CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 16, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Chinese Affairs
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16 April 1973
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tnennonls and nutrias ton the annIsnla et Inta
bublicsfien ire "roles/tie, Tilts), Aeon5 be directed
In Ilia olliaots nettled In the Indiriduil arIlelet,
I(, April 1973
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
CHINESE'. AFFAIRS
Page
Waiting for the Shoe to I)rop 3
Permutations in the Anti?Lin Campaign 5
Troubled Provinces 7
Eathers and Sons
Law of the Sea: Chinese Policy Takes Shape
A Test of Wills
9
10
1 I
ANNEX-Two Tracks for higher Education
CIIRONOLOGY
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Wailing for the Shoe to Drop
Chinese diplomacy has begun to zero in on the return of 90,000
Pakistani prisoneN held in India as the key to normal Sino-Indian relations.
In dialogues which have become more cordial with time, Chinese officials
have told Indian diplomats that movement on this issue, which would allow
Pckirg to maintain support for Pakistan, would swiftly bring a major
improvement in Sino-Indian ties.
Peking has sought to clear the air in other visible ways. Sensing Indian
unease with the Soviets, some Chinese diplomats have been hinting at a
mutuality of interest in reducing Moscow's influence; Peking has recently
posted a higher ranking charge in New Delhi; and, at Chinese initiative,
provocative propag?nda exchanges have ended between Chinese and Indian
garrisons along the Ilimalayan frontier.
China also has been active with Pakistan. During Pakistani General
Tikka Khan's visit earlier this year. Peking spoke mildly and stressed the
need for equitable and negotiated solutions to South Asian problems, Peking
apparently made no new military assistance commitments to Tikka and thus
avoided provoking India. At the same time, positive articles in the Chinese
press have encouraged Pakistani moves on the repatriation and Bangladesh
recognition questions.
tor
emphasis on a settle-
ment of the prisoner issue as a prerequisite or normal relations with New
Delhi is an added incentive for India to reach ; settlement with Pakistan. The
same is true, although to a lesser degree, for Bangladesh.
China is well aware of the enormous difficulties involved in reaching a
settlement and realizes that the pace of diplomacy is likely to remain
deliberate and that it can do little to force the issue. Peking, moreover,
attaches higher priority to other foreign policy problems such as the USSR,
the US, and Japan. The Chinese remain patient, although encouraged by
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Indian interest in better re:ations and, more importantly, by signs ftom both
New Delhi and Islamabad of heightened interest in a settlement.
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Perimitatiom in the Anil-Lin Campaign
The campaign to denigrate Lin Piao has been a prominent feature of the
Chinese political scene for the past year and a half. Pekilig has still not
denounced Lin by name in the public media?the phrase "swindler like Liu
Shao-chi" is used in from time to thne certain changes are intro-
duced into the campaign. Lin is long since dead, and these changes pre-
sumably reflect backstage maneuvering among the survivors of the stormy
events in September 1971.
Around the middle or last year a new slogan appeared; "Criticism (of
Lin) must come lirst and rectification of work style later," Propaganda
accompanying the slocan made it clear that the intent was to keep the
campaign on a theoretical level, avoid vendettas, and head oft a broad
confrontation between Peking Ind local provincial leaders, many of whom
are military men. Early this year, the official description of Lin's crimes was
reversed. For over a year Lin Irt'l been denounced as an ultra-leftist; after the
shift, it was asserted that although Lin "at some times and on some issues"
appeared to use ultra-left tactics, he was really an ultra-rightist. The new
line has not yet been authoritative!y endorsed. It couhl be the work of those
within the current leadership closely associated with the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution. These figures are undoubtedly anxious to dissociate the
anti-Lin campaign from the extremist programs and policies which they
themselves promoted during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution.
The anti-Lin drive is being reinvigorateu. Following last year's poor
harvest, criticism of Lin and the shortcomings of local rural authorities have
been linked at meetings throughout the country. In Kiangsi Province the
top-ranking party leader advised provincial officials on 31 March to take the
lead in punishing Lin "by mouth and by nen." At the same meeting an
economic spokesman criticized Lin's ultm-lettist errors, and a representative
of the provincial party newspaper lashed out at his "ultra-rightist essence."
According to an account, the party chief himself avoided taking sides.
The notion of criticizing both orally and writing was first advanced
in a Propk 's Daily editorial on 8 March. That stifle clay, according to foreign
observers present, Premier Chou En-hal attacked the former defense minister
by name at a tea party in Peking and linked him to the extremist actions
taken against foreign diplomats and experts in China during the hectic
summer of 1967.
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The speech may have been impromptu. The next day the Potpie's Dui/y
published only a short regime of it, glossing over Chott's biting remarks
about the ultra-leftists. The ?tpeech must have been discomforting to Mao's
wife, Chiang Ching, who was at the party and who was instrumental in
stirring up the xenophobic ,!xcesses against foreign personnel and properly.
Liu Sluto-chi was not criticized by name until late 1968, some two
years after he had been removed from power. Since the anti-Lin campaign
has become a politically charged point of contention in Peking, it could take
much longer to brand him a villain publicly. Indeed, recent Chinese broad-
casts have reminded listeners that it took t4 n years to wipe out every trace of
Wang Ming, a renegade from the party's early history.'
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Troubled Provinces
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Political maneuvering in Poking continues to breed violence in the
provinces, High tension and politically motivated clashes III sew nil provinces,
of involving army units, have been reported by travelers since last
summer. The outbreaks apparently were precipitated by a round of purges.
aimed mostly at provincial politico-militmy leaders, which began last spring.
These and earlier moves against military leaders stem directly from the Lin
Pia? affair but have claimed both pro- and an victims, While Lin and
most of his closest military stipporters have bei.oi removed, the political
forces set in motion by the affair have not ouiettd down.
The most recent report of violme comes from Szechwan
)1' an mined clash there in January between ,:adres
sent by Peking and local officials. Each group was sapported by a diffewnt
faction of the army. This repon ba..!ks up several earlier accounts of trouble
in Szechwan. The clash appears to have been related to maneuvering over
replacements for the top two political leaders, one of whom was purged in
the fall or 1971 while the other died early last year. Appointment of a new
provincial party first secretary in February just after the reported clash
dues not necessarily mean that the contending factions have been reconciled
or that farther disruptions will not occur,
The SI (tuition in Szechwan illustrates a continuing political problem:
friction between cadres discredited during the Cultural Revolution but now
rehabiliiated and local officials who indite(' their tiosts through the Cultural
RevoluCon, 'recently stated that this
friction was "at tne root" of much of the political tension in Kwangtung
Province. 11- wm'"herie was friction between party and army cadres, but
st re3sed ; only part or the larger dispute between old and new
leaders.
in has reached a new stage in Kiangsi Province, when;
left leaning n men who had held leading state and party posts since
the Cultural Revolution have been purged. Replacing them were veteran
military and civilian cadres, some of whom were transferred from other
provinces. At present the leading personality in the province is an experi-
enced military man who came from Foochow Military Region headquarters.
Ills transfer should help the military region commander, lion lisien-chu, to
assert control over affairs in Kiangsi. Although the province falls within his
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Troubled Provinces
Political maneuvering in Peking continues to breed violence in the
provinces. I ugh tension mid politically motivated clashes in several provinces,
often involving army units, have been reported by traveler.: since last
summer. The outbreaks apparently were predpitated by a round of purges,
aimed mostly at provincial politico-military leaders, which began last spring,
These and oilier moves against military leaders stem directly from the Lin
Piao affair but have claimed both pro- and anti-Lin victims. While Lin and
most of his closest military supporter; have been removed, the political
forces set in motion by the affair have not quieted down.
The most recent report of violence comes from Szechwan
of an armed clash there in January between cadres
sent by Peking and local officials. Fad% group was supported by a diftrent
faction of the army. This report backs up several earlier accounts of trouble
in Szechwan. The clash i appears to have been related to maneuvering over
replacements for the top two political leaders, one of wbc.in was purged in
the fall of 1971 while the other died early last year. Appointment of a new
provincial party first secretary in February just after the reported clash
does not necessarily mean that the contending lactiom have been reconciled
or that further disruptions will not occur.
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The situation in Szechwan illustrates a continuing political problem:
friction i.etween cadres discredited during the Cultural Revolution but now
rehabilitMed and ; lr; local
. tyminoil thoir
-)sts through the Cultural
Revolution. recently stated that this 25X1
friction was at tile root" of much of the politkal tension in Kwangtung
Province. Ile said there was friction between party and army cadres, but
stressed that this was only part of the larger dispute between old and new
leaders.
This competition has reached a new stage in Kiangsi Province, where
left-leaning military men who had held leading state and party posts since
the Cultural Revolution have been purged. Replacing them were veteran
military and civilian cadres, some of whom were transferred from other
provinces. At present the leading personality in the province is an experi-
enced military man who came from Foochow Military Region headquarters.
Ilis transfer should help the military region commander, Ilan lisien-cim. to
assert control over affairs in Kiangsi. Although the province falls within his
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military purview, Ilan and the previous Kiangsi leadership were ;11 odds.
Factional lighting !it Kiangsi got so bad that in the summer of 1972 the
province was closed to travele N.
There have been sentter:d reports of violence front other provinces,
including Fukien, Kweichow, Ningsia, and Sinkiang, Kweik.how has long
been troubled. There is turmoil in the leadership; very few top leaders have
appeared in public sir .,e the provincial party committee was formed in May
25X1 1971. the top two leaders in Kweichow were
publicly denounced in June 1972 and that a high-ranking military officer
had taken over on a temporary banis.
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Political competition in the countryside is not a simple civilian-military
split. Civilians and soldiers are on both sides of most key issues, and both
sides look to patrons in Peking for leadership and support. 'Me struggles in
the provinces undoubtedly complicate the political infighting in Peking with
the result that the provincial and top-level disputes have by now become
mutually reinforcing. The fact that military men have been replaced by other
military men in Szechwan, Kiangsi, and Kweichow would appear to indicate
that, at the provincial level at least, the army remains the ultimate arbiter.
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Fathers and Sons
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An Mort ty discredit former defense minister Lit Piao's son, who is
said to have died with his father in a plane crash in Mongolia, is reportedly
U mier way iii Kwangsi Priwinced I the 25)(1
campaign is being in there as a move against politburo member Yao
Wen-yuan because he, like Lin 's son, is young and related to a top leader.
(Yao Is widely believed to be Mao's son-in-law.) Yno's close association with
the radical Mine. Mao and his own leftist credentials have probably antago-
nized moderate leaders such as Chou En-lai, who would no doubt like to clip
Yao's wings.
The younger Lin. named as a ringleader in his father's alleged coup plot,
has figured prominently in the continuing criticism of Lin Piao. Although
there is no other evidence to date or a campaign against the son personally,
attacks on nepotism, whether aimed at young Lin or at Yao, are beginning to
surface. Late last year, /Wide 's Daily condemned the practice and said Mao
bdieves in promotion based on merit. On 28 February, a broadcast from
Liaoning attacked the "father and son" or the Chiang Kai-shek family. This
theme may have as much relevance for Peking as for Taipei. especially
because Liaoning counts among its top leaders Mao's nephew, Mao Yuan-
hsin,
The main target or the anti-nepotism line is most likely Yao. who has
been the center of conflicting stories about the succession. Inaccurate
western press releases last fall quoted Chou En-lai as saying Yao was Mao's
successor. These stories were hotly denied by a number of Chinese officials.
and Peking reportedly issued a document to refute the press reports. In early
March, at the same time the criticism of Lin's son was reportedly launched in
Kwangsi, cadres in neighboring Kwangtung were allegedly told that the
succession question was not a "father-son enteit.;se," and that "contrary to
popular belief," no one had been named to succeed China's top leaders.
'Whether he is Mao's son-in-law. Yao certainly has close ties to the Chairman
through Mao's wife. Chiang Ching. a connection that might make Yao's
detractors reluctant to attack him directly. For them, a campaign against
Lin's son would be a useful ploy to discredit Yao. ?
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Law a the Sea: Chinese Policy Takes Shape
Peking used the remit session id the IN rienetal Assembly Seabeds
Committee to reassert its siippoit lot the matit,.no of 1 turd World
nations and to shai pen its own policy in preparation tor the 191,1 Law or the
Sea Conference. Vrom the Chinese point of view, the immediate gains were
few,
The Llirected steady criticism at the two super-powers, accusing
them of seeking maritime hegemony. plundering ocean resources belonging
to underdeveloped countries, and selfishly opposing the legitimate claims or
underdeveloped countries to expand their maritime economic rights. As the
committee session wore on, the Chinese tamed their attacks on the USSR,
charging that Moscow seeks to impose on underdeveloped nations interna-
tional standards to which it is unwilling to submit, The Chinese went on to
attack the current law of the sea illnvention., as devices to maintain the
predominance of (Ile super-nowers?
Peking's representatives hacked up the criticism by informally cir-
culating draft articles on the extent of the territorial sea and transit through
straits. Although the Chinese had some diffictilty lining up co?sponsors, the
draft was obviously drawn with an eye on the underdeveloped nations. It
would give coastal states the right to define their own territorial Was. Straits
lying within territorial waters would be considered parts of the territorial
sea, even if frequently used for
international navigation.
The draft also ender-Ned cacti country's right to exclusive economic
zones beyond rhe territorial seas; the limits of these zones would be deter-
mined by geographic and geological considerations, the country's reSolIrce%
and its plans for national economic development. The draft gives tio specific
limit for either territorial waters or the economic /one, thus opening the way
for support of the claims by some Latin American nations to a 200-mile
zone. Throughout the paper. the Chinese emphasize negotiations as the
means of resolving conflicting claims.
The articles do not deal with the use of the oceans beyond the
economic zone, but speeches by Peking's representatives provide Wine ifl
sight into Chinese thinking. They called for international machinery to
control exploitation of deep ocean resources and scientific research and for
suspension of such exploitation until the machinery is created. They also
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advocated harming mitlear coilitrialgicx and weatum% tom) iiirerriational
watetx
Huth the ITS atid I1SSij ()ppm(' Mtn( Of theq,C ptopmalq, So tar 111111C
1110 TWO %Votlil Itic ilhiplayed any petit:ilia, eniliti?iaxtn tor
them. IhiMexican repRxentative, for example, called the propoval% "naive,?
Nevettlicicxx. the ( oinew probably will continue to lobby lor xiappott and
formally xiihmit their paper doting die .411trittict tricelitir of the Sea1v41N
Committee in (;eneva, Thix would be their firxt maior initiative at Mr
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ANNEX
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Two Tracks for Wier Edocation 25X1
Chinese higher ethicathin collapsed in inid-19(4), and colleges and
uolvetsities did not reopen or four years. Even when the doors began to
open, radical across-the-board changes in education policy mode for a highly
politicized and vocationalized system. Recent revisions have improved some
aspects or cdocatioo in science and engineering. but the improvement is by
no means no Two different types or higlwr education are now
available. Some sodents are pursuing fairly rigorous academic programs,
apparently offered only at certain universities. Many of these students will
probably go on to postgraduate training and eveatual careers in scientific
research. The majority or students undergoing "higher education" are pur-
suing the advanced vocational training offered at all universities,
When thl. schools reopened in the fall of 1970. publicized requirements
for admission emphasized criteria related to a student's class background and
political record rather than academic qualifications. All college entrants were
to have undergone a minimum of two years of labor experience, and the
rigorous nationwide college entrance examination that had been abolished in
1966 was not reinstituted. It soon became evident, however. that students
selected without reference to academie qualifications could not meet the
study requirements, and even qualified students experienced difficulty Over-
coming long absences from school. The Chinese have now revised the 1970
admissions schemes and arc re-emphasizing academic capabilitiel for at least
a portion of the college entrants. Entrance examinations are being adminis-
tered by many local units and by sonic colleges, and procedures are evolving
to admit some students. especially in the science and fine arts fields. directly
from secondary schools without an intervening labor experience.
During the Cultural Revolution, curricula in science and engineering
were attacked as irrelevant to China's problems and level of development.
and the principles of higher education were redefined. When the schools
reopened, only vocational training was offered. Courses previously lasting
four to six years were cut to two or three, theoretical courses were deleted,
and practical labor was emphasized.
The Cultural Revolutionary system was too narrow and shallow to
prepare the kind of high-quality, well-rounded scientists and engineers
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needed for research and devklopment work in military and industrial fields.
To en,-(..ct this deficiency, basic theoretical course work has now been
reinstitutes: in certain universities and colleges. Because of the increased
difficulty of the curricula, numerous schools are forced to offer entrants
refresher e0111Ses la011ig lo 12 months, Other indicat;ons of an upgrading
()I' standards ore the return to coupv ex;imina lions. which were abolished at
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and the extension of college
training ;it certain universities to three or lour years. Although productive
labor remains part of the new curriculum, it does not lake up as much Om
and attempts are being made to relate it to a student's field of study.
China has relatively few doctoralklevel researchers (5,000 to (,000), but
It does have large 11111111M's or baccalaureate-level scientists and engineers
(roughly a million). There were indications that China could not effectively
utilite all the baccalaureate-level %Cit.:I:Isis and engineers who were produced
before the Cultural Revolution. Many were underemployed, if not unem-
ployed. The developing dual approach to higher education should help
satisfy China's needs for a large number of trained workers and technicians
and for a small number of highly educated r?.7searchers without over-
populating the intermediate ranks of baccalaureate-level scientists and en-
gineers.
The Chinese have indicated that postgiaduate training will resume as
soon as university graduates are available, hist when this will occur is
unknown, because the length of the upgraded undergraduate programs is still
not settled. Recent proposals for postgraduate training reflect the need for
people capable of "advancing the scientific if.welopment of the country."
Doctoral-level sei;:!ntists and engineers i're scarce, and the lor.s. On% type 01'
manpower during the Cultural Revolution las retarded Chinese scientific
progrecs. China has chronically had a duarth of highly educated manpower,
but the resumption or postgraduat.: training should gradually overcome this
deficiency"
16 April 1973
Chinese Affairs
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23 March Chinese aid program in Mongolia officially terminated,
30 March
31 March
Chou En-lai receives North Vietnamese and PIM ambas-
sadors regarding implemeniation of Paris Agreement.
,,,Meeting reported by rsk.'NA on 4 April.)
Chou En-lai and ot her senior Chinese officials visit
British Industrial Exhibition in Peking. Peter Walker,
British secretary of state for trade and industry, com-
pletes visit to China. Japanese Ambassador Heishiro
Ogawa arrives in Peking.
1 April China and Romania sign 1973-1974 scientific coopera-
tion agreement.
Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan4ma hosts banquet for
visiting Albanian delegation,
2 April Hungarian Premier Jeno rock receives new Chinese
Ambassador Li Tse-wang.
President Ahidjo of Cameroon ends Visit to China.
3-11 April Iranian Minister of Economy visits China: signs first
Sino-Iranian trade and payments agreement.
3 April New Zealand ministerial delegation ends visit to China.
Japanese ambassador presents credentials to Tung Pi-wu.
People 's Daily editorial lauds progress toward imple-
mentation of fails Agreement in Vietnam: first Chinese
commentary on subject in nearly a month.
5 April Alfred L. Jenkins, deputy chief of the US Liaison Office
in China arrives in Peking; meets with Vice Foreign
Minister Chiao kilan-hua the following day. PRC ambas-
sador to Japan, Oen Chu, presents credentials to
Emperor Iliroliito.
8
April Chou En-hi receives ticishiro Ogawa, Japanese ambas-
sador to Peking.
16 April 1973
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9 April (lion Fn-lai receives newly appointed Greek ambassador
Peking.
10-12 April
and Chi Peng-lei; leaves for North Korea.
Madame Binh visits Peking; holds talks with Chou
I I April Sihanouk met by (lion ane large turnout of
Politburo and senior Foreign Ministry officials on his
return frimi Indochina; People '1 Daily editorial lauds
results of Sihanotik's trip.
II April
12 April
12 April
14 April
China attends meeting of UN Economic Commission for
Mia and the Far Last for first time; Chinese delegation
walks out next day in protest over address by Cam-
bodian representa I
Chou lin-lai hosts banquet for Sihanouk; calls for end to
American bombing in Cambodia and withdrawal of US
support for Lou Nol Government as keys to Cambodian
settlement.
Former party secretary gcaeral Teng Ilsiao-ping reap-
pears at banquet for Sihanouk. NCNA identifies Teng
by his old government title, vice premier.
US Steel Corporation receives invitation to attend
Spring Canton Fair, bringing to 20 the number of US
firms invited to date.
Peking purchases a S4I million fertilizer complex from
Japan, raising whole plant purchases for 1973 to a
record $300 million.
PRC releases five of six Japanese nationals who have
been held in China on spy charges.
15 April Ilan Hsu, the new deputy chief of the Chinese Liaison
Office, departs Peking for Washington.
16 April
16 April 1973
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Large Chinese delegation headed by China-Japan Friend-
ship Association President Liao Chi:rig-chili arrives in
Tokyo for month-long visit.
Chinese Affairs
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