CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 16, 1971
• Content Type: BULL

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No 1 oreign Dir.rcn/
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
N2 605
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acre
'I'll(- (;I:N7'11A1, IN'I'1;1,1,1(;l'NCE' BULLETIN is produced by (lie
Director of Central Inntelligcnce to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intclligcncc bc,u?ing -m issues of uatioual security to the I'resiclcnt,
tlrc National Scenrity Council, and other senior gov^rnuuvnl officials, It
is produced ill consultation with (lie I)eparltneuts of State ;urd I)efc!rse.
WVben, because of, tiro shut factor, adequate consultation NV
ill] the d~part-
nu9nt of prinru?y concern is not f.;,stltle, items or portions thereof' arc pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets,
interpretations of intelligence irrforniation in this publication represent
inunecliate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and rnorc complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication iiwy be designated speeiffcally
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
inrther, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
't'his docttmcnt contains inIornuation affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the mcan:ng of Title
13, suctions 793 and 791, of the US Code, as ain.rnded.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohiliFed by las'
r 6XOUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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No. 0222/71
16 September 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
LAOS: Government forces enter Paksong. (Page 1)
JORDAN-UN: Syrian opposition to Jordan's resolution
may complicate Security Council meeting on Jerusalem.
(Pnc 2
25X6
25X6A
YUGOSLAVIA-CHIN?,: Belgrade closes Chinese exhibit
at Zagreb Fair. (Page 5)
SPAIN: Death of striking worker may lead to anti-
government demonstrations. (Page 6)
CHILE: Christian Democrats extract concessions from
Allende. (Page 7)
PERU: Government moves against enemies on both left
and right. (Page 9)
RHODESIA-ZAMBIA: Factionalism in Rhodesian exile
groups. (Page 10)
CONGO (B) - CHINA: Military aid agreement (Page 11)
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Israali warning against Syrian provo-
cations Page 11)
UN: Financial difficulties (Page 11)
HONG KONG: Textile exports to US (Page 12)
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LAOS: Bolovens Plateau Area
oSaravane
?? ~'V!nfeng
4an Lao
14 gam
F
Pnkson ,~ Ban Houoi
'ong
Bolovens
forces
o Communist held location
? Government-field location
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LAOS: Government forces have entered Paksong
town on the Bolovens Plateau.
Elements of two irregular battalions moved into
the town on 15 September. By late afternoon, they
were fighting from house to house to mop up pockets
of enemy resistance and complete the capture. A
North Vietnamese counterattack remains a real possi-
bility, however.
The irregular troops are part of a larger gov-
ernment task force that, with artillery and air sup-
port, has been pushing toward Paksong since it was
airlifted to positions three miles from the town on
11 and 12 September. If Paksong is secured, the
government's next step presumably will be to try to
link up with other government battalions that have
been trying to advance to the town along Route 23
for the past seven weeks.
Paksong, the commercial center for the Bolovens
Plateau area before its loss to the Communists in
mid-May, is an important road junction, and its cap-
ture will give Vientiane a welcome psychological
boost. (SECRET)
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JORDAN-UN: Syria's refusal to support the Jor-
danian draft resolution on Jerusalem could compli-
cate today's scheduled Security Council meeting.
Syria s opposition at the Arab foreign ministers' 25X1X
conference last weekend completely surprised the
Jordanians and the other delegations. The Syrian
foreign minister, acting under "inflexible Baath
Party instructions," denounced the draft as too
weak, as unnecessary--because he said the facts on
Jerusalem are already well known--and as smacking
of the internationalization of Jerusalem. Both the
Egyptians and the Tunisians argued against these
views, and the Syrian foreign minister agreed to
convey their opinions to Damascus. The Egyptians
have promised further demarches, and the Jordanians
have tried to enlist French and Soviet support as
well. Amman suspects that Syria is bluffing in
order to embarrass Jordan, and that although Syria
might haggle in the course of the debate, it would
not actually vote in opposition to a position
adopted by the other Arabs.
aware that if Syria remains inflexible, it will be
impossible to confine the Security Council meeting
to a brief and limited discussion of the resolution.
Nevertheless, Jordan probably believes that it has
gone too far at this point to change its course.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Jordan is probably
25X6
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YUGOSLAVIA-CHINA: Belgrade's decision tc pad-
lock the Chinese exhibit at the Zagreb Fair yester-
day was designed to avoid prejudicing TiLo's discus-
sion with President Nixon in late October.
The Yugoslav action followed US complaints about
Chinese posters carrying anti-US propaganda in 'lag-
rant violation of fair regulations guaranteeing a
nonpolemical atmosphere. For several days prior to
the padlocking, the Chinese stalled in meeting Yugo-
slav requests to remove the offensive material.
There is no explanation for the delay but Peking is
unlikely to tarnish 4_ts recent rapprochement with
Belgrade by failing to make amends. The decision
was not an easy one for the Yugoslavs, especially
as a Chinese trade delegation was visiting the fair
at the time. Belgrade hopes to avoid any sensational
press coverage that could inflate the incident. Fur-
thermore, Belgrade will now be more wary of Chinese
attempts to involve Yugoslavia in their propaganda
efforts. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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SPAIN: The death of a striking worker at the
hands of the police will provide a new rallying
point for additional antigovernment demonstrations.
The strike of construction workers in Madrid
was organized by the illegal workers' commissions
ostensibly in connection with negotiations for a
new collective bargaining contract. Actually, the
strike appears intended to demonstrate the power
of the workers' commissions to stir up labor unrest.
They chose the construction sector because of its
low pay and bad working conditions, and because of
their own strength among these workers. Nonethe-
less, the strike was not markedly successful. In
the face of extensive deployment of police and se-
curity forces, even opposition sources reported
that ten percent of some 150,000 construction workers
had walked out.
Although the directorate general of security
publicly stated that the worker was killed in a
scuffle when he resisted arrest and attempted to
disarm the police, the incident has provoked anger
among workers throughout industry. Various labor
groups are considering ways to exploit the killing
to their own tactical advantage through publicity
and protest gestures, even including further strikes.
They are likely to receive moral support from im-
portant Catholic clergymen.
The Spanish Government is acting to prevent
the incident from getting out of hand. High level
officials of the Syndicate Organization--the offi-
cial labor establishment--are meeting to deal with
the legitimate grievances of the construction workers.
Concurrently, the government reportedly is taking
precautionary security measures to prevent further
disturbances.
The timing of the incident is an embarrassment
to the government, coming as it does just as the
campaign for the elections of 29 September for the
national legislature is getting under way. Strikes
would detract from the government's efforts to pro-
ject a liberal image during the electoral period.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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CHILE: The opposition Christian Democratic
Party PDC) has reportedly extracted several con-
cessions from the Allende government.
In exchange for the PDC's agreement not to sup-
port formal impeachment proceedings brought against
the minister of economy by the conservative National
Party (PN) , Allende has reportedly agreed to four
points: peasants' seizures of farms and workers'
Psizures of industries will be stopped; PDC workers
discharged following government intervention of
textile plants will be reinstated; the government
will submit legislation to Congress clarifying which
economic sectors are to be state-controlled, which
are to remain in private hands, and which are to
be mixed; and Allende has agreed eventually to re-
move the minister of economy, but this point will
not be publicly associated with his bargain with
the PDC.
The PDC's reported decision not to support the
impeachment proceeding effectively kills the attempt.
It also exemplifies the PDC's adroitness in maintain-
ing an effective opposition while avoiding the in-
ternal party strains that would inevitably result
from a direct confrontation with the government.
Although the specific terms of Allende's concessions
are significant, of at least equal importance is the
fact that he could be obliged to make any concessions
at all to his political enemies. The coincidence of
a bleak economic outlook and a considerable realign-
ment of forces within the ruling coalition may have
thrown Allende off balance. Whether the PDC and
other smaller opposition groups will be able to
capitalize on their temporary advantage will be de-
termined in part by whether they can overcome minor
differences and form a united opposition.
The opposition may use the occasion of Chile's
National Day, on 18 September, to intensify their re-
sistance to Allende's programs, although the govern-
ment is downplaying the traditional celebration of
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the day. Because of their careful adherence to the
letter of the law, such groups as the PDC and the
PN are unlikely to support any attempt to remove Al-
lende or alter his course by force. Some junior
military officers, who are disturbed by the worsen-
Ing economic situation and by what they see as the
danger Allende poses to the Chilean Constitution,
could conceivably make such an attempt, but it would
be doomed to failure for lack of support. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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PERU: The government has charged the antiregime
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and
the "ultra left" with attempting to manipulate the
sixteen-day-old teachers' strike. Fourteen individuals
charged with counterrevolutionary agitation have been
arrested. The move came after many union locals had
accepted the government's second wage offer and au-
thorized their members to return to work.
The teachers' union has been heavily infiltrated
by the pro-Soviet Communist Party, and ".he Communist-
dominated labor confederation is actively and pub-
licly supporting the strike. While the military
regime continues to denounce "agitators" of what it
terms the extreme left and right--especially APRA,
the military's traditional enemy--the Communists
responsible for much of the nation's labor unrest
continue to enjoy an apparent immunity. (CONFIDEN-
TIAL)
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RHODESIA-ZAMBIA: Both Rhodesian nationalist
exile groups are beset by factionalism, and the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), once the
main guerrilla movement, is on the verge of dis-
integration.
For some time the Zambian Government has tried
unsuccessfully to persuade ZAPU's leaders to paper
over their differences and to come to terms with
the other Zambian-based exile group. ZAPU, which
for over a year has been wracked by an internecine
struggle for power, has been all but destroyed.
Its ranks have been badly depleted; its organiza-
tion has virtually collapsed; and its leaders are
more at odds than ever. ZAPU's acting president,
James Chikerema, has admitted that he commands the
support of less than half of ZAPU's 200 remaining
cadre.
Fissures also have appeared in the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU), ZAPU's smaller rival.
Last month ZANU's announcement that it was breaking
off "unity" talks with ZAPU because of its faction-
alism set off a controversy within ZANU between those
who favor unity and those who do not. It is uncertain
how serious this split is, but as in ZAPU, it is ap-
parently complicated by tribal and clan rivalries.
The Zambian Government has plainly become dis-
gusted with both groups. President Kaunda recently
issued a strong but vague warning that both should
settle their differences and unite. Kaunda is un-
likely to proscribe ZAPU and ZANU, but he probably
will do whatever he can short of that to reduce '.:he
security problems created by their constant bickering.
He has already handed over to Rhodesian authorities
some members of ZAPU who tried earlier this year to
oust by force both Chikerema and his opponents from
the leadership, and he has also restricted the rest
of ZAPU's adherents to camps in Zambia far removed
from Lusaka. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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XIB
5X1 B
CONGO (D) - CHINA: Brazzaville has announced
the signing of a military aid agreement with Peking
that provides for Chinese technicians and an unde-
termined amount of "heavy military equipment." The
announcement comes at a time when Brazzaville fears
a new attack by Kinshasa-backed exiles. While no
details were disclosed, the pact may augment a
I Imilitary aid grant concluded late last year
under which a number of Congolese military trainees
have gone to China; Peking has delivered an assort-
ment of ground forces equipment. Earlier this year
Peking also agreed to give the Congolese Popular
Militial small arms and ammu-
nition and to provide severa military instructors.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
ISRAEL-SY,..IA: The Israeli press on 14 Septem-
ber quoted "informed security circles" to the effect
that Israel would strike back if provocations by the
Syrians in the Golan Heights continued. One news-
paper speculated that the spate of incidents, about
one per day last week, resulted from Damascus' desire
to enhance its profedayeen and Arab nationalist image.
Any Israeli reaction would be designed to remind the
Syrians of their vulnerability and it probably would
be limited in scope. (CONFIDENTIAL)
UN: The US mission reports that the UN was
barely able to meet its mid-September payroll and
cannot meet its end-of-the-month obligations with-
out substantial contributions from the member states.
The UN comptroller believes Secretary General Thant
may have to impose arbitrary restrictions on UN pro-
grams, although he probably would not consider doing
so without the approval of the General Assembly.
This is certain to exacerbate the usual Assembly de-
bate on budgetary problems, which stem in large meas-
ure from Soviet and French refusal to honor :;. number
of past assessments for peacekeeping missions. Some
$26 million remains outstanding from the US 1971 as-
sessment. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
(continued)
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25X6A
HONG KONG: The colony's decision to limit to
a six.-percent annual increase the volume of all
textile exports to the US still allows for substan-
tial growth in this trade. The trend toward sub-
stituting high quality man-made fiber apparel for
woolens and cottons, which are in less demand, is
expected to continue, with the value of textile ex-
ports consequently rising. For example, in 1970
the total volume of textile exports to the US stag-
nated, although the value rose substantially. Hong
Kong's move, however, will put greater pressure on
Taiwan and South Korea to impose at least unilateral
controls on textile exports. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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