CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020179-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 22, 2002
Sequence Number:
179
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 10, 1972
Content Type:
BULL
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CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020179-1.pdf | 391.79 KB |
Body:
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Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R0008000Y0"1c9-0
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
1
C I A
DOWMENT Secret
SERVICES BRANCH [ALE C
OPY N2 548
10 August 1972
AoaeNOleleL1E%TRD3Y CIA-R DP85T00875R000800020179-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/(S P85T00875R000800020179-1
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced i-? : onsultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
merit of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views wh.t!h are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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44 .9 S , I P6EbT0( 37
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No. 0191/72
10 August 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X6
USSR: The leadership is concerned over this year's
grain crop. (Page 3)
THE NETHERLANDS: A minority government is formed.
(Page
UGANDA: Tribal unrest in the army threatens the
government. (Page 5)
IRAQ: Kurdish nationalists believe the truce with
tFe-government may break down. (Page 6)
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BOLIVIA: Compensation for nationalized mine (Page 7)
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SECRET
USSR: The Central Committee conference on 8
August on the harvest reflects the leadership's
concern that this year's grain crop will fail to
meet both domestic and foreign requirements.
The conference, addressed by Brezhnev, report-
edly discussed the progress of the harvest, procure-
ment of agricultural products, a speedup in land
reclamation work, and the development of the mixed
feed industry. Members of the Politburo, party
secretariat, and Council of. Ministers, as well as
officials of the Central Committee apparatus and
editors of central newspapers, attended. Brezhnev's
speech was not published.
The gathering of such an array of senior offi-
cials at the height of the vacation season indicates
unusual concern over this year's harvest. It is es-
timated to be nine to ten percent less than the har-
vests of 1970 and 1971, largely because of Severe
winter weather and summer drought. Such a harvest
would be a decided setback to Brezhnev's livestock
program that is designed to improve the Soviet diet.
This program requires a grain harvest substantially
higher than in the last two years. Moreover, the
requirements of the livestock program are believed
to have already drawn down reserve stocks of wheat
to the level considered vital as a strategic reserve.
As a result of the disappointing harvest pros-
pects, the Soviets are buying large amounts of for-
eign grain, mainly wheat, for delivery during the
next year. Purchases from the US, Canada, and
France should enable the Soviets to divert more of
their domestic grain to the livestock sector, ful-
fill most of their grain export commitments, and
guarantee enough wheat of milling quality for their
flour industry. (CONFIDENTIAL)
10 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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THE NETHERLANDS: The Liberal and three con-
fessional parties have agreed to form a minority
government under Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel,
but a return to political stability must await the
outcome of elections in November.
Formateur Biesheuvel managed to organize a
four-party government on 8 August, three weeks after
the defection of a fifth partner brought down his
original majority coalition. The new cabinet will
be supported shakily by some 74 of the 150 members
of the lower house, but it may be able to count on
a few additional votes from right-wing splinter
groups.
Hard bargaining attended formation of the new
coalition. The Liberals reluctantly dropped their
call for government intervention by 1 November,
failing a voluntary agreement on wage and price
restraint. The three religious parties, despite
their poor showing in recent polls, acceded to
elections in November, rather than early 1973.
Between now and the elections, Biesheuvel will
attempt to push his 1973 budget through parliament
and to reach an agreement cn wage and price policy
for next year. His prospects for success are not
good. On such issues as control of inflation and
defense spending, the national interest is likely
to be subordinated to intense maneuvering by all
parties for electoral advantage. (CONFIDENTIAL)
10 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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UGANDA: Growing tribal unrest in the army
poses a threat to President Amin Is government.
25X1 C
I Ia dispute
in the army between Amin 's Ka wa tribe and other
tribes from his home district of West Nile has al-
ready resulted in several deaths and could easily
precipitate large-scale violence. Officers from
the disaffected tribes resent the growing dominance
in the army of the relatively small Kakwa tribe.
They reportedly hope to enlist the support of other
tribes in a move against Amin. Since Amin seized
power in January 1971, he has more than doubled the
number of Kakwa officers and enlisted men, making
the tribe the second largest in the army. He also
has stationed his fellow tribesmen in key units and
installations.
Under Amin the traditionally unruly army has
become more seriously troubled by tribal, ethnic,
and religious rivalries that have caused bloody
clashes. Large numbers of experienced officers and
non-commissioned officers have been killed or have
fled the country, thereby further weakening disci-
pline. Amin has exercised little control over the
army; his erratic exercise of power has in fact
heightened tensions.
Nonetheless, as long as Amin retains the sup-
port of the key units that were responsible for his
successful coup, he probably will be able to hold
on to power. These units are made up largely of
Amin's fellow tribesmen. However, should they also
suffer from tribal unrest or slip from his grasp,
Amin would have great difficulty retaining control
of the country. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
10 Aug 72
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IRAQ: Kurdish nationalists are concerned that
a two-year-old truce with the Baghdad government
might break down.
A Kurdish nationalist who recently met with
rebel leader Mulla Mustapha Barzani has told a US
Embassy officer in Tehran that relations between
Barzani and Iraqi strongman Saddam Tikriti are be-
yond repair. There have been few armed incidents
between the regime's forces and the rebels since the
peace accord was signed in March 1970, but mutual
distrust and plotting have continued unabated.
Barzani has spurned Baghdad's attempts to
bring the Kurds into a "national coalition," despite
repeated Soviet pressures on the Kurdish leader to
come to some accommodation with the government..
Barzani's reluctance has been reinforced by two at-
tempts on his life by government agents. Barzani,
for his part, is actively plotting against the re-
gime, but he represents no real threat without sub-
stantial foreign support.
At the moment, concerted action by either side
does not appear imminent. The remoteness of a real
political solution, however, is endangering the
shaky truce. (CONFIDENTIAL)
10 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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NOTES
25X1 D
BOLIVIA: Continuing its efforts to attract
foreign investment, the Banzer government apparently
has decided to compensate investors in the Mina
Matilde Corporation at a level that they probably
will find acceptable. La Paz plans to offer $13.4
million to US Steel and Philipps Brothers for the
zinc mine nationalized in 1971 by the previous
Torres administration. The US Government has agreed
to encourage the investors to accept this proposal
before the next negotiating session scheduled for
later this month. The payment is to be made in
cash, with the US Government helping to arrange
financing for $11.4 million. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
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