THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000600040004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1973
• Content Type: IR

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The Transformation of Nature in China
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74.3
September 1973
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The Good Earth? 4
Man and Nature: Traditional View. . . . . 9
Man and Nature: Post - 1949 Developments . 13
Controlling the Huang Ho . . . . . . . 16
The Huai and Hai River Basin Projects 18
Afforestation . . . . . . . . . . 20
Nature in Transformation: Progress and .
Prospects 24
Chronology of Water Control Projects and . . .
Problems in the Hai I/o Basin . . . . . . foZ"Lowing text
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1973
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE IN CHINA
SUMMARY
Agriculture is a critical element in China's present
and future. A key question -- and problem -- is the
ability of the, People's Republic of China (PRC) to in-
crease agricultural output sufficiently to keep pace with
the annual rate of population increase. The answer is
complex, but an important factor is China's progress in
the protection, improvement, and management of its land
resources. Maximum benefits must be realized from
increased use of chemical fertilizers, larger supplies
and improved distribution of water for irrigation, new
crop varieties, and other technological advances. Although
the PRC's land area of 3.7 million square miles is exceeded
only by the USSR and Canada, its agricultural land resources
are subject to major limitations. Specifically:
The amount of cultivated land is virtually
static; a number of reasons, mostly physical,
suggest that this will continue to be true for
the foreseeable future.
Much 'land now cultivated is of average to
low productivity.
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Climatic conditions, particularly in North
China, are highly variable, specifically in the
amount, distribution, and intensity of rainfall,
with resultant serious effects upon agricultural
output.
A sizable proportion of the land now tilled
is subject to yearly damage from drought, flooding,
erosion, and waterlogging.
Environmental improvements were implicit in the major
river basin and other water conservancy programs begun in
the early years of PRC rule. Additionally, China's rural
labor was mobilized periodically to engage in local compaigns
of ditch digging, tree planting, and a host of other activities
designed to improve agricultural conditions through the up-
grading of environmental resources. Peking characterized
these menial tasks as an opportunity to "remake nature" and
to put an end 'to natural calamities. Nature, or the
physical environment, was labeled an "enemy" that caused
drought, floods, privation, and famine.
Mastery of nature has not been an easy task, even to
those inspired and guided by Mao Thought.
shrubs on previously barren hillsides and extensive tree
plantings results of China's "greening"
campaign.
increased water s orage aci i ies and the expansion 51-
irrigated land.
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he record is not complete DUT
at this time would include the following:
Enough environmental improvements have been
made to lessen the impact from either prolonged
rainfall or lengthy dry periods.
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Water impoundments, canals, and related
water control and storage facilities have been
built by the millions, though most are small
and many inadequate for intended needs.
The Huang Ho (Yellow River) project, the
most widely publicized and largest in scope of
the river basin projects, has been scaled back
drastically and altered -- principally because
of the lack of effective anti-erosion work.
Some improvements in the Huai and Hai basins
apparently have been made; serious flooding is
less likely and damage from waterlogging probably
reduced.
Millions of young saplings have been planted,
but results in terms of original goals have been
a patchwork of success and failure.
The PRC has not claimed complete victory in its battles
with nature, but some improvements in the overall picture
are undeniable. That more has not been accomplished and
initial goals have not been reached is due not to a lack of
incentive or official dedication to the tasks at hand, but
rather to the reliance upon mass labor, lack of technically
trained personnel, failure to coordinate related projects,
overall managerial weaknesses, and the immensity of the
problem.
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The Good Earth?
1. The amount of cultivated land in China is
relatively small -- approximately 11 percent of the
total area -- and no sizable tracts of good agricultural
land remain unused. The physical constraints that account
for this situation can be summarized simply but aptly:
most of China is too steep, too high, too cold, or too
dry to support intensive, Chinese-style agriculture.
2. Hills, mountains, and high plateaus comprise
more than two-thirds of the Chinese landscape -- land-
forms ill-suited to intensive, Chinese agricultural
practices (Map A).
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PRC: Elevation and Major Areas
of Cultivated Land
Feet Meters
C1842 30ou ~1
3281 y. 1000 r~ l Over 30%
090 200 In cultivation
3 ?- 0
Much of China is at comparatively hitch elevations: about
one-third of the land is above 6,600 feet and two-thirds
exceeds 3,300 feet. The lower summer temperatures,
shortened growing season, and steep slopes usually found
at these hioher elevations combine to preclude much agri-
culture (Map B). Nevertheless, the pressure for additional
agricultural land has been so severe in China that sizable
upland areas have been painstakingly and laboriously
terraced to obtain additional fragments of agricultural
land.
3. Nearly half of China receives so little rainfall
(15 inches or less annually) that crops cannot be grown
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PRC: Mean Annual Precipitation
Inches
39 147 394 591
0 100 500 1000 1500
Millimeters
501024 7.73
unless under full irrigation (Map C). Areas of deficient
precipitation include almost all of western and northwest-
ern China, but they contain overall only about 4 percent
of C H na's total cultivated acreage. Although additional
supplies of underground water probably can be tapped, no
major areas of cultivated land are foreseen being developed
there.
4. Of greater agricultural importance is the seasonal
amount, variability, and intensity of rainfall in the major
grain producing provinces. In North and Northeast China,
where annual precipitation averages only 25 inches (about
the same as central Kansas), 60 to 75 percent of this total
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PRC: Annual Precipitation Variability
(in percent)
Precipitation variability data for
western China are not available.
is concentrated in only 3 summer months.* This concentration
in so short a period poses an annual threat that meager spring
and early summer rains will stunt the growth of spring-sown
crops or that too much summer rain in too short a period will
damage crops by local flooding and erosion.
5. The variability of rainfall also is a crucial factor
in the major grain growing areas (Map D). The most serious
In Kansas only about half the yearly rainfall is recorded
during the May through August period; furthermore, average
daily rainfall intensity in July is less than half of the
amount for North China stations.
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PRC: June Precipitation Variability Map E
(in percent)
Prccipitntion variabifily data for
western China ate not available.
conditions exist in North C,ii na , where annual variability
(departure from normal rainfall) ranges from 20 to 30 per-
cent -- in agricultural terms a high figure because crop
yields are considered unstable when departures from normal
exceed 20 percent.* Spring and summer variability is
especially critical and is extremely high on the North China
Plain (Map E). Absolute variation in rainfall amounts is
Variation is computed by averaging the absolute values of
departures from the average., dividing this figure (mean
variation) by the average, and multiplying by 100 to arrive
at variation expressed as a percent.
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immense in North China: I;' ai -feng has received as much as
19.5 inches of rain in July and as little as 1.6 inches,
and at Tientsin the range is from 15 inches to 1.6 inches.
Finally, how much rainfall occurs during any one "rain" is
another significant indicator of agricultural stability;
here again, Ncrth China is frequently subject to brief
gully-washing rains that cause flooding and erosion and
damage water control works. Many of the weather stations
in North China, for example, have recorded as mach as 9 to
10 i nc'ies of rain during a single 24-hour period.*
6. Not only is most of China's land poorly suited
for agriculture because of terrain and climatic factors,
but even the presently cultivated area possesses inherent
physical liabilities. Only an estimated 31 percent of
China's cultivated land is classified by PRC officials as
"fertile," and of the remainder, 40 percent is "ordinary"
and 29 percent "low-yielding." Although the precise
meaning of these terms is unclear, they at least suggest
the shortage of good land and the predominance of ordi nary
and relatively poor agricultural land. The Chinese also
have been explicit in stating that sizable percentages of
their cropped land are subject to a variety of environmental
hazards, all of which threaten yearly crop output and over-
all economic stability. Again, evaluation of these assertions
is difficult, but they do emphasize the necessity for the
careful management and control of China's physical resources.
Man and Nature: Traditional Views
Let there be no action contrary to
Nature, and there is nothing that
will not be well regulated.
--Taoist Commentary
* Average July rainfall for most of North china is G to 9
inches recorded on 9 to 13 days per month; Washington, D.;;.,
averages about the same number of days of recorded rainfall
but its total for the month is only 4.Z5 inches.
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7. Harmony between man and nature was a basi c
philosophy of ancient China, originating in Chinese
folklore with elaborations from those philosophical-
ethical precepts of Taoisi,i and huddhism that were
assimilated into Chinese culture. Practical observations
of what happened when man tampered with his environwent
undoubtedly helped strengthen these philosophical under-
pinnings, as suggested by the following armorial of
Ch'eng Hao to Emperor Shen-tsung, ca. A.D. 1075, which
stated:
It is not merely that the natu re
of things has been violated, but
that the mountains from which
forests and woods grow have all
been laid bare by indiscriminate
cutting and burning. As these
depredations still go uncurbed,
the fish of the stream and the
beasts of the field are cut
short in their abundance and
the things of nature are be-
coming wasted and exhausted.
What can be done about it?
8. The belief that China had achieved a harmonious
relationship with the earth reinforced the belief of 18th
century Western humanists in the superiority of Oriental
culture in general and Chinese culture specifically.
Chinese philosophical views toward nature were contrasted
to those of Western man, conditioned by his Judeo-Christian
heritage: man is created in God's image, he has been given
dominion over the earth, and he shall subdue nature so that
progress will continue and a better tomorrow he realized.
9. In spite of official injunctions against actions
"contrary to nature," the Chinese in the course of more
than three millennia of intensive occupance of their land
probably altered their environment to a greater extent than
has any other civilization. This record is impressive
whether measured by the changed appearance of the Chinese
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landscape or by the immense physical labor involved and
the massive amounts of earth materials removed and re-
shaped. The North China Plain, for example, has been
under intensive cultivation for so long that its "natural"
vegetation still is a subject of scholarly debate. Some
2,000 years ago almost a';1 of the lower Yangtze Valley
was chokeu with thick forests and extensive swamps; several
centuries of clearing and drainage work were necessary
before the regulated, almost geometrical landscape of
the present day c!nerged. Although continued tillage and
expansion of cultivated land produced an often dramatic
physical modification, the process itself was viewed as
part of a never-ending cycle of life. The constant working
and re?oork i ng of the soil, with continual return to the
earth of its products in the form of compost and fertilizer,
renewed the soil's abilit+,' to produce again sustenance for
mankind.
10. Man thus was a much more active participant in
altering the physical landscape of China than Western
humanists realized. The Chinese recognized that environ-
mental mastery was not only a legacy of their legendary
founders but also a necessity. The manipulation and
management of the environment were viewed, however, not as
subjugation of nature but rather as cooperation with and
adjustment to natural conditions.
11. A significant change in man-land relationships
became apparent by the mid-19th century. The physical
resources upon which agriculture depended had been stretched
to the breaking point, and, increasingly, erosion and
flooding damaged cropland, famine became more common, and
the general standard of living of the peasantry declined
markedly.* Much of this breakdown can be traced directly
or indirectly to the rapid increase in population that had
taken place since the beginning of the 18th century --
from about 150 million to perhaps 430 million by 1850.
Other factors such as bureaucratic corruption cntd
inefficiency, military ineffectiveness, the impact of
the Western nations, and fiscal problems also played
important roles.
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Although increased agricultural productivity was recorded
during this time span, much new land was required to pro-
vide sufficient food for tho. rapidly cirow'inq population.
Most of this new land was in South China, where sett.l ers
cleared forested uplands and planted mountain fi el ds of
corn and sweet potatoes.* But careless tilling of the
uplands speeded erosion, which in turn led to more frequent
and serious -fl ood i ng in the valleys and plains, as indicated
by a contemporary 19th century source:
Formerly the bed of the Hsiang River
[a tributary of the Han River located
in south.:estern Honan and northern
Hupeh] was several tens of feet deep.
Ever since the systematic deforesta-
tion consequent upon maize growing,
the topsoil has been washed down by
torrential rains . . The further
upstream one goes, the shallower the
ri""er bed becomes. Small wonder that
from 1821 to the present [ca.1838]
there has hardly been a year in which
the Hsiang River did not flood.
12. Pessimism permeated the reports of both Western
and Chinese earth scientists who in the 1912-1949 period
investigated the status of China's physical resources and
probl ems . The more striking and serious problems were in
North China. Although locally some progress had been made
to combat erosion through contour plowing of slope lands
and the construction of terraces, erosion was so widespread
and so little ground cover remained that improvement seemed
Corn and cwcet potatoes, crops native to the Americas,
Were introduced into Clnna in the late Z6th century. They
soon were well established in the Chinese agricultural
system bccauce of their high yields and adaptability to
e720irOflm ntal conch tionc unsuited to rice, wheat, and other
traditional staples.
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impossible without major capital-intensive projects under
governmenL auspices . In contrast, management of land re-
sources in the lowlands of South China was more successful
principally because rice -- the dominant crop -- required
the leveling and diking of small parcels of land and a
carefully regulated flow of water into the fields (Figure 1).
Consequently, irrigated rice farming produced an agricultural
system that maximized the use of available land resources
and minimized damage to them. Reckless use of nearby unland
fields continued, however, and erosion often was so rapid
that some land had to be abandoned because of exhausted soil
fertility after no more than two or three seasons of culti-
vation. By the end of Manchu rule in 1911 and the opening
of China to wide-scale modernization, damage to the
environment had so worsened that traditional methods cf
combating these problems no longer were effective. The
lack of technical knowledge of how best to combat environ-
mental difficulties remained a serious drawback, and the
lack of a truly effective national government prevented
the introduction of enough technical advisors and sufficient
capital to initiate large-scale land and water conservancy
programs.
Man and Nature: Post - 1949 Developments
No matter how big the hiZZ,s are
and how deep the gullies can be,
they are inanimate things. But
men are living being.. We have
our hardworking hands.
Mao Tse-tung -- "The Foolish Old San Who
Removed the Mountain"
13. Since 1949 China's millions have been enjoined to
"conquer" and "transform" nature, to "harness" the deserts,
and in other ways to alter the physical environment for the
benefit of man. Chairman Mao, the oft-cited source and in-
spiration for these admonitions, over the years has issued
a series of exhortations demanding fulfillment of a variety
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Figure 1. North China landscapes (above) reflect dry field agriculture,
lack of protective upland vegetation, and severe erosion -- particularly
in loess areas. Rice landscapes of South China (below) maximize land re-
sources through elaborate water control measures and terracing.
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of environment-related tasks. Recently, the "changing
nature" theme has reappeared in the Chinese press, which
features articles centered around Mao's instructions, in-
dicati ng progress made and work currently underway.
14. The view of nature as an "enemy" and the
glorification of man as an instrument of change contrasts
with traditional Chinese views of adjustment to and
harmony with nature. The aggressive tone of the PRC
leaders' rhetoric is in keeping with Marxist-Maoist views
that conflict, contrail-i ;Jon, and the struggle are the
proper condition of society and, indeed, its most i im-
portant dynamic. The emphasis in Chinese tr.,atment of
its environmental problems has been on what man can do,
under the guidance of the Party, to initiate change and
bring about improvement.
15. Major Chinese efforts have focused on water
conservancy and protective afforestation, including both
large-scale state-directed and -financed projects and a
host of local works involving little investment but
massive amounts of rural labor. During the early years
of economic rehabilitation (1949-52), emphasis was on
repair of dikes, irrigation canals, locks, and similar
facilities. Additionally, work commenced almost im-
mediately on two major flood control projects, the Huai
River and the Ching -- the latter name applied to that
portion of the middle Yangtze River down to southern
Hupeh.* Later, when the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57)
was announced, a modest amount of state investment was
allocated to initiate major, long-term programs designed
to control the perennially unruly rivers of North China --
the Huang, the Huai , and the Hai (Map F) .
The Ching project involved the construction of dikes
and sluice gates to provide a flood retention basin for
the Yangtze south of Sha-shih.
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PPRC: North (.:hind River Basins
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16. More specific plans relating to protection and
improvement of the physical environment were incorporated
in the Twelve-Year Plan (1956-67) of the National Agri-
cultural Development Program, adopted in 1958. These
included such basics as increased development of water
conservancy works, irrigation, and flood and drought
control projects, with emphasis upon small and medium-
sized projects, soil improvement, extension of soil and
water conservation practices, promotion of afforestation,
and expansion of the network of meteorological and
hydrological stations. Use of the commune and its
organizational structure to mobilize the rural masses
was the principal means specified to implement the
objectives of the Plan.
17. Planning and work on some early projects was
hampered by an inadequate data base and the lack of
scientifically trained personnel. Tc remedy the situation
China's scientists undertook, with some Soviet help, a
series of major surveys designed to inventory, describe,
and interpret physical conditions of key areas and their
s,rtghtti r,(' ~ + ~
nr'~
..
nliinn f ~
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specific problems. Priority was given to studies of the
loess areas of the middle Huang Ho (Yellow River) basin
and the extensive arid areas of western China. By the
late 1950's the results of some of these efforts were
beginning to be published in the form of major monographs
and articles in technical and professional journals.
More specific technical material undouhtedly was forwarded
to appropriate ministries in Peking for use in particular
projects.
Controlling the Huang Ho
If you zazit till the Huang 11o i
clear, hots old will you be?
--Chinese Proverb
18. Matteo Ricci, the pioneer Jesuit missionary
to China in the late 16th century, remarked that: "The
Yellow River has no respect at all for Chinese law and
order. It comes from a barbarous region and . fre-
quently ravages whole districts of the realm, silting
them up with sand, and changing its course at will ."
Though news to Europeans, Father Ricci 's description and
characterization of the river merely reiterated what the
Chinese had know-,n since earliest times: control of the
turbulent Huang Ho was the most persistent and serious
environmental problem in all of China.
19. The PRC leadership placed a high priority on
a plan to permanently control the Huang, eliminating its
periodic floods and erratic changes in course and at the
same time more fully utilizing the river both for power
generation and as a source of irrigation water. Ac-
cordingly, in 1955 the "Report on the Multi-Purpose Plan
for the Permanent Control of the Yellow River and
Exploitation of Its Water Resources" was presented to the
National People's Congress. The plan, ambitious in concept
and massive in scope, was based upon earlier studies and
recommendations, plus post-1949 investigations. It called
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for construction of a series of multi-purnose dams desi 'ned
for flood control , power generati on, irrigation , and navi
gati on purposes . The most t~ubl i ci zed project was the
building of a giant hydroelectric dam at San-men (Three
Gates), a point on the Huang upstream a few miles from
where the river and its volley widen before emerging on
the North China Plain (Hap F) . Smaller dams were planned
upstream from San-men, including two on the upper Huang
near Lan-chou, plus a series of reservoirs on principal
tributaries. But the key to success was, in the words of
the plan, the necessity . . to develop at the same time
large-scale water and soil conservation works in Kansu,
Shensi, and Shansi Provinces and other loess regions."
Numerous soil and water conservancy targets were spelled
out in the plan (Figure 2).
20. It probably was inevitable that the massive
physical changes required to reduce soil erosion did not
in fact occur to any significant degree, given the short
time schedule for construction of the San-men project
(1957-61), the inmense size of the soil and water conser-
vancy tasks (only 5 percent of the loess area was covered
by trees), and the dizzying rural organizational changes
of the period. The San-men Dam was essentially completed
in 1961 and a mamnoth reservoir was to have been filled,
taking several hundred thousand hectares of cropland out
of production (Figure 3). But it was soon discovered that
the silt load of the river had not been measurably reduced:
by 1963 the penstocks were: clogged with mud. Since then
the gates have remained open and the Huang Ho continues as
before -- transporting its heavy burden of silt seaward.
21. Mention of the Huang Flo project, and particularly
of San-mein Dam, virtually ceased in the PRC press after 1961.
In late 1963 and continuing until the advent of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, an occasional article appeared on proper
techniques to reduce erosion and soil and water losses in
the middle Huang Valley. Only recently have press items
reappeared commenting on the overall problem of the Huang.
Progress is related in general terms, usually tied to one
or more of Chairman Mao's statements, but specific references
are to small-scale local achievements rather than a review of
accomplishments throughout the Huang Ho basin. No mention,
for example, is made of the 1955 plan nor of the great mass
of concrete at San-men.
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Figure 2. The key to control of the Huang Ho is minimizing erosion
from barren loess-covered uplands. Terracing and the planting of
protective vegetation on non-cultivated slopes are essential.
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Figure 3. San-men Dam, nearing completion
in 1961, was expected to prevent serious
flooding (as below), provide irrigation
water from its massive reservoir, and gen-
erate power. Only limited flood control
benefits have as yet been realized from
San-men.
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22. It is clear that Chinese planners grievously
underestimated the importance of systematic, long term
soil and water conservancy work in the loess-mantled
middle reaches (Shensi , Shansi , and eastern Kansu) of the
Huang, origin of almost nine-tenths of the sediment load
of the river. Press reports of 1963 and later clearly
indicated that diverse physical factors present in the
middle Huang Valley had not been taken into account. A
December 1963 People's Daily article stated that hence-
forth "geographical considerations based on actual practice"
would be the criteria to be followed in future local land
and water conservancy projects. Earlier, for example,
projects suitable for a particular physical environment had
been imposed on other areas with differing physical
conditions -- with predictable results. In the future,
according to the article, ". . . preventive measures [soil
and water conservancy projects] should be geared exactly to
the problems as they exist."
The Huai and Hai River Basins Projects
Water Conservcowy is the Lifeblood
of Agriculture
--Mao Tse-tung
23. Two other problem rivers, the Huai and Hai ,
received early attention from PRC leaders. Both river
basins suffered from excessive loads of silt and from
their inability to discharge through their silt-clogged
channels a sufficient volume of water to prevent flooding
during periods of heavy rains. Although flood prevention
was the most immediate problem, other objectives included
water for irrigation and the generation of electricity.
24. Early work on the Huai consisted principally of
repair and rehabilitation of existing facilities. Because
considerable engineering data were available from pre-1949
studies on control of the Huai , the PRC was able to shift
quickly into a comprehensive program involving the building
of new outlets, straightening river courses, and the con-
struction of reservoirs. The pace, direction, and emphasis
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of the plans, however, frequently changed. Announced
successes were often followed by later admissions of
failure. Familiar problems arose -- uncoordinated efforts,
incompetent planning, hasty work, poor maintenance of com-
pleted works, and failure to complete basic erosion control
in headwater areas.
25. By late 1972 a Chinese article proclaimed that
the basin " . . had been transformed."* The construction
work of over two decades certainly has superficially trans-
formed the Huai basin landscape with new reservoirs, new
river channels and outlets, and a host of lesser works
;.impleted. Whether the transformation has completely
eliminated the chronic problems of the Huai awaits the test
of prolonged heavy rains and lengthy dry spells before a
final verdict can be reached (Figure 4).
26. The Hai River, a short but important stream in
the northern port-ion of the North China Plain, serves as
the outlet for five major streams that wind across the
northern Plain and which unite just west of 'Tientsin. This
portion of the Plain long has been subject to serious
flooding and its agricultural potential limited by consider-
able amounts of waterlogged and alkalinized or salinized
land. Although some flood control projects were completed
during tip,: 1954-1960 period, very serious flooding in 1963,
when all five rivers overflowed, prompted a decree from
Chairman Mao Tse-tung that "The Hai Ho must be brought under
permanent control." (See Chronology of Water Control
Projects and Problems . . . following text.)
27. A variety of projects were subsequently under-
taken, including major drainage projects that have involved
the digging of new channels and providing new outlets.
Nevertheless, an April 1973 broadcast from Anhwei told
of the "first stage" of a Huai project calling for a
123-km canal and the construction of bridges, regulators,
and navigation locks to relieve some 400, 000 hectares of
cultivated Zand from the threat of flooding.
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Figure 4. Major Huai and Hai River projects have been
carried out to reduce waterlogging through improved
drainage and leveling of individual fields and to less-
en flooding by construction of new channels and locks.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Progress also has been made in rd l ievi nn w-:ate.rlnclni ncj and
sal inc conditions, thus ii,iprovino existing cultivated laud
and reclaiming additional land. The area of alkaline land,
according to recent reports, has been reduc:od by half.
Overall, the amount of work done in the llai basin is
impressive (flap G).
28. Although the probability of scri ous flooding in
the Ilai basin certainly has been greatly reduced, the long
term success of the present programs will depend upon
efficient management of the newly created control and
drainage systems. Dikes must be inspected and strengthened,
protective ve,:-tation on the dikes maintained, water seepage
from streams to areas of sandy soil control lei:, dr' dgi ng
continued, and pumps continually maintained and repaired.
Improved crop yields can be expected over the next few years
from land that previously had been waterl ogped , although
salinized soil must be leached fur years before it becomes
fully productive. Some successes have been achieved in
reducing the area of alkaline land, but the complicated
network of new channels must be operatively synchronized
to prevent the development of additional problems of water-
logging and salinization following periods of above-normal
rainfall.
Afforestation
Develop forestry and clothe all poscibZe
bare land with green.
--The National Program for Agricultural
Development
i ng
of trees on previously 5arren hillsides, along major roads,
and in the cities. Visible contrasts between pre-1949
conditions and the present are great (flap I-I) . How much
has actually been accomplished is difficult to determine,
even though abundant statistics have been released on land
afforested -- particularly during the first decade of PRC
rule. It is clear that the yearly figures have contained
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25X1
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PRC: The Hai Ho Basin
Chl?nlnp
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Under construction
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