CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY MAO TSE-TUNG AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM IV. THE 'TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM (REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XII-61)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 9, 1961
• Content Type: IS

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OCI No. 4064/61
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
MAO TSE-TUNG AND HISTORICAL MA:;:RItT,ISM
IV. THE "TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM"
(Reference Title: POLO XII-61)
Office of Current Intelligence
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FUH OiF'XCXAr, usi: ONLY
CURRENT IN TE'LLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
MAO TSE-TUNG AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
IV. THE "TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM"
This is a working paper, the fourth of a series on Mao
Tse-tung as a Marxist philosopher. Another paper, concerned
with Mao's treatment of the concept of "contradictions,"
originally scheduled to precede this paper, will soon follow. STAT
This paper, like the first three in this series, was
written by the China Division of the Sino- STAT
Soviet Bl
oc Area. Useful co!nm9nts on the paper have been
offered in particular by China Division
and by Philip Jones of the Far East Branch of Analysis
Division of ORR. The Sino-Soviet Studies Grou would
l
we
-
come additional comment STAT
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Marx and Lenin originated the dogma that the elimination
of the bourgeoisie as a class and the expropriation of their
holdings must be carried out during the "socialist" stage of
revolution. Lenin was willing to make use of certain Russian
capitalists until the Soviet regime was less unstable, but,
as it turned out, he expropriated capitalist property violently,
and in Stalin's fuss is the "transition to socialism" was car-
ried out following the total destruction of the capitalists.
as a class.
The Chinese Communists claim, in contrast, that Mao Tse-
tung has discovered a peaceful method of handling capitalists.
The "national" capitalists--i.e., those who remained after the
"bureaucratic" capitalists had been "smashed" in 1949--are said
to be a part of the advancing "transition to socialism" in
China, and it is asserted that such a transition is unprecedented.
This claim is in part valid.
Whereas Eastern European leaders after 1948, following
Soviet practices, felt obliged to reject the "peaceful trans-
formation" of capitalists, Mao was able to work out the details
and put into practice the Marx-Engels-Lenin theory of " uying
out" the capitalists during a period of gradual transformation.
Although the relatively peaceful soci-.list transformation of
Chinese agriculture in 1955 was a more impressive accomplish-
ment, Chinese Communist claims for Mao center on the transforma-
tion of small capitalist enterprises.
What Mao did, in stages, was to transform capitalist in-
dustry and cormerce into mixed public-private industry and
commerce, to transform capitalists into share.holdeks, and to
transfer administration of private enterprises into party and
government hands.
The stages of Mao's policy toward capitalist enterprise
were reflected in Chinese pronouncements on the progress from
"new democracy" to the "transition to socialism." During the
period of a moderate line toward the economic activities of
small capitalists (1949-52), China was still in the stage of
"new democracy." In 1953, after tougher policies had been
introduced, the "transition to socialism" was said to be at
hand. Indeed, in 1953 it was held that "new democracy" had
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ended and the "socialist" stage begun back In 1949. Mao appar-
ently took this line in orde'' not to be regarded as less advanced
than tho regimes in Eastern Europe.
Mao's claim that the "6ocial9.st" sii;age was at hand appar-
ently took the Soviets by surprise. As of 1953, Moscow was
unwilling to grant that the Chinese had begun the "t :trans it ion
to socialism" even in 195'; , During 1 954., Moscow gradually and
grudgingly adknowledged that the Chinese were "building social-
ism." At the same time, Soviet theorists insisted that this
step must entail the change from "democratic dictatorship" to
"dictatorship of the proletariat"--a declaration Peiping was
unwilling to make until 1956.
The Chinese Communists claim not only that Mao discovered
a new form and method for the "transition to socialism" by
peacefully transforming (gradually taking over) capitalist enter-
prises, but that the capitalists themselves are being trans-
formed. This transformation is effected by intensive indoctri-
nation, which, differing somewhat from Soviet practices, seeks
to effect permanent changes, makes extensive use of group
pressures, is applied to non-party as well as party people,
and is a very prolonged process. The small capitalists are
generally not sent to prison or camps for this transformation;
they keep working in their businesses.
Even Khrushchev, no admirer of Chinese practices, has paid
a backhanded compliment to Mao's innovations in dealing with
the capitalists. So has Mikoyan. Soviet spokesmen have been
careful, however, to restrict the applicability of these prac-
tices to China.
One interesting sidelight on the development of Mao's policy
toward capitalists is that Chou En-lai claims some of the credit
for it. It is most unusual for anyone but Mao to be "creative."
Mao's doctrines on the "transition to socialism," in par-
ticular on the means of "buying out" and "transforming" capital-
ists, are communicated by the Chinese to other Communists with
a missionary zeal. The doctrines are said to be of "universal
significance"--for Communists in underdeveloped areas and even
in the West. This kind of proselytizing has angered the Soviet
leaders, who are now attempting to take the wind from Mao's
sails by insisting that Marx and Lenin had been the first to
discuss the "buying out" policy and by incorporating the policy
into the Draft Program of the 22nd Soviet party congress. The
Draft Program does not mention Mao in this connection.
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MAO TSE-TUNG AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
IV. TIM "TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM"
In Chapter V. of State and Revolution (August 1917),, Lenin
males a distinction between "socialist" society and Communist
society in discussing the "transition from capitalism to Com-
munism." Citing Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program (1875),
Lenin says that the "political transition perio " of which
Marx spoke "must undoubtedly be a special stage or epoch" of
transition, and this stage, he says, has been designated by
Marx as the "first" phase of Communist society. It is, he
continues, "generally called socialism."
"Peaceful Transformation" of Capitalist Enterprises
The view that the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class
and the expropriation of their holdings must be carried out
during the first, transitional ("socialist") stage became for
Communists a dogma. Marx, Engels and Lenin, however, saw the
need for more than one method of expropriating the bourgeoisie
and thereby eliminating it as a class. Faced with economic
problems in the Soviet state, Lenin was willing to make use of
certain capitalists until the Soviet regime was able to estab-
lish a degree of economic stability. Lenin later claimed that
he was compelled to resort to direct, violent methods of ex-
propriating all capitalist property, as the capitalists had
resisted his effort to "gradually and peacefully" transfer
their holdings to the Soviet government.
There really never had been for Stalin a "soft" policy
toward the capitalists, and his writings concerning them are
not marked by any gentle phrases. The bourgeoisie must be
"smashed," capitalists, merchants, kulaks, and profiteers must
be "eliminated," and the exploiting class must be "liquidated"
during the "transition to socialism." Describing in 1925 the
New Economic Policy (NEP), Stalin says that it would be an "in-
evitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries."
Adhering to Lenin's view, Stalin goes on to concede that capital-
ists will be tolerated, but that is all he concedes:
NEP is a special policy of the proletarian state,
counting on the toleration of capitalist elements,
- 1 -
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the commanding heights being in the hands of the pro-
letariau state, counting on the growth of the role of
the socialist elements to the detriment of the capital-
ist elements, counting on the victory of socialist ele-
ments over capitalist elements, counting on the aboli-
tion of classes and the laying of the foundation o:' a
socialist economy. (1)
In the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)
of 1938, his writers strongly condemn as u ; ia'r:ina, a opppo ion
the theory of the "peaceful growing of the bourgeoisie Into
socialism-and the fostering and encircling of thL: bourgeoisie,
not destroying it." (2) Thus the "transition to socialism"
in the USSR was carried. out following the liquidation of the
capitalists and the total destruction of them as a class.
The Chinese Communists claim that Mao has discovered a
peaceful method for handling capitalists, that the "transition
to socialism"in China is advancing with the continued e:xxist-
ence of the "national" capitalists, and that such a transition
is unprecedented. The claim in large part is valid.
The Chinese are, of course, referring to the only cu.pital-
lets who were permitted to continue in their businesses after
1949, viz. the enterpreneurs engaged in the production and
sale of consumer goods. All other capitalists had been char-
acterized as "bureaucratic-capitalists" and had been expropriated
and "smashed" in 1949. They no longer exist as a stratum.
The remaining small entrepreneurs are designated the "middle"
or "national" bourgeoisie and it is their enterprises which
gradually have been transformed.
Because the capitalists (national bourgeoisie) in China
are (a) weak, (b) obedient to the CCP and its program, and (c)
willing to be transformed, the "transition to socialism" can
be a "peaceful" process. Chinese writers contrast this with the
history of the transition in the USSR, where the capitalists
were "smashed" because they were (a) strong, (b) antagonistic
to the CPSU, and (c) unwilling to change their ways.
The contrast between the Soviet and Chinese situations
was made in 1956 by theorists Wu Chuan-che among others:
Unlike the violent expropriation of the means of
production of the bourgeoisie which was the form
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of struggle adopted in the USSR in the transition
period, in China we have adopted peaceful transforma-
tion of the capitalists' enterprises during transi-
tion....
Regarding the elimination of classes, it can be car-
ried out only by class struggle, as there is no other
road. But the form of struggle adopted--armed or
peaceful, bloody or bloodless struggle--must be
changed according to the objective conditions. (3)
This "peaceful transformation" of the capitalists' enter-
prises into state-run enterprises has been made possible, Wu
says in an earlier article (1955), because Mao had mastered
the law of "bloodless change." Wu says that "Because of his
profound knowledge of this law, Chairman Mao has adhered to
the correct line for the last 30 years of revolutionary strug-
gle, opposing both tailism and adventurism, and thus has led
the revolution to a victorious conclusion. He has created
the basic conditions for a transition to socialism by peace-
ful means." (4)
We have suggested above that there is a warrant in Lenin's
works for a transition by peaceful means. During the period
of the NEP, Lenin spoke of the Soviet government's desire for
a gradual transition. In his report delivered at the 7th Moscow
Gubernia Party Conference, 29 October 1921, Lenin stated that
the Soviet government in 1917 and 1918 "attempted to introduce
its economic policy...which was originally calculated to bring
about a number of gradual changes, to bring about a more cau-
tious transitioL to the new system." (5) In discussing the
policy of spring 1921, Lenin again referred to gradual, in-
direct methods: "The political situation. in the spring of
1921 revealed to us that retreat to the position of state
capitalism, the substitution of 'siege' tactics for 'direct
assault' tactics was inevitable on a number of economic ques-
tions." (6) But when NEP was brought to an end, so was the
existence of the "new bourgeoisie," i.e. the nepmen as a class.
The idea of "peaceful transformation" of capitalists' en-
terprises in China, therefore, may well have been a concept
which Mao took over from Marx, Engels and Lenin. In his
Peasant Question in France and Germany of 1894, Engels had
stated that "once our party has seized state power, it should
immediately expropriate the big landowners and the factory
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owners, Whether this expropriation ro uires the use of buying
oat, is a mattor primarily to be determined not by us, but by
the conditions prevailing when we attain political power, and
is even more determined by the actions of the big landowners
themselves. We absolutely do not state that ransom is imper-
missible under all conditions. Marx told me (and how many
times!) that in his opinion we would get off cheapest if we
could buy out the whole lot of them." (7) Thus Engels had
sanctioned a relatively moderate form of expropriation, e.g.
buying out rather. than violent requisition. Like Marx, he
was less revolutionary in his late years.
Lenin goes beyond Engels' position and speaks of using
the skills of capitalists in the s.:..rvice of the new state.
Thus in Unavoidable Catastrophe and Boundless Promises (May
1917), Lenin says.
As to the individual capitalists, or even the majority
of capitalists, not only does the proletariat not
intend to "strip" them (as Shulgin has been "scaring"
himself and his ilk), not only does it not intend to
deprive them of "everything," but, on the contrary,
it intends to place them at useful, honorable tasks,
subject to the control of the workers themselves. (8)
One year later, in his "Left-Wing" Childishness and Petty Bour-
geois Mentality- (May 1918), he speaks o? eying off" the capi-
talists an of a peaceful-transition to "socialism:" "Marx
was profoundly right when he taught the workers the importance
of preserving the organizu,tiLn of large-scale production pre-
cisely for the purpose of facilitating the transition to soci-
alism and that (as an exception, and England was then an excep-
tion) the idea was conceivable of paying the capitalists well,
of buying them off, if the circumstanres were such as to com-
pel the capitalists to submit peacefully and to come over to
socialism in a cultured and organized fashion, provided they
were bought off." "Well, and what about Soviet Russia?..-..
Is it not clear that certain conditions prevail which cor-
respond to those which might have existed in England half a
century ago had a peaceful transition to socialism begun then?"
/Lenin's emphasis? (9)
State capitalism was common to both NEP Russia and the
transitional economy of Communist China. Lenin appears to
have combined Engels' idea of "buying off" with the concept
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of state capitalism. In his The Tax in Kind of April 1921,
Lenin says:
We can and ought to combine the method of ruthless
suppression of the uncultured capitalists, who re-
fuse to have anything to do with "state capitalism"
or to consider any form of compromise, and who con-
tinue by means of profiteering, by bribing the poor
peasantry, etc., to hinder the application of the
measures taken by the Soviets, with the method of
compromise, or "state capitalism," or buying off the
cuTturcd capitalists who agree to practice and who
are useful to the proletariat as clever, and expert.-
enced organizers of very large enterprises, which
supply commodities to tens of millions of people.
/Lenin's e-:nphasis7 (10)
The NEP, defined succinctly by Lenin as "capitalism plus
socialism" was shortlived. Within several years it was-ended
and remaining capitalists were expropriated outright. In China,
however, the Communists are buying off the "national" capital-
ists by compensating them with fixed interest and combining
this with the gradual takeover ("socialist transformation")
of their enterprises.
Some of the Chinese methods of "peaceful" takeover of
capitalist enterprises may have been taken over from early NEP
experiences and from the considerable experience of the Eastern
European satellite regimes from mid-1945 to 1948, but some
methods are probably unique--e.g. the nationwide campaigns of
"struggle" against the capitalists which intimidated them ("gave
them a lesson in political power," as the Chinese Communists
put it) but did not entirely liquidate the private capitalist
sector of the economy. Moreover, the precise details on how
to "buy out" and on the matter of how to use the "national"
capitalists in the production effort while permitting them no
independent economic activity are probably uniquely Chinese
Communist details. For a brief period in 1960, the East Ger-
mans were prepared to learn something from the Chinese on the
matter of using capitalists. On 13 May 1960, two members of
the Berlin Bezirk organization of the National Democratic Party
discussed with Chinese embassy officials "a number of questions
concerning the incorporation of the members of the middle class
rational bourgeoisie7 in the building of socialism in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic and democratic Berlin." (11) But the
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East Germans retreated from this teacher-pupil - relationship
with the Chinese, almost certainly as v result of uoviet op-
position to it.
Whereas the nepmen--the small capitalist--were "smashed, "
'together with the kulaks in the countryside, in the 1920s fol-
lowing the NE? period and whereas Eastern European satellite
leaders felt compelled to reject "paaceful transformation" of
capitalists in 1948, Mao was able to move mire slowly. He in-
sisted that small capitalist holdings would be taken over one
step at a time by "peaceful" means and that "national" ,apital-
ists would continue to exist as capitalists, working in their
own firms under CrP-supervision.
Marx, Engels, and Lenin had set forth a 'theory of "buying
out" the capitalists, of purchasing their means of production.
Mao put the theory into practice, working out the policy of
gradual "socialist transformation" of the capitalists enter-
prises. This is his contribution to the doctrine of expropria-
tion of the bourgeoisie.
Actually, the "socialist" transformation of agriculture
in 1955 was a more noteworthy accomplishment of Mao's than
the transformation of small capitalist enterprises. The 1955
collectivization of hundreds of millions of peasants without
large-scale bloodshed stands in stark contrast with Stalin's
brutal and chaotic collectivization in the late 1920s. The
methods employed by Mao in 1955 in collectivizing the Chinese
peasants could well serve as the basis for a claim that the
Chinese leader had made an original contribution to Communist
dcctrine on rural collectivization. But while the Chinese
theorists praise the achievement they* make no such claim.
Their attention has been and is centered on the contribution
Mao made in transforming small capitalist enterprises.
Precisely what were the deta::Ls of the policy worked out
by Mao for gradual, trans format ion?
In the first years following the establishment of the PRC
in 1949, transformation of the private-capitalist enterprises
took the following firm: a number of the most simple forms
of state capitalism were applied, such as private enterprises
working on government 'orders, the sale of their products to
the state, -trading on government commission, etc. At the same
time, the administration of the enterprises was completely in
the hands of the capitalists.
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Beginning in 1952-53, that is, after the end of the recon-
struction period, the CCP began to create mixed, public-private
enterprises, administered jointly by representatives(of the
government and private capitalists, but with the government
having the deciding role. Actually, there was nothing very
"peaceful" about the process. The "Five-Anti" movement of
January to June 1952 was used by Mao to take a big step for-
ward in the direction of placing private business more completely
under CCP control; this required, in Mao's view, mobilization
of the party and the masses for a class war against the bour-
gr~oisie. Even the smallest merchants were forced to exhaust
their savings and liquidate all concealed assets under condi-
tions of persecution and terror. There were many suicides,
and those who escaped with their lives saved nothing elsa ex-
cept a small'share in their own businesses. This latter con-
sideration meant that they continued tc exist,. as capitalists,,
and for this reason the Communists insist that the buying out
is a "peaceful" process.
From 1952-53 until 1955, the capitalists we.-re bought out
by means of a system of distributing profits according to the
principle of "four horses per measure of oats." That is, the
capitalists received 25/10 of the profits of the enterprises.
But in 1955, the process of transforming capitalist enterprises
into state-capitalist enterprises was intensified. The CCP
began to create specialized companies in entire branches of
industry and commerce; to which the individual enterprises
were subordinate. The administration of the small enterprises
went entirely into the hands of the party. The now (1955)
situation is described by the Chinese as follows:
After this change-over (to joist state-private opera-
tion by whole trades) was realized, the state made the
following important provisions which are still current.
A fixed rate of interest was paid by the state for the
total investment of the capitalists in the joint state-
private enterprises. Irrespective of locality and
trade, the interest was fixed at a rate of 5 percent
per annum. In the meantime, the state declared that
this system would not be changed for seven years
starting from 1956. This. was the continuation of the
policy of "buying off" the capitalists after the change-
over by whole trades, only the form of payment was
changed. The fixed rate of interest took the place
of the distribution of profit according to definite
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proportions. In all the joint state-private enterprises,
the total investment of the capitalists amounted to
about 2,418 million yuan, of which 1,693 million yuan
were in industry; 586 million yuan in commercial and
catering trades; 102 million yuan in communications
and 'transport; and 36 million yuan in personal services.
Under the fixed interest system, the annual outlay
from the state treasury was over 120 million yuan.
There were 1,140,000 recipients in all." (12)
As a result of the complete transformation of small capital-
ist enterprises into state-capitalist enterprises in 1956, and
the introduction of a new form of "buying out"--in the form
of a guaranteed percentage of the capital invested in the mixed
enterprises--all private ownership of the means of production
was converted into joint enterprises.
Thus Mao showed considerable originality in applying Marx's
Engels', and Lenin's theory of "buying out"--by raps orining
capitalist industry and commerce into mixed, public-private
industry and commerce, transforming capitalists into shareholders,
and transferring the administration of private enterprises into
party and government hands.
From New Democracy to the "Transition to'Socialism"
Before the Chinese Communists seized national power in
1949, Mao had promised that the capitalist sector of the economy
would be permitted to develop. As early as 1934, Mao stated
in Our Economic Policy that "so long as private enterprises
do not transgress the legal limits set by our government, we
shall not only refrain from prohibiting then, but shall pro-
mote and encourage them." (13) In The Chinese Revolution and
the CCP (December 1939), Mao described an important aspect o
New Democracy. "Economically, it means nationalization of all
big capital and big enterprises of the imperialists, collabora-
tors, and reactionaries, distribution of the land of the land-
lords among the peasants, and at the same time the general pre-
servation of private capitalist enterprises without the elimina-
tion of the rich-peasant economy." /emphasis supplied? (14)
In his report to the 7th Congress of the CCP of April-1945,
Mao stated that "The task of the New Democracy we advocate...
is to assure the Chinese people the possibility of....freely
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dovalopinf; it private capltalic;t economy which, however, must
not ' hold In it:; gru:ip tho I. lee.. ihood of the pooplo. ' "
Following the a.,.;tablishmunt of the Chinoc3o Com;nuni!.-t regime
in 1949, Mao reaffirmed hiss New Democracy viG'v that a private
capitalist sector of the national economy shoulJ exist along-
side a otato-owned "socialist" sector. In his report to the
party's central committee of 5 June 1950, Mao made it policy
that national planning must talce into account the interests
of "all sections" of the economy and improve relations between
state-run and private capitalist enterprises. Ton days later,
politburo member Chen Yun stated that "The state allows private
capital to conduct commercial activities in order to develop
the circulation of commodities.... The People's Government
protects the interests of all capitalists who benefit the
nation's welfare and the people's livelihood."
Thus in 1950, Liao and his lieutenants in the party continued
to stress a rno,`_-rate line toward the economic activities of
small capitalists in China. The "transition to socialism" was
not mentioned as an immediate goal. This was still the period
of New Democracy which had -been discussed by Liao ever since
the 1930s. That is, it was still the period which was to pre-
cede the start of China's "transition to socialism." "New
Democracy," not "socialism," was the term used and most fully
discussed by Chinese Communist writers throughout the period
from 1940 to 1953.
But in mid-1953, following Stalin's death and as hostilities
in Korea were subsiding, the Chinese leaders changed the line.
In July 1953, the Chinese began to claim that the "transition
to socialism" was at hand in China.
On 10 July 1953, the transition had been made the immediate
task in a decision of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) at a closed session of the union's executive committee.
This was indicated by the following statement which appeared
in an August issue of the official newspaper of the CCP:
The task of attaining national industrialization
and the gradual transition to socialism is now placed
before the people of the entire nation. (15)
By October, the phrase "transition to socialism" began to appear
with increasing. frequency in Chinese published materials and
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IFORi O.? ICIAL tfli1~ ONE Y
on 27 October a full-blown "general line" for the transition
VAU1 cliscu::+sod by IA Woi.-han, director of the CCP central com-
mJ.4tere':s United Front Work Department. Like Stalin, Mao laid
clown a t;wiorai line for build:ing "socialism."
Li Wei-han presented tho official formulation of the gon-
era]. line for the "transition to socialism" in the form of a
directive from Mao Tse-tung. Ile quoted Mao's directive in
full :
With regard to the goneral line of the state in
the transition, Chairman Mao has given the follow-
ing directive: "From the founding of the People's
Republic of China /PRC to the basic conclusion of
socialist reform is tie period of transition. Dur-
:ing this stage of transition, the general line and
the general task of the state is the gradual realiza-
tion, over a relatively long period of time, of
the socialist industrialization of the state, and
the gradual realization of the socialist trans-
formation by the state of agriculture, handicrafts,
and private industry and commerce. This general
line is the lighthouse that illuminates our various
tasks. Divorced from this general line, we shall
commit rightist or leftist mistakes in our various
tasks." (16)
Li did not reveal the occasion on which this directive was is-
sued, but in view of the circumstance that the gradual "transi-
tion to socialism" was laid down as an immediate mission at
the 10 July session of the ACFTU's executive committee, referred
to above, it is likely that the formulation of the general line
was under active consideration by Mao in summer 1953.
Why was the line on transition gradually introduced in the
period from July to October and raiseec to a nationwide propa-
ganda campaign only in October? A possible answer is that Mao
went slow at first. By going slow at first, the Chinese leader
and administrators in the party were able to "grope their way"
toward the best methods of carrying out the politburo decision
on transition and, when these methods 'ere finally determindd
through trial-and-error, the nation-wide campaign to implement
the new policy was launched.
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According to Mao's directive revealed by L i In October
:1053, private industry and ccnrnnerce would now be subjected to
"socialist transformation by the state." This statement and
tiro announcement that the "New Democracy" stage had ended and
the "socialist" stage simultaneously begun in October 1049
(founding of the P1W), apparently came as a surprise to many
people in China.
Starting in late October 1953, as the national campaign
for the transition grew in intensity, the notion of the New
Democracy economy as one in which the private sector of the
economy is allowed to "flourish" unimpeded by central controls
was bror.,;ht under attack aixl gave way to the line that the
private sector gradually was to be crowded out and eventually
'taken over by the state.
Indicative of this change in line, theorist Yao Peng-chang,
in criticizing the heretofore authoritative book in which Meng
Hsien-chang had recorded the concept of an expanding private
sector, found it a matter cf concern that "this book was able
to circulate for three Sears without having been censured." (17)
Meng was berated for "not criticizing private capitalism" which
inevitably would be displaced from the economy. Capitalism
would not be permitted to develop at will, Yao continued, and
the leniency toward private business would be qualified. Yao
condemned Meng's interpretation of New Democracy in the fol-
lowing manner:
The author's information concerning the leading role
of the state-run economy is incorrect. He says that
"State-run enterprises in their so-called leading
role merely guide, but do not squeeze out; merely
are of relative, not preponderant importance; merely
pose as hosts, not as ,~ionopo fists; merely ? unction
in coordinating, not in opposing; and merely have the
power to help, not to restrain." (A Course on New
Democracy Economy, p ,ii These phrases reveal t 1e
author's ignorance of the corrupt, backward face of
private capitalist economy.... From the viewpoint
of the leading role of the state-run economy, for it
me-ely to help is incorrect and to say that it merely
shall coordinate is even more erroneous. /Yao's em-
phas is/*-(m
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The attack suggested that Mao's general line i'o:?mulation was
significantly more radical, more restrictive of private capi-
talism than his earlier concept of New Democracy in which
"socialist" and capitalist economic sectors were to grow side
by side. Private enterprise becomes more and more a declining,
temporary supplement to the swelling state economic sector.
Mao's statements made ever since 1934 that the small pri-
vate sector would be protected and permitted to develop sud-
denly were revealed to be part-of a certain kind of promise,
viz. a dialectical promise. The early promise of a freely
developing small-capitalist economy had been transformed: al-
though the private sector would be "used," it was now to be
"restricted and reformed."
That this change was unexpected--that is, that New Demo-
cracy was to be replaced by the "transition to socialism"--is
also attested to by Chu Kuang-chien, the seemingly bewildered
professor of the Western Language Department, Peking University,
when he wrote the following:
Upon studying the general line, I heard that the
period of transition to socialism actually had begun
when the PRC was founded. I also heard that the
general line was not suddenly espoused. /-.7
It was mentioned by Chairman Mao in On New Democracy i
and On the People's Democratic Dictatorship and
clearly was stipulated in the Common Program. I
read these documents again and found that the
general line governing the transition from the New
Democracy stage to socialism clearly had been out-
lined. I had read these essays many times in the
past, but now I know that I had failed to under=
stand them. I did not grasp the essence of New
Democracy and failed to appreciate that it was a
period of transition to socialism. (19)
Reading Professor Chu's confession in a manner that does justice
to his intelligence and literary ability, one concludes that
he was only seemingly bewildered and was in fact writing between
the lines. That is, Professor Chu apparently was informing
careful readers that he "failed to appreciate" that the New
Democracy was a period of "transition to socialism" precisely
because the documents he cites are ambiguous on the matter.
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Ile apparently was also telling his readers that in the 1953
directive, Mao for the first time, and in one stroke, had pushed
back to October 19 9 t e start ing date for the transition and
the completion date for New Democracy. Professor Chu concluded:
"I have come to understand that studying is no easy matter.
One might have read an essay a number of times and thought its
import had been comprehended. Actually, however, one had not
grasped it at all."
The authoritative understanding of the New Democracy so-
ciety prior to the general line campaign of October 1953 was
that it consisted of two stages, the first of which prepared
for "socialism," and the second, which made the direct transi-
tion to "socialism." This pre-October 1953 concppc was attack-
ed by Yao Peng-chang, who would merge these stages and blur
them. Yao's assertion that the "New Democracy society is the
transitional society" on the road to "socialism"--a poi of
particular emphasis in general line prop aganda-?-exemplified
the new element in the CCP claim of Chinese political and eco-
nomic progress. It was a claim to the prestige which accrues
to a Communist-led state when it proclaims that "building
socialism" is the new task at hand.
Mao apparently was reluctant to accept a position for China
which placed it in a doctrinally inferior status. That is,
according to Soviet theorists, the "democratic," or "New Demo-
cracy," stage in Eastern Europe had been completed in late 1947,
after which time all Eastern European Communist regimes were
acknowledged to be in the second stage, the more advanced stage
of "transition to socialism." China, however, was still held
to be in the '.first stage, and this clearly was intended to im-
ply that the Chinese Communist regime was less advanced and
revolutionary than the regimes of Eastern Europe. Mao appar-
ently decided, therefore, to move at least abreast of these
regimes by proclaiming that the transition was in progress and
had been ever since October 1949.
Mao did not begin the transitional campaign until after
(a) the national economy had been "rehabilitated" and the first
five year plan was being prepared (December 1952), (b) Stalin
died (March 1953), and (c) the Korean hostilities had ended
(July 1953). The timing of the campaign was probably influenced
by all three factors.
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Soviet Reluctance to Accept China as "Ouildng Socialism',''
As of October 1953, when the Chinese made clear, through
the propaganda on their general line, that they had entered
upon the "buildi?,,g of socialism," two key statements constituted
the Soviet line on the nature and general tasks of the Chinese
state and the developmental stages of a "people's democracy."
These were A. Sobolev's October 1951 Bol'shevik article and
Ye. Zhukov's November 1951 report to a Soviet conference of
orientalists.
Sobolev stated that the first stage of people's democracy
was the stage of an agrarian, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist
revolution. He then asserted:
The second stage is the stage of the establish-
ment of the dictatorship of the working class in
the form of people's democracy and the building
of socialism....
As a result of basic political and social-economic
transformations, people's democracy in the countries
of central and southeast Europe has entered into the
second stage of its development--the stage of the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of
socialism....
The PRC is a state of people's democracy in the first
stage of its development. People's democracy in
China does not yet fulfill the functions of a dic-
tatorship of the proletariat. In the present stage
socialist `.tasks, as immediate tasks, are not being
proposed and are not being resolved. This is a matter
for the future. Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that
only after a flourishing national economy and culture
have been established, only after the necessary condi-
tions have been established, will China, in conformity
with the will of its people, undertake to solve the
tasks of building socialism.. (20) .
That China was in the first stage, and that this fact marked
it and other Asian Communist regimes as less advanced than the
Eastern European s:,tellites, is indicated by Zhukov. He says:
"The basic distinction between the people's democracies in the
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Orient and the European people's democracies lies in the fact
that in the present stage in China, Mongolia, Korea, and Viet-
nam, people's democracy is solving the national-liberation and
anti-feudal tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and
does not set for itself as a task to be resolved in the near
future, the building of socialism..." (21)
According to the Soviet line, then, China was still in
the first stage of a people's democratic revolution, the task
of which was to carry out "general democratic" reforms and to
establish the prerequisites for the future proclamation of the
"transition to socialism."
Soviet propagandists were unprepared for the turn of events
in China--Mao's general line claim that the transition was at
hand--and were uncertain and confused. They were confused about
the way to fit it into the orthodox Soviet theory on the transi-
tion from capitalism to "socialism" in general, and thece$tab-
lished line on the development of people's democratic revolu-
tions in particular. The Soviet leaders themselves seemed re-
luctant to accept the transition claim.
The Russian October Revolution slogans, which' had been
promulgated on 25 October 1953, had sent greetings to the Chi-
nese people "who are struggling:.for industrialization, economic
and cultural advance, and for the strengthening of the people's
democratic state." The specification, "socialist," did not
appear. Nor did the Pravda editorial of 9 November take into
account Mao's characterization of China's new stage. The edi-
torial merely repeated the formulation as given in the October
Revolution slogans, while explicitly referring to the building
of "socialism" in tie European Communist countries:
The great Chinese people are successfully struggling
for the industrialization of their country, for
the further advance of their economy and culture, and
for the all-round strengthening of their people's
democratic state.... The European people's demo-
cracies are marching forward with confidence.
Utilizing the rich Soviet experience, the toilers
of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Albania'are successfully struggling for the
further advance of their national economy and for an
increase in the material and cultural level of the
life of the people, and for the building of a social-
ist society. /emphasis supplied (22)
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And, Pravda's year-end editorial on 31 December read:
Shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union along
this path of progress and happiness march the great
Chinese people, who have rapidly rebuilt their
economy and have raised the banner of struggle for
further economic progress and for industrializa-
tion, and the European people's democracies, which
are confidently building socialism. (23)
The first overt acknowledgement by a Soviet publicist of
China's ''transition to socialism" carne around the middle of
January 1954. In the Kommunist review of the fourth volume
of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works (third volume in the'Chinese
edition), G. Yefimov stated:
The People's Government and the Communist party
are planning to bring about, over a relatively pro-
longed period of time, the socialist industrializa-
tion of the country, socialist transformations in
agriculture, trade, and other sectors of the nation-
al economy. The policy of the People's Government
and the CCP is directed, thus, to the gradual transi-
tion from the minimum program, the creation of a new
democratic state, to the maximum program, the building
of a socialist society in China. (24)
The entire statement stands as unique in the January issues of
Soviet journals and magazines. There was no Soviet-originated
statement in any other Soviet publications in January 1954 that
China was "building socialism." On the contrary, the traditional
distinction between European satellites and China continued
to be made in a number of the January publications.
Thus, in an article on Lenin's revolutionary doctrine in
the 17 January issue of Pravda, the following statement appeared:
Marxist-Leninist theo7..-y and the colossal historic
experience of the Soviet Union are helping the
toilers of the European people's democracies to
build socialism successfully and are inspiring
the great Chinese people in the building of a new
life. (25)
In quoting Chinese statements, however, the Soviet writers did
not delete Chinese-originated references to the transition.
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Thus in the 14 Fe11kuary 1954 Pravda editorial on the occasion
of the fourth anniversary of Ii~ amino-Soviet treaty, the state-
ment was made that "Comrade Mao Tse-tung has characterized the
present period in the history of China, as a new stage--the stage
of socialist transformations." (26)
The testimonials to Sino-Soviet friendship, which conunemo-
rated the Sino-Soviet treaty and appeared on Pravda's third
page in the form of short articles by various Soviet and C1 nese
workers, peasants, and artists, also reflected the difference
between Russian and Chinese sources in the references to China's
stage of development. Whereas the Russians spoke only in terms
of China's "building a new life" and being engaged in "build-
ing up its heavy industry," the Chinese referred to their build-
ing of a "socialist society," or "building socialism."
It was in February 1954 that the second direct acknowledge-
ment of China's entry into the phase of "socialism" appeared
from a Soviet source. It came in an article on China by I.
Kurdov in the February issue of Kommunist. (27) Now although
Kurdov acknowledged the new state of affairs in China, he had
not yet caught up completely with the new Chinese line: he
had written that the first stage of the Chinese revolution was
concluded only after the completion of the anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal tasks, which took place, as far as the anti-
feudal tasks were concerned, "in subsequent years" after the
establishment of the PRC. The Chinese were claiming, however,
that the first stage of the revolution was completed, and the
second stage initiated, with the founding of the PRC.
The next Soviet-initiated reference to China's new stage
came toward the end of April from a variety of sources.
The first was made in the May Day slogans, which were is-
sued on 21 April 1954. Number 6 in the list of the slogans
read in part: "Greetings to the Chinese people, who are suc-
cessfully struggling for the socialist industrialization of
the country, for economic and cultural advance, for the further
development and strengthening of their people's democratic
system." (28) Compared with the above-cited October Revolu-
tion slogan on China (1953), it emerges that they are identical
e:.ccept for the significant qualifier "socialist" before the
word "industrialization" in the May Day slogan.
Toward the end of April, Kaganovich declared to the Soviet
of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet that "The ruling circles
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of the imperialist states, especially the US, are following
with hatred and anger the successes of Communist construction
in the USSR and the successes of socialist construction in'the
great PRC and in all countries of people's democracy." (29)
Toward the end of April 1954, then, the Soviets began to
give general recognition to the claim advanced by the Chinese
the preceding October that they were engaged in the building
of "socialism," that they were in the period of "transition
to socialism." However, until the end of May, there was no
discussion by a Soviet theoretician or publicist directed
specifically to this new phenomenon, no extended article on
the stages of the Chinese revolution in the light of this new
development, no echoing of the Chinese claim that the second
stage--the stage of "socialism"--had begun in October 1949.
Soviet theorists did insist, however, that with the second
stage in any Communist country must appear the change from
"democratic dictatorship" of the proletariat and peasantry to
"dictatorship of the proletariat." But this, as we have sug-
gested, is precisely what Mao refused to do until 1956. Mao
had taken the unorthodox step, therefore, of entering the stage
of "transition to socialism" without declaring a proletarian
dictatorship. Mao's formula for transition is in this sense
different from that prescribed by the Soviets.
The long delay in Soviet recognition of China's "transi-
tion to socialism" suggests that Moscow opposed the unorthodox--
that is, Chinese Communist--line on transition under a "!people's
democratic dictatorship." During the entire period of Soviet
resistance, Moscow may have attempted to persuade Peiping to
declare the proletarian dictatorship. Certainly, Soviet pro-
paganda made it clear that this should be done, as the prole-
tarian dictatorship was held to be necessary for the transition.
Peiping's failure to yield and the compromise of 1956, which
was required to conceal the Sino-Soviet variance on proletarian
dictatorship, can be taken as a measure of Mao's ability even
in 1953-54 to undertake a policy of which Moscow did not approve.
By insisting that "peaceful transformation" of capitalists'
enterprises differs from that of the Soviet Union and the European
people's democracies, the Chinese claim that Mao has arrived
at a new form and method for the "transition to socialism."
To nations engaged in drawing up plans for "mixed economies"
the claim that "socialism" is being built in this "peculiar"
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'way in China would keep the Chinese post--revolutionary example
of economic behavior at the center of their attention. (30)
"Peaceful Transformation" of Capitalists Themselves
Now the claim for Mao that the Chinese make is not merely
that the capitalists' enterprises will be transformed (gradually
placed under state control), but that the capitalists will be
transformed as men, i.e. they will be mentally changed or re-
molded. W9u Criuan-che says that "The ideology of the capital-
ists, who card only for profits, is not absolutely impossible
to transform.... We can...use the method of education to trans-
form this ideology." (31) The term, "education," actually
means intensive indoctrination and, in practice, it is a mild
form of brainwashing.
The claim was stated with considerable precision by the
writer Shu Wei-kuang in 1955:
In a state where the proletariat has seized political
power, under definite social and historical condi-
tions, establishment of the principle that capital-
ists can be basically transformed under socialist gui-
dance is another brilliant contribution of Comrade
Mao Tse-tung to the treasure house of Marxism-
Leninism. This theory has never appeared in the
classical works of Marxism-Leninism, and no country
in the world has ever gone through this kind of experi-
ence.
In the USSR and the states of people's democracy in
Eastern Europe, violent and forcible methods of ex-
propriation were used to eliminate the bourgeoisie.
But, under our concrete conditions in China, the
identical goal of eliminating the bourgeoisie can
be attained by taking the: road of peaceful trans-
formation. (32)
Shu's claim appears to be valid.
As noted above, there is some evidence that the concept
of a peaceful transformation of capitalist industry and commerce
was seminal in Lenin and, to a lesser degree, Engels. But whereas
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Engels and Lenin gave a warrant for "buying out" the capitalists
and Lenin saw that they could be put to work for the Soviet '
state, they never went as far as Mao. For what Mao wants, and
believes he can get, is not just the capitalists' business,
their cooperation, and the use of their talents. He wants their
souls as well.
Mao believes that capitalists can be mentally changed and
will be willing, !under "education," to exchange their capital-
ist soul for that of a wage earner. In his report to the 8th
CCP Congress in 1956, Liu Shho-chi expressed this view with
considerable confidence:
In the course of bringing about the socialist trans-
formation of capitalist industry and commerce, we have
carried out the transformation of enterprises in con-
junction with the remolding of individuals. That is,
while the enterprises are being transformed, educa-
tional measures are adopted to remold the capital-
ists gradually, enabling them to be transformed from
exploiters into working people earning their own
living....
It can now be stated with conviction that with the
exception of a very few diehards who still attempt
to put up resistance., it is possible, iii the economic
sphere, for the overwhelming majority of the national
bourgeoisie to accept socialist transformation and
gradually change into real working people. (33)
Liu's confidence is not based on the belief that the capital-
ists will transt 'prm their ideology, their world-view, voluntarily.
This is, of course, possible, but experience undoubtedly shows
Liu that only few individuals will accept a complete change
of their moral, political, and economic outlook except when
they are compelled to do so.
When Liu says that the capitalists must be "educated and
remolded" 'into a "socialist" world-view, he is paraphrasing
Mao. In 1949 and in 1950, Mao had stated that':the capitalists
would be educated when the time came. In his report to the
party plenum of June 1950, Mao says that "Toward the people,
/The people's democratic dictatorship7...does not use compul-
sion, but democratic methods, namely: it does not compel them
to do this or that, but uses democratic methods in educating
and persuading them." (34)
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But both Liu and Mao are using euphemisms, for the line
between persuasion (through education) and compulsion (through
te:vror and threats) is a fine one indeed in China. Education
of the capitalists has been carried out in conjunction with
"struggle" campaigns of various degrees of intensity. As Li
'Pei-han, director of the CCP's United Front Work Department
put it in 1960, "During the past 10 years, we have waged
several violent struggles against the national bourgeoisie,
while at the same time we have launched massive and regular
educational work among them.... They have gradually turned
from their passiveness into an active attitude, and they have
accepted socialist transformation without too much reluctance."
(35)
Li concedes that there are still difficulties, as "human
transformation is an unprecedented and great task in the history
of mankind.... While transformation on the ecc': n11c front is
relatively easy, the real difficulty lies in th, txansformati.on
of man, i.e. political and ideological transformation." (36)
The "rightists,- of course, are a problem. Regarding non-
Communist "rightists" among intellectuals and capitalists, Li
speaks of transforming them gradually by means of "criticism,
isolation, education, and help." He uses the term, "isolation,"
again in connection with bourgeois intellectuals in general,
and it emerges that he is not referring to physical. isolation
but rather to'the feeling of having been left out: "Intellect-
uals among the working class have made unprecedented progress
and in this situation, some of the bourgeois intellectuals feel
they are isolated. I see nothing wrong in this; it is rather
desirable." (37) Li's remark that it is "desirable" implies
that creation of this feeling of isolation is deliberately
fostered by the CCP cadres, whose responsibility it is to "help"
transform the capitalists.
The Chinese Communists are clearly aware of the psycholo-
gical effects of each of their tactics in transforming the minds
of the capitalists and bourgeois intellectuals, and Li says
that "Basic transformation is a thorough-going process which
entails pains and shocks." Transforming the world-view of the
capitalists, remolding their thinking through thought reform,
is a protracted process. In his On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions Among the People (June 1957), Mao predicts that
the capitalists "will still need ideological remolding for quite
some time" even in the future when they rid themselves of the
label "bourgeoisie." (38) ritao recommends a combination of
work among wage earners inthe enterprises and "study."
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To help then in their "study," the Chinese Conununis%;s ap-
parently apply certain aspects of their experiments in brain-
washing criminals and political prisoners to more recalcitr~,r_t
capitalists--they are called "diehards"--many of whom are either
too old and/or have too much self-respect to submit easily to
the degrading process of thought reform.
The methods used by the Chinese Communists in indoctrinat-
ing political prisonsers are decisively different in several
respects from Soviet methods. These differences are:
1. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese attempt to ensure
that the political prisoner will develop a long-lasting change
in his attitude and overt behavior, which will be sustained
after his release. Nothing less than the establishment of a
"new moral code" in the prisoner's mind is a major goal.
2. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese make extensive use
of group interaction among prisoners in obtaining information,
applying pressures, and carrying out indoctrination.
3. Whereas in the USSR and the satellites in Eastern Europe
the ritual of public self-criticism, confession, self-degrada-
tion, punishment, and rehabilitation is a party procedure, the
Chinese have extended this practice to the non-party population,
and have made it an important aspect of their thought reform
procedure.
4. In China, the period of detention is greatly prolonged.
Whereas in the USSR trial and sentencing take place fairly soon
after the completion of the interregation, in China the prepara-
tion of a first confession is only a prelude to a long period
of indoctrination and re-education, which may go on for years
and is not terminated until the authorities believe that the
prisoner has finally adopted a "correct" attitude and behavior.
(39)
Now a small capitalist, unlike a criminal or political
offender, is generally not sent to prison to be mentally trans-
formed. His prison is familiar to him: his enterprise.
It appears that Mao has taken over the Soviet practice
of requiring a public confession, or "self-criticism," and
further developed it with traditional Chinese methods of sus-
tained learning by rote and endless repetition. One Chir=se
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writer described protracted learning and sclf-.ro:form as follows:
Many businessmen call for a change in their status.
Certainly a good sign, this is comprehensible to us.
it indicates that they realize exploitation is shame-
ful and labor glorious. But to change an exploiter
into a real laborer is a matter which requires colos-
sal effort in self-reform. If any capitalist thinks
that he can be made into a real laborer simply by
acquiring the status of laborer and if he pays no
attention to the bourgeois mentality hatched and
developed through a long life of exploitation and,
therefore, relaxes his effort, his self-reform will
be impeded ...A change in status cannot be attained
simply by waiving his interest income. He must be
subjected to a tough course of ideological remold-
ing. For this reason, the problem of changing
status can be solved only gradually and individually,
according to the actual conditions of each person,
the principle of voluntariness, and the possibilities
of success. (40)
Capitalists presumably will continue to be capitalists until
1963 or later. The payment of fixed interest to industrial-
ists "will continue until after the second Five-Year Plan,"
according to Vice Premier Po I-po's statement of 10 December
1956. Thus the Chinese Communists envisage a prolonged period
of thought reform for the capitalists, and Li Wei-han says
that "We must be patient and meticulous in our work." (41)
Patient and meticulous work has indeed produced in China
a type of capitalist never seen before in other countries.
And a new type of capitalist in a Communist country is indeed
an innovation. Even Khrushchev was compelled to make, however
ambiguously, an acknowledgement of the novelty. In a speech
s c ev praised the "original forms" of revolution in China and
then centered his attention on the capitalists in the Chinese
delegation. "I am no longer a young man and in the days gone
by, I worked in capitalist enterprises. I had occasion to
take part in strikes, to be in workers' delegations, and to
negotiate with capitalists. But at that time, we did not sit
side by side, but were opposed to each other and our interests
were irreconcihble."
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There is a clof inito note of orthodoxy in l;hrushchov's last
rozmtrlc. This was his backhanded way of flattering the Chinese.
Moreover, he paid tribute to Mao's :innovation without prais-ing
Mao himself. In 1056, the Soviet loaders felt the need to
agree with the cocky Chinese at least to the extont that in
China a now approach to tho capitalist man had been discovered.
But they credited the Chinese party or the Chinese people for
the unique approach, not Mae, who was the object of the same
kind of personality cult in China which thoy were trying to
diseouragp in the USSR and the bloc.
Choosing his words carefully, Mikoyan had told the Chinese
party congress in September 1956 that "each country has its
distinctive features and contributes something specifically its
own in effecting the transition to socialism." Ile stated that
the bourgeoisie in China had "found it more convenient not to
clash with the people's state, but to work under its control,"
and that, as compared with the setting of the Russian revolu-
tion, there had been in China "new historical conditions, a
more favorable situation." This fact explained differences
in Soviet and Chinese "experience," and left room for certain
innovations.
While conceding that the Chinese view on "peaceful trans-
formation" of small capitalists was something new, Moscow had
reserved a special kind of praise for the Chinese Communists.
On 23 November 1956, the Pravda editorial applauded the Chinese
"who always make it clear that their methods, though perfectly
correct in their country, are not necessarily of universal ap-
plication." The international significance of Chinese innova-
tions was a constant source of concern for the Soviet leaders
then as it is today.
The idea that a capitalist could be made to change his
stripes, so to speak, appears to have evolved from Mao's works
in the late 1930s and 1940s. Mao speaks repeatedly in this
period of "preserving" the capitalist economy in China and of
sustaining the alliance with the "patriotic capitalists." But
it is difficult to determine just when and how the thought oc-
cured to him that the capitalist man could be transformed into
the working man.
Chou En-lai claims some of the credit. During a discus-
sion with former premier of France, Edgar Faure, who was visit-
ing China in 1956, Chou recalled his own stay in France between
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1924 and 1927. He had worked there as a student and as a manual
workor, in Paris and Rouen. Chou stated:
It was while I was amongst you that I was converted
to Communism. I observed, I shared the life of my
follow-workers and I came to the conclusion that
it was not possible to transform the wage earners
into capitalists, but that it was possible to trans-
form the capitalists into wage earners. (42)
Mr. Faure says that this was a jest on Chou's part, but Chou's
statement stands as an explicit and unambiguous assertion of
a bit of personal creativity which is very unusual among Chinese
leaders other than Mao.
Chou's "Jest" appears as a slender reed beside the claims
made for Mao regarding transition--claims which proliferated
in 1960. According to his eulogists, Mao had shown originality
on all aspects of the "transition to socialism." No other Chi-
nese leader is given credit for any o:' the policies dealing
with the construction of "socialism."
As few doctrines in the world today, Mao's doctrines on
"buying out" during the "transition to socialism" command a
devoted service. The practical way of "buying out" capital-
ists and of transforming them into wage earners is communicated
by the Chinese Communists to other Communists with the passion-
ate zeal of a missionary who sets out to conquer a new world
for his creed. In the words of Tao Chu, first secretary of
the Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee,
Peaceful transformation of the capitalists' enter-
prises has now been attained in China. China's ex-
perience in this matter is of universal significance.
The truth underlying this experience is not limited
to colonial and semi-colonial countries. We are
aware that with the East Wind prevailing over the
West Wind, revolution will triumph in several capital-
ist countries and the big capitalists will be de-
prived of their rights. At that time, it is entirely
possible for these countries to adopt the guideline
of peaceful redemption toward the middle "national"7
and small capitalists. (43) - -
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This kind of proselytizing has angered the Soviet leaders,
who are now attempting to take the wind from Mao's sails by
insisting that' Marx and Lenin had been the first to discuss
the policy of "buying out" the bourgeoisi+3. The policy has
been incorporated into the Draft Program of the 22nd Soviet
party congress as one which had been "foreseen by Marx and
Lenin." There is in this connection no mention of Mao.
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1. Stalin: "Report to the 14th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.)
(December 1925)," in Works, Volume 7, Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1954, p; 374. Attacking Zinoviev's
moderate view of NEP, Stalin in Problems of Leninism
(January 1926) emphasized the aspect of struggle:
"NEP is the party policy which admits the struggle
between the socialist and capitalist elements."
2. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B),
Short Course (1938)-,-edited by a commission of the
~en? ra Commit ee of the CPSU (B.), International
Publishers, New York, 1939, p. 275.
3. Wu Chuan-che: "Peaceful `Transformation of Capitalist In-
dustrial and Commercial Enterprises is a Special
Form of Class Struggle," Che-hsueh 'Pen-chiu (Philo-
sophical Research), No. 1, Peiping, 1 March 1956.
4. Wu Chuan-che: "The Basic Class Contradiction During China's
Transition to Socialism," Che-hsueh Yen-chiu, No. 1,
June 1955.
5. Lenin: Selected Works, Volume IX, International Publishers,
New York,-1-9-3V, p. 285.
6. Lenin: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 286.
7. Marx and Engels: Selected Works in Two Volumes, Volume
II, Foreign Languages Publishing use, 1955, p. 433.
8. Lenin: Selected Works, Volume VI, op. cit., p. 148.
9. Lenin: Selected Works, Volume VII, op. cit., pp. 368-370.
10. Lenin: Selected Works in Two Volumes, Foreign Languages
Publishing House, Moscow, olume II, Part 2,
p. 536.
11. East Berlin National Zeitung, 14 May 1960.
12. Kuan Ta-tung: The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist
Industry an ommerce in China, Foreign Languages
Press, Peking, 1960.
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13. Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works, Volume I, International
Publishers, 1 New Yor F, ?55'4, p. 144.
14. Mao Tse-tung: Selected Work , Volume III, op. cit.,
pp. 96-97.
15. Peiping Jon-min Jih-pao, 27 August 1953.
16. "Speech Given at the National Congress of the All-China
Federation of Industrial and Commercial Circles,"
Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 November 1953. Originally
given on 27 October.
17. Yao Peng-chang: "Criticism of A Ccurse on the NeW Demo-
cracy Econ,~'iiy, " Shanghai Wen-hui Pao, 7 January 1954.
18. Ibid.
19. Chu Kuang-chien: "I Have a Role in the General Plan of
the General Line," Peiping Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 15
Jan-.n ry 1954.
20. A. Sobolev: "People's Democracy as a Form of Political
Organization of Society," Bol'sheyik, No. 19, October
1951.
21. Ye. Zhukov: "On the Character and Peculiarities of People's
Democracy in Countries of the Orient," Izvestiya
akademii nauk SSSR: seriya istorii i fii osofli Yews
of the Academy of Sciences USSR: History and Philosophy
Series), Moscow, Volume IX, No. 1, January-February
1952, p. 80.
22. Pravda, 9 November 1953.
23. Pravda, 31 December 1953.
24. G. Yefimov: "Fourth Volume of the Selected Works of Mao
Tse-tung," Kommunist, No. 1, January 1954 (approved
for printing can 12 January), p. 120.
25. A. Rumyantsev: "Great Theoretician of Communism," Pravda,
17 January 1954.
26. "Indestructible Soviet-Chinese Friendship--Mighty Factor
in Safeguarding the Peace," P.~avda, 14 February 1954.
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27. I. Kurclov: "Great Power of the Chinese People," Kommunist,
No. 3, February 1954.
28. Pravda, 21 April 1954.
29. Pravda, 27 April 1954.
30. Mao's application of the Marx-Engels-Lenin concept of "buy-
ing out" the capitalists and taking over their busi-
nesses is alleged to constitute a "model" for under-
developed countries. In 1956, Wu Chuan-che stated:
The experiences and achievements of China's
socialist transformation of capitalist indus-
try and commerce have created the following
model: for countries which at one time were
semi-feudal and semi-colonial, just as China
had been...the model shows how the working
class should handle its relations with the
national capitalists and, after revolutionary
victory, how to eliminate exploitation and
complete the transition to socialism. There-
fore, China's peaceful transformation of
capitalist industry and commerce as a form
of class struggle has a very crucial signifi-
cance. We may say that China's experience
in transition regarding elimination of ex-
ploitation and of classes certainly has en-
riched the Marxist-Leninist theory of the
transition period.
(Cf. Wu Chuan-che: note 3 above.)
In 1960, the Chinese extended the relevance of their
"model" beyond "semi-colonial" countries to include
capitalist states. (Cf. Tao Chu: note 42 below.)
31. Wu Chuan-che: "peaceful Transformation of Capitalist Indus-
trial and Commercial Enterprises is a Special Form
of Class Struggle," Che-hsueh Yen-chiu, op. cit.
32. Shu Wei-kuang: "The Gradual Leap in China's Transition
Period," Che-hsueh Yen-chic, No. 1, June 1955.
33. Liu Shao-chi: "The Political Report of the Central Com-
mittee of the CCP to the 8th National Congress of the
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Party," delivered on 15 E ptember 1956, in 8th
National Congress of the CCP, Volume I, Documents,
Foreign Languages Press, Peiping, 1956.
34. Mao Tse-tung: "Report to the Party Plenum (6 June 1950,)
in People's China, Volume II, No. 1, 1 July 1950,
p.
35. Li Wei-han: "Study Chairman Mao's Works; Gradually Im-
prove Your World-view," Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao,
25 September 1960. Given originally as a speech on
14 August 1960.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Mao Tse-tung: On the Problem of the Correct Handling of
Contradictions ong the People, English-language
text, New Century Publishers, New York, 1957. p.. 18.
Reprinted from Political Affairs, July 1957.
39. L. E. Hinkle and H. G. Wolff: "Communist Interrogation
and Indoctrination of 'Enemies of the State,"'
Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, August 1956.
40. Li Kuang-yu: "How Correctly to Understand the Problem
of Change-of-Status for Capitalists," Shih-shih Shou-
tse (World Affairs Handbook), No. 24, 23 December 1956.
41. Li Wei-han: "Study Chairman Mao's Works...,' op. cit.
42. Edgar Faure: The Serpent and the Tortoise, New York, St.
Martin's Press, 1958, p. 18. Translated by L. F.
Edwards.
43. Tao Chu: "Speech to the Political Economy Class of the
Kwang-tung Provincial Party Committee (30 March 1960),"
in Canton Nan-fang Jih-pao, 13 May 1960. This passage
was deleted in a version of Tao's speech published
in the Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao, 5 August 1960.
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