CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020206-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 206
• Publication Date: September 12, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intellzence bulletin
No Foreign Difsem
DOWNEY
SHUMS n0im0i'm
FILE 9MIT
P
Do NOF
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
seem
N2 534
12 September 1972
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The CENTIIAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ,'s produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence; to meet his responsibiitties for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government official.;. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because, of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or p :tions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further :nformation and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
13, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of, its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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Warning: Sensitive Sources
and Methods Involved
Secret
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Central Intelligence
No. 02].9/72
12 September 1.972
0
ulletin
VIETNAM: Indications of Communist military plans
and negotiating position. (Page 1)
ISRAEL - ARAB STATES: Another major terrorist at-
tack may be imminent. (Page 5)
VIETNAM: Government forces press to recapture Quang
Tri City. (Page 7)
LIBYA: A funeral for terrorists killed in Munich
may spark demonstrations. (Page 8)
CHILE: Allende is trying to defuse the tense polit-
ical situation. (Page 10)
WARSAW PACT: Forces deploying for large exercise
(Page 11)
PERU: The government stiffens its terms for new
oil-ventures with foreign firms (Page 11)
SECRET
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25X1 C
25X1 C
E VIETNAM: There is additional confirmation that
the Communists are directing their cadre to prepare
for a substantial military highpoint beginning in
Septerrmber and continuing into October.
COS as instructed its subordinates to prepare
for a campaign designed, to tie down Saigon's main
forces while the Communists attempt to roll back the
pacification program in the countryside. Local
forces and main force sapper and artillery units
allegedly will conduct most of the action in Septem-
ber, hitting military installations, district towns,
and government outposts. In October, main forces
are to lead an offensive designed to "threaten urban
areas, disrupt GVN administrative functions, and de-
plete GVN military forces and supplies" so that the
allies will be "forced to negotiate a settlement on
the basis of the seven-point proposal."
Cadre have been told to be "determined to main-
tain the offensive and uprising at the present level,
and, at the same time, to build up our armed and
political forces rapidly so that we can fight for a
long time. " The iri truct.ions stress the need for
the quick recruitment in September of many new troops
for use in October. They claim that'if the allies
prove willing to reach a political settlement. that
"favors" the Communlsts, enemy forces will be used
to achieve "greater victories" during the cease-fire
period. If the allies refuse to negotiate an end to
the war prior to the US presidential election, "we
will be able to use our armed and political forces
to return 'Co a prolonged state of warfare and fight
on indefinitely until the enemy is defeated."
Communist main forces allegedly have been told
to "thrust far into the provinces around Saigon"
and "penetrate the Saigon defense line." 25X1C
by early September the enemy's Ith
and 9`th divisions had already established elements
12 Sep 72 Centre; InteUigenee Bulletin
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fin provinces adjacent to the capital. In fact, Com-
munist sapper and small-element attacks against gov-
ernment strongpoints have picked up recently north-
west of Saigon, and there are numerous indications
that the enemy is concentrating forces in Hau Nghia,
southern Tay Ninh, and southern Binh Duong provinces
for a more substantial round of assaults, perhaps
including infantry attacks on urban centers. Main
elements of the Communists' 7th and 9th divisions
appear to be maintaining the positions they held
during the previous fighting around An Loc and along
Route 13, but parts of the 7th Division, at least,
could quickly move closer to Saigon.
COSVN's i,:structions appear to correspond
rather closely with the Communists' current public
line on negotiations, which is stressing the demand
for a three-segment coalition government that pre-
sumably would leave some, if not most, of the GVN
administrative mechanism intact as one segment of
the coalition. The instructions state that a "vic-
tory" over the US means a political Settlement and
the withdrawal of American forces. It does not
"mean that the Saigon puppets cease to exist." To
deal with the remaining GVN apparatus, cadre are
urged to be in position to act "quickly and force-
fully" against GVN personnel in the event of a po-
litical settlement.
The Communists' most recent public pronounce-
ment, the statement of 11 September from the Viet
Cong's "provisional government" (PRG), contains the
usual stretches of rhetoric praising the Communist
stand and castigating Washington's position, albeit
with some new twists. At one point it asserts that
the PRG is "prepared to reach agreements to the
effect that neither a Communist regime nor a US-
sLooge regime shall be imposed can South Vietnam."
This assertion is obviously designed to rebut the
charge that the Communists are demanding outright
control in Saigon as part of a settlement. Commu-
nist spokesmen have been saying in recent weeks that
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Hanoi has no intention of imposing a Communist gov-
ernment on the South, but this is the first time the
PRG has talked in terms of a formal agreement on the
point.
The statement calls for an end to the "US mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam" in language reminiscent
of the Viet Cong's two-point "elaboration" last Feb-
ruary. It does not demand, however, that the US set
a deadline for its withdrawal. Nor is there any ex-
plicit call for President Thieu's resignation or for
the dismantling of Saigon's "oppressive machinery,"
although another section of the statement does make
it clear that the Communists still want Thieu out of
the picture before too long. Instead the statement
focuses, as other recent pronouncements have tended
to do, on the three-segment "government of national
concord" called for in both the seven-point proposal
and the two-point "elaboration." It asserts that a
settlement "must proceed from the actual situation
that there exist in South Vietnam two administra-
tions, two armies, and other political forces," and
it claims that the establishment of a "concord" griv-
ernment is "necessary" to guarantee "democratic
freedom." At one point the statement provides an
explanation--which Communist spokesmen have refused
to provide at such an authoritative level in the
past--on how such a government would be set up:
the PRG and the Saigon government (minus Thieu)
would each appoint a third of the membership, and
the other third would be appointed "through negotia-
tions," apparently among the Vietnamese parties con-
cerned.
Taken at face value, this statement appears to
be the most authoritative expression to date of Com-
munist willingness, once the allies have agreed on
the principles of a political settlement, to nego-
tiate the specific modalities with the Saigon gov-
ernment. The statement touts the virtues of the
seven points and the "elaboration," however, in a
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way that makes it clear that Hanoi is ready to re-
vert to a tougher line if necessary.
In sum, the overall message of the COSVN in-
structions is that the Communists are planning to
commit substantial elements of both their main and
local forces to another offensive burst in the hope
of forcing major concessions from the allies. The
PRG statement, meanwhile, suggests that they may be
prepared to abandon some of their detailed demands
on the exact shape of a political settlement in re-
turn for agreement on the principle of a three-seg-
ment coalition that would bring them formally, if
perhaps loosely, into the central power structure.
At the same time, they appear to be carefully pre-
serving their options for continuing the war along
present lines if they fail to farce a sett.Lement.
They do not appear to be preparing for one last,
all-out assault after which they would. simply accept
the best terms available. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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ISRAEL - ARAB STATES: Another spectacular
Arab guerrilla incident may be imminent.
1 25X1 C
There have been other indications that the
guerrillas, elated with the outcome of the Munich
affair, intend to keep up the pressure on Israel
and to focus international attention on the Pales-
tinian question. A member of the Israeli Embassy
in Brussels was entrapped and seriously wounded
on 10 September by an Arab identifying himself
as a Moroccan. national. In Israel, guerrilla:
fired at an ?sraeli patrol near Hebron on the
West Bank of Jordan. Ther were no casualties.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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/E T NAM / rv.vu.;r.v: rrn
Bastogn
19
k
P
iku
Thanh An
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E VIETNAM: South Vietnamese forces are pressing
their effort to recapture Quang Tri City despite
determined enemy resistance. Ranger and airborne
.anits have been fighting around the clock against
Communist forces to the north and south of the town,
and a Forward marine unit reportedly has entered
the citadel. Casualties on both sides have been
heavy.
South Vietnamese lst Division elements are
also attacking southwest of Fire Support Base Bas-
togne in Thua Thien Province and are encountering
stiff opposition. Action remained light in the
southern three provinces of Military Region 1.
Most of the fighting was concentrated around the
district capital of Tien ??huoc in Quang Tin Prov-
ince, where enemy forces still hold the town against
government units trying to retake it.
Recent indications that the enemy's 52nd Regi-
ment has moved from the highlands to Quang Ngai
Province suggest that the Communists may soon raise
the level of fighting in this area. Quang Ngai
so far has escaped heavy attack, but with the enemy's
2nd Division already in the province the addition
of the 52nd could mean that the Communists plan to
expand their coastal battlefront to include all
of the central provinces.'
The hea,,,iest enemy attacks elsewhere occurred
in P1.eiku Province, where units from the enemy's
320th Division continued to harass government pa-
trols in the Thanh An area and to hit truck convoys
along Route 19 northeast of the town. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM) 3
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LIBYA: A'funeral this week in Tripoli for
the five fedayeen killed in Munich may provoke anti-
German demonstrations.
According to the Libyan press, several wealthy
Libyan businessmen have received custody of the
bodies and intend to stage a large public burial.
Although the Libyan Government is not publicly in-
volved, protocol officers %.re reportedly assisting
the delegation of private citizens sponsoring the
services. The West German diplomatic mission has
tightened its security in anticipation of a mob
attack on its chancery similar to the violent as-
sault on the British Embassy last month. US offi-
cials in TripoJi feel that the stage is set for
serious demonstrations, and they fear that other
Western embassies may also be targets for angry
Libyan protesters.
The Libyan media and some government officials
have bitterly denounced West Germany in the wake
of the event in Munich. President Qadhafi, however,
who reportedly issued a strong reprimand to lead-
ers of the attack on the British Embassy, has re-
mained silent. Nevertheless, the Libyan leader is
deeply committed to the Palestinian cause, and he
could encourage excesses by going beyond a cere-
monial tribute to the fallen fedayeen commandos.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN .DISSEM)
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CHILE: President Allende is again making
overtures toward the opposition to defuse the tense
political situation.
Allende, who has watched the buildup of vio-
lence with growing concern, on 10 September pub-
licly invited the Christian Democrats to resume a
dialogue with him "to avoid armed confrontation."
In addition, the government has authorized a major
demonstration on 14 September by opposition parties.
Both moves appear calculated to exploit divisions
between opposition elements who still favor politi-
cal solutions and those who would provoke violence
in the hope of a showdown that would bring down
the government.
In his remarks, on 10 September, Allende again
denounced e-:tremists on both the left and right.
He had particularly harsh words for the violence-
prone ultras in his own Socialist Party (PS), whom
he labeled "traitors twice over."
In a possibly related development, there are
conflicting press reports that PS Secretary-General
Carlos Altamirano has resigned. His advocacy of
the extremist approach is particularly galling to
Allende and his resignation, if confirmed, would
remove one serious obstacle to Allende's efforts
to restore political calm. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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NOTES
WARSAW PACT: Shield-72, this year's major
Warsaw Pact exercise, will be held in Czechoslo-
vakia this week. According to an official Czech
announcement, the commander in chief of the Warsaw
Pact, Marshal Yakubovskiy, and the Pact chief of
staff, General Shtemenko, as well as military dele-
gations from all Pack countries and Mongolia arrived
in Czechoslovakia in the last two days to attp.nd
the exercise. Combat troops from Czechoslovakia,
Poland, East Germany,. Hungary, and the Soviet Central
Group of Forces are involved, with Romania and Bul-
garia limiting their participation to staff elements.
Judging from past exercises, the SYiield-72 scenario
will be a NATO attack into Czechoslovakia from West
Germany and Austria followed by a successful coun-
terattack by defending Pact forces. (SECRET)
PERU: Bolstered by favorable results from
preliminary drilling at its own test wells, the
State Petroleum Company--Petroperu--is stiffening
its terms somewhat for new joint venture contracts.
Peruvian Sun Oil Company, one of 13 foreign firms
that will be developing tracts in the northeastern
jungle region, will be required to lend Peru 4,000
barrels per day of crude oil over a two-year pe-
riod. A number of other companies preparing to
sign contracts for remaining tracts may be forced
to grant the government one-time cash loans of up
to $8 million. In addition, Petroperu will now de-
mand 54 percent of total production from the oil
fields, compared with 50 percent in contracts con-
cluded earlier. Foreign investors are unlikely to
be deterred by these modifications in the rules,
because Peru's terms still compare very favorably
with those offered by other oil-producing countries.
(CONF IDENT IAL )
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