INTELLIGENCE REPORT MAO'S 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' IN 1967: THE STRUGGLE TO 'SEIZE POWER'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010039-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: May 24, 1968
• Content Type: IR

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RSS No. 0028/68
24 May 1968
ILLEGIB
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN 1967: THE
STRUGGLE TO "SEIZE POWER"
(Reference Title: POLO XL)
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RSS No. 0028/68
24 May 1968
cQ .01
12 /It?d NQ.r*ti .-
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN 1967: THE
STRUGGLE TO "SEIZE POWER"
This Intelligence Report develops in broad outline
the course of the "Cultural Revolution" in Communist China
during 1967. It is written from the point of view that
Mao either initiated or approved policies which shifted
the direction and intensity of the "Cultural Revolution"
during the year, and that he ordered the sharp reversal
of policy from revolutionary action to moderation follow-
ing the high level of economic disorder and violence of
August.
Mao was not forced, the paper argues, to reverse
his revolutionary policy by pressure from a "moderate"
faction, nor did the period of moderation which followed
his August decisions mean that the "Cultural Revolution"
was over; rather, it was a pause, a temporary shift in
emphasis from revolution from below to revolution from
above.
Nevertheless, the net effects of events in 1967
were to diminish Mao's power to control developments and
to create major, probably long term, political, social
and administrative dislocations.
This is one of a series of SRS staff studies based
on continuing surveillance of the China scene. The
research a for the preparation of this
report was
Chief, DI Special Research Staff
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN 1967: THE
STRUGGLE TO "SEIZE POWER"
Page
Introduction ....................................1
The "January Revolution" ........................2
Efforts to Restore Order (Early 1967)...........7
The Resurgence of the Left (Spring 1967).......13
Calls for Order Again (May-June 1967)..........17
The Wuhan Incident (July-August 1967)..........23
Moderation Again (September-December 1967).....28
Prospects ......................................36
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN 1967: THE
STRUGGLE TO "SEIZE POWER"
Summary
In January 1967, Communist China's "great proletar-
ian cultural revolution" entered a new stage--a stage of
violent overthrow of all those in positions of authority
in the party and government who refused to accept Mao Tse-
tung's new "revolutionary" order. As originally envisaged
by Mao, this revolutionary act of "seizure of power from
below" was to have resulted in the creation of a new power
structure dominated by his "revolutionary Leftist" support-
ers and modeled after the Paris Commune. As the ultimate
expression of Mao's "mass-line" approach to politics, this
undertaking to rely on the "revolutionary masses" to create
a viable substitute for a "bureaucratic" party and govern-
ment apparatus was probably doomed from the outset.
Erupting in Shanghai under the name of the "January
Revolution," this frenzied drive to "seize power" initiated
a period of nation-wide violence and disorder which required
immediate and drastic countermeasures. The first of these
was the decision of 23 January ordering the People's Libera-
tion Army to intervene in the "cultural revolution" in order
to support the outnumbered and disorganized forces of the
"revolutionary Left." The second was a shift in policy
toward party cadres, emphasizing more humane treatment
and rehabilitation to make use of their administrative
skills. The third was an effort to overcome the pronounced
tendency toward "anarchism" which had characterized the
"January Revolution," an effort to reorganize and rectify
the ranks of the "revolutionary Left."
Finally, the decision was taken to jettison the
Shanghai example in favor of a new model for emulation
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in the. "seize powe..; " movement: throughout China--that pro-
vided by the formation of a three-way alliance to seize
power-' in the province. of. Heilurgkiang, Whereas the
"revolutionary rebe.ls'~ had played the dominant role in
Shanghai, they were nov to share their power in fact,
the g-,-eater part, of their power) with two new "allies,"
the People's Liberation Army and '`revolutionary party
A-.adres
The p,r n-,.ipai charactee.rist:ic of the next phase of
the ul t:uxa,l r volution ' extending through March and
much of April was the, resurgence of the "'evolutionary
Left incited on..Fe again to criticize and attack the op-
position and thus maintain 'revolutionary momentum. In
-Mao's view, the pendulum had swung too far in the direction
of order and stability imposed by the PiA and party cadres
from above ano it was necessary once again to stress the
role of the revolutionary masses" Senior party cadres
in central government organs were the first to be attack-
ed, charged with perpetrating "false power seizures" in
order to ..-einstate all or most: o!: the old officials and
systems of control.
Tre fact that these false power seizures" bad
also occurred in the g::'eat majority of China's provinces
constituted a serious indictment of the Army's perform-
ance since ordered to intervene in the "cultural revolu-
tion." In view of this poor performance, a 6 April Mili-
tary Affairs Committee directive (of crucial importance
in understanding the subsequent course of the "cultural
revolution" throughout 1967) stripped local military com-
manders of all real authority in dealing with the "revo-
lutionary Left," forbidding them to open fire on "mass
organizations," to label these organizations "counter-
revolutionary," to make mass arrests, or in general to
"take any important action", towards these organizations
without first receiving instructions from Peking. For
their part, the "proletarian revolutionaries" were also
enjoined not to use force against the Army, warned that
"under no circumstances should the spearhead of struggle
be directed against the People's Liberation Army."
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The main characteristic of the "cultural revolution"
in the months which followed was increased antagonism and
hostility between the Army and the "revolutionary Left."
"Revolutionary mass organizations" in the provinces and
major cities launched bitter attacks against local mili-
tary control committees, both for having suppressed them
in the past and for failure to support them in the present.
Local military district commands continued to experience
great difficulty, as Lin Piao had admitted earlier in a
30 March speech, in "finding )ut the difference between
Left and Right" in their dealings with mass organizations.
As a result, the original timetable for "seizure of power"
in the provinces had, as admitted by a regime spokesman
on 5 May, "to be postponed for some tima."
Since Mao's directives governing the development
of the "cultural revolution" were by definition correct,
the failure of the revolution to proceed according to
plan could only result from faulty execution of these
directives. Given the premise of Mao's infallibility,
the principal issue over which differences of opinion
would arise within the central leadership in mid-1967
was whether to assign primary responsibility for this
adverse development to the People's Liberation Army (its
failure to identify and provide adequate support to the
"Leftists") or to the "revolutionary Left" (its refusal
to unite and observe revolutionary discipline as mani-
fested in continuing "factionalism" and "anarchism").
The significance of what has come to be known as
the "Wuhan Incident" (in essence, an act of insubordina-
tion by leaders of the Wuhan Military Region Command)
is that it afforded extremist elements in the central
leadership an opportunity to focus once again on the
"mistakes" of the PLA as the primary cause of failures
and setbacks in Mao's "cultural revolution." One example
of what might be called the over-reaction of the central
leadership to the Wuhan Incident was the decision in early
August to arm selected Red Guard and "revolutionary rebel"
units. When combined with Madame Mao's earlier call to
Red Guards "to take up arms" under the slogan "attack by
reason, defend by force," the stage was set for a new form
of "revolutionary rebellion" directed toward a second
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"seizure of power," this time from the military commanders
and newly established "revolutionary committees" in a num-
ber of provinces. Mao's "cultural revolution" was about
to enter an "ultra-Leftist" phase, as it would be called
when the violence and anarchy it unleashed would neces-
sitate a hasty retreat.
The results of this sharp turn to the left were
nearly catastrophic. In foreign policy, a reign of ter-
ror directed at foreign diplomats was instituted in Pek-
ing, culminating in the ransacking and burning of the
British Chancery. More alarming to the leadership in
Peking was the discovery that, at a time of mounting
violence and economic disorder, "factionalism" had spread
from the Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" into the
Army. There was no choice in late August but to apply
the brakes, pull back, assess the damage, and initiate
a tend toward moderation in the "cultural revolution"
which would last throughout the remainder of 1967.
The unfolding of Mao's "cultural revolution" had
brought China by the end of August to the brink of anarchy,
featuring pitched battles by heavily armed factions in
nearly all of China's provinces. Recognizing the gravity
of the situation, Mao's new leadership team in Peking would
seek to achieve two separate but related objectives in
the remaining months of 1967: (1) to carry out a series
of measures designed to restore minimum levels of public
order and production; and (2) to dissociate Mao and his
"cultural revolution" from responsibility for the violence
and lawlessness endemic in China by finding new scape-
goats. The gravity of the crisis was such that for the
first time it was necessary to sacrifice a number of pro-
minent members of the Cultural Revolution Group, holding
them, rather than the policies they were administering,
responsible for the "nation-wide disturbance" in China.
This sharp reversal of policy was explained in a
series of "supreme instructions" issued by Mao Tse-tung
during the course of an extended tour in September through
North, Central-South and East China. Perhaps the most
important of these "instructions" was that the process
of setting up a new governmental structure (the "revolutionary
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committees") in all the 29 provinces and major cities of
China be speeded up and completed by the end of January
1968. To meet this deadline, it was no longer possible
to rely on the long;di-awn-out, cumbrous and generally un-
successful method of "seizure of power" from below. In-
stead, it was necessary to impose solutions from above,
hammering out agreements in Peking on the basis of Mao's
directive "to solve the problems of various provinces one
by one."
Although the trend toward moderation initiated in
late August continued, two major components of the effort
to restore order had run into difficulty by the end of
the year. First, the attempt to restore order from below
by "establishing revolutionary great alliances on the
basis of trade, profession, department or class in school"
was foundering because of the refusal of "revolutionary
mass organizations" in many areas to comply voluntarily
with this directive. The undertaking to restore order
from above by speeding up establishment of a new govern-
ment structure had also fallen far short of the original
goal. The principal reason this program had not pro-
gressed faster was Mao's insistence that representatives
of the "revolutionary Left" ne heard in the negotiating
process and receive genuine representation in the new
organs of revolutionary power.
Given these setbacks and failures, it was a fair
question to ask at the close of 1967 whether the "cultural
revolution" was coming to an end. The answer to this
question, however, depends upon the answer to another,
more basic question: whether Mao Tse-tung still dominates
the central party, government and military leadership in
Peking. The record of developments in the "cultural revo-
lution" in 1967 demonstrates, it is believed, that Mao
remained in charge throughout, initiating or at least
approving all changes in policy, including the sudden re-
treat toward moderation in late August forced by objective
circumstances. These circumstances--principally a damaged
economy, a disturbed Army, a fragmented "revolutionary
Left," a breakdown of party and government machinery, and
the consequent threat of anarchy--forced Mao to call a
halt to the destructive, rnasm phase of his "cultural
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revolution" and press ahead with the construction of a
new "revolutionary" government and party apparatus.
This shift in strategy should not be construed,
however, as a change in basic goals. In the eyes of Mao,
the "cultural revolution"--as the ultimate expression
of his views on the nature of man and society--can never
end. As long as Mao Tse-tung continues to dominate the
leadership in Peking, the "great proletarian cultural
revolution" will continue in Communist China.
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN 1967: THE
STRUGGLE TO "SEIZE POWER"
"The aim of every revolutionary struggle in
the world is the seizure and consolidation
of political power." --Mao Tse-tung
In January 1967, Communist China's "great proletar-
ian cultural revolution" entered a new stagle--a stage of
violent overthrow of all those in positions of authority
in the party and government who refused to accept Mao Tse-
tung's new "revolutionary" order. Erupting in Shanghai
under the name of the "January Revolution." this frenzied
drive to "seize power" initiated a period of nation-wide
violence and disorder which persists to the present day.
Although implicit in what had gone before, the
strident call to "seize power" suddenly transformed the
"cultural revolution' from an effort to reform the exist-
ing structure of power into an all-out assault against
the power structure itself. As originally envisaged by
Mao Tse-tung, this revolutionary act of "seizure of power
from bdlpw" was to have resulted in the creation of a new
revolutionary power structure dominated by his "revolu-
tionary Leftist" supporters and modeled after the Paris
Commune. As the ultimate expression of Mao's "mass-line"
approach to politics,,'this undbrtaking to rely on the
"revolutionary masses" to create a viable substitute for
a "bureaucratic" party and government apparatus was prob-
ably doomed from the outset.
Factionalism, more than any other single factor,
would undermine Mao's grand design to mobilize the forces
of the "revolutionary Left" to "seize power" from his
enemies in 1967. Explaining late in the year why th;i
movement had failed, Premier Chou En-lai would point'to
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alternating "seizures" and "counter-seizures" of power by
contending "factions" as having produced a situation in
which "seizure of power became surrender of power and
power could not be retained." Because of "factionalism"
in the ranks of tt,c; "revolutionary Left", it had bsen
necessary to relinquish the power "seized" to military
control committees set up in nearly all provin.'es and
major cities by the People's Liberation Army.
Although not mentioned by Chou, another important
product of Mao's call to "seize power" from below would
be to f.nculcate contempt among Red Guards and "revolution-
ary rebels" for authority of any kind, including the
authority of new "revolutionary" institutions and even
that of the Party Center. The net effect of the struggle
to "seize power" in 1967 would be to diminish, rather
than increase, Mao's power to control developments in
Communist China.
The "January Revolution"
"The central task of the great proletar-
:an cultural revolution, in the last analysis,
is the struggle by which the proletariat
seizes power from the handful of people with-
in the party taking the capitalist road."
--Commentator Article in Red Fla , "Proletar-
ian Revolutionaries, Unite, T January 1967.
Al:itough the 8 August 1966 Central Committee deci-
sion on the "cultural revolution" had predicted "relatively
great resistance" once the Red Guards were turned loose
on society, the extent and effectiveness of this opposi-
tion was clearly beyond expectation. The nature of this
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"opposition"* was analyzed and explained by Chen Po-ta
(Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central
Committee) at an important party work conference held
in Peking in October. The principal opposition, accord-
ing to Chen, had come from provincial party secretaries
who, "afraid of losing their positions and prestige...,
instigated workers and peasants to fight against the
students."
The provincial party and government apparatus had
been able to repulse the first attack by Red Gu:,rds in
August and September by mobilizing workers and peasants
in their defense? To prevent this from happening again,
it was necessary for the Maoists to infiltrate and take
over these opposition strongholds. This campaign began
immediately after the October work conference, with the
formation of new "revolutionary rebel" organizations in
industrial and mining establishments, party and govern-
ment organs, and, to a lesser extent, among the peasantry.
The expansion of the "cultural revolution" into the govern-
mentand the economy would engender increasing resistance
which, in turn, would lead to a final test of strength
when Mao would exhort his supporters to "seize power" in
all those party, government and economic organizations
which continued to resist.
If the expansion of the "cultural revolution" in
November and December to cover industry and the country-
side was intended primarily to re-establish Mao's control
over the provinces, there was a parallel escalation and
*The term "opposition" is an unfortunate one, since
it suggests conscious resistance to Mao's directives con-
cerning the "cultural revolution." Much of the "opposi-
tion", however, has came from those who consider them-
selves loyal supporters of Mao but who either have mis-
understood the vague and contradictory guidelines laid
down to govern the "cultural revolution" or have acted
in self-defense.
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extension of the revolution at the center encompassing
the party, government and military control apparatus in
Peking. In a major spee::h to a Red Guard rally on 18
December, Chiang Ching (Deputy Head of the Cultural Revo-
lution Group and, of greater importance; Mao Tse-tung's
wife) charged that the municipal public security bureau
had been largely responsible for recent bloody clashes
in Peking. Describing the bureau, along with the Supreme
People's Pro curatorate and the Supreme People's Court,
as "bourgeois" in nature, she then called upon the Red
Guards in her audience to 'rise up in rebellion" and "take
over' these government organs. she movement to "seize
power" from below by calling upon the 'revolutionary Left"
to take over government and party organs nad begun.
On 26 December, addressing the newly-organized
"All China Red Workers General Rebellion Corps," Madame
Mao (together with Chen Po-ta) endorsed the recent "sei-
zure" of the Ministry of Labor by this "revolutionary
rebel" organization, as well as its intention to take
over the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. With this
call to the "revolutionary Left" to seize control of China's
labor organizations, the stage was set for the outbreak
in Shanghai of what has come to be known as the "January
Revolution"--the Maoist drive to "seize power" in the
party and government apparatus on a nation-wide scale.
The "January Revolution" in Shanghai resulted in
a Pyrrhic victory. Instead of winning over Shanghai's
million-odd workers, it antagonized a large proportion
of them, precipitating a large-scale strike which for a
time crippled the economy of Shanghai_ This in turn re-
sulted in the complete paralysis and breakdown of local
government and necessitated a premature, disorderly "sei-
zure of power" in Shanghai for which Mao's "revolution-
ary rebels" were ill-prepared,
It is important to understand the nature of the
"opposition" generated in Shanghai at this time for it
was to be duplicated in nearly all major cities and pro-
vinces, becoming so widespread and tenacious that the
"seize power" movement in China would soon grind to a
halt. Although depicted in every case as the product
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of "base and sinister tricks" played by the "handful" of
Mao's enemies, the actions of the "opposition" at this
time were in most cases taken by organizations and groups
who considered themselves to be loyal supporters of Mao
and the "cultural revolution." This was true even of
the general strike carried out in late December by Shang-
hai's railroad, harbor and public utility workers, a strike
motivated primarily by political grievances directed not
at Mao but at the violence and radicalism of young "revo-
lutionary rebel" workers in that city.
Other strikes in Shanghai and elsewhere at this
time were motivated by economic grievances. But instead
of being provoked by "reactionary elements" (as alleged
in the important 12 January Red Flag editorial, "Oppose
Economism and Smash the Latest Counterattack by the Bour-
geois Reactionary Line"), these strikes were the direct
result of exhortations by Madame Mao (in the 26 December
speech noted above) to large numbers of contract workers,
temporary workers, and apprentice workers to rise up
against the "political oppression and economic exploita-
tion" to which they had been subjected by Liu Shao-chi
and Teng Hsiao-ping and all others responsible for foist-
ing these revisionist, capitalist systems on China's work-
ing class. As Madame Mao put it, these "contract and
temporary workers have suffered the most...and therefore
their spirit of revolt is the greatest." But when they
rose in revolt, demanding an end to the low-wage policy
which was a common feature of all these systems, they were
then told that they had been "deceived" and "hoodwinked"
into following the "evil road of economism" and were "pur-
suing only personal and short-term interests."
Another form of "economism" (defined as "the con-
spiracy of using the 'sugar-coated bullets' of economic
ben_efits...to corrupt the masses revolutionary will") at
this time in Shanghai and elsewhere was the payment of
year-end bonuses and of travel allowances to enable large
numbers of "revolutionary workers" to go to Peking to
engage in the "large-scale exchange of revolutionary
experience," as the student Red Guards had done before
them. The responsibility for this unexpected development
must also be borne in large part by'.the Maoists themselves.
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On the one hand, party and government cadres in the indus-
trial (also agricultural) sector were accused of "exploit-
ing" and suppressing the workers. On the other hand, the
workers were invited to rise up in rebellion against these
revisionist, capitalist systems of "exploitation" and,
if need be, to carry their grievances to higher authorities.
Having effectively undermined the authority of the local
cadres (who quickly succombed to worker demands for travel
funds and economic benefits), the Maoists then accused
them (in the words of Chou En-lai) of engaging in a "big
lot to pass the burden of all kinds of contradictions
~i.e. problems] up to us."
The Maoists were confronted with a number of serious
problems as they took stock of the "cultural revolution"
in mid-January 1967. First, more than a million workers
had descended on Peking to protest their "exploitation"
by local party and government cadres. Next, there were
reports of widespread disorder and bloody clashes in a
number of cities and provinces where "revolutionary rebels"
were rising up to "seize power" in response to Mao's call
to emulate the example of Shanghai. Also, the prelimin-
ary results of the "new stage" of extending the "cultural
revolution" into factories and mines were at hand, results
which showed that both revolution and production in the
industrial sector had been adversely affected by sending
in "revolutionary students" without adequate preparations.
Finally, reports on the progress of the "seize
power" movement in Shanghai revealed growing chaos follow-
ing the breakdown of party and government controls in that
city. What had been hailed just a few days previously as
a "brilliant example" was now repudiated as a model for
general emulation. Addressing a workers rally on 15 Janu-
ary, both Chou En-lai and Chen Po-ta stressed that "sei-
zure and control of everything... as has been done in Shang-
hai" was "not good" and was not to be repeated in Peking.
Indeed what had happened in Shanghai was now depicted as
but another example of "plotting" by the enemy, who wanted
"to wreck the social order and the process of production
and thereby make us a laughing stock" by "withdrawing
behind the scenes while allowing you to place all organi-
zations under your seizure and control." Rather than
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the formula of "seizure and control," Chou and Chen ad-
vocated the "supervision formula" as "much better and' 'more
practical"--that is, keeping party-and government cadres
on the job under "supervision" by the "revolutionary
rebels."
Another of the difficulties involved in taking over
power in Shanghai (as noted by Chou in an 18 January
speech) was the inability of "revolutionary workers, peas-
ants and intellectuals" to achieve "unity." Indeed, the
failure of the "revolutionary Left" to achieve "great
unity" was denounced in a series of statements at this
time, not only by Chou and Chen Po-ta but also by Madame
Mao and even by Mao himself, statements decrying the
phenomena of "anarchism," "departmentalism," "sectarian-
ism," "splitting," "small-group mentality" and "ultra-
democracy" which characterized the behavior of "revolu-
tionary rebels" generally throughout the country. Having
succeeded in the destructive task of overthrowing the
party and government control apparatus, the "revolution-
ary rebels" had failed in the constructive task of estab-
lishing a "new revolutionary order."
Efforts to Restore Order (Early 1967)
"Originally the Army was not to intervene
in the Cultural Revolution...but now that the
class struggle has sharpened,;. the Army must
support the 'Leftists' ..Most old cadres still
do not understand the Cultural Revolution."
--Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Military Affairs
Committee Plenum, 20 or 21 January, 1967.
The havoc created by Mao's "revolutionary rebels"
in their frenzied drive to "seize power" during the "Jan-
uary Revolution" required immediate and drastic counter-
measures. The first of these was the decision of 23 Jan-
uary ordering the Peoplels Liberation Army to intervene
in the "cultural revolution," directed to support the out-
numbered and disorganized forces of the "revolutionary
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Left." The second was a shift in policy toward party
cadres, emphasizing more humane treatment and rehabilita-
tion to make use of their administrative skills. The
third was an effort to overcome the pronounced tendency
toward "anarchism" which had characterized the behavior
of the "Revolutionary Left" during the "January Revolu-
tion", an effort to reorganize, retrench and rectify the
ranks of the "revolutionary rebels."
Finally, the decision was taken by Mao personally
to jettison the Shanghai example in favor of a new model
for emulation in the "seize power" movement throughout
China--that provided by the "formation of a three-way al-
liance to seize power" in the province of Heilungkiang.
Whereas the "revolutionary rebels" had played the dominant
role in Shanghai, they were now to share their power (in
fact, the greater part of their power) with two new "al-
lies," the People's Liberation Army and "revolutionary
party cadres."
The new, dominant role of the military in the govern-
ment and administration of China would be revealed in dis-
cussions of the course of the "seize power" movement in
February. Although at first the fiction was maintained
that "revolutionary rebels" were leading the way in form-
ing the new "three-way alliance to seize power," (d.g.
in Heilungkiang province), this pretense was dropped in
a 23 February Red Flag article describing the "seizure
of power" in Slians rovince. Here it was made clear
that the PLA had taken the initiative throughout, dictat-
ing'its will and imposing the cadres it had selected upon
the representatives of the "revolutionary Left." In those
provinces (the great majority) where for various reasons
the "seize power movement" had bogged down, the PLA was
directed to establish military control commissions charged
with maintaining law and order. As the only remaining
nation-wide organization still intact, the PLA perforce
had to step in to replace the now largely defunct party
and government control apparatus.
For the same reason, the PLA was soon deeply in-
volved in administering China's economy. On 22 February,
the Army was directed to restore order in the countryside
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by supervising the organization of peasants and rural
cadres to carry out spring planting. A month later the
Central Committee directed workers and cadres in factories
and mines to "cooperate effectively with the comrades
from the PLA" who were being sent to'lgupport their work
in industrial production." The further disclosure in
March that PLA personnel had been sent in large numbers
to conduct military and ideological training in univ6r-
sities and schools showed the extent of influence and
control exercised by the military in China in the early
months of 1967.
The problem of finding "new leaders" or "revolu-
tionary leading cadres"--the second component of the "three-
way alliance"--was an acute one, described by a leading
member of the Cultural Revolution Group (Wang Li) in early
February as "the biggest problem now." In successive Red
Flag editorials of 3 and 23 February drafted under the
personal supervision of Mao himself, the problem of "treat-
ing cadres correctly" received priority attention. As
emphasized in these editorials and accompanying comment-
ary by regime spokesmen, the "revolutionary rebels" in
Shanghai and elsewhere had gone too far, "opposing, ex-
cluding and overthrowing all cadres indiscriminately."
In the graphic description by Wang Li, "all that remained
after the 'seizure of power' were some vacant offices and
stamps." The most serious problem facing the Maoists in
the wake of the "January Revolution" was that it had suc-
ceeded too well, destroying the party and government con-
trol apparatus without providing an effective substitute.
The end result, as regime spokesmen emphasized, was
"anarchy", a situation aggravated by rivalry and clashes
between "revolutionary mass organizations" acting (as the
23 February Red Flag editorial put it) like "a host of
dragons without -a-leader."
To deal with this alarming situation, the regime
instituted what would subsequently be referred to as Mao's
"mild cadre policy." Reaffirming the original line taken
in the central committee decision of 8 August on the
"cultural revolution," this policy called first of all
for "correct treatment" and "support" of "revolutionary
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leading cadres," defined as "those leading cadres who fol-
low the proletarian revolutionary line represented by
Chairman Mao." The examplar of this category in the pro-
vinces was Pan Fu-sheng, the former party first secretary
in Heilungkiang province who had stepped forward to join
the "revolutionary Left" during the "cultural revolution"
and had been rewarded by a position of leadership in the
new "revolutionary committee" established there. Described
as "more mature politically...,more experienced in strug-
gle..., and having greater organizational skill" than the
"young revolutionary fighters," these revolutionary cadres
were "to act as the core of leadership" both in the "sei-
zure of power" and in the exercise of this power by the
new "revolutionary committees."
Indeed, the time had come for the young militants
of the "revolutionary Left"--the third component of the
"three-way alliance"--to take their lumps, now blamed for
the chaos of the "January Revolution" which they had been
incited to carry out. They were attacked and criticized
from all directions, not just by the relative moderates
(like Chou En-lai) but also by the zealots in the Cultural
Revolution Group and even by Mao himself. Among the crit-
icisms leveled by Mao at his "little revolutionary gen-
erals" at this time were (1) that they were being "cor-
rupted" by "money" and "cars;" (2) that they "called for
criticism after criticism and took part in too many ral-
lies;" and (3) that they had been guilty of "sectarianism"
and "splittism" and must endeavor to "achieve unity" even
with those who held "contrary opinions." Adding to this
inp$ctment, Chi Pen-yu of the Cultural Revolution Group
criticized Kuai Ta-fu and Nieh Yuan-tzu (the two most
prominent Red Guard leaders in Peking) for "hanging out
the signboard of the Peking Revolutionary Rebel Commune"
prematurely and without permission, a charge which would
serve to explain the disappearance at'this time of the
ill-fated and short-lived Shanghai Commune.
In addition to these verpal attacks, a number of
measures were instituted at this time in a concerted ef-
fort to retrench, reorganize and rectify the unruly ranks
of the "revolutionary Left."
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Next, reorganization of the Red Guard
s was
effected in Peking by merging the three former.1y independ-
ent Red Guard "headquarters" into a single "ReC Guard
Congress." Speeches at the rally proclaiming this Con-
gress, moreover, suggested an intent to establish similar
congresses in all major cities and provinces, with the
ultimate goal of forming a national organization.
Finally, it was announced that Red Guards on re-
turning to their schools would have to undergo "rectifi-
cation"--"a painful process of protracted ideological
struggle"--in order to overcome their "tendencies of
departmentalism, small group mentality, ultra-democracy,
individualism and anarchism..." And with the disclosure
that the PLA would supervise this "rectification" campaign
in China's schools and universities, it was clear that
the "revolutionary Left" was being disciplined for the
excesses it had committed during the "January Revolution."
As a result of the urgent need to restore order
and maintain production, the "seize power" movement in
China at the end of February was in a state of suspended
animation. Only Shanghai and the four provinces of Heilung-
kiang, Kweichow, Shansi and Shantung had succeeded in set-
ting up "revolutionary committees" approved by the central
leadership as fulfilling the requirements of a genuine
tripartite alliance of revolutionaries, party cadres and
the army. In a major summing up of the progress of the
"cultural revolution," a 9 March editorial in Red Flag
entitled "On the Revolutionary 3-in-1 Combination" revealed
what these requirements wore. Citing a directive by Chair-
man Mao that these "provisional organs of power" would
have to be "revolutionary and representative and have pro-
letarian authority," this editorial discussed candidly
the problems which had obstructed, and would continue to
obstruct, the effort by Mao's "proletarian revolutionaries"
to "seize power" in China.
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The dominant theme of the editorial was that all
three components of the alliance--the leaders of revolu-
tionary mass organizations, representatives of the PLA,
and revolutionary leading cadres--were essential, as
expressed in the injunction not "to overlook or under-
estimate the role of any one of them." Of particular
concern was the practice of "excluding" or "regarding
as secondary" the role of "leaders of the revolutionary
mass organizations," who, although guilty of "shortcomings
and errors," still constituted "the base of the revolu-
tionary 3-in-1 provisional organ of power." Reiterating
the policy on party cadres laid down the preceding month,
the editorial stressed the importance of the role of the
"revolutionary cadres" (that of providing "the nucleus
and backbone" of the new "revolutionary committee") while
holding forth the prospect of redemption and "proper jobs"
for the broad mass of cadres who had made "mistakes".
What was new In the discussion of cadre policy, however,
was a call for vigilance against "class enemies" who were
"distorting" the principles governing the formation of
"3-in-1" organs of power to "impose" on the masses cadres
who "persisted in their mistakes" and thus "carry out
counterrevolutionary restoration."
The editorial's discussion of the PLA revealed
that it too was experiencing difficulties in playing its
"extremely important role" in the struggle to seize power.
Admitting the existence of "dissension between the revo-
lutionary masses and the PLA," the editorial attempted
once again to blame this on the "intrigues" of class
enemies. More to the point, it revealed that the PLA was
having a hard time carrying out the ambiguous directive
by Chairman Mao "to actively support the revolutionary
Leftists," conceding that "some comrades in the local army
units may commit temporary mistakes in giving their sup-
port because of the intricate and complex conditions of
the class struggle."
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The Resurgence of the Left (Spring 1967)
"A big question now confronting the
people of the whole country is whether to
carry the great proletarian cultural revo-
lution through to the end, or to abandon
it halfway." --Red flag Editorial, "On the
Revolutionary Tnree in One Combination,"
9 March 1967.
In the same editorial's allusion to mounting op-
position lies the explanation, it is believed, for the
next phase of Mao's "cultural revolution" which would
extend through March and much of April. The principal
characteristic of the new phase would be the resurgence
of the "revolutionary Left," incited once again to
criticize and attack the opposition and thus maintain
revolutionary momentum. In Mao's view, the pendulum
had swung too far in the direction of order and stability
imposed by the PLA and party cadres from above and it
was necessary once again to stress the role of the revo-
lutionary masses.
The first target of attack by militant Red Guards
and "revolutionary rebels," unleashed again in early
March, was what was termed the "countercurrent of counter-
revolutionary restoration" in central government organs.
This referred to the practice of "false power seizure"
whereby senior party cadres or revived party committees
had exploited, so it was charged, Mao's "mild cadre policy"
to reinstate all or most of the old officials and systems
of control, at the same time ignoring and suppressing the
opinions of the "revolutionary Left." The ring-leader
of the new "counterrevolutionary current" was Vice Premier
Tan Chen-lin, charged with perpetrating sham seizures in
agricultural departments, but heavy criticism was also
leveled at three more "Vice Preiiers--Chen I, Li Fu-chun
and Li Hsien--nien, specialists in foreign affairs, econom-
ics and finance respectively. Although defending the last
three of his Vice Premiers against these charges, Chou
En-lai, in addressing a March rally of "revolutionary rebels"
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in industry and transportation, also attac!ced this "tend-
ency of rehabilitating all cadres, disregarding their
previous offenses,' characterizing it as an "extremely
grave" mistake and as the "main danger" at that time.
Chou also revealed in this speech that this phenomenon
of "false power seizures" had appeared not only in "cen-
tral offices" but in "the p ovinces" as well.
The fact that these "false power seizures" had
been widespread, occurring in the great majority of China's
provinces, constituted a serious indictment of the Army's
performance since ordered to intervene in late January
to "support the Left" in the "cultural revolution "`
What had happened
was that the "revolutionary Left," instead of forming a
"great alliance," had split into two "factions." When
the first of these had "seized power" and been recognized
and supported by the local military command, the other
faction had then attempted a "counter-seizure," attacking
not only the newly-established "revolutionary" regime but
the People's Liberation Army as well. Reacting to this
attack, the local military commander had opened fire in
self-defense and suppressed the attacking faction as a
"counter-revolutionary organization."
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At the same time that its power was being sharply
curtailed, the PLA was ordered to establish military con-
trol committees and thereby assume responsibility for
exercising "the provincial leadership power" until such
time as new Revolutionary Committees approved by the Cen-
ter (i.e. genuine "power seizures") could be created.
Regional and provincial military commands were also
directed at this time to "rectify immediately" all of
their previous errors in dealing with the "Left," releas-
ing all those previously arrested, rehabilitating all
those previously labeled "counter-revolutionary" and, in
general, seeking the forgiveness of the "revolutionary
masses" for their wrong conduct. The net effect of this
series of decisions in late March and early April was to
place an almost intolerable burden on the PLA, subjecting
it to severe pressure and strain at the very moment it
was being ordered to take over the responsibility for
governing the country and administering the economy.
A key ingredient in this new revolutionary upsurge,
as in earlier ones was to escalate the attack against
Liu Shao-chi, to launch (according to an important 8 April
People's Daily ed'torial) "a powerful general offensive
against the number one party person in authority taking
the capitalist road." New features of this intensified
campaign in early April were (1) public humiliation at
a struggle rally where, nevertheless, Liu continued to
deny his guilt as a criminal or counter-revolutionary;
(2) wall-poster demands (allegedly citing Kang Sheng and
Chi Pen-yu) that Liu be put to death for his "betrayal
and collusion with a foreign power;" and (3) a barrage
of criticism of Liu's leading theoretical work "How To
Be a Good Communist," condemned by Mao, Lin Piao, Chou
En-lai and other top leaders at this time as "anti-
Marxist."
The basic purpose of this "general offensive"
against Liu Shao-chi was an attempt once again to form
a "great alliance" of the "revolutionary Left" (which
had split into rival factions in the disorderly struggle
to "seize power" in January) and, following this, an
attempt once again to form genuine "three-way alliances"
(which had been dominated by the Army and old-line cadres
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at the expense of the "revolutionary Left" in February
and March). The first objective of "great unity" was
to be achieved by inciting the revoluticnary masses to
undertake "great criticism and great struggle" not only
against Liu but also against the "handful" of Mao's
enemies in "each area, department and unit" throughout
the country, depicted as the supporters of Liu who had
to be overthrown in order to bring him down. The second
objective was to be achieved by leashing the Army and
exerting new pressure on party cadres to step forward in
support of the revolution, both by offering a way out for
repentant cadres (by joining in the attack against Liu
Shao-chi and his alleged supporters) and by threatening
dire consequences should they refuse. Political and
ideological struggle against a common target would serve,
it was thought, to unify and strengthen the ranks of Mao's
"proletarian revolutionaries."
Instead, the result of leashing the PLA while un-
leashing the "revolutionary Left" was renewed violence
and disorder. Serious, large-scale clashes were soon
reported not only in the provinces but in Peking as well.
Developments in Peking provide a good case study of the
chaos and disruption attending the new violent phase of
Mao's "cultural revolution" in April and May.
In brief, what happened was that the Red Guards
and "revolutionary rebels" utilized their new freedom of
action to attack one another and, for good measure, the
PLA as 'ell. According to wall-poster reports, a large
force of Red Guards invaded Peking University to demon-
strate against Nieh Yuan-tzu, chairman of the recently
tnified Peking Congress of Red Guards, charging her with
incompetence and a selfish desire "to gain high office."
When an "armed clash" developed and Peking garrison troops
were sent to restore order, the Red Guards then directed
their attack at the Peking garrison deputy commander.
Instances of worker "revolutionary rebels" defying and
even seizing PLA representatives were also reported in
Peking at this time. As a result, leaders of the Cultural
Revolution Group headed by Madame Mao convened a series
of meetings in mid-April between feuding Red Guard and
"revolutionary rebel" groups to chastize them for attack-
ing the PLA and for engaging in "unprincipled civil wars."
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The fact that these "unprincipled civil wars" broke
out on the eve of the establishment of the Peking Municipal
Revolutionary Committee goes far to explain the nat"ire of
this new type of warfare in China. As opposed to -st1e
"principled" variety fought largely on ideological and
political grounds, these wars are fought to determine who
gets what share of the spoils in the new revolutionary
order. It was ironic that the formal proclamation on 20
April of the new Peking Revolutionary Committee--in theory
representing the achievement of a genuine and harmonious
"three-way alliance"--should have been the occasion for
intensified conflict within and among the components of
this alliance.
Calls for Order Again (May-June 1967)
"Recently our great leader Chairman
Mao instructed us that we should trust in
and rely on the masses, trust in and rely
on the People's Liberation Army, and trust
in and rely on the majority of the cadres.
Chairman Mao also called on us to support
the army and cherish the people." --People's
Daily Editorial, "Further Strengthen the
Unity Between the Army and the People,"
12 May 1967
The disclosure in a 12 May People's Daily editorial
that the People's Liberation Army was 'resolutely carry-
ing out the five tasks of supporting the Left, support-
ing industry, supporting agriculture, exercising military
control, and helping in military and political training"
merely confirmed what had already become abundantly
clear--that the Army was now governing most of China in
? place of the discredited, largely defunct party and
government apparatus. In its party role, military con-
trol committees at all levels (provincial, county, muni-
cipal and even down to the level of individual enterprises
and communes) were charged with leading the "cultural
revolution," held responsible for the creation of "true
proletarian revolutionary great alliances" and of revolu-
tionary "three-way alliances." This was a delicate
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political task for which, lacking guidance from Peking,
it was singularly ill-prepared. In its government role,
the Army was responsible for administering the economy
and for maintaining order, the latter task rendered ally impossible by
prohibiting the use of force.
the Army
in dealing with the revolutionary masses was "to learn
to do mass work, trust the masses, rely on them and con-
sult with them on important matters...to skillfully adopt
means of persuasion and education instead of adopting
simple and crude means of issuing orders." For their
part, the "proletarian revolutionaries" were also enjoined
not to use force against the Army (e.g. the demand in the
8 May Red Flag editorial that "On no occasion and under
no circumstances should the spear head of struggle be
directed against the People's Liberation Army.")
Instead of mutual trust and cooperation, however,
the principal characteristic of the "cultural revolution"
in the months which followed was increased antagonism
and hostility between the Army and the "revolutionary
Left." In fact, neither performed according to Mao's
high expectations. Instead of increased strength through
greater unity, there was a further splitting of the revo-
lutionary ranks, a split brought on (according to Hsieh
Fu-chih in a 7 May speech) by those demanding "a great
shakeup, great differentiation and great reorganization
inside the Left wing." Instead of supporting Army com-
manders, "revolutionary mass organizations" in the pro-
vinces and major cities launched bitter attacks against
local military control committees, both for having sup-
pressed them in the past and for failure to support them.
in the present. For their part, local military district
commands continued to experience great difficulty, as
Lih Piao had admitted earlier in a 30 March speech, in
"finding out the difference between Lett and Right" in
their dealings with mass organizations.
Mao's solution to this problem, the single most
important cause of tension between the military and the
"revolutionary Left," was typical. On 7 May, the dhairman
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directed Lin Piao to carry out an intensive two week "recti-
fication" campaign in the Army, a summin up (according a 15 June Liberation Army Daily editorial) of itsex-
perience in the struggle to "support the Left" during the
previous stage "in order to develop new merit, correct
mistakes, and carry on the battle." Central to this
campaign was the demand that local military commanders
atone for their past errors by engaging publicly in "self-
criticism," thereby securing the forgiveness and winning
the trust of those "proletarian revolutionaries" whom they
had previously wronged. Responding to this demand, the
Shantung Provincial Military District Party Committee is-
sued a public "self-criticism" on 31 May, a document which
Mao enthusiastically endorsed as a model for general emula-
tion. Of particular interest was the admission in this
document that the decision to issue the "self-criticism"
had sparked a "heated argument," with some arguing that
such an action "would dampen the morale of the armed forces...
might upset the armed forces...[and]...that the masses
might use it against us."
An a guide for the prevention of new "mistakes"
by the Army, the Tsinghai military district commander Liu
Hsien-chuan published a lengthy article in People's Daily
in early June summarizing his successful experience in
identifying and supporting the "Left" in Tsinghai Province.
Although admitting that there had been "complicated strug-
gle" and "all sorts of factions," Liu asserted that there
were basically only "two kinds of factions" which could
be clearly differentiated--a "Leftist" faction which "wants
to revolt" and a "conservative" faction which "wants to
conserve." Having conducted "investigation and study among
the masses," he had been able to identify as genuinely
"Leftist" those organizations which had first rebelled
against, criticized and attacked "the handful of persons
in the provincial party committee who were in authority
and taking the capitalist road." The "conservative" or-
ganizations, on the other hand, had been "controlled by"
and had sought -to protect this "handful' of Mao's oppon-
ents within the Party.
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Liu's account of developments in Tsinghai had om-
mitted one important fact--that his predecessor in command
of the Tsinghai Provincial Military District had arrived
at exactly the opposite conclusion in his investigation
work and had been singled out for attack in the 6 April
Military Affairs Committee directive as a "counter-revolu-
tionary" who had "carried out savage, armed repression
of revolutionary mass organizations." That it was danger-
ous for a provincial military commander to decide on his
own which mass organizations were "Leftist" was the most
important lesson of the Tsinghai experience
the disclosure in early May
that fighting between rival mass organizations had entered
a new stage of "armed struggle." The extent of the new
disorder in Peking was revealed by Hsieh Fu-chih, in a
speech on 14 May. As reported in a wall poster, Hsieh
disclosed that production had declined seven precept in
April, a decline due chiefly to "armed struggles" but also
to worker protest strikes. In the first ten days of May,
according to Hsieh, there had been 133 armed struggles
and bloody incidents involving more than 63,000 people
of which a "two-figure" number were killed. In addition,
cases of beating, destroying, looting, searching houses
and illegal arrest had been common and were increasing.
Not long before, on 5 May, Hsieh Fu-chih had revealed
in a speech to students at Peking University that "armed
struggles at factories, schools and various organs" were
taking place not only in Peking but in many provinces as
well. Despite the fact that "conservative factions" (the
opposition) had not yet been defeated in various provinces,
the "Leftists" there (as in Peking) had begun to "break
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up" by fighting among themaelvea
timetable for "seizure of power"
ginally scheduled to be realized
had to be extended. Hsieh concl
of the status of the "seize powe
the admission that the timetable
poned for some tine."
Hsieh's pessimistic view
vinces was confirmed by wall pos
clashes and serious disorder in
out May, even to the point of di
major rail lines. So serious wa
was necessary for the Central Co
Military Affairs Committee and C
to issue a joint circular on 6 J
gle, assaults, destruction, pill
authorized arrests and calling o
ganizations" to comply. Althoug
sibility to the PLA for implemen
did not authorize the use of for
ing "revolutionary organizations
of authority, the Army remained
and in fact disorder continued t
out much of China.
The contradictory element
sued by Mao at this time for dea
of spreading violence and disord
trast. On the one hand, he warn
discipline and trends toward ana
places must be overcome with out
"crucial problem bearing on the
proletarian cultural revolution"
petty bourgeois thought in our r
of proletarian revolution,' In a
nouncement, the principal manife
--"conducting struggle by force,
ing, robbery, search and arrest"
in June and July. On the other
capable of restoring order, the
to use force, reminded once agai
tion Army Daily editorial) that
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. An a result, the original
in the provinces--"ori-
between February and May"--
uded his gloomy assessment
r" movement in China with
would have "to be post-
of conditions in the pro-
ters reporting violent
many parts of China through-
srupting service on several
this disorder that it
a
mmittee, State Council,
ultural Revolution Group
une forbidding armed strug-
age, houseraids and un-
n all "revolutionary or-
h assigning general respon-
ting this circular, it
ce against these contend-
." Lacking this grant
powerless to restore order
o spread unchecked through-
a in the prescription is-
ling with this situation
er stood out in sharp con-
ed that "disregard of
rchism existent in many
fail," and cited as a
victory of the great
the need "to guide the
ank and file to the orbit
ccordance with this pro-
station of "anarchism"
such as assault, wreck-
--was condemned repeatedly
hand, the one instrument
PLA, was still forbidden
n (in a 27 June Libera-
the only proper response
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to criticism and attack by the masses was "to do poli-
tical and ideological work patiently among them."
As viewed from Peking, the status of the "great
proletarian cultural revolution" in mid-1967 was far from
encouraging. Since February, only one new area, Peking,
had been "liberated" by Mao's revolutionaries. The new
revolutionary upsurge initiated in April had come to naught,
the "seize power" movement had bogged down, and, even
more alarming, the forces of the "revolutionary Left" had,
as admitted by Hsieh Fu-chih in a 12 June speech to Red
Guards, grown weaker rather than stronger in many places,
even in those provinces (such as Heilungkiang) where new
"revolutionary" organs of power had already been estab-
lished. Since Maors directives governing the development
of the "cultural revolution" were by definition correct,
the failure of the revolution to proceed according to
plan could only result from faulty execution of these
directives. Given the premise of Mao's infallibility,
the principal issue over which differences of opinion
would arise within the central leadership at this time,
then, was whether to assign primary responsibility for this
adverse development to the People's Liberation Army (its
failure to identify and provide adequate support to the
"Leftists") or to the "revolutionary Left" (its refusal
to unite and observe revolutionary discipline as manifested
in continuing "factionalism" and "anarchism.")
The disclosure that differences of opinion had
arisen within the central leadership was made by Hsieh
Fu-chih in the 12 June speech noted above, when he referred
to "heated discussions within the Central Committee in-
ner circle occurring every day." Although Hsieh did not
reveal the substance of these discussions nor identify
the participants, it is a fair inference (based both on
the previous record of the "cultural revolution" and on
subsequent developments) that these differences concerned
the conflicting claims of restoring order and and main-
taining revolutionary momentum, with one group (i.e. Chou
En-lai representing the government and presumably spokes-
men for the military) arguing the need to restore order
and another group (i.e. such leading members of the Cul-
tural Revolution Group as Madame Mao, Chen Po-ta, and
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Kang Sheng) advocating a more militant policy in support
of the "revolutionary Left."
One outcome of this debate was the decision to send
a number of high-level government and military delegations
to investigate and provide guidance on the conduct of the
"cultural revolution" in the provinces. A major objective
of the delegations sent out at this time was to put an
and to the armed struggle which had broken out between
contending factions and between these factions and local
military commands. The means for achieving this objective
was a six-point formula advanced by the Central Committee
under which representatives of both factions agreed (1) to
stop breaking into military organs, assaulting Army of-
ficials, stealing weapons, and attacking each other; and
(2) by means of "rectification" and "self-criticism," to
form "great revolutionary alliances." When agreements
to this effect were negotiated in Yunnan and Anhwei in
late June and early July, it appeared that Mao's "cultural
revolution" had once again entered a more moderate phase,
marked by a concerted effort to damp down violent struggle
and reduce the antagonism which had arisen between Army
commanders in the provinces and the "revolutionary Left."
The Wuhan Incident (July-August 1967)
"At present a large-scale movement for
criticizing and repudiating the handful of
top party and military persons in authority
taking the capitalist road is sweeping over
the whole country. This is the general
orientation of the struggle." --Red Flag
Editorial, "The Proletariat Must firmly Grasp
the Barrel of the Gun," 31 July 1967
The significa::ce of what has come to be known as
the "Wuhan Incident" is that it sharply reversed this trend
toward moderation, precipitating a short-lived "ultra-
Leftist" phase of the "cultural revolution" extending
from late July through most of August. The Wuhan Incident
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afforded extremist elements in the central leadership an
opportunity, which they were quick to exploit, to focus
once again on the "mistakes" of the People's Liberation
Army as the primary cause of failures and setbacks in
Mau's "cultural revolution." it was seized upon as a
pretext for launching another great revolutionary upsurge
from below, for exhorting the Red Guards and "revolution-
ary rebels" to rise up against their oppressors wherever
encountered, whether in the military, the new "revoluion-
ary committees," or in the central government. The end
result of this ill-advised venture was near anarchy and
a further discrediting and weakening of the forces of the
revolutionary Left.
In bare outline, the story of the Wuhan Incident
which unfolded during a seven day period in mid-July
concerns the failure of a high-level mission, headed by
Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li, to persuade the two factions
in this large central China city to stop fighting and ac-
cept the six-point formula for achieving unity recently
issued by the Central Committee. As applied in Wuhan,
however, this formula called for the preferment of one
faction (designated an authentic "revolutionary rebel"
organization) over the other (labeled a "conservative"
organization) and, in so doing, reversed an earlier deci-
sion made by the local military. What is more, the lead-
ers of the Wuhan Military Region Command were then ordered
to make a public confession of error and conduct "self-
criticism" before the revolutionary masses.
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As noted above, extremist elements in the Cultural
Revolution Group of the Central Committee appeared deter-
mined to exploit this incident to further their own goals.
Addressing representatives of contending factions from
Honan in Peking on 21 July, Kang Sheng attacked the Wuhan
Military Region for having committed a "mutinous act" and
warned of the possibility of "another Wuhan" occurring
in Honan Province in the near future. In an even more
inflammatory speech on the same occasion, Madame Mao
exhorted her audience of "young revolutionary fighters"
not "to be naive", as their comrades in Wuhan had been,
but rather "to take up arms to defend yourselves" when
attacked by the "handful" using "pistols, rifles, spears
or swords." On 25 July, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li re-
ceived a frenzied heroes' welcome at a million-strong
mass rally in Peking, and throughout the following week
Mao's propagandists mounted a series of editorial attacks
on "capitalist roaders" in the People's Liberation Army,
culminating in the shrill call in the 31 July Red Flag
editorial to "bring down" and "sweep the handfUrof party
and military persons in authority taking the capitalist
road completely and totally into the junkyard."
Reflecting this tough line toward dissident or
potentially dissident military commanders in the provinces,
Lin Piao delivered a major policy speech on 9 August to
a gathering of top political and military leaders (both
central and regional) in Peking. As he had on earlier
occasions, Lin defended chaos or "upheaval" as essential
to achieve the objectives of the "cultural revolution"
(to "expose" reactionary things and reactionary persons)
and counseled those present, even when unjustly attacked,
"to stand up to it and restrain
your anger." Lin's speech
was directed primarily, however, at those "comrades" who,
through lack of understanding of the "cultural revolution,"
had made "mistakes" in various military regions, reacting
to attacks on their "Military District Commands" by "sup-
pressing the masses." The remedy, as Lin reiterated for
emphasis, was for these local military leaders to quickly
admit their "mistakes" by carryi:g out public "self-
criticism" (as the Wuhan Military Region Commander Chen
Tsai-tao had refused to do), "so that the revolutionary
rebels may be their teachers and their own mistakes their
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own teaching materials." If not, the fate of these mili-
tary leaders would be the same as that of Chen Tsai-tao
--"to have their pigtails grabbed."
Additional evidence of what might be called the
over-reaction of the central leadership to the Wuhan
Incident was the decision in early August to arm selected
Red Guard and "revolutionary rebel" units, both in Peking
and the provinces, to assist in safeguarding property,
maintaini!.ng order and "assuring the smooth development
of the cultural revolution." Authorization for this
potentially explosive move was attributed to Mao Tse-tung
himself, quoted in a wall poster at this time to the
effect that "everyone should be prepared to take up
bayonets." When combined with Madame Mao's earlier call
of 22 July to Red Guards "to take up arms" under the
slogan "attack by reason, defend by force," the stage
was set for a new form of "revolutionary rebellion" direct-
ed toward a second "seizure of power," this time from
the military commanders and newly established "revolution-
ary committees" in several provinces. Mao's "cultural
revolution" was about to enter an "ultra-Leftist" phase,
as it would be called when the violence and anarchy it
unleashed would necessitate a hasty retreat.
The rationale for this attempt to seize military
power was, given the premises of the "cultural revolu-
tion," quite logical. As revealed in Red Guard publica-
tions of the time, the reason why "revolutionary rebels"
had been "suppressed" in various areas was that "mili-
tary power" in these areas had been "usurped" by "persons
of the Liu Shao-chi-Teng Hsiao-ping headquarters." In
terms of the dialectics of the "cultural revolution,"
the "main contradiction" was no longer one with "the
handful in the Party" (who had been "dragged out" in the
preceding year) but with "the handful in the Army."
Aided by Red Guards sent out from Peking, local "revolu-
tionary rebels" were, according to one plan, "to unite
with the broad masses of People's Liberation Army cadres
and fighters, drag out these executioners and reca ture
the military power usurped by them."
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Paralleling this drive in the provinces, "revolu-
tionary rebels" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were
also incited by extremist members of the Cultural Revolu-
tion Group to seize a greater share of power over the
conduct of China's foreign relations. In part a function
of the continuing attack against Foreign Minister Chen
I, this struggle within the Foreign Ministry also reflected
pressures exerted by militants to inject a new "revolu-
tionary" content into China's diplomatic relations, to
convert foreign ministry and foreign service officials
into "red diplomatic fighters." Exemplifying this new
type of revolutionary diplomat was Yao Teng-shan who
had returned in glory after being expelled from Djakarta
it April and who, it was subsequently charged, headed the
drive to "seize power" in the Foreign Ministry in August.
The results of this sharp turn to the left were
nearly catastrophic. In foreign policy, a reign of ter-
ror directed at foreign diplomats was instituted in Pek-
ing, culminating in the ransacking and burning of the
British Chancery and the manhandling of the British Charge
on 22 August. In domestic policy, although no single
incident served to dramatize the damaging effects of the
new militance of the "revolutionary Left," the consequ-
ences were more serious, threatening the unity and
stability of Mao's "proletarian headquarters," of the
newly established "revolutionary committees" in the
provinces, and also of the People's Liberation Army it-
self. The discovery that, at a time of mounting violence
and economic disorder, "factionalism" had spread from the
Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" into the Army was
most alarming of all. There was no choice in late August
but to apply the brakes, pull back, assess the damage,
and initiate a trend toward moderation in the "cultural
revolution" which would last throughout the remainder of
1967.
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Moderation Again (September-December 1967)
"This nation-wide disturbance is the
last of its kind. The Army is also dis-
turbed this time. After this disturbance,
the whole country will be in peace and be-
come the regime of the revolutionary rebels.
It is the Party Central Committee that allows
this nation-wide disturbance." --Mao Tse-tung,
Quoted in Canton Hung Wei-ping (Red Guards),
23 October 1967
The unfolding of Mao's "cultural revolution" had
brought China by the end of August to the brink of anarchy,
featuring pitched battles by heavily armed factions in
nearly all of China's provinces. Recognizing the gravity
of the situation, Mao's new leadership team in Peking
would seek to achieve two separate but related objectives
in the remaining months of 1967: (1) to carry out a
series of measures designed to restore minimum levels
of public order and production; and (2) to dissociate
Mao and his "cultural revolution" from responsibility
for the violence and lawlessness endemic in China by
finding new scapegoats. The gravity of the crisis was
such that for the first time it was necessary to sacrifice
a number of prominent members of the Cultural Revolution
Group, holding them, rather than the policies they were
administering, responsible for the "nation-wide disturb-
ance" in China.
The vehicle for announcing the sharp reversal in
policy was a 5 September speech by Madame Mao in Peking
which was subsequently disseminated for "study" to all
"revolutionary committees, military control committees,
and revolutionary mass organizations" throughout the coun-
try. As a confirmed extremist and a confidante of Mao,
Chiang Ching was no doubt selected as a spokesman whose
pronouncements would be accepted as authoritative by the
"revolutionary Left," the more so since most of the policies
she now criticized in this speech were ones with which
she was formerly associated. The central theme of her
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speech was a vigorous defense of the central leadership,
the newly formed provincial "revolutionary committees,"
and the People's Liberation Army against the recent at-
tack ("a gust of foul wind") launched by "wicked people...
appearing either as 'ultra-Leftist' or Rightist"' who
were attempting to undermine the "cultural revolution."
Exemplifying this new threat by "ultra-Leftists" was the
"May 16 Corps", a "counter-revolutionary organization"
which sought "to undermine the Party Central Committee
headed by Chairman Mao" by "centering its opposition on
Premier Chou En-lai." Another objective of these "bad
people" was "to dissolve all the revolutionary committees"
which hid been set up in the provinces "with the approval
of the Central Committee," thus depriving the revolution
of its vital "leadership organs."
The bulk of Madame Mao's speech, however, was de-
voted to repudiating the "armed struggle" by Red Guards
and "revolutionary rebels" ?ncited by the slogans "seize
a small handful in the Army" (which had appeared in the
31 July Red Fla editorial) and "attack by words, defend
by force~w is she herself had advanced in a speech of
22 July.) The wide-ranging assault of the PLA which had
taken place in response to these exhortations was revealed
in her statement: "Everywhere we seized their guns, beat
them up and scolded them. But they did not strike back
or argue." Although praising the forebearance of the
military under this attack, Madame Mao made clear that
there were limits to this forebearance, warning repeat-
edly of the d
"
anger of
creating chaos" in "our field
armies." And to ensure that these attacks would cease,
she stressed that it was no longer permitted for Red
Guards to travel about the country "kindling the fire
of revolution and exchanging revolutionary experience"
as they had done a year earlier.
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Other measures indicating a firm resolve td put
an end to "armed struggle" appeared in a 1 September reso-
lution passed by the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Com-
mittee. The first of these forbade payment of wages to
workers who had left their production posts to engage in
"armed struggle." The resolution also demanded that
Red Guards who had gone out to the provinces to take part
in these struggles "must return to their original units
immediately and unconditionally." As stressed in a Libera-
tion Army Daily editorial of 7 September, these steps
were necessary in order to carry out "Chairman Mao's great
strategic plan."
This plan was expounded in a series of "supreme
instructions" issued by Mao Tse-tung during the course
of an extended tour in September through north. central-
south and east China, the tour itself an indication of
the gravity with which Peking viewed this crisis in the
"cultural revolution." Although somewhat vague and
oracular in tone, these instructions showed that Mao not
only approved the series of measures under way to restore
order but viewed them as necessary to make further progress
toward the goals of his "cultural revolution."
Most of the principles outlined in these instruc-
tions were not new, having been enunciated in earlier
stages of the revolution. What had produced the recent
"nationwide disturbance" was not the principles them-
selves, but rather, as Mao took great pains to demonstrate,
that these principles had been misunderstood and mistak?
enly applied. In fact, the principal lesson which Mao
appeared to derive from his September review of develop-
ments in the "cultural revolution" was that all three
components of the new revolutionary organs of power--the
PLA, the revolutionary cadres, and the "revolutionary
rebels"--had made "mistakes" and would therefore (as
pointed out by Lin Piao in a 1 October National Day
speech) once again have to undergo "rectification" and
"ideological education."
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The most pressing problem was "educating" the Red
Guards and "revolutionary rebels" in order to prevent,
as Mao put it, their "turning to the extreme Left." This,
of course, had already occurred, creating; what Mao refer-
red to elsewhere as "the chief danger at the moment"--" that
some people want to beat down the PLA," to "incite the
soldiers to oppose their officers" and t+' create "chaos
in the Army." Another manifestation of this phenomenon
of "ultra-Leftism" was "factionalism," a problem which
had bedeviled the "cultural revolution" from the outset
and to which Mao now turned his attention.
First were the Olympian pronouncements, widely pub-
licized, to the effect that "there is no reason whatso-
ever for the working class to split into two great ir-
reconcilable organizations" and "there is no conflict
of fundamental interests in the ranks of the Red Guards
and revolutionaries." Next was the admission, made more
explicit in speeches by other top leaders at this time,
that radical Red Guard organizations in Peking had been
responsible for spreading "factionalism" into the ranks
of the workers in July and August. As stated by Kang
Sheng on 20 September, the "two great factions struggling
in factories have been influenced by the two factions
struggling in colleges and universities."
The solution to this problem appeared in another
"instruction" by Chairman Mao given wide publicity in mid-
October--"to build revolutionary great alliances on the
basis of trade, profession, department or class in school."
It was necessary to break up the mass "proletarian revolu-
tionary organizations" (consisting of students, workers,
peasants and cadres) which had become unmanageable, dis-
solving these organizations into their separate components
which then would become easier to control. A prime ob-
jective of this reorganization was to get student Red
Guards, carriers of the virus of "factionalism," out of
the factories and the countryside and return them to the
class room where they would once again (as had happened
in February and March) undergo "rectification," a course
of "military-political training" conducted by the PLA.
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How to promote "great unity" and establish "great
revolutionary alliances" between formerly feuding "factions"
was the theme dominating discussion of the "cultural revo-
lution" in September and October. As explained by Chair-
man Mao, there were "two prerequisites for a great alli-
ance," prerequisites embodied in his call addressed to
the "revolutionary Left" at this time "to combat selfish-
ness and criticize and repudiate revisionism." Exemplify-
ing the first, three prominent leaders of contending Red
Guard organizations in Peking engaged in "self-criticism"
at a 20 September meeting of the Peking Red Guard Congress
of Colleges and Universities and pledged to form a "great
alliance" in advance of National Day.
The second prerequisite referred to the launching
of still another "campaign of mass criticism and repudia-
tion directed at China's Khrushchev," redirecting "the
spearhead of struggle" away from internecine strife toward
"the handful of top party persons in authority following
the capitalist road." As spelled out in a 17 September
Liberation Army Daily editorial, the intent was to "guide
the revolutionary masses to look forward instead of back-
ward," to dissuade them from demanding a settling of "old
accounts." As this editorial also made clear, the PLA
was assigned the main responsibility for promoting "revo-
lutionary great alliances" in both schools and factories.
Although assigned the responsibility for restor-
ing order in the ranks of the "revolutionary Left," the
PLA was still denied the authority necessary to carry out
this assignment. In addition to the general prohibition
against use of force in dealing with the "revolutionary
masses," the PLA received specific instructions at this
time not to suppress "revolutionary mass organizations."
Limited to the instrumentality of ideological and poli-
tical training, the PLA's authority was further restricted
by the requirements that only "a handful of bad persons"
in these organizations were to be held responsible for
"factionalism", and that it was necessary (as pointed out
by Chou En-lai in a 9 October speech) "to rely on the
revolutionary masses in these organizations to expose
and deal with them." Compounding the difficulty was the
admission (in an article discussing the problem of the
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"ultra-Left" in Hunan at this time) that "the broad revo-
lutionary masses...find it more difficult to distinguish
clearly the class enemy coming from the Left." Forbidden
to use force and unable to secure voluntary compliance,
the PLA was powerless to carry out its assigned mission.
After a temporary lull in September and October, the
problem of "factionalism" would once more become acute,
threatening by the end of the year to engulf China once
again in anarchy.
Further complicating their task, PLA cadres were
informed at this time that they too would have to under-
go "training and education" to atone for and prevent the
repetition of "mistakes" they had committed in "support-
ing the Left" in the previous stage of the "cultural
revolution 25X1
Mao during his September tour of the pro-
vinces, he Chairman was very concerned over this ques-
tion and repeatedly asked the comrades of various units
how and why they made mistakes." The most important
reason, according to Mao, was that "Army cadres have not
been educated over a long time and have no experience in
this connection." To help correct this deficiency, "train-
ing classes" for senior military cadres from the provinces
were held in Peking beginning in September and extending
through the remainder of the year.
A quicker, more effective remedy for these "mis-
takes" committed by the PLA in "supporting the Left" (i.e.,
supporting "conservative" rather than "revolutionary"
mass organizations) was to order the Army to disengage
from factional struggles altogether. This order appeared
in a 17 September Liberation Army Dail editorial in the
injunction to Army troops "not to involve themselves in
struggles among groups" and, more succinctly, in the slogan
enunciated in speeches the same day by Chou En-lai and
Madame Mao: "support the Left and not just factions."
An important ancillary purpose of this directive, of
course, was to prevent the virus of "factionalism" from
spreading further into the Army.
Civilian party and government cadres--tike third
component of the "three-way alliance"--were to be given
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still another chance "to correct their mistakes" by taking
part in this "training" program in the fall of 1967. As
suggested by another Maoist instruction ("it is necessary
to expand the area of education and diminish the area
under attack"), however, the principal concern of the
"training" program this time was to protect these cadres
from the punitive, wholesale attacks to which they had
been subjected by "revolutionary rebels." The time had
come to reassert Mao's "mild cadre policy," as exemplified
in his admonition that "it is not good to beat the cadres,
punish them by making them kneel on the ground, hang
sign boards on their necks and put dunce caps on them."
As discussed in an authoritative People's Daily
editorial of 21 October, this new policy was asea on the
recognition that "correct treatment of cadres" was "the
key to realizing the revolutionary three-way alliance,
consolidating the revolutionary great alliance and making
a success of the struggle-criticism-trans'formation move-
ment in each unit." There was an urgent need to recruit
"revolutionary cadres" who, because of their "richer
experience...better organizing and working ability and
higher understanding of policy," would "serve as the core
and backbone in the revolutionary provisional organs of
power"--the "revolutionary committees." And since, the
editorial asserted, "the ranks of our cadres have become
purer, stronger and more vigorous," it would be possible
"to let large groups of revolutionary cadres ...join the
provisional power organs for a three-way alliance on all
levels."
The final and perhaps most important "instruction"
conveyed by Chairman Mao during his September tour was
that the process of setting up a new governmental structure
(the "revolutionary committees") in all the 29 provinces
ani major cities of Chin; be speeded up and completed by
the end of January 1968. Whereas only seven of these had
been formed in the first nine months of 1967, it was now
intended to create 22 in the ensuing four-month period
in order (in Mao." s words) that "problems of the whole
country could be solved basically and the whole situation
put into the normal track before the Spring Festival."
To meet this deadline, it was no longer possible to rely
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on the long, drawn-out, cumbrous and generally unsuccess-
ful method of "seizure of power" from below. Instead,
it was necessary to impose solutions from above, hammer-
ing out agreements in Peking on the basis of Mao's direc-
tive "to solve the problems of various provinces one by
one." As reported by Chou En-lai on 26 September, dele-
gations from 12 provinces had come to Peking for just
this purpose, a development which Chairman Mao had hailed
as "good", because ''they have all come to look to the
Central Committee to solve their problems."
Chou's prediction in this speech that "it is not
possible to solve very quickly the problems of the 12
provinces" was an accurate one. Emphasizing that "we
must seriously discuss these problems in a responsible
manner" with the representatives of the army, revolution-
ary leading cadres and representatives of revolutionary
mass organizations assembled in Peking, the Premier in-
dicated a major stumbling block which would prevent rapid
establishment of these "revolutionary committees"--that
the composition and membership of these committees could
not be arbitrarily decreed from above but would have to
be approved by all three groups comprising these revolu-
tionary organs of power. This meant that top leaders of
the Party Center (notably Chou himself) would be forced
to spend night after night in protracted and exhausting
negotiating sessions lasting a month or more, during
which the two "factions" from the province concerned
wrangled over the degree of representation and share of
power to be allotted each. As a result of the delay
imposed by this time-consuming and laborious process,
only seven additional provinces and major cities had suc-
ceeded in proclaiming "revolutionary committees" by or
near the time of the Spring Festival.
Although the trend toward moderation initiated in
late August continued, two major components of the effort
to restore order had run into difficulty by the end of
the year. First, the attempt to restore order from below
by "establishing revolutionary great alliances on the
basis of trade, profession, department or class in school"
was foundering because of the refusal of "revolutionary
mass organizations" in many areas to comply voluntarily
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with this irective. Forbidden by Mao to use force and
"to suppress revolutionary mass organizations," the PLA
was powerless to cope with the fresh outbreak of "faction-
alism" in November and December which threatened once
again to plunge large areas of China into "armed strug-
gle" and anarchy.
The undertaking to restore order from above by
speeding up establishment of a new government structure
had also fallen far short of the original goal. Here
again the principal reason this program had not progressed
faster was Mao's insistence that the representatives of
"revolutionary mass organizations" be heard in the
negotiating process and receive genuine representation
in the new organs of revolutionary power. Despite the
reverses encountered in 1967, Mao Tse-tung appeared
determined at the close of the year on carrying his
"cultural revolution" through to the end.
Prospects
"The Chairman has called for setting
people in motion the first year, winning vic-
tory in the second year and finishing the
work in the third year." --Hsieh Fu-chih,
Speech on "Fight Self, Repudiate Revisionism,"
5 October 1967
The announcement in the fall of 1967 that the time-
table for completing the "cultural revolution" had been
extended to mid-1969 reflected a new appreciation of the
difficulties involved in carrying the revolution through
to the end. Central to this new appreciation was the
realization that the struggle to "seize power" in 1967,
which had started so exuberantly in the "January Revolu-
tion," had been a failure.
The admission of failure in the "seize power" move-
sent appeared in a remarkably candid speech by Chou En-
lai delivered in Peking on 8 November to representatives
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of rival worker and Red Guard groups from Canton. With
the exception of Shanghai, Chou explained, the "rebels"
had not been able "to seize power in a proper way" be-
cause of their inability to form "great alliances," a
result in turn of their inability to understand and act
upon "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line." What had hap-
pened in most cases was that "power was seized by only
one faction," which'invited counter-seizure by another
facti',,.., so that "seizure of power became surrender of
power and power could not be retained."
After the Army had been called in to exercise
this power temporarily, a second attempt (beginning in
April) had been made to unite the revolutionary masses
into "great alliances" under the slogan "take the Left as
the core." But this attempt also had failed--"no matter
which group you took as the core, things did not work
out"--because it too had promoted "factionalism," leading
to the indiscriminate labeling of "mass organizations"
as "Rightist," "conservative" or "royalists with guns."
The way to overcome this "factionalism" in the new stage
of the revolution, Chou emphasized, was to recognize that
all "mass organizations" were "revolutionary," that "all
the masses are determined to make revolution." As was
to be expected, the Premier spent little time explaining
why the "seize power" movement had failed, merely point-
ing out that the "question of power seizure" was a new
one (Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin had never discussed
it) which "Chairman Mao" had brought up and therefore
required "study in the course of practice."
The failure of Mao's grand design to mobilize the
forces of the "revolutionary Left" to "seize power" from
below necessitated a fundamental change in strategy in
the fall of 1967 to one emphasizing control from above.
An important part of this effort to re-establish centralized
control over the political and economic life of the coun-
try was the decision at this time to convene the long de-
layed "Ninth Party Congress" in 1968. As revealed by
Hsieh Fu-chih in a 26 October speech and in surrounding
commentary, this decision reflected an intention to bring
to an end the chaos which the practice of "extensive
democracy" had produced in the preceding year, a situation
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in which party leadership had consisted largely of bring-
ing "Mao Tse-tung's thought into direct contact with the
masses." It also reflected disenchantment with the per-
formance of the People's Liberation Army in 1967, speci-
fically its failure to recognize and provide adequate
support to the "revolutionary Left."
Hsieh's speech suggested that another important
reason for resurrecting the Party was the need to recruit
experienced cadres quickly in order to restore orderly
processes in the government and economy of China. This
goal was to be achieved by organizing the party congress
"from the top downward," by having the Central Committee
select those who would attend. With the inducement of
a chance to resume positions of authority within the party,
government and economic apparatus, it could be expected
that a large number of veteran party cadres would step
forward to denounce Liu Shao-chi and join the ranks of
the Maoists. Although there was some uncertainty as to
the timing (Hsieh mentioned both May and September as
possible dates), convening of the Ninth Party Congress
in 1968 attended by carefully selected delegates would
permit the voting out of office of the "handful" of Mao's
opponents within the Party,* the formal investiture of
Mao's new leadership team, and the proclamation of another
great victory achieved in the "great proletarian cultural
revolution." The creation of a revitalized Chinese Com-
munist Party'staffed by trustworthy "revolutionary suc-
cessors" has, of course, been a primary objective of Mao's
"cultural revolution" from the outset.
*Although only a rough estimate, the "handful" (the
term employed in the original 8 August 1966 Central Com-
mittee decision on the "cultural revolution") had probably
grown by the end of 1967 to encompass several thousand
leadership cadres at the central, regional and provincial
levels of the Party, including nearly two-thirds of the
Politburo, half of the full members of the Central Com-
mittee, and three-fourths of the provincial party first
secretaries.
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Progress toward the original goals of the "cultural
revolution" in 1967 was minimal and achieved only at great
coat. The first goal--that of discrediting and overthrow-
ing Mao's major opponents within the Party--was achieved
readily enough, but in most cases the power "seized" from
these opponents had then to be relinquished to the Army.
Another important result of Mao's call to "seize power"
from below had been to inculcate widespread contempt
among Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" for authority
of any kind, including the authority of new "revolution-
ary" institutions and even that of the Party Center. For
these reasons,Mao's power to control developments in China
--like that of other leaders--probably declined in 1967.
Progress toward the second goal--that of identify-
ing and training trustworthy "revolutionary successors"--
was limited and uneven. At the outset, many youthful
Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" appeared to be
enthusiastic in their support of the revolution. After
more than a year of violence and bloodshed and especially
after their recent demotion to a position of secondary
importance, it is likely that many among the younger
generation in China have grown cynical and would welcome
the opportunity to resume their studies in a quieter and
better ordered society.
Failure to make progress toward the third and
final goal--that of achieving an ideological revolution--
was most noticeable of all. Instead of smashing the
"four olds" (old ideas, culture,'customs and habits) and
creating a new Chinese man devoted to Mao's conception
of the good society (featuring class struggle, heroic
poverty and collective enthusiasm), the end result of the
"cultural revolution" in 1967 was to make the "four olds"
more prevalent than ever, to revive traditional relation-
ships and intensify the pursuit of narrow, selfish inter-
ests (the most basic, of course, being personal survival)
by both legal and illegal means.
Given these setbacks and failures, it was a fair
question to ask at the close of 1967 whether the "cultural
revolution" was coming to an end. The answer to this
question, however, depends upon the answer to another,
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more basic question: whether Mao Tse-tung still dominates
the central party, government and military leadership in
Peking. The record of developments in the "cultural
revolution" in 1967 demonstrates, it is believed, that
Mao remained in charge throughout, initiating or at
least approving all changes in policy, including the sud-
den retreat toward moderation in late August forced by
objective circumstances. These circumstances--princip-
ally a damaged economy, a disturbed Army, a fragmented
"revolutionary Left," a breakdown of Party and government
machinery, and the consequent threat of anarchy--have
forced Mao to call a halt to the destructive, mass phase
of his "cultural revolution" and press ahead with the
construction of a new "revolutionary" government and Party
apparatus.
This shift in strategy should not be construed,
however, as a change in basic goals. In the eyes of Mao,
the "cultural revolution"--as the ultimate expression of
his views on the nature of man and society--can never end.
As long as Mao Tse-tung continues to dominate the leader-
ship in Peking, the "great proletarian cultural revolu-
tion" will continue in Communist China.
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