CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 259
• Publication Date: November 17, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
No foreign Disseiv
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Mate Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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Secret
N9 582
IA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2
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SRVfl~sS B,PANCH
 Approved For Release 2005/06Y09-~r bP85T00875R000800020259-2
Ibo (:I Nfl(/\I. IN II:I.I.ICI N(:I M11 1.1 1IN i~r poo(luced by the Director of Central
Intelligence t') rileet Iris w)11 sibilities lot providilrg current intelligence bearing on issues
of nalinn,ll security to the lllw,iclerrt, Iliv National Security Council, mid other senior
(lov,'Inrncnl officiils? II 1?, plodur,cd in comull.)lion With the Ueparlnulnis of Stale and
I)ef(ur,(? When, hec,lov! of the how factor, ,ulecluate consultation with the dep'-.11 till (m It of
prlrony concern is 111)1 (c)able, item; ur portions thereof arc produced by the Central
I nlelliyence Agency and enclosed in hi l(lo ts.
Intcll)relntioly; of irrtelhgcnce inlurnraliun in this publication represent in)nu(liale and
p(eIirnlnary views which are 5(Ihject to modification in lint: light. of further infnrrnation
,Ii((I nrow complctc analysis.
Cert:rirr ndclligence item'. in finis publication miry In (lesignated specifically for no further
(Ir,semrr1ition. Other intellirlence item; nray be dissemin,rtc(I further, bill only on it
nc,:rl?to-lcnnw basis.
(Ili,, docnrnent contains infoinr,)tion affecting the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sec lions 193 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to or reccihl by an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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No. 0276/72
17 November 1972
Central Intellz~ence Bulletin
25X6
ARGENTINA: Army out in force for Peron homecoming
today. Page 2)
EGYPT: More signs of political ferment. (Page 4)
CHILE: Lawsuits involving copper exports may in-
crease. (Page 5)
LAOS: Souvanna tries to step up pace of talks.
(Page 6)
CYPRUS: Greek Cypriots concerned over activities
of forces loyal to Grivas. (Page 7)
HONG KONG - CHINA: Economic ties strengthened
(Page 8)
LAOS: The rainy season in retrospect. (Page 9)
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SECRET
ARGENTINA: Juan Peron's homecoming today will
be tightly controlled by the armed forces.
Some 30,000 troops have cordoned off Ezeiza
Airport, where the former president is scheduled
to arrive at 0900 EST, using tanks to block the few
roads that lead from central Buenos Aires 21 miles
to Ezeiza. The Lanusse government has also reminded
the nation that the state of siege remains in effect
and that mass rallies and demonstrations are for-
bidden. Troops have occupied radio and television
stations to prevent extremist take-overs, and all
schools, public establishments, and private busi-
nesses have been closed down.
One aspect of the government's security pre-
cautions to "protect" Peron that is particularly
galling to the Peronists is the restriction of the
airport welcoming party to only 300. Peronist
sources suggested that this might cause Peron's
aircraft to be diverted to Uruguay, although in
Rome Peron's private secretary labeled as false all
reports that the trip might be delayed or canceled.
Peron has termed his visit--expected to last
no longer than a week--a "mission of peace" and
has called upon the Peronist masses to take no ac-
tion that might -thwart him. Nonetheless, his pres-
ence in the country will provide dissidents on the
right and terrorists on the left with the best
chance they are likely to get to sabotage the elec-
tions scheduled for next March. This risk is com-
pounded by the possibility that an over-reaction
by Peronists or the security forces could set off
a chain reaction of violence desired by neither
side.
Neither President Lanusse nor Peron has con-
firmed that, a political agreement has been reached,
but earlier repcrting indicated that both sides
expected Peron to give his approval to Lanusse's
election plan and possibly to endorse another can-
didate to carry the Peronist banner. Lanusse will3.
17 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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be out of the capital. when Peron arrives, but he
is due back Saturday. No meeting between the two
long-time rivals is scheduled, but there are indi-
cations that an understanding exists and they may
get together to put the finishing touches on an
agreement. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
EGYPT: Signs of political ferment continue
to surface.
According to several contacts of the US In-
terests Section in Cairo, an incident, possibly a
coup attempt by a group of air force officers, oc-
curred at an Egyptian airbase south of Cairo within
the past few days. Although details of the episode
are sketchy, as many as 20 arrests may have been
made. One version of the affair alleges that the
director of military intelligence was dismissed
following the incident.
The recent activities of Egypt's two leading
military figures provide an indication of official
concern over the episode. War Minister Ahmad Is-
mail Ali, who had been scheduled to attend the
meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers in
Kuwait beginning on 15 November, apparently delayed
his departure by one day, during which he continued
his recent series of visits with Egyptian troops,
exhorting them to "maintain discipline" and focus
on strictly military matters in preparation for
"the battle against Israel." Chief of Staff Shazli
did go to Kuwait, but returned after only one day.
A number of other manifestations of the malaise
in Egyptian society have appeared in recent weeks.
In early October, Ln incident involving a small
number of army personnel who publicly denounced the
Sadat regime took place in Cairo but was quickly
quelled by security forces. More recently, there
was an outburst of sectarian strife between Egyp-
tian Muslims and adherents of the Coptic faith.
All these were apparently isolated incidents,
and so far there is no evidence that the many dis-
affected elements in Egyptian society are coalescing.
SL.3at presumably is taking greater security pre-
cautions, but as discontent increases, so do the
dangers to his position. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
DI SEM)
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CHILE: Lawsuits involving Chile's copper ex-
ports may increase.
The Swedish Government, despite its sympathy
for President Allende, turned down Santiago's re-
quest last week to circumvent a preliminary court
decision favorable to the Kennecott Corporation
which is contesting proceeds from copper sold from
its nationalized El Teniente mine. Stockholm re-
fused to buy some Chilean copper that came under
jurisdiction of a Swedish court, telling Santiago
that it could not intervene in a dispute over com-
pensation for nationalized resources.
Now there are indications that Cerro Corpora-
tion, another of three US companies whose copper
holdings were nationalized, may eventually launch
a legal campaign similar to that of the Kennecott
Corporation. Chile signed a compensation agreement
with Cerro, but has failed to meet scheduled pay-
ments. To put pressure on the Chilean Government,
Cerio has informed Santiago that it has an even
stronger legal position than Kennecott and could
easily seize the proceeds from Chilean copper sales
to Japan from Cerro's nationalized mine.
These lega actions and threats of others pose
substantial pi .ilems for a nearly bankrupt Chile.
Although the sums involved so far are not large,
some copper buyers in Western Europe are holding
off on negotiations for 1973 sales contracts. Per-
haps in an attempt to minimize further legal pro-
ceedings, Chile is reportedly considering a barter
deal with China to exchange some copper, presumably
from Kennecott.'s El Teniente mine, for soybean oil
and other foodstuffs. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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LAOS: Prime Minister Souvanna is attempting,
to step up the pace of negotiations.
Souvanna has invited Lao Communist leader Sou-
phanouvong to come to Luang Prabang, the royal cap-
ital, for discussions. Souvanna presumably believes
that direct private dealings with his half-brother
are the best way tc move forward on such difficult
issues as a Lao cease-fire and the shape of any fu-
ture government. Many of the arrangements for the
Lao settlement of 1962 were worked out in face-to-
face meetings between the two leauers.
The government is clearly attempting to create
a favorable atmosphere for the ongoing sessions in
Vientiane. The official Lao newspaper on 14 Novem-
ber carried an optimistic account of the fifth ses-
sion of the peace talks on Tuesday, emphasizing the
similarity of the positions of both sides.
The Communists have thwarted government efforts
to re-establish a presence north of the Bolovens
Plateau before a possible cease-fire. Communist ar-
tillery attacks and ground assaults by two North
Vietnamese battalions forced irregular units on 15
November to withdraw from Saravane, a provincial
capital that had been reoccupied by the government
earlier this month. Irregular units attempting to
retake the town are meeting stiff resistance. (CON-
FIDENTIA,L )
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SECRET
CYPRUS: Increased activity by forces loyal to
General Gr vas has created concern in the Greek
Cypriot community, but President Makarios maintains
that there is no reason for alarm.
Last week Greek Cypriot authorities uncovered
a new undergound organization known as EOKA B, be-
lieved to be headed by Grivas, a persistent cam-
paigner for enosis--union with Greece. Authorities
have since intensified security precautions and in-
creased police patrols around the island.
Makarios, in a conversation with a US Embassy
official, played down the significance of groups
such as EOKA B, claiming he can control any moves
by Grivas supporters. At least some of his out-
ward confidence may be for popular consumption; he
may feel expressions of concern would only add to
tensions within the Greek Cypriot community. In
recent months, the community has seemed unusually
united in its willingness to end differences with
the Turkish Cypriots, and this has led to a more
forthcoming attitude in the intercommunal talks.
In an attempt, to undermine the talks by de-
stroying this unity, Grivas could decide on a cam-
paign of violence. The effects of such tactics
would depend largely on the ability and willing-
ness of Greek Cypriot security forces to ferret
out Grivas supporters. Pro-Grivas sentiment is
known to exist among some elements of the security
forces. The outcome of Grivas' effort would also
depend upon Makarios' success in turning the con-
siderable support he enjoys,within the Greek Cyp-
riot community against Grivas. (SECRET)
17 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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HONG KONG CHINA: Economic ties between Hong
Kong and C iii na are b ng strengthened. Early thins
week Peking agreed to sell an additional 3.5 bil-
lion gallons of water to the colony through August
1973. As a result, Hong Kong will receive about
one fourth of its water from China. Peking will
earn an additional $3.9 million in hard currency
from the arrangement, slightly increasing the col-
ony's importance as a source of foreign exchange.
Meanwhile, a Chinese delegation is in Hong Kong in-
vestigating the hotel business with an eye toward
setting up operations there or developing tourist
facilities in China. (CONFIDENTIAL)
17 Nov 7 2 Centrel Intelligence Bulletin
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LAOS: The Rainy Season in Retrospect
As the, new dry season begins in Laos e the Com-
munists must view the results of their military
activities during the ~:ecer,tly ended rainy season
with some satisfaction. In the north, they managed
to turn hack all of Vang Pao's efforts to match
last year's recapture of the Plaine des Jarres--
despit:e the fact that a full North Vietnamese di
vision withdrew for service in South Vietnam. In
the south, they succeeded in keeping government
forces well away from the Ho Chi Minh supply cor-
ridor to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
The Contest for the Plaine
As the rainy season began in April in north
Laos, the Communists were still maintaining pres-
sure against Long Tieng. Their siege of Vang Pao's
headquarters quickly ended, however, because of the
early arrival of rainy weather, which washed out
their supply route, and the redeployment of the
North Vietnamese 312th Division to South Vietnam.
When the Communists abandoned positions overlooking
Long Tieng, they shifted the bulk of their forces
to a line of hills southwest of the Plaine to check
possible government offensives. With the departure
of the 312th, the North Vietnamese were left with
four regiments--the same number they had during the
1971 rainy season when they did not make any real
attempt to defend the Plaine.
The North Vietnamese pullback allowed govern-
ment forces to recapture Sam Thong, a former refugee
center just north of Long Tieng, and several nearby
hills. The irregulars tried unsuccessfully to
breach the Communist defensive line southwest of
the Plaine in June and July, but relatively few ir-
regular units were involved because most of Vang
Pao's tribal forces were returned to rear areas
for badly needed rest and refitting. The respite
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delayed any major government rainy season campaign
in the north. 13y mid--August, Vang Pao was able to
commit nearly all of his G,000 retrained tribal
troops, plus some 4 , 000 t~ oL ps from other areas, to
a major offensive against the Plaine. The militory
objective was to push the Communists far enough back
to limit: the effectiveness of any enemy drive on
Long Tieng the following dry season. It! politic~~l
aim was to regain as much territory as possible to
strengthen Prime Minister Souvanna's hand in any
possible peace negotiations with the Communists.
For the next two and a half months, irregular
task forces tried to move onto the Plaine from the
north, west, and south. The North Vietnamese used
one of their crack regiments to hold the defensive
line southwest of the Plaine, while their other
three regiments--despite heavy air strikes--ianeuvered
from one sector of the Plaine to another to inflict
a series of defeats on the irregulars. Vang Pao had
intended a simultaneous advance to prevent the Com-
munists from concentrating their limited manpower,
but the irregular columns made no real effort unless
the Meo general was personally on the scene.
As the rains began to taper off in mid-October,
Vang Pao concentrated over 5,000 men--including some
of the government's best troops--in a single task
force on the southern tip of the Plaine. After
making some limited progress, these troops lost just
enough momentum to allow the Communists to concen-
trate the bull-, of three. regiments against them. On
26 October Communist ground forces, tanks, ond ar-
tillery routed the government troops, killing over
100, wounding 200, and capturing many more. Vz,ng
Pao is currently attempting to regroup the remaining
elements of his ball y battered force in thr- hi a
few miles south of the Plaine, but they are still
under heavy -nemy pressure.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
SECRET
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Fighting in the South
In south Laos, the North Vietnamese objective
was little different from previous years--to keep
the government at ax::-is-length from the Ho Chi Minh
trail complex. But they were a hit more aggref~;sivo.
Communist pre-emptive moves began in mid-May, when
a North Vietnamese regiment for the first time oc-
cupied Khong Sedone, a provincial. capital north of
Pakse. Although government troops managed to re-
capture Khong Sedone in early June, it took them
another two months to drive the North Vir?;tnamese
well away from the surrounding area. The fighting
at Khong Sedone resulted in some heavy casualties
on both sides, and the irregulars had to have sev-
eral weeks of rest and retraining before they could
be committed to regain .l_~st ground.
At the same time that the North Vietnamese
moved into Khong Sedone, other, Communists were
launching strong attacks farther south against gov-
ernment defensive positions just 15 miles from
Pakse. Elements of one North Vietnamese regiment
kept up these attacks throughout the summer, suc-
cessfully tying down government troops east of that
important southern town. The combined pressure in
the Khong Sedone and Paksr~ sectors prevented the
government from organizing any sizable offensive
operations in the south until mid-October. In
early November eight irregular battalions managed
to occupy Saravane--a provincial. capital north of
the Bolovens Plateau--while other government units
moved into the village of Ban Lao Ngam, which is
on an important Communist supply route. The Com-
aunists attempted to forestall this government of-
fe,7sive by once again attacking Khong Sedone and
the frontline east of Pakse, but they failed. The
North Vie Lnamese are now focusing their al.ti_ Mien
on eliminating the government presence north of the
Bolove_,s and have already reoccupied Saravane.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
SECRET
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Looka.rq n11-)ad
'rho governw,~ ;,c :'r; fa].lu.re to the l.o:;r)e:;
,;ustainoca in the previous dry season :Leave:; the Com-
nluni sts in a good military po51.Li.on. `.I.'he prospect
of an .umninent settlement in Vietnam and a cease-
fire in Laos, however, add:; political caimonsions to
the military situai:ion. An end to the fighting is
now obviously uppermost in the thoughts and actions
of both sides, and the dry season socill-s likely to
bring a series of attacks and maneuvers in a.nticipa-
tion of some form of in-place cease-fire.
In some area- this seams well under way. The
Communists staged their strongest attacks in over
a year to drive dispirited irregular battalions
back to within ton miles of the royal. capital of
Luang Prahang and have recently attacked the air-
field there with rockets. Enemy units made an un-
precedented attack on Kong Kok, southeast of Savan-
nokhot, and broke a long-standing informal. local
arrangement by attacking Thakhek, a provincial cap-
ital on the Mekong and several other positions to
the north near Route 1.3. The timing of these un-
usual attacks suggests that they were probably
aimed in part at making some limited territorial
c7.-ing7 in licrht- of i-.hn nnmrn talks now under wav in
Vientiane. At a minimum, they serve to remind the
,government: that mi 1 i 1_ -ry crn he i ncr. fared
if the negotiations remain stalled.
In the north, i-le course of future fighting
seems loss clear. 3t is not at all certain that
the North Vietnamese will mount a major attack on
Long Tieng once they have mopped up Vang Pao's
remnants near the Plaine. Any full-scale attack
on Vang Pao's defenses around Long Tieng would re-
auire a respectable buildup of new troops and sup-
plies from North Vietnam. Some troops to fill out
Central IntclUgcrlcc Btarlctln 13
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the minks; of unity; already in place have been (le-
tocted moving toward the Plr.tine, but no :;.i.gnt.iIcant
remount:, of supplies have boon shipped.
a cease-fire is arrancfed in the next sev-
eral weeks, the Communist,-.; will clearly control
more than half of Laos, morc-, territory than t','-ey
held at the time of the 1962 cease-fire. An exact
comparison betuoen 1.962 and 1.972, however, is not
possible because no effort was made ton years ago
to draw an agreed upon cease-fire line or to pin-
point troop locations.
Government and Communist negotiaf.ors in Vien-
tiane have not yet come to grips with the questions
of a cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops.
If, however, North Vietnamese forces are eventually
withdrawn and the government accedes to Communist
demands that irregular units be disbanded, the op-
posing military forces would consist of the Royal
Lao Army and the Pathet Lao. Vientiane's regular
army stands at some 48,000 men--including some
nominally "neutralist" units--while the Lao Commu-
nists have approximately 35,000 to 45,000 combat
and support troops spread throughout the country.
JV4Y -ho years 1..11Gse J.r.1-l eno s l ac, forces of ibo L1
f uV 111
sides have not been particularly aggressive or of-
fcctivc. i-:ithout foreign prodding they would prob-
ably be generally willing, if not eager, to comply
with the terms of any cease-fire. (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
17 Nov 72 Central IntdIligcncc Bulletin 14
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