INTELLIGENCE REPORT TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XXVII)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 4, 1968
• Content Type: IR

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RSS No. 0026/68
4 April 1968
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
aDbl t45W5
ILLEGIB
Intelligence Report
TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
South and Southeast Asia
(Reference Title: POLO XXVII)
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TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
South and Southeast Asia
This Intelligence Report presents highlights from
a detailed review and analysis of Communist China's foreign
policy in South and Southeast Asia published separately
as an Annex.
The series is being produced by the DD/I Special
Research Staff;
Comments and queries are invited.
Chief, Special Research Staff
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TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
Squth and Southeast Asia
Contents
Page
Conclusions ..........................................1
Introduction ......................................... 4
I. 'The Neutrals" ...................................5
Cambodia ........................................5
Indonesia .......................................6
Burma ...........................................7
Nepal ... ......................................10
Afghanistan .................................... 12
Ceylon .........................................12
Pakistan .......................................13
India .......................................... 15
II. The Non-Neutrals...... ...........................
Thailand .... ................................17
Malaysia and Singapore ......................... 18
The Philippines ................................ 19
Hong Kong and Macao ... .........................20
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TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
South and Southeast Asia
Conclusions
During the ten-year period which ended in the mid-
1960's, Communist China's foreign policy in South and
Southeast Asia had emphasized conventional diplomacy com-
bined with assurances of friendship and non-aggressive
intent. This policy emphasis had been intended to induce
the governments of the area either to adopt or to retain
neutralist positions and to dissuade them from increasing
U.S. influence in the countries.
Beginning in 1966, Mao Tse-tung gradually shifted
his foreign policy toward some countries in the area from
diplomacy directed at neutralization to the open encourage-
ment of rural-based insurrection. The shift toward stimu-
lation--and where feasible, support--of the several small
insurgencies in Sc,;th and Southeast Asia has been accom-
panied by a drastic deterioration in the diplomacy of as-
surance. Never before have the Chinese Communist leaders
called for the overthrow of so many neighboring govern-
ments, including several with which Peking maintains diplo-
matic relations. Peking is now openly encouraging "armed
struggle" in Burma, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia,
and the Philippines. Of the non-Communist nations on
China's periphery, only Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan
are not present targets of Mao's new insurrectionist line.
Cambodia is in a special status between the two extremes,
as a small anti-government insurgency is increasingly
cutting across the thin fabric of Peking's diplomacy to-
ward Sihanouk.*
*Vietnam and Laos are excluded from this study because
they are the primary responsibility of Hanoi and have long
been obvious cases of an insurrectionist foreign policy.
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Despite the selective encouragement of insurgency,
Peking has continued to be cautious and non-adventurous.
With the exception of shallow probes on the border with
India, the Chinese have avoided overt and offensive moves
on the periphery of the mainland. They have limited their
own involvement in the developing insurgencies and have
insisted that the guerrillas follow a policy of "self-
reliance."
The shift in foreign policy in the area apparently
reflects Mao's revived desire to "push" revolutions. Mao
seems now to regret that he did not continue without in-
terruption the advocacy and support of rural-based revolu-
tion in "the East." His original convictions were reflected
in Liu Shao-chi's proclamation in November 1949 that Mao's
road of guerrilla war was the model for Communist-led
revolution in "colonial and semi-colonial countries" every-
where. In late 1951, he began to soften the revolution-
ary-insurrectionist line and to shift i:o conventional
diplomacy and the cultivation of neutralism; policy in
the ensuing ten-year period was characterized as peace-
ful coexistence embodying the "spirit of Bandung." Since
1966, however, policy toward certain countries has been
moving back toward the earlier revolutionary line.
In addition to his revolutionary compulsion, several
basic factors appear to have impelled Mao to adopt this
new line in foreign policy. One is Mao's dispute with
the Soviet leaders over his contention that rural insur-
rection is the "only" road to power for Communists and
leftists in underdeveloped countries. Another is Mao's
increasingly obsessive concern to sustain tension and to
intensify "class warfare" in foreign policy as well as
in internal affairs. Another factor is Peking's increased
support of Hanoi, and the desire to punish those govern-
ments which aid the U.S. or refuse to adopt the Commun-
ist position on the Vietnam war. Still another factor
--one which operated during a period of highly irrational
behavior from January to early September 1967--seems to
have evolved from Mao's desire to export his ego-cult.
During that wild eight-month period, Chinese Communist
diplomats abroad adopted extremely militant practices;
in Peking, a number of foreign embassies were invaded
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and several offices were severely damaged. In order to
retain formal diplomatic relations with some countries
and to prevent a large-scale exodus of foreign diplomatic
missions from Peking, Mao apparently permitted Chou En-
lai to preside over a retreat from the 1967 irrational-
ities.
This has been a partial retreat, however. It, has
not been accompanied by a corr3sponding retreat from the
insurrectionist line imposed on certain unfriendly coun-
tries. On the contrary, that line has been sustained
toward every country against which it had been declared.
The return to an insurrectionist line is a new feature
of Mao's foreign policy in South and Southeast Asia and
will probably continue for sometime.
Mao's second-in-command, Lin Piao, the capable guer-
rilla warfare strategist who has "safeguarded" Mao's views
against Chinese military professionals, probably will sus-
tain Peking's new foreign policy line, and, if he succeeds
Mao, continue that line.
Although Peking's new insurrectionist line is cen-
tered on nibbling tactics and takes a long view, overall
Chinese policy in South and Southeast Asia during the
next several years will probably be increasingly bellicose.
Peking's effort to stimulate guerrilla warfare is
concentrated on Burma and Thailand. The threat in these
countries is long-term, but nonetheless important. In
Burma, Mao and his lieutenants apparently intend gradu-
ally to expand the small insurgent forces of the Kachin
and Shan tribes along the China border, and to build up
the small and weak political-military apparatus of the
Burmese Communists (White Flags) in central-south Burma.
At the same time, they will try to create from these
elements and others an integrated insurgent movement led
by the Communists. Although some conditions in Burma
are favorable for support of the insurgency, the develop-
ment and maintenance of unified insurgent forces among
disparate political and ethnic groups has always been a
major problem.
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In Thailand, Peking is encouraging insurgent move-
ments now in being in at least three areas, and this ef-
fort seems to be parallel to one which Hanoi is implement-
ing in that country.
The rate of expansion of these small insurgent
movements probably will be slow, but the Chinese have
indicated that the "protracted" nature of the struggle
is useful for the building of an effective party appara-
tus and guerrilla force. Mao seems to believe that in-
surgent movements in the area will distract the U.S. and,
as stated in a July 1967 Peking broadcast, provide a more
favorable situation for the Vietnamese "people's war,"
as well as demonstrate the correctness of his strategy
of rural-based insurrection. ,
Introductio-.
Communist China was successful in keeping on good
terms with most neutral leaders in nearby countries after
1954, reassuring them, especially the Indonesians and
Burmese, that Peking would not use local assets for sub-
version. That general mollifying policy is now mainly
discarded toward most neutrals in the area. The record
shows that, roughly speaking, diplomacy (and its restraints)
were dominant in Peking's foreign policy from the mid-
1950s to the mid-1960s. During that period, Mao accepted
the rational principle that, in order to prevent U.S.
"encirclement" of the mainland, armed insurrection in the
area must be subordinated to a policy of assurance-against-
subversion. That is, he had been convinced that, as an
antidote to containment, diplomacy could be more useful
than revolution.
As a consequence, Peking adopted the kind of diplo-
matically "correct" policies usually associated with Chou
En-lai, observing the nationalistic sensitivities of
neutral leaders and accepting the legitimacy of their
governments, and encouraging neutralism wherever possible.
However, Mao and Chou did not view the governments as
one homogenous or undifferentiated group of neutrals,
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and Peking clearly indicated a preference for the policies
of those countries which were vigorously involved in anti-
Americanism--viz., Cambodia and Indonesia.
Cambodia: Although Chou had been tactful in moving
Sihanouk away from the West by exploiting his fear and
hatred of countries friendly to the U.S., such as Thailand
and South Vietnam, he had in 1960 warned that Peking would
make problems for Phnom Penh if Cambodia "permitted the
entry of American troops" on its territory. Increasingly
thereafter, Sino-Cambodian relations centered on the basic
matter of whether Sihanouk was to be given a clear state-
ment of commitment by Peking rega:ding Chinese Communist
military intervention to defend his regime from outside
attack. Chou's practice was to string him along with
statements which implied such a commitment, but never
explicitly declared it. At no great cost beyond some
political support and military aid, the Chinese leaders
induced Sihanouk to be their most faithful sycophant
among non-Communist national leaders, and increasingly the
Cambodian chief of state defended a whole range of Mao's
policies, including vituperative anti-Americanism and
vigorous support of the Communist position on the Vietnam
war. When, following his October 1965 talks with the
Chinese leaders (who advised him to reject Soviet aid),
Sihanouk acted independently to sign a military aid
agreement with Moscow (18 March 1966), Peking became less
effusive in praising him. The Chinese leaders, however,
continued to encourage his assertive anti-Americanism
and retained that part of their policy which was intended
to deter him from re-establishing diplomatic relations
with Washington and reducing his hostility to Saigon and
Bangkok.
This rational policy was temporarily discarded
during the aberrant period of Mao's proxy "revolutioniza-
tion" of Foreign Ministry officials in the spring and
summer of 1967. In that wild period, Sihanouk's national-
istic sensitivities were outraged by Chinese diplomats
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disseminating Mao's ego-cult in Cambodia and by Peking's
interference with his action against a pro-Chinese friend-
ship association. When, in late October 1967, Chou was
permitted to revive his policy of assurance-against-sub
version, he attained a reciprocal pledge from Sihanouk
regarding a toning down of anti-Peking criticism in Phnom
Penh. Chou may not be able to keep Mao convinced that,
so long as Sihanouk is demonstrably anti-American and
supports the Communist position on the Vietnam war, he
should be kept in tow. At present, a small anti-govern-
ment insurgency in Cambodia is starting to cut directly
across Peking's diplomacy and may eventually impell
Sihanouk to withdraw his ambassador.
Indonesia: Clear signs in mid-1960 that Sukarno
was prepared to work with the Indonesian Cummur.ist Party
(PKI) under Nasakom (national-religious-Communist) unity,
and that he could replace Nehru as Communist China's major
political partner in the area, induced the Chinese lead-
ers to cultivate his good will. Mao and his wife person-
ally participated in September 1962 in the effort to move
Djakarta into Peking's camp regarding the Sino-Indian border
dispute, and in January 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio
was urged by the Chinese leaders to accept their position
in that dispute. Sukarno's assertive anti-Americanism
became a key unifying factor, and his "To hell with your
[U.S.] aid" speech of 25 March 1964 induced the Chinese
leaders to support his policy of "confrontation" with
Malaysia and the UK. The Chinese kept their military
support at the no-risk level, promising some weapons and
guerrilla-war instructors; they were more forthcoming
They used this increased leverage on
Sukarno i:, January 1965 to try to attain greater PKI
representation in the Cabinet, their intention being to
advance Aidit's strategy of working within Indonesia's
"bourgeois-nationalist" government as well as outside it
to help bring the PKI to power.
Failure of the Sukarno-Aidit, coup (1 October. 1965)
converted a major anti-American partner into a pro-West
enemy at a time when Peking's diplomacy had suffered set-
backs elsewhere. In order to avoid a new setback and to
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retain an official presence in Djakarta, Peking did not
immediately shift to a revolutionary-insurrectionist
policy. Because Mao had not yet called for a "revolution-
ization" of the Foreign Ministry, Chou had some leeway
to try to avoid a diplomatic break despite vigorous persecu-
tion of Overseas Chinese. After Mao called for "revolu-
tionization" of Chinese embassy officers (9 September
1966), Peking's exchange of vituperation with Djakarta
escalated into serious diplomatic insults, including a
calculated snub of Suharto by the Chinese military attache,
who was expelled as a result (31 January 1967). Diplomacy
deteriorated rapidly during the fanatical period in the
spring and summer of 1967; each nation invaded the embassy
of the other on 5 August (the Chinese acted in retalia-
tion), but by that time the Chinese already had shifted
to Mao's revolutionary-insurrectionist policy and had
appealed to Indonesians "to overthrow the reactionary
regime" (PRC government statement of 26 April 1967) and
"to overthrow the Suharto-Nasution fascist regime" (Red
Flag editorial of 9 July 1967). Concealing their own
earlier encouragement of the PKI to work within Sukarno's
government, the Chinese leaders began to insist that the
PKI should have begun "armed struggle" in the Maoist pat-
tern at an earlier stage of the revolution.
Suspension of diplomatic relations by Djakarta ot1
10 October 1967 has deprived Peking of an easy channel
for supporting the PKI, but the new PKI politburo is now
pledged to a Maoist program of long-term party building
and, later, guerrilla warfare. Peking's open support for
this program and its use of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia
to disseminate anti-Djakarta propaganda, as well as the
policy orientation of the Suharto regime in Indonesia,
reduce the prospect for re-establishing diplomatic rela-
tions between Peking and Djakarta in the near future and
isolates the Chinese leaders from a former major ally.
Burma: The Chinese leaders apparently believed
that Chou En-lei's assurance-against-subversion made to
Rangoon in June 1954 would induce Burma to keep the Ameri-
can presence at a minimum and to avoid participation in
any anti-Communist regional alliance. Although the Chinese
Communists had engaged in various forms of subversive
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activities--including contacts with Burmese Communists?
they had limited the scope of covert operations suffi-
ciently to avoid a major dispute. Even who n their policy
toward Rangoon had included the sending of PLA patrols
into the Kachin State in mid-1956 to exert pressure during
a border dispute or again in November 1960 to support
Burmese army action against Chinese Nationalist irregulars,
revolution had been subordinated to diplomacy. The Chi-
nese Communists did not supplant Burmese authority or
establ 'sh Communist rural bases in the border areas as
they could have done.
Mao's diplomacy became increasingly crude, however,
following Peking's June 1964 decision to increase support
for Hanoi. Seeking to win acceptance of Peking's posi-
tion on the Vietnam war, Ne Win was hectored and harassed
by Chou and Chen Yi in July 1964, by Chou during three
visits in April 1965, and by Chou again in Peking in July
1965. Ne Win resisted these pressures, which had the
effect of disillusioning him with Peking. He had not
taken kindly to Chinese support for 20 White Flag Com-
munists who had come from Peking in. October 1963 to
negotiate--unsuccessfully--terms for an end to insurgency,
and he was angered by subsequent revolutionary initiatives
w'iich indicated more open Chinese support for the White
Flags in Burma. The list of initiatives includes: Peking
Radio's broadcast of a Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
message (30 September 1964) implying the need for, a new 25X1
government; Chen Yi's request in early December 1964 that
Ne Win try again to include the White Flags in a 'united
front" government;
These moves provoked Ne Win. He reacted with increasing
irritability and with firmer anti Peking moves against
signs of more aggressive Chinese Communist intentions.
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It was in this atmosphere of increasing Sino-
Burmese tensions that "revolutionized" Chinese diplomats
returned to Burma in January 1967 to disseminate the sym-
bols of Mao's cult among Burmese and local Chinese. This
was the immediate cause of the open exchange of recrimina-
tions between Rangoon and Peking.
anti- 25X1
Chinese sentiment culminated in the murder of a Chinese
embassy technician by a Burmese demonstrator on 28 June.
Peking's response was to subordinate diplomacy even more
to revolution by depicting the government for the first
time as "reactionary" (NCNA report of 28 June), praising
"the revolutionary armed struggle led by the CPB" (People's
Daily editorial of 30 June), broadcasting the 28 June
ZP demand for the "complete overthrow" of Ne Win (broad-
cast of 1 July), and ordering its technicians to stop
work (PRC government note of 5 July). On 31 October,
when Peking was impelled to withdraw all its aid person-
nel from Burma, the Chinese warned that they would con-
tinue to support "the Burmese people's revolutionary strug-
gle;" however, this was merely a publicly stated euphemism
for their earlier shift to Mao's revolutionary-insurrec-
tionist policy, in the summer of 1967.
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Sino-Burmese relations have not been formally broken,
but Ne Win may be impelled to do just that as the Chinese
become more active in trying to make the border area in-
surgency a major problem for his security forces.
Nepal: Nepal's leaders have been encouraged to
remain neutral not only to prevent them from joining an
anti-Communist regional alliance, but more importantly,
to detach Nepal from India's dominant influence. After
Sino-Indian border clashes intensified, following the
Tibet revolt in March 1959, the Chinese leaders decided
to make their charges of Indian "expansionism" appear
more credible by treating Nepal as a completely independ-
ent country, in contrast to New Delhi's depreciatory
paternalism. The Chinese placed an ambassador in Kath-
mandu for the first time in August 1960, split the dif-
ference on ownership of Mount Everest by drawing the
border-agreement line through its summit in October 1961,
accused India of "great-nation chauvinism" toward Nepal
in May 1962, gained the right to bring aid equipment into
Nepal "from the north" in January 1963, and expanded their
presence through additional aid agreements in September
1965 and December 1966. By May 1967, they were effectively
competing with India and had displaced part of the latter's
dominant influence.
But "revolutionized" Chinese officials, who had
returned from re-indoctrination sessions in Peking, abused
Nepalese nationalistic sensitivities by disseminating Mao
badges and books along the Kathmandu-Kodari road and by
claiming in an NCNA account of the road-opening ceremony
on 26 May 1967 that "many" Nepalese ;hooted that Mao is
the sun shining in the hearts of al. peoples. The "revolu-
tionized" Chinese also used the new road to import from
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Tibet large shipments of propaganda materials through the
Nepalese postal system. The Nepalese leaders were further
angered by the undiplomatic demonstrations for Chinese
diplomats, expelled from New Delhi, conducted at the
Kathmandu airport by Chinese embassy officials in late
June. Anti.-Chinese students were aroused to a violent
demonstration of their own against the Chinese for dis-
playing only Mao's picture in Peking's stall during the
annual celebration of the King's birthday on t July.
on 8 July, Peking publicly charged
the Nepalese government, for the first time, with complicity
because they believed that the Chinese lead- 25X1
ers had been tactfully working to downplay the t July
incidents. In contrast to the unprovocative action of
the Chinese ambassador, another fanatical accusation was
broadcast by Peking Radio on 21 July, thundering a series
of demands and insisting that Kathmandu "must promptly
annul all measures discriminating against China and stop
all anti-Chinese utterances and deeds on Nepalese terri-
tory,." (emphasis supplied) This was the style of "red
diplomatic fighters" and not that of Chou En-lai, but
Chou apparently had to swim with this current.
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Although tensions have subsided, the Nepalese lead-
ers are more suspicious of the Chinese leaders than they
have been in recent years. Kathmandu has established a
committee in its Foreign Ministry to evaluate security
reports on the activities of Chinese, as well as Soviet,
officials in Nepal. In order to prevent New Delhi from
reasserting its influence more extensively, the Chinese
will have to mollify Kathmandu in any future disputes
provoked by Mao's "revolutionized" diplomats.
Afghanistan: Afghanistan's unobtrusive neutralism
and inactive role in major international developments have
kept it on the periphery of Peking's foreign policy efforts.
Intensification of Peking's disputes with New Delhi and
Moscow, however, impelled the Chinese leaders to try to
enlist the Afghans in their camp. A friendship and non-
aggression treaty was signed in 1960, a border agreement
was added in November 1963, and economic aid and cultural
exchange agreements followed in March 1965. Despite
Kabul's rebuff of the Chinese delegation's effort in April
1966 to induce Afghan officials to condemn the U.S. policy
in Vietnam, the unobtrusive Afghans have not stirred any
deep resentments in Peking and relations seem to have
been unaffected by Peking's general shift to the left in
foreign policy.
Ceylon: The neutral policy of Ceylon kept rela-
tions friendly until the Tibet revolt in 1959 and the
Sino--Indian border dispute in 1962 combined to create
some degree of antipathy when Colombo refused to take a
strong pro-Peking stand. Relations were exacerbated to
an unprecedented degree during the fanatical period in
the spring and summer of 1967. After a Ceylon Communist
party politburo member publicly touted Mao to Red Guards
in Peking as "the greatest teacher, leader, and Marxist-
Leninist alive" (speech of 26 May 1967) and after Mao
rewarded this kind of sycophancy by having an "extremely
cordial conversation" with !'im on 6 June, Ceylon's Foreign
Minister protested to the Chinese charge (interview of
11 August) about Peking's support for a man who advocated
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"overthrow" of the government. The charge replied in
the most revolutionary way he could--namely, by quoting
from Mao's "thought". He was ordered out of the Foreign
Minister's office.
But the immediate cause of open Sino-Ceylonese
recriminations was the 15 August Peking protest over
Colombo's seizure of goods and a parcel of Mao buttons
addressed to the Chinese embassy. By publicizing their
protest, the "revolutionized" Chinese impelled the Cey-
lonese, whi had preferred to keep the dispute in private
channels, to release their reply to the press. The Chi-
nese escalated the dispute, organized a demonstration in
front of Ceylon's embassy in Peking on 20 August
Chou may have
been permitted, at this point, to reduce the tensions,
and although demonstrations were again staged in front of
the embassy in early September, they were carefully con-
trolled and of limited intensity and duration.
The Chinese leaders now seem to be reluctant to
warm Indian hearts by protracting the dispute with Colombo.
But if a renewed effort to spread the Mao-cult should
provoke Colombo into a new round of protests, the Chinese,
operating under Mao's revolutionary policy, probably would
respond with open vituperation.
Pakistan: The Chinese leaders view Pakistan as
a counterweight to India in South Asia. Since the estab-
lishment of Sino-Pakistani relations in May 1951, they
have avoided antagonizing Karachi on the Kashmir issue.
Unlike the Soviets, who supported Indian claims, they
refused to recognize New Delhi's sovereignty over the
area. In the process of trying to isolate New Delhi in-
ternationally, the Chinese leaders increased ties with
the Pakistanis, concluding a border agreement ?.n March
1963, an airline agreement in August 1963, and apparently
some arrangements for supplying military aid in February
1964 during Chou En-lai's visit. By that time, Ayub had
become Mao's quasi-ally and was to receive important poli-
tical support during the India-Pakistan war in September
1965. The Chinese leaders, for the first time since the
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establishment of the Peking regime, committed the PLA to
some form of action within a specified time limit in
support of a non-Communist quasi-ally. Their ultimatum
of 16 September 1965 to New Delhi demanding that structures
on the Sikkim-Tibet border must be dismantled within three
days was intended to humiliate the Indians and to ease
pressure on hard-hit Pakistani forces. The unprecedented
commitment was, they apparently calculated, safe in mili-
tary terms; they could control the extent and nature of
any skirmishes with Indian border patrols, correctly di.s-
counting the prospect of a major Indian attack. Politi-
cally, however, they had taken a major risk.
They could not control Ayub's policy, and when he
moved to end the fighting on 18 September, Mao's diplomats
were out on a political limb and were impelled to explain
why they had not acted on their ultimatum. International
opinion, which was extremely critical of Mao's war-like
interference and favorable to Moscow's moderating effort,
confronted Peking with a major foreign policy setback,
This rash political commitment apparently reflected Mao's
increasing reluctance, in recent years, to act on the
basis of what his foreign policy experts--Chou, particu-
larly--tell him about the probable detrimental consequ-
ences of revolutionary moves. In any case, the Chinese
leaders tried to absorb the political defeat and to retain
Ayub as a useful counterbalance to India, their major
enemy in South Asia.
The Pakistanis have been accorded special treatment
and have been exempted from psychological and physical
attacks in the course of Mao's purge on the mainland.
Communist China's military aid program for Pakistan con-
tinues. In late September 1967, the Chinese diplomatic
mission leaving Tunisia turned over Peking's interests
there to the Pakistani embassy. The Chinese leaders are
aware that Ayub will insist on sustaining high-level con-
tacts with Soviet and American officials. Despite signs
of Sino-Pakistani frictions in 1967, Peking probably will
continue to support Ayub and to avoid imposing a revolu-
tionary-insurrectionist policy against his government
so long as he remains an enemy of India and does not cri-
ticize Peking's policies
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India: Once Communist China's major friend in the
area, India is now a major enemy. After the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations in April 1950, Chou En-lai
had been given considerable leeway to try to maintain
friendly relations between Peking and New Delhi. Imple-
menting a policy of assurance-against-subversion, he set
forth the five principles of peaceful coexistence with
Nehru in April 1954 and even stated that Sino-Indian rela-
tions were graced with a special personal relationship
between himself and the Indian prime minister.
India's transformation in 1959 from friend to enemy
was a development which the Chinese leaders accepted with
reluctance. Because of India's importance in South Asia,
Chou in April 1960 tried to induce Nehru to negotiate the
border dispute. But Nehru rebuffed him, and, as the In-
dians began to occupy positions near and in some cases
behind Chinese border posts (after the PLt1 had moved into
Indian territory earlier in the western sector), the Sino-
Indian border dispute gradually developed into a major
clash.
Shortly after their first attack on Indian posi-
tions in October 1962, the Chinese appraised Nehru as a
man who had put himself in the position of a lackey of
the imperialists" (People's Daily article of 27 October
1962). Mao in September 196 fessed a desire to set-
tle the border dispute by negotiations, but his policy
toward New Delhi actually was to discard more and more
openly any possibility of negotiated settlement. As the
Pakistan-India war developed, Chou tried to clear his own
name by dissociating himself from the earlier policy, at-
tacking "the Indian reactionaries' vaunted nonsense about
their policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence"
(speech of 9 September 1965). A full scale clash was
averted, but the Chinese made a series of temporary shal-
low probes into Indian territory, partly to assert their
own claims and partly to encourage the Pakistanis to sus-
tain (or revive) their military confrontation with Indian
forces.
This active patrolling policy subsided in 1966 but
was resumed in August 1967, following an intensification
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of Peking-New Delhi recriminations over Chinese open sup-
port for a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy for In-
dian Communists and after Indian diplomats had been beaten
by Red Guards. Firefights on 11 September and 1 October
1967 apparently were military expressions of intensified
political relations.
Peking's support for the revolutionary-insurrection-
ist road in India was declared openly in the spring of
1967. "Rebellion" is "the only way out" for the Indian
people, according to the People's Daily of 19 May 1967.
The tribal minorities in the northeast--i.e., the Nagas
and Mizos--were praised for waging "armed struggle."
The Chinese centered their attention on Communist insur-
gents in India in late June 1967, praising the small group
of extremists in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal
as "the revolutionaries" of the Indian Communist Party,
and oa 5 July, People's Daily made it clear that only the
China model--viz., "Mao Tse-tung's road" of "using the
countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities"--
would be acceptable to Peking. This political support
for a ludicrously small group occurred in the context of
Peking's criticism of both the right and the left wings
of the CPI, indicating that the Chinese will insist on
complete rather than partial support from any Indian Com-
munists in the future.
The Sino-Indian diplomatic dispute, which had in-
tensified Peking's appeals for a revolutionary-insurrec-
tionist policy, developed in early June 1967 at a time
when Mao was permitting (if not encouraging) Red Guards
to defy the practice of diplomatic immunity. The beat-
ings administered to the Indian embassy's second secretary
when he was expelled on 14 June led to a retaliatory at-
tack on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on the 16th and
a siege of the Indian embassy in Peking on the 17th, and
there seemed to be little more that could be done to
strain Sino-Indian relations further.
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The prospect seems to be for all-out political
warfare despite the existence of diplomatic relations.
Small and sporadic patrol clashes almost certainly will
occur on the border. Peking will continue to exaggerate
the importance of any future Maoist-type uprisings, and
probably will continue to provide some aid to the Nagas
and Mizos.
II. The Non-Neutrals
Regarding enemies such as Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Philippines, the Chinese leaders'
shift to a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy required
only a further subordination of diplomacy to revolution
because government-to-government relations had not been
established.
Thailand: Failure to move the Thais away from
their close relationship with the U.S. impelled the Chi-
nese leaders to drop their relative restraint. At some
time between the central committee work conference of
June 1964 and the U.S. airstrike against North Vietnam
in August 1964, the Chinese leaders apparently decided
to create trouble for Bangkok by organizing anti-govern-
ment Thais into a united front of political and military
opponents.
The political prong of this dual effort was center-
ed on establishing seemingly non-Communist fronts--viz.,
the Independence Movement of Thailand and the Thai Patriotic
Front--in November 1964 and January 1965, respectively.
On 6 October 1965, Mao himself
participated in the effort to exploit the former prime
minister Pridi, who has been in exile in China for many
years, but Pridi apparently refused to lend his name to
either of the front groups.
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The militar 25X1
be encouragement an
y d support ofetheiinsurgency. was to
rebroadcast a Thai Communist appeal for the "overthrow"
of the Bangkok government in December 196
z By
the small Communist insurgency in northeastern Thailandh,
seemed to be improving its organization; by May, Peking
broadcasts of Thai language intensified; by July, the
Pea le's Dail attacked Bangkok's su ort of the US
The prospect appears tp be for greater Chinese 25X1
encouragement of the various Thai and minority insurgent
groups while insisting that the guerrillas follow a policy
of "self--reliance."
Malaysia and Singapore; The Chinese leaders openly
declared their support for the small insurgent grou of
Communists operating against the Malaysian p
authorities from almost inaccessible bases in southern
Thailand. On 15 April 1965, the CCP sent a message of
greetings to the Communist Party of Malaya, pledging sup-
port against the "Rahman clique," and on 12 January 1966,
they publicized the establishment "in China" of a mis-
sion of the CPM front organization, the Malayan National
Liberation League, whose leader in Peking insisted that
"People's revolutionary war is the only answer to counter-
revolutionary war." The leader of this Peking-based
organization tied the small Malayan insurgency to Vietnam,
declaring on 1 February 1966 that the anti-Malaysia
campaign would be intensified "to coalesce with the anti-
imperialist struggle in Vietnam and Southeast Asia."
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The prospect is for sustained Chinese encourage-
ment of these Communist insurrectionists in southern
Thailand (along the border with peninsular Malaysia) and
of the ethnic Chinese guerrillas in Sarawak. They will
continue to depict the new state of Singapore as an addi-
tional target for subversion and Prime n ster Lee Kuan
Yew as a "puppet" of the West who should be overthrown,
but their first effort will be directed at penetrating
political parties rather than inciting overt insurrection
in the immediate future.
The Philippines: Peking's ten years of people's
diplomacy toward the Philippines his failed to move Manila
out of its close relationship with the U.S. In early
1966, when the Chinese began to revolutionize their policy
coward Manila, their primary goal was to warn government
leaders to avoid direct support of the American effort
in Vietnam. In mid-February 1966, Peking Radio's Philip-
pines section sharply increased its broadcasts to the
islands and in mid-March 1966, the Chinese called for a
"struggle against American efforts to induce...the Philip-
pines to send troops to South Vietnam."
In contrast to the earlier policy of professing
non-support for the Communists in the islands, Peking
published the "Philippine Communist Party's" 1 May 1967
program of armed struggle against the government. How-
ever, the Chinese seem to be exaggerating the size of the
pro-Peking elements among the Philippine Communists, the
degree of control which these elements have over the in-
surgents, and the extent of the insurgency. They claim
that, as a general principl3, Communist-led revolution
can succeed even in isolated islands.
The prospect seems to be for the Chinese to try
to establish a small group of Communists and leftists
as a distinctly separate organization from pro-Soviet
elements. They will almost certainly continue to insist
that rural insurrection is the only way to seize power
in the islands.
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Hong Kong and Macao: Although Mao in 1939 had com-
plained about foreign control of Hong Kong and Macao, for
many years thereafter he had been unwilling to use the
PLA to seize the colonies or to begin a political-subver-
sive struggle to impose local Communist control on their
governments. Khrushchev's derisive remarks about the
colonies in December 1962 did not impel him to than a his
olic of avoidin a confrontation, i
Only after Mao's
foreign policy was "revolutionized" in the wake of the
purge on the mainland was he willing to change the line
of caution and restraint.
Local leftists in Macao influenced by the militant
political atmosphere on the mainland, engaged in activity
which led the Portuguese authorities to suppress them in
November 1966. The Chinese leaders exploited this incident
(34 Chinese were injured) to attain an easy foreign policy
victory, in which "revolutionaries" subjugated "imperial-
ists," and by mid-December 1966 a combination of local
demonstrations and threats from the mainland resulted in
a protocol which formalized a significant loss of Porguguese
authority in the colony. In effect, the Chinese leaders
are now the proxy rulers of Macao.
The Chinese leaders and the Hong Kong leftists
(mostly union leaders and students) were encouraged to
act in a revolutionary way toward the British authorities.
On 6 May 1967, colony riot-police clashed with local Chi-
nese, who were demonstrating and shouting Maoist slogans
outside a Kowloon factory. Twenty-one workers were ar-
rested. This incident sparked a major confrontation be-
tween Peking and London. Unlike the Portuguese, the British
courageously resisted the combined pressures of local
leftists and Peking's threats--which included the burning
of the British charge's office in the Peking embassy on
22 August--and refused to accept various humiliating de-
mands. The Chinese leaders finally backed down, ordered
their apparatus in Hong Kong to end the violent phase,
and accepted a temporary defeat--that is, they allowed
the situation to subside into a: low-boil protracted poli-
tical confrontation.
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The prospect seems to be for no improvement of Sino-
British relations until London accepts certain demands
regarding arrested Chinese in Hong Kong. The Chinese
leaders may intensify the struggle to counter specific
British actions against the colony's leftists or to comply
with any future intensification of Mao's purge on the
mainland.
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