CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: November 18, 1971
• Content Type: BULL

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 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R0008000 t
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Cciitral Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 544
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0008000'6L9uVember 1971
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4
Secret
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No. 0216/71
18 N'vomb'r 1471
Gmtral intelligence Builethi
THAILAND: Military's reassertion of full power will.
have-no si Ini fl cant of I:ect on Thai polio, . (Paste 1)
INI).IA-PAKISTAN : Mrs. Gandhi apparently plauv, to con-
tinue~ present-pressure tactics for the time being.
(Page 3)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Army plans pre-emptive strikes in
central provinces. (Page 5)
COMMUNIS'E' CHINA: Pol'.ti.cal role of armed forces be-
mnc downplayed-since Lin Pico's fall. (Page 6)
USSR: Soviet leaders are log, ing .interest in economic
rclnr.ms. (Page 8)
YUGOSLAVIA: New Federal Executive Council is in
trou'bT7,. -(I':Tgc 10)
C11IL.: Opposition may benefit from struggle against
government control of national university. (Page 11)
ITALY: Assessment of president:ial election prospects.
Page 13)
PORTUGAL: Caetano moves to suppress subversive ac--
t.ivi. ties. ',Page 14)
CHILE. Government moves against narcotics traffic
Tag,- 15)
TCE,JAND: Controversy over fishing rights (Page 15)
USSR: New light tank (Page 17)
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SECRET
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S1';( ;J I I'll I'
't'HA L I,ANI) : 'l'hr, reannerti.on of fu.l.1 power by the
Thai mi itar.y will have no significant
c'1 fecL on the way Thailand .i:,; governed or on the
country',; domestic or foreign pol..ici.es.
i io 11111 i t..ary announced i. L:; comple to take-over
o1.' the Government on 1.7 Novr?moer under a new "Rrv-
olutionary ParLy. The 19(;13 Con.-Ititution has 1)(2011
annulled, the cabinet. and martial law
has been declared. All minis tries will be run, at
least for the time being, by undersecretaries under
the direct leadership of the Revolutionary Party
commander, Field Marshal Tllatlom. The goverr,ment an-
nounced that there would be no immediate changes in
military or police commanders.
These events do not appear to be a direct con-
sequence of arguments within the military over sub-
stantive policies, either domestic or foreign.
There is no evidence so far that issues of direct
interest to the US figured in the considerations
that led to the government's moves.
The military has become increasingly exasper-
ated over its difficulties with opposition elements
and particularly with parliament, which was abol-
ished with the annulment of the constitution that
created it. The mi.li.tary leadership has had serious
reservations about the suitability to Thailand of
constitutional government ever since the constitu-
tion was promulgated after several years of desul-
tory drafting.
The decision to rule by military decree co-.Me;;
at a time of another flurry of restiveness among
junior officers within the military establishment
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
25X6
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i.L:;eif . of LIie coy nt-D.ution and
parl.iamunt will. be popular all. through tho military
and w.i..l.. give a :,e:n:;e of cleci;ivenec;, and direction
that has been absent at the top. It will not, how-
ever, reduce resentment among younger, officers over
their poor promotion prospect_,, cause(] by they fail-
ure of top leaders, to retire on schedule.
The chances are good that the military will
bring off its reas:;umpti.of of full power with a min-
imum of difficulty. IL seems unlikely that any
troop commanders will chailer.go the leadership, par-
ticularly ranee the inunudiatce 'cargeLs of the govern-
ment are civilian elements. 't'here will be consider-
able grumbling among the Bangkok citizenry, but any
demonstrations should be easy to contain. (CONFI-
DENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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SEC,RET
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S I';(, It l';' I'
25X1 C
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Prime Minister Gandhi appar-
ently plans o continue for the time being to rely
on pressure on President Yahya to negotiate an ac-
commodation with East Pakistan.
Mrs. Gandhi, has adopted a restrained posture
since her return from Western Europe and the US.
She told parliament she had found sympathy and ap-
preciation among Western leaders for India's posi-
tion. She indicated that she still hopes Western
countries will be able to bring Islamabad to nego-
tiate with imprisoned Bengali leader. Mujibur Rahman.
On 15 November she told a meeting of her own party's
parliamentarians that India must not act "in haste
or anger" but instead should continue to explore
all possible avenues to a solution.
Mrs. Gandhi's statements suggest that her gov-
ernment is willing to give Western pressures on
Pakistan more time to hear fruit. Islamabad is also
under growing pressure from the Mukti IIahini guer-
rillas who, with Indian support, are making in-
creased inroads in many areas of East Pakistan.
There have beer some signs that President Yahya
may at least be attempting to test West Pakistani
public attitudes toward the idea of releasinci Mujibur
Rahman. During the past two weeks the government
has allowed West Pakistani o osition groups to call
publicly for Mu;ib's release
There remain, however, serious obstacles to
any attempt by Yahya to deal with Mujib. The West
Pakistani public would probably acquiesce, but the
reaction of military leaders is likely to be mixed.
Moreover, it is unlikely that either Mujib or Yahya
could make significant concessions without seriously
jeopardizing his position of leadership. (SECRET NO
FGREIGN DISSEM)
18 Nov 71 Central lntelligenc Bulletin
25X1 C
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CONTIO[NTIAL
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"OUTII V1I TNAM: '1'lie south Vietnamese plan to
s trilce c~n~_~my bac areas in hopes of pre-empting
anticipated Commun:i t; t military operations in the
central provinces during the coming dry Season.
General rJgo Dzu, the conunander of Military
Region (MR) 2, plans to campaign initially in north-
eastern Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border.
I:c plans initial cautious probes, to be followed
by the commitment of additional forces if the situa-
tion develops satisfactorily. The Communists use
bases in Cambodia and the Vietnamese highlands to
refit ard resupply, and as staging areas for incur-
sions into Kontum and Pleiku provinces during each
winter dry season.
Dzu also plans to go after enemy bases nearer
the main population centers of MR 2 along the coast.
He would use his territorial forces as well as reg-
ular units for this purpose, and he also hopes to
persuade Korean forces in MR 2 to participate.
Dzu faces a number of operational problems in
mounting a pre-emptive offensive that would require
considerable mobility and aggressiveness by his
forces to keep the enemy off balance. Since the
withdrawal of US units from MR 2, Dzu has had to
assume responsibility for a larger area, and as a
consequence his forces nov' are spread relatively
thin. in addition, high morale, aggressiveness,
and mobility have :ot, at least until recently, been
strong points among his units or th;, South Vietnar.-
ese Army as a whole. During the past year there
have been substantial improvements in each of these
areas, and some of Dzu's units have, in fact, shown
considerable initiative in contested areas within
MR 2. As a result, they clearly are in a better
position now to carry the offensive to the enemy's
sanctuaries. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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COMMtJN.i ;;T ('I11 NA: '.I'll.. 1)olit.ica.1 role of the
armedforce:.i i .,J tir,.i net downp.ldyed in the wake of the
leadership ul>hceaval..
There h~..u3 bct!u a marked chanclu in the treatment
accoi.ded the People',, L.iberation Army (PLA) in do-
mestic prop;lrlanida since the fall of Defense Minister.
Lin Piao and other Chinese military leaders. Pre-
viously the armed forces were touted as a model for
nationwide emulation, but recent radiobr.oadcasts
have ernpha:;i.-!.e.d heavily the necessity for the mili-
tary to subordinate .itself to "collective leadership"
under the party. There also has been a correspond-
ing decline in the attention given the PLA perform-
ance in the many civil. administrative tasks it in-
herited as a result of the Cultural Revolution.
Army units have been warned a number of times to
observe strict discipl'ne and obey all orders from
the Party center.
Much of the current propaganda reflects Peking's
concern about the impact of the top-level purges on
regional military commanders--a concern undoubtedly
heightened by recognition that 1-cal military figures
have exhibited some of the same factional tendencies
that contributed to the recent ruptures in the ruling
politburo. Beyond that, however, there have been in-
dications in propaganda since at least last summer
that some in Peking have been arguing for a reduction
of the overwhelming influence of the FLA in party and
government affairs. Premier Chou En-lai publicly ha,,
indicated his concern that China had assumed somewhat
the image of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.
He his remarked privately that some of the institu-?
tional changes of the Cultural Revolution are likely
to L. only temporary. This inay imply that he fore-
sees some further reduction of military influence in
civil party and government organs.
A by-product of the recent military purges may
well be the elevation of larger numbers of civilian
party cadres to positions in the central organs of
Central InMlligOue Bulletin
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SE(1R.E'l'
the party and government. One sign of this it., the
probable trantfor to Peking of the Hunan provincial
party boss, a veteran civilian cadre. lie is the
first :major provincial figure to appear publicly in
the capital since early September, and his ranking
just below the active politburo members in a recent
leadership turnout suggest:, that he is slated for a
high post.
The process of rectifying the imbalance between
civilian and military authority, however, will take
time, and it almost ccr+.a'.oi1 will not result in a
broad purge of the prec;ont military administrators.
There is still no noticeable diminution of the mili-
tary presence in the middle and lower levels of the
central bureaucracy. The military was well repre-
sented among the large turnout of party and govern-
ment figures in Peking last week, and on 13 Novem-
ber a former army political commissar was identified
as the new head of the Ministry of Metallurgical
Industry. Ile is the sixth milit i one of the other bomb-
ings. Preliminary indications
are that these brigades are rlii -eren - from le ARA 25X1C
and resemble earlier Portuguese dissident Communist
groups with a Maoist orientation.
The government believes that the difficulty of
monitoring and rounding up such bands requires extra
police powers. By moving quickly Cactano will head
off right-wing criticism of police failure to control
these terrorist groups. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intclligenuc Bulletin
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N( 'I 1
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