CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020071-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: March 28, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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No Foreign Di sem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence
hi
ulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
N? 5P2
28 March 1972.
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced b^ the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligerr?c bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from outoma?Sc
downgrading and
declassificalion
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No. 0075/72
28 March, 1972
Central Intelligence bulletin
25X6
USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: Soviet deputy defense minis-
ter concludes visit. (Page 1)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Prisoner issue lessens prospects
for early negotiations. (Page 2)
USSR-EC: Confirmation of new Soviet policy toward
EC. (Page 3)
BANGLADESH: Mujib announces nationalization meas-
ures. (Page 5)
POLAND: Parliament will select new president.
Page 6)
EL SALVADOR: Government may press reforms follow-
ing abortive coup. (Page 7)
CONGO: President Ngouabi commutes rebels' death
sentences. (Page 8)
ITALY-USSR: State-owned bank will finance equip-
ment for Soviet truck plant. (Page 9)
KUWAIT: Government imposes oil production quotas.
(Page 10)
CHILE: Plan for antigovernment demonstration
(Page 11)
TURKEY: British hostages (Page 11)
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USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: soviet Deputy Defense
Minister Batitskiy has concluded a ten-day visit
to North Vietnam, where he presumably inspected
improvements in Hanoi's air defenses and discussed
additional Soviet assistance.
Marshal Batitskiy, who was in Hanoi from 17-27
March,, was accompanied by several air defense spe-
cialists. Last year, Hanoi undertook significant
improvements in its air defense network and received
equipment for ten new SA-2 battalions from the USSR.
This equipment, the largest Soviet increment to
North Vietnam's air defense forces since 1967, ac-
counted for $45 million of the estimated $100 mil-
lion in military aid that Moscow provided Hanoi
last year. While Batitskiy was probably interested
in examining Hanoi's performance with this equip-
ment, the composition of the delegation suggests
that the Soviets took a hard look at all aspects of
North Vietnam's air defense system.
Moscow's desire to exploit Hanoi's obvious dis-
comfort over the Sino-US rapprochement may prompt
the Soviets to be more receptive to North Vietnamese
requests for additional military hardware, partic-
ularly if the survey revealed weaknesses new equip-
ment could overcome. The North Vietnamese could
also use Soviet assistance in improving air defense
tactics. The North Vietnamese had high praise for
the work of Batitskiy's delegation, although they
made no mention of the deputy defense minister's
presence in Hanoi until the last day of his visit.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
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INDIA-PAKISTAN: The prisoner-of-war issue may
have lessened the chances for early negotiations be-
tween the two countries.
Over the weekend, President Bhutto publicly
accused India of failing to live up to its obliga-
tions to the 94,000 military and civilian prisoners
it has held since the end of the war last December.
He made the same accusation to the US charge in
Islamabad, and the Pakistani ambassador repeated
it in Washington. Bhutto denounced the "brutal
killing" of prisoners. There have been two recent
incidents in which guards have killed prisoners
allegedly trying to escape. Bhutto also accused
the Indians of trying to exploit ethnic differences
among prisoners and said he would not "allow" Dacca
to go through with the plan to try some 1,500 pris-
oners for war crimes.
The Pakistani president publicly stated that
should New Delhi release prisoners to Dacca for war
crimes trials, Indo-Pakistani relations would reach
"the point of no return." Bhutto said that he still
wants talks with India, but he warned that "I will
not be blackmailed and browbeaten, and I will not
be humiliated."
India has acquiesced in war crimes trials but
is not committed to a timetable for turning over
the prisoners to Dacca and maintains that the trials
should conform to recognized legal processes. New
Delhi may be growing more skeptical about the pos-
sibility of fruitful negotiations in view of the
POW issue. The Indians recently informed Islamabad
of their preference for a low-level preparatory
meeting prior to a heads-of-government meeting.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
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USSR-EC: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has
confirmed that Brezhnev's overture to the Community
on 20 March marked a significant departure in So-
viet policy toward the EC, but amplification will
depend on developments elsewhere, especially in 25X1X
Germany.
the timing of Brezh-
nev s announcement probably was determined by a
wish to strengthen Chancellor Brandt's hand in the
Bundestag ratification debate. The Christian Demo-
cratic opposition has used Soviet unwillingness to
recognize the EC as one of its arguments against
ratification.
Brezhnev's formulation on the EC was deliber-
ately vague, as has been the case in his other de-
tente initiativ*.s. Refinement of the Soviet posi-
tion normally would be left to negotiation, but
Brezhnev may be tempted to be more explicit if he
feels it would increase the likelihood of ratifica-
tion.
Wh;.le the uncertain outlook in the Bundestag
may have helped determine the form and timing of
Brezhnev's statement, the possibility that, begin-
ning next year, East European trade with EC members
will have to take place through the Community and
not bilaterally, made necessary a reassessment of
the Soviet stance toward the Common Market, regard-
less of the outcome of the German debate. The So-
viets, moreover, want to forestall further inde-
pendent East European approaches to the EC and to
offset the recent signs of Chinese interest in the
EC.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Ply a demand for Common Market recoanition of CEMA
There is concern that Brezhnev's formula could im-
Community circles, while accepting Brezhnev's
speech as a turning point, have reacted cautiously.
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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25X1X
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BANGLADESH: Prime Minister Mujib Rahman has
announced an expanded government role in the non-
agricultural sector of the economy.
All banks and insurance companies, jute, cotton
te:::tile, and sugar mills, most of which are owned
by Pakistanis, have been nationalized. Mujib em-
phasized, however, that branches of other foreign-
owned banks and insurance companies are not affected.
In addition, the government has taken over all aban-
doned and absentee-owner's property worth more than
$200,000, as well as large portions of the foreign
trade apparatus and the internal water transport
system.
Mujib made no mention of any compensation to
owners of affected firms. Even if compensation is
paid to some owners, it is unlikely that Pakistanis
will receive anything.
Although certain jute, cotton textile, and tea
firms were nationalized soon after the Indo-Pakistani
war last December, the latest announcement extends
government ownership to almost all the country's
major industries. These take-overs are in line
with Mujib's promises during the election campaign
of late 1970. The agricultural sector remains in
private hands, but a ceiling of about 33 acres was
set on family land holdings.
Extension of government control to include at
least part of the shipping network may help speed
the distribution of imported foodgrains. Apparently
in an effort to reassure the populace in the face
of rising ric prices, Mujib announced that two
million tons of foodgrains are expected to arrive
from abrcad by the end of the year, (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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POLAND: The recently elected Sejm (parliament)
that convenes today will select a replacement for
President Josef Cyrankiewicz.
Cyrankiewicz was not re-elected to the Sejm,
a requirement for this position. The present min-
ister of education, Henryk Jablonski, 62, is vir-
tually certain to get the post. Two of the four
vice chairmen of the council must be replaced.
Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz is likely to be
reappointed, and except for a replacement for Ja-
blonski and a new minister of health, no major
cabinet changes seem likely.
The elections on 19 March were held a year
early to provide party boss Gierek with a govern-
mental mandate to go along with changes made in the
party since his take-over in December 1970. Two
thirds of the candidates on the approved list were
not members of the last Sejm, indicating Gierek's
efforts to put his personal stamp on the legisla-
ture.
Over 97 percent of the electorate went to the
polls and a sizable number exercised the option of
crossing out the names of candidates they did not
like. Thus, while Gierek received a 99.8-percent
vote in his district, some full members of the
politburo stood as low as 96 percent and near the
bottom of those selected by their constituencies.
Some of the provincial party bosses, especially in
Warsaw and the Baltic region where the rioting
started in 3.970, fared more poorly even thous l- all
were re-elected.
Nevertheless, the outcome represents an en-
dorsement for Gierek's regime; the outcome that he
sought and expected. Fifty thousand fewer voters
than did so in 1969 indicated disapproval of the
whole National Unity Front by crossing out all of
the names on the ballot. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intel';gence Bulletin
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EL SALVADOR: The Sanchez government may use
its remaining in office to push through ad-
ditional economic and social reforms in an effort
to regain public confidence, especially needed since
the coup attempt last weekend.
The administration appears to be developing
what the US Embassy describes as a "carrot and stick
strategy." The "stick" has been much in evidence
lately, with President Sanchez stating clearly that
he would not tolerate political dissent that .results
in public disorders. Two violent deaths last week,
widely attributed to the National Guard, are viewed
by many as object lessons to others who might get
out of line. The fate of those responsible for Sat-
urday's coup attempt is not yet known. The consti-
tution permits the death penalty for such actions,
but a less severe punishment is more likely.
The "carrot" appeared last week when legisla-
tion was enacted limiting the amount of rent land-
owners may charge campesinos for farm land. Addi-
tional legislation may include the long-awaited
agrarian reform law and provision for unionization
of rural workers. These two items have been opposed
strongly by cc?iservative elements, but many had be-
gun to realize, even before the abortive rebellion,
that the pace of reform would have to be stepped up.
This trend may well continue into the next ad-
ministration. President-elect Moline, appears to be
in accord iith Sanchez' firm hand in matters of pub-
lic order, but he has been characterized by some who
know him as more reform-minded on economic and so-
cial matters than either of his two predecessors.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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25X1X4
CONGO: President I!gouabi has defied his power-
ful army chief by commuting the death sentences
handed down by a Brazzaville military tribunal to
13 prisoners involved in the coup attempt last month.
Ngouabi has been publicly committed since early
March not to execute any of the approximately 150
persons arrested for involvement in the take-over
attempt on 22 February by regime extremists. His
assurances--in Brazzaville and also during a visit
to Paris--were prompted by allegations in some
French newspapers of a massive post-coup repression
in the Congo, including the torture and killing of
prisoners. The Soviets may also have brought pres-
sure on Ngouabi, at least indirectly, to spare the
plotters.
Important elements of the Congolese- Army have
been pushing for the execution of the coup leaders.
The chief proponent of this hard line is army Chief
of Staff Yhombi-Opango, who was a major target of
the plotters, and who was la ly responsible for
thwarting the c~,un at-
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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25X1X4
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ITALY-USSR: A state-owned Italian bank has ex-
tended a line of credit for $129 million to finance
the supply of Italian machinery and equipment for the
Kama truck plant in the USSR.
Italy's participation in the Kama project will
be small compared with its earlier role in building
a passenger car plant a?L Tol'yatti, which required
credits of abcut $400 million. France also has of-
fered credits of $216 million for assistance at the
Kama undertaking.
Thnn,s far, the Italian firm, Fiat, is not in-
volved in the project, although the firm had dis-
cussed the possibility of aci:: ng as principal coor-
linator in building and equipping the plant. Fiat
officials publicly said that the firm did not have
the capacity to handle the Kama project;
they noted that their experience at Tol'ya??i m e
them wary of further involvement with the Soviets.
A high Fiat official said recently, however, that
the firm is now interested in more limited partic-
ipation.
The Italians are hopeful the new credit will
boost their lagging exports to the USSR. Orders
generated by the 1966 agreement with Fiat, for ex-
ample, increased Italian exports to the point that
Rome had a substantial surplus in its trade with the
USSR during .1.969-70 instead of the usual deficit.
In 1971, however, Italian exports to the USSR de-
clined while imports continued to rise, resulting
in Italy's first trade deficit with the USSR since
1968. (CONFIDENTIAL)
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X6
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KUWAIT: The government has imposed oil pro-
duction quotas in an apparent move to forestall de-
bate on conservation measures proposed by opposi-
tion members in the Assembly.
1uwait has orally instructed British Petroleum
and Gulf Oil Company, the owners of the Ktawait Oil
Company, to hold oil production this year at or be-
low the level in 1971. Production thus far has been
about 20 percent above the average for 1971, but the
companies expected the total for 1972 to be only
about six percent higher than last year.
Similar unilateral moves by Libya and Vene-
zuela to establish quotas have not yet jeopardized
the supply of oil to consumers. Increased produc-
tion from other sources, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Nigeria, will continue to satisfy expected
growth in oil demand. The actions to limit produc-
tion, however, demonstrate the ability of the oil
producing countries to exert control over their oil
resources. This impairs the flexibility of the com-
panies in taking advantage of such factors as sea-
sonal. shifts in demand and changes in chipping rates.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
28 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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NOTES
CHILE: A demonstration against the Allende
government, now set for tonight,will probably lack
broad support from opposition elements. The inept-
ness of rightists and military officers who appar-
ently planned a coup last weekend has made other
opponents wary of implied association with the dis-
credited groups. The government's accusation that
leaders of the far rightist Fatherland and Freedom
Movement intended to use a women's march on 24 March
to set off a coup will further curtail the Movement's
usefulness as an opposition collaborator. Even the
conservative National Party had been reluctant to
support the women's march. The Christian Democrats,
who organized a successful march last December, are
continuing negotiations with Allende and are un-
likely to participate. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
TURKEY: The three British radar technicians
kidnaped Sunday near the Black Sea coast town of
Samsun almost certainly were taken as hostages for
the three terrorists who have been sentenced to
death. A Constitutional Court ruling on a final
appeal of the death sentences is pending and, if
denied, the executions of the terrorists is likely
to follow soon thereafter. One of the kidnapers
has been tentatively identified as Cihan Alptekin,
a leftist terrorist accused of involvement in the
kidnap-murder of an Israeli diplomat in Istanbul
last May. Alptekin and four other terrorists es-
caped from a military prison in Istanbul last Novem-
ber. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(continued)
Central Intelligetwe Bulletin 11
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