CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIIt ECTO It AT E OF
INTI LLIGIiNCE
Chinese Affairs
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Top Secret
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5 March 1973
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Commenle end duerles on the aonilnlt of Ihle
publltallon are welenme. They should be dlreoled
In the otllaere named In the Individual aillelee,
5 March 1973
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
CHINESE AFFAIRS
The Politics of Agriculture
Ho Tam's Travels
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Who Commands the PLA?
The "Year of Europe"
When Left is Right and Right is Wrong
Zayyat's Coming
New Emphasis on Expertise
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ANNEX Succession Preview: Who'- Who
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The Politics of Agriculture
The Chinese, who have not boon insisting on
rigid formulas in the face of diminishing agricultural
returns, have recently been paying unusual attention
to farm production. The note of concern and practi-
cality that runs through articles and broadcasts pre-
ceding the spring planting can be attributed to last
year's disappointing harvest. Much of the problem
was simply the natural calamities that hit most of
Asia, but the Chinese are also hinting that misman-
agemont and inefficiency wore partially at fault.
Still, no scapegoats have been singled out, and
cadres have been warned not to blame agricultural
shortcomings on the "swindlers" who got blamed for
most other problems.
A report on agriculture given to the Iiupeh Pro-
vincial Party Committee by its first secretary typi-
fies the increased emphasis on agriculture. In the
past, the provinces have been content to rely on
verbal exhortation. This year, Hupen not only plans
to send an unusually high-level group of cadres to
rural areas to ensure vigorous spring farming efforts,
but also calls for the reduction of study meetings,
increased technological training, and the rehabilita-
tion of veteran cadre.
It is inconceivable that Hupeh would dare to
espouse such sensitive policies without the prior
approval of Peking. Other provinces have made similar
statements, although not in such detail or at such
length. The February issue of Red Flag, the frequently
pedantic party theoretical journal, weighed in with an
article on the subject. Unlike most Red Flag articles,
which are graced with seemingly endless paragraphs
of esoteric ideological argument, this piece was con-
spicuous for its straightforward, practical approach
to farming. The article carries weight because its
author is the party secretary of Tachai production
brigade, the national agricultural model.
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A number of factors will, of course, influence
the harvest. Chinese investment in agriculture ap-
parently is increasing, but its affect will not be
very noti.oablo thin year. More important for a good
harvest will be the successful implementation of the
more moderate approach to agriculture. Those policies
have been popular with the peasants, but occasionally
have boon politically dangerous for the cadre who
must enforce them. Poking broadcasts indicate that
the central leadership is making some attempt to calm
the justifiably nervous officials and assure them
that they run no risk by pushing current policies.
Still, the most important influence on the likely to be Mother Nature.
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Ho Tam' n Travels
After having spent the 9-14 February period in
Peking, North Korean Foreign Minister l1o Tam stopped
there again on 20-21 February on route home from
Pakistan. While he only stayed overnight, he was
troatod very warmly and was again received by Chou
En-lass this despite the fact that he had seen Chou
only the week before and Ghat a reception by Foreign
Minister Chi Pang-fei would have mot all protocol
requirements.
There is little doubt that Chou Is gesture was
made in the hope of assuaging to some extent Ho Tam's
ruffled feelings. He had come to Peking in an effort
to obtain stronger backing for North Korea's inten-
sified propaganda effort to label the presence of US
forces in South Korea the "sole" obstacle to Korean
unification. He received nothing of the kind. In
fact, the joint communique issued at the conclusion
of his initial visit was extremely bland and contained
only the most pro forma demands for US withdrawal.
Moreover, after the initial visit NCNA singled out
Seoul rather than Washington as the root cause of
blocked progress. NCNA went So far as to paraphrase
Pyongyang's harsh anti-US statements, but substituted
"South Korea" for "US."
Since the Tam trips were just prior to and during
the visit of Dr. Kissinger to Peking, Peking's be-
havior toward the North Korean foreign minister was
a not too subtle reminder of how highly the Chinese
value their developing relationship with the US. In-
deed, the Chinese are probably counseling the North
Koreans to pursue with patience a policy of moderation,
while improving Sino-US relations and the winding down
of the US military involvement in Indochina contribute
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to a decrease in tension throughout Asia. As this oc-
curs, the Chinese probably argue, a decrease in US
forces in the area will follow. Until such time the
Chinese are taking a vary relaxed attitude toward the
presence of US forces in Korea, to the apparent
chagrin of Pyongyang.
The Chinese can also argue that US troops in
South Korea are there as part of a "containment"
of China that might be considered irrelevant in
Washington in the current context. Peking's diplomacy,
the argument runs, may be able to got the troops re-
moved; Moscow does not have this card to play. So
long an this remains so, China can afford to snub the
Koreans occasionally. Such discord between the Chinese
and North Koreans is at most relatively minor in a
relationshi that has in fact become closer over the
past year.
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Who Commands t he PLA?
A contradiction has developed in Chinese domes-
tic propaganda over the question of who is to be
portrayed as the head of the Peoples Liberation Army.
One version describes the PLA as "founded and led by
our great loader Chairman Moo," while the second
adds to that "and the Chinese Communist Party."
The evolution of the who-conunands-the-army quest on
strongly suggests that those phrases reflect a sen-
sitive political issue.
Before the purge of former defense minister Lin
Piao, the PLA was routinely described as founded and
led by Mao and, directly commanded by Lin. After
Lin's removal, the PLA was "founded and commanded" by
Mao. This formulation prevailed until Army Day 1972,
when the joint editorial and do facto defense minister
Yeh Chien-ying's speech both added the phrase "and
the CCP." This usage has been generally applied
ever since. A number of provinces have, on occasion,
fallen back to describing the PLA as commanded by
Mao alone, but most follow the "Mao and the CCP"
model.
This formulation appears to be part of a de-
liberate diminution of the Chairman's public eminence.
In the ideological sphere, the phrase "Mao Tse-tung
Thought" is frequently replaced by "Marxist-Leninism-
Mao Tse-tung Thought." Likewise, once singular ref-
erences to Mao now often take the form of "Mao and
the CCP," or "Mao and the Party Center."
While the shift is in keeping with an emphasis
on collective leadership and serves to prepare the
way for a China after Mao, it may also be a manifes-
tation of the behind-the-scenes political struggle
in Peking. Official documents detailing Lin Piao's
alleged crimes make the point that the old formula-
tion describing the PLA as led by Mao but directly
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commanded by Lin was a weapon in the former defense
minister's effort to consolidate his power; indeed,
Mao himself, in the course of one of his speeches in
the summer of 1971, refers to this phrase as a Lin
maneuvor. Thus, while it is unlikely that anyone
would be foolhardy enough to attack the Chairman
directly, the addition of the clause "and the CC1?"
could mean that some leaders at the center may be
using a similar tack to deflate Mao's public image
as a means of reducing his still considerable polit-
ical authority.
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The "Year of Europe"
China's strong interest in Western European
affairs was again demonstrated last week. NCNA en-
thusiastically praised President Nixon's statement
that 1973 will be the "year of Europe" for US policy,
noting the President had also said that Washington
would continue to place "enormous emphasis" on Asian
affairs, including the dialogue with China.
Peking continued its efforts to expand trade
ties with Western Europe. Three fertilizer plants
with a total value of over $30 million were purchased
by the Chinese from a Dutch-based engineering firr,,
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Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei arrived in Paris
on 26 February, the first time a Chinese Communist
foreign minister has ever visited Europe. II
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Over the past year the Chinese have devoted an
increasing amount of their diplomatic energies to
West European affairs. Not only are they seeking to
re-establish normal relations there, but they are
also alarmed at the trend toward further detente in
Europe, especially by the prospects for the confer-
ence on European security which Peking sees as a
Soviet plot. The Chinese believe that any further
relaxation of West Europe's guard against Moscow
will give the Soviets a freer hand on the Eastern
front. In this context, Peking would like to see
Washington place renewed emphasis on the US role in
Europe, particularly its role as the dominant power
in NATO, and the NCNA headlines on a "Year of Europe"
are clearly a reflection of this desire.
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Lin with being an ultra-leftist.
A flurry of provincial broadcasts, probably
guidance from Peking, says it iswrong to regard Lin's
crimes as ultra-leftist. The broadcasts confess that
Lin not only appeared to be an ultra-leftist" on
some issues and at some times," but occasionally did
carry out an ultra-leftist line. A recent broadcase
from Szechwan explained that "the true nature of this
line is ultra-rightist, not ultra-leftist." The
basic reason for this confusion is that official
charges against Lin cover the entire political spec-
trum, linking him with the rightist "revisionist"
policies of Liu Shao-chi (many of which are back in
vogue today), as well as blaming him for the radical
excesses of the Cultural Revolution.
Official charges aside, Lin's record put him
solidly in the leftist camp. The denials in the
media of his ultra-leftism and the emphasis on his
so-called "rightist" crimes seem designed to take
the heat off the leftists. While this could be a
conciliatory gesture by the moderates, the new line
is more likely the work of those closely associated
with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, possibly
under the direction of party propagandist Yao Wrn-yuan.
The campaign against ultra-rightists is accompanied
by a new, more defensive line on the Cultural Revo-
lution. Several radio broadcasts have called for
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When Left is Right and Right is Wrong
More confusion has been added to the protracted
campaign to criticize Lin Piao. After denouncing him
for over a year as an ultra-leftist, the party now
claims that Lin was not an ultra-leftist but an
"ultra-rightist." The term first appeared around
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"defending and developing the groat fruits" of the
Cultural Revolution and have repeated en old Mao
quote, resurrected in the New Year editorial, justi-
fying the Cultural Revolution an "completely n?ces-
nary and extremely timely." Even in the palmy days
of 1966-67, this phrase had a distinctly defensive
ring. Thu present propaganda initiative seems to be
a rear-guard action on the part of those who may be
afraid they will be tarred w4.th the same bru.ih Lin
,an. In an event, it is not likely to cause major
reversals.
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Zayyat'n Coming
The Chinese will play host to Egyptian Foreign
Minister Zayyat starting March 11. The visit is the
first by a high-ranking Egyptian official since Presi-
dent Sadat's ouster of the Soviet military mission
last July. The Chinese, who welcomed Sadat's move,
have proceeded cautiously since than in exploiting
Moscow's loss. In largo part this caution probably
reflects Peking's realization that it is incapable
of replacing the USSR as Egypt's benefactor. Chinese
leaders quickly congratulated Sadat on his defense of
Egyptian national sovereignty, but by just as quickly
bemoaning China's own economic underdevelopment, Poking
officials from Chou En-lai on down impressed upon the
Egyptians that Peking's ability to aid them materially
is very limited. An exchange of visits by Chinese and
Egyptian industrial experts in August and December 1972
suggests that at most some of the $65 million in
credits left over from earlier loans may be released
to help the Egyptians develop light industry. II
Nevertheless, the Chinese are interested in
maintaining a dialogue t,!ith Cairo as part of their
effort to combat Soviet influence. As reported in
the Cairo press, Chou's remarks to Cairo journalist
Muhammad Heykal last month added up to a severe
critique of Soviet policy in the Middle East. For
example, Chou told Heykal that on Middle Eastern
matters, Brezhnev was even weaker than Khrushchev
had been in 1967. Brezhnev, Chou said, faces the
US as a mouse faces a cat.
Chou also dropped several remarks on the general
Middle East situation. Reiterating China's support
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for the Arabs, Chou agreed with Heykal that a politi-
cal solution would involve the element of force.
Chou's remarks were matter of fact, however, rind did
not appear to encourage Arab bellicosity. Rather,
his heavy stress on the necessity for a strong,
united home front in Egypt carried with it the im-
plication that, before embarking on further efforts
against Israel, Egypt must put its own house in order
and work for Arab unity. This advice, which would
preclude Arab military action for the time being,
echoes counsel of vice Foreign Minister Ho Ying in
December 1972 that Egypt should accompany its prepara-
tion for battle "by serious action in the political
and diplomatic fields." In fact, the Chinese, who
can rend a travel itinerary an wall an the next man,
recognize that the recent trips of prominent Arabs
to Moscow and Washington--not to mention Mrs. Moir's
visit last week--may presage a new diplomatic attempt
to move the Middle East problems off dead center.
While China will to a large degree be on the outside
looking in,
even for a
:eking
few bars
may shortly
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obviously would like to danno,
in this elaborate minuet that
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New L?"mphanin on T:xportine
The recent broadcast of two V op t r: 'a i'a # l2g
articles by Radio Poking indicates that the Chinese
are contemplating a return to factory management
techniques used before the Cultural Revolution. The
articles convey this idea by praising management
practices initiated by the party committee of Talion
Stool Mill--a model unit whose name lands authority
to the changes. According to 1'aopia'a Ur'-,;.1y, the
reduction wan accomplished by sending ordinary
workers back to production tasks while retaining
"indispensable specialist management personnel."
Moreover, the paper attributed the mill's increased
production to appointing people with "higher con-
sciousness, greater dynamism, and richer experience...
to leading and directing posts." By and large, those
persons seem to be the once-disgraced veteran man-
agers.
Over-reliance on expertise was severely criti-
cized during the Cultural Revolution. The economic
planners in Poking may view a return to skilled man-
agement as a moans of overcoming inefficiency. The
planners may be only partially correct in their be-
lief that by enhancing the authority of management
specialists most of the bottlenecks can be removed,
but the increased emphasis on skills and experienced
personnel will make possible a freer, loss dogmatic
approach to management.
It is unlikely, however, that the now freedom
will be fully exercised as long an the average of-
ficial remains uncertain about the life of the policy.
Ila knows too well its past history, and as long an
the pol1.tical situation in Poking remains unsettled,
the central government will have difficulty getting
him to implement urge-prone programs with vigor.
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CHRONOLOGY
19 Februarys Joint communique innuod by China and
North Korea following visit of North
Korean Minister of Foreign Affairn Ito
Tam.
19-18 Februarys Dr. Kissinger and party visit Poking?
Kissinger received by Chairman Mao
Tse-tung on 17 February. Chinese
media give broad coverage to visit
and project optimistic view of Sino-
US relations.
16 Februarys 1973 Sino-Guinean trade agreement
signed in Conakry.
NCNA headlines President Nixon's re-
marks to NATO Supreme Commander that
1973 will be "the Year of Europe" for
US policy.
17-22 February: Madame Bhutto visits China to cele-
brate first Pakistan International
Airlines flight to Poking and is ro-
coived by Premier Chou En-lai.
18 February: Visiting Japanese trade delegation
received by Minister of Foreign Trade
Pai Haiang-kuo.
19 February: Stop-over visit of DRV and PRG repre-
sentatives on route to Paris Interna-
tional Conference on Vietnam. Re-
ceived by Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-
fei.
Formation in Shanghai of the first
province-level Young Communist League
committee since the Cultural Revolu-
tion; committee officially endorsed
by People'a Daily on 22 February.
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20 February: Charge d'affairna Kao 0 arrives to
open Chinese Embanuy in Dahomey.
Gino-lthiopian protocol signed covering
oconom!.c cud projects under the 19'
Chinaao loan.
20-21. l'obruary: Ito Tam returns to Poking on route
home from Pakistan and iu received
again by Chou En-lai.
21 February: Talks on possible long-term contract
for the sale of Chinese crude oil to
Tokyo broken off. Japalwono officials
are optimistic that talks will be
resumed.
21-22 February: Ethiopian Airlines starts service to
China. Wang Shih-yen heads Chinese
friendship delegation arriving in
Addis Ababa on 23 February return
flight.
22 February: Joint US-PRC communique issued re-
affirming the principles of the
Shanghai Communique and agreeing to
establish "liaison offices" in Poking
and Washington.
23 February: PRC technicians depart Hong Kong for
training at Boeing plant in Seattle.
24 February: Chinese delegation arrives in Ecuador
for trade negotiations.
25 February: Chinese delegation to the International
Conference on Vietnam, headed by For-
eign Minister Chi Pang-fei, arrives
in Paris. The following day Chi
strongly endorses the agreement.
Chou En-lai says he expects heads of
the Peking and Washington liaison
offices will be of ambassadorial
rank.
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Tung Pi-Wu, acting chairman of the
PRC, and Chou En-lai sand massages
to the King of Loin and Prince Sou-
phanouvong congratulating them on
the signing of the Laos cease-fire
agreement.
26 February: Charge d'affaires Chu Chi-chan leaves
Poking to open PRC embassy in Aus-
tralia.
1 March: China marks anniversary of 1947 up-
rising on Taiwan for the first time
since 1965. Fu Tso-i calls for
negotiations to arrange reunification
of Taiwan with the mainland or in-
formal contacts if the GRC is not
ready for formal negotiations.
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ANNEX
A Succession Preview: Who's Who
The downfall of Mao's chosen heir Lin Piao in
September 1971 reopened the succession question.
Since that time, the leadership has boon pondering
the transfer of authority upon the death of China's
aging leaders---particularly party Chairman Mao Tso-
tung, 79, and Premier Chou En-lei, 74--and has shown
interest in bringing younger party members into the
leadership. The succession question has become a
favorite topic of conversation among Chinese at every
level and is oven raised with foreign visitors.
As matters stand now, the sudden departure of
either Mao or Chou would probably not cause wide-
spread or prolonged turmoil. Mao's death could
actually smooth the way for an easy transition
Before the Cultural Revolution, there were four
vice chairman, but at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969,
Lin was named the sole vice chairman. As a result the
party is now without a vice chairman. The selection
of a vice chairman will be one of the first orders
of business at the Tenth Party Congress. Unless the
congress opts for a "collective leadership"--much dis-
cussed since Lin's departure--the person chosen will
replace Mao as head of the party. In the meantime,
Mao still must approve all major personnel appoint-
ments, and getting his agreement on a slate of can-
didates, particularly on possible vice-chairmen, is
probably one of the problems holding up the party
congress.
If Mao should die before a tenth congress is
convened, the whole process of personnel election
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could wall be greatly facilitated. The congrana prob-
ably would be called soon after his death. The leader-
ship might choose to elevate one of the non-controversial
honorary alders on the currant Politburo, possibly
old marshal Chu Toh, to act as temporary chairman.
Something similar was done a year ago when the 87-
yoar-old Tung Pi-wu was named acting head of state.
With Chu in the chair, the day-to-day affairs of the
party would probably be overseen by a group including
Chou En-lai and possibly Shanghai party boss Chang
Chun-chiao and the do facto defense minister, Yoh
Chian-ying.
If Mao Dies First
If Premier Chou were to outlive Mao, it would
probably make little difference, over the short run
at least, who succeeds Mao as party chairman. The
major burden of running the country has been on Chou's
shoulders since, and oven during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. After Mao's death, China would continue along
the course Chou has sot, and it might well move faster.
Chou himself is likely to shun the party chair-
manship, although presumbably he could have it, if
he so desired. The Premier is an administrator, not
a theoretician, and is perfectly suited to keep the
machinery of government running smoothly. He has an
almost endless capacity for work, carrying a load
which would stagger many a younger man. Chou has
never shown any particular interest in being party
chairman, and t'-:alt is probably one reason he con-
tinues to be trusted by Mao, who has disposed of
many other comrades. After Mao is gone, Chou might
well prefer to be the power behind the throne than
to occupy it himself.
If he does not take the job, Chou certainly will
have a large say in the selection of the man who does.
The name that crops up most often is Chang Chun-chiao.
Given the current make-up of the Politburo, Chang is
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a logical choice. Apart from Mao and Chou, most of
the ton members are either "honorary elders" or mili-
tary man. Li llsion-nion is a government. specialist
whose forte in administration rather than politics.
The remaining throe are Chang, Chiang Ching (Mao's
wife), and the young Shanghai radical, Yao Won-yuan.
Of those, Chang is clearly the best candidate on the
basis of experience and probable acceptability to the
other members. This process of elimination among
lower ranking cadres may account for the number of
reports about Chang's favorable prospects.
Chang, a loading radical during the Cultural
Revolution, owes his position to the support of Mao
and Chiang Ching. Nevertheless, he is astuto enough
to compromise when he has to, and with an eye toward
his post-Mao future, it is possible he has taken
stops to make himself acceptable to moderates like
Chou. It is doubtful that he is one of Chou's "trusted
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but Chang seems certain to figure prominently in the
post-Mao party. The radical wing of the party will
continue to exist long after Mao's death, its views
will have to be represented, and Chang is the least
controversial of those Politburo members closely as-
sociated with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution--
more acceptable by far than either Chiang Ching or
Yao Wen-yuan.
Although Chiang Ching's role has h..sen largely
restricted to cultural affairs, a move seems to be
under way to pre-empt her leadership in that polit-
ically sensitive field. This has probably been
motivated by a desire to minimize her potential as
a political force when Mao passes from the scene.
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is offensive to the leadership in the provinces; this
distaste probably applies to Yao Wen-yuan as well.
Yao's blistering attacks during the Cultural Revolu-
tion did not endear him to the moderates. Although
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he in currently in charge of party propaganda work,
Yao owes his Politburo position solely to his close
association with Moo and Chiana China.
Candidates for the chairmanship will not be
limited to the current Politburo. The Tenth. Party
Congress, whether it occurs before or after Mao's
death, will bring some nee; faces onto that under-
strength body. Even if Chou should choose to act
as a regent to the new chairman, he would probably
wish to call on experienced party officials to re-
build the party, because he has not in th9 past
devoted as much attention to party affairs as to gov-
ernment matters.
MI
From Chou's point of view the reinstatement of
some pre-Cultural Revolution party leaders to their
former Politburo rank probably is highly desirable.
(He has done much the same in the government
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HOW
many and who should be reinstated may well be sub-
jects of fierce debate; in addition, there are those
within the leadership who oppose any move along these
lines.
Over the short term, the new party chairman
could find himself in a weak position. Wholesale
damage was done to the party during the Cultural
Revolution, and it has yet to regain its pre-eminence.
Mao's still-considerable influence derives not from
his position as head of the party, but from his great
prestige and popular appeal. The next chairman will
not enjoy the latter advantages and will find, as
has Mao, that the only institution left with the
strength and authority to get things done is the mili-
tary. While many military leaders in the provinces
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double as provincial party chiefs, their influence
derives from the troops they command. The military
is the largest and most important interest group in
the party. As such, it cannot easily be divested of
its party role. Military men will remain a significant
political force well after Mao's de4th, and any party
leader with political ambitions would be well advised
to court them.
A strong voice will be that of Li Te-sheng, an
alternate member of the Politburo, who holds a key
post in the central military hierarchy as director
of the army's General Political Department. He may
be in line for the job of chief of staff, which has
been vacant since the Lin affair, and he seems al-
most certain of promotion to full membership on the
Politburo at the Tenth Party Congress.
The new party chairman will also have to estab-
lish a sound working relationship with the provincial
military leaders. Chou apparently enjoys the support,
if not the full trust and confidence, of the moderate
military leaders, but the military establishment is
uneasy about the drive to reassert the primacy of
the party. On the one hand, Chou has gone out of
his way to calm their fears and has spoken on their
behalf in Peking. On the other hand, he is sensitive
to criticism of the military's dominant role in the
regime and would like to re-establish some measure of
party control over the army. Military leaders prob-
ably recognize that they need Chou as much as he needs
them. They have worked well with him since the Cul-
tural Revolution and would probably transfer their
cooperation to a party chairman endorsed by Chou.
To the masses, Mao's death would probably not
be as traumatic today as at the height of his per-
sonality cult. The cult has been diminishing in
recent years, and Mao's image was badly tarnished in
the Lin Piao affair. While he is still loved by many,
there are probably more people than ever before who
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look at Mao critically. Chou Command! wide respect
throughout the country, and no long an the country
hen such a leader to turn to, Mao's death will prob-
ably not be especially disruptive.
Mao's death would leave Chou the single most
important figure in the country. With no vtsiblo
challangern to his authority and relieved of the
need to secure Mao's approval, Chou would have a
freer hand to direct party and government affairs.
fie would still have to accommodate a variety of in-
terests, but his powers of persuasion and his con-
siderable prestige would enable him to forge a work-
able coalition out of the disparate groups at the top,
much as he frequently did at lower levels during the
Cultural Revolution.
If Chou Dias First
Should Chou die first, the situation would be
much less clear. Mao has associated himself with
many of the current moderate Chinese policies, par-
ticularly in the field of foreign affairs, that are
identified with Chou. Without Chou, a turn to the
loft could wall occur. For example, Chiang Ching
and Yao Won-yuan might be given added responsibilities,
and plans to reinstate former party leaders (many of
them the very people Mao removed during the Cultural
Revolution) might be halted. The Chairman is on rec-
ord as saying that the country ought to have a new
Cultural Revolution every few years, but he probably
would not launch another one like the last. Even if
he should want to, it is unlikely that he could call
out either youth or the army as he did in the 1960s,
and the party as it is now constituted would be an
even less reliable instrument of his will.
The most immediate problem posed by Chou's death
would be the selection of a new premier. The nod al-
mcst certainly would go to Li Hsien-nien, the only
active vice premier and the only government official
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with Politburo rank, a prarequinite for fl,o head of
government. Li in clone to Chou and 1~; ~tR 1r-4:y of
the name views, but he may lack Chou'r;j~~1:9
skills and, especially, Chou'n inf1:ucincp with Mao.
It in not likely that Li, who in in hir4 rA1,t ; :. xtien,
would have the political weight to name z 1)),,c-minded
successor.
Chou and Li appear to be grooming a number of
younger government offieialn for high posts. Vice
Foreign Minister Chiao Xuan-hua in certainly among
them, an in Pai faiang-kuo, a military man until 1970,
who has turned in an outstanding performance an min-
inter of foreign trade. Mont of those nocond-echelon
government buroaucratr are not even members of the
party Central Committee, however, and unless they
attain that status, they will find it difficult to
roach the first echelon. Chou presumably will sponsor
some of those people for membership on the Central
Committee, if not the Politburo, at the Tenth Party
Congress, but if he should die before the congress,
their promotions would be in doubt.
Chang Chun-chino has frequently boon mentioned
in speculation about future premiers, but his future
is likely to be much brighter within the party hier-
archy than in the government. Although theoretically
he is in charge of China's largest city, Shanghai--a
job which could give him vast administrative expericnco--
Chang has lived in Poking since 1969, attending to hie
Politburo duties and making only brief periodic visits
to Shanghai. His only foray into the adtninetre"_ivc
field was in 1970, when he headed a health campaign
in 13 provinces; the campaign was a flop.
A more likely long range prospect in alternate
Politburo member Chi Tang-kuoi. Chi, in his early
forties, appears to handle agricultural ;utters for
the party. His ideological predilections are unknown,
but he rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolu-
tion and may be associated with the party's radical
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wing. Most of these people, with the probable excep-
tion of Chang Chut;-chiao, will play important roes
in the peat-Chou government, but Hao will choon,~ who
becomes premier,
It will be more difficult to replace Chou ae
the chief spokesman for the moderates, than an premier.
Moderate members of the leadership would be hard
preened to find another champion who carrion as much
weight with Mao. Initially, because no many of them
are military men, they would probably turn to Yeh
Chien-ying. Yeh, too, in in his neventien and would
be no more than a temporary successor. Either of the
two regional military commanders now on the Politburo
conceivably could load the moderate cause, but both
of them seem content to remain in their home provinces
away from the political fray in Poking.
Chou's death would cause considerable anxiety,
both within the leadership and among the people,
since he in considered by many an virtually indispensable.
If Chou should din before he has boon able, via the
Tenth Party Congress, to give those he trusts suf-
ficient stature within the party to play a major role,
those anxietiga would be well founded. The beat hope
for China, then, in for Mao to die irat.
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