CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

$(proved For Release 2005106/09 `. CIA-I~DP85TOQ$75R000$90020094-5:.
{{ ,.
{ ji,i~ ~'if ~~'j.~ {~. >~.~'f Fit"t /;
~"
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R00080 PIN
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLJ.G'ENCE
Central Inteiiience
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Boa
ENV SERVICES
ulletin
sawat
N? 562
28 April 1972
Approve
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09,.: CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
I'hc CENTRAL INTELIJCI?NCE' 13ULLETIN is produc' 'l by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
currclit intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the Picsideut,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with toe Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of Primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and prelimit ry views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Titlc
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
E, dulled from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Seca"e
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
 Approved For Release 2005/06/8 .4m tP85T00875R000800020094-5
Central Inteilikence
No. 0102/72
28 April 1972
U
~lletin
25X6
SOUTH VIETNAM: Renewed attacks on outer defenses
of Quang Tri City. Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Government's problem with students in-
tensi es. (Page 4)
CHINA: Decision to curtail May Day celebrations
re e,ts instability in leadership. (Page 5)
CHINA-MALTA: Peking extends interest-free loan.
(Page 7)
NATO: Allies will seek to narrow differences on
detente issues. (Page 8)
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: Prospects improve for free
trade agreement with EFTA countries. (Page 9)
USSR-CUBA: Status of Soviet naval units (Page 10)
PERU-ROMANIA: Joint company to develop copper
Page 10)
Approved For Release 2005/06U(f&-P85T00875R000800020094-5
 .-
Approved For Release 2005/084c R TTDP85T00875R000800020094-5
THAILAND
n,r,r,
srr,
South
t rr
tCHAU 1 ~I nN\/UON )'i ?'nVU)O(;` .1
_ 1 f~'l/t)or: ~\ \} Uri ,: ))r r - TUV
Approved For Release 2005/O i jRI.E-'1FDP85T00875R000800020094-5
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
SECRET
LQ SOUTH VIETNAM: North Vietnamese infantry,
supported by tanks and artillery, have returned to
the attack against the outer defenses of Quang Tri
City.
Enemy ground attacks were preceded during the
night of 26-27 April by extensive shellings by
130--mm. guns and 122-mm. rockets. By midnight on
tho 27th, North Vietnamese forces were pressing
hard against positions of the South Vietnamese 3rd
Division southwest of the city. Enemy units were
mounting supporting assaults north and south of the
main drive, and intense artillery fire was being
directed against the city and the La Vang combat
bases. Government defenders had been pushed back
to within two miles of the city.
The extensive Communist build-up before the
new assaults and the strong artillery support being
given to North Vietnamese infantry units suggest
that the fighting may be heavy and sustained. It
has been three and a half weeks since the North
Vietnamese were stalled at Dong Ha in their drive
south, a suitable interval for regrouping between
major drives. Early on the 28th, tank-led North
Vietnamese units forced government defenders to
withdraw from Dong Ha and the Cua Viet River de-
fense line. ARVN forces are now attempting to es-
tablish a new defense line several kilometers south-
east of Dong Ha.
Flying weather remains poor in the Quang Tri
area. Virtually all of the enemy's major drives
during the current offensive have been timed to
coincide with poor local weathe. conditions. This
was true of the original thrust across the DMZ, the
drive down toward An Loc. and the most recent as-
sault in Kontum Province. It appears that the
enemy may be deliberately holding up attacks, even
after forces are in place and the battlefield is
prepared, in order to wait for bad weather and th
protection it affords from allied air attacks.
(continued)
28 Apr 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CI ARDP85T00875R000800020094-5
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
SECRET
In the highlands, enemy progress down Route
14 toward Kontum City remains slowed by the de-
struction of a key bridge, and the government's
newly organized defenses at Vo Dinh have not yet
been tested. The badly mauled 42nd ARVN Regiment
is being refitted in Kontum City, and the 47th has
been flown to Pleiku Province where it will re-
group. On the eastern edge of the highlands, South
Korean troops have managed to reopen Route 19
through An Khe Pass, which had been closed by the
Communists for 15 days. The first supply convoy
moved through the pass toward the highlands on
27 April. If the pass can be kept open for a few
days, it may be possible to relieve some of the
shortages that have been developing in Kontum as
a result of the enemy's systematic interdiction
of the main roads leading into that province.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 2
28 Apr 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 20051
{ADP85T00875R000800020094-5
gftf
 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
 Approved For Release 2005/06/059~CIQ-p85T00875R000800020094-5
CAMBODIA: The confrontation between the gov-
ernment and students in Phnom Penh has intensified
as a result of a shooting incident yesterday at the
city's law school.
Twenty students were wounded, three of them
seriously, when military police fired on a group
trying to join student agitator Koy Pech, who is
barricaded in the law school with some supporters.
This is the first time blood has been shed in an
encounter between Cambodian demonstrators and the
Lon Nol regime.
Large numbers of defiant students have con-
gregated at Phnom Penh's Independence Monument and
have refused to disperse until the government agrees
to talk to their leaders. The government thus far
has not responded to this demand. Instead, it has
set up additional barricades, reinforced military.
police with regular troops, and ordered the evacua-
tion of the law school. It has made no effort, how-
ever, to disperse the crowd at the monument or to
ban further demonstrations. In addition, military
police controlling the crowd at the monument evi-
dently are under orders to avoid incidents and the
use of riot gas and weapons.
Lon Nol jvidently is still trying hard to
cope with the disturbances with a minimum of force.
His apparent hope that the government could outwait
the students holed up in the law school may be
fading, although he probably is still reluctant
to force the issue. by storming the building--es-
pecially since some students tiere have weapons.
Lon Nol may find it difficult to vacillate much
longer, with the referendum on the new constitu-
tion, the original object of the students' un-
happiness: only two days away. It is possible
that he will opt for a short-term expedient that
might involve opening direct talks with the stu-
dents and postponing the referendum until some
compromise is found. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
28 Apr 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2005/06/b il'. t'EP85T00875R000800020094-5
 Approved For Release 2005/OyRl'DP85T00875R000800020094-5
CHINA: Peking's decision to curtail its May
Day celebrations attests to persistent instability
within the ruling elite.
A foreign press service in Peking, attributing
its information to diplomatic observers there, has
reported that, Chinese officials are saying that the
traditional mammoth May Day fireworks display has
been canceled for "economy reasons." The unprece-
dented cancellation of this event probably is de-
signed to avoid the necessity for a top leadership
turnout; Mao Tse-tung, for example, has not missed
the May Day celebrations since 1966. The last oc-
casion requiring a major leadership show, the Na-
tional Day rally last October, also was called off,
allegeuly as an economy measure. That rally was
canceled because of the Lin Piao affair. Although
an upheavel of similar magnitude may be under way
now, curtailment of the May Day festivities is prob-
ably also due to some major internal political de-
velopments.
The most obvious explanation for avoiding a
leadership show is to conceal the political decline
of one or more of the ruling politburo members.
All of the active politburo figures, however, have
been making regular public appearances in recent
weeks with the exception of Mao, who last appeared
when President Nixon visited Peking. But prolonged
absences from public view have been so much a part
of Mao's leadership style that neither the state of
his health nor the political temperature in Peking
can be accurately gauged by his pattern of appear-
ances. Or. the other hand, the continued public
activity of the remaining members of the ~1ite is
no guarantee that they are not engaged in intense
maneuvering behind the scenes. The problem of
sorting out a new power configuration in the wake
of the Lin Piao affair doubtless continues to roil
the waters in Peking, and it is possible that there
will be other high political victims as the search
for a more durable leadership coalition goes on.
(continued)
28 Apr 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020094-5
 Approved For Release 2005/06/0Eloft85T00875R000800020094-5
Another possible indicator of fresh political
tensions is the circulation among party cadre of
yet another document denouncing Lin Piao and the
top military leaders purged with him. The document
describes a plan--the "571 Project"--purportedly
drawn up by the Lin forces in preparation for an
armed coup against Mao. The document is a curious
one remaining some particularly scurrilous attacks
on Mao and identifying Lin as a proponent of some
pr