INTELLIGNECE REPORT THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XLIV)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010043-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 87
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: IR

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The International Liaison Department
of the Chinese Communist Party
(Reference Till:-: POLO XLI V)
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THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS
This study examines in some depth the International
Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), the only one of the Party's central departments
on which there is enough evidence to support such an
examination. The study finds that the ILD, radically
reorganized in recent years, has been given new duties --
particularly in the realm of improving the CCP's relations
with governing CP's abroad -- and with these new duties
an enhanced status. The ILD is no longer obliged to
implement the revolutionary, counter-productive policy of
trying to export the Cultural Revolution, but instead is
now charged with fostering reconciliation with friendly
governing CP's, and a more relaxed line toward the CP's
in non-Communist countries. Among these latter, the ILD
is reducing its commitments and diversifying its holdings.
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hi q tud
d b
y was prepare
y /
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summer intern with this Staff. was _
given muc elp and valued counsel by other components
of the Agency,. in particular the nfficp of Current
Intelligence
Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff
SFr.R RT
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THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Contents
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FUNCTIONS, ORGANIZATION AND STATUS . . . . . . . . .1
THE ILD IN ACTION -- IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY. . . 13
Relations with Communist Government/Parties. . . 13
Relations with Opposition and Splinter
Communist Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
PERSONNEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Director:
'Keng Piao 43
Deputy Directors (Conjectural)
Jen Yun - chung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Shen Chien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Yang Yu-heng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Chang Tsang 52
Chang Hsiang-shan 53
Other Known Members
Tang Ming-chao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Mao Pao- chung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chao Hsueh- l i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Tien Shu-chien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Yang Chun-cheng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
H s i ao Huang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Yao Shih-ken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
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Other Possible ILD Members
Tsao I-ou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Feng Hsuan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Chu Ta-cheng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Liu Ke-ming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Liu Chun-fa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Ma Te-chuan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Hsing Chu-fang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Huang Chun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Lin Hsien-nung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Hung Tso-chun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Chang Chen-hai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Other Persons Seen Often in Company of ILD
Personalities at ILD Functions
Cheng Kuo- tsai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Chin Hui. .67
Lao Yuan -hui . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Li Mei. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Li Kuei-cheng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
Li Ming-hsiang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
Li Wen-kun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o68
Shih Yung - lu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Tai Sheng-pu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
High-Level Party Personnel Often Associated
with ILD
Kang Sheng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Kuo Yu- f eng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Yao Wen-yuan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chang Chun-chiao. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
Wu Fa-hs ien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Chi Teng - kue i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Chang Shih-Chung. . . . . . . . . . . . . . o74
Liu Hsi-Chang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o 7S
ANNEX 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
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THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Sum,
The International Liaison Department of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was
probably formed in the early 1950s, possibly after a
reallocation of the responsibilities of the United
Front Department. Throughout the 1950s and early
1960s, it remained behind the scenes, responsible for
contacts, communications, and coordination with other
Communist Parties around the world. It began to be
more active with the development of the Sino-Soviet
split, when its delegates to foreign Party meetings
began to be more vociferous in advancing the CCP
cause. As the rift deepened and the Chinese began
searching out independent supporters of their position,
the ILD's activities became more 'important.
Organized geographically and working hand-in-
hand with Chinese embassies in.various countries, the
ILD performed the task of finding, investigating and
eventually supporting pro-Chinese splinter groups and
malcontents, encourlgi.ngthem..to form so-called
"Marxist-Leninist" parties in opposition to pro-Soviet
"revisionist" parties. In thi.s task the ILD pursued
a patient, soft-sell policy, providing funds to keep
the promising groups active, and offering political
and organizational training on Chinese soil where it
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was deemed profitable. The ILD appeared to receive
high-level supervision from the two ranking members
of the Party Secretariat, Teng.Hsiao-ping and Peng
Chen, and on occasion from Liu Shao-chi, then Mao's
designated successor.
The purges of the Cultural Revolution had a
tremendous impact on the ILD, both organizationally
and operationally. Its top-level leaders and
supervisors were wiped. out very early in the Revolu-
tion, and those who replaced them, under the guidance
of Kang Sheng and a group of PLA officers, were
obliged to implement a counter-productive policy of
ideological militancy and....organizational interference
until this "revolur.ionary diplomacy" was replaced by
a new, more flexible-1 . ine. .In.1968.and much of 1969,
the ILD remained ideol.ogical.ly.and.organizationally
incoherent, gradually. retr.ea.ting...from. the policy of
giving explicit directions to splinter parties, and
trying instead to improve strained relations with
ruling Parties in selecte.d.co.untries. Although the
department's leadership ...see.me.d... to.,be .generally in the
hands of the PLA, under the. overall .direction of the
civilian Kang Sheng..and.his wife, one veteran ILD
cadre, Shen Chien, continued to make frequent
appearances.
It was not until late 1970 that the new ILD
really began to take shape,._rrith.the,reappearance of
several veteran mernbe.rs..who..had: been missing during
the Cultural Revolution....Shen..Chien.had.been
identified by Kang Sheng.as.head..of.the.department
in mid-1970, but Kang'.s own.disappearance.shortly
thereafter left a leadership vacuum. This was filled
by Keng Piao, Peking's Ambassador to Albania, who
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returned in January 1971 and was named to head the
ILD in March. During this period, the military
presence which had dominated the ILI) was reduced.
I'LA officer Kuo Yu-feng ceased to appear with ILD
personnel and reportedly took up full-time duties
with the Organization Department. Another PLA
figure, Chu Ta-cheng, disappeared. Yang Yu-heng,
yet another PLA man once high in the ILD hierarchy,
went out of sight for a time, and has more recently
been making low-level ILD appearances. Jen Yun-chung
remains the principal visible PLA member of importance
within the department. In this regard, the ILD has
been an exception to the general course of Party-
rebuilding, which has seen PLA domination of most
provincial Party committees, of many if not most of
the central Party departments, and of the Party
committee of the Foreign Ministry.
In addition to consolidating Party control
over the ILD, Keng Piao has been expanding the
department. Several new members have been added to
the small coterie of veteran cadres (who seem to
occupy the top leadership positions) listed in the
open press u3 members of the ILD. Division of labor
along functional and geographic lines, though not
specified in the press, seems to be taking place.
The ILD itself seems to have acquired more
importance along with its greater visibility. In
any kind of public listing of central regime depart-
ments, it is ordinarily the first one mentioned,
and its leaders are usually the first ones mentioned
in group appearance lists. On such occasions,
Keng Piao is invariably the first or second person
mentioned after Politburo members, and ILD deputy
directors Shen Chien and Jen Yun-chung invariably
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appear before vice-foreign ministers and sometimes
before even the acting foreign minister, Chi
Peng-fei.
In terms of duties performed, the ILD has
recently become more active in the implementation
of policy toward China's major allies, particularly
in the realm of improving government/Party
relations. Some observers believe that the ILD,
and particularly Keng Piao, plays an active role
in the overall formulation of foreign.policy, and
has supervisory authority over the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and all other departments concerned
with foreign relations. However, it-seems likely
that -- as the Chinese themselves have said
privately -- the most important foreign policies
are formulated by a small group around Chou En-lai
(of which Keng is apparently one member).
With the onset of the Cultural Revolution,
ILD policy incoherence seemed-to parallel the
condition of China itself, The export-of radical
excesses to foreign countries caused China's Party
relations to decline along. with its overall
international prestige. Ideological militancy, as
well as obeisance to the thought of Chairman Mao,
was demanded of China's Party allies, large or
small. Those who had the independence and will to
do so, resisted this type of activity. The result
was that China's only allies were the.Albanians,
who had already burned all other bridges, and a
smattering of insignificant "Marxist-Leninist"
splinter groups. Upon these latter, the ILD made
further demands, such as the creation of clandestine
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organizations, which added up to requiring a duplica-
tion of the Chinese experience. These demands often
caused serious internal difficulties for the parties
concerned.
With the decline in "revolutionary diplomacy"
after mid-1967 and the perceived military threat
from the Soviet Union after autumn 1968, ILD policy
began to reflect the change in the thinking of the
CCP leadership. In late 1969, the ILD, although
still in a state of organizational disorder, began
to implement a policy of reconciliation with the CCP's
various potential allies. This included a gradual
warming of Party relations with North Vietnam and
the National Liberation Front of South Vietna^:. North
Korea, the Laotian Patriotic Front, and Rumania. As
the ILD has itself consolidated, is has continued to
play a major role in maintaining these good relations.
With a new, less militant ideology in hand,
the ILD has put into effect a more relaxed policy
towards smaller Party friends, much to the relief of
some of them. Organizational as well as ideological
requirements have become much more flexible and
realistic, and the Chinese have admitted that earlier
policies were sometimes wrong.. On the other hand,
it appears that some loyal Party allies which offer
insignificant help to the Chinese have been down-
graded in order to pursue bigger.game at the government
level. Stressing Maoist principles of "pelf-decision
and self-sufficiency," the ILD has basically terminated
financial support for some "Marxist-Leninist"
(pro-Chinese) parties, leaving.them to flounder.
Consonant with this, Peking has sometimes shown as
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much (or as littl.e)... interest.- in-other pro-Chinese
groups as in the proven, loyal "Marxist-Leninist"
parties.
There are further indications. that, even while
continuing to support Communist-led armed-struggle
in Asia, the furthering. of diplomatic relations may
have some effect on the.type.. of Chinese support given
to such rebel. groups.- cuts ide.....Indochina. . Though it
is unlikely that the..CCP .wi..l.l,..ta,rminate .support to
rebel movements.. in...Malays:ia.:.and..Burma,. it is not as
yet clear how it .wil.l...handle._...the-p.roblem of maintain-
ing good relations...wi.th...both ...sides . in -a .civil war.
The final policy stance ..will ..prob.ably. be .more.. the
result of cons iderations...of ..Chinese national interest
than of ideological consistency.
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THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Functions, Organization and Status
One organizational feature that appears to be
common to nearly all Communist Parties of any size is
a department of the Party set up to deal with relations
with other Communist Parties and countries. In the
Soviet Union, this function is divided between an
International Department (for non-bloc parties) and
a Bloc Department (for Communist Parties in power). In
the People's Republic of China, these function- are
united in an International Liaison Department (ILD).
It is the purpose of the first part of this paper to
trace the organizational development of the ILD* from
a relatively obscure and clandestine branch of the
Party to its present status as an open, active partici-
pant in the implementation of Chinese foreign policy.
Prior to 1971, the existence of the ILD was not
officially acknowledged 25X1
It may have been
*The translation International Liaison Department
is technically incorrect: The official name given to
the department by the 9th Central Committee is Chun Yang
Tui Wai Lien Lo Pu, which more. accurately translates as
"Central Foreign Liaison Department." However, NCNA and
FBIS translate the term as International Liaison Depart-
ment, so this paper will do the same. It is important to
(continued on page 2)
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formed in or about 1951-52 when the United Front
Department was split in two, though this is uncertain.
Prior to and during the Cultural Revolution
the functions of the ILD were limited.
Its primary
responsibility was to maintain contacts with
friendly Communist Parties in Communist-ruled
countries, and to find, nurture and develop pro-
Chinese sentiment wherever it was found. In this
capacity, it often worked hand-in-glove with overseas
MFA personnel in the embassies.
At the same time, it is clear from the available
evidence that the MFA and ILD kept their functions
carefully se arated.
(continued rom page 1) note, however, that this is a
new name; prior to the 9th Central Committee meeting,
the official name for the department was Chung Yan
Kuo Chi Lien Lo Pu, which does translate accurate y as
"Central International Liaison Department."
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The first head of the liaison department was
Wang Chia-hsiang. This was surmised from his frequent
attendance at foreign Party Congresses and his
greeting of Party delegations to Peking. and h more
recently been confirmed by Red 25X1
Guard posters. Wang got into trouble in the Peng
Te-huai affair of 1959, and,although his fall was not
'formally ratified at that time, and he remained
nominally the department'head, he did go into eclipse;
d
e facto leadership of the ILD passed into the hands
oTuTt Hsiu-chuan, with Politburo-level supervision
apparently provided by Tenp Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen.
The purges of the Cultural Revolution hit the
ILD very early. Among the first to be disposed of
was Wang Chia-hsiang, and by early 1966, Wu Hsiu-chuan
and much of the rest of the top leadership were also
out of power, if perhaps not yet purged.* Leadership
"See Appendix Tor list of suspected ILD members
purged during the Cultural Revolution.
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duties were taken over in March 1966 (according to
later Red Guard posters) by Liu Ning-i, former
head of the ACFTU, assisted by Chao I-min, a veteran
ILD member with much experience. These two carried
on the majority of the visible work of the ILD during
1966 and early 1967, with Liu himself attending a
New Zealand party congress in April 1966. As the
Cultural Revolution expanded and grew more violent
and disruptive, the ILD, like nearly all other
components of the Chinese bureaucracy, ceased to
function effectively. Following the standard pattern,
younger members of the department engaged in vicious
criticism of the higher cadres, and the department
became almost completely paralyzed,
fierce ideological quarrelling had
broken out between "heaven" and "earth" factions
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ILD,
with the result that work came to a virtual standstill.
Nobody was willing to take the responsibility for
writing reports or signing papers, and almost all
work was passed on to the highest levels of leadership,
which were also under heavy ideological fire. Sometime
during this period, Wang Li, former radical journalist
and member of the central Cultural Revolution Group,
was brought into the ILD as a deputy director in
charge of combatting "revisionism" within the depart-
ment. Much of the middle-level leadership was
apparently brought down during this early 1967 period.
In late 1967, things went from bad to worse. In
September, Wang Li himself came under intense
criticism from his superiors, who curtailed his duties
and informed the ILD to do likewise; he was later
purged. Chao I-min, although he claimed to be a
member of the "revolutionary" faction of the depart-
ment, was reportedly investigated on the basis of early
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1967 Red Guard evidence, and was declared a
"renegade" in September 1967 and imprisoned. His
fate is unknown, but he was dropped from the CCP
Central Committee in 1969 and was presumably
purged. Liu Ning-i also came under heavy attack.
He was apparently defended by Kang Shengfor a
time, but the attacks continued and Liu disappeared
in early 1968.
In May 1968, a Canton 'Red 'Fla . supplement
carried a speech made by Kang3Tenngo the "Military
Control Group" of what was clearly the ILD, indicating
that as far as..internal organization was concerned,
things were entirely in the hands of the PLA.
External functions of the ILD, such as greeting
foreign Party delegations, holding talks with them,
and such other publicly reported activities, were
handled by Kang Sheng and his wife, Tsao I-ou. The
PLA figure Kuo Yu-feng was also brought up to Peking
and elevated by Kang Sheng during this period.
Little information exists on what happened
to the ILD during the rest of 1968 and much of 1969.
Apparently t e
ILD was still in a state of limbo, in spite. of its
new name and its official status under the 9th Central
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Committee. Public appearances were handled mainly
by Kang Sheng and his wife, along with Kuo. In
late 1969, the triumvirate of Shen Chien, Yang
Yu-heng and Chu Ta-cheng, which was to remain in
evidence all through 1970, began to appear. Shen
was a veteran cadre, Yang a known PLA officer, and
Chu believed to be a PLA officer. During late
1970, other veteran ILD members, such as old Party
cadres Chang Hsiang-shan and Tang Ming-chao, began
to make reappearances.
With the disappearance of Kang Sheng in
November 1970 and the recall of Ambassador Keng
Piao from Albania in December, the ILD apparently
began to move toward stability. Chu Ta-cheng and
Kuo Yu-feng made their last appearances in ILD roles
in January 1971 (Chu reappeared in November), and
Yang Yu-heng seemingly went into decline. Keng Piao
began to make ILD appearances in February, and was
identified as head of that department in March 1971.
Since then, several other members of the department
have been publicly identified, indicating a new
public status and prestige for a formerly unpubli-
cized organization. In addition, the staff of the
ILD seems to be expanding considerably, with
several new faces appearing since May 1971. Keng's
rising status may eventually lead to P. Politburo or
revamped Secretariat position, though this is pure
conjecture.
There is now a striking scarcity of PLA men
within the ILD. Almost all of its apparent leaders
and supervisors come from civilian backgrounds.
Until he was recently purged, Politburo member and
head of the PLA Air Force Wu Fa-hsien showed up
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occasionally at small ILD functions, but the
Politburo members most frequently seen in connection
with the ILD in 1971 have all been civilians:
Chou En-lai, Yao Wen-yuan, Chang Chun-chiao, and
Chi Teng-kuei. As for actual department membership,
Jen Yun-chung (possibly the senior deputy to Keng
Piao) and Yang Yu-heng.are the only known PLA
figures seen often in ILD roles; Kuo Yuwfeng has
been transferred. out of the ILD, Yang Yu-heng seers
to have declined. in. influence, and Chu Ta-cheng's
current post is uncertain. This'has contrasted
markedly with increasing.PLA participation in other
sections of the Chinese Party and government.
Before the Cultural Revolution the ILD was
between 1000
and 1100 members, many of them engaged-in research
activities. After the. Cultural Revolution, Kang
Sheng reportedly put the number remaining at
9AA_ ?AA
Recent in ica:ions are at t e epartment,
under Keng Piao, is again rebuilding its numbers.
Formerly, the ILD was organized hierarchically
and geographically, and to a degree, functionally,
with the majority of the work being done in the
b
geographic
ureaus. of which there were nine
These bureaus were:
1st -- Soviet Union F, East Europe
2nd -- Korea.$ Vietnam
3rd -- India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal,
Indonesia, Malaya
4th -- Japan, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand,
Laos
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5th -- US, Canada
6th -- Australia, New Zeeland
7th -- West Europe
8th -- Africa
9th -- Latin America
10th -- Reception
lith* -- (Data ?)
There was also a separate general (administrative)
office.
The leadership was conventionally hierarchi-
cal: a director of the department, several deputy
directors, a secretary general and several deputy
secretaries-general, all above the bureau chiefs.
It is presumed that this organizational struc-
ture was entirely destroyed during the Cultural
Revolution. Other events, such as the heightened
importance of the Vietnam conflict, and increasing
hostility with the Soviet Union, have probabl also
brought about chanpps in the organization.
the chart
below is entirely conjectural, base upon appearances
in public with various delegations. It seems
likely that, for functional and liaison reasons,
the organization is somewhat similar to that of
the MFA.
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DEPARTMENTAL LEADERSHIP
Politburo Supervision Department Director
YAO Wen-yuan KENG Piao
CHANG Chun-chiao
CHI Teng-kuei
Deputy Directors (?)
JEN Yun-chung (senior?)
SHEN Chien
YANG Yu-heng (?)
CHANG Tsang (?)
CHANG Hsiang-shan
BUREAU LEADERSHIP
Soviet Union and East Europe Section
LIU Ke-ming -- section head
FENG Hsuan -- section leader, with a
political security background
Western Europe, North America and Australia Section
TANG Ming-chao
-- section head (until assigned to UN)
CHAO Hsueh-li
-- 'leading member' perhaps Western
Europe subsection
LAO Yuan-hui
-- interpreter, English
TAI Sheng-pu
-- interpreter, English
LI Mei
-- interpreter, English
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Bureau Leadership (continued)
SHEN Chien
CHANG Hsiang-shan
TIEN Shu-chien
YANG Chun-cheng
CHIN Hui
MAO Pao-chung
HSIAO Huang
HUANG Chun
HUNG Tso-chun
CHENG Kuo-tsai
LI Kuei-cheng
LI Ming-hsiang
LI Wen-kun
SHIH Yung-lu
'Latin American 'Section
SHEN Chien -- section head (?)
Asian Section
section head.(?)
head of Korea/Japan sub-section
interpreter,-Korean
interpreter.-Korean
head of...Indochina sub-section (?)
interpreter, Vietnamese
interpreter, Vietnamese
interpreter, Laotian
West Asia and African Section
CHANG Tsang (?)
Reception Section
LIU Chun-fa
HSING Chu-fang
MA Te-chuan
LIN Hsien-nung
YAO Shih-ken
CHANG Chen-hai
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There is some disagreement as to present and
past responsibilities of the ILD. Basic policies
are of course formulated in the Politburo standing
committee. Below that level, it is possible to
argue -- as some observers have -- that the ILD as
a Part organ is responsible .for.the next level of
formulation of foreign. policy, superior in.power to
the Ministry of Foreign.Affairs, which is subordinate
to the State Council. In other words,.it is-
con-ceivable that the ILD is the focal point of
supervision of the entire foreign..affairs.apparatus,
including the MFA, the Chinese People's Association
for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and other
departments. *
There is some information to support this view.
First, Keng's own Party position is apparently quite
high; he has been listed on_many.occasions as the
first Party dignitary after Politburo . members. (although
he has begun to follow Kuo Mo-jo), and'-'always ahead
of Chi Peng-fei, acting Foreign Minister of e P RU.
Further, Keng was mentioned. by name (along with
Chou En-lai) in a recent Mao directive on foreign
policy; no other Party members were mentioned. Further,
in contrast to previous custom, ILD personnel are now
given pride of place in the Chinese media. Not only
"There is some speculation that Keng.is.a member
of a possible-de. facto secretariat under Chou En-lai,
responsible for thie daa'y-to-day running.of China's
affairs.
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vL'Vi\ri 1
is the de-artment always li:?ted ahead of the Ministry
of Foreig,i Affairs, but ILD deputy directors now are
consistently mentioned ahead of deputy foreign
ministers, and on occasion ahead of the acting foreign
minister. Further, members of the ILD have recently
been appearing regularly at functions which they
previously would not have attended, for example,
greeting economic or government study delegations from
allied countries, attending various protocol functions
and receptions at'foreign embassies (from socialist
countries) and other affairs usually handled exclusively
by the MFA. Further, Keng Piao has been giving
numerous briefings to foreign Communists, at which he
has spoken with authority on international affairs and
Chinese relations with non-Communist nations, as well
as on international Communist relations. For example,
shortly after meeting with.Keng and other ILD
personnel, in July 1971 a sympathetic American,
William Hinton, wrote an apparently authoritative
article for a Chinese newspaper concerning the rationale
for China's recent initiatives toward the United States,
defending those actions against anticipated leftist
criticism.
However, most of the ILD's public appearances
have been with friendly Communist delegations, and that
aspect of foreign policy is clearly its main concern.
It does not seem to have the scope to act as the focal
point for the shaping of all foreign policy below the
politburo standing committee level. On balance, it
seems likely that MFA personnel have been telling the
truth in insisting that important foreign-policy
decisions are made by a small group around Chou En-lai.
Keng Piao is probably one member of that group.
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The ILD in Action -- 'Implementation of Policy
Any discussion of policy pursued by the ILD is
based upon scant information and bound to be speculative.
Moreover, there would necessarily be a time lapse
between the actual formulation of policy by the standing
committee of the Politburo and its correct implementation
and reiteration by the liaison department -- which makes
for further imprecision. For the purposes of clarity
and convenience, the discussion of policy herein is
divided into two topics, that of relations between the
CCP and other Communist state parties (e.g., CPSU,
Korean Workers Party), and that of relations between the
CCP and clandestine or opposition parties in countries
not ruled by Communist governments. In terms of infor-
mation available, most of the discussion of the former
is based upon open source information
Relations with Communist Government/Parties: By
1963, the ino- oveet sp it and its world-wide reper-
cussions in the Communist movement had significantly cut
down the number and frequency of the CCP's party contacts
and functions with other Bloc countries. Not that the
ILD was out of work, but there was probably much less
overt work for it to do in this field than in earlier
periods of international Communist amicability.
With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966,
China's Party relations decreased even more. Like most
capitalist and neutral nations, China's few Communist
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'allies' generally reacted very coldly to Maoist
"Red Guard diplomacy," with the result that both
Party and state relations with other socialist countries
declined steadily. If -- as seems likely -- the
appearance of ILD personnel at various public functions
is an indication of the state of relations between the
CCP and other Parties, the only Bloc Party which
remained on good terms with the CCP by early 1967 was
the Communist Party of Albania. Relations with the
North Korean Workers Party (KWP) and the Vietnamese
Workers Party (VWP) or Lao Dong Party were outwardly
correct, but strained. While delegations from the DRV
still visited Puking on occasion, receptions were not
attended by Kang Sheng, Liu Ning-i or Chao I-min, the
known ILD leaders during this period. The K11W1P was
treated even more coolly by the CCP in the press, on
important anniversaries, and on those few occasions
when delegations from the DPRK came to Peking during
the Cultural Revolution. By February 1967, the strains
in relations with the KWP were particularly severe,
as a result of Chinese dissemination of Red Guard
attacks on Pyongyang. Relations with the CPSU and with
the strongly pro-Soviet Parties of East Europe and the
Mongolian People's Republic 'were totally ruptured, and
reflected open hostility. In contrast, Albania basked
in the warmth of grand Party receptions, often attended
by the entire CCP Politburo, numerous celebrations and
receptions at embassies, and lengthy press coverage.
Enver Hoxha, Albania's Party and government leader,
became the foreign leader best known in China. The
CCP maintained relat.ions._ with. _the Rumanian Party, but
they were only moderately better than with other East
European Communists.
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Mao ordered a pullback from "revolutionary
diplomacy" in August 1967, but it was only gradually
that this policy began to be reflected in improved
relations with various Communist regimes. In the
wake of the Sino-Soviet border clashes of March 1969,
and in line with new ideolo`4_cal and policy formulations
adopted by the new 9th Central Committee in April,
improvement was marked. Judging by press coverage,
length and wording of Party communications, and
frequency and attendance at receptions, Chinese rela-
tions with Albania were still the most amicable, but
relations were clearly better with the DP.V and the
NLFSV. The ILD, represented by Kang.Sheng and a few
others, played an increasing role in these public
demonstrations of improved relations. In June 1969,
China dispatched to the DRV one of the first post-Cul-
tural Revolution ambassadors, and also gave embassy
status to the NLFSV, which now became the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRGSV). In
the summer of 1969, Chinese overtures for improvement
of Party relations with the Communist Parties of
Rumania and North Korea also became evident. The CCP's
posture toward Cuba's party, however, appeared to
remain cool and distant. The Soviet Union continued,
of course, to be an object of scorn, while its East
European allies were only slightly less disparaged.
The few delegations from these latter countries that
did visit Peking received quiet, unheralded receptions,
strictly in accordance with formal protocol, and
attended only by a few government and military personnel.
October 1969 was a very active fence-mending
month for the Chinese Communists, in which the ILD, even
in its tenuous state of organization, appeared to be an
active participant. Two future leaders of the emerging
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department, Shen Chien and Yang Yu-heng., attended the
2 October soiree given by the Politburo for high-level
Party/government delegations from the DRV, the PRGSV,
Albania, DPRK and Rumania, which were attending
National Day celebrations in Peking. In December 1969,
the ILD was also represented at a reception given by
the central Cultural Revolution Group -- just prior to
the CRG's disappearance -- for. friendly Communist and
"Marxist-Leninist" parties from Albania, France, DRV,
Burma and Australia.
During the early part.. of 1970, Communist China,
with the ILD still playing an active if minor role,
continued to improve Party relations with its chosen
allies. In April 1970, Sino-Korean relations took a
great step forward with the vi.sit.of Premier Chou En-lai
to Pyongyang. Thereafter, the.DPRK received much more
Chinese press coverage, expanded..the 'social' activities
of its embassy in Peking,. and.gener.ally began to receive
more high-level treatment by the CCP, including more
frequent appearances at Sino-Korean functions by ILD
members. VWP First Secretary Le Duan's May 1970 visit
to Peking and Mao Tse-tung.'s 20 May statement, of support
for the Vietnamese. cause. appeared.. to reach a new high
point of Sino-Vietnamese amicability. The warm, high-
level reception given to. Rumanian Communist Party
leader Emil Bodnaras on his June 197.0 visit to China
also gave evidence of improved relations. Kang Shen
egan to ma a more frequent appearances with various
delegations from. these. countries, and even made an
occasional public speech.
It is, however, unwarranted to conclude -- on
the basis of more frequent, friendly high-level gatherings
between the CCP and other Communist Parties-- that these
Parties have become close in all respects. In spite of
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protestations of everlasting "militant and revolutionary
friendship" or similar sentiments, there is evidence
of serious mutual suspicions between the Chinese and
various friendly parties. Only the fanatically anti-
Soviet Albanians seem to be fully trusted.
there were strong elements o revisionism wit n-t e
VWP, which even Ho Chi Minh, though a good revolutionary,
could not cope with or understand.* Kim Il-sung's
vacillating flirtations with the CPSU and the JCP must
also make his ideological purity suspect in Chinese
eyes, and indeed, Keng Piao, as late as June 1971, has
expressed CCP reservations about the internal workings
of the KWP. The Rumanians, too, must appear as ideologi-
cal fence-straddlers.
It would appear, then, that pragmati,m began to
take precedence over ideology during the post-Cultural
Revolution period, and particularly since the Soviet
"This type of briefing is an example of the tenacity
of the kind of attitude which had proven so counterproduc-
tive to Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural
Revolution, and from which the CCP was apparently able to
pull back only gradually. Today it would be branded as
"ultra-Leftist." Chang Tsang, though identified here
as an ILD official, has never made a public appearance.
If, as seems possible, he is no longer part of the
department, expressions of this type of opinion may
explain this.
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invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the
bloody Sino-Soviet clashes of early 1969. China
needed allies, if only to exert opinion pressure on
the Soviets to dissuade them from what the Chinese
may have considered as impending military action.
In view of this need for political support, ideological
differences began to be downplayed. The ILD leadership,
consisting mainly of civilian cadres, veterans of the
old .LLD or the diplomatic corps, would seem to be
particularly well-suited to the performance of this
type of task.
After the decline of Kang Sheng, the ILD became
even more active in its relations with established
governing Communist Parties. However, it still seemed
to take a back seat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) on public o:casions, perhaps mainly due to the
fact that its leading members at that time, Shen Chien
and Jon Yun-chung, lacked the Party or government
status to properly display the growing importance of
the department. This lack was eliminated.w ith the
return to Peking of Keng Piao,.who had been serving
as ambassador to Albania. Kong returned in January
1971, appeared at various foreign affairs functions the
next month, and was finally publicly identified as
head of the ILD in early March, when he-accompanied
Chou En-lai on an important trip to Hanoi. Since that
time, the ILD has been significantly more active in the
maintenance of good Party/government relations with
selected Communist nations.
Asia has appeared to be the area of primary
concern in this regard, and the ILD has apparently
played a major role in continuing the warming trend of
relations with North Korea, North Vietnam and other
Asian Communist Parties (with the notable exception of
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the JCP). Le Duan, the First- Secretary of the VWP,
visited China enroute to, and immediately upon his
return from the 24th Congress of the CPSU in May
1971. Keng Piao was a regular participant in the
talks that ensued, and accompanied Le Duan on his
tour of China. Keng and other members of the ILD,
Shen Chien in particular, have been-conspicuous
participants in a variety of functions and receptions
for DRV delegations, at which, previously, ILD members
were not present. These have included the greeting of
government, economic, and youth delegations to Peking,
as well as attendance at numerous receptions in the
DRV embassy.
In the spring and summer of 1971, the JLD has
become increasingly active in developing and maintain-
ing relations with the two-other Southeast Asian
Communist Parties in control of a large part of their
countries: The Laotian Patriotic Front (LPF) or Neo
Lao Hak Xat, and the Cambodian People's Revolutionary
Party. The CCP has generally expressed firm support
for the activities of these embattled Parties, and
recently their visiting delegations have received
public, high-level treatment in Peking. LPF leader
Kaysone Phomivane visited Peking in April 1971, and
was received by high-ranking offieials of the CCP,
including Keng Piao.and other members of.the ILD. Keng
recently commented also on the.fact.thatthe Chinese
were highly impressed by the military success and mass
appeal demonstrated by the Cambodian Communists since
the 1970 anti-Sihanouk coup, and, perhaps as evidence
of that growing interest, appeared prominently at an
August 1971 reception for a Cambodian rebel hero, the
first time that any ILD personnel had had any public
association with Cambodian delegations.
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Keng Piao and Shen Chien were particularly
active, during the summer of 1971, in improving Chinese
relations with North Korea. Kong was a member of the
delegation, headed by Politburo member and Vice-Premier
Li Hsien-nien, which visited Pyongyang in July to
commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Sinu-Korean
treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, and was
one of the main Party members consistently present at
the departure. and return of various student, journalist
and worker delegations to the DPRK. Other ILD members
were frequent participants in Sino-Korean functions,
and it would appear that earlier criticisms of Kim
I1-sung's Korean Workers Party were laid aside.
Outside of Asia, the Chinese have seemed
particularly concerned with maintaining good Party re-
lations with Rumania. The June 1971 visit of Rumania's
government and Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu was the
culmination of a warming trend that had brought ever
more important Rumanian leaders to China since early
1970. The August 1970 stopover in Bucharest of a high-
level PLA delegation and the extension of a large loan
provide 'indications of China's interest in consolidating
this relatively recent friendship. The ILD has
seemingly been quite instrumental in pursuing this
policy. Keng Piao, for example, was one of Ceausescu's
escorts on his recent tour of China. Again, ideological
issues have been consistently played down, the main
virtue of the Rumanian Party being its independence of
and resistance to its Soviet neighbor. Although the
Chinese appraisal of the Rumanian ideological position
is mixed, Rumania's anti-Soviet tendency has provided
sufficient assurance for the Chinese to develop Party
relations.
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There has been considerable speculation that
China is developing.. relations with Rumania and
Yugoslavia with.the. intent of consolidating an anti-
Soviet bloc in-Eastern Europe consisting of these
two new friends... and. Albania
T us far,
however, the ILD has done nothing to restore relations
with the Yugoslav Party. Presumably, the ideological
gap is still too wide for the Chinese to pretend that
Party relations can be maintained with a Party which
they had so recently denied even the name of "socialist."
However, in contrast to 1970, the Chinese in 1971 have
not published. any messages from renegAde Yugoslav
"Marxist-Leninist" party groups, reinforcing other
evidence that the Chinese are at least letting ideologi-
cal disagreements with the once "arch-revisionist"
Tito government. cool for the sake of improved state
relations.
Albania's special relationship with China,
including the closest of Party relations', has frequently
been exploited by the Chinese. Tirana has cooperated
closely with Peking's policy of searching out and
supporting ideological allies, particularly in Europe.
Not only have Albanian embassies in various countries
been involved in financial support for various pro-
Chinese Marxist-Leninist parties disposed in Western
Europe,'but they have been entrusted by the Chinese,
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through the ILD, with the task of political and
ideological training of numerous pro-Chinese elements
which find it either impossible or impolitic to go to
China.
The task of consolidating and reassuring politi-
cal, if not ideological, allies has become particularly
important in the light of China's new tactics vis-a-vis
the United States. These tactics have not been warmly
received amongst China's Party allies; the only open
endorsements have come from the Rumanians and North
Koreans. The North Vietnamese, in spite of China's
reassurances have
remained very cool to the idea in pu) is
Although the LPF has remained
silent on the issue, the NLFSV has shown some confusion
over the matter, and has ended up reaffirming its
independence, asserting that it will never succumb to
any other Party's leadership, including that of the CCP.
This awareness has
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manifested itself in repeated reassurances to the
North Vietnamese and others that China will not sell
out its principles, nor its allies. Here again the
ILD has seemed to play an important role.
Relations with Opposition and Splinter Communist
Parties: The more important of the ms's tasks in t =e
Cultural Revolution period and for a short time there-
after (as it had been ever since the emergence of Sino-
Soviet rivalry) was the identification, instruction,
and support of Communist Party groups favorable to
Peking in foreign countries. This function, although
certainly less important now than is the ILD's partici-
pation in the maintenance of state/Party relations with
certain countries, is still actively carried out by the
ILD today.
Chinese policy in this matter has gone through
a number of changes, in response to developments in
the real world and different official interpretations
of Mao Tse-tung's "thought."
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, it was the
responsibility of ILD personnel in some of the larger
overseas missions (such as, presumably, the embassies
in Paris and Bern), or, more often, the head of mission
in the smaller embassies, to identify, contact, analyze,
report on, and support pro-Chinese groups -- often
small and insignificant.
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Operationally, the ILD worked in close coopera-
tion with the foreign intelligence organ of the Party,
the Investigation Department (ID), a member of which,
Secretary General of the ILD. Use of ID information
by the ILD was supplemented by a daily NCNA publica-
tion, "Reference Material." '(Ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao),
which was mainly a translation of foreign newspaper
articles, and by another NCNA publication, "Brotherly
Parties Publications Material" (Nsiun -ti Tang Pao-
K'an Tsai-liao), which was a compendium o trans ated
foreign Party publications. In addition.
/the reports of NCNA 'stringers'
(foreign nationals employed overseas b the NCNA)
supplemented this information store.
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If the trip to China proved to be successful
for the group concerned, in that the ILD found it to
be "genuinely" Marxist-Leninist or at least worthy of
further cultivation, instructions were passed on to
the original. point of contact -- either an embassy
or NCNA office -- to continue and develop the contact.
There is some evidence-that,-before the
Cultural Revolution, once one particular party or
group had received official . Chinese. approval, contacts
with other groups-were generally, not pursued. It was
apparently the ILD's.positionthat, once: relations
were established with.one.Party~ direct relations with
other revolutionary parties or groups would be
counter-prod-act ive.
This policy and procedure led:to reverses
during the early stages.of the-Cultural-Revolution.
Among the "Marxist-Leninist:'-parties.-: already cultiva-
ted, several seemed reluctant.-or-unable to make the
kind of ideological shifts. that current Maoist
precepts seemed to demand, and. these 'attempted to
curtail their relations with the CCP. Some which had
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gained official ILD.support, such as the Jacgu-+s Grippa
faction of the "Marxist-Leninist" Party of Belgium,
openly declared their distaste for the Cultural Revo-
lution and supported the polices which-they attributed
to Liu Shao-chi. This, of course, brought about their
immediate fall from favor. Although the ILD had
always been faced with the problem of discovering the
"genuine" Marxist-Leninist parties among a host of
competing pro-Chinese groups, the problem became
particularly acute in 1966-67, when pro-Maoist groups
seemed to proliferate. Additionally, in line with the
tougher stance of "revolutiopary" Maoist. diplomacy the
ILD was responsible for making. sure that parties which
declared themselves to be pro-Chinese were indeed toeing
the correct ideological line. These knotty problems,
added to the fact that the ILD leadership was being
heavily attacked during the Cultural Revolution, led to
general incoherence in policy.
This confusion manifested itself in several ways.
First of al the ILD
virtually stoppe sen ing messages.out to embassy
officials, and provided no guidance whatever to field
personnel attempting -to..select the "genuine" Marxist-
Leninists from a host of Maoist groups. Further, it
seems that, -'ather than working.through-.their disinte-
grating ILD apparatus, Liu.Ning-i, Chao_I-min and
(later) Kang Sheng.began increasingly-to encourage
various party and faction leaders.tocome personally to
China, where, they apparently felt, more thorough and
reliable judgments could be made of the various Maoist
supplicants.
For those who showed promise, or who had already
received the blessing of official Chinese: recognition
for their particular groups, a trip to China could also
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include extensive briefings and de-briefings and
a rigorous political. training . course.
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The widespread purges and dislocations within
the CCP caused by the Cultural Revolution, though
they did not cause the discontinuance of foreign
visits, did tend to give pause.
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In contrast to the later period, when the
ILD soft-pedaled ideological differences and used
persuasion to try to win over visiting delegations
to their point of view, the Cultural Revolution
saw not only an increased demand by the ILD for Maoist
orthodoxy and ideological militancy, but also an
increase in organizational demands on foreign
parties. The idea of creating a clandestine party
organization arallel to the overt organization
(where one existed) began to be proposed-by the
ILD. Whether this was done a , part of a blind
application of Mao's concept of Chinese revolutionary
experience, or out of a real concern for the welfare
and safety of Marxist-Leninist parties under possibly
repressive governments, is uncertain. But it appears
that the ILD began. to stress this idea of..parallel
structures more heavily for a. number of parties
during the Cultural Revolution. In. those parties, such
as soma; in Latin America, where governmental suppression
was a real problem, such a policy was. natural and
acceptable. However, for those parties which were
allowed to operate openly and competed with other
parties for popular support, the idea-was irrelevant
and impertinent. In New Zealand, when-CPNZ Party
Secretary V. G. Wilcox attempted to put the parallel
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0L' LOMM l
structures into effect, he found himself faced first
with difficulties in convincing old cadres of the
necessity of going underground -- with connotations
of armed struggle -- and then with open party rebellion
from one of the largest local CPNZ committees. The end
result of this was a split in the party, which, to the
Chinese, was very undesirable. After his 1968 visit to
China, during which Wilcox was apparently criticized for
"his" mishandling of the plan, the Chinese dropped the
By 1970, the ILD ha abandoned this
idea altogether and had added..it to the growing list o
Liu Shao-chi's errors.
During the late stages of the Cultural Revolution,
Peking began to get a good deal of negative feedback
from its party proteges concerning the guidance and
advice from Peking. From New Zealand and Australia
came grumblings about the t e of ro a anda comin from
Peking.
Apparently even China's most loya a ies
concluded that the Cultural Revolution materials -- such
as stress on "armed struggle" and Mao's ego-cult -- were
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unsuitable propaganda for foreign consumption.
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Another aspect of ILD policy, held over from
earlier leadership, also began to receive heavy
criticism from the CCP's more outspoken allies in
Latin America. This concerned China's attitude toward
factionalism and the official 'blessing' of certain
parties by the CCP. Although ILD policy was very
vague during the Cultural Revolution, it appeared
that it followed the pre-Cultural Revolution penchant
of selecting one party or group from among a number
of competing radical organizations, and declaring it,
on the basis of their general criteria or sometimes
on the basis of Mao's personal recognition of the
leader,* the orthodox "Marxist-Leninist" party within
a certain country. This party, then, became the sole
recipient of aid and encouragement, and often would have
its articles published in the Chinese press.
Until recently, the ILD consistently carried
out a policy of discouraging factionalism within
these chosen parties, or among groups whose ideologies
were very similar. Although personal quarrels and
factionalizing have seemed to be endemic problems
among radical groups that seek Chinese support, the
ILD until 1970 strongly opposed these tendencies, often
withholding financial and propaganda aid, or threaten-
ing to do so, until various factions within a certain
KThiS wourcT seem to be the case with the "Marxist-
Leninist" parties in Chile, Italy, and to some extent,
New Zealand.
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party or competing groups of similar ideologies could
unite and.settle their difficulties. Such a policy
was pursued.with.reference to pro-Chinese parties in
Italy, Belgium,. Sudan, Indonesia, and Latin.America.
Only when factionalism involved important ideological
differences would the Chinese condone it.
By 1970, however, ILD policy on the issue of
factionalism. seemed. to have changed. This was perhaps
due to a combination of factors:
1. no amount of ILD pressure seemed to be able
to quell the problem of factions within small splinter
parties;
2. the. ILD had come under no small amount of
criticism from a number of sources for choosing one
faction over another (particularly in Latin America),
sometimes on the basis of false or unreliable inform-
tion; and
3. there had been a change in the overall foreign
policy line, shifting away from "revolutionary diplomacy."
The latter. consideration is, of course, by far the most
important. Although an exact date for this shift in
emphasis of Chinese foreign policy is impossible to fix
exactly, its results can perhaps. be seen in the
enunciation and implementation of ILD policy during late
1969 and 1970.
In contrast to. the hard-Line militancy and
relatively stringent organizational "suggestions" made
by the ILD during the Cultural Revolution period, the
new line seems more pragmatic, relaxed and realistic.
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ariVAr. 1
As explained to various Party visitors to China in
mid-1970 by Kang Sheng., Tang. Ming-chao., and Chang
Hsiang-shan, the latest ILD program contains strong
elements of pragmatism.. The new. Maoist ideological
demarche stresses independence and initiative, and
strict attention to . local. conditions before determinin
party policy or organizational procedures.
Kang continued to stress the necessity for ideological
correctness (apparently still.in the context of Maoist
orthodoxy), but the advice on careful study of local
conditions (rather than the Chinese experience) for
the application of correct organizational principles
seems to be something of a return to pre-Cultural Revo-
lution attitudes.-The ILD has.gone yet another step
in retreating from attempts to exert organizational
influence on foreign.parties: it has decided to keep
the financial aid given to'a~ party to a minimum, and
instead give moral and propaganda support to a wider
range of pro-Chinese groups.
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SFC.RFT
This new policy was reflected in the press,
particularly with the publication of National Day
greetings and earlier congratulations. Most notable
was the proliferation of these greetings in 1970,
there being messages from three Italian "Marxist-
Leninist" groups plus the PCI, two from the Nether-
lands, two from Belgium, and two from Greece.* Though
ree ings were also printed from two "Marxist-
Leninist" splinters in Yugoslavia and one in East
Germany. These, however, may be fabrications or simply
from one or two disaffected expatriates.
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the beginnings of this policy could be seen to a
degree in 1969 National Day.greetings, the tendency
was much more pronounced in 1970.
In 1970, the rather sensitive issue of party
finances also seems to have been cleared up some by
the ILD. Tang explained in September that although
giving political, military and financial aid to
foreign parties could.-sometimes be a good thing,
too often it had brought bad results such as misuse
of funds, or a reliance upon the CCP for aid, leading
to a lack of attention..to local work.* It was
admitted that the ILD's policy in this regard had
been incorrect in the past, allegedly a result of
Liu Shao-chi's faulty line, and that it had come
under heavy criticism in the Cultural Revolution.
xThe new policy was no doubt a reflection of
Chinese disapproval of notorious fiscal irresponsibility
and extravagance on the part of several splinter group
leaders.
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This period seemed to be rather a watershed'for
the ILD in terms of formulating and applying a
cohesive policy. ILD officials in various briefings
were now able to give clear and concise information to
visiting parties with reference to ILD policy on
various issues. The confusion and reticence of the
Cultural Revolution period now in the past, and a new
and more congenial Maoist orthodoxy in foreign relations
apparently well in hand, ILD members began to expound
and elaborate on CCP policies with some confidence.
In addition to. comments on Party organization, finances,
the applicability of the Chinese experience, and
encouragement of various comreting Marxist-Leninist
groups, the ILD unveiled new policies on other issues.
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Among these were the advocacy of close attention and
support for student groups, the stated intention to
work with.inde enden* sectors of pro-Soviet
"'revisionist") parties-(rather than to vilify them
en masse), and stated..opposit.ion to any kind of inter-
national or large regional grouping of Marxist-
Leninist parties, an idea which various Latin American
parties had been voicing for some time.*
The ILD under Keng Piao seems to be carrying
on these principles in relation to pro-Chinese parties,
and perhaps it is even broadening them. Chinese
non-interference in internal fact~ional:_di-sputes has
been graphically demonstrated-by the equal treatment
given to both factions of the-'--feuding Communist Party
of Belgium.(Marxist-Leninist), which have visited
China on separate occasions in 1971. This policy is
also reflected in the even greater variety of parties
whose messages.of congratulations on the occasion of
the CCP's SOth.anniversary were published in the
Chinese press in July 1971. This time, messages from
the two competing factions of the Belgian party were
printed, four from various Italian groups (including
two from feuding. factions. of. the formerly recognized
PCI/ML), two from separate groups in the Netherlands,
Some South American-Marxist-Leninists went ahead
with a regional conference anyway, which was held, but
sparsely attended, on 4 September 1970, in Santiago,
Chile. They afterward expressed disappointment that
the Chinese refused to support the idea, and they in-
dicated that no further meetings would be held.
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three from Germany, and two from Greece. As for
Latin America, only a few messages were published,
coming entirely from parties which apparently had
little or no factional difficulties.
Little new information exists as yet on the
implementation of ILD policy on financing of splinter
groups as it was expounded in 1970.1
It would appear that t e ILD's stingy
financial policy is still in effect.
There are good indications that China's
relations with its Communist party and group allies
are now subordinate to the process of improving the
PRC's diplomatic status in the world. It has been
note;" that no congratulatory messages were published
from pro-Chinese parties in some countries where
China is attempting to improve diplomatic relations,
Peru being a prime example. Neither was any 50th
anniversary message published from the pro-Chinese
Communist Party of Ceylon, the leader of which,
N. Shanmugathasan, has always received the warmest
welcome in Peking visits, and whose role in the
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recent disruptions in Ceylon is highly suspect.*
China and Ceylon have seemed to be making other
strides to improve state relations, and the CCP has
repeatedly disavowed any connection between the
insurgents and themselves. Although state relations
with India have not been greatly improved, relatively
little has been heard in the Chinese press recently
about the pro-Maoist Naxalite insurgents, who were
so warmly applauded during the Cultural Revolution.
Closer to home are the indicators of dwindling
support for pro-Chinese Communist insurgent parties
in Thailand, Burma and Malaysia. Active Chinese
support for these insurgencies has been apparent for
several years, with the Chinese supplying publicity
and moral support, arms, training, sanctuary, and
sometimes actual leadership to these fraternal
parties. Leaders of these parties, particularly
the Burma Communist Party/White Flag, have
occasionally been seen in Peking, and seem to have
residences there. Recently, the situation has been
complicated by evidences of a warmin trend in state
relations with Burma and Malaysia.
"Shanmugathasan was arrested during the recent
disorders, and there is some reason to believe that
the CCP is annoyed with him. It seems likely that the
Chinese, as a further disavowal of their involvement
in the affair, have decided to avoid public.displays
of contact with the pro-Peking party for the time being.
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It has also..been.noted that on the occasion
of the SOth anniverdary of the CCP, the congratula-
tory messages to China from some insurgent groups in
Southeast Asia outside Indochina were somewhat subdued;
the BCP failed to take note of Chinese support and
assistance for its struggle, as it had in previous
years, and the Malayan Communist Party proclaimed only
that "our enemies will never succeed in their attempt
to undermine the revolutionary unity between the
Malayan and Chinese Communist Parties..." It seems
likely that the Chinese will apply the principles of
"self-sufficiency" and "self-decision" a little more
to some of their Asian allies, although they must be
sensitive to the contradiction between their strong
espousal of the concept of armed struggle and any
notable decrease in support. But in any case, Chinese
support for all secondary Party.allies appears to
be tempered by considerations of national interest,
such as the attempt to improve overall diplomatic
relations.
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Personnel of the International Liaison Department
Director
KENG PIAO
Keng Piao, a full member
of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party since
1969, was first reported to be
Director of the International
Liaison Department (ILD) of
the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party on 8
March 1971, when he accompanied
Premier Chou En-lai on a visit
to North Vietnam (DRV). This
article was also the first
public admission by the Chinese
that a Party liaison department
under the direction of the
Central Committee had been re-
constructed.
Keng was born in 1910 in Hunan, and was reportedly
involved in underground Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
activities as early as 1925. He was an officer in the
Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army by 1930, and
rose rapidly through the ranks. In 1934 he was a divi-
sional chief-of-staff in the 1st Front Army of Chu Te,
then was transferred to the 4th Corps of the 4th Front Army,
commanded then by Chang Kuo-tao and Hsu Hsiang-chien,
with whom he participated in the Long March. After attend-
ing the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University
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at Yenan in 1937, he became a brigade commander in the
115th -Division of the 8th Route Army, commanded by Lin
Piao. *
Keng is one of the many present Chinese Communist
foreign affairs officials who took part in the operations
of the Marshall Mission to China in 1946. During the
civil war period, he was chief-of-staff of the Shansi-
Hopei-Chahar Military District, and later deputy commander
of the 2nd Army Group of the North China Field Army under
Yang Te-chih, later reorganized as the 19th Army Group.
His distinguished diplomatic career began soon
after the formal establishment of the People's Republic
of China. In June 1950, he was posted as China's first
ambassador to Sweden, and in November of that year was
named concurrent ambassador to Finland and Denmark,
posts from which he was relieved in late 1954 and early
1955, respectively. In February 1956, Keng traded posts
with the present vice-foreign minister Han Nien-lung,
and became China's ambassador to Pakistan, where he
participated in numerous events contributing to a warming
of Sino-Pakistani relations. He held this post until
December 1959, when he was recalled to Peking and appointed
deputy foreign minister in charge of relations with the
nations of Southeast Asia, Nepal and Pakistan.
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In September 1963, Keng became ambassador to Burma,
where he represented the PRC ably during the high-point
of Sino-Burmese amicability. He was recalled in early
1967, and general) remained out of sight during the Cul-
tural Revolution)
Whatever "tests" Keng may have faced during the
Cultural Revolution, he apparently passed with flying
colors, as he was elected to the 9th Central Committee
in April 1969 (one of only two ambassadors to attain this
Party recognition), and in May was sent to what was then
perhaps China's most important diplomatic post, the Cli-
nese embassy in Albania. Keng was the first ambassador
to be dispatched in the immediate post-Cultural Revolution
period, a reflection of his esteem among the top CCP
leadership.
In December 1970, Keng was recalled from Tirana
to Peking, and until the announcement of his appointment
to the ILD directorship, he was rumored to be in line
for the Foreign Minister post apparently vacated by
Chen Yi.
Since the March visit to Hanoi, Keng has been a
busy man. He has met visiting Party delegations from
the DRV, North Korea (DPRK), Chile, the Laotian Patriotic
Front (LPF', the South Vietnamese National Liberation
Front (!'l.;SV), New Zealand, Belgium, France and Rumania,
sometimes accompanying the leaders on tours of China.
He has travelled in high-level Chinese government/Party
delegations to the DRV and DPRK, and has seen off other
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Chinese delegations to Albania, Rumania, and DPRK. He
has also attended numerous Communist embassy functions
in Peking.*
Keng P9ao's star seems to be definitely on the
rise. Until recently, when he has begun to follow Kuo
Mo-jo, Keng has been listed consistently as first
after the Politburo members at various official func-
tions, and at ILD functions, he is frequently listed
right after Chou En-lai. On 12 August 1971, he
received his own 'headline', being the main Chinese
Communist personage meeting with a Belgian Marxist-
Leninist Party delegation.
Keng Piao has to be considered
one of China's most important, and most visible leaders
in the foreign affairs apparent, and success in his new
position may well lead to a higher Party position,
perhaps even a seat on the Politburo.
*In one departure from standard protocol and custom,
he met with a pro-Communist (if not Communist) American
writer, William Hinton, on 24 July 1971, shortly after
which Hinton published an authoritative-sounding article
on Chinese policy towards the United States.
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Deputy Directors: (the following designations are
conjectural, not confirmed any-
where in the Chinese press)
JEN YUN-CHUNG
Jen Yun-chung is one of the more mysterious
figures in the apparent upper levels of the ILD leader-
ship. He was first listed in the press as a Deputy
Political Officer of the Heilungkiang Military District,
1965-68. In February 1968, he was noted as having
been transferred to an unidentified department of the
central government (along with PLA leaders Kuo Yu-feng
[see below in high-level Party personnel associated with
the ILD] and Wang Liang-en, now an MFA "responsible
person"). Thereafter, txcept.for a virtual disappearance
during 1969, Jen began to appear frequently with notable
visiting Communist Party delegations. During late 1970,
he made several appearances, mostly with visiting
Rumanian delegations.* During this early period of
ILD work, Jen was usually listed after Shen Chien (see
below); recently, however, they have been listed first
among the ILD functionaries rather alternately, with Jen
being first more often than Shen, though in no obvious
pattern. Jen's appearances have multiplied significantly
in 1971, and particularly since Keng Piao's accession to
the ILD directorship (corresponding to the unprecedented
visibility of the department).** On 3 September 1971
ota appearances - 13; in ILD functions after
20 November - 11.
**Through August he had made 65 public appearances,
all but three dealing directly with ILD functions,
and all but six after the March trip to Hanoi.
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NCNA listed him first among "leading members and staff
members of the organizations concerned of the Interna-
tional Liaison Department." It is possible that he
was originally brought in to form a revolutionary com-
mittee for the ILD, or perhaps as a military overseer
of ILD affairs during the more chaotic period of the
Cultural Revolution. During a May 1968 Kang Sheng
speech to the Military Control Commission of the ILD,
Jen was identified by name, and made a comment on re-
organization work. Due to his consistent position as
first or second among ILD functionaries at public ap-
pearances, it seems likely that he is a deputy director
of the International Liaison Department, and he may
be the senior deputy. He is still an active PLA member,
appearing always in uniform at ILD functions.
SHEN CHIEN
Shen Chien is a long-
standing veteran of the ILD,
being one of the few who not
only survived the Cultural
Revolution, but made several
public appearances in ILD y
functions during that time
span when the disorganiza-
tion of the central govern-
ment in the Cultural Revolu- k ~
tion was at its peak. He
is also one of the four
people, aside from Keng ? 4A. A
Piao, who has been speci-
fically identified in open
sources as "a leading
member of the International
Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party." His first identification of this type
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was on 1 May 1971, and the designation has recurred on
several occasions since then.
On 14 September 1970, an official North Vietnamese
newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan, in describing the reception
of a DRV Par y iciai visiting Peking, identified
Shen as "Director of the Forei n Liaison Department of
the Party Central Committee."
No further
mention of Shen as Director appeared in 1970 or prior
to Keng Piao's March 1971 appointment to that position.*
Shen Chien has had a long career in various capa-
cities within the Chinese Communist foreign affairs ap-
paratus. Born in Hopeh Province in 1915, he attended
Peking Normal University ar,d spent one year at Western
Reserve University in the United States (probably in
1947). In 1949, he was reported to be Director of the
Gereral Administrative Office Secretariat of the People's
Revolutionary Military Council. In October 1950, he was
appointed to be a counselor to the Chinese Embassy in
New Delhi, India, a post which he held until 1955. From
1955 to 1960, he served as Deputy Director of the American
and Australian Affairs Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA). He was sent in November 1960
- Some observers tie Shen's fate closely to that of
Kang Sheng on the basis of :uch reports and feel that
Shen's failure to be appointed publicly to the ILD post
may reflect Kang's decline. But Shen has not gone
into eclipse; he has continued to be a very visible
and active participant in ILD functions, apparently
at a very high level.
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aink-Jimim J.-
as ambassador to Cuba, where he remained until he was
replaced by Wang Yu-ping in January 1964. He was men-
tioned briefly in December 1964 as Vice-President of the
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and in
some capacity escorted Che Guevara during his visit to
China in early 1965.
cri-
ticized during the Cultural Revollutionabutewaslrestored
to favor after proper self-criticism. Although his
name is not mentioned in the reports of early disrup-
tions within the ILD, during which, in 1965-66, much
of its top leadership was removed, it is likely that Shen
was in political trouble during the period of his dis-
appearance. However, by the time the foreign affairs
apparatus began to undergo its most severe shakeups; and
during which time most of the rest of the ILD leadership
went down, Shen seems to have re-emerged in good stand-
ing. His first public reappearance was to welcome Hsieh
Fu-chin and his delegation back from their ordeal at
Wuhan in July 1967, and he has continued to make public
appearances at ILD functions without interruption ever
since that time.
In addition to his ILD responsibilities, Shen is
also President of the China-Cuba Friendship Association,
and has been called upon to participate in numerous
activities in that capacity. Shen is the most active
of the known ILD members, and has been for some time.
He is probably a deputy director; he greets nearly
every major Communist Party delegation that visits
China and often accom anies them on tours of the coun-
try.
Unli a some other ILD officers, he seems to have no
geographic area specialization
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Lunczivns or european Marx istst- en iiniin sts. He
attends some functions that no other ILD
erso
li
p
na
ty
attends, such as various DPRK and DRV embassy receptions
in Peking. In 1970, he made at least 73 public appear-
ances, four as President of the China-Cuba Friendship
Association, 22 with DRV or NLFSV delegations, 20 with
DPRK delegations, 19 with Rumanian or Albanian groups,
and six in miscellaneous capacities, some with other
foreign Communist Parties. In 1971, he had made at
least 117 appearances as of 31 August, 28 with DPRK dele-
gations, 24 with Vietnamese or Laotian delegations,
39 with Rumanian or Albanian delegations, 12 with
miscellaneous Communist Parties, eight as President of
the China-Cuba Friendship Association, and six miscel-
laneous appearances.*
YANG YU-HENG
Yang Yu-heng has been reported as a Deputy Director
of the ILD. He is a little-known figure. He was first
identified as a "responsible person" of an unidentified
PLA department (possibly its foreign liaison department)
in 1960, then began making public appearances at ILD
functions in September 1969. He has met many of the
known Communist Party visitors to China since that time,
ome o servers regard Shen Chien as possibly holding
a concurrent post as head of the Chinese Communist In-
vesti ation De artment
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although it would appear that he has been declining in
importance since Keng's appointment as director.
Whereas previously he was invariably listed along with
(but after) Shen Chien in greeting important delega-
tions, recently he has been absent from functions of
the type at which he appeared in 1970, such as the June
1971 visit of Rumania's state and Party leader Nicolae
Ceausescu. Instead Yang has been seen with delegations
of fairly low priority and prestige, such as youth
groups, along with new and low-ranking members of the
ILD. Although he did not appear with other ILD members
at the 1971 May Day celebrations, he was listed after
Jen Yun-chung and Shen Chien at the 1971 celebration
of the anniversary of the PLA on August 1. His present
status, therefore, is uncertain.
Yang also has not seemed to have any geographic
specialization, although recently he has met few dele-
gations other than Indochinese and Albanian. There is
some speculation that h,' is a member of the security
apparatus.
Chang Tsang is one of the most shadowy figures
in the ILD, mainly because, unlike any of the other
persons herein discussed, he has never made a public
appearance.
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CHANG HSIANG-SHAN
Chang Hsiang-shan has been identified as a mem-
11ar AC t1.e Tf T
1n open materials.
He was identified in People's Daily as a "leading func-
tionary of the International L a~ ison Department of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party" on
14 May 1971, when he accompanied a trade union delegation
from the DPRK on a tour of China.
Chants is unquestionably a veteran of >GLD affairs,
a li ely mem er o t e apartment orn in
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Chekiang Province in 1914, Chang became "visible" in
1950, when he was reported as the Director of the Marx-
Lenin Institute in Peking. He attended the British
Communist Party Congress in 1959, and continued to be
active in liaison affairs thereafter, particularly in
front organizations such as the'.Werld Peace Council
and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. Chang also
travelled to Japan on several occasions, and was a
member of Liu Ding-i's 1965 deie;ation to an anti-
nuclear bomb conference in Japan -- a dele ion which
was denied entry with great publicity. He i.ad also
been denied entry to Japan when he travelled there with
Peng Chen to attend a JCP congress in 1964. On that
occasion, he was.:identified as "Chief of the Japanese
Affairs Section, International Department of the CCP
Politburo." Chang is also the director of the Asia-
Africa Society of China.
Nothing is known of Chang's status or activities
during the Cultural Revolution, though it could bess-
sumed that, due to his close association with Peng Chen,
Liu Ning-i, and other ILD leaders, he probably came
under some fire. However, he survived, reappeared in
1969, and has been active in ILD functions ever since.
Though he has met Communist delegations from many coun-
tries, he seems primarily concerned with Asian nations,
particularly North Korea and Japan. Though his status
as a Deputy Director is open to question, his ILD af-
filiation is not, and he may be in charge of a (hypo-
thetical) bureau for Japan/Korea affairs. Recently,
he has been seen most often with visiting groups of
Japanese "friends."
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Other Known Members
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TANG MING-CHAO
Tang Ming-chao is another
of the few persons who has been
associated with the ?LD in open
source material. On 6 May 1971,
Tang was identified as a "leading
functionary" of the ILD, accompany-
ing the Secretary-General of the
New Zealand Communist Party (CPNZ),
V.G. Wilcox.
Tang has had perhaps one
of the more varied and interesting
careers of the known ILD members. Born in Kwangtung
Province in 1910, he was educated at Tsinghua University,
then in 1934 moved to the United States. He spent 16
years in the US, where he attended the University of
California, became a citizen, edited a Chinese-language
newspaper, and even did some work for the US Army (in
1^44). He returned to the Mainland in 1950 and became
active in Chinese "peace" delegation activities and the
Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries. He was also active in the Na-
tional People's Congress, the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee, and was editor of China Reconstructs in 1962.
After 1963, he was referred to as a leading mem er of
an (unidentified) department of the Central Committee.
He disappeared during the Cultural Revolution, but, un-
like his longtime friend and suspected ILD associate
Lin Tang, he survived it. He re-emerged in April 1970
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and has been making numerous appearances at ILD func-
tions since that time.
If it is warranted to assume that the ILD is
functionally organized similarly to the MFA, Tang could
probably be considered to be head of the West Europe
and Australo-American Affairs section of the ILD. If
so, it is probably due primarily to his fluency in
English and his past experience. He has appeared with
Communist delegations from Belgium, New Zealand, Great
Britain, Australia, Italy, France and the United States.
Recently, he has met with delegations from a US Black
Workers' Conference and with William Hinton. In the
early 1960s, he did a considerable amount of foreign
travel to World Peace Congress and Afro-Asian Solidarity
Organization conferences and various Communist Party
congresses. He is now with Peking's UN delegation.
MAO PAO-CHUNG
Mao Pao-chung first appeared in ILD-type functions
in October 1968, when he had contacts with DRV -,;id
Albanian Communists. He then disappeared from public
view until March 1971, when he began to make appearances
with Indochinese Communists from the Laotian Patriotic
Front, North Vietnamese Workers Party, and NLFSV. He
has appeared very frequently since then, with several
important visiting Communist Party delegations. He
seems, however, to be primarily concerned with North
Vietnamese Communists, and could be placed in the Indo-
china section, if such exists, of the ILD. His presence
at other functions may indicate that he is head of
that bureau. He was listed second among "leading mem-
bers and staff members" of the ILD, who met with a
French Marxist-Leninist group on 3 September 1971, and
again with a JCP (L) group one week later.
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CHAO HSUEH-LI
Chao Hsueh-li, who was formerly in the Chinese
embassy in Switzerland (1965-1968), has recently met
visiting Belgian and French Marxist-Leninist Party
delegations. On 10 September 1971, he was identified
in a NCNA release as a "leading functionary" of the
ILD, accompanying the French delegation on a tour of
China. With his previous experience, it is conceiv-
able that Chao is the head of a West European sub-
section of Tang Ming-chao's ex-bureau.
TIEN SHU-CHIEN
Tien Shu-chien is one of the many new faces in
the ILD, making his first public appearance in April
1971, when he greeted a delegation from Japan. On 11
May 1971, he was identified as a "responsible working
person" of the ILD, while accompanying a DPRK Trade
Union delegation visiting China along with Chang Hsiang-
shan. He has since appeared several times, almost
always in connection with Korean delegations or Chinese
delegations going to Korea, leading to the conclusion
that he is perhaps a Korean interpreter for the ILD.
He may be higher than that, however, since he has more
recently appeared with a Vietnamese group.
YANG CHUN-CHENG
Yang Chun-cheng was also identified as a "respon-
sible working person" for the ILD during the May 1971
visit of the Korean trade union delegation. He has
since appeared exclusivley with known ILD members,
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solely in connection with DPRK affairs. He appears to
be an interpreter, Korean, perhaps in Chang Hsiang-
shan's department for Japan/Korea Affairs.
HSIAO HUANG
Hsiao Huang, another new ILD functionary, began
to make numerous appearances along with other ILD per-
sonalities in March 1971. He has appeared almost ex-
clusively with VWP, NLFSV, and LPF delegations, indicat-
ing that he is either a Vietnamese interpreter, or,
more likely, in the Indochina Bureau of the ILD. On
10 September 1971, he was listed after known ILD mem-
bers Jen Yun-chung and Mao Pao-chung in meeting a
JCP(L) group.
YAO SHIH-KEN
Yao Shih-ken has met delegations from Belgian
and French Marxist-Leninist parties, KWP, VWP, and NLFSV.
He is probably a low-level functionary, being last in
the 3 September 1971 listing of "leading members and
staff members of the organizations concerned of The
International Liaison Department of the CCP Central
Committee."
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Other Possible ILD Members
TSAO I-OU
Tsao I-ou is a full member of the Central Com-
mittee, and is perhaps best known as the wife of Kang
Sheng, the former Politburo supervisor and probably
virtual director of the ILD during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Tsao began to make public appearances in ILD
functions soon after her 'coming-out' in 1.966, during
the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Through-
out the Cultural Revolution, she greeted nearly all the
important Communist- and Marxist-Leninist delegations
who visited China, along with Kang and Kuo Yu-fens 25X1
(see below). In a 1970
Tsao was vraised highly and iden- 25X1
tified as a leading member of the "reorga.nization
committee" concerned with -- or one of -- the CCP's
central departments.
After Kang Sheng's disappearance in late November
1970, Tsao's public appearances became less frequent,
although she has continued to appear in evident favor.
In April 1971, she met with V.G. Wilcox and his CPNZ
delegation, and in June she was present at the meeting
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S1~.CKE L
between Ceausescu and Mao, Lin Piao and Kang. She
must still be considered a possible member of the ILD,
though perhaps a rather inactive one.*
Feng Ilsuan qualifies for
the list of ILD members by vir-
tue of his past experience, his
appearances, and his previous
identifications as a working
member of the ILD. The British
China Topics of 21 Januar 1966
pp es him n the ILD
Feng was born in 1915 in Kiangsu Province, taught
at 'Kang Ta' University in Yenan in 1947, and became
ambassador to Switzerland in 1956, having served as
'minister' there since 1950. Relieved of his ambassa-
dorial post in 1959, he returned to China and became
Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, a post
which he held until March 1965. In the same period, he
In August 1971, she met a non-Communist Congolese
women's delegation, indicating that her ILD connection
may be over.
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appeared to hold some post in the central political
security apparatus. In March/April 1966, he accompanied
Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi to Pakistan while the Cultural
Revolution was gathering steam. That was his last
recorded appearance until June 1970, when he met an
Albanian government/Party delegation.
Feng is rather a tentative member of the ILD,
and still makes frequent appearances in MFA-type func-
tions. However, whenever he appears at a major Party
gathering, such as meeting an important delegation or on
National Day, he always appears along with known ILD
members, often listed immediately after Shen Chien.
He may be in a post for coordination with the MFA,
or with whatever political security apparatus now
exists, or with the Investigation Department (foreign
intelligence). Liao Ho-shu places Feng as deputy
director of the Investigation Department, but there
is no confirmation of this.
Chu is a suspected ILD member
He is identified in the press
as a "responsible person" of an unidentified depart-
ment of the Central Committee. Chu appeared in September
1969, and began making numerous appearances at ILD
functions, listed always after Shen Chien and Yang Yu-
heng. After January 1971, Chu dropped out of sight,
but he reappeared, in apparent favor, in November 1971.
Chu, like Jen Yun-chung, was mentioned by name in a
1968 Red Flag report of Kang Sheng's speech to the
Military Control Group of the "XX Department" (appar-
ently the ILD), indicating that he has a PLA background,
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and may have later become a member of a revolutionary
committee in the ILD. His present post is unknown;
it is uncertain whether her still an active'ILD
member.
Liu Ke-ming has been reported as a member of the
"1.st Bureau" of the ILD, dealing with Soviet and FAst
European affairs. He was mentioned in the Rumanian press
as the "deputy general secretary of the foreign rela-
tions department of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China" on 2 September 1970. It would
appear that he still holds this type of position, judg-
ini by his recent public appearances. During the past
two years, his only public appearances have been with
Party delegations to or from Albania and Rumania, the
most notable being his presence during the meeting
between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Tse-tung in June 1971.
He has, however, made only seven appearances thus far
in 1971, which could lead to some doubt as to his posi-
tion.
Liu Chun-fa has apparently been with the ILD
since sometime in 1969, as he began to meet delegations
from the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front
(NLFSV) in September of that year, and also sent his
condolences to the DRV embassy in Peking on the death
of Ho Chi Minh. He made only one appearance in 1970,
but reappeared in June and July of 1971, meeting
Rumanian and Korean delegations. There is ha:..,dly
enough inforamtion even to speculate on his position,
although his ILD affiliation would seem probable from
his repeated public appearances with known ILD members.
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MA TE-CHUAN
? Ma Te-chuan is another new face with the ILD,
having made his first (and last-known) appearances in
April-May 1971, when he met Party delegations from
Belgium, New Zealand, and Laos. Taiwan's monthly
Studies on Chinese Communism identified Ma as an ILD
fu functionary i-'n it June 1971*issue (page 143). However,
too little information is available to do more than
speculate on Mass functional or hierarchical position.
HSING CHU-FANG as being an ILD functionary
Hsin Chu-fang was also identified une
Y in
oug he was apparently a writer, having pub-
pub-
lished in Chung kuo Ching-Wien (China Youth) magazine
l
in p 1964, Hsing h did not beg into delegations apeapublicly until
Aril 1971, when he met Party from New
and Belgium, Since then, he has met delegations
Zealand an
from the VWP and KWP. Again, not enough information
exists to support speculation.
If it is reasonable to assume that the ILD would
have its own staff of interpreters, then Huang Chun can
also
be presumed to be an ILD functionary . He first
appeared hi in May 1971, and was listed b as an interpreter..
All s subsequent appearances have been with known or
suspected ILD personnel, always among the last listed,
and always with a Vietnamese group of some type or an-
an
other. He can probably be placed in the Indochina burea
as a Vietnamese interpreter.
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LIN HSIEN-NUNG
Another new face in the ILD crowd whose position
is hard to estimate is Lin Hsien-nung, who first began
to appear in ILD functions in March 1971. Since then
he has met Party delegations from New Zealand, Chile,
Rumania, DRV, DPRK, and LPF. He has also seen off a
Chinese workers' delegation to Rumania.
HUNG TSO-CHUN
Hang Tso-chun has also appeared (since June 1971)
exclusively in the company of ILD members, greeting
delegations from DRV and NLFSV. He may be in the Indo-
china Bureau.
CHANG CHEN-HAI
Chang Chen-hai was first identified in 1968 as
a responsible person of the Canton MRC. He has met
Party delegations from Belgium, DPRK, KPF, and has
seen off a Chinese delegation to Albania. The nature
of his connection to the ILD is not known, but he has
usually been listed among known or strongly suspected
members.
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Other Persons Seen Often in Company of ILD Personalities
at ILD Functions
CHENG KUO-TSAI
Recent appearances only with LPF delegation
-- possibly an interpreter, Laotian.
CHIN HUI
Probably a Korean interpreter; met General Federa-
tion of Trade Unions of Korea delegation in May 1971,
and accompanied a Chinese youth delegation to Korean
Youth Conference in June 1971.
LAO YUAN-HUI
Probably an interpreter, English. Has appeared
with CPNZ's Wilcox in May 1971, and with delegation
from US Black Workers Congress in July.
LI MEI
A recent appearance -- may be same Li Mei active
in Overseas Chinese affairs in early 1960s.
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LI KUEI-CHENG
With LPF delegation in July 1971.
LI MING-HSIANG
With LPF delegation in July 1967 (with Yang
Yu-heng).
LI WEN-KUN
Met NLFSV And VWP delegations in June 1971.
SHIN YUNG-LU
Appeared with ILD members greeting delegations
from NLFSV and VWP, May/June 1971.
TAI SHENG-PU
Attended CPNZ Congress with Liu Ning-i and Tang
Ming-chao in 1966, then disappeared. Recently re-
emerged to greet Wilcox during his April 1971 visit to
China.
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High-Level Party Personnel Often Associated with ILD
KANG SHENG
Among his many other duties and responsibilities
as a (onetime) member of the Standing Committee of
the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Central Commit-
tee, Kang Sheng seems to have been responsible for the
I
LD its personneldi
, an operatons.
965-1966 until his disappearance in November 1970
,
Kang was the man ultimately in charge of implementing
Mao's policies toward "fraternal" Communist Parties.
He met every Communist Party/government delegation
from China's major allies, and nearly all of the known
Marxist-Leninist splinter ?arty delegations that visited
China. In addition, he travelled to Albania in 1966
to a Party meeting there.
Chinese Communist arty personnel in con-
as the he
d
a
of the ILD - o ------?
(or Politburo-level supervisor), usually in
charge of briefing the visiting delegations on CCP and
PCR policy and activities.
Kang, who had a leading role in Party-rebuilding
at least until late 1969, was in charge of the reorgani-
zation of the ILD after its top leadership was purged
or criticized in the Cultural Revolution. In a speech
carried in the Canton Red Flag Bulletin (Hun -ch'i T'un -
hsin) of July 1968, Kang a resse:d himsel to the prob-
lems of reforming the "XX Ministry" (clearly the ILD,
since Wang Chia-hsiang, Wu Hsiu-chuan, Chao I-min and
Liu Ning-i are mentioned as former leaders) through the
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application of Mao's thought.* An earlier Red Guard
poster, noted on 12 May 1967, reported other incidents
in which Kang showed concern with the internal workings
of the ILD, namely condemning Wu Hsiu-chuan and defend-
ing Liu Ning-i (appointed as head of the ILD in March
1966). In a briefing to Chilean Communist delegates in
July 1970, Kang again discussed the reorganization of
the ILD. During some of the more chaotic periods of
the ILD's Cultural Revolution experience, Kang may have
served as the actual head of the department.
Kang's actual influence on the activities and
policies of the ILD are difficult to determine. It is
apparent that policy changes were made similar to those
made in other departments during the Cultural Revolution,
namely drawing policies and operations more closely
within limits determined by Mao's ideology. Ideological
purity (by Maoist standards) began to be stressed more
heavily. In line with post-Cultural Revolution Maoist
ideology and tactics, various Parties began to be urged
by Kang to become more self-sufficient and less reliant
on financial aid and political advice from China.
Kang Sheng's decline after the winter of 1969-70
apparently has affected the ILD. Great changes appear
to have been made in the organization and functions of
the department since Kang has been gone. A new director
has been appointed, a man with no known relationship
to Kang Sheng, and Kang's own proteges (with the exception
of Shen Chien) seem to have been quietly removed from
positions of influence within the department. It is
believed by some observers that the ILD is now a much
en un-c ung and Chu Ta-cheng made comments during
the speech, which is described as being delivered to
the "Military Control Group of the XX Ministry on May
30, 1968."
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more influential department, in terms of actual formula-
tion of foreign policy, than it used to be.' Keng ciao
is apparently the ranking Party member under Chou
En-lai -- in the foreign affairs apparatus. Kant; is
presumed to have no current influence over the policies
or personnel of the ILD.
KUO YU-FENG
In his July 1970
Kang Sheng mentioned that Kuo Yu-
eng was
part of tie "Central Committee Reorganization Team,"
along with Kang's wife
Tsao I-ou
Oth
,
.
er reports, as
well as his position in name-lists, seem to indicate
that he is high up in the Central Committee Organiza-
tion Department, perhaps even head of that body. His
connection with the ILD was rimaril during the 1969-
70 reor anization eriod
also participated in t e briefing of the visitingedele-
gation. Furthermore, Kuo was very visible in the open
press during 1969-70, performing ILD functions along
with Kang Sheng, Tsao I-ou and Shen Chien, meeting
Party delegations from several European and Asian coun-
tries.
-71-
Kuo is a PLA officer, first noted in 1958 in
Lushun as a political officer and-reported transferred
to Peking in May 1968, where he began to appear as a
"responsible person" on the Peking Municipal Revolu-
tionary Committee. He was named an alternate member
of the Central Committee in April 1969. In 1971, he
ceased to be listed with the known ILD members, and
ceased appearing at ILD functions (the last being greet-
ing the British Marxist-Leninist Party on their tour
f China in December 1970). Since then, he has been
the Director of
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the )rganization Department. It would appear that, with
the ILD now a going concern under a reliable man, Kuo's
presence in the ILD is no longer required.
During the course of his
spectacular rise in the hier-
archy of the CCP, Politburo
member and Secretary of the
Shanghai Municipal Party Commit-
tee Yao Wen-yuan has taken on
a number of important respon-
sibilities in addition to his
official Shanghia duties. The
most important of these has been
the supervision of the regime's
entire propaganda apparatus.
However, one of his new respon-
sibilities has been meeting
with Party delegations that
visit Peking from other countries. Yao began to appear
at ILD-type functions with Kang Sheng during October 1970,
and has continued attending such functions in the absense
of the latter. After a two-month absence from Peking
in early 1971, during which time he was in Shanghai, Yao
continued to meet both high-level and low-level foreign
Communist delegations, often along with ILD members.
In nearly every case, he has been mentioned as being
a participant in any substantive discussions that took
place between the Chinese and their visitors. This
was notable during the Ceausescu visit to China in June
1971. It is possible that, in spite of Keng Piao's
Party position, it is still considered necessary for
the ILD to have a Politburo-level supervisor. If so, Yao
may be that supervisor, perhaps with help from Chang Chun-
chiao. Although Yao's only travel experience outside of
SFC'.R FT
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China was in a Red Guard delegation to Albania, which
he led in 1967, many observers believe that Yao has
taken over Kang's role.
CHANG CHUN-CHIAO
Chang Chun-chiao, Politburo member and 1st Secre-
tary of the Shanghai Party Committee, is also frequently
present in Peking, and often in attendance at ILD func-
tions. Though he is of slightly higher rank than Yao
Wen-yuan (they are respectively fifth and sixth among
active Politburo members) and is always listed before
Yao whenever the two are together at a foreign affairs
function, it would appear that, at least as far as liai-
son work is concerned, Yao is somewhat more closely
concerned. In particular, while Chang often meets with
important foreign delegations, and sometimes escorts them
around China, Yao Wen-yuan is invariably listed as
being present during the actual discussions, whereas
Chang almost never is. Chang has met delegations,
beginning about October 1970, from New Zealand, DPRK,
DRV, NLFSV, Rumania, Cambodia (Sihanouk), Japan, and
the US (Hinton). However, his participation in ILD
functions is sporadic, and his presence may be more due
to his Party rank than ILD affiliation.
WU FA-HSIEN
Wu Fa-lisien, the portly, frog-faced commander
of the PLA Air Force and Deputy Chief of Staff of the
PLA, was making appearances at foreign affairs, and
particularly ILD functions, from about 1967 until his
apparent fall in September 1971. In 1969, he was men-
tioned by Kang Sheng, in a briefing to a foreign Com-
munist delegation, as one of the outstanding members
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of the new Central Committee, along with Tsao I-ou ~Kang's
wife) Kuo Yu-feng, and Shen Chien. Even in Kang's
absence, Wu continued to make frequent appearances E.long
with ILD ::*embers. He was the only military member of
the Politbura to do so consistently.
Chi Teng-kuei, an alternate member of the CCP
Politburo and a deputy secretary of the Honan Provin-
cial Party Committee, is a little-known figure. Since
1970, he has frequently appeared at foreign affairs and
ILD functions. He was tapped by Mao himself for the
Politburo, and may be close to Chou En-lai. He has also
been associated with Keng Piao in briefing visiting
Communist delegations, and open sources have noted his
frequent performance of liaison duties.
Chang Shih-chung was named an alternate member
of the Central Committee in April 1969, as a representa-
tive of the "workers." He has also been selected as a
member of the Peking Party Committee and was. a leading
member of the Conference of Representatives of Peking
Revolutionary Workers. He connection to the ILD seems
to be in his consistent appearance with workers' dele-
gations which visit China, particularly from Communist
countries. He has also met Communist Party delegations
from Great r3ritain, Albania, and Rumania, as well as
the Hinton group from the US.
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which If not
actual member ththate
holds or will hold an important rank in a liaison
position in the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
if and when it is officially reorganized.
LID H5I-CHANG
Liu Hsi-chang is another member of the Peking
Municipal Committee and the Conference of Representatives
of Peking Revolutionary Workers who has had some deal-
ings with ILD members at foreign affairs functions.
Rising through the ranks of Revolutionary Rebels during
the Cultural Revolution, he was elected as a "worker"
representative to the 9th Central Committee. His liaison
work has consisted of meeting various Communist Party
delegations, seeing worker delegations off to various
Communist allies nations (he was himself in a delega-
tion led by Yao Wen-yuan to Albania in 1967), and meet-
ing trade union delegations visiting China. His exact
relation to the ILD cannot be estimated at this time,
but it is perhaps significant that he has made so many
appearances with known ILD personnel.
1.
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ANNEX
The following is a list of former known or conjectured
members of the International Liaison Department purged
or missing during and after the Cultural Revolution.
WANG Chia-hsiang -- former head of early ILD, in
jeopardy after Lushan 1959,
purged early in Cultural Revolu-
tion.
-1.
WU Hsiu-chuan
LIU Ning-i
CHAO I-min
CHANG Shang-ming --
acting head of department during
Wang's disgrace. Purged 1966.
named director in March 1966.
Purged January 1968 and dropped
from CC in 1969.
probably deputy director under
Liu and perhaps before. Purged
September 1967.
in charge of "anti-revisionism"
in department. Purged noisily,
autumn 1967.
reportedly deputy director for
Administration, purged in 1965.
reportedly head of Asia section.,
Purged early with Hsu Li.
CHAO An-po -- Japan section. Undergoing re-
education.
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YEH Hu-sheng
LIAO Cheng-chiao
CHUANG Tao
TIEN Fu
CHEN Hua
LI Chu-li
CHANG Chi-ming
CHEN "ran-nan
CHU Shih-lun
HO Hsi-chuan
HSIUNG Fu
LI Chi-hsin
LI h i-san
LIN Tang
WU Hsueh-chien
Soviet section.
India-Pakistan-Ceylon section.
Japan section. Last seen 1970.
reception section.
General Office, perhaps cadre
section. Purged early with
Hsu, Chang.
Reported Secretary-General 1965.
Purged 1968.
missing.
missing.
missing.
missing.
attended several foreign Party
congresses. Purged February
1967.
identified in 1966-68 reports
on the ILD. Missing.
contacts- with Latin American
Parties in early 1960s. Missing.
close associate of Tang Ming-Chao.
Missing.
Afro-Asian Solidarity Ctte G Youth
organizations. Missing.
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YU Chih-ying -- trade union organizer; contacts
with New Zealand and Australia
CPs. Apparently purged with
Liu Ning-i.
WANG Wen-chung -- missing.
CHANG Chi-lung -- missing.
KUAN Yuan* -- also in organization dept.?
Dropped from Central Committee
in 1969.
CHAO Han* -- also in organization dept.?
Purged in 1968.
CHEN Yeh-ping* -- organization department? Denounced
in 1967.
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