Minister Guichard were accorded the
additional prestige title of minister of state.
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Both Jean Royer and Jacques Chirac, who
have been accused of exploiting their positions as
commerce and agricultural ministers to gain popu-
larity with the workers and farmers, have been
shifted to other posts. Former interior mini Ater
Marcellin, who was tarred by the Le Canard bug-
ging scandal, was shifted to another ministry, and
former industry minister Charbonnel, who or:,,;ly
clashed with Prime Minister Messmer, was
dropped.
By reappointing Messmer as Prime Minister,
Pompidou has probably muted, at least tem-
porarily, the speculation over his successor. The
colorless Messmer is not considered to be a seri-
ous presidential contender. Had any of the major
presidential hopefuls been appointed, it would
have been immediately construed as the nomina-
tion of the ailing Pompidou's successor, and Pom-
pidou would have assumed a lame-duck status.
Instead, Pompidou has kept all his options
open and has recaptured control over the timing
of events in French political life. Pompidou has,
in effect, reminded French politicians of the
supremacy of the presidency in :;ie Fifth Re-
public.
The President and Messmer consulted only
three advisers prior to announcing the reshuffle.
One of these officials, Pierre Juillet, has beer
trying to arrange a reconciliation between Pompi-
dou and the Gaullist "barons," and his inclusion
in these discussions implies that the cabinet
changes-unlike the previous changes of govern-
ment-were coordinated with party leaders.
In addition, Pompidou has recently had con-
ferences with Michel Debre, Jacques Chaban-
Delmas, and Roger Frey. The appointment of
Frey to a prestigious consultative office is another
sign that the barons and Pompidou have drawn
closer. The depth of the reconciliation is suspect,
however, and there is no evidence that it includes
a commitment by Pompidou to support Chaban-
Delmas as the governing coalition's candidate in
ITALY: PUTTING IT BACK TOGETHER
Mariano Rumor's eight-month-old govern-
ment collapsed last week after the small but influ
ential Republican Party withdrew over an economic policy dispute with the Socialists. Rumor
was asked almost immediately by President Leone
to make the first try at putting together the
country's 36th postwar government, but any gov-
ernment formed now is likely to be an expedient,
contrived to get the country through its conten-
tious referendum on divorce, now scheduled for
May 12.
Early indications are that Rumor will aim
for another center-left grouping among the same
parties-Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social
Democrats, and Republicans. Rumor will face the
nettlesome task of reconciling the opposing views
of the Socialists and Republicans over economic
priorities. Successive governments have been im-
mobilized by disagreement between the Socialists,
who have demanded immediate action on costly
social and economic programs, and the Republi-
cans, who have insisted on budgetary austerity.
The issue came to a head last week when Socialist
Budget Minister Giolitti accused Republican
Treasury Minister La Malfa of trying to force his
policies on the country indirectly through the
terms of a loan he had negotiated with the IMF.
If the Republicans cannot be persuaded to
rejoin the coalition, Rumor or some other pre-
mier-designate may ask them to support in parlia-
ment a government composed of the remaining
three parties. The three parties have enough votes
in parliament to go on without the Fepublicans.
The Republican Party, however, enjoys influence
out of proportion to its size-it is the smallest
coalition member-because of its internal unity and
La Malfa's prestige as an economist.
The Christian Democrats may have to set up
a temporary one-party caretaker government if
these alternatives fail. This is an established way
of letting the dust settle, but there is not much
enthusiasm for the idea now. The other coalition
parties all favor the existing divorce law, and they
do not want the Christian Democrats, who
oppose divorce, in the driver's teat during the
referendum campaign.
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The Communist Party was caught off-guard
by the government's collapse. While Rumor was
in office, the party supported his efforts to deal
with economic problems and adopted a construc-
tive stance in parliament. At the same time, the
communists accelerated their campaign for an
open role in the government by pointing out that
the ruling parties were already accepting indirect
communist support.
Although the communists are making a rit-
ual bid for inclusion in the next government, they
know that they cannot make a good case with the
divorce referendum pending. The communists are
at odds with the dominant Christian Democrats
on the divorce issue and would have prcierred to
avoid a government crisis until at least after the
referendum.
The dissolution of parliament followed by
new elections is still considered a last resort, even
though it would automatically postpone the
troublesome divorce referendum. The center-left
parties probably will resist this temptation, be-
cause they fear that the communists and neo-
fascists might benefit from voter resentment over
inflation, energy-related austerity measures, and
the recent oil payoff scandal.
The government's recent effor'Ls to explore
the possibility of loosening Portugal's tight grip
on its African territories has led to a confronta-
tion between rightist stand-patters and those who
believe changes are necessary. As a result of bitter
opposition from the right, Prime Minister Caetano
appears to have backed off from any change ;)-
'L-the present time.
Last month the govern ment-presurrwbly
with Caetano's acquiescence-permitted the piisbli-
cation of a book calling for self-determination for
the Portuguese African territories. The aui:hor,
General Antonio de Spinola, is the former com-
mander in chief and governor of Portuguese
Guinea, and now vice chief of staff of the armed
forces.
Page 24
The publication of Spinola's book has led to
considerable political infighting over demands
from the right, led by President Thomaz, for
Spinola's dismissal, and Caetano himself is also
under attack for allowing the book to be pub-
lished. Spinola will be difficult to oust. He has
wide support in the armed forces, including the
backing of his boss, General Costa Gomes.
There are other signs that the government
was considering softening its policy toward its
overseas territories. During a recent visit to Mo-
zambique, the overseas minister mentioned the
possibility of granting increased autonomy to the
African territories. Lisbon also permitted the for-
mation of a multi-racial organ zation in Mozam-
bique led by a former insurgent. Although the
new group has been described in the foreign press
as a "third force" that could provide an "African
solution" to Portugal's colonial problems, Lisbon
has been careful to limit its scope.
Pressure on Caetano against a policy change
was recently intensified following stepped-up in-
surgent activity in Mozambique. In an attempt to
placate white settlers who havs protested alleged
lack of army protection there, the government
agreed to provide them with arms and a radio
network. Lisbon is concerned that they might
seek a "Rhodesian solution."
The conflicting pressures on Caetano were
evident in his speech last month at his party's
annual conwress. He stressed that Portugal cannot
accept a policy that would mean abandonment of
the whites. At the same time, he referred to his
own past support for a federation or community
of Portuguese territories.
Caetano has tried to appease both sides. He
apparently has refused to fire Spinola, but in a
speech this week to the National Assembly, the
prime minister reaffirmed Portugal's determina-
tion to remain in Africa and to build a multi-
racial society there. He scorned any vote of self-
determination as "inappropriate for the African
mentality," thus repudiating one of Spinola's
principal points.
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The elections on March 10 will set the stage
for the formation of Belgium's 22nd government
since World War II. The elections are not ex-
pected to lead to a settlement of Belgium's long-
standing problem-how to get the French-
speakers of Wallonia and the Flemish-speakers of
Flanders to live together. There are signs that the
election process will only divide the country
further into rival groups.
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Mar 8, 74
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For the first time, the three traditional
parties-Socialist, Social Christian, and Liberal-
that have governed Belgium in various groupings
for almost three decades have each posted two
lists of candidates in Brussels, a French-speaking
list and a Flemish-speaking list. In effect, the
traditional parties have split. The Socialists still
maintain a semblance of party discipline, but the
Social Christians and the Liberals, who have sub-
divided into a third group catering to the Brussels
area alone, have been seriously weakened.
These divisions will erode the power and
authority of the traditional parties, which have
already suffered by large-scale retirements of
prominent legislators since 1971. In general, their
replacements have been more radical and doctri-
naire, making the formation of coalitions more
difficult than ever.
The decline of the traditional parties has
been accompanied by an increase in strength of
ethnic minority parties. The Volksunie in Flan-
ders, thr Wallonian Rally, and the Democratic
Front of Francophones have increased their share
of the votes in recent national elections from
insignificant percentages in 1968 to a healthy
1.0-25% in 19"171. The trend is expected to con-
tinue in this election and will probably add to the
instability of the central government.
If the two major parties, the Social Chris-
tians and the Socialists, retain enough seats to
ensure implementation of the comparatively mod-
erate plans for federalism now planned, they will
probably forge another coalition. The Socialists,
however, are increasingly dominated by their left
wing ?;4hich is attempting to exploit the energy
crisis and the current public distrust of the large
oil companies in order to radicalize the
party platform without losing votes. One of the
Socialist planks demands government participa-
tion in the energy sector of the economy, and
other planks concern education, abortion, and
government participation in the private sector.
The outgoing government had reached an impasse
on these issues, which are anathema to the Social
Christians. Should the Socialists increase their
parliamentary strength, they will drive a very hard
bargain before entering into a coalition with the
Social Christians who are expected to lose a few
seats. Any government formed as a result of such
hard bargaining woulc; be even weaker than the
last one.
Some of the more doctrinaire Socialists have
gone so far as to say they intend to remain
outside the government and to work for their
reforms in opposition. Socialist co-President An-
dre Cools, who is widely believed to have engi-
neered the fall of the last government for political
motives of his own, has invited liberal Social
Christians and Communists to join the Socialists
in a Progressive Front. Although such a grouping
of political beclfellows at a national level is highly
unlikely in the near future, the proposal lends
credibility to Socialist threats to work in opposi-
tion. In this case, the Social Christians perforce
would have to turn to the linguistic parties in
order to achieve the necessary parliamentary ma-
jorities. Considering their conflicting views on sev-
eral key issues, such a coalition would be highly
unstable-even by Belgian standards.
Belgian National Elections
1965-1971
50 Percent of total vote
1968
1971
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Mar 8, 74
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Argentina:
CORDOBA SITUATION REMAINS CLOUDED
The government's inept handling of the
police rebellion against the left-wing provincial
government in Cordoba has dimmed the prospects
for early or peaceful resolution of the conflict. If
Peron obtains corgressional approval for plans to
invoke federal intervention of the province, re-
newed and bloody clashes can be expected be-
tween opposing left and right-wing forces in
Cordoba-and possibly in other cities.
Following an acrimonious debate, the Senate
approved Peron's request for authority to re-
organize the executive branch of the Cordoba
government, but opposition members of the
Chamber of Deputies have already raised a howl
of pretest over what they regard as the govern-
ment's heavy-handed and illegal action in per-
mitting the removal of a democratically elected
administration. The US Embassy reports that the
bill may face a protracted delay in the legisla-
ture-a situation that would leave the Cordoba
problem dangling in limbo. Thi: hiatus, in turn,
would substantially increase the chances for fur-
ther conflict in the perennially troubled industrial
city. There is a possibility, however, that a federal
administrator might be appointed before the bill
is enacted by Congress, but subject to eventual
approval by that body.
The atmosphere in Cordoba, meanwhile, re-
mains tense following a week of strikes, ex-
plosions, and street fighting that has left an unde-
termined number of dead and wounded. The
The national government's apparent clumsi-
ness in handling the Cordoba affair is causing
strain and unhappiness among moderate leftists
the breach among rank-and-file Peronists, the
Cordoba debacle appears to be creating some dis-
sension within top levels of the Peron govern-
ment. Secretary General of the Presidency Solano
Lima is said to be angry over Peron's decision on
intervention after being assured by Peron recently
that this was not in the cards. Solano Lima has
been reported in recent weeks to be or. his way
out and this final ";'umiliation" may prompt his
resignation. Solano Lima has ben Peron's inter-
mediary with leading politicians and has also been
the anchor man in attempting co iron out disputes
between federal and provincial authorities-many
of them the outgrowth of Peron's purge of
Marxists.
The volatile situation in Cordoba is further
complicated by the maneuvering of Peron's ortho-
dox lab( r supporters to oust leftists from control
of Cordoba's powerful trade union confederation.
Coinciding with the outbreak of the police revolt,
the convocation of a "rump" congress to elect a
new slate of labor leaders adds weight to the
argument of those who claim Peron conspired to
bring about the course of developments in Cor-
doba. While achieving their objectives, the con-
voluted tactics of Peronist labor leaders in sup-
planting the leftists could cause further problems
in the city. Leftist refusal to acknowledge the
validity of the union elections is likely to increase
the level of protest-and probably violence-be-
tween rival unionists. The reopening of the uni-
versity-a hotbed of leftist activity-will also in-
crease the chances that students will join the fray
should armed leftist labor groups decide to pro-
mote disorder in the province. If civil strife be-
comes widespread, it would sorely test Peron's
ability to keep his fragile movement intact and
bring some semblance of order to the long-suffer-
Page 27 WEEKLY REVIEW
In addition to widening
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The, /\rarla government has named the ad-
ministration-backed presidential candidate, Gun-
oral Kjull Laugorud, the winner of last Sunday's
election despite the fact that the moderately left-
ist opposition candidate, General Efrain Rios,
actually won.
The government delayed until March 6 be-
fore announcing officially that Laugorud had
won. It needed the extra time to engineer a mas-
sive fraud to give Laugerud a plurality in the
three-man race. The final count issued by the
government gave Laugorud about 40 percent of
the vote. Rios was given 36 percent, and 24
percent was won, apparently legitimately, by
Colonel Paiz, the third candidate. As none of the
three received a majority, the government-
controlled Congress must decide. In the next two
weeks, it will make its choice-and that choice
will almost certainly be Laugerud.
The government's belated announcement
came a few hours after police used force and tear
gas against supporters of Rios who were demon,
strating in the capital. Earlier, Rios had accused
the government of gross fraud and claimed he had
won a majority of 130,000 votes. He declared
that "historical responsibility and military honor"
required him to reject the government's stolen
election. He threatened to "paralyze the country"
if he were cheated of his victory.
Whether the government will be able to
make the Laugerud "victory" stick will depend
heavily on the attitude of the army, which ii turn
will be influenced by the degree of popular dis-
content created by the government's transparent
fraudulence. Thus far, the army has remained on
the sidelines,
~Altho!Jgh it Would
pre ter to aver ecoming involved in a major
conflict between pro- and anti-government ele-
ments, the army may be forced to act if violence
breaks out. In the absence of violence, it is likely
General Kjcll Lae'erud
to do nothing to upset the government's plan. In
any case, the leading generals are believed to favor
Laugerud, and any action on their part is likely to
benefit him.
The outlook for the next several days is for
some degree of instability, with each side airing
charges and countercharges. Outbreaks of serious
violence are possible. In the longer run, the elec-
tion results could mean a re$u:?gence of large-scale
violence that generally has been absent during the
last part of President Arana's term. The outlawed
Communist Party and the Cuban-o1 iented Rebel
Armed Forces will view the outcome as proof
that working within the system is impossible.
They may find new support for extreme measures
against the government.
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