INTELLIGENCE REPORT MAO'S 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION': ITS LEADERSHIP, ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010022-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 296
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 18, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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Top Secret
ILLEGIB
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP,
ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND STS CASUALTIES
(REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XXII)
Toj.Secret
95 25X1
18 February 1967
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP,
ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUPMIENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES
This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff.
It offers a fairly detailed narrative account of Mao Tse-
tung's "cultural revolution" as it has developed since
September 1965, a sunwiary of that account, and some specu-
lation on prospects.
This study presents what has been and remains in
most respects a minority view, the view of one "school."
It finds the evidence persuasive for the propositions that
(a) Mao has taken the initiative at each stage, (b) he
has been conducting a massive "test" of party leaders and
the party apparatus, (c) changes in the leadership have
represented primarily a purge directed by Mao, and only
secondarily a "power struggle," (d) the entire effort
has developed coherently, given its irrational base in
dogma, and (e) Mao is now carrying out methodically and
in general successfully a scheme for the reorganization
of the party which he outlined last autumn.
Because a great deal of the most valuable material
on each stage of the revolu-
tion to date came to hand well after the fact
the study
,
presents developments both as they appeared at the time
and as they looked when iurthe.r illuminated. Not all of
the facts are in yet, avid material still to be received
may compel a change in some of the present conclusions.
The DDI/R3 would welcome further comment on this
working paper, addressed to either the Chief or the Deputy
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For when you defeat me in an election
simply because you were, as I was not, born
and bred in a log cabin, it is only a ques-
tion of time until you are beaten by someone
whom the pigs brought up out in the yard.
The Background, 1962-1965 .............................1
Mao Contrives a Test, Winter 1965-66.................. 7
April-May: The Dominance of the Party Apparatus..... 17
June: The Work-Teams ................................22
July, Early August: The "Cultural Revolution
Group" .............................................32
August-September: The Unleashing of the Red
Guards .............................................57
September: The Subsidence of the Red Guards.........78
October: Waiting, Debating, or "Struggling"7....... 112
November: 'Waiting for Lefty' ......................141
December: Less Bread, More Circuses..... o ....... o..170
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP,
ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES
S'.unmary
The "great proletarian cultural revolution" is
said by Peking to have derived from a number of specific
initiatives taken by Mao Tse-tung between autumn 1962 and
autumn 1965. While mo.; of these cannot be confirmed,
the "revolution" from tine start has obviously been Mao's.
It has grown out of concepts evident as far back as 1958,
and in particular out of Mao's conviction--stated publicly
and emphatically in mid-1964--of the urgency of the need
for revolutionary successors whom he could trust to carry
out his will.
Mao's obsession with this need--and his consequent
insistence on conducting a massive "test" and thorough
purge of the Chinese party--has been the central,fact of
the "revolution." The revolution has not seemed to repre-
sent a "power struggle" in the sense of a struggle for
dominance in the leadership; the group around Mao, and
in particular Mao himself, has been dominant in the lead-
ership in all stages. Mao's initiative in each of these
stages has been confirmed by both open and clandestine
materials.
Changes in the composition of the group around
Mao--changes coming sometimes thick and fast--have seemed
to represent primarily changes in Mao's own evaluation
of his lieutenants. Some of the changes probably also
reflect a contest for position, below Mao, among his
lieutenants, looking toward an early succession. While
the purge did not begin with such a contest, and the con-
test has been secondary all along to Mao's initiatives,
this maneuvering for posit.-Lon is probably an increasingly
important factor.
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Moreover, there has clearly been a struggle--which
continues--against resistance to Mao's will on the part
of the vast apparatus of the party, the government and
the military establishment, from the top level down. While
there is no declared opposition, this is a struggle to
make the apparatus, both in the center and in the pro-
vinces, fully responsive to Mao's new team.
The First Test: The "Poisonous Weed"
The opening gun of the "revolution" was fired,
article attacking a playwright whose earlier work~was -
genuinely critical of Mao. Mao apparently did not tell
other party leaders--with a few exceptions--that he in-
tended a particular anti-Mao play to serve as a test of
ideology and loyalty for his entire "cultural" apparatus
and for the highest leaders of the party machine which
=supervised it. In other words, Mao was making a major
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initiative without providing clear guidance as to what
response was desired, with the intention of punishing
those who made the wrong response. He was probably de-
termined from the start to purge Peng Chen, who had al-
ready failed h _m as director of the "cultural." purge,
and whose own Peking committee sheltered the attacked
playwright and itself contained some writers who had
bitterly criticized Mao.
Immediately after the attack on the playwright
appeared, Minister of Defense Lin Piao, who was being
rapidly built up as the foremost and ideal student of
Mao's thought, issued a directive on the work of the PLA
which stated the general criterion for the testing of
party officials as well--whether they regarded the works
of Mao as the "highest instructions" for their own work.
Soon thereafter, in late November 1965, Mao left Peking,
to sketch or observe the development of the "cultural
revolution," and possibly to undergo medical treatment.
Lo Jui-cuing and Yang Sliang-kun, both in posts that made
them dangerous, disappeared at this time, probably arrested.
At the same t .me, Lin Piao's PLA newspaper took the lead
in defining the immediate "cultural" issue and forcing
others to declare themselves--the question of whether
the attacked playwright's work was a "poisonous weed"
(the Maoist position) or a matter for debate (the "enemy"
position).
In mid-January 1966, Mao called together a few
party leaders and his own wife (then a minor figure)--a
group which later emerged as the "cultural revolution
group" directing the campaign--to discuss the unsatis-
factory situation, but he did not immediately replace the
original group then operating under Peng Chen. In Febru-
ary, Peng issued a self-serving report on the cultural
revolution in the name of the politburo--possibly approved
by Liu Shao-chi, in Mao's absence from Peking--aad he and
Lu Ting-i did not act to bring the party press into line
with the PLA newspaper on the issue of the "poisonous
weed." Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the supervisors
of both Peng and Lu, also failed to take this action.
Unlike Peng and Lu, who could not afford to uncover a
trail leading to themselves, Liu and Teng need not have
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been consciously resisting what they took to be Mao's
will in that period; while they may have been (if the
charges of opposition to Mao in September 1965 are true),
they may instead simply have failed to understand what
he wanted, have lacked the illumination of his already-
revealed "thought" and the revolutionary ardor which (in
Mao's view) would have shown them the "correct" line
without specific guidance. While neither Liu nor Teng
fell entirely out of Mao's favor at this time, and Teng
may have gone on to play an important role its the purge
of Peng Chen, the poor performance of the party press
during the winter apparently created or strengthened Mao's
reservations about Liu, and perhaps about Teng as well.
Wall-poster assertions that some of Mao's lieutenants
(not Liu and Tong) were plotting a "rebellion" or "coup"
in February (during his absence) seem to be a deliberate
corruption of a still-obscure but apparently minor inci-
dent of that month. In fact, there is no evidence of
any important initiative by any of his lieutenants during
that winter.
In March, still in Mao's absence, Mao's wife began
her spectacular rise to the top, working then--with Lin
Piao--on the problem of the political reliability of the
PLA. Later in March, Peking announced that Mao was not
ill--meaning, perhaps, that lie had recovered, possibly
from an operation in February. On the same day, Liu Shao-
chi--who knew or suspected that his own status was now
in question, as (it was later learned) he told someone
so at the time--was sent abroad for a month,
By the end of March, Mao was back in action, clearly
in command. lie intervened in the Ch.-L,ese party's negotia-
tions with the Japanese party, peremptorily rejecting their
draft communique and thus reversing several of his top
lieutenants. Peng Chen disappeared from sight at that
time, and the party press very quickly discovered that
the work of the anti -Mao playwright was indeed a "poison-
ous weed." The party's Peking committee under Peng Chen
tried to protect its own leaders by joining the attack
on lesser figures, but Mao's spokesmen carried the attack
in their direction.
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Preparing; the Ground: The Conventional A
---- _.._ -_~__-- pparat us
In early April, the PLA newspaper publicly forecast
the course of the next several months--a wide-scale if
not high-reaching purge. The "cultural revolution" then
began for the public in late April and May, with meetings
and rallies of all elements of the population to denounce
the "black gang" uncovered in Peking (the attacked play-
wright and his friends on the Peking committee), and to
swear allegiance to Mao's thought. Throughout this April-
'fiay period, the conventional party apparatus under Liu
and Teng, using conventional methods, was in charge of the
conduct of the "cultural revolution". Liu and Teng,
given in effect another chance, seemed to be doing a
good, routine job; there was nothing in the materials
of the period to suggest that the party apparatus itself
would be displaced by extraordinary vehicles in later
stages.
Mac reappeared near Shanghai in early May, looking
good.
At a party meeting late: in May, Mao gave
some further guidance--but again, apparently, unclear
guidance--on the conduct of the "revolution'.'.
Failure of the Apparatus: The ;York-Teams
With the ground prepared in April and May, on 1
June the party began to move against the range of cultural
and educational organizations and in particular ; gainst
the educators, the most important of whom were concur-
rently secretaries of the party committees in their in-
stitutions. Liu and Teng, presumably on the basis of a
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good performance in April and May, were still in charge
of implementing the "revolution." The instrument of the
"revolution" in June---almost certainly approved by Mao
in the May meeting--was the "work-team." These small
teams, which had been used before in the countryside,
were named by higher party bodies and assigned to in-
vestigate and reorganize educational and cultural bodies;
the teams commonly followed or effectrd the removal of
the principal administrators and party secretaries, and
took charge.
With a tew exceptions, the work-teams failed to
back the most militant elements on the campuses (and
elsewhere), and in many cases suppressed them in the
same ways as had the local party leaders whom the work-
teams had dislodged. The work-teams clearly did not
have a directive to support such elements, and Liu Shao-
chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have been principally blamed for
this. While Mao's spokesmen have encouraged the view that
Liu and Teng were consciously sabotaging Mao's policy,
and this may be true, the evidence is good that again
they did not have a clear directive from Mao himself
In other words, Mao had again set them a test, and again
--whether deliberately, or from lack of understanding--
they had failed to do what he wished, together w;th
much of the party apparatus.
Beginning at the end of June, probably on Mao's
initiative, there was intervention on the campuses by
officers--including Mme. Mao--of what was soon to be
revealed as the "group in charge of the cultural revolu-
tion," plus the more prestigious and adroit Chou En-lai.
These leaders apologized to the "revolutionary students"
for the "mistakes" of the work-teams, and backed the
militants against the teams, which were withdrawn in the
next month.
The New Directorate and the New Directive
For the rest of the summer, Mao and the new figures
in his favor were improvis.ng. The new central "cultural
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revolution group" under Chen Po-ta (Mao's long-time writer)
was surfaced in u;arly July. The new i::struments of the
revolution, immediately formed, were to be "revolutionary
committees" responsive to the central group, chosen by
election and directed to "give a free rein to the masses"
(meaning the militants). On the campuses, these commit-
tees initiated another a?.J longer period of at least parti-
ally directed violence, against "enemies" identified in
the earlier stages. Off the campuses, the "revolution"
was also proceeding turbulently, although with less vio-
lence and disruption of normal activity.
In early August, Mao reportedly declared his favor
directly--in a wall-poster--for the militant students.
At the same time Chou En-lai and Mme. Mao both began to
prepare the students--some already organized as Red
Guards--for large-scale action against the party appara-
tus, telling them not to dissipate their forces by fight-
ing among themselves, but to concentrate them against
enemies in the party. Then on 8 August the party central
committee--then in plenum--issued a 16-point directive for
the conduct of the "revolution" in which militant exhorta-
tions were foremost and which served to encourage the
militant students who were soon to be turned loose on the
party apparatus.
The 8 August directive--the main lines of which
were credibly attributed to Mao personally---stated the
party's aim of bringing down the opponents of Mao's line
in the party, praised the revolutionary young, predicted
"fairly strong" resistance, called for this to be attacked
with "daring...above everything else," told the party not
to fear "disorder," and stated that "all forces must be
concentrated to strike" against the "main target...in the
party." It went on to classify all party officials ac-
cording to their attitudes toward the revolution, warned
them against counter-attacking the revolutionaries, and
reassured them that they would not be criticized by name
in the press (i.e. officially condemned) without higher-
level approval. In sum, the directive incited the revo-
lutionary young against the party apparatus without pro-
viding them with any clear criterion for distinguishing
between those loyal to Mao's thought and those disloyal,
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while keeping in the party leadership's hands the later
decision as to whom actually to purge.
The Now Team and the Red Guards
This party plenum which had produced the 16-point
directive lasted through 12 August. There is some evidence
that a minority showed resistance in this plenum to Mao's
plans for the further conduct of the revolution, in
particular the plan for the further subordination of the
conventional party apparatus and for attacks on it by the
Red Guards about to emerge. Party spokesmen have implied
that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping led the resistance
forces at the plenum, but it is not clear whether they
were in open opposition to Mao or (in defending themselves
against charges) simply said things that were taken as
open opposition because Mao was already determined to break
them. In any case, Liu and Teng were demoted by the plenum
(Teng, the junior, was not held responsible to the same
degree for the pair's "errors"), and Lin Piao was "un-
animously" elected as the party's (sole) vice chairman.
Lin addressed the plenum, identifying himself completely
with Mao, stating his favor for the militants, announcing
the new team's plans for reorganizing the party according
to Mao's principles for the cultivation of revolutionary
successors, reiterating the team's intention to purge
those who proved to be hard-case incorrigibles among
party officials, and confiding his expectation of a long
and hard struggle.
On 13 August the central committee issued a com-
munique on the plenum. While certain differences between
the party and the PLA press in commenting on the 8 August
directive had suggested possible differences in degrees
of militancy among members of the new team, the communique
itself was thoroughly militant, reiterating the need for
"daring" and for turning the masses loose. Soon there-
after, on 18 August, the Red Guards made their first ap-
pearance at a rally which displayed Lin Piao publicly as
Mao's new anointed successor. The rally also displayed
the rest of the new team (less Mme. Mao): Chou En-lai
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as still third-ranking, Tao Chu (the new propaganda chief)
and Chen Po-ta of the "cultural revolution group" newly
risen to fourth and fifth, Teng IIsiao-ping sixth but
demoted among active leaders, Kang Sheng (the old police
figure) risen to seventh, aLid Liu Shao-chi down all the
way from second to eighth. Conunentaries immediately fol-
lowing the 13 August rally suggested strong', that a
number of other party leaders would be brought down, in-
cluding any who resisted the attacks of the Red Guards.
The Unleashing of the Red Guards
In the days following the rally, Chou Ln-lai and
officers of the central "cultural revolution group" gave
a number of interviews to the Red Guards, bypassing the
conventional party apparatus which was about to be attacked.
The Guards were told that they were free to organize them-
selves any way they liked, and to say in their posters
anything they liked. They ware expressly incited against
the party apparatus, but--as confirmed in many accounts
of these briefings--they were not given specific targets,
and were told repeatedly to sorve their problems (whom
to attack, and how hard to attack) for themselves. In
other words, once again the instruments of the revolu-
tion were set in motion without clear guidance. (This
feature of the revolution--incredible to most Western
observers--derives from Mao's conception of the process
as a test of both the party officials being attacked and
the attacking forces, a revolutionary "storm" in which
potential revolutionary successors--both ser:ior and
junior--would prove themselves. The concept, to an out-
sider, is basically irrational; but it is clearly Mao's
concept, and Mao in important respects is irrational).
In the last ten days of August the Red Guards
burst out in the streets of Chinese cities. Their actions
were first reported as directed against the visible signs
of traditional, Western and Soviet influence, but a picture
later emerged of violence from the start, with beatings,
torture, forced labor, pressured suicides, and murder (all
of this against a defenseless populace), attacks on party
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headquarters and 'arty officials, and clashes between
visiting Red Gu; ds and local forces (including Rod
Guards) organized by local officials. Later information
also showed that the Red Guards even in this first stage
of their activity began to split into hosti'.e and com-
peting factions, possibly reflecting differences in the
new team itself.
The Subsidence of the Red Guards
The violence of the Red Guards began to subside
in Peking--the pilot area for the country--at the end of
August, at which time Lin Piao and Chou En-lai made the
first of a series of speeches in which the two leaders
were to take somewhat different lines, leading to specula-
tion about critical differences between them. In this
case, while both ca?led for better discipline on the part
of the Rf.:d Guards ("Don't hit people"), Lin again incited
them against party leaders while Chou did not. However,
in briefing Red Guards going out to the provinces, Chou
also encouraged the Red Guards to move aggressively against
local party leaders despite anticipated resistance. Chou
again refused--at this stage--to specify targets or to
state the new team's favor for one wing of the Red Guards
over others, although both of these things were done at
a later stage. There is no evidence that Lin Piao or
any other leader was giving the Guards contrary instruc-
tions privately.
While the party leaders in Peking were calling
both for militancy and for discipline, and Peking itself
was fairly quiet, serious clashes continued elsewhere in
China until mid-September. In some of these clashes,
thousands of people were engaged, sometimes with hundreds
of injuries and dozens of dead. There is excellent evi-
dence of the insolence and brutality of the Red Guards
toward party officials and even the PLA. It seems clear
that the dominant leaders did not try very hard to hold
the Guards within well-defined limits.
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Some observers have held that it was really the
objective of the Red Guards in that period to overthrow
the first secretaries of the regional, provincial and-"
municipal bodies they "bombarded," and that they there-
fore failed in their mission: but the evidence is to
the contrary. Just as the Guards w~.-re not given specific
targets, so they were not told how far to go, and the
PLA at that stage was not told to help them. Moreover,
a survey of the Red Guard action--that is, of the targets
of attack, and of the weight of the attacks--shows no
pattern. In Peking's eyes the mission of the Rud Guards
seems to have been, at that stage, not to overthrow but
to shock, shake up, test the responses of, the party
leaders outside Peking--out of Mao's dogmatic belief
that the truth would emerge from such a "storm" and out
of the new team's practical desire for additional material
on which to base the real purge-list later. The first
secretaries outside Peking, however, may well have con-
cluded that most of them would end up on the list no
matter what they did.
On 15 September, at a third great rally marking
the end of the first period of Red Guard violence, Lin
Piao again called for action (by implication, violence)
against party leaders, while Chou En-lai chose to empha-
size a constructive role for the Red Guards--assisting
in production. Again these differences suggested pos-
sible policy differences. however, party and PLA journals
soon endorsed the positions taken by both leaders, and
the R,.~d Guards did in fact help with the harvest.
In briefing the Red Guards in that period for future
operations, Chou En-lai and others of Mao's new team em-
phasized that it was not Mao's intention to destroy the
conventional party apparatus, and imposed clear, specific
limitations on the Guards (e.g. they were not to seize
official media, or imprison people). These spokesmen
continued, however, to refuse to provide specific targets
or to arbitrate the quarrels among the Red Guards; and
the Guards themselves continued to polarize, preparing
to set up rival headquarters. At the end of September,
it appeared that further and strong action would be taken
against important figures in the party, but that there
might be some delay.
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waiting, Perhaps Debating
The party's pronouncements in early October were
thin and ambiguous: e.g., the party journal in a single
editorial called for "striking down" party leaders and
for allowing them to correct their errors. However, with-
out publicity, the new team moved to reinstate the most
militant students (now Red Guards) who had been denounced
and suppressed by the work-teams, and in other ways
began at this time to show its favor for this wing.
Moreover, also without publicity, self-criticisms by
leaders who had made "mistakes" (e.g. Liu Shao-chi's wife)
were being offered. Peking continued in this period to
make known that Lin Piao was to be Mao's successor and
to try to validate his claim to this position.
There is some evidence that in mid-October an im-
portant member of the new team submitted to the others
a report on the "cultural revolution" which was soon
found unsatisfactory, indeed a continuation of the "er-
roneous line" of Liu Shao-chi and Tong Hsiao-ping. This
report might have been by Tao Chu (who began to be attacked
in posters three weeks later), and may have been seen
as an effort by Tao to protect the party apparatus (in-
cluding Tao's own assets in the Central-South, where he
had been the regional first secretary), against the plans
of more militant members of the new team.
On 18 October, there was another mass rally which
was confined to a drive-by and seemed aborted. The reason
apparently lay in a dispute among the Red Guards about
posting public criticism of Liu Si.ao-chi, a dispute which
may, again, have reflected disagreement in the new team
as to how to handle Liu. The Guards were told, in effect,
that the time was not ripe, which led to such large-scale
fighting among them that the plans for a conventional
rally were changed. At about this time, rival Red Guard
headquarters began to appear.
Immediately thereafter, the party press began a
series of extremely militant commentaries which suggested
that the dominant figures of the new team were trying to
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persuade some others that the time was at hand for deci-
sive action against some of the party leaders in disfavor.
In the same period, the recently-rehabilitated militants
of the Red Guards smashed up some government offices in
Peking, and there was a barrage of poster attacks on
ministries and their coordinating staff offices. These
various developments suggested to some observers a warn-
ing to Chou Fn-lai and others not to persist in opposi-
tion to the plans of the dominant figures. While Chou
and Tao Chu both might reasonably be regarded as less
militant than some others, Chou at least was in good favor
and remained so, and the line-up of the time thus remains
obscure.
Mao's Scenario
On 31 October, Red Flag made public a scenario
for the future course of the purge. It told party offi-
cials that, with the exception of a few hard cases, those
in disfavor with the new team could keep from getting
purged by conducting a grovelling self-criticism, admit-
ting their errors (e.g. in the period of the work-teams,
or during Red Guard "bombardments"), restoring the reputa-
tions of those they had damaged, and (in effect) swear-
ing eternal allegiance to Mao's thought. While some
observers argued that Peking was really saying that it
was unable to act against leaders in disfavor, the edi-
torial suggested instead that Mao was planning a prolonged,
elaborate spectacle of a kind he had staged before on a
smaller scale.
Materials received much later revealed that the
Chinese party was holding a work-conference at this time
--ending about 8 November--in which Mao and Lin made
important speeches, and in which Liu and Teng, both in
disgrace, offered their first self-criticisms. This con-
ference was evidently attended by many or most of the
regional and provincial first secretaries, whom Mao could
have purged on the spot if that was all he wanted to do.
The speeches of Mao and Lin, which are little known, are
exceptionally valuable for an understanding of what Mao
and Ln in fact wanted to do.
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Mao in his speech blamed himself for having allowed
Liu and Tong (for some years before August) to handle the
"routine work" of the party, admitted that he had not fore-
seen every turn of the cultural revolution, and reaffirmed
the value of mass action. He went on to tell his audience
--in particular, the regional and provincial leaders--
that they had not been well--prepared for the Red Guard
descent on them in August and September and should be
better-prepared for (lie implied) another wave. He at-
tempted to reassure them that most of then would "pass
the test," and said that even Liu and Teng need not be
regarded as hard-case incorrigibles like Peng Chen and
others of the first group. (Mao was not convincing, how-
ever, in this avuncular role.)
Mao's speech was apparently followed by the self-
criticisms of Liu and Teng, in which both accepted re-
sponsibiliti' for providing erroneous guidance (i.e.,
guidance later found so) to the work-teams. Liu went on
to blame h:;.mself for certain rightist retreats in policy
in earlier years which Mao almost certainly had approved
at the time but which he now wished to attribute to some-
one else. However, neither self-criticism, as reported,
was as grov~;lling as Mao appeared to desire. In fact,
Liu made a ;tinly-veiled defense of his actions, arguing
(truthfully) that he had not been given clear guidance.
Lin Piao in his speech to the conference did not
bother to adopt a conciliatory pose and was harsh toward
Liu and Teng in particular. He emphasized that Mao meant
to carry out a thorough struggle against opposing ideology,
for as long as necessary. He too praised the Red Guards.
He also asserted that most of the party apparatus outside
Peking was "good," but he said frankly that all local
leaders would be judged for the mistakes that all local
committees had made. it is doubtful that many :,~f the
first secretaries from the regions and provinces were
reassured by this presentation.
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Preparations for the Spectacle
immediately following the conference, on 10 November
People's Daily returned to the proposition--identified
in p icul r-with Chou En-lai--that the cultural revolu-
tion must not be allowed to interfere with production.
It was further reported that factories were being allowed
to disband Red Guard units and replace them by "militia."
Chou continued in high favor.
During these first two weeks of November, there
were renewed reports of serious incidents involving the
Red Guards on one hand and party figures, the PLA, and
factory workers on the other. In some of these, the Red
Guards again beat and tortured party officials. In mid-
November, the party closed the city of Peking to visit-
ing Red Guards for the winter, and also forbade the Guards
from operating private jails, kangaroo courts, and torture
chambers. At the same time, however, the central committee
issued a general directive on the rehabilitation of the
militants, another sign of the favor of the dominant figures
for the very forces which had been doing these things.
As of mid-November, the new team itself did not
seem stable. it was still dominated by an irrational
and highly suspicious man whose continued favor could
not be counted on and who might himself behave so badly
that his lieutenants would combine to overthrow him,
and its other members looked like a mismatched set. There
had already been signs of disagreement--perhaps very
serious disagreement--among them, drawn along 'militant'
and 'moderate' lines. Most observers, even while disagree-
ing about what had happened in the previous year, could
and did agree at that time that the new team probably
would not last.
On 23 November, Red Guard pamphlets denouncing
Liu and Teng in detail seemed to foretell early public
action against some of the party leaders who had pre-
viously been removed from the public scene or publicly
demoted. Mao is said to have left Peking (after a final
Red Guard rally) on 26 November. On 28 November, Mao's
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wife publicly reiterated that those who had failed Mao
would be put through criticism. and self-criticism in
public spectacles, and that some would be brought down
in any case; moreover, Mine. Mao seemed to snub Tao Chu
publicly on this occasion,
The Beginning of t11- Spectacle
On 4 December, Mao's new team began to stage this
long-promised series of spectacles. On that day, Peng
Chen and six lesser officials ("cultural" figures) were
handed over to the Red Guards. Posters soon demanded
their "trial," and other posters called for the dismis-
sal from their posts of Liu Shao-chi and Tong Hsiao-ping.
These were probably intended i.n part as a warning to
regional and provincial officials to offer. (or augment)
their own self-criticisms before time ran out.
By this time, all or almost all of the party's
regional bureaus and provincial committees, and most of
the major municipal committees, had been repeatedly cri-
ticized in Red Guard posters. Some of this criticism--of
those not criticized earlier--may have been commissioned
by the new team to get such criticism on the record, in
order to justify action against all of those (e.g. proteges
of leaders in disfavor) against whom it wanted to move
for whatever reason. No doubt a large purge-list was
taking shape.
At this time (12 December), Red Flag reiterated
the ritual by which an erring officia mus seek forgive-
ness--self-abasement, reinstatement of those injured,
and correction of the record. This editorial was especi-
ally interesting in suggesting that many officials were
refusing to make the kind of self-criticism Mao wanted,
and in further suggesting that some of them were capable
of putting Peking to a lot of trouble before being brought
down.
Meanwhile, in early December there had continued
to be serious clashes between the Red Guards and party
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committees, between the Guards and workers, and among
elements of the Guards. Beginning on 12 December, party
leaders--particularly Chou En?-lai and Mme. Mao--again
condemned violence by, against, and among the Guards,
but again stated their favor for the most militant ele-
itients of the Guards, those chiefly responsible for the
violence. Chou and Mme. Mao soon took action to dis-
band some of the Red Guard organizations which had opposed
these militants
Mao's new team was clearly plan-
ning to use the Guards on a large scale again.
From 12 December, the public scene in Peking was
filled with rallies. On that date, Peng Chen was put on
public display, possibly with others of the first group
(Lu Ting-i, Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun). On 13 Decem-
ber Tao Chu, who himself may (but may not) have been al-
ready marked for discard, made the first public attack
by a party leader on Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.
Tao is said to have stated that theme had not been enough
criticism of the Liu/Teng line--and, of course, not
enough self-criticism by those who had implemented it.
Tao's defense of himself for implementing that line .in
June and July was jeered by some of his audience.
In mid-December, the new team released Liu's self-
criticism; and Mme. Mao publicly rejected it as . "hoax,"
but refused to let the Red Guards feature Liu and Teng
in a public rally--possibly in the interest of not pro-
voking any additional resistance from the party apparatus.
She is also said to have told the Guards to allow the
Ministry of Public Security to make all the arrests,
while at the same time criticizing the Ministry (still
directed by a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping who had turned
against Teng) and announcing that it or at least elements
of it would henceforth be subordinated to Lin Piao's PLA.
Moreover, in the first known instance of specific target-
ting by a party leader against others not already in clear
disfavor, Mme. Mao marked several second-level leaders
for action by the Red Guards.
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Public criticism of those in disfavor intensified,
others came into disfavor, and even old opponents were
gathered in. On 10 and 20 December, fresh rallies were
hold to denounce Peng Chen and others of the first group;
all were displayed at the rally, and were brutally. handled
by the Red Guards. zit the same time, huge new posters
demanded further action against--even "liquidation" of--
Liu and Tong. Other leaders, including Ho Lung of the
military affairs committee (who was later to be accused
of planning a "rebellion" or "coup") were also denounced.
Peng Te-huai, the former Minister of Defense (Lin Piao's
predecessor) who had led the opposition to Mao in 1959
and then disappeared, was reportedly seized by Red Guards
and brought to Pelting.
The decision to move more forcefully against op-
ponents of the new team seemed to be reflected in two
other important developments in December. On 26 December
(Mao's 73rd birthday), People's Daily made public the
essentials of a party r'irec ,ive which turned the Red
Guards and other "revolutionary" organizations , oose
on the factories; it was soon revealed that the "revolu-
tion" would move into the countryside "on a large scale"
as well. Visible resistance to the "revolution" in those
areas may have led the new team to take this action
earlier than originally intended. The other was the fall
of Tao Chu, and--apparently--of a number of military
fi;ures, perhaps a week or so later,
In early January, Tao, the ourt?h-ranking member
of the new team, was being denounced in the same terms
as Liu and Teng and may have been paraded around Peking;
and at the same time a number of military leaders--both
commanders and pol i't ic.tl officers--began to be denounced.
There were several other party leaders, at the second
level, who seemed marked for discard. The party appeared
to be moving into a period in which there would be unusual
opportunities for Mao's lieutenants to maneuver against
one another.
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Prospects
With respect to action against its opponents, Mao's
new team by the end of December 1966 had moved some distance
from the situation it had been in as early as October and
as late as late November--when its pronouncements had in
effect put the new team itself on trial, had obliged it
to take some further action if it were not to seem either
frivolous or impotent. It had taken such action. But
it was agair. in a situation in which further action seemed
to be demanded---action against those in disfavor who had
refused to go through the elaborate ritual prescribed
for them or had been found irredeemable anyway--including
der,,inciation by name in the official press, the trial and
sentencing of some of those in custody in Peking, and
the dislodgement of some unregenerate leaders (probably
the majority of the regional and provincial first secre-
taries) outside Peking.
The party directives of December, on extending the
"revolution" to the factories and the countryside, gave
Mao's new team both an occasion and an instrument for
taking action at the same time against regional and pro-
vincial leaders: that is, the progress of the revolu-
tion would surely cause a great deal of disorder and
additional resistance, and party leaders outside Peking
could be blamed for this, whereupon the Red Guards and
other "revolutionary" organizations could depose those
leaders by the approved method of mass action, action
taken together with acceptable elements of the party com-
mittees. Reports from the provinces in January 1967 sug-
gested that this in fact was happening at several points;
Peking was explaining that the simple "overthrow" of those
in disfavor would not do, that there must be a "seizure
of power" by a "mass movement," arid was praising revolu-
tionary "rebels" (against the conventional apparatus) who
were calling for joint action with those in the party
committees who were loyal to Mao's line. Once again, how-
ever, as often since 1957, Mao may have underestimated
the resistance his new initiative would provoke. Already
in late January there were indications that the PLA would
have to be used, something that Mao had preferred not to
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do, and which may have been the issue behind the purge
of late December. Moreover, if as expected the new of-
fensive were to have damaging economic consequences, the
strength of the resistance would also be expected to
increase.
The role of the PLA leaders--including the command-
ers of regional headquarters--may be critical. These
leaders have had some reason to worry, but have not had
as good reason as-Have first secretaries outside Peking
to conclude that most of them will be purged no matter
what they do. On balance, it seems likely that some of
them will refuse to follow Mao's orders, but that the
great majority will do as they are told. Thus, while
it is conceivable thrt Mao and others of the new team will
be overthrown following a split in the PLA, the probability
seems otherwise. The prospect seems to be for substantial
resistance by various combinations of forces at some
points, but not for resistance coordinated to the point
of posing a threat to Mao and the other central leaders.
The threat to the new team seems still to proceed
The new team
even as recomposed--without Tao Chu--still seems unstable;
not even Lin Piao, let alone the less militant Chou En-
lai, can be sure of Mao's continued favor.
There are various possibilities for a true "power
struggle"--that is, for Mao's power. Two possibilities
turn on Lin's position: if he sees himself as declining
in Mao's favor (the tone of Peking's treatment of Lin has
been muted since November), he might make common cause
against Mao--with Chou and various military leaders--while
he still can. Or if Lin is actually deposed before he
can do this, there might in consequence be the kind of
equalization of strength among the two groups of Mao's
lieutenants--the Maoists, and the relative moderates
around Chou--which would make a frank competition feasible;
then, should Chou win out, he might go on--with the sup-
port of the military leaders--to depose Mao himself.
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There are at least two possibilities for a power 25X6
struggle which do not depend on a decline in Lin's posi-
tion. One is that of Mao's death
the new team might quickly pull apart, through an an intensification of the differences that seem already
to exist. Another is that of Mao's severe deterioration,
to the point of incapacity, so that Tire` would have to be
set aside.
While evaluation of these possibilities
--a Lin-led coup, a Chou-led coup,vMao's"death,~or Mao''s
incapacity should probably be re
ard
d
g
e
as an outside
chance in itself. And the four of them seem to add up
to less than an overall probability of Mao's early over-
throw. In sum, the prospect for 1967 seems to be for
the continued dominance of Mao and the Maoists, and for
their continued progress--at various speeds at various
points--toward the reorganization of the party, govern-
mental and military apparatus throughout China.
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THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND ITS VEHICLES
The "great proletarian cultural revolution" in
China is said by Peking to have derived from a nuitber
of insights and pronouncements by Mao Tse-tung between
1962 and the e:nd of 1965: e.g. his admonition to the
central committee's tenth plenum in September 1962
"never to forget class struggle," his complaint about
the state of the arts in China in December 1963, his
warning to Chinese literary associations in June 1964
that they and most of their publications had failed to
carry out the party's policies, and his declaration in
another central committee m,.eting of September 1965
that it was necessary to "criticize bourgeois reaction-
ary thinking." Mao is further said to have "personally
organized and led" the "cultural revolution" in the "last
half of 1965."
While these initiatives now attributed to Mao were
not made public at the time and cannot be confirmed, the
regime did in fact launch a "socialist education" campaign
in spring 1963--a conventional campaign, conducted through
orthodox part organs
and in mid-1964 public y
indicated that something more ambitious lay ahead. On
14 July 1964, in the last of a series of violently
polemical articles directed against the Soviet party
,
Peking published an article "On Khrushchev's Phoney Com-
munism" which has since been attributed to Mao personally.
Among other things, the article spoke of "degeneration"
in Chinese society (and of the efforts of "degenerates"
to find "protectors and agents in the higher leading
bodies"), of the need for a "thorough socialist revolu-
tion on the political and ideological fronts" requir-
ing a century or several centuries, of the need to con-
duct extensive socialist education movements repeatedly
throughout China, and of the need to train millions of
successors who would carry on Mao's policies rather than
to allow China to evolve into a "phoney" Communist state
like the USSR. It was asserted further that such suc-.
cessors would come forward in "mass struggles" and be
tempered in the "great storms of revolution."
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It is the thesis of this paper that Mao's obsession
with the problem of revolutionary successors--of ensuring
that his successors, and their successors, be leaders whom
he couFcc( trust to carry ouiis will--is the central fact
in developments in China since September 1965. This paper
will contend that no other hypothesis can explain either
the course of the "cultural revolution" or its casualties.
The September 1965 meeting--not a plenum--of the
CCP central committee probably played an important role
in shaping the "cultural revolution," and possibly in
fixing its targets among the top-ranking leaders of the
party; but there is little solid information about it.
Beyond the bare statement of the party that Mao at this
meeting "pointed out that it is necessary to criticize
bourgeois reactionary thinking"--which might at the time
have referred narrowly to "cultural" matters, or at the
other extreme might have referred to every kind of opposi-
tion to the entire range of Mao's policies--the evidence
on the content of the meeting is confined to a few state-
nouncements by some " Lo~I
Y purged leaders which can be read in
various ways, and assertions made recently in wall-posters.
The September 1965 meeting need not, of course,
have been confined to the coming revolution, but might
have taken up--as well at that time as another--a set
of large related matters, not only the content and scope
of the "cultural revolution," but policies of economic
and military development, the situation of the war in
Vietnam on which Peking had staked so much, the implica-
tions of all this for Peking's relationship with the USSR
and s
_-
o
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There is some confirmation in the 1 October 1965
number of Red Flag that the September 1965 meeting had
been concerned in large part if not mainly with the forth-
coming "cultural revolution," and that there had been
some resistance in the meeting to Mao's sense of it. A
major editorial on that date, "Adopt the Proletarian
World Outlook to Create Our New World," reviewed the
"tremendous successes" which had resulted from following
Mao's guidance and the party's line, and went on to ob-
serve ominously that "the old ideas. . .have always attemp'Led
to fight for survival and to disseminate their influence
under the cloak of names and slogans of socialism and
Marxism-Leninism"--the implication being that some persons
in the party who presented an orthodox appearance were
covertly heretical. (This line was later to emerge as
the charge that Mao's opponents were waving a false 'Red
Flag' in order to bring down the real Red Flag.) Never-
theless, it was still possible for the party journal to
reassure its readers that the determination to achieve
a through-going "proletarian world outlook...does not
mean that we want to negate everything and denigrate
heritage"; it was rather to "keep all the valuable parts
intact," and the method of operation was to be that of
"democratic criticism," making "full use of explanation."
The Red Flag warning about heresy-masked-as-orthodoxy
was no repeated in the editorial of the People's Daily,
which was to lag until the following June t- i eceiVing
the signals correctly in the "cultural revolution."
A wall-poster not reported uritil January 1967 also
provides some confirmation of opposition to Mao's concepts
in that ;eptember 1965 meeting. Mao himself is quoted
in the poster as declaring that the "party center. . .pro-
posed revisionism" it, September and October 1965. The
implication is that the top leaders of the party apparatus--
Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--led this opposition,
and another poster of the same period expressly accuses
Teng of being in opposition to Mao in that meeting; but
these charges came at a ti.iie when Peking was blackening
Liu and Teng retroactively, and it is uncertain whether
they really were in opposition that early.
The evidence is a bit better that Peng Chen and
Lo Jui-ching were among those offering resistance then
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to some aspect of Mao's plans for the "revolution." Peng
Chen, speaking on National Day (1 October) in Peking, can
be regarded at least in hindsight as speaking like a man
who had lost an argument about "cultural" policy and
wanted both to reaffirm his position and to keep the sub-
ject open for another effort later: after a number of
frank statements about China's backwardness and problems,
Peng in this speech asserted that the party must encourage
the "full airing of different views" and must pay atten-
tion to all views both correct and incorrect, because
"divergent views make comparison possible and help guard
against onesidedness." (This can also be read as an am-
plification of portions of the Red Flag editorial, but
Chou En-lai in a speech on the same occasion did not take
this line.)*
o ui-c ing s -speeches of May and September 1965 can
also be read as implying favor for positions which, if
stated in the September meeting, could have got him into
troubl;. But readers differ as to which of his conjectured
views are applicable. Some hold that in his May speech,
in discussing preparations for war and the strategy of
"active defense" in war, Lo was stating his favor for
some doctrine other than Mao's; it is hard to understand
this argument, however, as Lo in his speech spells out
the doctrine in terms which seem to be entirely consonant
with Mao's, and in fact explicitly cites Mao as his auth-
ority for the doctrine. Others hold that in his September
speech (delivered just prior to the meeting), Lo was
stating his favor for a more aggressive policy in the war
in Vietnam, one which would have meant war with the U.S.;
others do not find that in his speech but find instead
indications of a strong professional respect for (or fear
of) the U.S. military establishment ("They are armed to
the teeth and possess complete sets of machinery for kill-
ing people. Whoever is afraid of death...has no alterna-
tive but to surrender..."). Either point of view could
have led him to argue that the central problem was not
the indoctrination but the combat-readiness of the military
establishment, which would entail a compromise with the
USSR, and so on. He may well have argued this way, but,
it will be contended, for other reasons than those imputed
to him on the basis of this speech.
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Peng, at a propa-
ganda conference the same month (September 1965), declared
tII t
o
everyone is equal before the truth--a proposition
subsequently attacked as a slogan of the "black gang"--
and that even Chairman Mao should be criticized if he
were wrong.
I
a "rumor" that Peng tried to muster a
a
i
m
jor
ty
vote against Mao at the September meeting--presumably an
overstatement, in view of Peng's continued activity
through March 1966. However, the various material, includ-
ing the fact that action was begun against Peng only two
months after the September meeting, does seem to add up
to a probability that Peng was in some degree of opposi-
tion to Mao at that meeting.
The same is true of Lo Jui-ching, who was appar-
ently seized just two months after the meeting.
On the PLA anniversary in 1966 (1 August), the news-
papcr, reviewing the three "big struggles" against repre-
sentatives of the "bourgeois military line" since 1953
(all of them, actually, stating a professional military
point of view as opposed to Mao's obsession with guerrilla
warfare and political indoctrination), spoke of the last
struggle as "not very long ago," a struggle with those
who "had got hold of important posts in the army and...
opposed the Party's central committee and Mao Tse-tung's
thought,...covertly opposed Comrade Lin Piao's directives
on putting politics in the forefront,... gave first con-
sideration to military affairs, technique and specialized
work..."
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In other
words, Lo's offense was to resist Mao's desire for even
further political indoctrination of the armed forces at
the necessary expense of military preparedness.*
As for others who may have opposed Mao at that
September meeting, there is less evidence.
J Lu Ting-i, then director of the propaganda depart-
ment and third in importance among the party leaders thus
far purged, also spoke at the September 1965 propaganda
conference summoned by Peng Chen, and in his speech at-
tacked Stalin (read Mao). Another possibility is Yang
Shang-kun, judging entirely from his disappearance. And
as previously noted, it is possible that Liu and Teng
were among the opposition. Tia is, the build-up
of Lin Piao to replace Liu as Mao's chosen successor
moved swiftly after September 1965, and, while it had
begun before the meeting with the attribution to Lin
of a major article on Mao's thought,** its acceleration
may have reflected Mao's disappointment with Liu's
performance at the m:_,eting. Finally, recent poster
attacks (since November 1066) on Liu and Teng include the
*r. Red. uard_poster has quoted Chou En-lai as assert-
ing that Peng and Lo (the "armed forces") were in league.
This may or may not hare been true, but they seem to have
had a common interest in preventing Mao from carrying out
his extreme policies.
**One of the functions of Lin's article was to 'correct'
a mistake made by Peng Chen in May, when Peng had publicly
(and correctly) attributed to Aidit the concept that the
countryside of the world will surround and overcome the
cities of the world, a concept which Mao claims as his
own; Lin in his article set the record 'straight,' and,
in view of Mao's boundless vanity, it seems likely that
Peng was already in some trouble about this.
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charge that Teng at the September meeting made a speech
declaring his opposition to the plans for a cultural
revolution and in particular to changes in the educational
system; this charge is no doubt over-stated, in view of
Teng's subsequent continuance in some degree of favor
until August 1966, but it is possible that Teng offered
less than the resounding approbation that Mao desired.
In sum, while September 1965 was probably an im-
portant date in the development of the "cultural revolu-
tion," it is impossible to judge how much of Mao's think-
ing he made known at the meeting. Similarly, while several
of the party's leaders--Liu, Teng, Peng, Lu, Lo, Yang,
and perhaps others--were or may have been resisting Mao
at that meeting, it is impossible to judge the degree or
(in most cases) the precise issue.
A harsh tone about the party's intentions, together
with a description of the ongoing campaign as a "cultural
revolution," appeared in the official version (1 January
1966) of a speech given by the propagandist and culture
monitor Chou Yang in. November 1965. But Chou was not
launching a qualitatively different campaign; he was in-
stead trying to get aboard a bandwagon which (he had
observed) had begun to roll in Shanghai three weeks earlier,
and which was soon to run down Chou Yang himself.
Mao Contrives a Test, Winter 1965-66
The Shanghai development was the appearance in a
local newspaper of a polemical attIck by Yao Wen-yuan,
a little known Shanghai writer, on a 1961 play by Wu Han,
a well-known writer who had worked closely with officials
on the party's Peking municipal committee headed by Peng
Chen. This event--the initiative for which was taken
directly or indirectly by Mao--was not even noticed in
the West; this particular issue (10 November) of the
paper was not received.
The contention of the party
tnat it was Mao who ordere the firing of this
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25X1
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opening gun, is more credible than is the contention of
some observers that one of Mao's lieutenants--say, Lin
Piao or Teng Ilsiao-ping- -planted the article as a specula-
tive investment for which he only later got Mao's back-
ing. Mao was, after all, active at the time, and this
was a major decision.* It also seems, on balance (although
this was in doubt for some months), more likely that Mao
deliberately did not make his intentions clear as to what
purpose the article was to serve, than that Mao fell ill
before he could make his intentions clear. In other
words, Mao meant the article to serve as a test for his
entire "cultural" apparatus and for the hig es leaders
of the party apparatus which supervised it, with a few
possible exceptions: Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and a few
others (e.g., Chiang Ching) were probably regarded as
having already passed the test, and were in Mao's confid-
ence; while Peng Chen, l:u Ting-i and a few others
(e.g.
Chou Yang) were probably regarded as having already failed
the test, and thus already marked or purging. Thus Mao
was doing in 1965 what the party had asserted--probably
falsely--that he had done in 1957 in'the first stage of
the "hundred flowers" campaign, namely, allowing people
to respond freely (without guidance) to a major initiative,
and then punishing those whose reponses did not please
him. (In the 1957 campaign, it had been Mao who was
deceived: the evidence is good that in encouraging free
expression in that campaign he had mistaken obedience
- Pelirig-Yirs-f said-That the local newspaper published
the article "under the leadership of the /hanghai7 party
organization..." Later, Peking said that-this wag done
by the Shanghai committee of the party under the "direct
leadership" of Mao and the central committee
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for love and was shocked by the opposition and hostility
revealed, and that when the crackdown came the party
was simply putting a good face on things by asserting
that Macy all along had meant to entice his enemies to
stick their heads tip so he could cut them off; but Mao
hau learned something from 1957, that his opponents could
be enticed into revealing themselves. It seems likely,
although it cannot be proved, that Liu and Teng were
already on the list of those to be "tested." There is
an alternative hypothesis--that Liu and Teng were in
Mao's confidence from the start, joined him in watching
the party's "cultural" leaders disgrace themselves, and
only later fell into disgrace themselves; but this is
not consistent with evidence that Liu at least (if not
Teng) was falling from Mao's favor as early as March.
The failure of Liu and Teng to bring the central press
into line on the "cultural" issue as Mao had posed it--
whether Hai Jui was a "poisonous weed"--can be explained
in either-of--two ways: (a) they may have been consciously
resisting what they sensed to be Mao's will (if the
charges of opposition as early as September 1965 are
true), perhaps in the expectation that Mao would die or
that they would prevail anyway, or (b), as seems a bit
more likely, they may instead simply have failed to un-
derstand what Mao wanted, have lacked the illumination
of his already-revealed thought and the revolutionary
ardor which (in Mao's view) shoLid have shown them the
"correct" line without specific guidance. Either way,
they failed the test.
immediately after the publication of Yao's
article, the Peking committee queried the Shanghai commit-
tee as to what kind of high-level backing this article
might have. in the next three weeks, most of China's
important newspapers and journals reprinted the article;
one group of publications--led by Lin Piao's Liberation
Army Daily--forthrightly agreed with the author tT aVW
Han s ayay was a "poisonous weed," while another group--
including the central committee's own newspaper, People's
Daily, and the publications of the Peking committee--ca ed
instead for a "hundred flowers" debate on the question.
Toward the end of November, Mao and a number of other
important leaders dropped out of sight; two of these--Lo
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Jui-ching .~ `an- Sharp --'-,o n--were apparently the first
top-level victims of the developing purge.*
It was not clear at the time that Lin Piao and the
PLA newspaper had been chosen as the public leaders of
the "cultural revolution, " although ;,here was some pre-
cedent. Since the time of the September 1962 plenum,
the ILA under Lin Piao had been consistently presented
as the model for all Chinese to emulate in the "creative
study and application of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works."
In 1964, a political officer system modelled on that of
the PLA had been established in several sectors of the
economy, staffed in large part by PLA officers. In
September 1965, with the appearance of Lin's first major
article (this on Mao's concept of "people's revolution-
ary war"), the regime had begun to build up Lin as the
foremost and ideal student of Mao's thought. And on 15
November 1965, Lin issued a five-point directive on the
work of the PLA for 1966. Although this too was not
clear at the time, this directive was to be used as the
model for the testing of party officials as well as of-
ficers of the PLA--the essential point being whether
these officials "regarded the works of Mao Tse-tung as
the highest instructions" for their work. it was soon
explicitly stated and reiterated that Lin himself had
shown everybody how to study and apply Mao's thought.
There are various repor.s and conjectures as to
why 11Iao left Peking and as to what he was doing in this
period--lasting until early May--when he remained out of
sight. One view (the view taken by this study) is that
Mao withdrew in order to sketch out., or to observe (if
it had in fact been sketched out in September), from a
*Lo Failed-o +ap'pear on an important military funeral
committee in December. The removal of Lo--who had the
power to order troops into action--was evidently thought
to be a more urgent necessity than the removal of Peng.
This was probably true of Yang also.; although he may not
have been arrested for months.
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safer place than Peking, the "cultural revolution" as it
developed from November to June, and possibly to prepare for
An o eratx ' d
Y
p on urng the winter. At the other extreme
is the view that he left because of sudden and critical
illness and was so indisposed through this period as to
be ca able of nothin at all
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At the time of Mao's disappearance,* and parti-
cularly as the months wore on with no indication of Mao's
whereabouts or condition, there was ground for speculation
that Mao was seriously ill--perhaps completely incapacit-
ated i
There was not to be any
additional 'hard' evidence as to Mao's condition until
May 1966, when he re-emerged in what seemed to be aston-
ishingly good shape.
While it seems fair to assume that
Peking was never telling its officials the com lete truth,
the account of Mao's role s 25X1
generally credible, both because (a) some of the things
stated, which moreover seemed improbable at the time,
have since been confirmed, e.g. the importance of Mao's
wife in the "cultural revolution" in general and with
respect to specific tasks, and (b) the failure of
Liu S1iiao-c was ou of the news from mid-November
to mid-January, and was presumed at the time to have
been with Mao and in Mao's confidence; but the failure
of Liu Shao-chi to bring the central party press into
line on the question of Hai Jui, in the period of Decem-
ber t,) April while he was the ranking party leader, seems
most credibly explained by Mao's failure to confide in
Liu that he meant the issue of Hai Jui to serve as a
test for the entire party apparus-Tincluding Liu).
Wall-posters have quoted Mao to the effect that he left
Peking for Shanghai in November 1965 because he felt
that the party apparatus in Peking was unresponsive to
him--in other words, that he had already decided to purge
the entire top leadership of the party apparatus; but
it is uncertain whether he had really decided by that
time to purge anyone but Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching.
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.tn role to Mao between about ILLEGIB
i,",:ich in effect concedes that
ze was out oj' action in that period. This latter indica.-
tor as to the period o? Mao's inaction is supported by
(a) the fact that no activity to 25X1
Mao in tli:is period,- (b) the slow progress of the "cul-
tural revolution" in general and the party purge in
particular in the same period, as if other leaders were
unwilling to make large decisions in his absence, which
is just what would be expected, and (c) Mao's reappear-
ance in May of 1965 25X6
although the evidence is 'soft,' seems to In tu point t
to a
situation in which Mao took the major initiatives in the
"cultural revolution" at least before and after the
period of mid-January to mid-March 1966.
To return, then, Mao during December meditated on
the course of the "cultural revolution,"
Already unhappy with the perform-
ance of Peng Chen as head of the five-man committee which
had been in charge--possibly since inid-1964, possibly much
later in time--of implementing the cultural revolution,
and already having set in motion (directly or indirectly)
the process that was to destroy Peng (criticism of Wu
Han Is play as a "poisonous weed"), Mao called together
a few "cultural" figures who did not include Peng.
Those summoned were: Kang Sheng (already regarded as
the only reliable member of Pong's five-man committee),
Chen Po-ta (Mao's principal ghostwriter), Ai Ssu?-chi (a
theorist who died two months later), and Chiang Ching
(Mao's present wif
e, a onetime bit player in the movies.
* ien Po=ta Figs since emerged as head of the "group
in charge of cultural revolution," Kang as a senior offi-
cer of it, and Chiang as Chen's first deputy in the gr. :p .
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i In February, Peng
issued an unsatisfactory report on the cultural revolu-
tion in the name of his conunittee and then in the name
of the politburo--indicating, perhaps, Liu's approval--a
report which minimized class struggle, minimized the
importance of iIu Han's plays (as had Peng in October)
and mildly defended rightist writers against their left-
ist attackers.*
`-fA wall-poster hs.s conf firmed the existence of the five-
man committee and its issuance of this report at this
time. other posters assert that party and military lead-
ers were plotting a coup at this time (February), the period
of Mao's conjectured inactivity. The poster account is
not credible as a whole, because it assigns key roles to
Lo Jui-ching (almost certainly seized the previous Novem-
ber) and Ho Lung (in such good favor with Mao as late as
August 1066 that Mao rode with him at a rally).
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Early in the same month (March), Teng Hsiao-ping
had dropped out of sight, and was presumed to be with
Mao. Later in March, on the 26th, Peking announced that
Mao was not ill (meaning, probably, that he had recover-
ed),** and on the same day Liu Shao-chi departed on a
trip abroad that was to keep him out of Peking for the
next four weeks, a period in which important steps were
taken in the "cultural revolution" and the purge. Liu's
trip served two purposes: to give the appearance of
'business as usual' after the announcement that Mao was
well, and to get him out of the way for the move against
25X1
**There is credible recent testimony from the Japanese
Communist party that Mao was fully in command in late
March. After the CCP and JCP had reached agreement on
a joint communique, Mao met with the delegations and
peremptorily rejected their draft, thus reversing Chou
En-lai and several other senior leaders, whom he cri-
ticized for their conduct.
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Peng Chen.
On 29 March, Peng Chen
made his last public appearance; and in the second week
of April, probably some days after returning to Peking,
Teng Hsiao-ping reappeared in public.
The dispute on the issue of how hard a line to
take toward Wu Ban's play had been conducted throughout
the winter of 1965-66, and was still going on until a
few days before Tong's public reappearance. At that
time, the end of the first week in April, the party's
central publications--People's Daily and Red Flag--agreed
that Hai Jui was indeed a_"poisonous weed just-as Mao's
spokesman and the Liberation Army Daily (Lin Piao's voice)
had contended all along._ oo a and still does) as
though Tong had brought back to Peking--a few days before
he reappeared in public--clear instructions from Chairman
Mao, who had decided that the dispute had gone on long
enough, that some had passed the test and others had failed
it (some, of course, had been given the answers in advance),
and that all would now line up on one position. (Tie PLA
newspaper continued, however, to attack positions taken
by People's Daily, the party organ, on other issues.)
The Peking committee itself tried quickly--and un-
successfully--in mid-April to protect its leaders by
taking the lead in denouncing one of its own lesser figures
who had worked with Wu Tian. It was not clear at the
time whether any of the party's leaders--even the leaders
of the Peking committee--would fal:17-- i consequence of the
PLA newspaper's admonitions to "old comrades" and those
in "high positions" (5 April) and Red Flag's call for
acticn (29 April) against the "protectors of Wu Ilan,
but it was apparent that "socialist education" was about
to move, as the Communists say, to a new and higher stage--
that is, a wide-scale if not high-reaching purge.
On 18 April, the Liberation Army Daily in a major
editorial forecast the direction, iT not the full range,
of the developments of the next several. months. Entitled
"Hold aloft the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking
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and take an active part in the great socialist cultural
revolution," the editorial reviewed the "sharp class
struggle on the cultural front" and the "black anti-
socialist thread running counter to Mao Tse-tung's.think-
ing" since 1949, introduced the term "great... cultural
revolution" and traced it back to the tenth plenum in
September 1962, reiterated its earlier assertion that
Mao's works were to be regarded as 'supreme guidance,"
asserted that a "mass movement is rising," and called
in sum for nothing less than a "new culture." It did
not, however, specify, as party journals were later to
specify, that the main targets of the revolution would
be the "reactionary academic 'authorities"' and the
"bourgeois representatives within the party." On 30
April Chou En-lai lined up on the right side (where he
was to remain), declaring that a "cultural revolution
of great historical significance is being launched in
China." In speeches in the same period, Teng Hsiao-
ping spoke briefly but favorably of the new "revolution,"
while Liu Shao-chi did not find--or was not given--occasion
to mention it.
April-May: Dominance of the Party Apparatus
The "cultural revolution" began in some places in
late April, soon after the PLA newspaper had given the
signal in the 18 April editorial; and it seems to have
been underway everywhere in May. The theme of the first
stage was also stated (8 May) by the Liberation Army Daily:
"Open Fire on the Anti-Party and Anti=socla?isT ack
Thread."
At just this time (on or about 10 May), Mao reap-
peared, receiving a group of Albanian visitors at some
point believed to be in East China. Vith Mao on this oc-
casion were Lin, Chou, Teng, and a liaison official (Wu
Hsiu-chuan). (Chen Po-ta reappeared at the same time,
but not in this group.) In films of the meeting, Mao 25X6
looked astonishingly good: he looked younger than his
years, moved easily and without assistance and dis la ed
no tremors.
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Throughout China, in late April and May, rallies
and meetings of all elements of the population (or their
"representatives") were held in order to denounce the
"black gang" uncovered in Peking and to swear allegiance
to Mao's though. and promise to study it even more
thoroughly. These were not casual affairs; they seem
to have disrupted community life all over China for a
period of weeks; and worse was ahead.
Some observers have surmised that the "cultural
revolution" was directed from the start by the "group in
charge of the cultural revolution" at the party center
in Peking--that is, by the extraordinary body headed by
Chen Po-ta, a body which was an enlarged successor to the
five-man group headed by Peng Chen until his downfall in
or about April 1966. This surmise would seem reasonable
at first glance, and also because a number of special
groups named--from their own members---by party committees
at all levels in April and May expressly to carry out the
tasks of the "cultural revolution" were in most if not
all cases known as "cultural revolution teams" or "cultural
revolution groups," However, while the "group" at the
party center may have existed in a quiescent state in
April, May and June, there is good evidence that the con-
ventional party apparatus was in charge of the conduct
of the "revolution" in its early stages. This fact makes
more interesting the emergence of extraordinary party
bodies, and the activities of even more special organiza-
tions such as the Red Guards, later in the campaign.
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With the ground prepared in April and May, the
party was ready to move against the range of cultural and
educational organizations--"all cultural, educational,
journalistic, publishing and academic unii:s"--and in
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particularly against the educators, the principal carriers
of the -Ii case of "bourgeois ideology."
Before the campaign against these targets was
launched, there was apparently another central committee
meeting, analogous to the September 1965 meeting. Most
of the party's leaders were out of the news during the
third and fourth weeks of May. Wall-posters seen much
later (December) quoted Lin Piao to the effect that the
May meeting considered the fact that most central com-
mittee members had a poor understanding of the cultural
revolution and were resisting it; and the account of Lin's
speech to the October-November work-conference has him
criticizing Liu and Teng for acting contrary to the line
which--the speech suggests--was stated by Mao in May.*
Other posters have suggested 16 May--the date of a "com-
nmunique" cited by Lin--as the approximate date of the
decision to send in work-teams.
The campaign against the educators--which was
obviously planned from the start to be a campaign concur-
rently against the party committees in the universities,
committees in which the administrators of the universities
were usually leading figures--got underway on 1 June,
with a Peking broadcast on the substance of big-character
posters written by "revolutionary" students and teachers
at Peking National University which denounced the univer-
sity's administration for its poor (conservative) conduct
of the revolution to that time. This was the signal for
similar posters to go up on campuses all over China.
There is a fair amount of information on the cam-
paign on several campuses in June, and substantial info-
mation on the campaign at Peking National University it-
self. The campaign at this university--commonly known
as "Peita," a contraction of the Chinese name--seews to
iWAnalys-fs-ot`GC1 were conjecturing at this time, mainly
on the basis of propaganda treatment of Liu, that he was
already in trouble; this minority view is now known to
have been correct, although it was weakened by a related
thesis (regarded then and now as incorrect) that Teng
Hsiao-ping rather than Mao was the prime mover. The
very good treatment that Liu and Teng were getting in
the Peking press as late as July is now believed,-to have
been the result of their own dominance of the press (in
Mao's absence) at that time.
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have been representative of the campaign against all in-
stitutions of higher learning.
The campaign at Peita was launched prematurely on
25 Ma
wit
th
y,
e slap-up of wall-posters denouncing the
h
president of the university, posters written by a group
led by a female teacher in the department of what passes
these posters were covered
b
u
25X1
25X1
niversity
u
o' ficials p J
(probably by the party committee in th
i
e un
ver-
sity, a committee headed by the president himself) after
a visit to higher party authorities (almost certainly the
reorganized Peking municipal committee) in Peking. On
1 June, however, the party center was ready. On that day,
concurrently with an incendiary editorial in the reformed
and militant People's Daily which specified that "educators
must be the first o rece ve an education," Peking broad-
cast the content of the 25 May posters attacking the
president. On the same day or the next day (Peking has
given both dates) the original posters--reinforced by
other posters--went up on the walls. Peking has since
described this action as the "first shot" in the revolu-
tion at Peita, and has attributed the decision to Mao.
June: The Party's Work-Teams
The vehicle of the revolution at Peita, a vehicle
which was to proliferate elsewhere in China during June,
was the "work-team." This was a small team--rarely if
ever larger than five people--assigned and named by higher
party committees, and sent down to investigate and to
carry out the cultural revolution.
Peking has confirmed the surmise that the concept
of the work-team was approved by Mao if not actually
originated by him. ;;peaking in November 1966, Chiang Ching,
Mao's wife, did try to reduce Mao's responsibility for
the failure of the work-teams ("As early as June of this
year our Chairman Mao made the point that work-teams
should not be sent out hastily"), but she nevertheless
associated Mao with the decision to send in the work-teams.
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Peking announced on 3 June that the reorganized
Peking municipal committee (known to have been in opera-
tion
no later than 25 May) had decided to assign a "work-
team" headed by Chang Chieng-hsien (a secretary of the
Honan provincial committee) Co Peking University to lead
the cultural revolution; also, to remove the president
and his deputy from the posts of secretary and deputy
secretary of the university's party committee; and also,
to have the new work-team function as the university's
party committee until another could be organized. Under-
lining its point that the new Peking municipal committee--
a part of the regular party apparatus--was in charge of
the "revolution" at Peita, the 3 June announcement of Li
Hsueh-feng and Wu Te as the new first and second secretaries
of the committee went on to state flatly that all of the
work of the cultural revolution in the city of Peking
was under the "direct leadership" of the new municipal
committee. On 5 June, Peking reported that "at present,
under the leadership of the work-team appointed to the
university" by the new Peking municipal committee, the
masses of teachers, students and workers at Peita were
"liquidating" the former president's "crimes."
25X1
There was a precedent for the dispatch of a "work-
team" of this kind. During the autumn of 1964, "social-
ist education" work-teams had been sent down from higher
party levels to help with political work in the country-
side. Such activity included the identification of
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activists, the organization of these activists, the or-
ganization of criticism of party cadres by the peasants,
and eventually the self-criticism of the peasant associa-
tions. This activity in the countryside, however, had
been low-key and leisurely, compared with the assign-
ment given the new work-teams in the schools.
Similar scenarios--criticism of the administrators-
and-secretaries of universities for conservative leader-
ship of the revolution, and their displacement by work-
teams sent from higher party levels--have been provided
by Puking and by the provincial press for several other
institutions of higher learning. At Chengtu University,
for example, "revolutionary students and teachers" began
on 3 June to put up posters criticizing the deputy
secretary of the university's party committee--the "leader"
of the university's existing "cultural revolution group,"
the group named by the university committee--for having
failed to mobilize the mass of revolutionary students.
He was moved to hold an "emergency meeting" about this;
the Chengtu municipal committee and the Szechuan provin-
cial committee backed the students and criticized him;
the students and teachers put up more posters, and he
again defended himself but was removed from office by
the Clrngtu committee sometime before 23 June, at which
t iyjme it was announced that both the Szechuan provincial
committee and the Southwest regional bureau had approved
the action, and that the Chengtu committee was sending
in a work-team to take over.* Similarly, at Chengchow
University the acting president and concurrently secretary
of the university's party committee was criticized in
'25neinferes ing i. `em in the Chengtu account is that
the dismissal was announced by the Chengtu committee's
propaganda department. This suggests that the members of
these first "cultural revolution teams"--that is, the
teams named by party committees from their own members,
as distinct from the work-teams later sent down from
higher party organs--were originally selected by the
propaganda departments of the party committees.
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early June, resisted, but was found guilty by the provin-
cial committee of having suppressed the revolutionary
students and teachers; the provincial committee dismissed
him, and sent in a work-team in mid-June to "reorganize"
his "cultural revolution group." There are similar ac-
counts from a dozen other institutions. In all cases the
actions of dismissal of the offending administrator/secretary
and of dispatch of the work-team were said to have been
taken by the appropriate organ of the conventional party
apparatus.
Work-teams were sent to many other places, in addi-
tion to the schools. Peking itself has never provided a
clear picture of the depth of the effort--that is, how
far down into the cities and the countryside they were
sent, and the provincial press has not presented a clear
picture either. The latter, however, indicates that they
were sent to "many" party and government organizations
as far down as medium-sized cities and possibly below,
and that they were concentrated on (although not restricted
to) "cultural and educational units" of all kinds, includ-
ing newspapers, publishing houses, radio-stations, cultural
bureaus, federations of art workers, even movie-houses.
The criterion for sending a work-team seems to have been
the existence of "problems"--meaning, as in the case of
the schools, an insufficiently militant local leadership,
the presence of a leader or group of leaders who had al-
ready failed the test and was now marked for discard.*
ii a iese work - eams were struggling with their
tasks, the party center publicly indicated its sense of
the scope of the problem.. On 13 June, the CCP central
committee (along with the State Council) issued a notice
decreeing the postponement of college entrance examina-
tions for six months in order to "thoroughly carry out
the cultural revolution and-reform the educational
system." As surrounding commentaries made clear, the
new system was to put a new emphasis on class background
and political reliabi~ity as criteria for admission, on
the division of the students' time between study and
labor, and on political indoctrination. In late October,
Peking reportedly extended the postponement to summer
1965.
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Nevertheless, the work-teams do not appear to have
been given directives to support the most militant elements
of the "revolutionary students and teachers" that they
could find, even though they were subsequently discredited
for having failed to do just that. Neither, it appears,
were the party committees themselves given such directives
by whatever combination of leaders was then directing the
"cultural revolution" from Peking. Many of the first
directives may have emphasized the establishment of order,
as many campuses were reported to be out of control.W-
The picture is complicated by the fact that it is
not known how active were the roles, at this stage, of
Mao and the small group of lieutenants who were soon to
emerge as the "group in charge of the cultural revolution."
As previously noted, it is virtually certain that Mao
approved the concept of the work-team, and it seems quite
probable that Tao Chu as the new head of the Propaganda
Department and other officers of the "cultural revolution
In at Ieast some instances, the work-teams were in
fact directed to take action against the leftists. For
example, in Tsinghai the provincial party co'nnittee an-
nounced on 13 June a decision to remove the editor of
the Tsinghai Daily for an editorial he had commissioned
and published ten days earlier, and to send in a work-
team to "systematically examine and reform" the work of
the newspaper. The editorial, condemned by the party
committee as contrary to Mao's thinking, in fact stated
precisely the militant line on the conduct of the revolu-
tion that was later to be vindicated (and the editor
himself was later to serve as a prime example of a func-
tionary to be "rehabilitated" by a party committee which
had acted incorrectly). it is impossible to believe
that the Tsinghai party committee would have acted in
this way, at this stage of the revolution, if there had
been an existing directive to support the militants.
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group" (whether it was in operation yet as a group of not)
took part in the discussions which preceded the decision
to establish the work-teams. There is also a little
evidence (to be presented later) that some of these lead-
ers provided some degree of guidance, at least to work-
teams in Peking. However, it is probable that the largest
roles in providing guidance to the party committees,
which in turn provided it to the work-teams, were played
by the senior figures of the conventional party apparatus,
Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. In any case, it is
probably the latter who will be forced--or have already
been forced--to accept the largest share of responsibility
for what has been found retroactively to be the "mistakes"
of the work-teams.
Similarly, it is unclear whether Mao planned in
advance to discredit the work-teams, as part of a scheme
for discrediting the conventional party apparatus and
its leaders, or whether instead he found them to be in-
sufficiently revolutionary after examining their perform-
ance for some weeks. On balance, the latter seems more
likely, if for no other reason than that the pioneer work-
teams were assigned by the new Peking party committee
which itself had just been named, and thus was not a part
of the old apparatus. But in either case Mao was setting
the conventional party apparatus another test, as he had
with the issue of Hai Jui the previous winter, and as he
had with the stage! Tie "cultural revolution" which had
just been conducted by the local party committees whose
teams were dislodged by the work-teams; and again it was
to fail the test.
What happened was that "many" of the work-teams
assigned to the universities--and presumably many of
those assigned to other organizations and "units"--did
not give in to the extreme demands of campus leftists
w1 se clamor had already brought down the previous
administrator/secretaries and leaders of the first "cul-
tural revolution teams" and who were later to be justi-
fied in virtually the full range of their demands. In
the great majority of cases (judging from Peking's later
descriptions of the "mistakes" of the work-team concept
and work-team operations), the work-teams sympathized
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more with their fraternal party organizations on the
campuses, the party committees there which likewise were
the product of the conventional party apparatus, than
with the militant students (many of whom were soon to
emerge as Red Guards).* In other words, the work-teams,
following the removal of the administrator/secretary
previously marked by the party center as the main target,
failed to carry through the range of action against the
faculty and student-body demanded by the militants, and
in many cases "suppressed" the militants in much the
same ways as had the local leaders who had just lost their
jobs.
re a ively small number of work-teams guessed right,
or were sent in late enough (in July) to have got some
clues. Speaking to this point in November 1966, Chiang
Ching described the decision to send the work-teams in
the first place as an "error," said that the work of the
work-teams was "still more erroneous,}' and then noted
that "some work-teams followed correct principles and
policy and did not make mistakes." Apparently the most
common attitude was that expressed by Li I Isueh-feng of
the Peking committee (according to later posters) on 23
June: "At this tense moment, party members should stand
up and defend their party leaders; if they do not, Nazis
will take over." As it turned out, 'Nazis' took over any-
way.
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In a written self-criticism dated 10 October
(reported in wall-posters), Mme. Liu was to provide a
summary of the "errors" of the work-team at Tsinghua.
The work-team had been (i.e. was found retroactively to
have been) too conservative; there had been trouble
with the "false leftists" (known to have included some
vindicated later as the 'real' leftists, the revolution-
aries who had acted correctly) who were trying to dis-
credit the work-team; her own plan was to make an example
both of the "black gang" (those regarded as extreme
rightists) and the "false leftists," but unfortunately
the team had acted against some people whose views differed
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from the work-teams (i.e. those later vindicated as true
revolutionaries); the work-team had employed improper
methods in prohibiting people from making complaints to
the reception office of the CCP central committee and in
using the excuse of "protection" to put people in jail;
she had been unaware at the time that she was committing
errors, had gone on in July to make more mistakes, and
had defended the record of the work-team throughout July;
and so on. Mme. Liu in this sel:P. -criticism gave credit
to Chairman Mao personally--as Lin Piao was to do in his
speech to the plenum in August--for discovering and re-
versing the errors of the work-team.
the picture presented by Chiang
Ching in her November 1966 report. The summary of her
speech (all thus far available) has her saying that "the
sending of cultural revolution wo.'k-teams to various
organizations...was an error," and "what those work-
teams had done in the course of their work was still
more erroneous. Instead of directing the spearhead against
the handful of people in authority within the party who
were taking the capitalist road and against the reaction-
ary academic 'authorities,' they turned the spearhead
against the revolutionary students. The question of what
the spearhead of the struggle should be directed against
was a cardinal question of right and wrong..."
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But it will be noted that Chiang Ching does not
assert that the work-teams had been directed--by Mao or
anybody else--to support the "revolutionary students"
as later defined, and Mme. Liu's account also indicates
that there was no such directive. Indeed, the very little
evidence as to the roles of officers of the "cultural
revolution group" in providing guidance at the time suggests
that their guidance was little more militant than that
of the conventional party apparatus.
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July and Early August: The "Cultural Revolution Group"
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When the "group" was surfaced in early July, its
principal figures were soon identified: Chen Po-ta as
the "head" or "leader," Chiang Ching as his first deputy,
and Tao Chu and Kang Sheng as "advisors." Chang Chun-
chiao, a secretary of the Shanghai committee, was later
identified as another deputy, and Wang Jen-chung of the
Central-South committee and Hupei committee and Liu Chih-
chien of the General Political Department were still later
(before their fall) identified as additional deputies.
Other members (untitled) given during the fall by both
official sources and wall-posters were Wang Li, i uan Feng,
Chi Pen-yu,, Mu Hsin, and Yao Wen-yuan, all of them young
writers and polemicists. NCNA has also given Hsieh Tang-
chung, a general officer who heads the cultural depart-
ment of the General Political Department, and wall-posters
have additionally given Chang Ping-hua of the Hunan com-
mittee and some other provincial and regional figures who
have not been confirmed. It is not known how many of
this lot--apart from Chen, Chiang, T.-,c, and Kang--were
functioning as members of the "group' in July.
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n e official account
of proceedings in Fukien, the workers, peasants, and
soldiers were acting as the "main force" in the revolu-
tion; armed with Mao's fought, they were wiping out freaks
and monsters; in the cities, while continuing their hard
work in the factories, they wrote big-character posters
in their off-duty hours, and criticized bourgeois ideas
and customs, such as refusal to participate in manual
labor; in rural areas, the poor and lower-middle peasants
also wrote big-character posters, held meetings, exposed
sabotage, denounced capitalist opportunism and church
leaders, attacked old ideas, exposed and condemned bad
books and music and drama, and at the same time prepared
to increase agricultural production.
Most of the work-teams which had been sent to the
cities in June were apparently withdrawn in July, like
the work-teams of the universities, other institutions of
higher learning, technical schools, and middle schools.
While the withdrawal of these teams from the cities has
not been specified in any public statement, the 8 August
declaration suggests that, and so do statements by pro-
vincial party leaders which appear to apply to all work-
teams under their jurisdiction. The picture as regards
the countryside is least clear. It appears that the
"socialist education" work-teams in the countryside were
in general let alone, i.e. that they did not have "cul-
tural revolution" work-teams superimposed on them. And
they were apparently not disbanded when the work-teams
of June were disbanded; in one of his speeches in July
and August, Chou En-lai
said that the work-teams sent originally to the country-
side (beginning in 1964) had done well, the implication
being that they would remain. Broadcasts of August made
clear that "socialist education work teams" were still
active in some places, and this was probably general.
To return to the campuses, where the "revolution
seemed to be most advanced and militant,
speeches by Chou Et,-lai and other party leaders
to meetings of students in Peking, beginning in early
August. These speeches may have come immediately after
a statement by Mao--apparently of this period--summarized
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by wall-posters seen in December. (Mao's statement pre- 25X1
dates September, because it is cited in a briefing by an
officer of the "cultural. revolution group" on 2 September
and probably pre-dates mid-August, as it does not mention
the i cd Guards-)
The various accounts of the content .)f the spee-Iles
of other leaders agree that the party leaders again a_
gized for the work-teams of June--not just for the "mi.-
;akes" made by the work-teams, but for the top-level m,l,s-
takes of sending in teams from the outside in the first
place, and without clear directives. According to a fa.:.rly
full account of Chou's 4 August speech (made at Tsinghua)
Chou described the "send- 25X1
ing of work-teams" as a "policy mistake" an attitude he
shared, he said, with Li IIsueh-feng (the first secretary
of the new Peking committee, which had organized and dis-
patched the work-teams in June.** Specifically, Chou is
said to have continued, when the educational institutions had
25X1
2 A
a
ugust speech
by T -ng }Isiao-ping at People's University, in which he
said that the party center (including himself) had not
adequately prepared the work-teams, in particular had not
given them clear directives. Ironically, he went on to
say--as did others briefing the students in August and
September--that they must work out their problems for
themselves, in other words that they were still not to
get clear directives.
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asked for replacement of the party organs named by the
old (discredited) Peking committee, "we hurriedly decided"
to send the work-teams and "failed to consider carefully
what the work-teams' basic tasks were" to be. (Chiang
Ching was later to formulate the problem the same way,
criticizing those who did this, contrary--she alleged--to
Mao's instructions.) Moreover, Chou said, the "party's
policy was not clearly stated" to the work-teams--another
indication that the work-teams did not have clear direc-
tives to support the leftists. The work-teams in practice
had adopted an "administrative" attitude and had ordered
people about, rather than following the "mass line" of
disQussion. In sum, Chou said, if the party did not
carry out the three duties defined by Chairman Mao as
"struggling, criticizing, and reforming, "* if it failed
to concentrate revolutionary forces to struggle against
the "main target' (another formulation echoed four days
later) but instead dissipated its forces in looking for
"mistakes" and in "making trouble" among the students
and other revolutionary forces, it would be committing
a serious error in "direction."**
Chou reportedly went on to state his favor for free-
don: of expression for the students Kuai Ta-fu and Liu
Chuan, but to state also that he disagreed with their
expressed views. This was of some importance, as these
students--still not "rehabilitated" as of early August--
were later identified as the leaders of the most militant
elements of the Red Guards in Peking, those who were'to
-*Chou re errs to t its f on?mulut ion as if it were well-
known to his audience, and perhaps it was, from wall-
posters; but it did not appear in official documents
until 8 August.
**According 'to her later self-criticism, Mme. Liu Shao-
clii, who had been removed from the Tsinghua work-team
just the day before (3 August), had committed errors of
this kind. No version of Chou's speech indicates that
Chou included any criticism of Mme. Liu personally.
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lead physical attacks on party and government installations
and to lead the poster attacks on many party leaders.
C1.iou reportedly went on to apologize on behalf of
the central committee for the "mistakes" of the work-
teams, and to state expressly that the mistakes must not
be attributed entirely to tEa new Peking committee (al-
though, he said, mistakes made in the course of the work
were their responsibility). Chou then returned to the
point that "wee" (of the party leadership) were primarily
to blame for failing to define the correct (militant)
line, for having "poured cold water" on the mass movement
out of "fear" (a phrase much used later).*
Red Flag was to say much the same thing, in summary
form, on 21-Kugust: that "during a short period, mistakes
were discovered in the orientation and guidelines" of the
cultural revolution, and that Mao Tse-tung at that moment
"personally" sketched out the 16-point decision revealed
on 3 August.
This 8 August declaration of the central committee--
presented under 16 rubrics--was a curious document, a
lumpy mixture of militant and cautionary elements, mainly
militant. It was interpreted otherwise by many or most
observers at the time--that is, as mainly an effort to
put the revolution in order, to set some limits to the
-weep for enemies, to gain control over the entire process.
This was not an unreasonable interpretation, in the light
of the disorder, the proliferating and apparently senseless
violence of the previous two months, and the potential
of the released monster for damaging if not destroying
its creator; and it was that in part; but in fact the
*Chiang ZIiing 7I4. & . Mao) spoke at a Red Guard "debate"
two days later and emphasized one of the points Chou had
made--namely, that the students should concentrate their
energies on the struggle against enemies (in the party),
and not dissipate them in quarrels among themselves. In
other words, Rune. Mao, like Chou, at that time refrained
from stating the party leadership's favor for one-Red
v'iard faction over another. A lesser figure of the cul-
tural revolution group--Kuan Feng--took the same line in
a speech on 2 August.
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declaration was followed by the wildest period in recent
Chinese history.* The document--which appears in retro-
spect to have been written deliberately to justify both
a militant course (particularly in the short run) and
periodic retreats from it as the campaign developed,
and the final version of which was said by a party secre-
tary later as having been approved by Mao himself--is
worth considering in some detail. It remains the basic
document on the conduct of the "revolution."
The 8 August declaration reiterated that the party's
long-term aim was to change the "moral outlook of the
whole (Chinese) society," and, to'this end, its "present"
aims were to bring down those "in authority /in the party7
who follow the capitalist road" and the "bourgeois reac-
tionary 'authorities'" in the academic community,, to
criticize and repudiate bourgeois ideology, and to
n escr ng a ocuments as "mainly militant," the
present writer, who did not see the document until several
weeks after the fact and some weeks after the Red Guards
had been turned loose, cannot be sure that he would have
described it this way at the time. I'?% is surely true,
even in hindsight, that there is nothing in the declara-
tion which would permit any observer to predict the Red
Guards. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to read
this document, like others, as if one were reading it at
the time of its publication, in order to get the best
possible sense of the consistency or inconsistency of
the signals which Peking has been giving its audience
throughout the?"cultural revolution"; this is important
in order to judge whether certain curious developments
have reflected disagreement among party leaders, the
sending of false signals, or the sending of correct
signals which have been misread.
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transform education and the arts.* "Revolutionary youths"
we:1e presented as the "brave path-breakers" in conducting
the revolution, with their big-character posters and
"vigorous debates"--youths who inevitably had "certain
shortcomings" but whose "main revolutionary direction
has been correct."
The declaration conceded "fairly strong" resist-
ance to the revolution, and called for this to be attacked
in '.'a spirit of 'daring, "' a spirit which was to be "put
above everything else." As for the party leadership
being provided, the declaration went on to classify "party
organizations" at all levels as (a) the "daring" and thus
"correct"; (b) the conservative and lagging; (c) those
who feared exposure of themselves but would be "excused"
if they accepted it; and (d) the true bourgeois represen-
tatives, "extremely afraid," who had tried to suppress
the revolution; those of this latter class were to be
dismissed from their posts, although it was not clear
just when this was to be done.
After asserting that the party "should not fear
disorder," invoking Mao himself for the proposition that
a revolution "cannot be gentle," and calling upon the
masses to "make the fullest use of big-character posters
and great debates," the declaration stated in strong
language that "all forces must be concentrated to strike
at the handful of ultra-reactionary bourgeois rightists
and counter-revolutionary revisionists," and, again,
that the "main target of the present movement" was to
be those "in the party who follow the capitalist road."
The declaration did, however, ask that care be taken to
distinguish hard-cases in the party from those who had
simply made errors,. and "reactionary" academics from
ordinary academics, and pointed out that diverse opinions
among the masses were to be expected, that reasoning and
This spe sou i'on's formulation of 4 August--at-
tributed to Mao--of "struggling, criticizing, and re-
forming."
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not force siiould be used (with the "masses"), and that
minority views (among them) were to be tolerated. Mao
himself was given credit, in wall-posters seen in Sep-
tember, for inserting the phrase about reasoning instead
of coercing.
The declaration then switched back to the question
of the proper attitude, (particularly on the part of party
officials) toward revolutionaries. it noted that "re-
sponsible persons of certain schools, units and work-teams
have been launching counter-attacks against the masses"
(i.e., had resisted attacks by the revolutionaries), even
contending that "opposition to them /elves7 means opposi-
tion to the CCP central committee"; this kind of discour-
agement of revolutionaries was said to be "absolutely
impermissible." It vent on to warn both "anti-party ele-
ments" and erring officials against describing elements
of the masses as "counter-revolutionaries," and to warn
in strong terms against inciting the masses or students
to fight among themselves (although there was to be much
of this later), noting that "even proven rightists" in
these groups would be dealt with at a later stage of the
movement.
The declaration went on to classify party cadres
in categories analogous to those used to describe the
types of leadership being provided in the revolution:
the good, the comparatively good (whose mistakes were
small), those who had made serious mistakes but were
not anti-party rightists, and the "small number" of
anti-party rightists who must be "fully exposed" and
"pulled down." In an odd ambiguity, this paragraph
went on to say that even these elements "should be given
a way out so that they can turn over a new leaf"--a
passage which could be read, as a passage in Lin Piao's
speech to the central. committee plenum in the same week
could be read, as promising even these elements an op-
portunity to reform and keep their posts, but which seems
in the context of other pronouncements to have been offer-
ing them little more than a chance to keep their lives.
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The 8 August declaration went on to inform the
country that "cultural revolution groups, cultural revo-
lution committees, and cultural revolution congresses"
had been found to be "excellent new forms of organiza-
tions by which the masses become educated under the party's
? leadership" (i.e. for the conduct of the purge and re-
indoctrination), "organs of power" for the cultural revo-
lution, intended as "long-term, permanent mass organiza-
tions-suitable for schools and government organizations"
and also "basically suitable for factory and mining enter-
prises, neighborhoods, and the countryside." The members
of these groups and committees, and delegates to their
congresses, were to be elected locally (i.e., not simply
appointed, like the first committees of April and May,
and not--even worse--appointed by outsiders and sent
down, like the work-teams of June); it was further stated
that the "masses may at any time criticize" the members
of these groups, and that members found "unfit" could be
replaced. (This last provision, for criticism and replace-
ment, was later to give a handle to the Red Guards in
attacking, inter alia, the new cultural revolution groups
of some of the provincial and municipal party committees.)*
*The party apparatus--presumably directed in this in-
stance by the "group in charge o.-&O the cultural revolu-
tion" at the party center--moved quickly to establish the 25X1
new cultural revolution committees and groups.
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Further, the 8 August declaration reviewed the
task of transforming the educational system--that is,
getting rid of the domination of "bourgeois intellect-
uals," combining education with labor, shortening and
simplifying the courses, and so on.* It went on to
speak of the question of criticizing the "bourgeois
'authorities'" (of the academy and of the party) by
name in the press. This actionit said, should first
be discussed by party committees of those levels and
in some cases cleared by higher party levels.
The declaration, after steering the revolution-
aries away from scientists and technicians, discussed
"linking up" the cultural revolution with the "socialist
education" movement in urban enterprises and rural areas.
Where the socialist education movement--a less sharply-
focused and less ambitious campaign--was proceeding
smoothly, it said, it should not be disturbed. However,
suitable occasions could be found for "discussing" ques-
tions related to the cultural revolution, and in some
places the latter could be used to stimulate the other
campaign, if the local party committees approved.
The declaration noted briefly that it ought to be
possible to carry out the "cultural revolution" without
interfering with production, and that both socialist
education and the cultural revolution in the PLA were to
be carried on in accordance with directions from the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee and the PLA General Political De-
partment--i.e., not by either the conventional party ap-
paratus or the new extraordinary cultural revolution
*New violence on tTie campus was later reported to have
erupted on this same day, 8 August. In this incident,
at Lanchow, students at an industrial college there beat
up a number of other students in the presence of the
police, who did not interfere. This was not "Red Guard"
activity, but action by "revolutionary students" who
were apparently not organized or in any case not organized
to that degree.
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apparatus. The declaration concluded by waving the ban-
ner of Mao's "thought" and listing specific works of
Mao's as basic documents for party committees to study.
In sum, the militant elements are the more impres-
sive--the call for "daring" to be "put above everything
else," the rating of party organizations by degrees of
"daring," the specification not to fear "disorder," the
insistence that "all forces must be concentrated to
strike" at the rightists and revisionists, the specifi-
cation that the "main target" was that of party officials,
the failure to specify that force should no a used
against party officials, the warning to party and govern-
ment officials not to resist, and the specification that
the rightists were to be "pulled down." In other words,
the Red Guards who were to attack party officials in
late August and subsequently were correctly reading the
8 August declaration. Mao was inciting the revolution-
ary young against the party apparatus, and, moreover,
without giving them any clear criterion for distinguish-
ing Tetween those loyal to Mao's thought and the disloyal
who were to be "exposed" and "pulled down."
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The first commentary on the 8 August declaration--
by Red Flag, broadcast on 10 August--described it as the
"prTncipaT_document" of the cultural revolution. and as
the result of a "scientific summary ...made under the
personal supervision of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." It reiter-
ated the aims of the revolution and the presence of
"relatively strong and persistent" resistance to it, and
emphasized the need for "daring" leadership and for turn-
ing the masses loose rather than preparing a script for
them. It spelled out the point that
Experiences have indicated that each
unit must carry out cultural revolution
work by relying on its own masses and should
not depend on arrangements by upper-level
organs. Under general conditions, each
unit should carry out cultural revolution
work without the help of work-teams dis-
patched by upper-level organs.
However, persons would sometimes be "assigned by upper-
level organs to contact the masses"--presumably, directly
assigned by Chen Po-ta's "group" in Peking--and these
persons were not to act as "'special envoys"' or rush
to make a determination but must be suitably humble be-
fore the masses. Red Flag echoed the 8 August declara-
tion in asserting fiat tie effort now should "concentrate
on ;:hose persons in authority within the party who have
taken the path of capitalism"; and it spelled out the
point in the declaration about criticism of officials by
name. The names of "middle of the road elements" (those
still regarded as redeemable), the party journal said,
"may be ment-.oned in big-character posters issued by their
own units," but "so long as their names are not openly
published in newspapers"--which would require official
approval--and "they are allowed in the meantime to issue
big-character posters to defend themselves," they need
not regard themselves as condemned.*
*In point of fact, the most important party leaders
who had fallen had not been identified in the newspapers,
but lower-level officials had been.
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At the time the 8 August declaration was published,
a central committee "plenum"--with perhaps no more than
half of the members actually attending--had been in ses-
sion for a week, and was to continue until 12 August.
It was apparent from developments in the week following
12 August--the issuance of a communique on 13 August, the
surfacing of a new ranking of Chinese Communist leaders,
and the emergence of the Red Guards--that the plenum had
seen the formal presentation of Mao's new team and had
discussed the future course of the "cultural revolution."
The tone of the communique, and the radical changes
made in the leadership, raised the question of whether
there had been a showdown in the plenum on policies for
the "cultural revolution," a showdown which the militants--
Mao and Lin and their supporters--had won.
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Some observers have attached importance to an odd
circumstance in the reporting of Mao's visit on the eve-
ning of 10 August to a "reception center" in Peking main-
tained near the central committee headquarters for "revo-
lutionary people." On 10 August NCNA transmitted an ac-
count of the visit which was presumably to appear in the
11 August People's Daily; however, the first edition of
the newspaper onTThe 11 h was withdrawn, and the paper
appeared later in the day with no story about Mao. On
the same day, NCNA carried an account similar to its 10
August transmission but reversing a reference which in
the original version had named the central committee ahead
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o12 Mao in receiving expressions of regard from the masses.
It was later reported that the newspaper's original ver-
sion included a remark: from I,Iao that the party was losing
touch with the masses (obviously his true feeling, and
the root of the changes he had made, but something that
could not be stated publicly in just that way). And a
visitor to China has speculat
d th 25X1
e
at Mao was
"brought out" on this occasion by the "new mainstream
faction" (the implication being that Mao was their pup-
pet), and that "the Liu faction" (the now outsiders) re-
called the issue of People's Daily which reported this
(only to be reversed ancf suppressed the next day). It
seems unnecessary to reach very far for an explanation
of the withdrawal. There seems a sufficient explanation
either in the reported einark about the masses 25X1
or in the differences b
t
e
ween
e two texts. The second text is hardly less idolatrous 25X1
than the first (both accounts are ludicrous, like the
accounts of Mao's swim) and even increase the numbers of
those around Mao to "tens of thousands" and has the crowd
expressing its "best love" for Mao instead of the earlier
"vrarm feelings"; but the second text at a dozen points
is a smoother and better job. It is not surprising that
the propaganda apparatus--particularly in the light of
what had just happened to the old propaganda apparatus--
should take pains to get a story about Mao 'right.'
IvIontlis later there came 25X1
provided much insight into developmentst~atilthe plenum
and the relationships among Chinese Communist leaders
revealed there. The generally credible account, from
wall-posters apparently prepared by "revolutionary stu-
dents" present at the plenum, supports Chou En-lai's
version o! ovcats
That is, Lin throughout appoaro to be speaking like a 25X1
man ur.ite:3 tr7.t:. :::ao in a secure majority of expressed
opinion, ouc coulc] Co w?.iat it Wished with opponents.
iii the plonu,n, aii". not at r.l . J 'ho the: Cpol:osiuan Zor a "fac--
tion." in this ;speech he is speaking for Mao, informing the
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central committee of the program which he as Mao's first
lieutenant intends to carry out for Mao, and defining for
the central committee his relationship with Mao.*
Lin's speech as reported shows him to identify him-
self completely with Mao, and to think in the same sim-
listic terms, with the same visionary long-range goals.
In the speech he begins by classifying people into "two
kinds" down the line: those who eagerly study Mao's
thought, and those who do not (he specifies Lu Ting-i and
his "gang"); those who attach great importance to (i.e.
are obsessed by) political-ideological work, and those
who ignore it or even interfere with it (he fails to
specify Lo Jui-ching); those who are energetic and make
achievements (e.g. put up lots of big-character posters),
even though they offend people and are attacked, and
those who are inactive and conciliatory (e.g. put up
few posters). Thus, he goes on, the party must be re-
organized according to the principles governing the cul-
tivation of revolutionary successors stated by Chairman
Mao (in the mid-1964 article on "Khrushchev's Phoney
Communism"), and "we"--referring perhaps to the politburo
standing committee--have proposed, and Mao has agreed,
to dismiss from their posts those who oppose Mao's thought,
those who resist political-ideological work, and those
who lack revolutionary zeal. Further, he says, "we" are
now going to dismiss a number of people, promote a number,
and keep a number in their posts. Those who make mistakes,
f *T11I -la er pare the speech at first seemed hard
to accept at face value, not because of the relationship
defined in it but because it seemed inappropriate for
Lin rather than Mao to define it, especiall if Mao were
present.
Mao almost certainly had defined
the relationship, in a brief earlier speech, mating clear
to the central committee that Lin was now his designated
successor and would be speaking for him henceforth, and
that Mao may well have been absent from some sessions
of the plenum.
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even serious mistakes, will be given a chance to be tested
in future work, provided that they accept education and
truly repent; but the incorrigible must be dismissed.
(This was exactly the line taken in the 8 August declara-
tion, and with the same ambiguity as to just when the
hard cases were to be dismissed.) Unless this is done,
Lin continues, the "stalemate" will. not be broken, as
such people will carry out subversive activity "once
trouble flares up." (The reference to "stalemate" ap-
pears in the context to mean a loss of momentum in the
"cultural revolution," which was at that t:';ie in a trough,
rather than to designate a situation of "stalemate"
between or among contending factions at the top of the
party preventing any further action.)
In his speech as reported, Lin goes on to define
his own role. In the best Chinese style, he speaks of
his talents as unequal to his task, of the possibility
that he will make serious mistakes or even fail, and of
the need to rely on Mao, the standing committee, and the
cultural revolution group. He insists on the need to do
everything according to Mao's thought, and implies strongly
that one group in the party--one would think, Liu and
Teng and others--had been acting contrary to Mao's known
will:
There cannot be two policies or
two command headquarters. No wishful
thinking can replace the thinking of
the Chairman, and we cannot stage
a rival drama in competition with the
Chairman. We want monism...
Lin goes on to define his relationship with Mao.
He says that there are "many ideas we do not understand,"
that "we" must carry out Mao's directives, that he asks
Mao for instructions on everything and does everything
according to his orders, that he does not "interfere"
with Mao on major matters and does not trouble him with
min':)r matters, and that sometimes he does not understand
what Mao wants and therefore makes mistakes. He goes
on to describe Mao as the "genius of the world revolu-
tion," to speak of the "wide gulf between him and us,"
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to reiterate a modest assessment of his own talents, but
to state his willingness to accept thu "decision" of Mao
and the central committee.*
In his speech as reported, Lin then speaks directly
to the "cultural revolution group" present at the plenum.
He speaks of the movement as having begun with vigor, but
then having "cold water poured on it"--an obvious refer-
ence to the interval dominated by the work-teams. Mao
himself, Lin goes on, "reversed the situation"--meaning,
presumably, called for the withdrawal of the work-teams
and their replacement by cultural revolution groups. He
reiterates the abiding aim of transforming men, the
expectation of numerous struggles and reversals, and the
necessary progress through many stages to achieve both
spiritual and material ends. He praises the role of the
"cultural revolution group" and again criticizes its
precedessors (implying an intention to stick the party-
machine leaders, demoted at the plenum, with the respon-
sibility), and concludes resoundingly that Mao's thoughts
are the pearls among the fish-eyes.
The 13 August communi4ue of the plenum was less
informative than the above account of Lin's speech, al-
though consistent with it. It noted the plenum's "full"
*The ' cecision'Was presumably that of naming Lin the
party's only vice-chairman and thus designating him the
successor. In regard to the self-deprecating formulations,
Lin could be expected
to speak in this Chinese way no matter what the relation-
ship between Mao and himself, and some have read the speech
as a crafty and cynical description of manipulation of
Mao by Lin: ''I handle the minor matters and I see that
no major matters come up.' The other interpretation--that
Lin is describing his situation frankly--gives a more
credible picture: of Lin in awe of Mao, conscious of
the difficulties of his new role, and trying to do what
Mao wants but not always being able to, because for one
thing Mao does not always make it clear and for another
changes his mind, so that Lin has to accept the respon-
sibility for "mistakes."
55-
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approval of a "series of brilliant policies...put forward
by Comrade Mao" since 1962, mainly related to the cultural
revolution, and described these as an "important develop-
ment of Marxism-Leninism." Like the 8 August declaration,
it emphasized the need for "daring" in the conduct of the
revolution, and said flatly: "Don't be afraid of disorder."
It reiterated that the masses were to be turned loose,
not "blindly" ordered about, and called for support of
the "revolutionary left." And it included praise of the
"brilliant example" set by Lin Piao and the PLA in the
study of Mao's thought.*
On 16 August, Chen Po-ta, always regarded as' a
spokesman for Mao, spoke to a mass meeting of students
in Peking. Although the Red Guards had still not appeared
on the public scene, Chen's speech, not published until
the Red Guards had been sutf aced, was in effect the first
of a series of interviews given the Red Guards by officers
of tiia "c'11tural revolution group" and by Chou En-lai,
interviews in which groups of Red Guards were given
a few general directives. Chen's directive was very
general in this case. Implying an expectation (like Lin
Piao at the plenum) of considerable resistance, he called
on the students to "smash all kinds of monsters," spoke
of the value to them of passing through "storms and hard-
ship" and the "big revolutionary furnace," and asserted
Tn commen 1ng on a 8 August declaration before the
communique appeared, People's Daily on 11 and 13 August,
and the Liberation Army Daily' on August, differed in
their emphases. This party newspaper did not emphasize
daring and did emphasize "moral force instead of physical
force," while the PLA paper called for "absolute reliance
on the left faction of the revolution." There was and
continued to be speculation, given some support in the
differences of emphasis in the speeches of the two lead-
ers, that the former spoke for Chou En-lai and other
possible "moderates," and the latter for Lin Piao (repre-
senting Mao) and other apparent "militants."
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that their lack of fear was "very correct: ! !" (The triple
emphasis is in the Chinese account.) He called upon them
to "immerse" themselves in the masses and, to study "Mao's"
program for the cultural revolution. He concluded that
in making a revolution, "it is necessary to rely on our-
selves." ("Revolutionary students" and Red Guards were
later to assert that the party leadership had told them
that they were the only forces that the revolution could
rely on.) -
As of mid-August, then, the picture seemed fairly
clear. A militant cultural revolution would continue,
and would now turn to the party apparatus across the
board, led by the "group in charge of the cultural revo-
lution" and its subordinate bodies, and making much use
of "revolutionary students." It was not at all apparent,
however, that these students were to be organized as
uniformed "Red Guards" and encouraged to throw China into
the worst disorder in the 17 years of the Peking regime.
Mid-August to Mid-September: The Unleashing of the Red
Guards
The Red Guards made their first public appearance
on 18 August at a million-strong rally in Peking, a rally
which featured an appearance by Mao Tse-tung in army uni-
form, speeches by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, and a new
line-up of party leaders which displayed Mao's 'close
comrade" Lin as Mao's anointed successor.*
Before considering this new factor of the 1 red
Guards," the little available information on their
*NZiracuTously; rye cI`'ing does not give Mao credit for
creating the Red Guards--only for recognizing their
value when he "discovered" their existence.
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antecedents may be summarized.* A Red Guard who was in-
terviewed in ;September stated that there had been "talk"
about forming the Red Guards as early as late May, and
that a detachment was first organized at the middle-school
attached to Tsinghua university in Peking. Red Guards
interviewed in Peking in October said the same thing,
specifying 29 May as the date of organizing and naming
the group at Tsinghua. Peking itself at the same time
offered the same story, stating that this particular
unit--now operating as the "Red Guard Unit of the Peking
Militant School of Red Guards"--was "among the pioneers"
and was organized in May. Some degree of confirmation
is also available from wall-posters published in Red Flag,
posters written by the Red Guard unit at Tsinghua W ic-T-'
indicate that it had been in en,istence there at least since
24 June.
Obviously some time was required for the organiza-
tion and outfitting of the Red Guards before their massive
*fe TTecd- cards came as a complete surprise to observ-
ers of the Chinese scene. Although several observers had
a creditable record in forecasting many of most but in
no case all) of the spectacular developments--i.8. the
party purge, the extension of the purge to the top level,
the downfall of 1'eng Chen and Lo Jui-ching as individuals,
the decline of Liu Shao-chi and the rise of Lin Piao and
a new team, anti the early break-up of the leadership group
being presented by Poking as a harmonious unit as late
as late July--not a single one of the hundreds of steady
observers of the Chinese scene forecast the Red Guards.
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and disciplined appearance in Peking on 18 August
A wall-poster published in August in the Chinese
press also helps to fix the time; this poster, dated 27
July, attributed to a high-school attached to Tsinghua
(the point of origin asserted by the Red Guards themselves),
and calling for "revolutionary rebellion" against, "hyster-
ical gentlemen"n power, has been treated by Peking as
if it had been the opening gun for a nation-wide organiza-
tional effort,
As for the 18 August rally at which the Red Guards
first appeared publicly, while the NCNA account of the
rally maintained continuity with the central committee's
8 August decision by reporting that Chen Po-ta of the
"cultural revolution group" presided, it also reported
that "'Red Guards', composed of the most active, bravest
and Firmest of the revolutionary students, packed the
reviewing stands," that many were dressed in khaki with
red armbands (and that Mao himself wore such an armband),
and that these "revolutionary students" described them-
selves as "'Red Guards' for the defense of the party
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central committee, Chairman Mao, and Mao Tse-tung's
thought.* It also reported the speeches of Lin and Chou,
in which both incited the audience to carry through the
cultural revolution (Lin's was the more obsequious to
Mao and militant toward everybody else) and in which
neither saw fit to say a word about the role of the "cul-
tural revolution group" (instead, Chou slipped in a lit-
tle praise of Lin Piao). Both of these speeches, like
Chen Po-ta's speech of 16 August, qualified as directives
to the Red Guards in very general terms.**
At this 18 August rally, Peking published the new
standings of party leaders in the form of a name-list of
those attending. Mao of course appeared as number one,
but followed now by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Chen
Po-ta, Teng Ilsiao-ping, Kang Sheng, and Liu Shao-chi.
In other words, Lin had displaced Liu as second-ranking
leader and Liu had slid all the way to eighth place
(probably not even that, really); Chou had remained number
three; Tac Chu, the new director of the propaganda depart-
ment and one of the leaders of the "cultural revolution
group," had leaped all the way from the second level (a
regional leader, ranking low in the central committee)
AIao - 1-d_no s care liis "thought" on 18 August. Pelting
itself has said that some of the students asked Mao to
make a speech, but that Chou answered for him, pointing
to the 3 August declaration, and the books of quotations
they were carrying, as equivalent to a speech. Some ob-
servers were quick---too quick--to conclude that Mao was
not being permitted to speak for himself.
**In early November,
C;ou in this speech had urged the youth to
limit their activities to their own schools, and that this
reflected a continuing dispute with Lin Piao over the
use of the led Guards. While subsequent speeches were
to suggest possible differences between Lin and Chou,
Chou's 13 August speech neither stated nor implied the
limitation the correspondent purported to see.
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to fourth place on the top level and indeed to first place
among functionaries of the party apparatus (Peking ma-.,
have been signalling an intention to make Tao the secre-
tary general, and it was soon reported that he would
serve as Acting Premier in Chou's absences, another job
Tong had had); Chen Po-ta, head of the "cultural revolu-
tion group" which seemed to have become the most impor-
tant part of the party apparatus; had risen several notches
to filth place; Tong IIsiao-ping, the secretary-general
who had been head o. the secretariat and thus the acti.ial
director of the orthodox party apparatus (i.e., less the
special bodies like the "cultural revolution group") and
who was regarded by some observers as having played an
important role in carrying out Mao's purge of Peng Chen
(a view that is still tenable)' nominally retained his
sixth position but now with an additional active leader
between himself and the top and probably with his grip
slipping from his key job; and Kang Sheng, another leader
of the "cultural revolution" group suspected of having
resumed his duties with the secret police during the
purge, moved up several places and into the elite. In.
sum, Lin Piao had had a great triumph; Chou En-lai had
had a triumph (in holding to his position in such a tricky
and dangerous period); the leaders of the "cultural revolu-
tion group"--Chen, Tao and Kang--had had a great if rer-
haus insecure triumph; and the principal figures of the
old party-machine, Liu and Tong, had had a defeat, Liu a
disastrous one, Teng a substantial one.
It was surmised at the time that Liu and (to a
lesser degree) Teng had been demoted fv;.- some combination
of the following reasons: their actual or putative roles
as "protectors" of Peng Chen in the past; the uneven per-
formance of the party press (not fully in line until June)
in the campaign against the "black gang" beginning the
previous November; the retrospective "failure" of the work-
teams in June; and opposition to, or lack of cooperation
in, the superimposition of the "cultural revolution group"
on the conventional party apparatus, in particular the
direction of the.-: activity of the "group" against the
conventional apparatus (as forecast by the 3 -;ugust
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declaration and emphasized by the 10 August Red Flag).*
This surmise was all right as far as it went; ut there
was soon to be reason to conclude that another big item
on the list of charges was going to be that of opposi-
tion--in the central committee plenum of 1-12 August--to
the plans of Mao's new team for turning the Red Guards
loose to terrorize, discredit, and (conceivably) wreck
the conventional party apparatus as an entity. The ques-
tion that immediately presented itself, to those who had
watched Liu and Tong build up the party machine over the
years into what had seemed to be a powerful instrument
responsive to themselves, was whether Liu and Teng would
accept this defeat meekly, or whether they would instead
try to rally what forces they could to resis-.; the new
team (which in turn raised the question of whether they
any longer had access to their old forces).
A color film of the 18 August rally, shown in
Hong Kong two months later and attended by officers of
the U.S. Consulate General there, provided some valuable
if fragmentary indicators as to Mao's status and health
and relations between Mao and other leaders. The U.S.
observers were impressed by the youthful participants'
"apparently sincere adulation" of Mao and the skillful
exploitation of this feeling by speakers and cheerleaders,
preparing the participants to "go out into the provinces
energized and motivated to do battle against those-demons
and monsters who oppose the thinking and will of Mao
Tse-tung." The Consulate General surmised that the demon-
stration was also intended to make Mao's opponents in the
leadership, both those in Peking and those seeking the
films in the provinces, "feel hopelessly overwhelmed...,
asking themselves: who can oppose a leader who evokes
such evident adulation and who controls a mechanism which
can organize such a demonstration of mass support?"
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U. S. observers of the film reported further that
Mao moved slowly but firmly, usually without assistance,
and appeared in good health, apart from his apparently
poor vision. He seemed alert but detached, and unrespon-
sive to others. (Others have reported this as Mao's
"blind god" pose). Nu did exchange words with Lin Piao,
who thereupon made some changes in his printed speech
with a pen, and also chattered briefly with Chou, but
was not seen to have any exchange with other leaders.
Lin Piao had a "ghostly" appearance but seemed otherwise
vigorous. Chou En-lai looked tired but performed smoothly.
Tao Chu was the only other leader given the special treat-
ment of being filmed standing alone. Some others of the
new team--Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chiang Ching--were
visible but much less prominent.
Red Flag on 21 August reiterated that the principal
targets oZ' the "great revolution" were the "reactionary
academic 'authorities'.. . and bourgeois representatives
within the party," and it went on to warn that any person
who opposed Mao's thought or failed to implement it--"no
matter how high his position, how old his standing, and
how great his 'fame l "--should be the object of a "struggle
waged against him until he is dismissed from his official
posts and functions." This seemed to be cut to the mea-
surements of Liu Shao-chi, and to reinforce the impres-
sion that a number of other party leaders would be brought
down before the purge had run its course.
Another article in that 21 August number of Red
Flag, and a People's Daily article two days later, both
suggested strongly ha, ie Red Guards were to be sent
into action as quasi-military units against elements of
the party apparatus at the center and against its regional,
provincial and municipal bureaus. The implication through-
out was that the Red Guards had been formed in order to
organize the "revolutionary students" in a uniform way,
giving them the kind of charter and propaganda support
which would deter local authorities from organizing resist-
ance to them. Both articles seemed to incite the Red
Guards to make physical attacks on their targets, and
especially on party organizations. The Red Flag piece,
persistently describing the "revolutionary you is" as
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"lighters," jeered at the "overlords in power" who were
"shaking with fear." It went on to emphasize that the
"young lighters" had the "backing of Chairman Mao, "* and
described their task as precisely that of "rnaking trouble,"
bringing down "all the old ideas, culture, customs and
habits" (soon to be known as the 'four olds'). Young
people, the article went on, were the "most resolute"
in following Mao's instructions, and had "by far the
greatest love" for him. Finally, the young were bold,
daring to "defy the power of law, not vulgar politicians...
The People's Daily for its part denounced a "stubborn
faction" w is i is "absurdly regarded the leadership of
its own units as equivalent to that of the party central
committee," reiterated that the party committees of un-
specified areas and units had resisted the revolutionary
students and in "some areas" had even organized the masses
to struggle against the students, and went on most ominously
to declare that "the revolutionary student organizations,
such as 'Red Guards,' 'Red Flag Fighting Teams,'** and
others, are legitimate organizations" engaged in "legiti-
mate revolutionary actions," and that anyone opposing
these revolutionary actions "opposes Chairman Mao's teach-
ings and the party central committee's decision." In
other words, the party organizations marked as targets
would have a choice between allowing the Red Guards to
conduct violence against them or entering into armed war-
fare with the representatives of Mao's new team: on one
hand, and with the odds against them, the local figures
of the old party apparatus and whatever local military
forces they could muster, and on the other Mao, Lin Piao
*Off e-Sf [he regime s own newspapers later quoted a
female Red Guard to the effect that Mao himself at this
time (19 August) had told her personally that violence
was better than persuasion,
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and the bulk of the )LP., and the "cultural revolution
group" leaders recently projected into the inner circle.
Shaped up that way, if as though it would be an unequal,
even if sometimes protracted, contort.
Wall--posters in September spoke of an interview
given visiting Rod Guards in Peking by Tao Chu on the
day--21 August--of the ominous Rod Flag editorial. Mater-
ials received much later indicate tia Tao gave several
such interviews in late August, and that other officers
of the central "cultural revolution group" also gave
such interviews--probably dozens. The new team clearly
regarded these personal talks as the best channel of
communication with the Red Guards, as the conventional
party apparatus was still staffed by officials who were
themselves to be targets of Red Guard action.
Accounts of the 21 August interview agree that Tao
did not give the Red Guards particular targets, and, in
response to their demands for action against particular
party leaders, told them in effect that action was up to
them. The ;eptember posters said that Tao invited the
Red Guards to give an account of the behavior of their
local party committees, and told them that it was with-
in 25X1
their power to criticize and "change" their local
party officials.
Chou En-lai was prominent among those giving inter-
views and making speeches to the Red Guards in this poriod,
and there is a good wall-poster account of his speech at
Tsinghua on 22 August. Chou in this speech, lilce Lin Piao
at the August plenum, began in the approved Chinese way
by deprecating his own abilities, and inviting further
poster criticism of himself; he then proceeded authoritatively,
as if he thought his position to be secure. He noted that the
head of the former work-team at Tsinghua, who had made a self-
criticism that same day, realized his errors, but he went
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on to emphasizq as he had in his 4 August speechi that
the errors were "fundamental errors...in direction and
line" which were not the responsibility of the work-
teams alone but also of the central party leaders who
dispatched the teams. Citing the need for "speedy"
action in Peking in late May, to correct the situation
left by the "black gang," Chou said that the party had had
a choice between sending in work-teams to regain the
leadership or to rely on the local masses and risk "con-
fusion," and chose the former course without due con-
sideration. Further, the errors of the work-teams de-
rived in large part from the fact that they wore not
given proper guidance. Thus the larger errors were
those of the new Peking committee and of (unspecified
organs or leaders of) the central committee.
Chou in this speech went on to speak of the many
millions of students throughout China who were not as
"fortunate" as students in Peking, because they had not
"solved their problems there"--i.e., their party organi-
zations and work-teams were making the same old (con-
servative) errors, often "even more errors" than had
been made in Peking, injuring people and carrying out
"white terrorism." Because Mao could not go to all those
places in person, Chou said (implying, as others were
to state expressly, that Mao had directly intervened in
Peking), the 8 August declaration had been prepared as
guidance for the students. .!s previously noted, the 8
August declaration was militant, a.id had incited the
students against the party organizations without giving
them any particular guidance; and Chou in this speech
followed the same strategy. He urged them to "rise up
for the revolution," to "solve the problems yourselves,"
and (speaking to visiting students) to "hurry home today
with this fire." Ile reiterated that "You can solve your
problems by yourselves," and went on to imply that the
provisional cultural revolution committee of Tsinghua,
which had succeeded the work-team not more than three
weeks earlier, had already criticized it:ielf for being
too conservative (a godindication that the students
were reading the 8 August declaration as a militant
directive.)
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Chou then answered questions, and made clear that
the party leaders encouraged a wide range of student
expression and of organizational activity (a point of
importance,iri view of the variety of opinion already
being expressed by, and of organizations already being
formed by, the Red Guards). Chou encouraged the convention
of all kinds of meetings for "debating," stated clearly
that the students had "freedom of publication" (they
could say anything they liked in their posters), identi-
fied five different Red Guard organizations in Peking
an.] said flatly that "any kind of organization is all
right," and reiterated that "as long as the general
direction is correct, opinions can be exchanged even if
they are different."
Chou went on to ask the students to observe the
long-professed party principle of "curing the disease
and saving the patient," i.e., that the aim of the campaign
was to re-educate and reform as many as possible of those
in error, rather than to destroy them. Speaking
specifically of the discredited president and party
leader of Tsinghua, one found guilty of "following the
capitalist road," Chou encouraged the students to struggle
against him, but called upon them to make thorough prepara-
tions, to carry out propaganda among the people until
the ground was ready, to ;o through the entire process
of struggle, criticism and reform. In these passages,
Chou seemed to be saying that any additional important
party figures--like the one just mentioned, who was still
a member of the CCP central committee--who were to be
purged would be purged much later, after a prolonged
campaign. If this reading is correct, this too was an
important point, in view of the apparent failure of the
party leaders in Peking to move against any of the party
leaders denounced by the Red Guards in the weeks follow-
ing the first attacks.
There is no evidence that Chou En-lai or any of
the officers of the "cultural revolution group"--the small
number of party leaders reported as giving general directives
to the Red Guards before they were sent into action--gave
the Guards any better directives than -this. In other
words, there is no evidence that they were told to take
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action against specific individuals already marked for
purging--to take such action against provincial first
secretaries, for example, as would provoke such indi-
viduals to organize counter.-action which would serve as
a pretext for replacing them. If this is true, if they
were simply told to go into action, without any parti-
cular targets and with no specific limitations placed on
their actions, then Mao and his new team were making new
tests--both of party and government officials and of the
"revolutionary students" themselves; that is, the new
team would be testing the revolutionary qualifications
of the young and identifying those from whom the party's
eventual leadership would be drawn, and testing the
responses of the party seniors to these initiatives by
the young, and would be marking the examinations later.
As of this time (nearing late August) before the
Red Guards were sent out, the conventional party apparatus
had been hit hard only in one sector--the "cultural" sec-,
tor, that is, individuals concerned with the direction
and management of propaganda, education, and the arts.
About 80 important "cultural" figures had been publicly
brought down*: seven directors and managers of the cen-
tral apparatus, including the onetime chief (Peng Chen)
of the first "cultural revolution group" and the director
of the Propaganda Department (Lu Ting-yi); some seven
members of the Peking committee of the party (the only
regional, provincial or major municipal committee which
had been hit hard as a whole); two deputy directors of
departments of regional bureaus and two provincial secre-
taries; some 15 directors and deputy directors of pro-
vincial propaganda departments; six editors; about 23
administrators (presidents or vice-presidents) and
*OnTy__a- efew par~gures who were not concerned with
the management of some kind of "cultural" activity had
fallen: Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun (chief of the
central committee's administrative office), Liu Jen (Peng
Chen's first deputy), and Li Kuei (first secretary in
Huehot, Inner Mongolia).
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secretaries of party committees of institutions of higher
learning; and about 17 officers of unions and federations
of artists of various kinds and directors of governmental
cultural bureaus. About 50 of these were known to have
had important party positions--the main categories excluded
being those educators who were not concurrently secretaries
of party committees, and the last category given above.
The implication of the 21-23 August commentaries summarized
above was that this figure of 50 was to be multiplied
several times before the Red Guards were put back on the
least'..
While the party was preparing to send the Red Guards
out into the streets, "cultural revolution committees"
and subordinate "groups" wore being formed throughout
China--as in effect had been directed in the central com-
mittee's 8 August declaration--in those places were they
bad not already been established in July. Some of the
schools took the trouble, on the occasion of "electing"
these new committees (committees for universities, teams
for smaller units), to criticize publicly the two earlier
forms of "cultural revolution" organization--the first
groups appointed by the party committees, and the work- 25X1
teams which supplanted them--as being inferior to these
new bodies elected by and thus (it was.'implied) respon-
sive to the masses. Nevertheless, at least in the univer-
sities, these new committees were in most cases identi-
fied as "Provisional" committees
just as the
party secretaries who had fallen from favor were generally
replaced by "acting" secretaries, the "provisional" com-
mittees were clearly on probation. There was consider-
able ambiguity in the remarks made by party secretaries
on these occasions. While some chose to emphasize the
role of the new committees and groups in "directing"
and "giving instructions" and asserted that they must
"boldly lead" the revolution, others chose to underline
the point that the committees were to "give free rein
to the masses," that the universities were to be "run by
the revolut4.onary teachers and students," and so on; some
of the chairmen of the newly-elected committees and
groups picked up this last point, being quoted as promising
to "run" the school in a worthy f as hioAe . g. to "foster
reliable proletarian successors."
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The emergence of the Red Guards, and some of the
remarks quoted above, raised the question of just what
degree of authority the new committees were, really to
have. They were apparently--as "organs of power" given
charters by the central coi,imittee and as bodies elected
expressly to "lead the masses"--to be at least nominally
in command of the Rid Guards, while they were apparently
to EF-a-f-Teast nominally responsive to the "revolutionary
teachers and students" among w iom 'le Red Guards had just
been identified as the best element. And the "revolution-
ary students and teachers" were apparently to have no re-
lation whatever to the young Communist League, which had
not been mentioned for weeks and the leaders of which
were evidently in trouble. It appeared that the party
center--probably meaning in practice, the "cultural revo-
lution group"--could avoid chaos only by giving the "cul-
tural revolution" units and the Red Guards and other
students identical orders concurrently, so that the Former
could "order" and the latter could "demand" the same
actions at the same time.* But there was no way to sort
this out at the time; one could only wait to see what
would happen.
There was not long to wait. At just about this
time, beginning 20 August in Peking and a few other placed
and a iew days later in most places, the Red Guards began
to appear in the streets of China's cities, and proliferated
in the last week of August. For the first few days, their
activities were reported by both Communist and non-Communist
media as a kind of dull-witted, humorless Hallowe'en,
directed against everything on the scene regarded as
"feudal, capitalist, or revisionist" .(i.e., traditional,
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Western or Soviet). As reported, they put up posters,
made speeches, shouted denunciations, changed the names
of streets, markets, schools, hotels, temples, theatres,
parks and lakes, tore down shop signs, defaced churches,
and took similar direct action against both the possessors
and the suppliers of offens4.ve (non-proletarian) food
and clothing, hair-styles and cosmetics, books and maga-
zines, photographs and paintings and objets d'art, and
so on. They were rewarded at once with an editorial in
People's Daily, "Very Good Indeed:"--and by other s'ach
editorials n those first days.
Observers in Peking began on 25 August to report
incidents of brutality by the Red Guards there--scenes
of "street punishment," in which the victims were placed
in a circle and beaten with belts or cords, or were beaten
on the street and dragged into houses, as well as much
parading of victims around the streets. On 28 August,
posters in Peking reportedly asserted that several Red
Guards had already been killed by "counter-revolution-
aries.," From such posters (reported later), a picture
emerged of. violence from the start (i.e., immediately
after 13 August) at some places, and of widespread violence
in the last week of August. In Peking, whe~e the Red
Guards had a free hand, the victims of their raids, beat-
ings, torture, and assignments to slave labor, although
primarily teachers, included party and government offi-
cials, one an officer of the "cultural revolution" section
of a municipal cultural bureau; this last was the first
reported attack by Red Guards on a subordinate unit of
the "cultural revolution group" from which they were sup-
posed to be getting their orders.* They also (in Peking)
* should e tTep-tin mind, however, that action by
the fled Guards s.gainst any given cultural revolution com-
mittee or team does not necessarily imply refusal to
recognize the authority of the central "cultural revclu-
tion group." All of the local committees and teams were
to be "elected" locally, and could be replaced if found
unfit; if thi3 local cultural revolution committee or group
were in fact selected and dominated by a party secretary
who was himself unfit, it would follow that the cultural
revolution groupwould also be unfit, and that the Red
Guards would be hostile to the group as well as the man.
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raided the apartments of senior party members, tearing
up their clothing and throwing their furniture into the
street. Some executions (although not of party officials)
were surmised, and "many suicides" reported. In Tientsin
(not far away), Red Guards from Peking reportedly beat
up a municipal o.ficial and people who came to his aid
(including women), beat up many other people in other
incidents, killed a teacher and perhaps others, and (on
26 August) fought with a "Red Corps" organized by the
Tientsin committee of the CCP; this last was the first
report of elements being organized by local party offi-
cials to repel the Red Guards. (Peking later reported
the death on 10 September---from "heart attack"--of the
First Secretary of the Tientsin committee; a correspondent
reported that the death was really the result of a beat-
ing by Red Guards.) There were soon reports from other
parts of China of attacks by Peking students on student
bodies elsewhere, of threats made by them against offi-
cials of "cultural revolution teams," of similar attacks
by local students on local people, and of resistance to
the Red Guards by a locally-organized "Red Corps" or by
local crowds apparently responding to local party leaders.
In' the most sensational single development of that
last week of August, the Poking regime publicly reported
through the Harbin radio on 27 August that a meeting had
been held by "revolutionary" people in Ileilungkiang to
denounce a "black gang" within "loading groups" of the
IIeilungkiang provincial committee of the CCP (a meeting
chaired by an alternate secretary of that committee it-
self), and then on 20 ,:,.ugust that the Red Guards of
various Harbin schools had held a "rally to burn down
the provincial CCP committee and shell the command head-
quarters"* (a meeting addressed by a secretary of the
.Northeast regional bureau of the party). The provincial
*This "she ling' as later defined as ferreting out the
"bourgeois careerists," but one report of the same period
states that R( d Guards actually set fire to one municipal
party committee headquarters in Hunan.
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committee was evidently one of those which _,ad organized
resistance against the Red Guards (possibly splitting
off some of the Red Guards themselves), as the resolution
adopted by the rally asserted that local counter-revolu-
tionaries had "put on arm-bands and called themselves Red
Guards" and had carried out a "fight against the revolu-
tionaries"; further, the resolution called for a reorgani-
zation of the local Red Guards and for the coordination
of student activity in the suture. In attacking the pro-
vincial committee in this fashion, those naming the target
and directing the fire--presumably the "cultural revolu-
tion group" in Peking and those local officials still in
their favor--were making good on their recent threats to
incite the Red Guards against the party apparatus.
In all the agitation in Peking at that time (the
last 12 days of August), the most interesting develop-
ment was not reported at the time and not in detail until
three months later--tile splitting of the Red Guard move-
ment into hostile factions, which physically clashed with
one another, and which were alleged by elements of the
Guards to be carrying out the will of different groups
in the top leadership. The information on this develop-
ment which became available from wall-posters in. November
merits a summary.
25X1
The Red Guards in Peking began to polarize soon
after their original organization there, even before the
Red Guard movement was revealed on 18 August;
/ On 11 August the decision to remove the work-team
was announced, and this, perhaps together with Chen Po-
ta's militant speech of 16 August, apparently emboldened
the sympathizers or supporters of Kuai Ta-fu to agree in
a meeting of 17 August to demand his reinstatement. This
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set the stage for the "incidents" of 19 and 24 August
in which there were physical clashes between the left-
ists and another group which was no less aggressive in
pursuit of its aims but more nearly "moderate" in its
attitude on the issue in contention--namely, whether to
attack central party leaders openly, especially Liu Shao-
chi and his wife.
On the morning of 19 August, 25X1
hIme. Liu and demanding that she return to the campus forte 25X1
criticism (she had not yet submitted her self-criticism)
,
but these leftists were immediately denounced by other
forces, which put up counter-posters and raised the issue
of the propriety of public attacks on central party lead-
ers.
On 22 August, as noted earlier, Chou En-lai spoke
again at Tsinghua and incited the revolutionary students
in general terms against the party apparatus (not parti-
cular leaders), and expressly encouraged them to say almost
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anything they liked in their wall-posters, to "debate"
in this way, and to form as many kinds of Red Guard
? organizations as they cared to. This apparently gave
fresh encouragement both to the leftists and to the
moderates at Tsinghua.
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September: The Subsidence of the Red Guards
In late August Mao's new team in Peking had given
an appearance of concern about those aspects of Red Guard
activity which were getting or might get out of hand, al-
though evidence was lacking that Mao and his new team
up to that time had wanted it any more in hand than it
had been. (In other wor s, Mao and the new team had
wished to have a large degree of disorder, had in fact
ca a upon the young revolutionaries not to fear dis-
order, had seen this as essential in order to terrorize
the populace and in particular to strike fear into party
functionaries, and now, having made their point, were
willing to assert falsely that the Red Guards had exceeded
their instructions.)
on 28 August People's Daily--in
an editorial entitled "Revolutionary Young eoopl e Should
Learn from the PLA"--had called for greater discipline.
Noting that Mao himself had originally issued this call,
the party newspaper asserted that the Red Guards and
"other revolutionary organizations" had been established
with the PLA as their ;yodel, and asked them to "learn
still better from the PLA" to carry out the "throe main
rules of discipline and the eight points for attention"
stipulated by Mao, to "adhere to mass discipline," and
to defend the "people's interests" and "state property."
it pointed out that the 8 August declaration had called
for reasoning, not coercion or force, and said--as the
8 August declearation had not--that this was applicable
even to "those in authority who are taking the capitalistic
road" (i . e . , even to the party figures previous identi-
fied as the main targets). In other words, now that the
Red Guards had correctly read and acted upon the militant
emphasis of the 8 August declaration, and subsequent
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commentaries, the party leaders could retreat for a while
into one of the cautionary provisions of the declaration.
Lin Piao and others of the new team were soon to call more
clearly for discipline--a discipline which if effected
would permit the Red Guards to be used in a more orderly
way, over the long term, against a narrower range of tar-
gets.
On 31 August there was another huge rally of "revo-
lutionary teachers and students" in Peking, in which Mao
had the starring roles. Mao arrived a~ the rally in the
first car, accompanied by Lin, Ho Lung (another old-time
military leader and officer of the Military Affairs Com-
mittee), Hsieh Fu-chih (still Minister of Public Security,
despite th,., fact that he had been a protege of Teng Hsiao-
ping), and Yang Cheng-wu (conunander of the Peking head-
quarters of the PLA); there seems no doubt that Mao in-
tended in this way to emphasize the degree to which the
new team united and rested upon the regime's instruments
of force. In the second car were the third and fourth-
ranking leaders, Chou En-lai and Tao Chu, along with
Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) and another party leader (not
Chen Po-ta, fifth-ranking, who was missing, but Nieh
Jung-chen, a new figure in the inner circle). Back in
the third car were the demoted leaders of the old party
apparatus, Llu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.
The rally was opened by Chiang Ching in her capacity
as first "deputy head of the cultural revolution group,"
and was apparently presided over by her (thus maintained
continuity, as Chen Po-ta had presided over the first rally).
Lin Piao and Chou En-lai again made the speeches.* Lin 25X1
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strongly praised the contribution of the Red Guards to
date in destroying the "four olds." He went on, however,
to call upon the Red Guards to "distinguish who are our
enemies and who are our friends," to "unite with the
great majority and concentrate all forces on striking
at the handful of bourgeois rightists." The "main target
of the attack," he said, must be "those persons in power
who have wormed their way into the party and are taking
the capitalist road." In this formulation, Lin was
reiterating almost verbatim the line which had been taken
in the militant portions of the 8 August declaration and
by Red Flag on 10 August, (It seems important to recognize
that- in-in his August and September speeches was not
originating a new line, but idei:tifying himself primarily
with the militant elements of the existing line.) Thus
restricting the range of Red Guard activity while incit-
ing them anew against party leaders, Lin went on to line
up with the 28 August People's Daily on the means of
struggle
("Don't hit pe`op e-"'_not even the bad "persons
in power"), and to describe the Red Guards as "the shock
force-of the great cultural revolution and a powerful
reserve force of the People's Liberation Army."
Chou En-lai also praised the Red Guards, but he
went on to emphasize the need for a discipline as strong
as the PLA's, and he did not incite the Red Guards to
further action against party leaders as Lin had. Stating
expressly what Lin had simply implied, Chou asked the
Red Guards to build themselves into a disciplined body
and to become a r liable reserve force" of the PLA.
During the first two weeks of September there were
additional indications that Peking intended to put the
brake on the Red Guard movement as a whole, while shaping
it up as a permanent vehicle on the PLA model--a vehicle
which could be driven headlong if so desired for a period
of weeks, or used to run over given individuals while
missing others, and then reliably slowed or halted.* The
De ega ions from otli Red Guard units and the party
committees they had been attacking were reported to be
trooping into Peking in this period to appeal to the
party center.
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party's actions at this stage like others cannot be fitted
neatly into a clearly-defined period, owing to the lack
of synchronization, especially the lag behind Peking it-
self; as previously noted, the Red Guards in P;sking had
begun to slow down at the end of August, while Red Guards
at many other places (including Red Guards from Peking)
were staging riots until mid-September. But the actions
taken in Peking of course indicated intentions as regards
the conduct of the "cultural revolution" as a whole.
Following up on the admonitory editorials and
admonitory elements of leaders' speeches of late August,
People's Daily reiterated on 5 September that it was the
par s ~~
Y policy to ,struggle By Reasoning, Not By Coercion
or Force" (the title of an editorial that day).* And 25X1
on 7 September the party newspaper told the Red Guards
directly that they were not to interfere with productive
work and should in fact organize themselves to assist with
the autumn harvest.
The paper went on
to say that the leaders of economic units should establish
two teams--one "mainly" for the cultural revolution, one
"mainly" for production.
- fe par y on tie same date put in better order its
plans for bringing provincial students to Peking for in-
doctrination. A later wall poster cites a party-govern-
ment directive of 5 September establishing quotas, teacher-
student ratios, length of stay (four days), and respon-
sibility for food and transportation. It does not appear,
however, that such good order was achieved.
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On 11 September People's Daily returned to a propo-
sition that had been pu forward in the 8 :'august declara-
tion and had been spelled out by the party newspaper it-
self on 23 August--namely, that the targets of the Red
Guards were not to be allowed to figs act, to organize
resistance. Quoting the 3 August declaration to the
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effect that "it is not permitted, whatever the pretext,
to incite the massc,~s to struggle against one another, or
to incite the students to do likewise," the 11 September
editorial took note (as it had on 23 August) that "respon-
sible persons in some localities and units openly defied
this decision,...creat(:d various pretexts to suppress the
mass movement,. ..even incited a number of wockers and
peasants.. .to oppose and antagonize the revolutionary
students." (There were of course many more instances of
this as of 11 September than as of 23 August.) The news-
paper reiterated that such resistance was "diametrically
counter" to Mao's directives," and that a "firm struggle"
would be waged against anyone so foolish as to resist Mao.*
This editorial coul; of course be read as the corollary
to the admonitions to the Red Guards in that period--better
discipline for the Red Guards, less resistance from the
party leaders attacked, a neater script all around. But
this could hardly have been satisfactory to the party
leaders who were then under attack or expected to be at-
tacked: even if assured in advance that they were in good
favor and would just be playing out a farce (a very few'
such assurances may have been given), acquiescence in
this role--public humiliation by children--would undermine
their authority forever and thus their ability to perform
the jobs they were trying to keep.** This was soon proved
to be the case, in IIeilungkiang, where a first secretary
in high favor w_th Peking found his provincial committee
to be paralyzed, after a particularly militant attack by
Red Guards.
It won seem th those who had "openly defied" a
central committee directive would have to be severely
punished at a later stage of the campaign, if the central
committee and its subordinate organs were ever to exercise
authority again.
**The Book of Job comments on their situation: "Unto
me men gave ear, and waited, and kept silence at my
counsel. After my words they spake not again... But now
they that are younger than I hold me in derision, whose
fathers I would not have set with the dogs of my flock."
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In the same period (dating from late August, in
Pc,-king), posters were observed reminding the Red Guards
of their subordination to /cultural?7 "revolutionary com-
mittees," and warning them not to attack "old revolution-
ary cadres," nor to use force except against those targets
"ratified by tine central committee" and municipal commit-
tees, nor to search the houses of "revolutionary cadres"
(party members?) except when ratified as above, nor even
to search "bad elements" unless in coordination with the
local police and public security officials.*
In this period of early September, the regime ap-
peared to be taking organizational measures to ensure
thu continuing coordination of the activities of the Red
Guards in a given province or municipality, and perhaps
given on a national basis. Provincial broadcasts and wall-
posters first spoke of a "Red Guard General Headquarters
of Universities and Colleges in Peking," and soon other
"General Headquarters" were reported as having been estab-
lished by a preparatory committee. The objectives were
stated by one provincial broadcast as being to "organize,
merge, unify, and handle matters under centralized con-
trol." The regime seemed to intend to combine all of
the individual Red Guard "headquarters" representing
separate types of schools into a true general headquart-
ers for a given area--one representing irs all types
of schools and then all types of Red Guard activity in
the area.** The establishment of headquarters in a given
isi ors o ien sin in mid-September reported walls
and vehicles covered with posters saying "use peaceful 25X1
methods, not violence."
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I I
area was normally celebrated in a rally attended by lead-
ing figures of the provinc i.al and/or mun.'cipal party cc.ia-
mittee, of the local cultural revolution committee, and
of the local military headquarters, with speeches by one
or more individuals from each such group. These Red Guard
headquarters "elected" their officers, and were then sup-
plicd with "instructors" from the local PLA headquarters.
Three of these provincial accounts referred to a
possible national headquarters of the Red Guards. One
(Mukden radio) spoke of an "Amalgamated General Headquart-
ers of the Red Guards," and two others (in South China)
referred to the "combined command" of the Red Guards,
one of them (Kweiyang) specifying that the Red Guard
headquarters in Kweichow had been established as a result
9f a proposal of representatives of this "combined com-
mand" and local colleges. It was not at all clear, how-
ever, what the components of this "combined command" were;
while it would have made sense for the "combined command"
to be simply the command of a general headquarters, repre-
senting many types of Red Guard units, the Kweiyang broad-
cast spoke of the headquarters itself as having been
established partly on the initiative of the "combined
command" (that is, the combined command existed first) ;
thus the "combined command" may have been composed of
local leaders of the party committees, the cultural revo-
lution bodies, and the PLA. Neither was there any way
to judge whether, there was a "combined command" in Peking.
Subsequent. materials gave no indication of a national
headquarters.
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Another important organizational measure taken in
this period, in order to slow the momentum of the Red
Guards and get or k,'ep them under control, was the estab-
lishment of Rec! Guard Control Squads, a kind of military
police (but with larger powers) given complete uniforms
and appreciable training. The first of these was reported
in Peking at the end of August, and another soon appeared
in Tientsin. These were said--like party pronouncements
and wall-posters--to have ordered Red Guards to stop using
coercion (including torture) and to adhere to the 16-point
directive of 8 August, and to recognize at all times the
authority of the central committee and municipal committees;
they were further said to have the authority to expel
disreputable elements and to tear down posters that did
not reflect the true intentions of the party leadership.
One poster, dating the decision to establish them as
25 August, described them as the elite corps of the Red
Guards--just as the Red Guards were the elite corps of
the "revolutionary students," and the latter were the
elite corps of the masses--and declared that they had
authority to "investigate Red /Guard?7 organizations in
all schools, organizations, factories and units."* Similar
bodies were subsequently reported in the provinces, some-
times under the name of "Picket Corps" or "Provost Teams"
described as being concerned with "security work and the
maintenance of revolutionary order" (among the roving
Red Guards). Observed (in films.) in action in Peking on
1 October, the control squads did indeed look like the
elite of the Red Guards.
This impression of early September--that Peking
was moving toward the systematic coordination of Red Guard
activity--proved to be misleading. The more important
development--which was not to become clear until November--
was the logical consequence of the polarization of the
Red Guards into militant and moderate elements which had
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begun even earlier than 13 August and which was noted
in the foregoing section of this paper. This was prepara-
tory action by the most militant elements of the Red
Guards to set up rival headquarters, which first appeared
in the Northeast, in late September, and then in Peking
and several provinces in Cctober.* The Red Guards had
been implicitly authorized to do so--that is, to set up
whatever organizations they liked--in Chou En-lai's
speech at Tsinghua on 22 August (not available until
late November), and they may have been explicitly authorized
to do so in interviews wii 'officers of the central "cul-
tural revolution group." Unfortunately, no material on
the preparatory stage is available, and it is not known
whether the militant organizers of the "rebel" headquart-
ers got explicit permission from these officers or any
other lea ers of the inner circle.
The question remained, in these first two weeks
of September which saw the closing of the first--that is,
the most violent--phase of Red Guard activity: from whom
were the Red Guards getting their orders? The answer--set
forth in detail below--seems to be that individual party
*Anays~s ._of d~ were the first to recognize that some
of the "headquarters" appearing in this period were not
later forms of organizations originally reported in the
"preparatory" stage, but were in fact rival headquarters.
The present writer
does not agree, however, that the material shows the
rival groups to be "responsive to different individuals"
in the politburo standing committee; what it shows, on
this writer's reading, is that the militants believe that
they are responsive to Mao and Lin, and believe that
their opponents are responsive to othcrs, and in some
respects are probably right about this--but not in -Te
sense of attacking targets to order.
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leaders, the conventional party apparatus, the PLA, and
the new "cultural revolution committees" all had roles,
but that their most important guidance from the top level
came from Chou En-lai (as their "advisor") and from the
central "cultural revolution group," and, at the work-
ing level, from the subordinate "cultural revolution"
bodies.
In a vague, general sense, the central committee
and Chairman Mao were ++.ie "leaders" or "commanders" of
the Red Guard. In fact the Red Guards were quoted in
their first appearance--18 August--as defining their mis-
sion as that of defending the central committee, Mao,
and Mao's thought. Red Guards like others were constantly
describing Mao as China's "supreme commander," or "great
leader," or "helmsman," and Red Guard wall-posters often
spoke of the party central committee as exercising "lead-
ership" or even "supreme" leadership, and told the Red
Guards to recognize this. But there was no suggestion
in any material that either Mao or the central committee
issued orders directly to the Red Guards.
Similarly, Red Guards were sometimes quoted as
recognizing Lin Piao as their leader or commander, or as 25X1
deputy to Mao in such a role, and it is,true that Lin had
publicly given them some of their general directives at
the rallies of 18 and 31 August.
The conventional party apparatus was sometimes
said to be in authority over the Red Guards, in the sense
that provincial party committees were sometimes described
as "leading the cultural revolution" in the province, or
as "supervising" the activities of Red Guards in their
jurisdictions; and in at least one province Red Guard
speakers cited the "leadership" of the provincial commit-
tee as well as that of the central committee and Mao.
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Leading figures of regional, provincial and municipal party
committees were prominent in public gatherings--usually 25X1
giving the main speeches--at public gatherings centered
on the Red Guards, and provincial committees were credited
with Navin celled some of these meetings;
rom that period suggested that the party committee's
leadership was being exercised through an extraordinary
party organ, the cultural revolution committee or group.
This did not mean that the party committee's leadership
was purely nominal; the cultural revolution committee or
group was often if not usually led by a secretary of the
local party committee, and it was later learned that at
least some of the cultural revolution committees and
groups in this period were submitting regular or at least
numbered reports to the local party committees (as well
as to the central committee). But even in cases in which
the local cultural revolution committee and groups were
headed by local secretaries who had been loyal to their
first secretaries, it is doubtful that the local party
committees could effectively direct and control the
activities of the Red Guards, because the cultural revo-
lution committees and groups were also getting orders
from the central "cultural revolution group" which they
could disregard only at their peril, and, moreover, Mao's
new team in Pr,king was bypassing the conventional party
apparatus in giving the Red Guards their most important
instructions in personal interviews, instructions which
the Red Guards were bound to take more seriously than
orders received from the local party secretaries whom
they were free to attack.
The "PLA"--as distinct from Lin Piao personally--
was surmised by some observers to be leading, directing
or supervising the Red Guards. This surmise appeared
to be built upon the many descriptions of the PLA as the
model, the calls upon the Red Guards to "learn from the
PLA," the assertion that the Red Guards were already or
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were to become a "reserve force of the PLA (according
to one report, an "armed" reserve), the links with the
PLA through the ;establishment of Corps and the assignment
of PLA officers as "instructors," the references to a
"combined command" of the Red Guards (the assumption
being--perhaps correctly--that the PLA at some level
represented part of the combined command), and the
prominent roles of military figures (along with party
committee and "cultural revolution committee" figures)
in the meetings celebrating the establishment of the
various headquarters and welcoming Red Guards back from
their travels. At least one observer conjectured that the
General Political Department of the PLA was directing the
Red Guards, and more than one concluded that the super-
visory role of the PLA--in itself uncertain---was at any
rate "increasing" as of mid-September. Apart from the
establishment of the various headquarters, which did in-
deed suggest a larger PLA role at least in making the
Red Guards a disciplined body, the surmise of PLA direction
of the Red Guards as of mid-September seemed to beTililt -
on little more than an impression of an increased promin-
ence of PLA figures in public activities related to the
Red Guards; for example, in at least two Red Guard cere-
monies of mid-September, military figures--uncharacteristic-
ally--were listed first among the dignitaries present,
and in at least three instances the military figures gave
the main speeches. 25X1
The "cultural revolution group" in Peking and its
subordinate bodies--together with Chou En-lai--appeared
to have the largest role in the direction of Red Guard
activity in this period.
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"cultural revolution" conuuittees and groups continued to
or
aniz
th
g
e
e lied Guards, with the lower-level bodies
sending their lists to higher-level bodies for approval.
There was considerable evidence cX a close relation-
ship between the "cultural revolution" bodies and the
Red Guards--much of which evidence indicated the direction
of the latter by the former--from broadcasts, posters,
and intercepted messages of the period. Just as officers
of the "cultural revolution group" in Peking had presided
over the first two Red Guard rallies in Pekiiig (18 and
31 C.ugust), in the meetings at many points in China which
established Red Guards Carps or welcomed Red Guards home,
in most cases in which a presiding official was identified
the presiding figure was a party committee official who
was concurrently an officer of the committee's cultural
revolution committee or group, although there were a few
reports of such meetings in which "cultural revolution"
figures were not identified as present. Local cultural
revolution committees and groups were sometimes identified
as receivi
"
ng
revolutionary students" from other areas,
25X1
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As previously noted, the students
attacking the provincial party headquarters in Sinkiang
in early September claimed to be acting under the authority
of Chen Po-ta; and it was to the "cultural revolution
groups" all over China that the local academics sent their
protest. At about the same time, according to later wall-
posters, the competing forces in a research institute
attached to a hospital in Pr-king--the work-team and the
body that had dislodged it (a "cultural revolution" body)--
both claimed to have the word--a "directive" or direct
instructions--from Tao Chu himself*;
/at least four other 25X1
officers of the cultural revolution group---Chiang Ching,
Kang Sheng, Kuan Fong, and Chang Ping-hua--were giving
speeches and interviews to the Red Guards in this period.
Chou En-lai also had a major role, perhaps the most
important role of any party leader. Chou was known to 25X1
have given iiuportant instructions to the Iced Guards in
at least two major speeches in August
he was reported to have given at
least two more important interviews in early September 25X1
*llUs inc.1 en was to f.tgure later in posters attack-
ing Tao Chu himself. The Minister of Health was said in
the September posters to have sent the work-team and to
have intervened personally on its behalf, while posters
of November charged Tao with defending this same Minister
of Health.
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and he was soon to give another major interview--appearing
together with Tao Chu--in which he gave the Red Guards
the clearest guidance ever reported. This role has to
be kept in mind when considering reports that this or
that Red Guard activity was directed against Chou; this
is not to say that there was no such activity, as the
most militant Red Guard units in late August did appear
to believe that their opponents represented Chou's line,
but to say that some of the lines which the Red Guards
were acting on were formulated by Chou himself.
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While the party leaders in Peking were calling
both for militancy and 25X1
for discipline, and Peking itself was fairly quiet, else-
where in China in the first two weeks of September many
clashes were reported. These continued to include at-
tacks by Red Guards on ordinary citizens, attacks by Red
Guards on party committee headquarters and on individual
party and government officials (including functionaries
o the now "cultural revolution" committees and teams),
the "shame parading" of party officials,* battles between
various groups of Red Guards (those from Poking were gen-
erally reported as the most militant and obnoxious),
battles between Rod Guards and local citizens organized
by party committees to oppose them, and such other fea-
tures as "hunger strikes" outside party committee head-
quarters and the use of troops to quell "riots." In some
of these disorders, thousands of people were reported to
have been engaged, and in some cases hundreds were reported
to have been injured and dozens killed, or hundreds as the
sum of several incidents).**
*7:-
;i.ent.cod scornfully on the cult of ',Mao or on the value of
Liu's confession." It is also possible to accept sum-
mer 1966 as a period for which lio--in the hindsight of
Mao and Lin--had to accept some part of ti,,e responsibility
(like Liu and Tong of the party machine, a:nd Liu Chih-chicn
of the General Propaganda Department)--tho.t is, respon-
sibility for "errors" in implementing the. ?":ao-Lin fine
at that time. It is also possible to believe that Ho tried
to protect sornc of his subordinates against attack and
tried to protect some of the leaders of the Southwest
(his onetime area) against the excesses of the Red Guards
and against plans to purge then., just as Tao Chu did for
leaders of the Central-South. It is also -credible that
IIo, like Lo, gave preference to his favorites. And in
11o's case there are both professional and personal rela-
tionships with disgraced leaders which could be and prob-
ably were used against him--e.g., longtime association
with Peng To-huai and others in the Northwest, and with
Tong llsino-ping, Li Ching-chuan and others in the South-
west, and personal relationships with his own disgraced
son, with Li Ching-chuan and his family, and with Liao
Ilan-sheng (reportedly married to his niece).. But those
things do not add up to a confirmation of the charge
that IIo and others were conspiring against Lin Piao, and
in llo's case as in Lo's it is necessary to look for some
development external to the charges which would suggest
at least that Mao and Lin believe that there is something
in this particular charge.
In Lo's case, the external development was the sud-
don and simultaneous fall of Yang Shang-kun, months before
an/?- other leaders fell. Therc: is the same kind of evidence
in No's case-?-the apparently simultaneous fall of at least
six others later alleged to be members of Ho's cabal.
Li Ching-?chuan, as noted, was denounced by the Madame on
the same date (18 December), Liao Han-sheng disappeared
from the news after 19 Decembe., Su Chen-hua :.nd llsu Kuang-
ta failed to make any appearances after late November,
and Huang 1lsin-ting and Kuo Lin-hsiang of the Chengtu
headquarters (not regularly in the news) apparently fell
at this time; a seventh, Yang Yung, commander of the Poking
headquarters, also dropped from the news after 19 December,
and was much later accused of being one of this cabal.
The time of the fall of other alleged members of the cabal,
25X1
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ILLEGIB
h~,;,c~? ;?, i~. not l:no?r And a co2l?plicating factor, with
rc?sl,.. c.: to l)0th groups, is that most of them were known
G:? L.;i i:_ Nerd to bc.' in trouble anyhow.
It may b?c: useful to consider first those who ai nr-
er;tly Lcl]. At thc sure titre, as if llao and his comrades
ii, favor had finally decided, in or about early December,
that they wore indeed a group of conspirators. Li Chinn-
chuan had been a direct, longtime protege of Tcng Hsino-
ping, and as such was expected to fall in any case.
(ilsich Fu-chih, still in high favor, was another such
case, but reportedly turned on Ton- in the summer of ?1966
and saved himself; Li apparently declined to do this.)
Li was obviously in disfavor also for the treatment ac-
corded the red Guards by organizations subordinate to the
Southwest Bureau in the fall of 1966, was clearly marked
us nit object of the next wave of Red Guard attacks, and
was pretty clearly marked for purging. Similarly, Lino
Han-shong was already in trouble; long associated with
Pcng '1'e-huni, he was both an in-law of 11o Lung's and a
brother- in-law of Yang Shang-ken's (enough in itse` to
sink him, as the materials have shown that Chinese Com-
munists like other Chinese take family relationships very
seriously), and there is a credible charge that he helped
to protect the Poking headquarters and the new Peking com-
mittoe (the one which succeeded Pen- Chen's group) against
Red Guard attacks in the autumn of 1966. Similarly, the
Navy man, Su Chen-hua, had been so closely associated
with Tong llsiao-ping that he was suspect in any case; and
in fact a sta ';ement attributed to a military leader in.
favor (llsu lisi.ang-chien) denounced Su not for con"piracy
with Ilo but for being Tong's "nail" in the Navy. Ilsu Kuang.-
ta had had some unfortunate associations (he had had a
great deal to do with the Russians, and had been close
to Peng Te-huai and other discredited leaders), and could
have been found against on that basis. The two officers
of the Chengtu headquarters, Huang and Kuo, were already
in trouble, held responsible--like Li Chino-chuan--for
resistance to the Red Guards there during the fall. Yang
Yung was probably in some degree of trouble, like Liao,
for the Peking headquarters' opposition to Red Guard
groups.
The timing of the fall of the others alleged to
be members of Ho's cabal is not known. The two deputy
commanders of the Air Force, Liu Chen and Chong Chun,
had not made appearances for months; one of them (Liu)
had already provided enough ammunition to bring him down,
in an article of 1965 which gave high praise to Liu Shao-
chi as at military leader (this may also explain the dis-
appearance`fromthe news after late 'November of another
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t:.-y I, . Ai-ping, who had written an even
pi,:c,: oi, Liu in 1965), and either or bath
or Li;( dcput icr-: mi.' ; hnvc run r:foul of the two senior of-
Of the Air 1'oi?cc in 1965 in the maneuvering for
;,usition which prolr.:b)y followed the death of the commander
Liu The two officers of the operations subdepart-
mcnt of the general staff, Wang and Lei, had been out of
the news for some months and had had past associations
with a number of leaders in disfavor. (Some posters linked
Wang and Lei with Lo Jui-ching rather than 1Io, and at
least one suggested that they had got into trouble at the
time of the "February coup" by failing to act rapidly
to bring in reliable troops; but both Wang and Lei appeared
to be in good favor as late as August or September, so
both of these charges seem weak.) Finally, Chiu Ilui-tso,
although in trouble for some weeks, was defended by party
and military leaders in favor and thereafter appeared to
be in good favor himself.
It can be argued that there was a single issue
in December which precipitated a negative- judgment on
several members of this group, and that they are linked
by their position on this issue rather than by bonds of
collusion. It might be contended, for example, that the
question of whether to send the PLA into action against
Mao's opponents arose in late November or early December
and that some members of this group--e.g. Ho-Lung-and
the commanders of service, headquarters and the operations
chiefs--expressed their opposition, and that--after. Mao
and Mn had decided upon intervention--this made them
(objectively) guilty of "collusion" with some of the
regional leaders who were to be moved against. There is
no good evidence, however,, that Mao and Lin wore discussing
as early as 'late November the question of sending g PLA into action, and, as will be argued later, it is hard
to believe that any significant number of military leaders
would have opposed a step aimed at restoring order.
Another possibility, of course, is that some of
them were simply framed by rivals, that there was no real
basis for moving against them. Since this is an occupa-
tional hazard for Communist leaders, it may have happened
in any number of cases in the purge; but evidence is lack-
ing.
On balance, the roughly simultaneous fall of at
least seven of this group--Ho Lung, Li Ching-chuan, Liao
Han-shen;, Su Chen-hua, Hsu Kuang-ta, Huang Hsin-ting,
and Kuo Lin-hsiang--suggests that Mac and Lin may really
believe that some of them were in collusion against Lin,
at least in the sense of working together to frustrate
his policies. This opposition was not discovered in
summer 1966, as Ho rode with Mao at the 31 August rally,
and need not have existed--even undiscovered--as far back
as summer 1966. The probability is that ' i t shaped up later,
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c. '.ta >r?; ;,,l,cr of t fie group had snore reason to oppose the 25X1
disro;.ti.vc and dangerous policies of the top leaders
The Purge of the Regional and Provincial Commands, 1966
It was apparent in August 1966 that the political
apparatus in the PLA's military regions and military dis-
tricts, and in the armies disposed in these areas,. would
be hit at'least moderately hard. Many'of the ranking
regional and provincial political officers were concur-
rently the first or second secretaries of the regional
bureaus and provincial committees, and the 8 August declara-
tion on the.conduct of the "cultural revolution" incited
the Red Guards against them. Moreover, the purge of both
party and military leaders in Peking seemed certain to
have consequences down the line, and the purge of the
General Political Department and the PLA/CRG toward the
end of 1966 could also be expected to have some cc:nsoqu-
ences for military commanders and political officers out-
side Peking. Moreover, it was evident that the PLP. might
have to be sent into action in order to remove some of
Mao's opponents at various points in China and to restore,
order in the wake of the "revolutionary rebels" sent into
action into December. This raised another question, be-
cause some of the leaders of the military-political ap-
paratus to be used against Mao's opponents were Mao's
opponents. While it looked as though Peking could manage,
sooner or later, to bring down any or all of these leaders
of military regions and military districts if the armies
in the field were reliable, it also seemed likely that
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1 ?ulk:irn;, ?;;011]d hn ve iu?dc the effort during 1966 to got
t:?? a fully rr.li.^.l;lo 1-.A litary commander or a fully
ircl i:ii1c: political officer in place in each regional head-
c;uariters and district headquarters before the need arose
for the PLA to go into action, if for no other reason than
in order to have in each headquarters its own man to whom
to send the orders (when necessary) to dislodge and arrest
the other, in order in turn to have reliable men in both
posts at the time of crisis. (Where one man held both
posts, arrangements would have to be made through deputies.)
Although information was and still is far from complete
and is lacking entirely with respect to the armies, it
is sufficient to indicate that for all of these reasons
--a purge of party secretaries, a purge of political
officers, a purge of military commanders, and a desire
to make replacements if possible by the end of the year--
Peking did indeed replace the leaders of the military
regions and districts at an extraordinary rate in 1966.
While it is still not known whether all of those regarded
as unreliable were in fact dislodged by the end of 1966,
it is evident that one important object of the purge was
achieved: the PLA served Mao well in the critical period
of January-March 1967.
Of the 24 key figures of the 13 military regions
(12 military commanders and 12 political officers, rather
than 13 of each, because in two regions one man occupied
both posts), at least 10 wore :replaced in 1966, and an
eleventh was soon to fall. Ten others .appear--in thh
light of events in 1967--to have been in favor at the end
of 1966, but some of them insecurely. The status of the
other four was obscure.
Beginning with the Peking headquarters, Liao Han-
sheng, the political officer, was removed in the latter
half of December, and the military commander, Yang Yung,
was soon to fall. There was no difficulty in seizing thorn.
Proceeding more-or-less clockwise, the military
corn::.under and concurrently political officer of the Inner
Mongolia military region, Ulanfu (also first secretary),
was 1 obably removed from the troops (although not formally
replaced) by the end of 1966; he was denounced in the
fall and made no appearances after October. The commander
of the Mukden headquarters, Chen Hsi-lien, once associated
with Tong IIsiao-ping, was one of those whose status was
in doubt; although not denounced, he made no appearance
after October; the political officer, Sung Jen-chiung,
seemed in good favor in late 1966, but, as a protege of
Tong Hsiao-ping, not secure, and he-vas criticized in
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postcr~, in cr.rly 1967. The military commander of the
'1'Si.i;;~~: hc., dyus:ric~~?~;, Yang Te-chili, long with Lin Pino,
was it; favor'; the political officer, Tan Chi-lung (also
first secrctru?y in Shantung), was denounced and disap-
peared in \'ovc;iJher and was probably dislodged at that
t imc: .
The status of both the military commander and the
political. officer of the Nanking headquarters was obscure,
the comrnandpr, Hsu Shih-yu, had not appeared since November,
and the political officer as of late 1966 was not known;
there was a lot of trouble in the Nanking area early in
1967. The apparent commander of the Foochow headquarters,
Han Ilsion-chu, who once served with Lin Piao's forces,
was in favor; the political officer, Yeh Fei. (concur-
rently first secretary in Fukien), was reportedly removed
around the end of the year.
Down in Canton, the military commander of that
military region, Huang Yung-sheng, for many years with
Lin Pino, was in favor; the political officer, Tao Chu,
was taken into the top leadership in Poking in August,
purged in December, and smoothly replaced in Canton. Up
.in the Wuhan military region, the military commander, Chen
Tsai-tao, who had served with Lin Piao, was in favor; the
probable political officer, Wang Jen-chung, was also
purged in December (he had been closely associated with
Tao), and he too was smoothly replaced;
In the Kunming headquarters, Chin Chi-wei once
closely associated with Hsieh Fu-chih, apparently was
in favor, although perhaps not securely, as Red Guard
posters denounced him; the political officer, Yen Hung-
yen (also first secro t:ary in Yunnan ), once close to Tong
Ilsiao-ping, was purged and replaced in. November, and
killed himself (or was killed by Red Guards) soon there-
after. In the nearby Chongtu headquarters, once the command
of Tcng Ilsino-ping, both the military commander, Huang
Ilsi.n-ting, and the political officer, Li Ching-chuan
(also first secretary of the Southwest Bureau), as well
as the deputy political officer, Kuo Lin-hsiang, were
denounced in December 'and apparently dislodged a Unost at
once, as Li was reportedly shame-paraded in January.
Up in the Lanchow headquarters, the military com-
iiander, Chang Ta-chih, apparently was in favor, although
perhaps not securely, in view of denunciations of him in
Red Guard posters; the political officer, Hsien IIeng-han,
was in favor (although the regional first secretary, Liu
Lan-tao, a man close to Tong IIsiao-ping, was purged and
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erne ,. iy used) . In the Tihun (Sinkinng) headquarters, Wang
En-;,.-lo, t,hr, v;a; (and is) both the military commander and
the ln1 i tic. 1 officer, apparently was in favor, although
r.ot securely, because lie had a lot of trouble with the
lR,:d Guards and he may have been an insta%ice of a local
loadcr in a tricky area with %rhom Peking was willing to
compromise--for the sake of order--until it was convenient
to br! 'g him down. Finally, in the Lhasa (Tibet) head-
quarters, Chang Kuo-hua, the military commander and
also one of t?pose who was hard hit by the Red Guards, ap-
parently was in favor, in view of his subscy,;ont assign-
ment to an even more important post in Chengtu, but he
did not seem entirely secure; the political officer of
the Lhasa headquarters, Tan Kuan-san, was transferred to
a meaningless job in Pelting during 1966, unless the latter
job is hold ,by a man with an identical name.
There is less information on the leaders of mili-
tary districts, in particular on the dates of changes,
but there is enough for a picture to emerge. Of the 44
key figures of the 22 provinces subordinate to nine mili-
tary regions (the military regions of Inner Mongolia,
Srechuan, Sinkiang and Tibet have no subordinate military
districts, but are self-contained, single-jurisdiction
military regions), at least 14 were replaced in 1.966
(most of them purged) only nine are known to have been
in favor and in place, and the status of 21 was obscure.
There is little doubt, however, that some of these 21
were replaced before or soon after the end of 1966, and
that others 'will yet fall.
Of the military district headquarters subordinate
to the Peking regional headquarters: in Hopei, the mili-
tary commander, Mao Hui, was left in p]a cc, but the political
officer, Liu Tzu-hou, was removed around the end of the
year and put on display; while in Shensi, the military
commr:ndor, Chen Chin-yu, may have been replaced in 1966
(he made no appearance after January 1966), and the poli-
;:ica ]. officer, first Tao Lu-chia and then Wei Hong, Was
appr:rontly purged and replaced twice before the end of
1966.
As for the military districts subordinate to the
Mukdon headquarters: in Heilungkiang, the military com-
mander, Wang Chia-tao, remained in place (and has been
very active politically in 1967), while the political officer,
Ouyang Chin, was apparently replaced by August; in Kirin,
the fate of the military commander, Lo Kun-shan, is obscure
(ho has made no appearandes since January 1966), while
the political officer, Wu Te, was transferred to Peking
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in ;A(1-19,GG (i;ot to :?c purged); and in Liaoning, the status
of thu -..31 i t^r;; lio Ching-chi, is obscure (he
ha ; not aI)p :~rcci :;i.-;(?c October), while the political of-
i'icc:: , flu-'111; 111.10-ching , was replaced and probably purged,
perhaps bci'orc the end of 1965.
In the single military district subordinate to the
Tsinnn headquarters, the Shantung military district (the
only case in which a one-province military region also
hsn ; a military district for th,: same area), the status
of both the military commander and the political officer
is obscure, as neither incumbent in 1966 was known, al-
though'Ho Chih-yuan may have been assigned in 1966 to re-
place the political officer.
Of the military districts subordinate to the Nanking
headquarters: in Chekiang, the military commander, Chien
Chun, has not appeared since October, while the political
officer,' probably Chiang 1Iua, was replaced in the fall
of 1966; and in Kiangsu, the military commander, Chao
Chun, may have been replaced late in 1966, and the poli-
tical officpr may likewise have been replaced (if he was
still Chiang Wei-thing).
As for the military districts subordinate to the
Foochow headquarters: in Fulcien, the military commander,
Chu Yao-hua, has not appeared since November,, while the
political officer, possibly Lit Sheng, may have been re-
placed in 1966; and in.Kiangsi, the military conw-andcr,
Wu Jui-shan, was left in place, while the political-.officor,
Yang Shang-kuei (brother of the doomed "conspirator" Yang'
Shang-kun), was definitely purged during 1966.
Of the military districts subordinate to the Canton
headquarters: in Kwangtung, the military commander, Liu
Ilsing-lung, was apparently replaced in 1966, while the
political officer, Chen To, remained in place, perhaps
shakily; in Kwangsi, the military commander, On Chin-fu,
has not appeared since October, while the political officer,
if he was still Wei Kuo-ching, remained in place; and in
Hunan, the military commander, Lung Shih-chin, has not
appeared since October, while the political officer, as-
suming he was Chang Ping-hut, was denounced and replaced
in the fall of 1966.
As for the military districts subordinate to th!-
Wuhan headquarters: in Anhwei, the military commander,
Lino Jung-pino, was apparently replaced sometime in 1966,
while the political officer, Li Pao-hua, was dennuncecl,
purged, and replaced in the fall of 1966; in Honan, the
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ini litany commiiander, Chang Shu-chip, survived poster attacks
:end ri.:,gained in place, while the political officer, if
still. V~ti Chih-pu, may have been replaced in 1966;
and i'- 1lupci, the military commander, ]]an Tung-shcn, was
].eft in place and has been poli.tically active in 1967,
while the political officer, Chang Ti-hsueh, was denounced
and probably replaced late in 1966.
Of the military districts subordinate to the Kun-
ming headquarters: in Kweichow, the military connnander,
lIo Kuang-yu, and the political officer, Shili Hsin-nn,
were both confirmed in their posts, presumably one of the
reasons Pelting early in 1967 described Kweichov, as a model
province; but in Yunnan, the identity of military commander
was uncertain, and the political officer, Chou Hsing, made
no appearance after October and may have been purged.
Finally, of the four military districts subordinate
to the Lanchow headquarters: in Kansu, neither the mili-
tary commander nor the political officer was known as of
1966 (or is yet known); in Ninghsia, the same is true;
in Shensi, neither the military commander, Hu Ping-yun,
the probable political officer, Yuan Ko-fu, appeared
after August; and in Tsinghai, the military commander,
Liu Shien-chuan, was left in place (although his deputy
has since. been purged), while the political officer, first
Yang Chih-tin and then perhaps Wang Chao, was denounced
and replaced at least once and perhaps twice in 1966.
The Reorganization of the PLA/CRG, January 1967
On 10 January, speaking to the Red Guards, Madame
Mao denounced Liu Chih-chitin, believed to have been the
first: chief of the PLA's Cultural Revolution Group, and
told the Guards that the PLA/CRG was about to be reor-
ganized. Tha MAC decision was in fact approved by Mao
and the central committee the next day, and announced on
12 January. The MAC document stated that the decision
was taken in order to "strengthen the leadership over
the great proletarian cultural revolution in the entire
army," and that the new PLA/CRG would "carry out its work
under the ?direct leadership" of the MAC and of the central
(and saperior) Cultural Revolution Group of the central
committee.
The now chief of the PLA/CRG was to be Hsu Ilsiang-
chien, an. independent (i.e., not closely associated with
any particular party or military leader), a politburo
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umc:mlbcr and perhaps already a vice-chairman of the MAC who
had boon criticized by the Red Guards in the days preceding
his now appointment and had been defended by Chou En-lni,
Chen Po-ta and perhaps Madame Mao (reports differ), who
had acted as "advisor" to the PLA/CRG at least since late
November. The Madame was now to take the title formally,
and--as events were to show--was to have more authority
than Hsu himself had. Liu Chih-chien (on whom poster
attacks had begun on 9 January) had been dropped entirely,
and lost his post on the central CRG (which he had wished
to resign) at the same time.
Hsu's deputies were to be (in apparent order of
rank): IIsiao Hua, secretary-general of the MAC and. director
of the Genei;al Political Department; Yang Chong-wu, acting
chief-of.-staff; Wang Ilsin-ting, a deputy chief-of-staff,
once connected with Tong IIsiao-ping; Hsu Li-ching, the
other active officer '(with Hsiao) of the general political
department; Kuan Fong, a member of the central CRG and a
writer for the PLA newspaper; Hsieh Tang-ching, director
of the cultural subdepartment of the general political
dcpartirent, once associated with Tao Chu; and Li Man-tsun,
director of the propaganda subdepartment of the general
political department.
The other members of the group (without titles)
were to be: Wang Iking-kun, senior deputy commander of
the Navy, who had had an early association with Hsu Hsiang-
chi.en and then Tong IIsiao-ping; Yu Li-chin, political
officer of the Air Force, who had appeared (in party
material) to be an able man; Liu Hun-ching, a little-known
Navy ofificer; Tang Ping-chu, a former editor of the PLA
newspaper who had taken over People's Daily, the party
newspaper; Hu Chili, an editor of Lhe PLA newspaper; Yoh
Chun, an unknown who turned out to be Lin Piao's wife and
thus probably the do facto second-ranking figure of the
Grou behind Madame blao
Wang Feng, anot per
unknown who remains so; Ho Ku-yen, reported to be a mili-
tary propagandist; and Chang Tao, another unknown.
The Liberation Army Daily on the same day (12 Janu-
ary) called Tor an a talon the "handful" of persons in
the PLA who were taking the wrong road or the wrong line.
On 13 January a Red Guard newspaper printed an authorita-
tive list of military' leaders who had fallen with 1Io Lung,
and on 14 January the PLA newspaper made clear that the
purge of the PLA still had a long way to go. This editorial,
insisting that the revolution in the PLA be carkied out
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thoroughly, spoS:e: of the "circle upon circle of resistance"
(mainly i'roin, the military equivalents or followers of dis-
credited party leaders, like Liu and Teng), and declared
that the PLA taut be manned by those "truly loyal" to
1,1ao, ',:no's thought, and 'iao's line. Rejecting the argu-
ment that the PLA did not need such a revolution, it
stated that the struggle between the two lines "not only
exists, it is acute and complicated..." The editorial
went on to call for an intensive and ambitious program
in "all high-ranking leading organs, military colleges
and schools, and cultural organizations" of the PLA ("dar-
ing to advance. . .and drag out one after another" those
taking the wrong road or wrong line, "struggle against
them, pull them down, and discredit them''), while calling
only for a low-key grogram in the PLA's "armed units,"
a program featuring "correct education." In other words,
Mao and Lin were willing at that time to accept a good
deal of disruption at the upper levels of the PLA, but
not of the military units which would do the actual fight-
ing if the PLA were sent into action. It is not known
whether this line was embodied in any directive prior to
the appearance of the 28 January directive--whidh in fact
changed the line, in the interest of reducing disruption
in the high levels as well.
In a sensational development, within a few days
of their appointment several members of the now PLA/CRG
were being attacked by the Red Guards in posters and
apparently in interviews with leaders of the central. corn-
mittec's CRG. Two of the deputies, Hsieh Tang-chung and
Kuan Feng, and four of the ordinary members--Wang Hung-
kun, Tang Ping-chu, Hu Chih, and Ho Ku-yer, were denounced
in this way. The initiators of the attacks were not known
but the contents clearly disconcerted some of the loaders 25X1
of the PLA/CRG and of the superior central CRG and put
them on the defensive;
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There was so-mo speculation at the titre that the
~et~acl::, ware really imed at Lin Pino--through the standard
practice of fo] lov-ing the thread from the lesser figures
to the higher. Lin had been ou c of sight and may have
been sick, and his name had curiously no c appeared in the
authoritative 14 January editorial. Lin's opponents--who
may conceivably have included Madame Mao, as the follow-
ing section will argue--may indeed have thought that this
was a good time to start a process envisaged as ending
with the fall of Lin. If so, however, the initiative
failed.
These first attacks on members of the reorganized
PLA/CRG made a disorderly episode, at the least; all of
those attacked had surely been investigated and found
virtuous before their appointment. And the attacks may
have boon, at most, the beginning of a campaign against
some top-level military leaders. But the attacks did not
serve to discredit either the new PLA/CRG or the central
CRG as a body; both continued to function, although very
little publicity was subsequently given the PLA/CRG.
The Teeter and Recovery of Hsiao Hua, January 1967
? Hsiao Hua, director of the General. Political Depart-
ment, had come under poster attack in early January but
had been given it vote of confidence on 12 January with
his appointment as senior deputy chief'of the reorganized
PLA/CRG. Nevertheless, Hsiao apparently continued to be
criticized b, other leaders in favor for errors in the
conduct of the "cultural revolution" in the PLA--as, in-
deed, he should have been, inasmuch as his subordinates,
Liang Pi-ych and Liu Chih-chien, had been not only cri-
ticized but purged for them. And he had apparently been
invited to make a self-criticism.
Yang Yung, commander of the Peking military region
and a key figure in the Chinese military leadership, ap-
parently took the initiative in mid-January to make public
the charges that were being made against Hsiao by other
leaders. His eagerness seems explained by the probability
that he was in trouble himself, and his calculation that
he could deflect or reduce the charges against himself
by inciting the Red Guards against fsiao. (There seems
to have been no position for which they were competing.)
Yang had been out of the news for several weeks, having
disappeared from it on the same day as Liao Han-sheng, his
colleague in the Peking headquarters (Yang was the military
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co;,un:lndcr, Liao the political officer); Liao had just been
"exposed" as one of Ho Lung's co-conspirators, and it may
be that Yang l:new or thought himself vulnerable through
his close associatiok with Liao, as well as to the charge
(made la ter) that he had worked with Liao to frustrate
the ]led :;uards in the autumn. (The Red Guards later pro-
vided a long list of Yang s "crimes" over the course of 25X1
many years, most of them incredible.)
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some posters i
name a successor for Hsiao (Kuan Feng of the CRG, who was
himself soon attacked in posters but remained iu favor).
On the sai,;c day, and for two days thereafter, posters
attacking )h-J o wore observed on army trucks.in Peking.
1'/hothor those were Red Guard trucks or trucks supplied
for the occasion by Yang Yung is not clear, but it is
apparent that the Iced Guards were encouraged by the re-
ported remarks of Yana, Chen, and the Madame, which were
in fact quoted in the posters.
Chou En-lai was chosen to repel the attack on Hsiao
on 21 January, on which day PLA troops were also sent out
to tea.- down the posters attacking lIsiao
speaking to "cultural revolution" cadres of the PLA, Chou 25X1
did not deny that Hsiao had been under criticism within
the party, but said that this was an "internal question"
which should not have been publicized. lie further said
that the criticism had been "distorted" in the posters.
In particular, Chou said, it was "slanderous" to assert
that Chen Po-+a had "slandered the PLA" in the way reported,
as Chen understood Mao's thought too well to have done
that. In. other words, lisiao had made errors which he would
have to recognize and admit, and Chen (and the Madame)
had been unwise to speak publicly about Hsino's case, but
both Chen and Hsiao (not to speak of the Madame) were good
comr.a?3es who were still in favor with Mao and Lin. This
seems to have been exactly the case.
The luckless Yang Yung was broken on the next day.
According to posters, Chen Po-ta and llsu Hsiang-chien,
chairmen of *the CRG and PLA/CRG, on 22 January denounced
Yang as being as bad as Peng Te-huai, and said further
that "others in Yang's group should confess." Chen report-
edly linked Yang with the earlier-discredited Liao Han-
sheng, declaring that the question of the Peking headquart-
ers which they had commanded was "extremely grave" and
that power must be seized back from them; and further,
that it had been intended (from what date is unclear) to
decide Yang's fate later, but his attitude had been bad
and the Red Guards could settle it themselves. Yang was
reportedly paraded the same day.
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Thr: i;post into 'csting feature of the affair was the
1 reedo:.: v. i.th which Chcn Po-ta and Madame Mao?--its
t:c1 7 rt:; Yan; Yung--?aj. ;cusp;od the case of lisino publicly
(rtlthou24-h they 1nny have been cornered by the Red Guards
on thhis). As previously suggested, the Madame may have
wanted llsino's job. It is entertaining to speculate
further that one or both, more likely the Madame, was
engaged in an operation to bring Lin Piao down, and that
Chou's defense of }Hsiao was a way of telling Lin's enemies
that they could not hunt any further down this path. In
other words, Chou could have been saying that, whereas
under the rules governing the purge of the party they
were permitted to follow the thread from Wu Han to Teng To
to Penn Chen to Teng Hsiao-ping to Liu Shao-chi, in this
case the thread would lead from Liu Chih-chien to Hsiao
llua to Lin Piao, and they should recognize that there
was nobody below Lin's level who was strong enough--not
even Madame Mao--to bring Lin down. While it was and
remains conceivable that the Madame would like to dislodge
Lin, the evidence for this proposition in the Hsiao llua
case is very thin.
The Order to the PLA to Intervene, Late January 1967
In the first half of .January, the "cultural revo-
lution" was in high gear. Party leaders were being de-
nounced and displayed, the purge of a large group of? mili-
tary leaders was revealed, the PLA/CRG* was reorganized
and told to move aggressively against resistance to Mao's
thought and policy, and the "revolutionary rebels" (in-
cluding the Red Guards, which retained their separate
identity), were being urged to act on the December direc-
tives extending the "revolution" into'the factories and
the countryside. The "rebels" in Shanghai, `who "seized
power" in early January, were praised as examples for the
entire country, and it was said that the revolutionary
rebels nation-wide were about to launch their "general
offensive."
There was, however, great disorder in this "January
revolution." Much of this was probably caused by Mao's
opponents still in place in the party apparatus outside
Pcking,at least in the sense of defending themselves
against attack, one means being that of turning Peking's
own directives on the "revolution" against it--disrupting
production and stimulating clashes among elements of the
population. But much of the widespread disorder was
caused by the "rebels" themselves. Not only were they
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unable to cope v.1th the disorders caused by other elements,
but they contributed greatly to the- disorder, by attack-
ing at random and by fighting anong themselves.
It may be, as some observers have surmised, that
11ao would have sent the PLA into action earlier than he
did if he had been confident of the loyalty of the PLA,
and that he had such confidence only after the purges of
December and early January (and, some add, the easing of
those purges in late January). The evidence indicates
to this writer, however, that Mao's scenario called for
the PLA to be used only as an absolutely last resort;
surely it would have been, much better in terms of Mao's
doctrine if the "rebels" had managed to "seize power"
without any assistance except for that offered by the
enlightened masses. Mao evidently was not persuaded that
they would be unable to do this until after the middle
of January. Whatever the case, it seems likely that Mao
himself vas-concerned with the scale and potential of
the disorders in China at the time, and that he was also
given counsel--on the need to restore order--by Chou En-
lai and his associates, who needed a greater degree of
order if they were to operate the government, and by the
military leaders still in favor, who had probably been
unhappy about the role of the "rebels" from the start.
On 17 January, Madame Mao expressed for Mao the
leadership's concern about "anarchy" among the rebels
and about certain other of their failings. On 19 January
the Military Affairs Committee met, almost certainly to
consider the question of armed intervention by the PLA.
On the following day, despite Madame Mao's warning, a
rebel corps reportedly invaded the State Council, and
was arrested for it.
On the next day (21 January), according to posters,
Mao told Lin Piao that the policy of non-intervention had
proved to be a failure and that the PLA must now inter- 25X1
vent. On 22 January, according to posters, Chou En-tai
affirmed the need to send the PLA into action.
On 23-January, the PLA was officially ordered into
act', on by a joint directive of the central committee, State
Council, Military Affairs Committee, and Cultural Revolu-
tion Group. The provisions of the directive soon appeared
in a Red Guam newspaper and a number of posters.
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This directive opened by speaking of the "new stage"
of thc revolution--th^ "struggle for seizure of power"--
and called upon the PLA to support the "proletarian revo-
lutionaries" in this struggle. It cited Mao's "recent"
statements that non-involvement was a false concept and
that the "demands of all true revolutionaries for support
and assistance from the PLA must be satisfied." The
directive declared that "all past directives" which had
kept the PLA out of action were now rescinded, that when
"genuine" leftists asked for help the PLA must "send out
troops" on their behalf, and that counter-revolutionary
individuals and organizations must be "resolutely suppressed."
There was the obvious problem of how the "true"
or genuine leftists were to be distinguished from the
false. This in fact proved to be a very complex task for
the PLA, in those cases--perhaps the majority--in which
guidance was not provided. It was provided in some cases;
for example, on the same day (2 7anuary), according to
later accounts from official sources, the PLA in Harbin
carne to the aid of the "true" rebels, surrounding and dis-
arming the counter-revolutionaries; the latter were almost
certainly identified for the PLA by the party leader in
favor there, Pan Fu-sheng, whose list had presumably been
approved by the party leaders in Peking. But this was
a "model" province, and in many if not most places, it seems, the
leaders in Peking and the pLA locally were not in happy
possession either of a Pan Fu-sheng or of thorough know-
ledge of the local situation. Thus the PLA seems in fact
to have been given a good deal of discretion in sorting
out the good comrades from the rascals and the "true"
rebels from the false, and--judging from the fact that
only a few revolutionary committees have yet been approved
by Peking--it seems to .have had its troubles.
On 24 January, the Peking Radio, as might be expected,
claimed the allegiance to Mao of "all" officers and men
of the PTA, and on 25 January the Liberation Army Daily
smoothly explained everything to the troops. Tie editorial,
entitled "The Chinese PLA Firmly Backs the Proletarian
Revolutionaries," presented the argument in terms of a
struggle against the bad "handful" in the party, although
much or most of the PLA'?s activity for some months was
in fact to be directed against some Of thc:cse calling them-
selves "rebels." It was stated that the proletariat was
now struggling to "seize power," and that Chairman Mao
had called upon the PLA to "firmly support and assist
them," oven where and when the (true) rebels were in a
"minority temporarily."
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Thu 25 January editorial went on to dismiss the
cal, "sor;c poop lc'' that the policy of non-interven-
ti.on 5;11011]d he continued; it pointed out that non?-inter-
vuntion (At this sta(e) would have the effect of assist-
ing the opponeentF of the: revolution. Some observers took
this line as an admission that some of the leaders of the
PLA itself opposed 14ao's decision, and this may be true;
posters denouncing Hsu ilsiang-Chien, chief of the reor-
ganized PLA/CRG, and.llsiao Hun, who had just been "cleared"
by Chou, reportedly appeared on the day that the decision
was announced and on the next day. But it seems doubtful'
that any substantial number of PLA leaders opposed the
decision, and the attacks on IIsu and Hsiao seem more credibly
explained on other grounds (Ilan was later criticized not
for opposing the decision but for carrying it out all too
aggressively, and Hsiao remained in favor). The PLA news-
paper's assertion of opposition by "some people" would
be expected in any case, as all important decisions are
opposed by "some people," and the newspaper had asserted
just 10 days earlier that there was a struggle between
two lines in the PLA--a struggle which, in the dialectic,
would of course be expressed in W.s instance. Moreover,
no individual opponents of the decision were named, either
at the time or subsequently, even in posters. -Inasmuch
as the principal mission of the PLA, under the new directives,
was to be the restoration o order, it is hard to under-
stand why any significant number of military leaders would
have opposed it in principle: the hardest people to'con-
vince, of the need for such a directive, would seer to
have been'the extreme militants like Mao himself, those
who all along had demonstrated a willingness to accept
a large degree of "disorder" in the interest of a thorough
revolution. If there was opposition, it seems more likely
to have been expressed as dissatisfaction with the lack
of clear guidance for -the order's implementatiu:,.
Reassurances to the PLA, Late January-February 1967
The militant line on the conduct of the "cultural
revolution" in the "leading organs'' of the PLA--the line
affirmed, or perhaps reaffirmed, in the editorials which
followed the reorganization of the PLA/CRG in mid-Jar:uary--
was eased within a few days of the time of issuance (23
January) of the order to the PLA to intervene in support
of the "true" leftists. Some observers have interpreted
the MAC directive or directives of late January s halting
the "revolution" in the PLA; while this is clearly not
correct, it does appear that the late January line and
M_
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the elaboration of it in mid-February substantially
modified the conduct of it--at the higher levels of the
PLA--as prescribed in mid-January.
25X1
In order to estimate the extent of the change, a
brief recapitulation may be helpful. The work-teams of
June and July had been found to be far too conservative.
Lin Piao in August had supplied a more militant. directive,
but the purge of inadequate cadres was still to be carried
out in only a portion of the ALA and by the PLA's exist-
ing instri+.rents, as directed by the General Political
Department; the task was given to party committees, which
were told to carry out a program of what was still a
fairly conservative nature, probably emphasizing "educa-
tion" rather than "struggle." The 5 October directive
had changed this with respect to military academies and
schools, telling these institutions to pursue a more
vigorous program emplo;*,ing the more disruptive methods
already in use by non-military organizations (contending,
posting, debating, exchanging experiences), and transfer-
ring leadership from party committees to special cultural
revolution teams under a PLA/CRG; there may have been a
concurrent directive for the conduct of the revolution
in the PLA as a whole, under the direction of the PLA/CRG,
but, if so, it surely called for less disruptive methods
in the PLA as a whole than in the schools. In early
January this PLA/CRG had been reorganized and put under
the direct leadership of the 11AC and the central CRG,
and editorials which followed the event called for an
intensive 'struggle in all high-level organs (snder' the
slogans of "daring..., dragging out..., pulling down...,"
and so- on).
The new orders--changing the mid-January line--
were embodied in a MAC directive of 28 January. This may
have been preceded by a directive of 27 January--dealing
with one part of the problem--which is worth a moment's
diversion. It will be recalled that Liu Chih-chion had
reportedly, in late November, expressed discouragement
over the progress of the revolution in the 13 military
regions, saying that fewer than half were really partici-
pating. The 27 January directive, as reported in posters
later, was reportedly concerned entirely with this ques-
tion; it reportedly placed the military regions on the
[Sino-Soviet) "fro.n1oier" (at least three) on the Alert
against the "revisionist" military threat and stated that
(in consequence of this concern the "cultural revolution"
could be postponed in some regions. This reported directive
was later criticized in Red Guard posters as representing
the personal initiative of Yeh Chien-ying rather than Mao's
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will, but in fact it is consistent with the 28 January
dirrcLivu as reported and with some- remarks attributed
to Chou L;n-lai a few days later. What is uncertain is
whet.h~?r there was in fact. a separate 27 January directive;
it is possib].c that the Red Guards whose posters reported
it had simply got hold of one portion of the 28 January
directive and misdated it by a day. In this connection,
there would seen no great need for a separate directive
on a matter essentially covered in a directive issued
one day later.
No official text of the 28 January directive is
available, but a purported reproduction in a Red Guard
newspaper--confirmed in part by posters--is probably
generally accurate. It was a MAC directive, endorsed
and praised by Mao on 28 January and published (on Mao's
order) the same day. Like the 23 January directive order-
ing the PLA into action, it spoke of the "new stage" in
which intervention by the PLA was necessary, and gave
directions appropriate'(as it said) to this new stage.
The first ox its eight points reiterated the central
point of the 23 January directive as to the need to sup-
port the "true proletarian revolutionaries" and to sup-
press the counter-revolutionaries, while the rest of its
points concerned the conduct of the cultural revolution
in ,the PLA.
The most important -t these points provided: ? that
the revolution would be c;.,nducted--meaning, perhaps,-would
continue to be conducted--by means of "big contending,
big blooming, big-character posters, and big debates"
(but not exchanges of experience) in "units of the armed
forces where the great cultural revolution has been
launched" (while evading the question of just where it
had been launched and also failing to call explicitly for
bad leaders to be brought down); that the revolution
should be conducted by reason and not by force; and that
those criticized should not be lightly classed with the
enemy; that there were to be no arrests without orders,
and no physical harassment (torture and parading; Westerners
had observed officers forced to lie on the ground with
their men's feet on their heads); that those who had gone
to exchange experience should return to their units to
handle their own struggles; that there were to be no
more assaults on military "leadership" (later reported
as "guidance"c)organs; that PLA organizations above divi-
sion-level could carry out the revolution either at dif-
ferent times or by easy stages (either reading is possible,
meaning 'as opportunity permits').; and that military forma-
tions of ermy'level and below must undertake "positive
education.
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' ? 1 1
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There was reportedly an elaboration of this MAC
di.rvc:tiw! in a central committee directive on 21 February.
Again thorn is no official text, but again there is a
detailed :'CCount, this one from posters. According to
these posters, which appears to 25X1
give the provisions of both the 28 January directive and
the 21 February elaboration, the main points of the two
were: that military organizations above division-level
should conduct the revolution by posters and debates,
but in separate groups and at separate tfwos, while lower-
level units should conduct the revolution entirely through
"regular education" and in particular should not take part.
in "exchanges of experience"; that "seizi.ng of power from
below" in "military guidance organs" (earlier reported
as "leadership" organs) was absolutely forbidden (a pro-
vision presumably addressed to the "revolutionary rebel"
groups known to exist in some of these organs); that there
were to be no further "invasions" of these organs (there
had reportedly been some more, since 28 January); that
the cultural revolution in units of division-level and
above was to be directed by party ccmmittees rather than
cultural revolution teams, in the interest of maintaining
a strict command system; and that PLA leaders who had
made "mistakes" were not to be treated harshly and wore
not to be irresponsibly classified with the enemy.
It is apparent that the two reported directives
added up to a substantial modification of the line
being expressed as late as 14 January--with its exhorta-
tions to have daring, drag out, pull down, and so on.
Some observers concluded at the time that the PLA "agreed"
to join the revolution--that is, consented to support
the rebels in seizures of power, and to restore order
generally--because these two directives promised that
the purge of the PLA would be "called off." But they
did not promise that. Where they differ from the 14
January line is that they are evasive or .conciliatory on
the question of pace at the higher levels, and more con-
servative with respect to the treatment of those cri-
ticized.. This was a 'promise' which was not very hard
to make, because Mao and his team had already conducted
a large-scale purge of the PLA leadership, had already
purged what was almost certainly the majority of those
they intended to purge. (As it turned out, the purge of the
PLA did continue, but at a much slower pace.) It can be argued
that this modification represented a "price" for, or the "terms"
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of, P1,A a!-sistance in the revolution outside the PLA; but,
apar i from the que.,tion of whether Mao and Lin would have
to buy the obedience of a military leadership which they
1-ad`:lroady showed themselves capable of cruelly purging,
it sew; : better to put the case in terms of reassurances
rather than hard coin. On this reading, the military
le::ders, and in particular the military units which would
have to do the actual fighting (if any), were being given
public reassurances, in the interest of the smooth opera-
tion of the PLA in the months ahead--reassurances that
the purge of the PLA would not be carried out to anything
like the degree or in anything like the wild way that the
purge of the party had been. The military leaders may
additionally have got private reassurances that only a
few PLA leaders wore yet to fall. While it was possible
(and may have been recognized by the military leaders as
possible) that these reassurances--like the assurances
given party leaders by Mao and Lin in the work-conference
of October 1966--would prove to be worth nothing, the
reassurances probably did help to make the PLA a reliable
instrument in the "new stage" of the revolution.
The PLA Occupation of China, Late January - March 1967
Military commanders everywhere in China apparently
responded loyally and swiftly to the 23 January directive
ordering the PLA into action. Contrary to early reports
in the Western press of defiance by various regional and
provincial military leaders, there was not one known in-
stance of such defiance. Within a few weeks, the PLA was
in effective occupation of all or virtually all of China
--that is, it had restored order sufficiently to be able
to take further steps in those provinces and cities in
which it knew what steps to take.
The paucity of effective resistance to this oc-
cupation--resistance in a plain military sense--was a
striking feature of the early months of 1967. While it
had been presumed all along that the PLA was the ull:imate
base of power in China--in other words, that political
power in China would continue to rest on military force--.t
had also been presumed that some of those in disfavor,
i.e., party-machine leaders (like Liu, Tong, and Peng),
individual military leaders, and long-entrenched party
secretaries in the provinces, would be able to make some
part of the PLA responsive to them per?r:rnally, Indeed,
in the early months of 1967, when all three groups were
under attack at the same time, some, observers predicted
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a PJJ spl it do "z: the middle and civil war, and most observ-
ci'S (including; this oz.o) expected that at least a few
combi.ns: t io>s of pr.rty and military leaders marked for
P111 'gill,"' wou.c; be able to offer effective, prolonged resist-
ance, especially in some of the outlying areas like
Szcchuan; although further information may establish that
this was indeed the case at this or that point, so far
as we now know this did not happen anywhere. Similarly,
while it may turn out that some of the apparently smooth
operations (like the' pacification of Sinkiang) represented
compromises with local leaders (like Wang En-mao in Sinkiang),
there is as yet no good evidence of this. In sum, the
solidarity of the PLA as an operating instrument--despite
the network of controls in it established by the old party
machine, and despite the purge of a number of military
leaders and the threat to a number of others--was truly
an impressive thing.
According to official accounts of PLA operations
in this period, the PLA did not have to do much fighting;
the threat of force was usually enough. Its first task
everywhere seems to have been to restore order sufficiently
to permit it to play--or try to play--its predominantly
political role, to this end occupying if necessary the
headquarters of the local party committee. According-to
the scenario given for the few provinces where things
went more-or-loss smoothly, the PLA, once in visible com-
mand, then "analyzed the nature" of the party officials
there and of the various "rebel" organizations; the next
step was to consult the "good" cadres and the'"true" left-
ists as to whether a complete "seizure of power" was
necessary; if not, the PLA "helped" to roorganize the
leadership to whatever degree was required; if, however,
a full-scale "seizure" was judged necessary, the PLA "sup-
ported" the good cadres and true leftists in effecting
this seizure--that is, it installed them in office, to-
gether with its own representatives, as a "three-way al-
liance," looking toward formation of a "revolutionary
committee." In so doing, (still according to the official
scenario), the PLA would do such things as preventing the
bad cadres from staging a "sham" seizure, assuming control
of "vital organs" like the public security bureau and
propaganda media and legal organs, setting up patrols,
and assigning armed guards to protect those cadres and
"rebel" leaders in favor; after this, the PLA would some-
times have to repel propaganda assaults and physical
attar.ks--including attacks on PLA installations--by
false "rebel" groups, sometimes incited and organized by
bad c;dyes; this repulsion of hostile actions would entail
a propaganda offensive, "exposure of plots" (using Mao's
thought), suppression of a "handful" -of counter-revolutionaries
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and disbnnd;uc-nt of 1heir organizations, the holding of
dc? s l r;t t ion!: and pnr des , protect on of the "revolu-
tionary co3i.;,;it tee" (i.1' one had been formed), and even
ns~.i.::tanco to the rebels in carrying out their own "recti-
fication' (m.ninly of trends toward "anarchism").
This account, however, is of the PLR's operations
in those few provinces and municipalities in which the
PLA's intervention proceeded smoothly enough to permit
a "revolutionary committee" to be established which was
in turn good enough to be recognized by Peking. It seems
apparent, from the failure of Peking to recognize more
than a handful of these committees, that in most cases
the course of events was not so smooth.
There seem to have been two main factors in this.
One was that in many if not most cases Poking itself did
not know enough about the local situation to be able to
give the PLA commander on the spot clear directives about
whom to support, with respect both to party officials and
to competing "revolutionary" organizations. Where.that
was the case, the PLA seems to have engaged in a holding
action while it tried to sort things out. It seems ap-
parent that the PLA had a terrible time trying to do this.
Where it vias on its own, it had little more to help it
than the searchlight of Mao's "thought." In other words,
just as the party press in early 1966 had been expected
to denounce Wu IIan's plays without a specific directive
to do so, just as the work-teams of summer 1966 had boon
expected to support the most militant students without'
explicit orders to do so, just as the Red Guards in the
autumn of 1966 had been expected to distinguish those
party officials faithful to Diao's thought from those un-
faithful without specific targetting by Peking, so now
the PLA--as that component of Chinese society which had
proved itself most faithful to Mao--seems to have been
expected, in those cases in which guidance was not pro-
vided, to recognize and bring forward the other good
servants. In some cases, probably, the PLA on the spot
recognized its inability to do this, and in other cases
it: found this out only when Peking' disapproved its selec-
tions. In yet other cases, the PLA on the spot and the
leaders in Peking probably agreed on the lists but ran
into such spirited opposition from those who#had been
excluded that they chose not to go ahead.
The other main factor seems to have been that what
guidance there was--in leadership statements and the party
press--was in apparent conflict with the general directive
the PLA was operating under. That ite, the 23 January directive
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had c,rd~Ircd the PLA ;o support the "genuine" leftists and
to suppres ceunt..^.r-rC volut'1031arics. The PLA in the field
had J."ood yea -on to hclieve that those regarded as "genuine"
lof t i.., -s , at the the order was issued, were the most
militant of the "rebels"--those symbolized by the Red Guards
of the 3rd Headquarters in Peking--and the kind of local
party officials who would find favor with such elements.
Yet the signals from Peking, after 23 January, were in-
creasingly to the effect that the extreme militants were
out of favor. And they were out of favor for a reason
that must have appeared to the PLA leaders in the field
as a very good reason--their inclination to "anarchy."
While the leaders in Pelting were not yet ready to
declare against disorder per se (as they were by June),
the extreme militants among t1 Red Guards were criticized
repeatedly in this period by officers of the Cultural
Revolution Group and also by Mao (according to posters),
and militant leaders were criticized--sometimes sharply--
by name. Many of their organizations were suppressed or
dissolved; e.g., the three Red Guard headquarters in Peking
were merged in late February. They were ordered to keep
out of the military establishment, were told that they
could not "seize" ministries without permission from the
central committee and could only "supervise" those seized,
and were forbidden to seize power in the countryside.
They were apparently put in the bottom layer of the "three-
way alliances." Travel by the rebels to "exchange experi-
ence's was suspended, and students were ordered back.to
school.
in the same period, the strong defense of the PLA--in
the party press--against any and all detractors was
pretty clearly aimed mainly at the rebel extremists. A
typical editorial (22 February) praised the work of Lin
Piao, insisted that the rebels could not do without PLA
support, demanded that all rebels in turn support the
PLA, asserted that this was in fact a test of true revo-
lutionaries, and declared that no one was allowed (under
pretext of the cultural revolutii+n) to incite the masses
against the PLA.
The PLA seemed increasingly to take these develop
ments as a mandate to find against, and to suppress, the
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most militant of the "rebel" groups. Although a complete
picture of the relations between the PLA and the rebels
throughout China is not avails,ule
the lilli.1111111 11
was acting so aggressively
against the most militant rebels that Mao was concerned 25X1
for the continued good health of the young "revolution-
ary successors."
This is not to say that Mao in March withdrew his
confidence from the PLA. On the contrary, he continued
to provide it with expressions of confidence. In early
March Peking called for PLA personnel to be represented
in all units "seizing power" at the provincial level and
below, and by the and of March the PLA was deeply involved
in the civilian sector (including industry and agriculture).
It was clearly replacing the shattered party apparatus
as the main channel through which policy instructions
were issued and the main instrument by which these instruc-
tions were supervised and enforced. .In sum, the positions
of Mao and Lin appeared to rest directly on the military
loaders in Peking, in the regional headquarters and pro-
vincial districts, and in command of armies.
The "cultural' revolution" in the PLA itself, which
had been substantially modified at the higher levels of
the PLA and kept in very low gear at the lower levels,
continued to move slowly. In late February the Peking
press appeared to be rejecting the notion--from what
source was not clear--that revolution in the PLA itself
should be speeded up, and it asserted that the revolution
in the PLA was in fact "vigorously developing" in mine
with Mao's and Lin's instructions. The main visible evidence
of this, however, was the continued appearance of poster
attacks on PLA leaders.
Lin Piao himself was not attacked, but remained
out of sight, and speculation continued that his status
was declining. He may have been sick for a time, and he
may even (as another military leader asserted) have been
working out a theoretical rationale for the PLA's support
of "power seizures," but there were probably not significant
fluctuations in his status. Most of the PLA leaders attacked
In posters in this period were people who had got into
trouble in an earlier period, i.e. prior to the PLA's
intervention in the revolution; these cases have already
been reviewed. There were a few new names., however: Haiao
Ching-kuang, commander of the Navy (probably for his
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asn,c>cjatio> v,i th Su Chon-hua and for errors in conducting
thv.. revolution in t he Navy) ; Li Tso-peng, Hsiao's deputy
in both job (probably for the same reasons) ; Hsiao Ko,
the PLA's onr tii,;c' director of training (for alleged pro-
Soviet fc c:l i n;;) ; ,no Yuan Tzu-chun, a deputy director of
the General Political Department who had apparently been
added to the P].A/CRC (probably criticized for bonds with
Liu Chih-chien, who was said by posters to have been
replaced by Kuan Feng). Most of these attacks appear to
have been speculative investments which failed; that is,
most of those first attacked in this period continued in
favor. ]lsu Hsiang-chien came under additional criticism
in this period, and he too continued for a time in favor,
being identified in late March as a deputy chairman of
the MAC, perhaps only recently appointed; but within two
weeks, when the line changed, Hsu was to be hit hard in
posters.
The Leashing of the PLA, April 1967
A counter-current to the conservative movement of
the period from late January to sometime in March, in
which the PLA dominated developments and dealt harshly
with the most militant and disorderly of the "rebels,"
became visible in March and was dominant by early April.
Although Mao's opponents made no comeback, his most
reliable ally, the PLA, was leashed again in April, and
one of the PLA leaders concerned with directing its
operations in the conservative period of February and
March was set aside.
"rebel" forces, and
raised the question of
whether
Mao
meant to reverse the
dominant.
conservative curreitt
which
%,.,as
then
Tan Chen-lin, a vice-premier who for some years
had been one of the party-machine group around Litt and
Tong but had recently been defended by Chou En-lai and
Madame Mao against poster attacks, had begun to be at-
tacked again in the second week of March. These attacks
were a new expression of the line of the most militant
The Military Affairs Committee met in the latter
half of March in a session or sessions described as agitated
by one of the most militant of the Red Guard leaders--who
may have khown that the MAC was working out a new line
governing the conduct of the PLA in the "cultural revolu-
tion." There was no public expression of this new line
in March, but it was clearly visible in an unpublicized
epeech (received later) by Lin Piao on 30 March.
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25X1
Lin's speech, as credibly reported in posters, was
c, ' ; nt ::?~ st on several counts--e.g. , his admission of
suL:,t,a tial production losses and many deaths in the
courr',; of the revolution but his dismissal of this as
necoss;:ry for the production of reliable "successor's,"
hi S description of the party apparatus outside Peking
as entirely "rotten" (the question being only that of
degrees of rottenness), and his confirmation that his
own health remained poor. But the speech was of greatest
interest for its clear signal of a change in line for
the PLA. Stating that the PLA was now in control of more
than 7,000 party and government organs throughout China,
Lin said that the conduct of the PLA in the present stage
was of even greater importance than in the past struggle
against Liu and Ting. Citing the MAC's formulation of
"ten points" (not made public until 6 April) to guide
the PLA, Lin said that the most important of these were
those restricting the PLA in its use of arms, physical
force, and the power of arrest (the first, second and
sixth of the points as published). Calling for the PLA
to rely on the 'left" and admitting that it was hard for
the PLA to discover the difference between left and right,
Lin emphasized that PLA units were not to take action on
their own initiative but were to act only on orders from
above--not from the party committees outside Peking (all
"rotten") but, presumably, from superior echelons of the
PLA and local bodies dominated by the PLA. This was the
clearest possible indication that PLA units on the spot
had mace many "errors" in' carrying out the directive-of
23 January,, as Judged by Mao (if not Lin) in hindsight.
Just two days later, on 1 April, a central committee
directive reportedly told party committees and the new 25X1
revolutionary 'ommittees everywhere (including those in
military regions and districts) not to classify "rebel"
organizations as counter-revolutionary without the central
committee's perr,~ission, and forbade arbitrary arrests and
physical humiliation.
t ie leaders of the militant Red
Guard organizations at the college and university level
--leaders criticized in February--returned to the lime-
light, making important (and militant) statements.
On 6 April the Military Affairs Committee embodied
all of this in a 10-point directive, endorsed, and ordered
published, by MMao. Declaring that the work of the PLA
in supporting the revolutionary leftists had been "examined"
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for :,c and found uneven in quality, the diree-
tivcr i;,ipo ;cd sc?veru1 specific restrictions on the PLA and
acWed several inhibiting observations. The directive as
r(.pc-rt,ed in posters told the PLA not to fire on "rebel"
groups but to confine itself to propaganda (it seems likely
that the actual text did not impose an absolute prohibi-
tion but instead ordered the troops not to fire except
as a last resort), not to make "mass arrests" (only of
hard-case individuals), not to classify rebel organizations
as "counter-revolutionary" unless and until authorized
by the MAC, not to initiate investigations of or legal
proceedings against the rebels (one version called for
investigations to continue but to be reported to the CRG
or PLA/CRG), and not to use force (including physical
humiliation) to extract confessions or to punish. The
directive as reported exhorted the PLA to remember class-
standpoint (i.e. to recognize that the militants were on
the right side), to recognize its main mission as propa-
g'nn(Jn, to ensure that only "politically reliable" PLA
cadres dealt with the masses so as to preclude rightist
cadres from suppressing leftist rebels (the directive
cited a deputy co:'.mander of the Tsinghai military distreict
as guilty of the kind of "brutal" suppression o.' rebel
groups which was now prohibited), to remember that the
PLA itself must "obey' and "learn from" the masses, and
to correct all its earlier mistakes in accordance with
the foregoing.
Lilt Piao's? speech of 30 March had taken away from
the PLA most of the large degree of discretion it had
enjoyed in dealing with disorderly elements and in sort-
ing out local officials and competing revolutionary groups.
And the spirit of the 6 April directive--and of editorials
of 6 and 10 April calling on the PLA to be humble before
the masses--was in sharp contrast to that of the 23 January
directive. That is, whereas the it-tent and effect of the
23 January directive was that of restoring order, placing
the party apparatus and the revolutionary rebels in sub-
ordinate positions in which they would obediently play
their assigned roles, the 6 April directive placed the
restrictions on the PLA rather than on the rebels, with
the predictable consequence that the most militant rebels
would assert themselves more aggressively than ever.
On the same day (6 April) that the new directive
was issued, there appeared intensive poster attacks on
IIsu Ilsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying, who had been prominant
in the MAC in the period following the 23 January directive
and who had probably played large roles in directing the
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conduct of the PLA in that period. Both the timing and
the content of these poster attacks suggested that Hsu
and Ych were to be held responsible for 'errors" in imple-
menting the line of that period--that is, were to be the
scapegoats for the mistakes of Mao and Lin, as Liu Chih-
chien had been but as Yang Cheng-wu and Hsiao Hun (both
close to Lin Pino) had escaped being.
The poster charges against Hsu--made by the most
militant of the Red Guards--emphasized that he had carried
out the "Liu/Tong line" and had oppressed the revolution-
ary masses (e.g. with "rectification") and suppressed mass
organizations. Secondary charges related to his conduct
(as chief of the PLA/CRG since January) of the revolution
in the PLA itself (he was held responsible for a 4 March
directive on this matter which has not come to hand), his
protection of discredited figures like L u Chih-chien but
at the same time his use of Liu as a scapegoat to save
himself, his responsibility for specific bad situations
(Szechwan, where serious fighting was reported, and Hupei
and Wuhan), his effort to restrict the role of Madame
Mao (his "advisor') in the work of the PLA/CRG, and his
opposition to Lin Pino in a recent MAC meeting (possibly
on the matter of the change of line). The poster charges
against Yeh were similar although less emphatic, charging
him with suppression of the revolutionary rebels, linking
him with bad situations in several areas (Szechwan, Hupei,
Tsinghai, Inner Mongolia), accusing him too of opposition
to Lin in the MAC and to 'the Madame, and asserting that
he had protected Madame Liu Shao-chi.
on pril, posters reported that M
d
a
ame Mao (de
facto chief of the PLA/CRG) had dismissed 11su and had said
that the group (and/or revolution in the PLA) would be
run by Hsiao, Hsieh, and Yang Cheng-wu .
On 20 April, with the inauguration of the Peking 25X1
Municipal Revolutionary Committee, the Chinese leaders
appeared to be saying that they would proclaim further
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"seizures of power" only when revolutionary committees
(or thA:; ty,?o had boon put together--meaning that most of
wVou) d rci~ni n under the control of the PLA indefinitely.
On this same occasion, Madame Mao tried to put the best
i ac:c: on the differences between the MAC directive of 28
January (a directive conciliatory to the PLA) and the
directive of 6 April (hard on the PLA), asserting that
they had the same spirit. They did not, but the Madame
was making or trying to make an important point: that
MAO wanted it both ways, that he hope(] and believed that
both the Red Guards and the PLA w:.uld reward his caifidence?
by correcting their errors (through their respective 25X1
"rectification" pro rams) and meeting in cooperation on
a middle ground.
Criticism of the rebels continued. In fact, Kuni
Ta-fu himself (the worst of all militants) publicly con-
demned "anarchy" in mass organizations. In the same week,
officers of the central Cultural Revolution Group (includ-
ing Madame Mao) met with rebel groups and told them again
to stop fighting among themselves? and editorials of the
? week again defended the?PLA. But the thrust of develop-
ments in the first three weeks of April was clear: the
PLA's control of events in China had been severely quali??
f ied by the directives it was now operating under, and ??
the PLA had been placed on the defensive.
On 23 April, posters reported the recent promotion
of four members of MAC to posts as vice-chairmen: Hsiao
Rua, Ilsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-%W, and Su Yu. (Red Guard
materials had indicated that Su, the onetime chief-of-staff,
in recent years had been concerned with national defense
industries, and a reported speech by Chou En-lai on 30
April also connected Su--along with Hsino and (Yang Shu-
sheng--with these.) At the same time, the MAC apparently
quietly dropped Hsu Hsiang-chien as a vice-chairman; neither
ilsu nor Yoh Chien-ying (who had been criticized in posters
along with 1Isu) was denounced as a conspirator, or dis-
graced, ana both, were identified as politburo members on
May Day; but Hsu at least was evidently set aside as a
military leader. The status of Yeh--and of Nieh Jung-
chen and Liu Po-cheng, carried also as vice-chairmen--
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was ?(,t i:; de cl.e:,r. At the end of April, the only top-
levc; rr.i ] i tar', leaders still clearly in favor, in addition
to L: n Pino, were the four new vice-chairmen of MAC: llsiao,
11-icIi, Yangr, and Su.
The most interesting question at this time was 25X1.
that of the initiative for the radical ehanra in the em-
phasis, during April, in the line governing relations
between the PLA and the-"masses." Only three leaders--Mao;
Lin, and Chou--were believed capable of taking the initia-
tive on a matter of this importance. It seems probable
that theinitiative was not Lin's, as he had been made to
look foolish (the fate of all of Mao's lieutenants), no
matter what other military leaders had been made to take
the fall. It also seems probable that the initiative
? was not Chou's, as he had shown a much greater concern
for order than had either Mao or Lin. That leaves Mao,
who seems again to have declared his favor--as on several
occasions in 1966--for the most militant elements of the
"masses," accepting (at-.least for a time) whatever degree
of disorder might ensue.
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Ui sc??(icyr Ada i n , "tay-Ju;ne 1967
At the' ?i v Day rally, Mao and Lin put on display
their first tc um, which leas taken the field on several
occAsioIh Since: the core of the politburo, Mao, Lin,
Chou, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Li Fu-chun; the top-
level military leaders in addition to Lin), Hsieh Fu-
chill, Ilsiao Hun, Yang Cheng-wu, and Su Yu; and five lead-
ors of the central CRG and PLA/CRG, Madame Mao, Wang Li,
Kuan Feng, Chi Pen-yu, and Madame Lin.
This small, mismatched group was presiding over
what appeared to be a deteriorating situation, in part
the result of the 6 April directive placing crippling
restrictions on the PLA and thus in effect inciting the
Red Guards to make trouble. Hsieh Fu-chih, who had as-
sumed office on 20 April as head of the new Peking Muni-
cipal Revolutionary Committee, is said to have described
y:. situation in Peking itself as poor, because the left-
ist rebels were again splitting up and fighting among
themselves; he is said to have specified that serious
fighting was going on in schools, factories and "various
organs." At the same time, there were reports of serious
clashes in recent weeks in at least nine provinces; there
were said to be especially severe in Szechuan, where troops
of the Chengtu headquarters were re'nortedly embroiled with
militants representing the 3rd Red Guard headquarters in
Peking.
Some observers expressed the belief at the time
that most of these clashes--what Poking itself called
"unprincipled civil war"--represented fighting among Red
Guard organizations over their shares of the spoils,
their strength in the new structure of power which was
being or was to be built. Even this issue--representation
in the structure of power--would carry the Red Guards
into cofiflict on some occasions with other elements in
the structure, i.e. the party cadres in favor and the PLA.
In addition, there was fighting between groups of workers,
although probably not on the same scale. Beyond this,
however, much of the fighting (some observers thought
most of it) represented "principled" struggle, with a
pattern apparently emerging in which fighting Red Guards
tended to divide between relatively conservative elements
aligned with and defending the local authorities--pre-
dominantly military leaders--and extremely militant ele-
ments, apparently directed by Red Guards* from, Peking of
the 3rd Headquarters type--who were attacking the local
(generally military) authorities and the local workers
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and clativcly conservative Red Guards- vho were aligned
with them. (There is no doubt that some of the attacks
by ini].ita nts included physical assaults on government
and PLA pc. rr,conncrl an(j, on 1-%vernmcnt organs and PLA in-
st..1lr:tions.) This situation has apparently been confirmed
in sonic instances, and some observers anal ' OCI,
who have done more than 25X1
have others) believed that this situation was general,
throughout China, and that it was the aim of the most
militant of the Red Guards to discredit the PLA as a whole
by forcing it to take actions which were forbidden it in
the 6 April directive. While this writer lacks the kind
of knowledge of local situations which would permit a
judgment as to a general pattern, it seems equally pos-
sible that the pattern was not and is not general but was
and is confined to a few provinces, a selective operation
in which the leaders in Peking have been keeping pressure
on some local leaders whom they do not entirely trust but
feel obliged to work with for n time. It is apparent that
Poking has been keeping both forces--attackers and defend-
ers---in the field, and these forces both seem to represent
aspects of Mao's "thought." (It is very doubtful that any-
one but Mao would have conducted the operation in this
way.) In any case, those observers at the time (May) were
surely right who concluded that the disorders could not
begin to be controlled unless and until the PLA was given
a fresh mandate.
Mao was not ready to reverse himself, however.
According to later posters, Mao on 7 May directed Lin piao
to give PLA units up to two weeks of "rectification"
training. In other words, his immediate concern was still
more with correcting the faults of the PLA in dealing with
the rebels than with the troubles caused by the rebels
themselves. As previously noted, Mao wanted it both
ways--wanted the rebels too to carry out a "rectification";
but the directives under which the PLA teas operating were
not such as to give the rebels any incentive to correct
their faults, or to encourage the PLA to help them to
correct them.
The line began to shift a bit in the 12 May editorials
of People's Daily and Red Flag,- but the PLA was still
put on ? hc dcien ive. 'eop=e s Daily praised the PLA and
asked the masses to recognize that its "general orienta-
tion is correct," but the PLA was nevertheless enjoined
to "sincerely learn" from and "humbly listen" to the
masses, in order to learn, to recognize the leftist forces
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to bu supporting; this editorial was
ally for its confirmation that the 6
April directive was being; "used to undermine"--that is,
was loin;; interpreted correctly as being in conflict withN_
the d i.rec t i vc:; of la tc January which had given the PLA
the dominant role. Similarly, 'Red Flag gave a list of
arguments (undoubtedly used by some PLA and government
leaders) in support of the case for strong measures to
restore order--that the "revolutionary masses are dis-
obedient," that "the left has also committed errors,"
that "revolutionary mass organizationa are not pure,"
that "organizations of various factions" (not only the
militants) have their strong points, that revolutionaries
are not concerned with production, that the situation
is "confused"--but it also rejected each of these argu-
ments; this editorial took note that the PLA had sometimes
supported the wrong groups, and went on to imply that
the PLA could hardly go wrong if it supported the most
militant.
Sometime prior to 14 ?slay , however, Madame Dlao, who
was probably as gocd a friend as the Red Guards had but
had been telling them for weeks to shape up, went so far
as to say that Red Guard leaders (those ordering attacks
on other Red Guard groups and on government and military
organs) were "not necessarily following the central caimitl,6
instructions." (That "necessarily," seems to suggest
a distinction between "principled" and "unprincipled"
struggles.) And on 14 Islay, the same day on which Red
Guards reportedly invaded the Foreign Ministry and destroyed
documents and beat up some Foreign Ministry officials
and PLA personnel they found in their way, the Pelting
'revolutionary committee served notice that it had had
enough. It issued a stiff six-point notice, obviously
addressed to the most militant rebels; telling them that
they must carry out Dlao's directive to use reas?.1n and not
force and that offenders against this principle would
be punished (it was specified that the Peking garrison
command had the authority to take action), forbidding them
to destroy or seize state property, calling for efforts
to overcome the "anarchy existing in many localities,"
speaking of the "sacred duty" of maintaining "revolutionary
order" in the interest of protecting the state and state
property, and telling all students (Red Guards) to return
to their home areas. Hsieh Fu-chih of the PMRC made a
commentary on this notice, reportedly stating that there
had been a great-increase in armed struggles in Peking,
that more than 60,000 Red Guards had been involved, that
there had been much beating, destruction, looting, and
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i.lle,;al search and arrest, and that the situation was getting
tenor. ?U .
While the situation in Peking apparently improved,
there were still some serious incidents there, and reports
of serious disorders continued to come in from the pro-
vinces. There were reports of large-scale clashes between
the Red Guards and the PLA, with hundreds of dead, in
Szechuan and Heilungkiang, and clashes between the same
forces on a smaller scale in Honan and Hupei in central
China, Fukien in the southeast, and Kansu and Sinkiang
in the northwest. Red Guard posters of course blamed
the PLA for initiating these clashes, but neutral obser-
vers
placed the blame on the militant Red Guards. In LJ..I
view of the directives under which the PLA was then operat-
ing, the judgment of those neutral observers was almost
certainly correct, at least in the great majority of in-
st:ance:.
On 22 May, People's Daily finally called for an
end to violence. It took note that these clakhes had
shifted the focus of the struggle, "wrecked production,"
upset the "orderly process" (sic) of revolution, destroyed
state property and taken lives. It described "struggle
by force" as a form not o-Of revolution but of "degenera-
tion," cited both Lin Piao and Mao as opposed to it, and
told the Red Guards either to resolve their disputes by
discussion or agree to disagree. It set forth the six
points of -tile P1MRC notice of 14 May--prohibiting the use
of force and destruction of property, calling for an end
to anarchy and for maintenance of order, and sending the
.Red Guards home--and. implied that this notice was to be
applicable throughout China. The trouble was, however,
that an implication of this sort was not nearly enough.
What was still required was a new directive to the PLA,
and some new, clear, tough directives to the Red Guard
leaders in private talks.
In the final week of May, there were reports of
fresh clashes, all on a large scale and all involving
the Red Guards and the PLA, in Sinkiang, Ronan, Chekiang,
Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and both northern and southern Kiangsu.,
What evidence there was still pointed to the militant
Red Guards as the initiators.
Some observers conjectured at the time that Poking
had ceased to announce the establishment of additional
three-way alliances and revolutionary committees in the
provinces and municipalities because of the inability of
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25X1
the Chinese leaders in Pelting to agree on the people to
be ntu.ed to lead them. This may have been true in some
instances, but the general explanation seems more likely
to have been the inability of. the PLA leaders on the spot
to come up with a slate which any of the leaders in Peking
would approve or even one which they themselves (the PLA
on the spot) would approve, and by the apparent fact that
in many places the militant rebels were making so much
trouble for the other components of the alliance that no
further political steps could be taken until order was
restored (again).
A number of provincial broadcasts of the period
suggested that disruptive activity by the rebels was ti'ze
principal factor in their failure to make good progress,
and the revolutionary committee in Shantung said this
flatly on 28 May. Noting that all of the things cited
in the PMRC'notice of 14 May had also been taking place
in Shnntung--"assaults, destruction, looting, confiscation,
and illegal arrests"--the committee argued that this
violence stood in the way of the "revolutionary great al-
liance." The lIonan Daily took note of the same develop-
ments, and, speaking~"or a province with an unrecognized
revolutionary committee and under the control of the mili-
tary, emphasized the difficulties of operation caused
by the "struggle against the PLA"--including repeated
assaults on PLA organizations--by the Red Guards there.
The lIonan radio went over the same ground on 1 June,
reiterating that the 6 April directive was being used
to "undermine" the 28 January directive, describing the
aim of the militants a ; that of bringing about a "state
of wild confusion," and concluding that it was "necessary
'to depend on guns...to maintain and consolidate political
rower." There were similar b2?4adcasts from other provinces,
telling Pelting pretty clearly that it 'was time to send
the PLA into action again.
A joint editorial by Red Flag and People's Daily
on 1 June stated Peking's agreement with tMs position
The editorial affirmed that new revolutionary committees
were "in preparation," but argued that, unless "anarchism"
wore overcome, the struggle for "seizure of power" would
be simply a struggle for power for "small groups" and,
even after the seizure of power, it would be "absolutely
impossible" for the agans of power to function. Whether
a now directive to the PLA was imminent was still debat-
able, as Mao's own position was not clear; but there was
no doubt of the need for it.
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It was an open question, however, as to whether
the PLA would proceed aggressively under the terms of
this directive. It had been burned before, and it would
serve Mao right if the PLA were to proceed very cautiously,
allowing the party leaders in Peking to live with the
disorder which their own earlier directives had encouraged.
It seemed likely that some commanders would move aggres-
sively and some would not.
The Scale of the Purge of 1965-67
It is generally recognized that the purge of the
Chinese Communist party has removed something like three-
' fourths of the party leadership (from the level of pro-
vincial first secretary up) as it existed in November
1965 when the purge began, but the scale of the purge of
the PLA leadership (from provincial commander up) in the
same period--to June 1967--could perhaps not even be
approximated by most observers. A survey of the PLA lea(I-
rship, in terms of key military organs, seems in order
for a concluding section.
As for the top-ranking military organ, the Military
Affairs Committee of the central committee, the two prin-
cipal officers, Chairman Mao and senior vice-chairman Lin,
have of course remained in place. But of the five other
key figures as of late 1965--the four other vice-chairmen
and the secretary-general--at least three have been purged
or removed from their posts, and the other two may have
been. The three are vice-chairmen Ho Lung and Chen Yi,
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and secretary-general Lo Jui-ching; the two uncertain cases
arc Nish ,Junrr-then (apparently still a vice-chairman as
o1' ?1 June:) and Liu Po-cheng. Of their three known replace-
ments, up to April 1967, at least one, 11su llsiang-chien
has already been removed as a vice-chairman; the status
of o;ie, Yeh Chion-ying, is in doubt; only one, Hsiao Hun,
who succeeded Lo Jui-ching as secretary-general, definitely
remains. The three new vice-chairmen (in addition to
Ilsiao Hun, reportedly moved tip to vice-chairman in April)
named only in April 1967--Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu,
and Su Yu--are still in place.
The PLA's Cultural Revolution Group has not been
hit as hard as the MAC, partly because it has been in
existence only since October 1966 or thereabouts. Of its
10 known officers in that period, only two have been
purged or removed. But those two were two of the three
chairmen it has had in its brief life--Liu Chih-chien and
llsu ltsiang-chien; and at least two of the other 10 known
members of the group have beer. purged.
As for the Ministry of National Defense, Minister
Lin Piao has survived and prospered, but of the other 10
ranking officers (nine deputy ministers and the head of
the general office) as of late 1965 at least five are
known or believed to have been purged--Lo Jui-ching and
Tan Cheng, who were the two senior deputies, and Hsu
Kuang-ta, Liao Han-sheng, and Hsiao Hsiang-Jung; one died,.
Litt Ya-lcu; one is in doubt, Hsu Shih-yu in Nanking; and
only three--Ilsiao Ching-kuang, Su Yu, and Wang Shu-sheng--
seetrc still in favor.
Of the 11 principal. officers of the General Staff
,Department as of late 1965, at least three have been
purged--the then chief-of-staff Lo Jui-ching, deputy chief
Yang Yung, and the director (as well as the deputy director)
of the .;perations sub-department. The status of two other
deputies, Chang Tsung-hsun and Chang Ai-ping, is in doubt.
As for the General Political Department, director
Ilsiao Ilea has survived and prospered,' but of the other
six principal officers as of late 1965 at least two have
been purged, deputies Liang Pi-yeh and Liu Chih-chien.
No officer of this very tricky department is secure.
Of thct directors of the other key departments and
sub-departments (regarded as rear services, training,
cadres, mobilization, intelligence, and security), less
is known., Both of the two known directors seem to be in
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1 r
pl.a ?c; but both the identities and the status of the other
roar are uncertain. (Thus this, group will not be included
in the suminnry.
Of the 13 principal figures of the seven service
headquarters as of late 1965--that is, the commanders and
political officers, with one case of a le.-der holding both
posts--only two are known or believed to have been purged.
but the etatus of some others is uncertain. Commander
Wu Fa-hsien and political officer Yu Li-chin of the Air
Force remain in place, having survived alleged intrigues.
Commander Ifsiao Ching-kuang of the Navy b:is similarly stir-,
vived, but political officer Su Chen-hua, an alleged iu-.
triguor, has been purged. The commander and political
officer of the Public Security headquarters, Hsieh Fu-chih,
who apprehends intriguers, has prospered. Commander 11su
Kuang-ta of the Armored Forces has apparently been purged,
but political officer Huang Chih-yung has survived.
Commander Chen Shih-chu and political officer Tan Fu-Jen
of the Engineers both appear to be in place. Commander
Li Shou-hsien of the Railway Engineers has been out of
sight, but political officer Tsui Tien-min seems to be
in place. The commander and political officer of the Artil-
lery Forces, 19u Ko-hua and Chen Jen-chi, have both boon
out of sight.
Of the 24 key figures of the 13 military regions
as of late 1965--the commanders and political officers,
with two instances of a single leader holding both posts
in his command--at leas 11 had been purged or'replaced
by early 1967, as noted in an earlier section. Appoint-
ments announced in posters in May bring the total, as of
.June 1967, to at least 13 of the 24; most of the appoint-
ments reported in May were replacements for men known to
have been purged, but two--Pan Fu-sheng as the new poli-
tical officer in the Mukden headquarters, Chang Chun-chino
as the new political officer in the Nanking headquarters--
were replacements for men believed in favor or in question
who had not been included in the 11 purged or replaced.
The status of four more o!' the 24 remained in or had come
into doubt, ,neaning that of the original 24 only seven
were known to be in place and favor by June 1967. Briefly,
by headquarters; the commander and political officer of
the Poking military region were both purged; Inner Mongolia,
the single man in both posts purged; Mukden, one in doubt,
one replaced; Tsinan, one in pace, one purged; Nanking,
one in doubt, o::e replaced; Foochow, one in place, one
purged; -Canton, one in place, one purged; Wuhan, one in
doubt, one purged; Kunming, one in place, one purged;
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Chc .;, Lu , both purged; Lanchow, both in place (the only
iI-?>t r.:.,cc? o1? this); Inner Mongolia, the single man in both
post:, purged; Sinkiang, the single man in both posts in
place: but in doubt; and Tibet, both replaced, but one in
another key post.
Of the 44 principals in the 22 military districts,
the figures as of June 1967 had not changed much from those
of January 1967; it was now 15 known or believed purged
or replaced, nine known or believed in place, and 20 in
cloubt.
In sum, of the 130 key military posts considered
(a somewhat smaller number of individuals, as some served
in more than one post), the occupants of some 46 of these
posts are known or believed to have been purged or re-
placed. If the figures were complete, the purge of the
military leadership would thus have been on a scale of
a bit more than one in three, or about half the scale of
the purge of the party leadership. However, the figures
are not complete, and, as the status of the many indivi-
duals in doubt is resolved, the casualties will surely
prove to have been substantially greater than one in
three, perhaps even as high as one in two. Thus the purge
of the military leadership has been at least half as
large as that of the party leadership and perhaps even
two-thirds as large--a purge substantially smaller than
the party purge, but probably larger than generally
recognized; and. the purge is not yet over. .
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