CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020288-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 288
• Publication Date: December 23, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
u
N2 582
23 December 1972
State Dept. declq*0 &p4 N bN l4ftiMn"A-fit9P85T00875R000800020288-0
 Approved For Release 2005/069 DP85T00875R000800020288-0
Tile C[.:NTRAL. INTE:LLIGFNCL: BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central
Intelligence to meet Inc respon sibilitres fur providing current intelligence hearing on issues
of national tiacnrity to the President, the National Security Council, aiuI other senior
govelnnlent official,. It is produced in consultation with the Departments 01 State and
Defense. When, because of the tirne factor, adequare consultation with the department of
primary concern is not fe, sihle, items or portions thereof are produced by the Central
Intelligence Agency and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and
prelitnirrary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information
and more complete analysis.
Con lain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further
dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a
need-to-know basis.
This ?iocument contains information affecting the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmi_sion or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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No. 0307/72
23 December 1972
Central Intellzgence Bulletin
CONTENTS
USSR-CHILE: Allende reportedly disappointed with
result&, of Moscow trip. (Page 1)
25X6A
25X6A
CAMBODIA: Recent low level of fighting contrasts
markedly with last year. (Page 5)
INDIA: Widespread hunger likely until spring har-
vest. (Page 6)
CHINA - US - NORTH VIETNAM: Chinese merchant ship
damaged by US air attack (Page 7)
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25X1X4
25X1X4 I I, the lack of results and the coolness of the
Soviets explain why Allende has been so quiet about
his trip since his return to Santiago. Soviet com-
mentary on the Allende visit was extensive while he
was in the USSR, but since then has been infrequent.
The most authoritative media treatment, in Pravda
on 15 December, gave no indication that any new
agreements had been signed.
USSR-CHILE: President Allende reportedly was
disappointed with the results of his visit to Moscow
two weeks ago.
Evidence is mounting that Moscow refused Allende
lac a-scale "bail-out" assistance. 25X1C
the Soviets apparently i agree
to provide some immediate help in the form of $25 to
$30 million in foodstuffs, but this is far short of
the $300 to $500 million in hard currency credits
Allende reportedly requested. Prior to Allende's
arrival, Luis Corvalan, Chile's Communist Party
chief, and Alfonso Inoztroza, the head of Chile's
Central Bank, reportedly had been treated very coldly
by the Soviets and the tenor of President Allende's
The Soviets apparently believe that Chile is
in serious economic difficulty because of errors in
economic policy that will take many years to correct.
They reportedly informed Allende that they are watch-
ing the Chilean experience with interest and ap-
plaud it, but that the USSR could not afford to
support Chile and Cuba at the same time. If Moscow
were to provide Allende with the massive hard cur-
rency assistance he sought, it would entail major
sacrifices for the USSR at a time when its foreign
exchange position is being strained by the need to
finance large grain imports.
Moscow's apparent refusal to bail out Allende
leaves the Chilean economy in dire straits. Chile
is encountering increasing difficulty in obtaining
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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financial help from traditional West European cred-
itors and an approach to Swiss banks, following Al-
lende' s visit to Moscow, reportedly was rebuffed.
Because of falling exports and exhausted foreign ex-
change reserves, Chile's import capacity will be
down by more than $300 million in 1973, unless ad-
ditional hard currency credits are obtained. Al-
though the foodstuffs allegedly promised by the USSR
will be helpful, they amount to less than eight per-
cent of Chile's food import needs and will not allow
Chile to avert a major cutback in imports and con-
sumption during 1973. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
23 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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25X6A
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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25X6A
23 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CAMBODIA: The low level of combat in recent
months stands in marked contrast to the fighting
a year ago.
Last year at this time government units north
and west of Phnom Penh were engaged in heavy fight-
ing with seasoned Vietnamese Communist units. With
the Communist spring offensive in South Vietnam,
however, most of these enemy forces were returned to
South Vietnam, leaving the Khmer Communists largely
on their own. Although the insurgents' ability to
conduct and coordinate tactical operations continues
to improve, they do not appear capable of dealing
any decisive military setbacks to the defensive-minded
Cambodian Army.
Most of the fighting during the last four
months has resulted from periodic Khmer Communist
interdictions of major highways. Diminished Commu-
nist activity along Routes 4 and 5 is making it
possible for the government to move badly needed
supplies of rice and other goods to Phnom Penh.
Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces are now try-
ing to clear Route 2 between Takeo and the South
Vietnamese border.
In addition to interdiction operations, the
Communists have also been putting pressure on sev-
eral provincial capitals--most recently the iso-
lated northern town of Kompong Thom. Since 7 De-
cember, Communist forces have carried out a series
of shellings and ground probes against Cambodian
positions in and around the town. Although the
Cambodians have abandoned a few positions, the
2,600-man garrison does not appear to be in grave
danger. The government is now airlifting rein-
forcements and has replaced the inept local com-
mander. (SECRET)
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INDIA: Widespread hunger is likely to last
until the spring harvest begins in April.
Drought has affected many areas, and acute
food shortages are occurring in a wide belt across
central India. State officials expressed concern
that the central government has provided them with
only half the amount of foodstuffs needed in recent
weeks. US officials and volunteer agencies on the
scene believe that central government stocks and
distribution are insufficient to deal with the
emergency.
Government foodgrain stocks, which totaled
nine million tons in August, dropped to four mil-
lion as of 1 November, and 3.2 million tons a
month later. Exports to other states by private
treaders in some surplus states were banned in an
effort to get the grain into government hands.
This move, however, has aggravated food shortages
in nearby drought-affected states.
The government has purchased an estimated
500,000 tons of foodgrains abroad since mid-Novem-
ber, about half of this from the US. Although
New Delhi claims shipments will begin arriving
next month, the volume will not reach substantial
proportions until February or later. In any case,
imported grains usually are distributed to the
large coastal cities, thereby doing little to help
the hardest hit inland areas.
In an effort to achieve a more equitable dis-
tribution of grain throughout the nation, New
Delhi is using the emergency situation to push the
state governments to take over the wholesale grain
trade beginning with next spring's harvest. Be-
cause the states lack facilities, however, such
moves will further disrupt distribution channels
and may cause even greater hardship. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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CHINA - US - NORTH VIETNAM: Peking has reacted
in a low-key and measured way to a US air attack on
20 December that damaged a Chinese merchant ship in
Haiphong harbor. In a terse broadcast on 21 Decem-
ber, the New China News Agency expressed the Chinese
people's "extreme indignation" over the incident,
but implied there were no casualties and little dam-
age. The broadcast said that the Chinese Government
"strongly protests the provocative act" and insists
that the US "immediately stop attacking" Chinese
ships and "guarantee" against any recurrence. NCNA
asserted that Peking "is closely watching the devel-
opment of da,ly expanding US war activities"--the
first hint that renewed US military operations
against North Vietnam have engaged Peking's serious
attention. This formulation stops far short of a
Chinese statement last June that such operations
"threatened" China's security. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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