CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 3, 2001
Sequence Number: 
23
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Publication Date: 
September 20, 1971
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BULL
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0C./ 0 % Cre No rorciKn Mum DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intellz~ence Bulletin tate Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Secret N2 605 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0008006iOd$3P*ember 1971 Approved For Release 2005/06/bQ9-CJDP85T00875R000800010023-4 The (;I;N'I'l1A1, IN'I'NLLI(:!?N(;E I3IILLI?'17N is produced by the Director of Central Iutelligcnce to fleet his responsibilities for providing (1i1i(nt intclli}.c'ncc+ bearing oil issues of uutional !:ccurity to the President, the National Security Council, and tither rcfior government officials. It is produced ill consultation with the Dclru'tments of Slate and l)efcuse. When, because of the time factor, adequate considtation with the dclru?t- iucnt of primary concern is not feasible, items or p lrtions thereof, tare pro- ducal by CIA and enclosed in brackets. Interpretations of intellig('1wc iriforf)atiou it, this Publication represent immediate and preliinir.,u?y views which are subject to 111oklificatioll ill ill(! light of further information and more complete' analysis. Curtain intelligence items in this publication fury be designated sl-ccifl, ally for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may he disseininatrd further, but only on a feed-to-know basis. WARNING 't'his docullwilt .?'nitains illformatimt affecting the national defei."e nl, `',1w sited States, within the meaning of Title 1.8, sections 793 and 79.1, of the US Code, as amended. Its trai,:cmissiou or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an nnauthori?!.ed person is prohibited by law. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downprading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/06 e I DP85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06` PP85T00875R000800010023-4 No. 022/71 20 September 1971 central Intelligence Bulletin 25X6 UN - MIDDLE EAST: The Securit.- Council is expected to reconvene early this week to consider Israeli ac- tions in Jerusalem. (Page 2) EGYPT: The new cabinet should not bring about rad- ical policy change. (Page 4) SOUTH VIETNAM: Agitation is growing, but the gov- ernment seems capable of controlling demonstrations. (Page 5) INDONESIA-CHINA: _`.:donesia is searching for a way to establish direct communications with Peking. (Page 7) EAST PAKISTAN: The Bengali rebels have decided not to disrupt the UN food distribution program. (Page 8) INDIA: Prime Minister Gandhi's dominance over her Ruling Congress Party is growing. (Page 9) CAMBODIA: Fuel tanks attacked (Page 10) BRAZIL: Death of guerrilla leader (Page 10) ARGENTINA: Elections scheduled (Page 11) Approved For Release 2005/06 9e PIDP85T00875R000800010023-4 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRE':I' UN - MIDDLE EAST: The Security Council is ex- pected to reconvene early this week to consider Is- raeli actions in Jerusalem, but intra-Arab agreement on a draft resolution is not yet in sight. After the second day of council debate, on Fri- day, the US Mission learned that the Arab group is reviewing two markedly differing texts. A Syrian draft would send a special. Council mission to Jeru- salem with instructions to report back within 15 days. It also cites the possible need to apply UN sanctions against Israel. The Soviets appear to be backing this approach, because in the past they have prefer- red that any mission be under the Council rather than the secretariat. The Jordanians have discarded the text worked out with the US and have drafted a new one with Egypt and Yemen (Sana). This draft does not refer to UN sanctions and calls upon the Secretary General to report within 30 days on the situation in Jeru- salem. It could well provoke a Western veto, but the Jordanians maintain it represents the "irreducible minimum" that could obtain Arab support. A critical problem for the Jordanians is the need to have a mem- ber of the Council introduce the resolution they have in mind. The only Arab state presently on the Coun- cil is Syria. There has been no clarification of Egyptia:i President Sadat's statement on Thursday that he wanted the Council to meet at she foreign minister level to consider the entire Middle East imbroglio. Presum- ably he is willing to wait for at least a few more weeks before moving fully in that direction. The Arabs are planning a full-scale Middle East debate in the General Assembly commencing in mid-November. This strategy is based on the parliamentary situation in the Assembly--priority will probably be given the Chinese representation issue--and a willingness to hold off until the Organization of African Unity 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 G1 P85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/0tiftIdP85T00875R000800010023-4 (OAU) peace mission to Middle East capitals, sched- uled for early November, has been completed. Last year wide Afzican support aided the Arabs in rolling up a 57-16 majority in the Assembly for a contentious resolution strongly opposed by the US and Israel. The Israelis hope to convince the OAU mission to support a more balanced text this fall. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0ISl,& tW85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/(1.CGIAKdP85T00875R000800010023-4 I EGYPT: The new cabinet appointed yesterday portends no radical shift in the formulation of for- eign or domestic policy. The retention of Prime Minister Fawzi, the min- isters of foreign affairs, war, and interior, and other cabinet members in politically sensitive posts emphasizes continuity with the government that was dissolved on 11 September. A number of ministries were abolished and two new ones created, in keeping with the government reorganization pledged by Presi- dent Sadat in his address to the nation last Thurs- day. One appointment which has attracted the atten- tion of political observers in Cairo is that of Muhammad Ghalib, who has served during the last t^ years as ambassador to Moscow, as minister of stc.te for foreign affairs. The authoritative Al-Ahram newspaper reported yesterday that Ghalib would have "special responsibility" in his ministerial post tor overseeing Soviet-Egyptian relations. (CONFIDEN- TIAL) 3 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0SEC-)R 85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRET 25X1 C SOUTH VIETNAM: Agitation continues to grow, but the government still seems capable of controlling protest demonstrations. The antigovernment demonstrations in Saigon over thq weekend were the most violent in more than a year. They were conducted principally by small gro':ps of radical students and were broken up by forceful po- lice action. The protests followed several weeks of scattered student disorders both in Saigon and in Hue. Presi- dent Thieu's election policy has >>een the target of most of the agitation, but the students also are raising traditional grievances against the govern- ment, such as summer military training. Although most of the groups involved in the agitation remain small and divided, their leaders probably hope that by continuing their protest campaign they can per- suade the government to accede to some of their de- mands. They also hope to improve ti,eir own positions within the student community. Vice Pres- ident y is encouraging the demonstrations. Ky met last week with radical, student leaders, who report- edly agreed with his advice that the recent fire- bombing attacks directed against Americans were coun- terproductive and that future protests should be di- rected solely against Thieu. Ky's staff is optimis- tic that veterans and other opposition political and religious groups can be persuaded to join the stu- dents in larger protest demonstrations beginning later this week. The vice president's aides hope the demonstrations will influence public and inter- national opinion against Thieu and induce the mili- tary to take some action against the President. Ky has close ties with some veterans' groups, and he apparently has gained in stature among the students, but he still faces major obstacles in attempting to unite diverse opposition groups behind his leadership. (continued) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRET The government appears to be well aware of the planned protest activities, and it probably hopes that strong police measures can break up and dis- courage demonstrations as effectively as they did during student protests last year. Nevertheless, heavy-handed tactics could create additional sympa- thy for the demonstrators. In addition, strong-arm measures such as those used over the weekend to break up a rally of opposition legislators--a more influ- ential group than the students--could backfire against the government. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : ~F,$T00875R000800010023-4 INDONESIA-CHINA: Indonesia continues to search for a way to establish direct communications with Peking. Earlier this year, Indonesia instituted indi- rect probes of Peking's attitude through Yugoslavia and Romania, and it has made other indirect ap- proaches on its own. 25X1 C Djakarta, which suspended relations with China in 1967, has been divided on the wisdom of resuming ties. The Foreign Department has favored resumption but the army, which is the dominant force in the government, has been opposed. This year, however, President Suharto and ? highly influential group of generals have moved toward a foreign policy that would balance Western financial assistance by an improvement in relations with Communist countries, including China. President Nixon's announcement in July of his intended visit to Peking presumably has had the effect of further underscoring the need for a policy shift. So far the government favors increased direct trade as the best way to begin normalization. The full resumption of relations probably will be a slow process. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSENT) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 25X1 C Approved For Release 2005/06/09 SWIR5T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/0 e -" 85T00875R000800010023-4 EAST PAKISTAN: The Bengali rebels reportedly have d iced ice ded not to disrupt the UN food distribu- tion program in East Pakistan. At meetings in Calcuttit earlier this month, guerrilla leaders concluded t1;,at the liberation movement had more to lose 'Char. to gain by sabc,,w:aging UN relief efforts during coming months when food is expected to become increasingly scarce in parts of East Pakistan. Their decision, apparently has the backing of the Bangla Desh exile government. Bangla Desh Prime Minister Ahmed recently stated that "neu- tral" relief workers would not be attacked, but added that some sort of guarantees must be given that relief supplies and vehicles would not be di- verted to the Pakistani Army. initially, some guerrilla. commanders favored interference because of their suspicion that arms and other military materiel might be transported to and within East Pakistan in' UN vessels. A con- sensus emerged, however, that it was unlikely that the UN would surreptitiously aid the army. Addi- tionally, it was agreed that by denying food to starving DengaJ_is ; the guerrillas could lose the sympathy and support of the Bengali populace. The leaders concluded that if the UN appears to adopt a policy favoring a united Pakistan, the separatists could reverse their decision and sabotage UN relief efforts. If the guerrilla threat can be reduced, it should assist the UN program, which has been slow in gaining momentum in East Pakistan because of fear for the safety for UN personnel stationed there since late August, as well as technical and bureau- cratic problems. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletir. Approved For Release 2005/06/0 , 1, R85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRT','1.' INDIA: Prime Minister Gandhi's dominance over her Rul ng Congress Party is becoming even more ap- parent. On 11 September she forced a resignation agree- ment from Brahmananda Reddi, chief minister of the southern state of Andhra Pradesh and a man whose domination of Andhra politics had marked him as one of the most powerful figures in the Ruling Congress Party. With his resignation and the earlier maneu- vered resignation of Mohan Lal Sukhadia, the long- time chief minister of the northern state of Raja- sthan, Mrs. Gandhi has struck decisive blows against old-guard party leaders with personal bases of oower. Few of the party "barons" responsible for placing her in office in 1966 remain in power positions to- day, and Mrs. Gandhi appears to have the strength to continue with a successful campaign to downgrade those who do. The recent resignations will give her a free hand to ensure that candi,_ates of her own choosing, and therefore beholden to her, are nomimated by state party organizations to represent the Ruling Congress in state electoral contests scheduled to take place by March 1972. Moreover, with the success of her recent maneuvers, ,he may have gained the necessary strength to effect a smooth reorganization of her cabinet. The New Delhi rumor mill is already dis- cussing the possibility of imminent cabinet changes. Such long-awaited changes could displace other in- dependent-minded party barons, upgrade the "progres- sive" image of her government, and make it still more responsive to her dictates. (CONFIDENTIAL) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/0~ft,CWrf DP85T00875R000800010023-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRET (A CAMBODIA: An attack by Communist sappers early to.a:zy on the Esso and Shell companies' fuel storage facilities on the northern outskirts of Phnom Penh apparently caused extensive damage. This raid marked the most significant enemy action in the capital area since the strike last January on the city's airfield. The storage tanks attacked are the only sizable pe- troleum facilities in central Cambodia. Although their destruction would cause a serious disruption to civilian consumers in the Phnom Penh area, mili- tary operations are not expected to be affected. (CONFIDENTIAL) BRAZIL: Government forces, killed renegade army captain Carlos Lamarca on 17 September after track- ing him through the interior of the state of Bahia for several weeks. The death of Lamarca, the most prominent and experienced B,:azilian guerrilla leader, is a severe blow to the nat!on's revolutionary forces. Lamarca had broken with the urban terrorist movement last March following several setbacks and apparently was trying to establish a rural guerrilla force at the time of his death. His death is likely to have a demoralizing affect on the advocates of both urban and rural guerrilla warfare, although initially a desire for vengeance could result in an upsurge of urban operations. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) (continued) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010023-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09jj , II ffF85T00875R000800010023-4 ARGENTINA: President Lanusse's announcement that national elections will be held on 25 March 1973 comes amid a notable increase in rumors of mil- itary dissension. There are also stirrings of labor discontent, and a "passive" general strike has been called for 29 September to protest the government's economic policies. Lanusse's election announcement was made nearly a month earlier than originally planned, probably in the hope of sidetracking his critics and gaining more time to devise measures to slow the high rate of inflation and to stimulate the sagging economy. The President reportedly is also in the process of moving his most loyal military supporters into key troop commands to frustrate any coup plotting. (SECRET) 20 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11 Approved For Release 2005/06/0 &&% 85T00875R000800010023-4