SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL',' NO 1, JANUARY 1966

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• Publication Date: August 23, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

T A NC) '966 SELECTFD TRAN S LAT IONS FRC)lit
'VC)Y1--i,NNAYA I`TY SI., , NO 1 ,
23 gu s t 19 /2 FT)T? TRANS NC) 966
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rni
t
LLI
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATI ON
Number 966
23 August 1966
SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL',"
No 1, January 1966
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Approved For Release 20M??9MtC,IAIMIII5A9W5M 348HREA MYSL' "
Issue No 1, January 046
Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR
Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministrv's Military Publishing House,
Moscow. The articles translated below are .erom Issue No 1, January 1966
which was signed for the press 25 December 1965.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
?age
The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Knowledge
and Its Significance In Soviet Military
Science and Practice, by Maj Gen N. Sushko.
and Capt 2d Rank V. Puzik
Essence and Phenomenon in Military Affairs,
by Col I. Grudinin 17
Combat Operations by Tank Units Against Operational
Defense Reservc:d1 by Lt Gen (Res) B. Arushanyan 29
Factors Influencing the Organizational
Structure of Ground Forces, by Col
M. Kir'yan
36
Logistical Support for Troop Regroupings,
by Maj Gen A. Skovoroda 45
A New Edition of a Scholarly Work on War and
the Army
A Necessary Book for Generals an(i. Officers
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SIGNIFICANCE
IN SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE AND PRACTICE,
by Maj-Gen N. Suohko and Capt 2d Rand V. Puzik
CPYRGHT
Valdimir Il'ich Lenin emphasized repeatedly that gnoseological
(theory-of-knowledge) problems of the development of science were becom-
ing extremely urgent because of the very needs of the development of concrete
sciences, because of the necessity to deepen and expand research on' the
problems which had arisen for science This principle applieb to any
specific field of scientific knowledge, including Soviet military seience.
Problems of the theory of knowledge are of 'specially great importance for
our military science for the following main reasons.
First, the modern revolution in the military field has caused
qvalitative changes in the former principles of the general theory of,
the art of war and of the doctrine of forms and methods of waging war.
Many concepts and categories of military science have been subj(:.cted to
radical change; some are gradually dying out, as obsolete; others which)
in the course' of development armilitary theory, reflect modern military
practice, are being filled out. with new content. A process is going on '.
of forming new concepts and categories which reflect the eSsential traits
of the qualitative transformations brought about by the revolution .in
the military field. These processes, taking nlace in Soviet military
science, require deep scientific analysis from positions of the
Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge.
Second, the revolution in the military field has brought about a
new stage in the scientific understanding of the principles governing
the course and outcome of modern war. The complicated internal relations
of armed Conflict with the use of nuclear missiles and other means pf
mass destruction have brought into being new special methods of research.'
Today more and more military theoritts and practitioners are using
mathematical methods of analysis and generalization of empirical data.,
and cybernetic devices for scientific predictions and working out
optimum splutioris in the development of models of weapons and combat
equipment and in conducting military operations. There is ever wider
use of various deductive methods of' arriving, from some general
principles and, rules of military practice, at private theoretical positions
and concrete recommendations in regulations as to leadership and com-
mand of armed conflict. In this conneCtion? gnoseoq.ogical analysis
of new methods of military-scientific research, their cognitive possibil-
ities, and study of the interrelations of these methoas with dialectical-
materialistic theories of knowledge assume special importance.
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Third, the revlolution in the military field has caused qualitative
changes in the nature of combat activities and the combat training of
troops These changes have complicated combat practice and have increas-
ed the role of scientifically-based guidance of the whole life and the
combat activities of troops. Hence the objective requirement to improve
the philosophical training of command personnel as an essential pre-
requisite to creative direction of trOopu in their every-day activities
and in the course of combat actions.
4
Consequently, military practice and the interests of furthardavelqp-
ment of Soviet military theory confront military specialists and phil-
osophers,with many concrete problems which can only be solved on the basis
of study of the principles and requirements of Marxist-Leninist theory
of knowledge.
The principles and requirements of dialectical materialism's
theory of knowledge
Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge is the doctrine of the Source
of any scientific knowledge, of the acquisition of kmwledge of the
objective world as ,a dialectical process of reflecting the material world
in the consciousness of people in concepts, categories, laws and theories
of science, of the ways of attaining oWective,truths, and of the role
of practice as the basis'of cognition and the criterion of truth.
In creating the dialectical materialistic theory of knowledge,
Marx, Engels and Lenin proceeded from the very important principle of
the theory of reflection, that the consciousness of man is the highest
form of refledtion of .the objective world. This theory of knowledge is
the apillication of the principles of the dialectical materialistic theory
of reflection to the process of cognition of the world by man. The
organic interrelation of the theory of knowledge and the theory of reflec-
tion constitutes the immeasurable superiority ,of Marxist-Leninist
gnoseology over all pre-Marxist, and modern bourgeois, gnoseology. .
The dialectical materialistic theory of knowledge has 4 universal
character, because it provides a gener?1 doctrine of the laws and
principles of scientific knowledge of the world. Specific sciences do
not have any special theories of knowledge. TheoretiCally generalizing
the experience of specific sciences in the acquisition of knowledge of
the objective world, dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge
reveals and formulated the general laws of cognition; it formulates the
general principles and requirements for scientific acquisition of
knowledge, which serve as methodology 'for constructing theory?in each
science and the scientific basis for the activities Of people in the.
revolutionary re-making of society. And it is because dialecti, al
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dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge fulfills the function
Of a single theory of scientific knowledge that its principles and
emancts should be applied in any field of scientific research, and also
in practical activities;"...in their practice people are guided completly
and. exclusively by the materialistic theory of knowlddge.Y. (Lenin, Complete
Collected, Works, Vol. 15, p. 1)43).
Let us examine the basic principles of Nhrxist-Leninist gnoseology
in the acquisition of knowledge of armed conflict.
Unity of the empirical and the ical. The experience of military
science in the scier'ific acquisition of knowledge, and all military
practice a, its bas Ta and goal, show that any study of armed conflict
begins With the accumulation of factual material. Observing the activi-
ties of units of various sizes in various training and combat situations,
the military researcher collects empirical data. For this purpose. he '
makes use of exper:1',ental methods in the form of proving-ground trials
and various experinntal exercises and maneuvers, and also. of the method
of statistical observation, enabling him to systematize the Selection of
facts. But study of armed conflict is not limited to the accumulation'
of empirical data. It should go on to abstract theoretical generalization
of the empirical data. By special scientific methods the military research-
er proceeds from knowledge of the phenomena of armed conflict and under-
standing of its essentials to the discovery of cause-and-effect relation-
shipso'to the discovery of the laws of armed conflict. The theoretical
generalizations tested in practice are incorporated in regulations and
manuals on the conduct of military operations and in methods of making
calculations for the application of weapons and equipment in combat.
. The movement of the acquisition of knowledge from the accumulation
of empirical information to abstract thought, to theoretical generaliza-
tion; is inherent in the process of cognition in any field of objective
reality. It is one of the most important laws of knowledge. It shows
that empirical knowlodge and abstract thinking are two different levels
of knowledge; a lower and a higher. EMpirical knowledge gives us
knowledge of the phenomena, and logical thinking; knowledge of the essences,
the hidden principles which govern the phenomena of the objective world.
Based on this law, dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge.
has formulated one of the initial gnoseological principle without which
it is impossible correctly to understand the whole succeeding process of
knowledge in any specific field--the principle of the unity of empirical
knowledge and logical thought. This basic principle of the Marxist-
Leninist theory of knowledge teaches our military cadres to approach
dialectically the very process of acquiring knowledge of armed conflict,
to apply flexibly various methods of study of empirical information and
of theoretical development of It, and also methodS. of practical testing
of the truth of theoreical principles of military science.
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The aip..111222a of the unity of theory and practice. Theoretical
knowledge: the higheut leveler Scientific knowledge, is not an end
in itself. Soviet Military science formulates various theories (in
which are expressed the relations, conforming to laws, of' the phenomena
and processes of armed conflict) in order to utilize 'knowledge of
these principles for the attainment of victory. Such relationship of
theory and practice exists in alifields of knowledge and practical actfv-
ity of people. Man acquires an understanding of the, laws of' nature
and society in order, in his practical activity, to transform nature and
make: revloutionary changes in social life.
Proceeding from this, Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge formu-
lates the principle of the unity of theory and practice. Applied to '
Soviet military science and, modern military practice, this principle
means that military theory'is based on military practice: orginates from
it, and is given life, corrected: And tested in the course of training and
combat activities of troops. In its turn, modern'military practice is
guided by scientific military theory.
The unity of theory and practice is a dialectical unity in which
practice has the leading role, by virtue of the fact that it is the basis
and the purpose of 'theoretical understanding of the objective world, aid
is the only objective criterion of the truthof scientific theoiies. ,
The prinicple of the unity of theory and practice should be approachd
creatively, with consiaeration of the specific characteristics and condi-
tions of the circumstances in which certain problems are being solved.
This means that any belittling or exaggeration of the importance of .
theory will inevitably lead to a break between practice and theory,
to a loss of the scientific theoretical bases for practical activity,
and to "practicaliseand subjectivism in the activities of our cadres.
Under-evaluation of theory and over-evaluation of practice is the
gnoseological root of subjectivistic and arbitrary decisions which do not.
have sufficient scientific theoretical foundation. A creative approach to
the unity of theory and practice means also that in certain stages of
the development of scientific knowledge and practice, the importance, of
theory may increase, and it may become of primary importance. It has
just such importance in the present-day situation of Soviet military
science. The deep and all-round development of military science, the
mastery of military theory by all officer personnel, is one of the
conditions for the high combat-capability of the Soviet armed forces, and
their readiness at any time to meet any aggressor with crushing resistance.
The principle of the concreteness of truth. Proceeding from the very
important position of philosophical materialism as to the possibility of
knowing the real world, Marxist-Leninist gnoseology considers the main
goal of knowledge to be the attainment of truth, that is, a true reflec-
tion of objective reality in human ideas, and in scientific theories of
the laws of its development. Then, and only then, car socialpractice be
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guided ty theory. In modern wax, armed forces which are guided by mili-
tary doctrine and principles of the art of war which do not reflect the
objective conformity to natural. laws (zakonnoxnernosti) of armed conflict
cannot gain the Victory (other things being equal) over an enemy Abbe
action are based on doctrine and theory which reflect the objective
truth of armed conflict.
Dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge teaches that comprehen-
sion of objective truth is a long process, in the course of which man goes
from ,the subjective idea "to objective truth through 'practice' (and
techniques 17-bekhniks.2)" (V. I. Lenin; Comlete Collected Works, Vol.
29, p. 183). It is for this reason that Mamist-Lenininist gnoseology
demands a .concrete approach to scientific knowledge. ' There is no
abstract truth; truth is always concrete (Lenin, 2n. cit., vol. 8,
p. oo). For Soviet military science, concreteness of truth means that
cognition (posnaniye) can adequately reflect military'reality only if ,
it takes the object of cognition -- armed conflict -- in concrete his-
torical circumstances of time and place. What was objectively true in the
principles and rules of the Soviet art of ,war of the period of World
War II .cannot be completely and unconditiOnallY- accepted for the practical
operations of our troops in war today. Nuclear weapons and rockets '
have brought forth new laws of armed conflict. Concrete analysis of the
experience' of past wars is necessary to make possible fruitful use of
that experience under modern conditions,
Lenin saw concrete amalysis of' the concrete situation as the very
essence of Marxism, as its vital dialectical soul. He developed this
gnoseological principle further in the following words: "The whole ,
soul of Marxism; its whole system, demands .that every thesis be examined
only (a) historically, (b) only in relation, to others, and (c) only in
relation . to. the concrete experience of history" (22. cit.). vol. 49, p.329) .
Such are the basis principles of the theory of knowledge of dialectical
materialism. Lenin points out that along with these principles, of great
importance also are the so-called elements of the dialectic, which
confront any scientific knowledge with a number of fundamental
(p:c.intsipal'nyye) requirements. Following are the main ones.
The requirement of objectivity of consideration. Objective
consideration =riot examples, not deviations, but the thing itself"
(Lenin, 22. cit vol. 29, p. 202) -- thus Lenin formulates the essence
of this most important gnoseological principle; which expresses a basic
and completely obligatory requirement of any scientific research. It
follows from the fact that the subject of knowledge of any science
exists objectively. People cannot arbitrarily change the conforming-
to-law nature of .phenomena and the processes of surrounding reality; they
must come to know these-laws, and build their activity on the basis of
these laws.
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The correct relationship between the objective and the subjective
is of tremendous importance for military activity. While based on
materialistic ideas of the objective nature of the laws of armed conflict,
Soviet military science by no means makes a fetish of these 1awb, but
teaches our cadres to utilirx them actively for victory Over 'the enemy.
This makes it possible successfully to develop the Soviet art pf war and
to combine orgnically a comprehensive evalutation of the objectively
existing circumstances with decisive actions and dependable provision
to the troops of the necessary means of warfare.
The requirement of comprehensiveness of examination. Objecipe
consideration assumes knowledge of phenomena and processes in the concrete
conditions of real existence, and especially from the point of view of
the multiform relations of a given phenomenon or process with others.
Hence we have still another requirement of the Marxist-Leninist theory
of knowledge -- comprehensiveness of condideration, or examination, of the
object of cognition. 'The totality of all aspects of a phenomenon, of
reality, and their interrelationships--thic is what constitutes truth,"
said Lenin in Philosophical Notebooks (Imo' cit., vol. 29, p 178).
This requirement is of first importance for Soviet military science
and for the practical activity of officers and commanders of all ranks,
both in time of ipeace and of war. Strategy, dperations and tactics,'
obviously, should be developed, not just on the basis of personal ,
experience, but on comprehensive generalization of all the combat
experience of troops (and also the experience of the combat operations of
a ;probable enenw), on deep study of the laws of armed conflict, and on
scientific understanding of the nature of modern military operations.
It is necessary, for example, not to judge as to the strength and capabil-
ities of the enemy and the condition of his units from separate items of
information and facts, but to do so-after having studied all the elements
of the combat situation and their interrelations and inter-dependencies.
Only then will a well-founded de4Sion for a battle (or an operation) be
possible. For the officer called upon to command troops during combat
operations, the following statements of Lenin are of urgent importance:
"In order really to know an object, it is necessary to encompass and
study all its aspects, all its relations, and the 'intermediaries between
it and other objects. We will ndver achieve this completely, but the
requirement of comprehensiveness will guard us against mistakes and against
/7tentq7 necrosis" (22. cit., vol, 42 p. 290).
The requirement to study the object of knowledge in its movement
and development. Military research, as wea as practice, cannot achieve
correspondence of thought with reality if ,,it ignores the actually exist-
ing uninterrupted development and improve:bent of military equipment and
weapons and the improvement of methods and -forms of armed conflict.
Ability to see, analyze and consider changes in the circumstances and
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possibilities of armed conflict and of military equipment, and lin the
relative strength of forces? and to draw 'correct conclusions from
them and to provide for wise revision' of' training and. indoctrination of
troops -- all this ' impells command personnel to make original decisions,
work out plans independently, introduce into them 'timely changes in
accordance with the changing military situation, and persistently put
them into effect. Boldness of thought of the Soviet officer and military
commander should be .combined with and supplemented by boldness of
action.
Observance of this requirement 'of Marxist-Leninist theory of
knowledge makes it possible to discover the relation of the preserrb.
.stage of development of military theory and practice. to the past and.
future, to* evaluate objectively military experience', to take, from'it
everything valuable and necessary' for present-day and 'to fore-
see the future. This helps our military cadres to determine both the
irianediate tasks and, the long-range ones in their work.
Such are the basic principle a and requirements of Marxist-Leninist
theory "of knowledge They are not a subjective construction of gnos e-
blogical principles and rules, remote from practical scientific knowledge
of the world, but' express the most general laws of human knowledge.
This is why they are scientific theory-of-knowledge principles and
requirements, the observance of which is a necessary condition for the
attainment of truth.
Some yroblems of Soviet military science and. aactice in
the light of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge.
Dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge constitutes the gno6e-
?logical foundation by any science, including ?Soviet military science.
This means that penetrating into the essence of the phenomena of armed
conflict is subject to the general laws of scientific knowledge, its
princii)les and requirements. By the application of them, the most
varied military fields come to be understood. In the light of dialecti-
cal materialism's theory of knowledge, the direction becomes clearer in
the solution of military theoretical and practical problems. Let us
examine some of them, to show again the -vast importance of the theory
of knowledge for Soviet military science and practice of today.
The p_r_oblem of the subject of Soviet military science. It has always
been a pressing one. Its solution, because of the revocutioli in the
military field and, the unusually complicated nature of the development
of the phenomena and processes of military reality, has assumed ?
especially great importance. Therefore the ceaseless discussion is to
be expected which is pursuing the goal- of accurately defining the subject
and, content of our military science, of bringing it into correspondence
with the deep chaM8YWP
IR,T63k44.&5031661bick1041162Wilitary field, in
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order on this basis to mobilize the military (tadres for deep study of
new problems of military theory and practice.
What does it mean, from the point of view of the theory of
knowledge, to define the subject of a specific science? It means to estab-
lish qualitatively a defined spliere of the objective world, the develop-
ment of which is subject to specific laws, and to make this sphereqhe
objective of cognitive and practical activity of people. Each specific .
science is a'system of knowledge of these laws. Science "in all fields ?
of knowledge," wrote Lenin, "shows us the manifestation of basic laws -
In the reeming chaos of phenomena" (2.t. cit.,. vol. 25, p. 46). And
our military science is no exception; it is a system of knowledge of
the laws of armed conflict.
The phenomena of war are unusually complex and many-sided. In
studying them in their interrelations and interactions, one gets the
impression that all these phenomena mast be included in the subject of
? Soviet military science. But such an impression can scarcely be called
? sciAntific, because it eUectically mixes together phenomena having
specific, qualitatively defined characteristics.
It must be agreed that war and armed conflict are phenomena mutually
interpenetrating one another. War is an extension of the politics Of
certain classes by the use of force. For,this very reason it is at the
Same time armed conflict, that is, the totality of means of force employ-
ed by the belligerent sides in' the interests of attaining certain class
political goals. And at the same time war, in comparison with armed
conflict, is a broader and more many-sided phenomenon. Armed conflict
does not exhaust the total content of war. During a war armed conflict
is always closely interwoven with other forms of conflict -- economic,
ideological and diplomatic conflict. And only by, combining all of them
are class and political goals achieved in modern war. Moreover, when
war comes it plunges a society into a special situation, very different
from that of peace. This depends, of course, on the scale of the war,
depending on which the society becomes more or less military,.
It is true that war, and consequently armed conflict, too, depends
on politics, and gives rise to and determines politics (or policy).
Btt,they cannot be considered as identical.on that basis. Armed conflict
is the basic attribute of war, its specific feature, its form of function-
ing, by means of which the warring sides accomplish military, and through
them, social and political tasks and achieve certain aims. In armed
conflict) as the basic form of war, is manifested the politicalessence
and the class content of war.
While being qualitatively a specific element of war, armed conflict
atl?ectiz .AisitfooldiWtiAliktifteiittiteitR6diMboiettrIvr c?nsists
in the act at the processes of development of armed conflict are subiect
8
GPYRGHT
to the operation of specific laws. MuleAN468960.11.fenin indleated,
Aprkwelicitor113eleaty 29.0011.AWOVriSA5FDEMTAMerriZr, opeaTing arMed up-
rising as a form of political struggle.
Consequently; examination of war as a social-historical phenomenon.
and armed conflict as a form of manifestation of its political essence
and class content; shows that these are interrelated by qualitntiveLy
different phenomena, each subject to its own lawn of development. For
war: these are laws of its dependence On the politics of certain classes,
laws expressing relationship to the means of production of material
goods, to 'the prevailing production relationships. For armed conflict,
these are laws expressing the objective connections and causal relations
of the phennmena and processes in coobat activitiescri lama asd sea and:
in the air. The two rows of these laws are inteTconnectect, but that they
are -qualitatively distinct., from the-point of view of dialectical
materialism's theory of knowledge, must be constantly kept in mind if
we desire to define correctly the subject of Soviet military science.
Of what does this subject consist? Soviet military science does
not specially study the laws of war a social phenomena, This is the
subject of Mancist-Leninist sociology -- historical materialism and
some other sciences (for example; political economy, which studies the
problems of the effect of economics on wars). Our military science,
in working out problems of military tSeory and in military practice; uses
the date of these and other sciences taking into account the great influ-
ence on armed conflict of political, economic, geographic, national and
other factors, in which the general laws of War are specifically
manifested. Its subject is. armed Conflict; the laws; principles, and
rules for carrying it on to victory.
Soviet military science is a system of scientific know:Inds?
of the laws of armed conflict and military affairs (voyennoye
knowledge of the conditions and factors which affect the course and
results of armed conflict, and thf t)-e principles and rules of die of
war, based on understanding of these laws. In essence, it is a theory of
the military field in its total scope. Recognition of the laws oi
armed conflict as the subject of our military science makes possible a
certain division of labor among the sciences which study the various
aspects of war as a social-pclitical phenomenon. Study of the laws of
armed_ conflict as the basic specific feature of war orients our military
cadres to the working out of fundamental problems of armed conflict with
the use of nuclear missiles and other means of mass destruction. At
the same time It does net exclude the need for Soviet military science
to take into account the data of other sciences and to use them in
developing its own General theory., military strategy, operational
methods, and tactics, and tin the theory and organization of combat
traling and military and political indoctrination of personnel.
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The founder? of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge
pointed out that each ?pacific ncionce in not just a nyotem of knowledge
about apecific lava of the development of the objective world, but in
at the name time a doetrine of the methods of (Judy of those lawn.
Science in a unity of theory and method.
Special methoda used for the at:0y and acquisition of knowledge of
variouo aopecto of the material world are determined b' the ?pacific
subject of the ?clone?. Thin in natural. Each object of scientific
invootigation require? opocial method? of ayotematization, analysio,
and theoretical generalizatJon of the empirical information. For
example, the age of our planet is ntudied in geology by the method of
radioactive decay, and the nature of minerals, Iv the roentgenometer.
Military ocience, too, ha? special methods of reuearch. HUt
inasmuch an it occupiers a border position between the natural, tech-
nical, and social ociencee, some of their methods are also peculiar
to it. Thus, military spocialinto engaged in developing the latent
models of weapon? and equipment make extensive use of the methods of
mathematics, otatiotico, cybernetics and other sciences.
Of great theoretical and practical importance In the scientific
classification of the special methods of investigation of the pheno-
mena of armed conflict, which are one of the important element? of
the atructure of Soviet military science.
Some authors, in trying to solve this problem, limit the variety
of special military scientific methods just to statistical analysis
and mathematical prediction. Their claseification is arbitrary; .
failing to take into account the functions and capabilities of special
methods in the various stages. of military scientific research. This
is the result of lack of attention to the theory-of-knowledge problems
of the variouo special methods of acquiring knowledge, and also a lack _
of undemanding of the dialectical character of the process of acquiring
knowledge of tho objective world in general, and of armed conflict in
particular.
However, it is precisely the theory of knowledge which provides
a scientific bad.? for the solution of the problem of classification
of the special methods of investigating armed conflict. Any scientific
investigation, from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist gnoscology,
is carried out in the following order: preparation of the scientific
investigation, theoretical investigation, practical test of the results
? obtained. In thin sequence of the knowledge-acquirtng pxycess there
in concretely manifested the most important gnoseological principle
of the scientific acquisition of knowledge -- the principle of the
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e, a. Oti0A p'o the empirical and. the theorbtical on
the bards of practice. "From lively contemplation to abstract thought?
and from the latter to praetlee -- this is the dialectical way to
knowledge of truth, to cognition of objective reality" (op. cit.,
Vol. 29, pp 152-153). Thin principle, reflecting the objeafVe law
of any scientific acquisition of knowledge, should be the foundation
of claseification of all special methodn of investigation in Soviet
military science. In accordnnce with this principle all special
methods of investigating the phenomena and processes of armed conflict
and the military field may be divided into three basic groupn: (1)
.methods of accumulating empirical data, (2) methods of theoretical
investigation, and (3) methods of practical teeting of the results
of investigation. Uovever, these three groups of metheds in the
concrete acquisition of keouledge of armed conflict are pplied in
synthesis, in combination, supplementing one another.
The accumulation and primary systematization of factual data is
the preparatory stage of military scientific research. Bere is where
the methods of the first group are used, the methods of accumulation
of empirical data: statistical observation, including that of
historical experience; laboratory experimentation; proving ground
trials; experimental training of troops; etc.
By the second group of methods theoretical investigation ie carried
out: analysis and generalization of etatiatical data, development of
mathematical models of the processes being studied, etc. At this stage
are used the method of probability, the method of statistical analysis
and mathematical modeling, methods of the theory of operations research,
and linear and non-linear programming.
The results obtained; in the form of static and dynamic principles,
generalizations, conclusions, and practical recommendations are then
tested by methods constituting the third group. These include the
methods of game modelling: command and staff exercises, games on maps
and on actual terrain, manipulation of the results of military scientific
research on computers, research exercises, etc.
Thus classification based on the principle of movement of the
knowledge process from the accumulation of empirical data to theoretical
investigation and generalization of the deta, and thence to practice
tae test of truth, can encompaea all the many forms of special
wcthode .-.1t investigation of the phenomena and processes of armed con-
flict and the military field (delo).
The alaesificatdon shows that some methods of the first and third
groups are interrelated and interpenetrating. For example: proving
ground trials and troop exezeises. Tn the one case they Provide empiri-
cal data for military scientific xeeearch. In the other, they make
Ap1iOv
ur KiIeS5S ZUUUIUUIUJ. -
t R136Fakt FiC)?? FEI4ite 620 08/30e0WrfdittelV984i99?7*09WPAPCRatarch ; to
discover new parametere end reviremente of the objective; to test
theoretical. generalizatione under conditiono moot closely appraximating
thoao of combat; to make decinione an to further thecretical research
or application of the eesea.te obtained in thtli =meet forces, and incorporeb.
tion of the principle develeped into militery regalatione and manuala.
The principle of the unity of' 1;1-eery and practice is expressed in the
organic Interrelatit:oehtp a! the special methede of military scientific
reftearah.
What is the relatioq of special methode of Soviet military science
to dialectical materialism's thmer7 to knowledge as a general method
of scientific acquieitice of knaWledge7 As we know, at the dawn of
the developmeut of our military science? the Trotskerites asserted that
to understand military precermee it wne not neceesaryto be a Marxist
philoncpher; it wee enough to be a nalitary epecialiet; they said that
Marxist pbeloaophy aad re;:hAng to do vitt the theory of warfare, with
the practical leederehip of armies. lean and his concedes gave a
decisive rebuff to this argument against the guoseological bases of
Soviet military science. They convincingly proved the great importance
of dialectical materialism and its theory of knowledge for all fields
of military science. Hence it follows that the scientific value and
effectiveness of the special methods of military scientific research
are determined_ not in themselves, but in dependence on those philoso-
phical gnoseoleeical principles which are the foundation for their
use.
VarxisteLeninist gnoseology is that universal method of acquisition
of knowledge in relation to which the special methods of military
scientific research are manifested. It does not follawfrom this,
however, that dialectical materialiam's theory of knowledge stands
above Soviet military science, above its special methods. The latter
are individual aspects, elemental of the universal scientific methods
of acquisition of knowledge. In other words, the gnoseology of dialec-
tical materialiam appears in its concrete form when it is embodied in
the practices and methods, specific for Soviet military science/ of
understanding armed conflict.
Within certain limits the special methods of military scientific
research are independent, but at the same time they represent the
putting into practice of the principles and requirements of the uni-
versal methods of acquisition of knowledge, applied to armed conflict
and the military field. For example, the statistical method expresses
one of the principles of the theory of knowledge, requiring that the
object of study be considered in movement aad development, from the
point of view of gradual quantitative accumulation and, successive
qualitative changes. The so-called. net (setevoy) method of resep.rch,
making it possible to encompass a great variety of phenomena and
processes in their numerous connections and relations, is an expression
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PYRG HT
CPYRGHT
Ari0001:1 Rerkeldltie 2000fellii*CMABFIDP83QOUVOMPAVAik mthodo or gam-
ing phyuieal, and mathematical modelling there is put into effect one of
the procedurea of the universal method -- analogy. In experimental me-
thodo ancrtrial exerciser; of troops io manifceted the requirement of
Marxist-Leninist gnoscology to take into acme, the interrelations and
the causalities of the promises being studied.
Thum dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge is the foundation
of the special methods of military scientific research. The use of these
methods in successful when there is strict observance of the principles
and requirements of Marxist-Leninist gnoseology, which is an important
condition for the development of Soviet military theory and practice.
The problem of truth and its criteria in the theory of the art of
war. The use of the special methods and the universal method of scienti-
fic knowledge in its dialectical interrelations assures the attainment of
truth and adequate reflection of the laws of armed conflict in the princie
ples of military science and practice.
' But what is the nature of objective truth, reflected by military
theory? According to the assertions of the idealist philosophers, there
Is no absolute truth, and there can be none. Human knowledge, in their
opinion, is always relative, i.e., lacking absolute credibility. Pro-
ceeding from sucha resolution of the problem of truth, bourgeois mili-
tary theoreticians are skeptical of the possibility of attaining Objec-
tively true, completely reliable knowledge in the process of gaining know-
ledge of armed conflict.
Clausewitz, too, believed that in the field of knowledge of the pheno-
mena.of war one could count on Obtaining only probably, and not absolutely,
true knowledge, since the very subject of knowledge -- the phenomena of
war -- was a field in which chance played a part, and not one of [strict]
cause-wad-effect relationships, and the rperation of law.- One cannot fail
to see behind all such reasoning the class limitations of the German mili-
tary theorist and the direct influence of idealism.
Modern bourgeois military philosophical thought has not advanced very
far in the solution oftbe pToblenx of the nature of truth gained in the
process of acquiring knowledge of armed conflict, Of course the theore-
ticians of the West cannot fail to take into acx=t the changes in the
military field which are taking place due to the appearance of weapons of
mass destruction. In striving to study comprehensively armed conflict
Involving the use of nuclear miss lies and the latest conventional weapons,
they are doing a great deal to develop new quantitative and qualitative.
methods Of studying the various kinds of military operations under modern
conditions. However, typical of modern bourgeois military theoretical
thought is a clearly expressed agnosticism, a denial of genere., repeti-
tive, persistent and essential connections and relations in the phenomena
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CPYRGHT
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and processes of armed conflict, i. c., a denial of the operation of laws
governing thn course and outcome of armed conflict. Thus, in the book of
F. Mikshe, Atomic Weapons, and Armies (Izdatelystvo inostrannoy literrttury,
1965, p. 33), wethe thought that hef of the strategic and tactical
principles of warfare are not subject to operation of laws and thereffte
cannot be known (poznana). "These factors which cannot be calculated,"
writes Mikuhe, "eau be known only intuitively, with much depending on
chance, luck, initiative, and improved organization."
In denying .the subject-to-laws nature of armed conflict, and assert-
ing the dominance in it of chance, modern bourgeois military philosophical
thought arrives at a denial of theoretical knowledge of military phenomena.
This iu evidence that the problem of truth continues to be the key point
where modern idealistic gnoseology is closest to bourgeois military science.
Soviet military science has as its methodological base the philosophy
of Marxism-Leninism -- dialectical materialism. Resting on the principle
of VA: Marxist-Lenirlist theory of knowledge of the possibility of estab;
lishing Objective truth and thus gaining reliable knowledge, our science
believes that the phenomena and processes of armed conflict can be known,
since they are subject to the pperation of certain laws. The establish-
ment of absolute truth in knowledge of the laws of armed conflict and a
comprehensive reflection of them in theory of warfare, in other fields of
military kncwledge, and in regulations and manuals -- this constitutes the
main goal of Soviet military science.
However, as Marxist-Leninist gnoseology asserts, the attainment of
absolute truth is a process; that is, correspondence of knowledge with.
objective reality is achieved in the course of the development of human
knowledge from the sum total of relative truths. "Each step in the devel-
opment of science adds new kernels bo this total of absolute truth, but
the limits of truth of each scientific thesis is relative, sometimes being
expanded, sometimes contracted, by the further growth of knowledge," wrote
Lenin (is. cit., Vol. 18, p. 137).
From this thesis it follows, first, that in the theory of military
science is expressea relative truth, which at each stage of development
of military sc4ence is limited by the level of development of that science,
by social conditions of the life of the people: and by the level of scien
tlfic and technical progress. Second, at each stage of scientific know-
ledge of armed conflict, relative truth, expressed by military theory, cn
contains kernels of absolute truth. This is why military theory and the
principles and rules of the art of war, incorporated in regulations and
manuals, serve as the scientific basis of successful conduct of coMbat
operations. And third; from this it follows that our art of war should
continuously develop, being constantly enriched by new principles and
rules. Our military regulations should constantly improve, being contin-
uously replenished with new and more exact regulations which regulate on
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YRGHT
AppraVai'162A46;14fisk041/0*19 90TAIRVP8,5V00875R0.0118100099envtty of the troops .
ni6 test of the truth of any scientific theory is practice. "The
question of whether human thought can arrive at objective truth," wrote
Karl Yhrx, is not at all a matter of theory, but a practical matter. Man
should demonstrate in practice the truth, I. c., the reality, the power,
the comprehensiveness (posyustornnost") of hip thinking (K. Marx and P.
Engels, Collected. Works., vol. 3, p. 1). And man, as Lenins said ths:s
prove in his praetical activity the objective correctness of his ideas,
concepts, and laws of science, and, the: correspondence of his concep-
tions with the nature of the things which he perceives.
What should we understand by practice as the, test of the truth of
military theory and the principles of the art of wart In our military
philosophical literature one encounters statements that the only objec-
tive teat of the truth of any doctrine, and of military theory, is war.
One cannot agrre with this. War is a practical determiner of the value
both of military theory as a whole and of individual, principles of war-
fare. But it would be incorrect to consider whr as the only form of mili-
tary practice. Woy, if one were to follow the logic to the end, then, on
the basis of the statement about war as the only objective test of truth,
one would have to come to the conclusion that in modernrmilitsry theory,
which underlies the characteristics of armed conflict with the use of
nuclear missiles, there Is not a grain of absolute,truth.
Military practice, which is the test of the truth of military
theory, is not just battles and engagemerstss. It is also coat training
of troops in peace tims exercises maneuvers, marches. "In time of
peace," says R. Yd. Malinovskiy, "there exists the only possibility of
testing theoretical conclusions in conditions most closely approximatirg
a battle situation' exercises and maneuvers, combat firing and launching
of missiles, field marches and sea cruises. The utilization of this op-
portunity As one of the ways of enriching military science with practical
experience and of strengthening the theoretical bases of practice."
(Bditel'no stoyat na strazhe mita [Stand Vigilantly on Guard of Peace],
Voyenizdst, 1962, p.
Miltary prastice, as a part of the social practice of people, is
the totality of material activity directed toward support of the, high
combat readiness of the armed forces and toward successful accomplishmEnt
by is';e,s of assigned combat tasks in the course of military training and
military operations. Military practice cansists, consequently, not onlSr
cr '.oat operations, but also of the practical military activities of
Nople in pease-time conditions, including various military experiments
carried out for the sake of gathering empirical information and improving
military theory. All these different forms of military practice also con-
stitute objective tests of truth, and hence are also forms of testing the
truth of individual principles of the art of war, and of all military theory.
15
RG
ATIprokedalantfrelsoteSOOMPIONWsRkiegrag8HRPRF(03?Watary reality
in order ;to test the correctdess of military theory, truth to a certain
degree can be tested by an intermediate logical means. -"If our premises
are true," wrote &gels, "and if we correctly apply to them the laws of
thought, then the results Mould be? in accord with reality." (K. Marx
and F. Engleln, Collected Works, vol. 20, p. 269). This means that if
during theoretical generalization, military research has dbserved the
principles and requirements of the materialistic theory of knowledge and
the laws and rules of logic, objective truth should be reflected to the.
highest degree in the theoretical theses.
We have considered only some of what in our opinion are the most
important military theoyetical problems in the light of Marxist-Leninist
theory of knowledge. This, of course, does not exhaust the range of
problems of military science and practice which could sUbcessfully be
solved with the help of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge.
Among them, for example, is the problem of developing a logical system of
Soviet military science as the totality of scientific categories, laws
and principles, and theory and method of investigating armed conflict.
Of great importance are problems of the dialectics of the development of
the basic concepts and categories of military science in the modern stage
of its development, and an analysis of the knowledge-acquisition functions
of various special methods of military scientific rnsearch.
Thus dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge is the gnosedlogi-
cal foundation of Soviet military science and practice. It equips Our
cadres with a method of scientific foresight in military matters, shots
not only the goal of knowledge of the laws of armed conflict, but also
the means of attaining that goal, and also points out the way to use'
known lams during armed conflict for the defeat of the enemy. The Marxist-
Leninist theory-of knowledge arms our military cadres with the dialectical
method of thinking, which has to do with subjectivism, one-sided absolu-
tism in the knowledge and practice of the military art, and dogmatism in
decisions and the methods oi putting them into effect..
This is thy systematic attention
officer personnel, to these problems,
blems of military theory and practice
which are of interest to a wide range
and practical workers.
should be paid, in the education of
along with other philosophical pro-
. Here are many important problems
of military specialists -- researchers
_
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ESSENCE AND PHENOMENON IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
by Col I. Grudinin
CPYRGHT
Merenoe and phenomenon, categories of materialist dialectics, re-
flect the most essential relationships and facets of reality, just as do
its other categories. At the same time they constitute stepping stones
of knowledge. Skilled application of the categories of essence and
phenomenon in combination with a high level of professional knowledge and
flawless utilization of special methods enables one to solve the most
complex problems of military theory and practice correctly and in a timely
manner.
Thl.EatIlm.glAr 121.LallaVestatizaz
War, as any event of the reality which surrounds us, has two in-
separably interconnected sides: the external and internal. The external
side of war is accessible to direct contemplation, Its inner side is hid-
den from direct perception and is cognized with the aid of abstract
thought on the basis of the data of living contemplation and practice,
scientif),c methods of cognition. The internal and external side of ob-
jective reality are reflected by categories of materialist dialectics
essence and phenomenon.
Essence is the inner basis of objects, events, processes, con-
eealed below the surface of phenomena and manifested in them. Phenomenon
is a method of manifestation, the discovery of the essence (the term
"phenomenon" is frequently used to signify "object," "event," "process."
In this definition it reflects the internal and external sides of real-.
ity, that is essence and its manifestation. In this article the term
"phenomenon" is used in a narrow sense, as a form of manifestation of
the essence.) War is a qualitatively unique phenomenon, radically dif-
fering from all other occurrences in society. It has only one inner
basis, one essence, hidden below the surface of phenomena and manifested.
The essential nature of war consists in the fact that it constitutes a
czatimateloisLE1211,= of classes and nations by violent means. This
definition was formulated by Lenin in his work "Failure of the Second
International:" "applied to wars, the fundamental thesis of the dialec-
tic... is that 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other (that is
violent) means this was always the vieWpoint of Marx and Engels,
who viewed each war ae a tin of politics of given, interested
powers -- and AlLar_slat.s.lames within them -7' at a given time"
LCemplete Collected Works], Vol 26, page 224). This essence
is manifested in all. elements forming the content of war, mainly in the
various forms of armed struggle, as well as the reorganization of the
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in the content and forms of the ideological and diplomatic struggle,
that is of all the vital activities of society, which alters its condi-
tion. Armed combat is the chief manifestation of the essence of war
and its specific expression. The essential nature of war and its phe-
nomena are en organic unity. There is and can be no unmanifested
essence of war. In equal measure there are no phenomena of war which
do not manifest its essential nature. Lenin said: "...the essence is.
The paenomenon is essential"(Eglat.ss?1:22.11, Vol 29, page 227).
In the course of war all battles, operations and strikes (inde-
pendent of scope), directed toward destroying the enemyls armed forces
and home front, represent in the final analysis a means of achieving
political objectives pursued by classes and states waging war. This
signifies that during the courea of war armed struggle is always essen-
tial. It always represents the chie manifestation of the essence of
war -- the 9,2=puati;m; of politics by violent means. The significance
of this thesis consists in the first place in the fact that it condi-
tions the immense responsibility of the personnel of our Armed Forces
and particularly command personnel in attaining the political objectives
of war and in defending our socialist Fatherland. Secondly, it requires
that command personnel, in resolving matters of military organizational
development, preparation for and organization of a battle or operation,
approach the problem from the standpoint of state interests. Thirdly,
it prompts one to study carefully and skillfully utilize the objective,
deep and essential relationships of armed combat. Fourthly, it aids in
exposing those bourgeois ideologists who separate armed combat from the
essence of war, endeavoring to prove that in war politics and armed com-
bat represent independent elements. Under present-day conditions some
bourgeois ideologists, realizing the catastrophic consequences of a
nuclear war and endeavoring to conceal the genuine culprits, announce
that a new world war will not be a continuation of politics of classes
and states. Bourgeois economist Sternberg writes: "In the atomic age
war is no longer a continuation of politics by other meens" (F. Stern-
berg, Die Militarische und industr1212_1122plution, Berlin, .1957, page
62).
A new world war, if unleashed by the imperialists, will in its
essence constitute a continuation of the adventuristic policies of the
ruling classes of capitalist states. This will be an unjust, predatory
war by the aggressive forces of imperialism. As for the socialist
nations, it will be a just war in defense of the socialist system.
The chief manifestation of the essence of war -- armed combat
with missiles and nuclear weapons -- will be expressed primarily in
mass strikes against major economic and administrative centers of the
warring states, as well as against troop concentrations. The essence
of war and its chief manifestation, being an inseparable unity, also
possess important differences. The essence of war acts as a
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CPYRGHT
eg ? rziA,Ropg5Too875R00030009Q023-1
POPNYIARSOieltfatTS?9PlAt eomva ana otner manilestations of war are
the dete=ined, the derived. The essence of war is relatitax stable,
while the phenomena expreseing it are more mobile. This is due to the
fact that the phenomena change te the degree of quantitative acuumula-
tione within the framework of the existing quality. In addition they
can change with an alteration not of the entire essence but merely of
one individunl facet. Finally, the phenomenon changes when changes take
place in the conditions for the tenure of the essential nature, although
the essence itself does not lose its qualitative certainty. During the
course of a single war, at various stages diversified methods of waging
armed combat may be utilized? But this does not alter the essence of
war. During the course of the great Fatherland War, at different stages
as well as in different operatic;, diversified methods of warfare were
employed? This was due to circumstances, a change in the relationship of
forces and development of the art of warfare. Here the eesential nature
of war, that is continuation of the policies of the Soviet Union by means
of force against Fascist aggression, did not change, while the forme of
its chief manifestation, that is the forms of armed combat, underwent
change. The multiplicity of form of manifestation of one and the same
essence is determined by the diversity of conditions under which it
forms and develops, as well as qualitatively diverse stages in the
development of an object, phenomeron, or process.
The essence reveals the inner basis of war, the most important
element in its quelity, the root causes of its coming into being. The
essential nature of war determines the overall character of armed combat
and its other manifestations, At the same time there is something unique
and characteristic only of each concrete phenomenon of war. Because of
this the phenomena of war are richer and more diversified than the
essence. The essence of war is manifested indirectly, chiefly through
armed combat and is cognized by abstract reasoning. The phenomena of
war .- armed combat, reorganization of the economy on a war footing,
changes in the ideological and diplomatic struggle -- appear and act
directly?
Th a job of science consists in reducing the apparent movement to
the inner movement. Consequently, in studying war one cannot stop at
the surface of phenomena but must penetrate into the deep-lying pro-
cesses, into their essential nature. This enables one to elucidate the
nature of each war, the natural laws governing its origin and develop-
ment, to predict the course of events, to expose those enemies who are
endeavoring to conceal the essential nature of their policies. '
The essence of war is linked with the social and ecenomic struc-
ture, for according to Lenin's definition politics is the concentrated
expression of eeenemics. From this proceeds the task of cognition, con-
sisting in penetrating from the essence of the first order into the
essence of the second orders from the study of the essence of politics
to transition to a study of the essence of economics, whieh determines
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politjooprovRiftaJWaestAVP WONERDegetAARKTWOWPWrthl from phe-
nonenon to essence, from essence of the first, so to speak, order, to
essence of the second order, etc., ad infinitum" 02,2;1112.sol3,Et_osas.,
Vol 29, page 227).
A superficial examination of the phenomena of war inevitably leads
to subjectivism, to flimsy, hairbrained schemes, which serve as one of
the main reasons for profound blunders in military organizational develop-
ment and in the art of war. The adventurism of many bourgeois military
leaders proceeds from the social essence of imperialism, doomed to in-
evitable destruction, as well as from the metaphysical method by which
they are guided. The aggressive ideas and actions of imperialist reac-
tion under present-doy conditions once again confirm the correctness of
Lenin's conclusion that imperialists are adventurists in their social
essence: they may fail to consider the relationship of forces which are
present in the world arena, and hence they may unleash a new series of
wars. The American Imperialists and those countries under their domina-
tion write and speak much of the necessity of preserving peace between
nations. But the essential nature of their policies consists in the
fact that they are striving to prepare a maximum quantity of forces and
then, employing the element of surprise, to unleash a massive nuclear
attack against the Soviet Union and other Socialist nations, gaining vic-
tory by abruptly altering the balance of forces in their own favor.
Under these conditions it would be a most profound error to assume that
the aggressors will not risk attacking the Soviet Union and other so-
cialist nations.
On 18 January 1962, President John Kennedy gave an address at the
White House, in which he stated that the first principle of American
strategy is a further increase in much more powerful nuclear armaments
than the nuclear striking force of the Soviet Union. The second princi-
ple consists in "possessing more numerous and more modern ground forces
and other types of conventional armed force," The third principle is
the organization and improvement of special forces for underground and
guerilla warfare. The essence of this plan is manifested in the inten-
sified race for missiles and nuclear arms, in the increasing size of the
army, in the organization of special forces for waging anti-guerilla war-
fare, for diversionary and subversive activities. Changes in directing
the development of forces and weapons, as well as the strategy of the
American imperialists, demand penetration into the essence of these
changes and timely consideration of these changes in military organiza-
tional development.
Phenomenon and Essence in Milita Or anizational Develo me t and in
Wark22
The continuing revolution ii military science persistently demands
revelation of the essence of each new phenomenon within it. An erroneous
appraisal of the_ r-s?ults andmr.o.spects S the urra-rd-
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.2D
CPYRGHT
PYRGHT
asToomR000300090023-1
401eviatrFocRettmitiPollOW:5a7593tion into tne ouoonce of pheromena.
The all-out development of science is eseential for a timely dinclonure
of the eeeence of new phenomena in military affairs. Profound theoretie
cal research with utilization of tho latest ociontific methods and
technical devices is called upon to reveal the role of conventional and
qualitatively new weapons, each branch of the armed forces and typo of
troop units and consequently the direction and intensity of dtmlopment
of corresponding branches of military economics.
A correct appraisal from the military viewpoint of now achievee
mente of science is impossible without the timely revelation of the
essence of these achievements. Here as in any other area a lack of
coincidence between phenomena and essence is inevitable, Therefore, as
well as due to attachment to the accustomed (in view of the woll-known
conservative nature of thought and a number of other causes), frequently
the new and original, emerging beyond the framework of the generally
accepted, is perceived for a certain period of time as insubstantial.
But ideas which seem insubstantial very frequently include ideas which
have comprised an entire era in science, in social and historical reali-
ties and in the development of military science. For example, French
Marshal Foch said: "Perhaps the aeroplane is fine as a sport, but not
for the army; it is useless for war" (B. L. Simakov, I. F. Shepilov,
Vpzdushny fl of Str mta [The Soviet Air Force], Voyenizdat, 1958,
page 8l)
As
As early as 1924 Soviet specialists developed a system of cumula-
tive charges for the engineer troops. But they were negatively assessed
and not utilized until 1942. An analogous case occurred in 1933. with an
electronic mine detector: it was condemned as dead weight, and in 1939-
1940 had to be redeveloped on a crash basis.
Before the Great Fatherland War the works of several Soviet
authors (V. Melkov, R, gydeman, R. Tsiffer) asserted that the nature of
the initial period, of war would be army cover operations, whim would
enable the main forces to be deployed. And yet the initial attacks by
Nazi Germany against its neighbors demonstrated the endeavor of the
aggressor to reach its objectives by surprise attack by previously de-
ployed armies. Yet the essence of this phenomenon was not discovered
in a timely manner and our military organizational development continued
to be oriented toward a period of mobilization. The main cause of this
situation wat a blind faith in the experience of past wars. In order to
avoid this, in all things (including military science) it is necessary
to orient oneself on the new and developing -- this is a law of human
activity conditioned by the constant development of surrounding reality
on an ascending line. Lenin teaches us: "...one must advance and look
not at the past but rather toward the future..." (Pon sobr. soch
Vol 36, page 264). Of course it does not follow frcm this that one can
ignore historical experience and not utilize it to a pr9per degree of
feasibility.
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a
On400n90023-1
Anomtritdrimfolieffec?APPLAMPticPWPPRORML.y protiontod by
tho discovery of the ossontial nature of a situation. In atratogy, op-
orationa and tactics a knowledge of the easence of a situation prosupp000s
the following: correct appraisal of the enemy's and ?nets own manpower
and weapons both from 4 qualitative and quantitative otandpoint; doter-
mination of the strong and weak points of the opposing troop concentra-
tions, their avallablo and potential reserves, their positiona, as woll
as terrain plus and mVals pointa in the deployment of the enemy and onols
emn troops; timoly discovery of the enemy's actual plan of action;
appraisal of other elements of tho situation, discovery of the possi-
bility of victory Wth minimum losses.
Penetration into the ounce of a situation is posaible only on
the basic of a thorough knowledge of military science, on the basic of
close interaction cf vital perception, abstract thought and practical
activity, that is well-organized, skillfully and continuously conducted
reconnaissance in combination with analysis by appropriate staff person-
nel and military loaders. Penetration into the essence of a situation
involves overcoming difficulties generated by the effect both oi objec-
tive and aubjective causes. These difficulties are conditioned by the
lack of convergence between phenomenon and essence, tho speed and inten-
sity of combat operations, the absence of precise information on the
onemy and finally by deliberate enemy actions designed to camouflage his
plans.
The lack of convergence of essonco and phenomenon, including in
militsry affairs, is causea by tho individual peculiarities of specific
objects, events, processes, as well as by the unique nature of the condi-
tions of their existence. One of tho objective forms of manifestation of
the essence of objects and events is semblance, which expresses the lack
of convergence between essence and phenomenon.
The methodological significance of the thesis of nonconvergence
of phenomenon and essence is immense. It teaches us first of all that
ono should not underestimate the results of live perception or sense
degree of cognition, including sensations, perceptions and ideas. At the
same time it requires that we not stop in the cognition of phenomenon at
the stage of live perception. In order to penetrate into the essence of
phenomena, analysis of the result of sense perception with the aid of
abstract thought is essential. Sense cognition, perceiving the external
side of a phenomenon, views it as from afar, and this is frequently de-
ceptive. A superficial study of semblance in military affairs can serve
as the cause of serious blunders. On the other hand a thoughtful analysis
of semblance forms an essential condition for penetrating into the essence
of a situi:tion and constitutes a guarantee of making the right decision.
For example, in 1944 the command of the Third Ukrainian Front
initially assumed that the bridgehead to the south of Tiraspoll was not
at all suitable for launching the main attack, due to its limited size,
CPYRGHT
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marehy nature and heavy foreotation. Subsequently, after a careful
otudy of the area, the command determined that this semblance, in com-
bination with a whole oyetom of measures to be taken to effect con-
cealed troop concentration, would help keep the deployment a secret from
the enemy and enable them to use the element of surprise. This thorough
ana.lersie of the situation was confirmed. The German command of the
"Seuthern Ukraine" army group thought that an assault by ScrYiet foree
Lo the oouth of Tiraspolc was impossible, and the main attack by the
Third Ukrainian Front, launched from the bridgehead, was taken to be
menely a support action, which in effect even to a greater extent de-
teriorated the situation of' the German troops which had formed at the
very Ipeginning of the openation.
In addition to direet nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence
one should bear in mind that many phenomena are not at all perceived by
our sense organs without the aid of appropriate instruments. One of
these phenomena was written about by the American magazine UulkeL111121.
aewe_12_21.1sLig.a12z2L6 "Around the Soviet Union," etates the magazine,
NTde have set up powerful radio monitoring stations which work around the
clock. These 'ears' not only record all tranmissicns by stationary radio
stations but also pick up short-wave radio communicaeions between mobile
units of the Soviet army from points thousands of kilometers away." For
the timely revelation of the essence of such phenomena a well-organized
intelligence setup is necessary, utilizing the most advanced technical
devices, and extreme vigilance is essential.
One should also constantly bear in mind that in military science
the nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence is intensified by the pecu-
liar features of warfare and conscious camouflaging of essential nature
on the part of the enemy. In order to deceive the Soviet government and
carry out a sneak attack on the USSR, the Nazi Germans employed all types
of false information and camouflage. With this objective in mind they
created the impression of a concentration of the main. German forces in
preparation for crossing the English Channel and invading the British
Isles, while they tried to sell their troop concentrations along the
Soviet borders as an attempt to misinform the British. In addition they
disseminated versions on the necessity of securing their new possessions
(in Czeeholovakia and Poland), displacing troops in areas not subject
to British air attack, and the conduct of operations in the Balkans.
The essence of these actions by our probable adversary was not revealed
by us in time, and this was one of the causes of the incorrect appraisal
of the military and political situation and the success enjoyed by the
Nazi German treeps in the initial period of the war. The main role in
concealing the essential nature of a situation and misleading the enegy
is played by the subjective factor: skill, initiative and other personal
qunlities of military leaders, as well as all military personnel. It is
they who utilize the featuree of terrain, season, time of day and mili-
tars equipment for concealing the essential nature of the plan being
implemented and the veeific eltuation.
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1.11.11.111111.11111.611111111..1.11111111.1111111111.1111M11111111
their plans but also the methods of carrying them out, utilizing for this
end the most advanced technioal devices. In order to penetrate missile
tionel importance to the concealment of the essential nature not only of
UkpluvvmdcRoinRetWittaN91)04igialfdahlaqiitERWMPACIPWa3c11 excep-
defense eysteme they consider it essential to employ decoy targets, to CPYRGHT
reduce the reflecting surface of the missile warhead, to jam the enemy's
air defense radar, to employ anti-radr missiles to select complicated
trajectories for their missiles and to employ multi-target missile war-
heads, In the opinion of foreign specialists the availability of such
devices and the skill to utilize them for concealing the essential nature
of a battle plan and to deceive the enemy will to a great extent deter-
mine success not only in a battle operation but the war as a whole.
The bourgeois military press recommends that radio be used more
extensively for misleading information, for radio can be used to create
the apparent existence of command posts, nonexistent airfields, to
demonstrate supposed preparations for an operation by increasing radio
communications volume, and to simulate the employment of fighter planes
and guided missiles. It ie considered that radio misinformation should
be conducted together with other measures intended to mislead the enemy.
Other measures include the following: rumors to incite confusion, the
semblance of shifting troops and equipment, simulated heavy use of roads,
and fictitious offensive operations. It is recommended to build deco;
missile launching pads and mock-ups of nuclear warhead storage areas, to
effect decoy transfers of nuclear weapons under heavy guard, to limit
the movements of military personnel and totally prohibit civilians from
areas simulating deployment of nuclear weapons.
With the objective of fortifying the "authenticity" of measures
observed by the enemy it is planned to feed enemy intelligence appro-
priate "documentary" materials. In order to successfully deceive the
enemy it is considered essential to study the enemy intelligence setup
and to know the indicatiDns according to which enemy intelligence iden-
tifies a given installation or phenomenon. One's own intelligence has
the assignment of determining how the enemy will react to measures taken
to deceive him. In order not to be deceived by the enemy it is essen-
tial to analyze and check extremely carefully all information obtained,
to thoroughly expose the essential nature of enemy intentions and ac-
tions.
The Decisive Role of the Commandin Officer in Revealin the Essential
Nature of a Situation
The essential nature of a situation is cognized by men and not
machines, and consequently the process of cognition depends on their
subjective qualities. In 1940 the Allied Command was unable to deter-
mine the main directten of the imminent offensive by the Nazi German
forces. Ardennes, where the main blow was to come, was weakly defended
by French troops. This occurred in the first place because Anglo-French
pp' vve ui IRlecte 2000100109 CU
2
90023-
PYRGHT
ppliatedliageftWiskgOOMPfA914aBP,MPREV591.fflen2a3i
lure of the enemy's
plans, and camouflaged operations and misinformation by ths German com-
mand reached. their objective. Secondly, the French command had incor-
rectly evaluated Ardennes, believing it impossible to utilize heavy
forces, particularay tank ob"yedineniya, in this area.
Tha concealment of the essential nature, that is the internal,
deep side of a situation below the surface of phenomenon is fostered by
war itself, with its constant danger to human life. During war the man-
power and weapons of the enemy are frequently exaggerated. Numerous
facts of history attest eloquently to this. During the first week of the
German offensive in France 2,500 German tanks were transformed in the
eyes of the French General Staff officers into as many as 70500. (Col
D. M. Proektor, japm, -1 4 LThe War in Europe: 1939-
1941], VoyenizdA, 19o3, page 301
The thesis that one can penetrate into the essential nature of a
situation only through comprehensively analyzing phenomena extends to
all constituent elements of the art of war: strategy, operational plan-
ning and tactics. It remains in force even in the area of operating
military equipment. Frequently phenomena which seem insignificant are
viewed by some specialists as all matters, for which they must pay
dearly. Since phenomenon, as the expression of a given facet of essence,
is alwaye significant, one cannot tolerate underevaluation of even one
phenomenon until its real essence is determined. Otherwise one may over-
look an essential factor, knowledge of which may greatly aid in achieving
victory, while to ignore or underrate it leads to defeat. There are maly
examples of such underestimation. On 7 December 1941 the American radar
station located at the north end of the island of Oahu detected some
suspicious targets rapidly appnaching Pearl Harbor. The radar opera-
tors reported this fact to headquarters. But the duty officer assumed
that it was a squadron of "Flying Fortresses" which was expeeted to
arrive from the mainland that day. Actzally radar had detected the
first wave of Japanese carrier-based aircraft, 45 minutes flying time
from the Amsrican base. There was enough time to sound the alarm and
prepara to repel the attack. By failing to reveal the esEential nature
of the phenaaenon detected by the radar the Americans were taken totally
by surprise. Under modern conditions the outcome of an entire war can
depend to a great extent on the ability to discover the essential nature
of such a phenomenon in a timely manner.
If a phenomenon expresses a given individual side of the essence
and not the essence as a whole this signifies that in analyzing a
uation it is essential to stud; not isolated phenomena but phenomena in
their entirety. Only by penetrating into the essential nature of a
situation is it possible to discoNer targets and enemy troop concentra-
tions, a blow against which will provide maximum effect. Otherwise a
scattering of forces is inevitable, in strikes against secondary targets
rand the pursuit of phanthm success. For example, if in the fall of 1941
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thoSorietpgricalecC6NuaketWactinNineiliM.PilWaTanWPRAVRIalinst
the main enemy forces but had deployed them uniformly along all fronts,
the Nazi German troops would nut have been defeated near Moscow and the
city's defense could have been seriously endangered. At the end of
1942 large Soviet reserves were located near Stalingrad and in the sum-
mer of 1943 near the Kursk Bulge, for the most powerful enerNy troop
concentrations were in those places at those times.
The genuine (aggressive) essence of such a phenomenon as the
creation of military-political blocs by American imperialism was re.
vealed in a timely manner by the Communist Party and Soviet government.
This enabled us to take timely and necessary measures to strengthen the
defensive capabilities of our country? At the present time one should
bear in mind that in order to camouflage an armed attack under prepare-
tion the imperialists may create the appearance of a. lessening of inter-
national tensions. Timely discovery of the essential nature of a situa-
tion depends to a decisive degree on many causes, including the quantity
and quality of technical intelligence devices, on acts of initiative by
persons capable of utilizing with maximum effectiveness the most ad-
vanced technical devices for rapid determination of enagy forces and
enemy plans. It is therefore extremely important to effect a comprehen-
sive and timely preparation and training of a sufficient number of spe-
cial cadres capable of immediately distinguishing decoy enemy actions
and installations from authentic ones.
While the ability to discover in a timely manner the essential
nature of a situation serves as a primary condition for opening the
possibility of victory in a battle, operation and in a war as a whole,
a careful camouflaging of one's own forces and the ability to deceive
the enemy and mislead him in respect to one's own plans and actions
serves as one of the major conditions for transforming this potential
into reality. In the summer of 1944 the headquarters of the First
Ukrainian Front, in order to conceal preparations for an operation,
drew up a plan of camouflage activities, which provided for simulating
the concentration of two tank armies and one tank corps on the left
side of the front in the zones occupied by the First Guards and 181h
Armies. In order to carry out this deception on a large scale we em-
ployed false tank movements by railroad, simulated tank soyedineniya
staging areas, designated their routes of movement and concentration
areas and conducted appropriate radio communications. In the false
areas of concentration a large number of mock-ups of tanks, trucks,
heavy guns and field kitchens were set up. At the same time steps were
taken to conceal the regrouping of troops along the front. All move-
ments of chasti and soyedineniya were conducted only at night, under
strictest concealment. Although we were unsuccessful in completely
deceiving the enemy (he detected the location of the armies in the
first echelon along the front), redeployment of the First Guards Tank
Army to an area south of Lutsk and the Fourth Tank Army into the
Ternopol' area remained unnoticed, which was of major significance.
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGH
Approved tlielatmek-e Miatamt95.41*EPIWA126?1319?,9321Maa is inconceivable
without knowledge of the unique nature of effect of the objective laws
of warfare. Expressed in sconce, these laws constitute the sum total,
the synthesized result in cognizing the essence of a phenomenon. "Law
and osaence," said Lenin, "are homogeneous (of the same order) concepts
or more accurately are of the same degree, expressing more profound cog-
nition by man of phenomena and the world,.." (E2UA,..k.byt_pochm Vol 29,
page 136). However law and essence are not identical concepts. As men-
tioned above, essence is the inner, relatively stable basis of objects,
processes of objective reality, coyealed below the surface of phenomena
and manifested in them. In contrast, "law is a relationship.. .a rela-
tionship of essences or between essences" (E9211?=?auh? Vol 29,
pAge 138). It fellows that knowledge of the laws of warfare creates the
potential to discover relationships between easences in a battle, opera-
tion and in a war. One of the most important laws of warfare is the law
of battlefield support. Nowadays the possibility of victory can be
quickly lost even with an unlimited quantity of high quality manpower
end weapons if the commanding officer commits errors in organizing bat-
tlefield support, primarily reconnaissance, camouflaging, anti-atomic,
anti-chemical, anti-bacteriological protection and operations against
enemy radio and electronic devices, Without well-orgarized reconnais-
sance and intelligence activities, conducted continuously and utilizing
all the most advanced technical devices, it is impossible to discover the
essential nature of a situation in a timely manner and to locate the posi-
tion of enemy nuclear weapons, the main direction of the imminent strike
and the time of the strike, and it is impossible to open. up the potential
for a victory and achieve it.
Without well-organized camouflaging and successful counter.
operations against enemy reconnaissance and intelligence it is impossi-
ble to keep onels nuclear weapons intact. Only with superior intelli-
gence, reconnaissance, camouflaging and superiority in suppressing enemy
intelligence and reconnaissance is it possible to gain advantage in a
battle and combat operation, in directing nuclear and conventional strikes
against enemy nuclear weapons.
The potential of being first in a. battle and combat operation to
engage in nuclear and conventional strikes and the possibility of swift
combat operations in turn can be transformed into reality only by cor-
rect utilization of the law of interaction. The precise and reliable
interaction of all branches of the armed forces and types of units pro-
motes concentration of superior forces in selected areas and realization
of the potential to defeat the enemy. Skilled actions by the military
in accordance with the above-imentioned objective laws, bearing in mind
their interrelationships and interdependencies, makes it possible simul-
taneous13, to follow th7J demande of the law of maximum destruction of
enemy manpower and weapons with minimum losses. This makes it possible
to reduce the potential of the enemy, to alter the situation in ()nets
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27
own favaporbyeikfazrdlggane309064?19cialktRRE8E8T5ETRICra9112eite or
combat operation to a successful conclusion,'
When the military leader fails to bear in mind the essential links,
objective laws and their interaction, or if he commits serious errors in
cognizing and utilizing the laws of warfare, this inevitably reduces the
potential of his troops, promotes change in the situation in the enemyls
favor and leads to defeat. Toward Voronezh our troops had 1,000 tanks
against 500 enemy tanks; thus, they had the potential. of frustrating the
planned German summer campaign of 1942. However, due to a lack of abil-
ity to penetrate into the essential nature of the situation, to cognize
and utilize the objective laws of warfare, due to the lack of initiative
and firmness in directing our troops on the part of the Voronezh Front
command, this opportunity was lost.
The lessons of the last war as well as experience gained in field
exercises attest to the extreme importance of teaching our officers and
generals (both in line assignments and in Armed Forces schools) the
ability to discover the essential nature of a situation, the ability to
think, analyze and creatively comprehend, and not simply to assimilate
course material. Only on this basis is it possible to train and develop
initiative and decisiveness in the actions of command personnel. Simple
assimilation of material is basea primarily on live perception. It does
not demand thorough independent logical thinking. Each commanding offi-
cer in his practical activities encounters at every step the necessity
of independently revealing the essential nature of a situation. Conse-
quently it is necessary that our command personnel training programs in
line assignments and in armed forces schools always provide for conduc-
ting classes which in content and form will promote maxim= development
of independent thinking for timely revelation of the essential nature of
a situation.
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CPYRGHT
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COMBAT OPERATIONS BY TANK UNITS AGAINST
OPEttikTIONAL DEFENSE RESERVES
by Lt Gen (Res) Rsrv B. Aruehanynn
CPYRGHT
In resolving the problem of combat operations against operational
defense resorvee along with problems dealing with the use of nuclear
weapons and several others, of great interest is the utilization of tank
assault groups. Moving ahead of the main forces and at a considerable
distance from them, tank soyedineniya will be the first of the advancing
ground forces to engage in combat with the tactical reserves of the de-
fensive forces. The latter may differ in composition and designation.
Initially they will be neighboring reserves -- as a rule consisting of
several individual soyedineniya or unified into a single unit type such
as an army corps, and subsequently deep reserves, represented most fre-
quently by individual infantry or tank soyedineniya, possibly having
been less exposed to strikes and retaining their combat capability to a
relatively greater degree. Airborne troops may also be dropped in the
path of advancing forces in order to hold important installations and
lead positions. Naturally the defending forces will attempt to unify in
a single plan the employment in a given area of all their tactical re-
serves, putting them into action chiefly with the aim of striking from
various directions, immediately following nuclear strikes by missiles
and aircraft and supported by conventional weapons.
All defense reserves, in the interest of maintaining a high rate
of advance, gaining time and attaining the objectives of an offensive
operation in a short period of time, should definitely be destroyed
preferably as they are detected, or upon their approach and depleyment.
In principle the nuclear firepower of the advancing forces enables them
to carry out eeich assignments even if the total forces of all troops
engaged in combat and deploying reserves are superior to the tank group
operating out in front. Obviously this is possible in practice only if,
the advancing forces possess the requisite quantity of nuclear warheade
and reliable means of delivering them to the target. It is most probable
that it will be necessary to destroy reserves subsequently, concentrating
the main efforts on defeating the strongest and most dangerous reserve
groupings at a given time. Air strikes and airborne assaults as well as
soyedineniya advancing directly behind the tank group can be directed
against other reserves. In this situation an important condition for
successful operations against defense reserves is to take care of them
by chasti. This in turn depends on the skilled employment of nuclear
weapons and on taking swift advantage of the results of strikes. Of
great importance is a rapid rate of tank advance. The more rapid the
rate of advance, the less manpower and weapons will be required in
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 mire
principle to carry out a given assignment of taking care of enemy re-
serves. With an overall high rate of advance, actions not only by the
tank group as a whole but by individual chasti can be extremely effec-
tive. Advancing on the heels of nuclear strikes, they are capable of
consistently handling considerably superior defense forces.
Even if the defending forces have been able to deploy and simul-
taneously bring large reserves into action, it will of course not be
advisable to employ against these reserves the entire force of the tank
group, thus creating the threat of becoming involved in a protracted
engagement. To take care of such forces it is desirable to use pri-
marily mass destrueaon weapons and minimum forces from the tank group,
using the rest of t, e tank forces to advance deep into enemy lines. In
order quickly to comp.ete the elimination of enemy reserves, sometimes
part of the forces from the second echelon or senior command reserves
can be moved up. Thus in order to wipe out defense force reserves join-
ed into various groupings, under modern conditions as a rule one should
not employ the main forces of the tank groups operating out i.i front.
These groups should push their rapid advance deep into enemy lines in
the interests of carrying out their main assignment -- rapid attainment
of the objectives of the operation. In order for part of the tank group
forces to handle the assignment of taking care of the defense reserves,
first of all continuous reconnaissance will be required, timely annihi-
lation of nuclear defense weapons, skilled utilization of the results of
offensive nuclear strikes, close coordination between advancing tank
soyedineniya, attack aircraft and airborne assaults, as well as reliable
air cover for the tank troops. In addition it is essential to provide
ahead of time the execution of all preparatory measures connected with
support for successful tank group operations separated great distances
from the remaining advancing forces. These measures include engineer
support for traversing zones of destruction and radioactive contamina-
tion deep in enemy defense, the crossing of a number of water barriers
and other types of support.
In order to achieve a high rate of advance and to create the
requisite conditions for putting defense reserves out of action, in a
number of cases airborne troops will be required, as well as air drops
of units of the advancing forces, which are capable of anticipating
defending forces in taking action, seizing and holding important in-
stallations and areas until the tank forces arrive (airfields, port
facilities, primary crossing points over major water boundaries, moun-
tain passes, road junctions, etc.), as well as delaying the deployment
of certain reserve columns until others are put out of action and se-
curing the flanks of the advancing tank forces.
Tank units operating far ahead of the rest of the advancing
forces can take care of operational defense reserves in a meeting en-
gagement, an advance against reserves temporarily on the defensive, by
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
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pinnirg aown reserxes with part of the forces and subsequent or simul-
taneous strikes by the main forces.
Considerable attention has been devoted to problems of the meet-
ing engagement in military literature. Therefore we should like to
examine only a few features of the meeting engagement, which a tank
group can conduct simultaneously with several soyedineniya of tactical
reserves operating from different directions. In this situation the
nuclear weapons at the disposal of the tank group, as well as a certain
quantity of nuclear warheads from the larger unit, will be concentrated
against the primary grouping of defending forces which are the most
heavily equipped with nuclear weapons and which present a serious threat
to the advancing forces in the forthcoming meeting engagement. Air
power will be directed tNaard wiping out intact combat chasti and
podrazdeleniya of those defensive forces against which nuclear strikes
were launched. If air power potential at a given moment is somewhat
limited, air strikes should be directed against the most dangerous
grouping of defense reserves not yet struck by nuclear weapons, approach-
ing the area of the meeting engagement.
Systematic strikes against troops in narrow spots, road junctions,
destruction of bridges and crossings over major water barriers even with
conventional weapons may delay reserves significantly and cause heavy
losses. This is attested to by the experience of the Great Fatherland
War. We have examples of successful actions by Soviet air power in de-
laying German tactical reserves, particularly during the counter-
offensive toward Beigorod and Kharikov. In this operation, as a result
of strikes by the 8th and 17th Air armies and long-range bombers, follow-
ed by soyedineniya of the 2nd and 5th Air armies, a large group of enemy
tank forces which were being shifted from the Donbass to the Kharlkov
area sustained heavy losses. What is most important, the tanks were un-
able to arrive on time at the designated areas to prepare countermeasures
techestvene V S Irtta2g.2-?2aRi-IakXal
[History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol
31 Voyenizdat, 1964, page 287).
Air strikes against approaching reseerve eolemns will increase as
they approach the deployment area and reach maximum at the initial moment
of the meeting engagement. At this time nuclear strikes can be most
effective. Ir all cases one should attempt to reach a position in order
to launch nuclear-missie etrikes or air strikes with nuclear or conven-
tional warheads against spotted reserves before they are able to employ
their nuclear weapons. With this objective in mind it will be necessary
to increase the intensity of aerial reconnaissance in the interests of
the tank gzovo Reconnaissance should be conducted continuously far out
in front, as well as on the flanks of the tank group. The highest demands
are placed on night reconnaissanee and reconnaissance under poor visibil-
ity conditions along probable reserve approach routes.
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Under these conditions it is particularly important to determine
the direction of movement of enemy columns as rapidly as possible, to
discover the primary concentration of enemy reserves and determine the
location of nuclear weapons which can be utilized by the defending forces
against the advancing units. This will make it possible to determine the
plan for utilization of reserves and provide enough time to prepare for
employing missiles and nuclear weapons, to assign missions to the air-
craft and troops designated to destroy the enemy reserves in a meeting
engagement.
The form of combat operations by a tank group in a meeting enggge-
ment with dispersed march and battle formations will most frequently
constitute tactically intercoordinated strikes from various directions,
launched in coordination with nuclear strikes, as well as advance and
frontal shift by some of the forces in a new direction. In the latter
case there will of course be no time for a complicated maneuver. There.
fore before turning the front of some of tae advancing forces toward the
flank, of particular significance is anticipating the enemy in launching
mass nuclear strikes at all newly spotted elements and at their nuclear
weapons. Under these conditions the nuclear weapons of the higher com-
mand will have to be brought in to supplement strikes by local tactical
weapons. Of particular significance also are bold and decisive actions
by individual anits of the tank group. The remaining tank forces should
continue to advance rapidly in the main direction.
The elimination of tactical reserves can take place in a situa-
tion whereby they have been able partially or completely to shift to
temporary defense with the aim of repelling the strike by the advancing
tank forces, to weaken and delay their advance, to win time in order to
regroup their own forces and prepare a new counterstrike.
If as a result of a successful meeting engagement a shift to the
defensive has taken place along an unprepared line, it can usually be
crossed and the defending forces taken care of while advancing, and if
necessary immediately following nuclear strikes from the air. In case
of an early shift of operational reserves to defense along a prepared line,
in order to push across and wipe out the enemy it may be necessary to
direct nuclear strikes and order a brief conventional artillery softening-
up. Under these conditions of particular significance is preparation of
the strike at such a time that would enable our forces to prevent the
enemy, which has shifted to the defensive, from using nuclear weapons.
In principle this becomes attainable only if combat against enemy
nuclear weapons is waged continuously. In other words, it would be
wrong to time the use of all weapons to the initial moment of artillery
softening-up. Action against enemy nuclear weapons should be conducted
continuously up to the preliminary artillery barrage, during and after
it, as well as during the period of support of the advancing forces.
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PYRGHT
The advancing forcea can drop airborne troop to tho roar of the
a R4OUAgig?..too6Abog CIA4t014010081=0004WW1a-tleo doeignatod
f seizing and holding important areas and lime along the approach
routes of raservee further to the rear, with the aim of preventing rein-
forcement of the existing defense force. The paratroop drop, in spite
of the fact that the tank group is operating far ahead of the remaining
advancing forces, will be cet up and carried out by the higher command.
As in a meeting engagement, the main forces of the tank group uhovad not
become involved in extended battle with the defense reeervee, but should
continue the advance. In order to wipe out the defending reoervez it is
advisable to utilize only part of the tank force e coming into direct con-
:Act with them, as well as newly-arrived eoyedineniya of the main forcoe
of the higher command.
In some cases a tank group out of physical contact with the re-
maining advancing forces will have to use part of its forces teakpoe
rarily to pin down enemy reserves, shifting to defensive actions on a
tactical scale at one point, with subsequent or simultaneoue strike:7 by
the main forces in another area. For example, this may occur with the
necessity of delaying one group of defense reserves launching a counter.
strike from different directions until the defeat of another, more
dangerous group.
Temporary defense may also be employed if in any area the defense
forces have succeeded in being first to launch nuclear strikes and the
advancing forces need time to regain order. Part of the forces may shift
to temporary defense as a result of an unsuccessful meeting engagement in
any given area. Under these conditions a special feature of operations
by tank forces will consist in the fact that organization of the fire
system, the laying of tank traps in the most tank-vulnerable arear; and
digging-in actions by podrazdeleniya for repulsing the attack of the
main forces of the approaching defense reservee will have to be done
simultaneously with combat against engaged reserves. In this type of
situation it is Laportant not to scatter personnel and weapons in
attempting to wipe nut several enemy troop elements all at one time, but
rather the most important should be chosen, the most dangerous to the
advancing forces. We believe that in order successfully to repulse an
enemy in direst contact it is advisable to employ the massed firepower
of artillery and tanks along with nuclear strikes. The main efforts of
the advancing forces, and primarily nuclear weapons anift sircraft, should
be directed toward destroying the approaching enemy reserve, enemy
nuclear weapons and aircraft from the ground.
Renewed advance by that part of the tank forces temporarily
shifting to the defensive will be organized while repulsing tae enemy,
with the approach of troops pulled from other areas, and the preps tion
of missiles, nuclear weapons and air power. The primary operations of
the tank forces and newly-arrived soyedineniya and chasti from the ad-
vancing forces develop as soon as possible after mass nuclear strikes,
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or the flank and to tho rou, gS
U9 ItligliRPetn-dagARObegOo044021340 ro-
oorvon u446FPNRIAea!RNREdedi o,Vi.th the objective of totally wiping
thom out.
A favoroblo rooult from 'oho operations of a tank group in combat
with oientional loromo r000rvoo &Tondo to a goat Loctont on effoutivo
and continuous fightoz airoraft and antiaircraft miooilo covor of its
marching column: and oombat formationo. Tho ooloouro and holding of air-
fioldo and landing otripo deep within Gnaw defenses aid the aircraft
oopporting the tnnk group.
SUOCOCJJ in actions by tank groups againot tactical defense ro-
oorvoo exerts a doololvo offoct on tho cotoome of the entire offensive.
Thoroforo the high command must conotantly bo particularly concerned
with keeping its forcoo at a proper dogroo of combat capability and with
timely support of the combat operations of those groups deep inoido enemy
dofenoon, and it must bo concerned with supporting those forcos with
noodod missiles, nuclear weapons, fuel and ammunition, aircraft and anti-
aircraft weapons. The organization ,end maintenance of continuous co-
operation between neighboring tank roups also conotitutes ono of tho
major concerns of the higher command und its headquarters.
In conclusion we shall touch briefly on a few characteristics of
combat by tank groups againstqxrattnel defonse reserves when advancing
thput the tp_s_f_a_luoo?zsanz. Under conditions whereby both
oidoo possess th000 weapons, each side, fearing a sudden nuclear strike
by tho other, will bo compelled to Maintain troop protective gear and
their own weapons in constant readiness to launch an immediate retalia-
tory strike. Thus the throat of nuclear attack as well as other means
and methods of conducting an offensive operation will leave their im-
print on tho combat operations of tank forces, including actions involv-
ing the annihilation ofopmtional defense reserves. Speaking of con-
ducting an offensive without nuclear weapons, one should bear in mind
the immense changes which have occurred,oince the war in the development
of conventional weapons and in troop orkOlization. In view of these
changes alone there can be no simple repeat of the techniques and forms
of warfare umployed in the last war. During the threat of nuclear attack
thocPenitioul structuro of defense and advancing troops will be preserved
in almost the same form we see for nuclear war conditions. The defending
forces will place theiropenticnalreserves Wscattered and concealed
staging areas, realizing the danger of nuclear strikes. The advancing
forces, in order to overcome the resistance of defense reserves, will be
compelled to concentrate considerable artillery firepower in the most
important areas, will have to call in air power and possibly a prelimi-
nary artillery barrage. The rate of advance even of tank groups under
these conditions will be slower than during an advance with nuclear
weapons utilization. This will make it considerably easier for the de-
fending forces to maneuver theirolo orabonel reserves and organize in short
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGrIT
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()vier y.,o.noidering the throat of nuclear strikes) largo counter-strike
groups of those reserves. Under those conditions conventionally armod
aircraft become much more important.
It will nevertheless bo insufficiently effective to inflict losses
on tactical defense reserves in areas of concentration and on the march
by air power and artillery. As a result of this the reserves may approach
the lines of deployment for launching a counterattack with greater =-
bat capability than when nuclear weapons are employed. Under these con.
ditions heavy forces will be required to stop a counterattack by the
defending forces. Sometimes advancing ground forces will shift to tempo-
rary defense in order to repel a counterattack, with subsequent strikes
and offensive movement once again with the aim of wiping out the counter..
attacking elements.
Since conventional weapons will not be enough to assure simultane-
ous coverage of the entire depth of primary defenses, it will be neces-
sary to successively eliminate initially nearby and subsequently deep
tactical and strategic defense reserves. The primary role in destroying
reserves and frustrating their counterattack will be tank troops in co-
ordination with airborne troops, heavily supported by air power, parti.
cularly jet aircraft, and artillery.
We have examined only a few of what we believe to be the most
vital problems in this area, and we do not cleim to have dealt with them
exhaustively. A further study of all aspects el* the problem of engaging
tactical defense reserves during an offensie;e constitutes one of the
urgent tasks of Soviet military-scientific thought.
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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF GROUND FORCES
by Col M. Kirlyan
CPYRGHT
A study of military organizational development in various coun-
tries shows that in resolving the matter of development and improvement
of branches of the armed forces arA the various types of units primary
attention is focussed on those brrnches and types with the aid of which
it will bo possible most efficiently and effectively to reach the obec-
tives of a future war. Continental nations, as is well known, have shown
preference for land forces, which have played the primary role in past
wars. Artillery has been the basis of their firepower. Troop organiza-
tional forms were to provide the most effective utilization primarily of
artillery firepower, tank weapons, as well as air power and infantry
weapons. Subordinate to this was the development of means of locomotion,
control and other military equipment.
Now the main trend in the organization of land forces is deter-
mined by missiles and nuclear weapons. The appearance of these weapons
in the arsenals of the armies of the world's leading nations, as well as
the exceedingly intensive and extensive military application of the
latest scientific and technological advances has led to a radical change
in many military problems: there has been a revision of the nature and
methods of waging war and conducting military operations, a revision of
views on the role of various branches of the armed forces and the vari-
ous types of troop units in a future war, as well as views of their
organizational structure, weapons and equipment.
The theory of military science proceeds from the standpoint that
a future world war will inevitably become a war of nuclear weapons and
missiles, where the primary attack weapon will be the nuclear warhead,
and where the primary means of delivering it to the target will be the
missile. A war fought with missiles and nuclear weapons can spread to,
if not all, at least the majority of continents. It will not be ini-
tiated by a clash between ground forces, but by decisive, massed nuclear
bomb and missile strikes at major targets located both in theatres of
military operations and deep in the heartland of the warring nations.
Strategic success will be achieved not only through destroying the
enemy's nuclear strike potential and by destroying major enemy troop
concentrations, but also by simultaneous annihilation of the enemy's
war-economic potential, by disorganization of governmental and military
control. Therefore the main role in carrying out the fundamental tasks
in such a war will be played by a qualitatively new branch of the armed
forces -- the Strategic Missile Troops.
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PYRGHT
Approved lIdtRekilitiec2090148090teliallWASTOOMMONigiN/Pbaat in a future war,
in addition to strategic missile troops, other branches of the armed
forces will also be used extensively, and each will have its own specific
assignments; air defense troops -- to prevent nuclear bomb and missile
attacks and to destroy enemy aircraft in the air; the air force -- to
strike enemy ground targets in the heartland and to hit enemy supply
lines, as well as to strike land targets along the front, and to engage
in combat with enemy attack aircraft; the navy -- to strike at bases and
other targets deep behind enemy lines and to engage in combat with enemy
sea power.
The primary utilization of ground forces will be to destroy oppos-
ing enemy troop concentrations, to seize and hold enemy territory with
the objective of preventing its utilization for the further waging of war.
On the other hand land forces will also play an extremely important role
in repulsing enemy ground strikes attempting to break through out lines,
as well as in preventing enemy airborne and beachhead assaults. Ground
forces will play an extremely important role in a future missile-nuclear
war.
Just what will this branch of the armed forces be, in what direc-
tion will it develop and bow will it look organizationally? The answer
to these questions depends on sociopolitical, economic and particularly
military factors, most important of which are the following: the nature
of a future war, the combat potential and trends in the armed forces
development of a probable adversary, the geographical position of the
country and the nature of the theatres of war. Proceeding from the
standpoint that a future world war may be a nuclear war, all of the
world's leading armies make primarily such important demands on their
ground forces as the capacity to wage successful warfare against enemy
nuclear weapons, a high degree of mobility and ability to penetrate and
cross zones of destruction, and radioactive contamination, a high capa-
bility to protect personnel and combat equipment against nuclear weapons,
etc. In accord with this, missile troops are being organized in our
ground forces. These troops are capable of striking all targets at
distances ranging up to several hundred kilometers. The range of TNT.
equivalent force in our nuclear warhead arsenal is becoming broader.
All armies are focussing attention on the further development of
tank forces and are equipping them with new tanks, protected to the max-
imum against the effects of mass destruction weapons and possessing
heavier armaments. Improvements are being made in airborne assault
troops, capable of being transported by air across zones which ground
troops are unable to traverse. There is a considerable increase in the
number of military transport aircraft, which have the job of carrying
units of ground forces over great distances.
The mobility of ground troops takes on great significance under
modern conditions. This is due to the necessity of utilizing most
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vgt(FdiENNItileett$00t0SearCientreftpT061317T 90WPWglextensive
effect
radioactive contaminationzones and zones of destruction, as well as
,
scatter-deploying troops in the interests of their protection against
enomy nuclear attack.
In connection with this all the most modern armies are doing much
to increase the maneuverability of combat units by equipping them with
armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles with the capabil-
ity of negotiating rugged and diversified terrain. The design of these
vehicles provides combat units with the capability of engaging in combat
without disembarking.
The rapid development of means of attack from the air has led to
the necessity of further improvement of antiaircraft and development of
anti-missile defense for ground forces, and hence to the necessity of
new troop units equipped with antiaircraft guided missiles, antiaircraft
guns and diversified radio and electronic equipment.
All foreign armies are seeking the most effective techniques of
protection of personnel. From an organizational standpoint this takes
shape in the organization, such as in the West German Army, of special
units outfitted with equipment enabling them to counteract the conse-
quences of utilization of all mass destruction weapons. Engineer,
chemical warfare, road-construction and other troops are being out.
fitted with new equipment so that they will be able to carry out the
most complex and complicated technical assignments in the interests of
supporting ground force operations and protecting them against mass
destruction weapons.
Much attention is being focussed on the perfection of recon-
naissance methods and devices, particularly aerial reconnaissance.
Operational and tactical units in the ground forces of the USA are
being more and more heavily equipped with reconnaissance aircraft,
capable of carrying out reconnaissance assignments in the interests of
maximum utilization of mass destruction weapons. Special units are
being formed with the special assignment of jamming enemy radio and
radar.
Bearing in mind that ground force operations will be of a focal
nature and will develop simultaneously at great distances along the
front and behind enemy lines, in the absence of solid fronts, the
organizational forms of obryedineniya and soyedineniya are faced with
the need of providing necessary independence of the latter in carrying
out their combat assignments. Therefore soyedineniya, chasti and in
some cases even podrazdeleniya contain in requisite proportions weapons
and combat equipment of all types of troop units and special troops,
and in obllyedineniya -- of armed forces branches.
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
Approved FiSFARVIMOZON.W04kRIPERPEAMPIIR3.(19 qinaggiVlale employment of
nuclear weapons, the armies of the world's largest nations, primarily
those poesesing nuclear weapons, are endeavoring to maintain ground
forces which could successfully carry out combat assignments with the
employment not only of nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons,
which wad be (capable of quickly shifting from conventional to nuclear
operations. Solution to this complex problem in the most highly develop-
ed nations finds expression in the endeavor to equip ground forces with
artillery systems adapted for using both nuclear and conventional ord-
nance, as well as in an increase in the overall quantity of artillery,
tanks, anti-tank weapons and tactical air units. All this also finds
expression :$11 organizational changes in soyedineniye and obnyedineniya.
History teaches us that in every war elements of the past are
inevitable alongside new features of the art of warfare. To a certain
degree this holds true for a future war as well, in which isolated
principles and even techniques of warfare from the Second World War will
undoubtedly be manifested, particularly in those areas Where only con-
ventional weapons will be employed in large quantity. Proceeding from
this standpoint, in determining the organization of ground forces under
modern conditions it is essential to bear in'mind experience in utiliz-
ing these weapons during the. Second World War, as well as the reasons
leading to organizational changes in the course of the war and after ?
the war. The fact is that changes in combat techniques do not immedi-
ateiY lead to radical changes in troop organization. During a certain
period of time the old forms of organization adapt to new combat tech-
niques. Troop organization in a sense is more stable than techniques of
warfare. Its changes usually occur after the art of warfare formulates
operational-tactioal demands for new models of weapons and combat equip-
ment, when they are fabricated and incorporated in the line units. Since
the process of developing and incorporating new weapons and equipment is
normally a lengthy one, it seems that old forms of organization absorb
new weapons and equipment for p. certain period of time. Only when major
changes take place in combat techniques under the influence of new
weapons and equipment does the quest begin for new troop organization.
Only a state possessing a strong economy and high level of scien-
tific and technological development is capable of creating ground forces
meeting the demands made by the nature of a fixture war, and only such a
state is capable of supplying these forces with everything needed to
conduct successful combat operations. With the development of diversi-
fied radio ecaipment and electronic devices, nvolearemissile and other
costly weapons, the influence of economic potential has become particu-
larly great. Under modern conditions the thesis of Engels that
Hweaponry, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend pri-
marily on the level of produotion achieved at a given mament'l has become
even more significant. Without a highly developed econoty it is now im-
possible to create modern grovxd forces and properly equip and supply
them.
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PYRG HT
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APBEIOarefnIluences tne organizational development of ground
forces thrvugh weapons which are distributed in such a manner that they
may secure the most effective employment of the selected techniques and
forms of conducting combat operations, that is in such a manner that
troop organization corresponds to the predicted nature of combat opera-
tions. At the same time the nature of combat operations, changing under
the influence of new weapons, demands constant 'improvement of the troop
organization adopted before the war. This is conclusively demonstrated
by the experience of the last war, during which there was constant im-
provement in the organizational forms of ground forces by increasing
the firepower and strike potential of ob"yedinenlya and soyedineniya
by organizing and incorporating in these units podrazdeleniya, chasti
and soyedineniya equipped with new systems of artillery and mortars,
tanks, self-propelled artill y and other equipment.
Of great importance for proper solution to organizational prob-
lems is a profound knowledge of the strong and weak points in the enemy's
troop organization, in order to confront him with more highly perfected
troop organization. One can see the results of erroneous or tardy con-
clusions in appraising the enemy's troop organization through the example
of the Great Fatherland War. The initial experience of the Nazi German
troops in Western Europe demonstrated that ma)elmum successful combat
operations were possible only when the ground forces included large tank
and motorized units. These correctly drawn conclusions served as a
basis for returning to the creation (delayed, to be true) of mechanized
corps. By the beginning of the war their organization and outfitting
had not yet been completed. The organizational forms of these
soyedineniya were also imperfect -- they were too unwieldy and control
was difficult.
Blunders committed in the organization of ground forces just be-
fore the war began had to be eliminated during the course of the war.
Correct conclusions drawn from the conditions created during the first
months of the war and a critical analysis of the defects existing in the
prewar organization of our operational obuyedineniya and soyedineniya
enabled us not only to neutralize the enemy's advantages in troop organi-
zation but also to create improved ground force organization. To a
considerable degree this predetermined our success and our potential to
conduct continuous and swift offensive operations.
But this was the past. Now that troop organization is heavily in-
fluenced by new types of weapons, particularly missile-nuclear weapons,
a constant study of the troop organization of the probable adversary and
a solid knowledge of the basic trends in organizational development of
the enenyis armed forces, the strong and weak points in the organization
of operational ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya and the methods by which
they are to be used in combat becomes even more important. In a modern
nuclear war troop reorganization at the beginning of or during such a
war, such as that which took place in the last war, is impossible. Now
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CPYR
WM 96 ! es l? 'I': 'Ill III?11
, sehial. .0 ore ,he war to possess troop organize
-
HT tion which in all respects is superior to that of the enemy and which
corresponds to the nature ef forthcoming armed combat.
The influence of physical-geographical conditions on the organic-
zation of ground forces is manifested through their equipment and com-
bat techniques. This finds expreesion in the creation of special combat
elements, highly adapted to operations under the conditions of a specific
theatre of war. Along with the development of weapons and combat equip-
ment, and particularly reduction in the weight, size and terrain cap.
abilities of this equipment, in all the armies of the world's largest
nations one observes a tendency toward universalization of combat units,
that is the tendency to set up ob"yedineniya, soyedineniya and chasti
which can operate under conditdons of various theatres of military op-
erations and carry out diversified assignments. But this problem has not
yet been completely resolved.
It is believed that ground force organization adopted in the
armies of the majority of western nations basically corresponds to the
conditions of conducting combat operations in such theatres of war as
Western Europe. This is due in the first place to the fact that in past
wars the decisive battles took place in this area and, in the second
place, this theatre now as formerly contain e the major regions, both in
an economic and administrative-political respect, the largest nuclear
weapons bases and other important military installations.
At the same time a study of the nature of probable theatres of
possible military operations shows that they differ greatly one from
another in relative ruggedness of terrain, road system, climatic and
other conditions. All these factors exert substantial influence on the
utilization of treops and of combat equipment, techniques of conducting
battles and operations, and thas on troop organizational structure. The
use of nuclear weapons in such geographically difficult theatres of
military operations as mountainous or heavily forested areas will eompli-
cats te an even greater extent the employment of soyedineniya and chasti
of ground forces designed to operate primarily in highly developed and
dense populated theatres of operations.
As the experience of past wars attests, the act of ignoring the
specific conditions of a given theatre is fraught with disastrous con-
sequences. The equipment and organization of the Nazi German troops
successfully withstood the test under the geographical conditions of
Western Europe, but they were counting on a blitzkrieg, and this equip-
ment and organization turned out to be poorly adapted for conducting
combat operations under the severe winter conditions of Eastern Europe.
The possibilities of troop operations in many theatres, particu-
larly mountainous ones, restricted to certain accessible areas and
along certain accessible routes, units split up one from another, make
diffINIVEAERrEff9tYPAPPRefiEWATP919.151MMORRo-ins into bat-
tle. As a result of this it is essential to have combat units for
operation in such theatres which can independently carry out combat
aesignments. In desert areas it is not always possible to employ heavy
equipment. Here vehicles with greater terrain-crossing capabilities are
necessary. The same can be said in respect to tae arctic regions and
forest-swamp areaa. In the mountains it is not always possible to em-
ploy artillery systems suited to ordinary intersected terrain. Mountain
roads frequently do not permit the passage of large-caliber weapons, as
well as tactical missiles. Mountains also complicate the problems of
logistics.
Hearing all this in mind, it is essential to develop weapons and
combat equipment which on the one hand can be successfully used to carry
out cambat assignments and on the other hand are suitable for utiliza-
tion under specific conditions of mountainous terrain. These demands are
taken into consideration in the organizational development of the armed
forces of various countries. For example, many modern armies possess
various types of mountain artillery, transport vehicles, engineer vehicles
and other military equipment furnished to troops trained to operate in
mountain theatres.
The development of weapons and equipment specially designed for
use in specific conditions of various theatres of war leads to the
development of new, independent podrazdeleniya and chasti outfitted with
this equipment. Their organization should correspond to the nature of
the combat assignments of the troops and guarantee the most effective
utilization under given conditions. Some of this equipment can be in-
corporated in conventional soyedineniya, chasti and podrazdeleniya with
the objective of broadening their combat potential.
The influence of geographical conditions on troop organization is
also manifested in change in the ratio of types of troops in various
troop units. If with operations on conventional terrain (flat, mod-
erately troken) the combination of a certain number of podrazdeleniya
(chasti) of different types of units in soyedinemi;ya and obuyedineniya
guarantees the capability of carrying out assignments, such .a balance
may be disturbed under other conditions. For example, under sandy
desert conditions troops will hardly ever be forced to cross waterways,
while personnel water supply will constitute one of the most important
tasks. Consequently the ratio of podrazdeleniya securing the crossing
of water barriers and water supply podrazdelen54ya will appropriately
change. In forest and swamp areas, where tanks have limited capabili-
ties, the ratio can be changed in favor of.reducing the number of tanks
and anti-tank weapons, while the number of combat vehicles with high
terrain-crossing capabilities can be increased.
The individual characteristics of theatres of war present vary-
ing demands on retaining troop vitality and combat capability. These
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PYRGH
'
p p &oda% r rmeanreauriayinsisu Ub Umlikel-tKUVii0 UU2S / OKUUUJUUUUUU1.5-
without incorporating appropriate podraz-
deleniya into soyedineniya and obllyedineniya. For examples the mass
utilization of nuclear weapons in ,a mountain theatre of combat opera.
tions will cause large landslides and rockslides on the roads, block
crossings, etc. Under these conditions combat troopo may find them-
selves in a difficult situation, and detachment from the main body of
podrazdeleniya to counteract the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes
may reflect on fulfillment of the combat mission. The situation will
be analogous during opentions in large forest areas, where the employ-
ment of nuclear weapons will cause fires and obstructions. Obviously
special units must be used for these purposes or special detachments
must be organized.
Itis clear from the above that two directions are possible in
seeking organizational forms of ground forces from the viewpoint of
having them correspond to the conditions of various theatres of mai-
tary operations. First thwe is the organization of special soyedineniya
and chasti for operating in various theatres of military operations;
second, there is the organization of units designed to reinforce conven-
tional soyedineniya and cha.sti applicable to various theatres.
Both trends have their positive and negative points. The organi-
zation of special units is advantageous in that such troops are prepared
and equipped ahead of time primarily for conducting combat operations in
a specific theatre. At the same time this is disadvantageous from the
viewpoint of economics. The organization of podrazdeleniya and chasti to
reinforce conventional soyedineniya is more advantageous from the view-
point of economics, but they are not always able to guarantee the suc-
cessful performance of troop combat operations in a given theatre.
Bearing the above in mind, in all the armies of the major nations,
in seeking the most suitable forms of ground force organization, one ob-
serves the endeavor to pmvide then with the capability of conducting
successfta operations in ell combat carried out in, developed, populated
regions. At the same time the mirdmum essential number of troop units
designed for operations in theatres with specific physical-geographical
conditions are being set pp. Lathe German Federal Republic an. alpine
infantry division was formed in 1956 and subsequently assigned to NATO.
The main purpose of this division was that of operating under extremely
difficult climatic conditions and on rugged terrain. The American,
BritiSh and French armies devote much attention to the organization and
training of' soyedineniya to function under arctic conditions, and in
southern regions, particularly in the jungle, where they undergo testing
and advanced training.
Speaking of the influence of the nature of combat operations in a
modern war on the forms of troop organization, one must remember that at
a specific stage a large number of demands on these troops cannot be met
in view of the lack of sufficient quantity and requisite quality of new
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equip nt and weapons. It is quite logical. Military science, looking
far into the future, determines appropriate demands on long.term troop
organization and weapons. Weapons in turn, as they are incorporated in
the line units, exert a direct influence on troop organization. In con.
elusion we shall note that the importance of the problem of continuous
improvement of ground force organizational structure demands the over
increasing attention of military-.theoretical thought toward resolving
this problem.
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR TROOP REGIOUPINGS
by Maj Gen A. Skovoroda
In modern highly maneuverable operations the role of troop re-
:eoupings becomes much more important. They will be a particularly
common phenomenon in the initial period of war, when the most abrupt
situational changes are possible, causing the necessity of introducing
substantial revisions into troop groupings organized earlier. Our
military-theoretical press devoted much attention to a study of the prob-
lems of conducting and supporting regroupings. A number of articles in
the journal ImaraujkaL (Military Thought) have discussed in suffi-
cient detail the aims and objectives of tactical regroupings, the effect
of new conditions on the nature and methods of their organization and
execution. Techniques of negotiating destruction zones and zones of
radioactive contamination have been examined, as well as engineer sup-
port, problems of reconnaissance, effective air cover for ground forces,
road commandant service and troop control. These are all very compli-
cated facets of combat operations, which have a most direct effect on
executing regroupings. Naturally logistical support of troop regroup-
ings becomes very important, primarily continuous supply of tactical
obnyedineniya and soyedineniya with various types of fuel, medical
assistance to the wounded and ill, maintenance and repair of combat
equipment while on the march. Logistical support becomes considerably
more complicated when troops are using rail and water transport. Dur-
ing the Great Fatherland War the Soviet Army supply services received
much practical experience in organizing support of large troop regroup-
ings. This experience indicates that in organizing support for opera-
tional regroupings three major tasks must be met simultaneously: full
support to operational obnyedineniya and soyedineniya in preparing for
and carrying out a march (providing truck, rail and water transport);
timely organization of facilities in new staging areas for supporting
subsequent combat operations; transfer and deployment of support and
supply chasti and administrative units with troop grouping in new
areas.
In conducting regrouping operations one must always bear in
mind that soyedineniya and chasti should arrive at the staging areas
as a rule with supplies on hand enabling the forces to go into combat
immediately. Support and supply organizations of all elements will of
course participate in meeting all tasks connected with troop regroup-
ing, but the primary role will be played by those which are directly
organizing and planning the regrouping. All principles enumerated,
formulated on the basis of extensive experience from the last war,
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havo not lost any of their significance. But in a missile-nncloar war
tho conditions and nature of the regrouping activities will change sub-
stantially. Tho cost in mon and materials will rise, and communications
and transport operations will bo much mom complex.
Lot us examine the primary features of logistical support of
largo regroupings under thouo conditions. In organizing support for
troop regroupings it is essential first of all to boar in mind their
larger scope, greater speed of execution and reduced time interval.
Supply outfits should be capable of furnishing forces within a limited
period of time and over great distances an increased quantity of ma-
terial, rapidly fuel combat and transport vehicles, repair dmmagod
equipment and evacuate the wounded. A quite logical contradiction
arises: on the one hand the quantity of supplies, particularly fuel,
increases greatly, while on the other hand the high speed of troop move-
ments sharply reduces the time available for meeting these requirements.
It is therefore difficult at present to count on bringing up everything
necessary from dumps and bases far to the roar during the process of
troop movements. Support and supplies in the regrouping areas should as
a rule bo organized ahead of time, before the troops move out. Tenden-
cies in this direction were observed in the last war, where supply dumps
and field hospitals were set up along the route of troop movements. A
characteristic example of .,nis is the organization and operations of sup-
ply outfits of the Second Belorussian front preparing for the Berlin
operation in April 1945. In accordence with a directive by the front
deputy troop commander for supply, one main and one auxiliary fuel dump
were set up to replenish fuel consumed during the regrouping, as well as
two main and one auxiliary dump for replenishing food supplies. In addi-
tion, essential mobile fuel reserves were organized by supply outfits.
We believe that the early placement of dumps of primary supplies along
troop regrouping routes will find extensive application under modern con-
ditions as well. Primary attention must be focused on fuel dumps, for
fuel consumption now comprises more than two thirds of the total quan-
tity of supplies allocated for regrouping support. In the aim of main-
taining a high degree of troop combat readiness during regrouping, ex-
pended supplies should be replenished daily, preventing a sharp drop
from established norms. This must be done as rapidly as possible, with
a minimum e:penditure of manpower and equipment. These demands can be
met to a considerable degree as a result of bringing supplies as close
as possible to the enroute rest and bivouac areas. Bearing in mind the
higher speed of troop movements and increased daily mileage therefrom,
it is possible to place dumps considerably farther apart from one another
than during the Great Fatherland War. But the quantity of supplies in
each dump, particularly fuel, will increase sharply since average daily
consumption increases. Early organization of supplies along troop routes
constitutes only one of the fundamental conditions for continuous enroute
supply. It is also very important to organize rapid issue of the sup-
plies to the passing troops as well as vehicle refueling. This problem
is met by the combined utilization of various types of transport, as well
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ee with an automted eyetem of fuel roloaoos from dumpe and high-flow
fueling oquipment. Refueling timo can aloo be redueod by coordinated
utalireltion of fueling equipment from difforent supply outfits. This
make it pceeiblo moro offielontly to utilize all fueling equipment, to
lint up a considerably larger number of refueling stations, scattering
than throughout Uho area where troops aro resting or bivouacking. In
this caoe there aro nu groat shifts of refueling equipment, and vehicles
enn be fuelled directly at the dooignatod otopping pointe. Time re-
quired to refuel combat and traneport vehicles in thus sharply reduced.
The above mothod of refueling demands porticularly careful plan-
ning in the hauling of fuel and utilization of refueling equipment
during regrouping, bearing in mind the cnroute troop formations, routes
and movement schedules. Depending on the opecifie situation, it is
advisable to set up refueling stations at rest and bivonac points either
before or immediately after the arrival of advanced units. Therefore
trucks carrying fuel and refueling equipment should either move out ahead
of the others or advance with the columns of chasti and podrazdeleniya.
Under modern conditions, whereby railroade and highways can be
subjected to enemy attack to a considerably greater degree than during
the Great Fatherland War, particularly with nuclear weapons, the role of
air transport is much more important in support operations during long-
distance regrouping. Air transport can be effectively utilized to
deliver supplies during abrupt changes in direction of regrouping move-
ments, upon the destruction of supplies placed ahead of time on routes of
movement, during truck delays in heavy destruction and contamination
zones. Air transport can also move important support and administrative
units considerable distances in a short time, support and administrative
units needed to support line units moving into combat. Transport air-
craft can be used on return runs to evacuate wounded from soyedineniya
and tactical ob?yedinaniya directiy to hospital e in the rear. In view
of these facts the necessity of conetant development of military trans-
port aviation is quite obvioue, in order to use it more extensively in
tactical combat support units and central eupport organizations.
Complex tasks will have to be met by road transport units of
tactical obuyedineniya in securing troop movements together with engi-
neer units. The assignment of -wider corridors and considerably more
routes for regrouping operations will of course require more equipment
and manpower for road building and maintenance. One should also bear in
mind that the time required to rebuild destroyed roads should be as short
as possible in order not to delay the advance of fastmoving troops.
Hence there are two very important conditions which must be borne in mind
when organizing troop regreuping road building and maintenance: routes
of troop movement should be prepared ahead of time to the extent that
this is possible and there should be available requisite supplies of re-
pair and rebuilding materials for the fast neutralization of the results
of enemy attack; a certain number of alternate routes and parallel roads
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if maneuvering is neoeouary during troop movements.
Enrouto traffic detachments in our opinion should also be exten-
eively ueed, detachmento assigned to support troop regroupings and to
move transport and supply columns. The role of such detachmento in the
operations zone becomes much more important undo:' conditions of heavy
destruction and contamination of communications and transport. In com-
bination with road commandant units handling the primary and secondary
roads, they make it pee:Able to utilize the entire road system in a
designated zone and thus guarantee continuous transport operations for
tho hauling and timay transfer of supply and administrative units.
In order to break up the regrouping operation the enemy will en-
deavor to direct nuclear strikes at the troop columns and create zones
of heavy radioactive contamination. According to foreign military ape-
cialiets those strikes are most effective when troops are crossing large
water barriers, mountain passes, defiles and other narrow points en
route. Therefore a particular concern of the headquarters of the re-
grouping troops should be organization of road commandant service along
the entire route and particularly at the most crucial points. Without
going into detail on this matter, we shall mention that 'c,ne basis of
road commandant service in the rear-echelon area can be dispatcher points
for road commandant units servicing primary and secondary roads. But one
should bear in mind that road commandant units, in addition to guarantee-
ing troop movements, should be shifted to new areas in a timely manner
and prepare the roads in these areas for organizing the hauling of sup-
plies.
Bearing these facts in mind, road commandant units should be
utilized in the overall commandant service system, particularly in rear-
echelon sectors and areas requiring particularly painstaking organiza-
tion of troop movements. In this connection we are in full agreement
with the idea expressed by Maj Gen P. Fomichev and Engr-Col V. Rudenskiy
in an article entitled "Some Problems of Traffic Dispatch in Modern War-
fare," that under modern conditions it is advisalle to "locate road
commandant podrazdeleniya chiefly at junctions and in major sectors,
that is in garrisons, and extensively utilize patrols and technical con-
trol devices" (yoyennza.1=11, [Military Thought], 1964, No 12, page 45).
During mass troop regrouping and extremely heavy road traffic it
is very important to correctly plan utilization of the road system in
the interests of meeting the overall needs of the tactical ob"yedineniya
of the various branches of the armed forces, the different types of
units and support outfits. The primary organizer in this matter should
be the combined arms headquarters which, in accordance with decisions of
the commander in chief, plans troop regrouping and comprehensive support.
It is necessary that traffic control on the roads be unified and cen-
tralized. This can be achieved by clear assignments for the manpower and
CPYRGHT
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Apiiiii4fircreftReitiaia0dOttaiggricCIA-FWEt8157p0MEWQ@WWW-lnits, trcop move-
ment control podrazdoleniya) and by delineation of zones (regions) whore
they are to be ueod. Nonobservance of thee principles may lead to a
Lk of coordination in directing traffic, uneven vehicle loads on truck
routes and, what is moot dangerous, to the forming of "bottlenecks" and
truck jam-upn. The problem of most effective utilization of roads, im-
proved organization and traffic safety during major troop regrouping
can be resolved by employment and precise following of traffic schedules
approved by headquarters and amooth operationo by the dispatcher ser-
vice.
Suecea: in oupply operations duripg troop regroupings depends to
a great extent or. the quality of pmparation of combat and transport
vehicles for the mareh. Resolution of this task is somewhat facilitated,
since modern armed forces aro equipped with vehicles with a greater
operating range, Atended time :Ind mileage between servicing, good
terrain.negotiating capability and. high cruising speeds. But neverthe-
less it is essential to see that the troops are constantly ready to
execute extended marches without special preparatiens. This is dictated
by the extremely limited time allotted te organizing regroupings and the
high speed of such operations. Extremely important for the timely
restoration and repair of damaged and out-of-commission equipment is the
early stoskpiling and proper spacing of supplies of ready units, assem-
blies and components, as well as efficient distribution of repair chasti
and podrazdeleniya along the columns. Repair chasti of a tactical ele-
ment, depending on the situation, should be moved out ahead of time into
the planned rest areas (major bivouacs) or to probable areas where major
equipment lessee will be sustained. A high rate of enroute progress is
promoted by well-organized technical support of the columns, effected
chiefly by regular repair podrazdeleniya. In order to repair damaged
equipment it is necessary to make extensive use of loeal repair facili-
ties in the regrouping zone and deployed repair outfits in front of the
active forces. It is well known that during major regrouping operations
troops may sustain considerable personnel losses, particularly in crossing
water barriers, in troop concentration areas, on mountain passes and in
other vulnerable areas. Therefore in order to carry out medical.-
evacuation measures en route it is essential to utilize the manpower and
equipment of all elements of the medical serxice, skillfully combining
them with local medical facilities. After giving medical assistance te
the sick and wounded, they should be evacuated to well-equipped field
hospitals ivilin hospitals) or transferred to medical outfits ahead of
operating o}: yedineniya. A decisive role in coordinating these matters
is played hy the medical ser-rice of the' next higher command.
It is eesenti.al to take particular care in working out measures
connected with medical assistance in rims destruction zones. A proce-
dure of cooperation should h up ahead of tIme between medical
podrazdeleniya and other ohaeti brought in to counteract the results of
enemy attack. It is an extrEmedy complicated matter to transfer supply
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chastiAppobvadkfloriatigarbMINOOMORWIRRKKWAREfEril.rWareas.
Support chasti and administrative elements should be transferred to new
areas with the thought of utilizing them in forthcoming combat opera-
tions. Therefore the grouping of support chasti and administrative units
en route as well as the time required for transferring them should be
closely coordinated with the operational arrangements of the regrouping
ferces and schedules of arrival. in, the naw areas.
In principle it is advisable to assign a. minimum number of sup-
port chasti and administrative elements of the tactical unit for troop
support during regrouping, bearing in mind that the main objective con-
sists in timely organization of supply and support in the new area.
Therefore the bulk of support chasti and administrative units of tactical
ob"yedineniya should immediately be moved to operate in the new regions,
moving them into these areas as rapidly as possible.
The procedure of transferring support chasti and administrative
units into new areas may differ. It is important only that the integrity
of the support chasti and administrative units not be disturbed and that
the columns made up of these units represent a specific support grouping.
Since there are very many support chasti and administrative units with
varying assignments, they should apparently be moved in echelons, follow-
ing up the supported troops or following specially assigned routes.
In conclusion we should like to make a few comments on directing
support units during troop regrouping. In a nuclear war direction of
support units constitutes a very complex and multi-faceted process.
This is connected with frequent and abrupt changes in the situation,
greatly extended lines of communication, changes in traffic routes and
troop structure en route. One must also remember the fact that as a
rule after regrouping troops will be required to engage the enegy without
pause. All this gives rise to the necessity of dividing tactical support
unit control entities so that support units will be under direction in
the areas of initial departure, en route and in the new areas at the be-
ginning of combat operations. Under these conditions there is much more
importance attached to tactical support groups working in close contact
with combined arms headquarters and capable of taking upon themselves
direction of support units at any time. During the process of regroup-
ing an important part is played by reliable communications with support
columns, as well as timely formulation and specification of their assign-
ments. Without these elements, support units cannot be properly trans-
ferred nor can they do their job of supplying regrouping forces in an
organized and totally satisfactory manner.
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CPYRGHT
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A, NEW EDIPION OF A SCHOLARLY WORK ON WAR AND THE ARMY
CPYRGHT By col S Lulconin
The fourth edition of Marksizm-Leninizm 0 voyne i. armii (Marxism-
Leninism on War and the Ata), the work of a group of authors, has come
out in a great nurbcr of copiesl. There has invariably been a great de-
mand for it. among Soviet readers, particularly officers and generals of
the Soviet Armed Forces. The heightened interest in this book is due
to the great importance and urgency of the problems with which it deals.
Under modern conditions, when revolutionary changes are occuring in the
military field, theoretical problems of war and the army have assumed
urgency and importance. With regard to these problems, the Communist.
Party of the Soviet Union is constantly called upon to fight against
various reactionary bourgeois theories and against modern revisionists
and dogmatists.
As the authors correctly emphasize, "Marxist-Leninist doctrine of
war and the army is a theory called upon to solve the sociological pro-
blems of the origin, course, and outcome of wars in world history, es-
pecially in the modern era" (p. 4). Being a constitutent part of dia-
lectical materialism, this doctrine serves as the philosophical-socio-
logical basis of Soviet military theory and practice. "It is of pri-
mary importance for the solution of present-day problems of war and
peace and the development and strengthening of the armed forces of the
socialist states" (p. 5).
Mastery of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, con-
structive study of it, and bold application of it in the practical work
of strengthening the military might of our country have been and con-
tinue to be important tasks of Soviet military cadres. Preceding edi-
tions of this book have already been of great assistance to officers in
the ascomplishment of these tasks. The new edition continues this noble.
mission,
Preserving everything that was good in the previous editions, the
staff of authors have revised the book both es to structure and content
of some of the chapters and sections. In it is systematically and con-
sistently set forth the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army,
based on the classical works of Marxist-Leninism, the program of the CPSU.,
and the decisions and materials of the congresses of our party, meetings
1. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, Fourth edition, revised and
enlarged. Maj-Gen N. Ya. Sushko and Col S.A.M. Tyushkevich, editors, Vo-
yenizdat, 1965. 384 pages.
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, triT e'rna commun
e ;
14illA and,.i iliii
orworkers' parties, and
ass;
the Octdb4i (1964) and subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee of
the CPSU.
In the book are reflected all the new achievements of Marxist-Leni-
nist theory on war and the army, witha consideration of the radical
changes in the relationship of social forces in the international arena
and the revolution in military affairs.
Among the structural changes, the most important, in our opinion, is
thejnclusion of a new chapter devoted to a consideration of the methodo-
logical problems of Soviet military theory (Chapter 7). The effort of.
the authors to meet the growing interest of military cadres in the pro-
blems of methodology in the now so rapidly developing military field de-
serves every commendation. Also certainly provoking interest is the in-
clusion of a special section on the modern revolution in the military
field (Chapter 6). Other chapters and sections have been greatly brought
up to date and systematized: in the first chapter is set forth the pro-
blem of the relationship of war and politics under conditions of the use.
of weapons of mass destruction. The second chapter more clearly expounds
the social character and types of wars of the modern era. There is shown
more fully the relation of Marxist doctrine on war and the army to Soviet
military doctrine and military science, and to the practice of training'
and indoctrination of personnel of the army and the navy. In short, there
Is muph that is new, interesting, and instructiVe in the book.
We believe it is necessary to dwell, if only briefly, on certain chap-
ters and sections of the book.
Considering war as a social-political phenomenon (Chapter 10, the
authors reveal its essence, origin, and causes, and, logically follow out
the interrelation of war and politics, the economic basis of various wars,
and 'the connection between war and ideology. They provide criticism of
bourgeois theories. of the causes, the nature, and the role of wars in his-
tory. In the book it is stated with emphasis: "From the point of view
of Marxism-Leninism the basic question in the analysis and appraisal of
war should be that of its social-political nature" (p. 14). And this is
right: without discovery of its social-political content, it is impossi-
ble to understand either the essential nature of war in general or the
specific peculiarities of each war in particular.
In Continuing the analysis of the essence of war, the authors show
two of its interrelated aspects as social phenomena. The political int..
terests of the warring classes and states determine the goal of the war,
and armed conflict, the means of attaining the goal. At the same time it.
Is concluded that war, especially under Modern conditions, "a special qua-
litive condition of society as a whole" (p. 17). In this connection there
Is subjected to criticism the views of some Of our military-theoreticians.
and philosophers who advance the "thesis of th_e_itolg6b-bit66259 and armed
Jun
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now9doinwnc ngly enough that war does not consist only
of armed conflict, although there can be no war without it. Armed con-
flict consteftutes the distinguishing mark of war, its specific, but the
ring of war is not limited to it. With the beginning of war, the whole
life of society changes qualitively. All the material and spiritual
foreec of the people, of the country, are directed toward assuring vic-
torious progress and outcome of the armed conflict. A world war, if one
were to be started by the imperialists, "would be a complex and many-
sided process, in which, along with the activities of the armed forces,
there would develop economic, diplomatic and ideological conflict. All
these forms of conflict, as well as armed conflict, will be subordinated
to the policies of the belligerent states and will be guided by them"
Cp. 18).
Here it would have been better to call attention to the fact that
all non-military means of conflict become different in time of war.
The book analyses in detail the rola of politics in the preparation,
starting and direction of a war, and also the effect of war on politics.
From this analysis the authore reach a conclusion as to the importance of
tlw, organic unity of a political approach to military problems and an ex-
cellent knowledge and sober consideration of specific military circum-
stances and principles of waging armed conflict fo/3 the attainment of
victory.
As we have already said, the books deal separately with the rela-
tion of politics and war when the use of weapons of mass destruction is
involved. U4D. 29-30) It is correctly noted that the increase in the
power of means of destruction leads not to diminution but iricrease of
the role of politics in the control of war, for di.:'ectly at the disposi-
tion of the governments of the belligerent states are means of armed con-
filet of unprecedented effectiveness. However, at the end of this paraQ
gr3Th there is what we think is a vague and contradictory statemnt about
th posfble consequences of a nuclear world war. This is all t-,/e more
dYsappointing when In the second chapter (pp. 89-90) this question is ex-
r:1mde,3 fairly clearly.
Examining the economic basis of wars, the authors analyze the eco-
nonics of mndarn imperialism and disclose the reasons for the increase
in aggressiveness of the imperialist states in the present era. "It is
Just because capitalism in its higher stage is on the verge of decline -
and ruin, going through a new, third stage of its crisis, that its aggres-
sive aims are not only not declining, tut are increasing still more" (pp.
37-38).
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The section, "War and Ideology," not only examines theoretical ques-
tions of the role of ideology in war, but traces its role historically
through various wars of the past, and reveals reasons for the growth of
the role of ideolqgy in modern war.
Unfortunately, some of the statements in this section are in thena-
ture of general opinions and declarations without the necessary foundation
in evidence. (pp.48-49).
In our opinion, the section on modern bourgeois theories of war is
written interestingly and with a militant party spirit. The most wide-
spread bourgeois views on war are subjected to criticism: the theory
of coercion (nasiliye), the theory of the "salvation of civilization,"
racist and chauvinistic,views, Maithusianism and geopolitics, and cle-
rical and psycholcgical conceptions of war. It would be useful to intro-
duce some fresh material into this section.
The book examines in detail the social character and types of wars
of the modern era (Chapter 2). The scientific solution of these problems
is of primary importance for determining the political lines of communist
parties, the working class, and all workers, in relation to each specific
war of our time. Speaking of just and unjust wars, the authors write:
"Any war waged by a people in the name of liberty and social progress, for
liberation from exploitation and national oppression or in defense of the
independence of their state, against an aggressive attack, is a just war
... A unjust war is contrary to historical progress" (pp. 70-71).
The position is well-founded that the legality and justice of revolu-
tionary-liberation wars must not be confused with the question of the ex-
pediency of using military means of struggle for social progress and na-
tional independence. Oppressed classes and peoples take up arms not by
choice, but by necessity, forced to this by the oppressive actions of the
exploiters.
The authors examine the social bases of clasSi-eication of wars, con-
sidering the basic clashes of interests which result in military conflict
and the social forces which enter into armed conflict. Proceeding from
this, they define the actual and possible wars of the modern era: (1)
world war between opposing social systems; (2) civil., wars: (3) national-
liberation wars; and (4) wars between bourgeois states (pp. 79-80).
Unfortunately, in describing the types of wars the authors missed
the opportunity to emphasize the different, directly contradictory nature
of wars of one type. Thus, speaking of a world war which the imperialists
might start, they assert that "it would be regressive in its effect on
social development and most reactionary in its political content" (p. 82).
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This statement is true only with regard to one side -- the imperialist
r side. But in a world war there will also be another side -- the socia-
list countries. And, here nothing is said about the just nature of war
from the point of view of the latter. The book thoroughly examines the
relation of war and socialist revolution. Presenting the Lenin thesis
that revolutions are not made to order, but are brought about by a, com-
plex of a great number of internal, andexternal causes, the author's
write: "War is not an indispensablc- element of this complex; it is not
a determining conditon of revolution. Between war and revolution there
is. no constant, unvarying relationship" (p. 85). On the basis of con-
crete historical material, the book traces the complicated and contra-
dictory relation of war and revolution, and those new features which
have arisen in the relationship of nuclear war and the world revolutionary
process. The authors give the detailed characteristics of civil wars and
wars of national liberation. It should be noted that the section on
national-liberation wars is somewhat drawn-out because of inclusion in
it of material on the national-liberation struggle in general. Also,
only one side of civil, wars and national-liberation wars is considered --
the just side, and the other side -- unjust war waged. by counter-revolu-
tion and by colonialists -- is omitted.
The chapter? "Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," has
been revis.ed in the new edition. In it are revealed the basic character-
istics of such wars: their undeniable justness, their revolutionary na-
ture, their involvement of the whole people, and their international
character. But we think the chapter still has not been brought up to the
necessary scientific-theoretical level, and it is excessively drawn-out.
In a separate chapter (Chapter 5) in the new edition are selected
materials on, the armed, forces of the socialist states. This deals with
the following subjects: the social nature, historical mission and main
distinguishing features of the armies of the socialist states, and their
development, training and indoctrination. The authors depend not only
on very rich military experience and the glorious progress of the Soviet
armed forces, but also utilize interesting material from the history of
the erstablishuent and development of armies of the other socialist coun-
tries, picking out those general features which are characteristic of all
the armies of the new, socialist type. The book clearly formulates and
provides sound basis for the four main distinguishing features of, these
armies: their truly popular (narodnyy) character, the friendship and
fraternity 'between peoples, and the friendship of the peoples of all the
countries of socialism and of the armies of fraternal internationalism
towardethe working class and the toilers of the non-socialist courtries.
These traite.of the armies of the socialist countries find their genera-
lized e)!_-pression in their spiritual aspect, in moral and political superi-
ority to the armies of the bourgeois states.
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The Drool( gives mucli attention to revealing and substantiating such
important principles of Soviet military development as increasing the
leading role of the Communist Party in the life and. activity of the armed
forces, and strengthening the activity and influence of the party organi-
%ations in the army and navy. The great Importance of the decisions of
the October (1964) and subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee of the
CPSU for the development of our armed. forces Is emphasized. The authors
call attention to the Importance of systematic, well-provEed party-poli-
tical work.
The new edition examines in detail the conditions, causes and fac-
tors determining the course and outcome of military operations and of a
war as a whole (Chapter 6). Unquestionably praiseworthy is the fact that
in the exposition of these very important military-philosophical problems
the authors proceed not from formulas and diagrams put out by, somebody,.
sometime, but from present-day actual conditions., They trace the depen-
dence of the military power of the state on the level of the economy, the
degree of development of natural and social sciences, the psychological
and political state of the society, and the righting power of the armed
forces, and on the relative power of the forces of the opposing sides.
In bringing to light these problems, the criticisms and desires expressed
in judging previous editions are taken into account. In particular1 a
new, very important section o the modern revolution in the military field
and its effect on the military power of states or coalitions), is incltded.
The authors strive to reveal the causes and essential nature of this revo-
lution and its decisive effect on the military power of states.
Examining the role ofscientinc and engineering progress in the
radical changes which have occurred in the military field, in the methods
and forms of waging armed conflict, the authors Stress the influence of
politics and ideology on these changes: The present revolution in the
military field began and continues on two diametrically opposing social-
political bases and under different ideological influences" (p. 248).
We must not fail to note the interesting and, in our opinion, pro-
found exposition of the economic bases of the military power of the state.
The authors correctly emphasize that the role of economic conditions in
a thermonuclear war has not only substantially increased but also has es-
sentially changed. Now the possession in advance of the necessary stock
of nuclear charges and the means of delivering them to targets has as-
sumed special importance, especially various types of missiles, and also
other modern weapons and all possible materiel necessary for waging war;
A definite virtue of the book is the thorough study by the authors
of the dependence of military power not only on the development of natural
sciences and engineering,. but also on that of social sciences. The book
shcvsApillieklifOgsFiklitrasetiVOOMOVANAIRPAROM875Rd110300090112.3-81ciences. The
96
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book shows, in particular, the enormous Importance of the social sciences,
the nucleus of which is Marxinm-Leninism, and also scientific research in
such currently leading branches of natural science as nuclear physics,
radioelectronics, cybernetics, dentistry of high-molecular compounds, bio-
logy, and others. On this basis, the authors condider the scientific po-
tential of a country ( or a coalititz) to be the level and rate of dele.:1-
opment of scientific thought, its capebility of rapid and effective solu-
tion of problems of the development; of society and of science itself. This
includea natural, social, and military sciences" (p. 275).
In studying the psychological (moral'no-) and political bases of mili-
tary pcmer, the authors define the essen6e and content of the morale of
the people and the army and of the morale (morarnyy) potential, and exH
plain the influence of the social-political system and the war aims on the
morale of peoples and armies, showing the increase in importante of the
morale factor in a nuclear missile war.
The reader will find much that is new and instructive in that part
of the book which considers the essence and the elements of the combat
per of the armed forces. rere a sociological analysis of the problemb
presented is based on a great amount and varict:; uf informtion on modern
military developnents.
The concluding chapter' (Chapter (), "Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War,
and Problems of Methodology of Soviet Military Theory, " appears for the
first time in this work. The authors examine the most Important principles
of methodology of Soviet military science, arising from the laws and. basic
categories of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, especially the categories of the
Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army. Interesting and important
problems are presented, the sclu%lon of which will prombte-further streng-
thening and development of the fruitful union of Marxist-Leninist philoso-
phy and Soviet military science. Not everything in this chapter has been
brought up to the required level. There still is not the neceseary con-
sisteney and logical harmony in the exposition of the problems pesed3 cer-
tain formulations are unclear. But what has been done certainly deserves
favorab]e comment.
We should also speak of some general defects of the book. First of
all, it id too long (384- pages). This is due, in our opinion, not so much
to the multitude of problems dealt with as it is to the uneveness of expo-
sition. Some chapters are very lovIg-drawn-out. For example, in the third
chapter ("Wars in. Defense of the Socialist Fatherland"), as mentioned above,
there is much mateial having only a remote connection with the subject:
discussions of the distinguishing features of a socialist fatherland, the
role of the wasses of the people In history and in the struggle for socialism,
etc. As a result the length of the book has been unjustifiably extended
by 45 pages. In addition, there are repetitions in the book. Probably the:
roved
pprove
editors are primarily to blame for this. For example, both the third and
fifth chapters deal with the cothbat cooperation of armies of the socialist
countries. On pages 150 and 293 the some quotation from Lenin is given.
From our brief 'oview of this book, it may be concluded that the au-
thors have created a useful and important scientific work, in which are set
forth the mcit important achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory, at its
present level of development, on war and the army. The book will serve as
a good textbook for ideological-theoretical training of officers.
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT by dol N. MaYutenkoir
The problem of a uniform understanding of military terns has fre-
quently been brought up in ymennaya Myslu, once in the postwar years a
great many new words and concepts have been added to military language. A
main charactertatie of military language, as of any other professional lan-
guage Is the rapid, addition to it of new terms, produced by the revolution
in science and engineering. NesPwords, upon becoming professional terms,
acquire an unambiguous meaning necessary for them and distinguish a certain
concept from bordering ones. Terms, especially military ones, should not
permit of more than one interpretation, especially within the bounds of
current military doctrine.
The existence of specialized tarns makes possible great brevity in
military speech, since it makes it possible to convey briefly complicated
concepts; the explanation of which would otherwise require many words and
much elucidation. People who know the meanings of the terms easily grasp
the meaning of regulations and manuals, and of military theoretical litera-
ture, and as a consequence uniformity of understanding is develcped and the
process of thinking is expedited. In the conditions of today, when military
operations have become rapid-moving, and abrupt changes in the situation re-
quire of command persoLnel firm, resaarcelna and continuous direction of the
troops under them, a common, uniform understanding of military terns is be-
coming all the more Importaub.
Unfortunately, not all our terms are understood in the same way by
everybody. Such a situation is intolerable. Now, as never before, there is
required absolute uniformity in this, for which there is also necessary a
single dictionary_ of military terms.
The first postwar publication of such a dictionary was undertaken in
19582. Utthntnnately, for all its virtues, the dictionary expressed the
point of view of its compilers, which could not be shared by all. We need a
dictionary WUdn haa codified "legalized") the principle persisting military
terms .and made them uniform and obligatory for. all. Such a dictionary, in
our opinion, shorild be small, and should include primarily those te.we needed
for f..11e. command of troops.
??????????????FrI
1. Mover' osnarat yoyennykh terminov (Dictionary of Basic Military
Terins.7.7yenizdat, 1967, 248 pp.
2. feratqysievaru creerativno-takticheskikh i obshchevevennykh slov
CterMindij rEilef Dictionary of Operational-Tactical and General Mili-
tary Words f,Terns) ). Voyenizdat? 1958, 324 pp.
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PY
RGHT
The recently published Slovar' osnovnykh voyennyk terminov (Dictionary
of Basic Military Terms), despite defects in it, with Aolich we will deal
below, undoubtedly will be of positive value and will help to attain a uni-
form understanding of many terms. The dictionary will be a valuable training
aid tori the training of young military cadres, and to a certain extent it can
be used by scholars and military editors, although both the latter would un-
doubtedly be better served by a military encyclopedia, in the publication of
which &wide range of Sovie6 readers is now interested.
In the main, the dictionary Iwing reviewed reflects the changes which
have taken place since the publication of its predecessor. Operational ter-
minology is widely represented in it. However, along with the obvious'vir-
tues of this book, it is not lacking in defects which should be taken into
account in subsequent editions of books of this kind.
First, it should be noted that the authors in many items draw a parallel
between operational art and tactics, thinking that those characteristic traits
inherent in a battle are to an equal detOee inherent in an operation. They
do not even to try to find the difference between them -- those characteristic
features which are typical of each of these Phenomena taken separately. ?
The dictionary is guilty of inexact and, in places, not entirely correct
definitions.
Thus, for example, "artillery instrumental reconnsissance" (AIR) is
treated in the! dictionary as "a constituent part of ground artillery reconnais-
sance" (p. X5). One asks, why only ground? It is well known that not only
in the conditions of today, but also in wars it has been a part also of air
artillery reconnaissance.
On the next page "artillery observation" is explained as "a means of
reconnaissance of the enemy consisting of observation of tne enemy from ground
artillery observation points." Again the question arises: why only from
ground points? Has not artillery observation been conducted, and is it not
conducted, from the air? For this their exists special spotting planes, and
besides these, during a number a past wars balloons were sent up for artillery
observation, Incidentally, it should also be pointed out that the term "ob-
servation," one of the most important methods of reconnaissance, is not in
the dictionary.
The dictionary states that a "ballistic rocket (raket) (p. 22) is a means
of destruction. That is true. It may carry a nuclear, chemical, or conven-
tional warhead. But the raket is primarily a means of delivery. Therefore it
would be more correct to consider it just as a means of delivery.
The compilers have confus the concept of "blocking" (blokirovaniye)
with "encirclement." The former only preceded the latter; it is not identi-
cal with it. Besides, "blocking" is of briefer duration than "encirclement,"
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PYRGHT
APPrgatikgrWeiglitsgc12MTP&$141:19PfUge?sUal? ?the aim of temporarily depriving
the enemy of the possibility of maneuver in outer directions.
"Combat training" (boyevaya podgotovka) is defined as "teaching to
various categories of service personnel, podrazdeleniya, chasti, soyedine
niya, and staffs the carrying out of combat operation's, and to rear. agencies
---their rear support." The question arises to whom does "their" refer?
To the rear agencies theOselves? Here, obviously, striving for brevity has
not been justified. It would have been better to have said "the rear support
of troops," but that definition, too, would be somewhat too narrow, since
rear personnel also engage in their awn protection and defense, and to a
certain extent also must be taught to carry out combat activities, especially
repulsing surprise attacks of the enemy and protection against his means of
destruction.
We cannot understand on what basis the authors say that a "military
umpire" (voyskovoy posrednik) is designed only for troop or command-and-staff
exercises involving two sides (p. 54). Military umpires are also designated
for exercises involving only one side.
A "second echelon," in the opinion of the authors, is ; "a part of the
operational formation or combat order of troops not participating directly,
at a given moment, in theiengagement (battle)" (p. 56). In the circumstances
of today such a definition cannot be considered correct. The second echelon,
even before entry into the engagement, may often wage battle, carrying-out
such mieaions as fighting against enemy forces which have broken through,
and against his landing assaults, carrying out encirclement and destruction
of forces remaining in our rear, etc.
Combat aviation never has been attached to soyedineniya, especially not
under the conditions of today. Its great speeds do not permit it to be used
in the zone of operations of a soyedineniye, and the compilers of the diction-
ary should have remembered this7, under "comblned-arms battle" they treat
this subOect incorrectly (p. 145).
In the opinion of the compilers, a "march security detachment" (pokhod-
naya zastava) can only be an advance party or a flank party (p. 176). This
is not entirely accurate. A rear party (tyltnaya pbkhodnaya zastava) also
has every. right to exist.
A "reconnaissance patrol" is sent out not on1y from a reconnaissance
detachment as is asserted in the dictionary (p. 194), but also from a re-
connaissance group. Besides, in considering the term "reconnaissance patrol"
one cannot ignore the existence also of the term, "combat reconnaissance
patrol," and fail to tell, at least in genera/ outlines, for what purpose
and when it is sent out.
There are many such definitions in the dictionary which are mainly correct
but are not complete. And this does not permit the meaning content of the
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example, in explaining the term, "artillery
group," the authors state that it is created foal the accomplishment of
missions in a battle (p. 15). They should have added: also in an opera-
tion, since these groups in the past war were created not onty in an army,
but even in a front. This is ell the more im0Ortant since a.reader often
encounters the term "artillery group" in military historical literature.
In considalng "surprise" (Vnezapnost') as one of the principles of
the art of war (p. 39), it should have been stated that it operates in the
course of a certain period of time, 1.e.9 it has a beginning and an end.
Under "military reconnaisance" it would have been appropriate to add
that, depending on the sphere in which it operates, it is subdivided into
land, air, space, and sea recunnaissance.
In explaining the meaning of "further (subsequent) mission" (dal'-
neyshaya [posledushchaya) zadacha), it should have bcen pointed out that
in order to accomplish it, changes art: necessary in the combat disposition
(operational formation) and in the organization of cooperation (for example,
entry into battle of the second echelon).
Unjustifiably narrow is the treatment of the term "operations research"
(p. 99). The proc6ss cif studying operations cannot consist only'of mathe.i
matical methods. Many methods of scientific research are applicable here;
including historical, logical, statistical, etc.
tinder "defenue of the sea coast" (p. 143) it is not indicated by whom
this is carried out, and this is something that is most basic.
In explaining the meaning of "defensive operation" (p. 143), the au-
thors say nothing about holding occupied lines. This mission under modern
conditions is not taken away from defending forces.
In defining the term "operational coordination" an important feature
was overlooked -- the operations of troops, as distinguished from tactical
coordination, outside of coordination of fire (ognevaya svyaz). On the
same page, under ?operational ob"yedineniye" they might have mentioned that
its composition is not permanent.
The term "reconnaissance group" (p. 194), in our opinion, shlu1d have
been defined more broadly. Reconnaissance groups may be formed also for
searches and ambushes. When necessary reconnaissance groups may carry out
their awn combat missions.
There are also explanatiws in the dictionary which, because they are
too general and in places not definite enough, cannot satisfy the reader.
For example, in defining "advance guard" (p. 5)0 they should have said for
what kind of march it is detailed. You see, in addition to an advance
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t e ? 'rec. on of the front, in a flank march
there is also detailed a flank advance guard. It is impOrtant also to an-
swer the questions is an advance gated always designated in dtrrying., out et
march, and who has the responsibility of guarding the troops if an advance
guard is not detailed? What organizations detail from their own forces an
advance guard? and for what purpose? It would have been goad to state the
c*position of an advance guard, and by what principles one should be guided
in designating it.
There should have been fuller explanation also of the designation of
a "rear. guard." It is' detailed not only for a 'perch from the front to the
rear, but also in a withdrawal. Troops withdrawing from battle move back
following the line of the rear guard. When necessary the rear guard en-
gages in battle on intermediate lines of defense, in order to delay the ?
enemy long enough for disengagement of the main forcae. It is also impor-
tant to tell which organizations of the defense detail a rear guard from
their own forces, and who covers those ccel.umns from which one is not de-
tailed.
A very general explanation is given of the term "immediate mission"
(blizhayshaya zade.cha) "Depending on the situation, an immediate mission
is destruction of means of nuclear attack, defeat of a main force of the
enemy, and taking of targets, regions and lines, the seizure of which assures
suOcessful accomplishment of the further (subsequent) mission" (p 25).? In
our opinion, definition of this mission should not be given apart fkam.its
relation to the general comkat mission. 'Resides, there should have been a
statement of the principles which underlie the breakdown of the genera/ com-
bat mission into a number of ones to be accomplished in segMenee. C122:20-
dering that the meaning of "immediate mission" in podrazdeleniyaf chasti,
and soyedineniya (not to mention obufredinertiya) is very differentt, it seems
inappropriate to us to put under this term one version of an immediate mis-
sion, since it may mislead some officers, who will take what is recommended
as an obligatory.standard.
In speaking of "kinds of battle" (p. 39), they might have named them,
and indicated the basic principles of classification. On the same page,
under "kinds of armed forces," they should have stressed that the distinguish-
ing feature of any kind of armed forces is its capability of carrying on
indePendent operations. The foreign term, "zone of combat opetatioxis" (p.
87)9 is not thoroughly explained. :;?irst, this zone can etso include coastal
regions, and consequently there can develop in it not only combat operations
of ground forces, but of naval forcee as IUO The latter, as a rule, oup- .
part the ground forces, of which the conduct of war by the US army is convinc-
ing evidence.
Second, the compilers are qf the opinion that a zone" of combat opera-
tions is occupied only by field armies and army corps. But it can also be
occupied by groups of arm4s0 It all depends on. the scale of combat opera-
ations and the operational/size of the theater itself.
PYRGHT
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APPrETTAf?044$inUfli9 iers include the term zone of oembat operations,"
why do they not give the term "zone of communications," which is the second
constituent part of a theater of military operations?
Under "objective laws of war" (p. 145) there should have been stated
the particulars of their application in war. They are manifested In the
form of princiges, and it would have been appropriate to point this out
under "principles of the art of war" (p. 179).
There is too brief exposition of the term, "alerting of troops"
(opoveshcheniye voysk). he most important thing will not be clear to the
reader: how and when it is done, and what means are used for this.
In the preface it is stated that the compilers made use of Kratkiy
slower' operatimao-takticheskikh obshaevoysaayk slov (terminovl (Brief
Dictionary of Operational and Tactical and General Military Words (Terns) ).
SD they did. But it is too bad that they did not listen to the voice of
criticism. A study of the reviews of the 1958 dictionary-would have enabled
them to avoid some defects. For example, in one of the reviews or the 1958
dictionary the absence of the term "voyennoye delo" (military affairs: the
military field) is pointed out. It OFtettu?s in Bur literature, but 10
not understood by everybody in the same way. And the authors of the new
dictionary should have included it.
On the whole, the book we are reviewing will be useful to our generals
and officers and is a necessary one for their libraries.
CPYRGHT
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