SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL' ', NO 10, 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 25, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATI ON
L."
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Washington, D. C.
9PRAWMAitlYSL?,
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Issue No 10, October 1965
Voyennaya Mysl? (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR
Ministr7r?Orrei' er?=6;" printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House,
Moscow. The articles translated herein are from Issue No 10, October
1965 which waS. signed for the press 22 September 1965.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Some Urgent Problems in Military Engineering
Psychology, by B. Lomov? Col V. Ofitserov,
and Lt Col V. Rubaklyin
Strategy and Transport, by Mai Gen Tech
Trps Ya. Shepennikov and Col Ye, Nensberg
On Means and Methods of Programmed Teaching,
Book Review by Engr Col N. Bazanov and
Engr Lt Col V. Koshutin
Some Problems in the Methodology of Soviet
Military Historfi..cal Science, by Co3. V
Solov? yev
An Answer to Opponents, by Maj Gen I.
Zav?yalov
It Depends on What One Should Give Up,
by Rear Adm (Ret) K. Zotov
Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs,
Book Review by Lt Col Ye. Rybkin
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SOME URGENT PROBLEMS IN MILITARY ENGINEERING PSYC11OLOGy 1
by B. LOMOV, corresponding member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences
cpyRGilifFSR, Col V. OFITSEROV, and Lt Col V. RUBAKHIN
The provision of our armed forces with new equipment leads to a change
in the nature of the relationship between man and machine. Automated sys-
temathat net only supply power and perform technological functions, but
systems which perform administrative functions as well, are being imple-
mented on an increasing scale. An intermediary link, as it were, forms
between the soldier and the weapon -- a complex control system. In a cer-
tain sense this separates the person from the weapon, makes the control
process a remote control operatiov, decreases the number of moving compo-
nents, decreases, the physical load, but at the same time increases the
mental lead, and ccmplicates the structure of movements.
The perception and processing of information, programming of action,
adoption of decisions and control are gaining an increasing role in the
work of the soldier. At the same time modern military equipment is char-
acterized by high speeds, the complexity of many pi.ocesses and unexpected
situations. A pilot, for instance, in a modern fighter has to operate his
aircraft under the influence of considerable G-force factors, and at speeds
exceeding the speed of sound. Under such conditions a person does not have
the time to fully perceive the rapidly changing situation, and react in
time and correctly to the readings on tens of instruments. The preparation
of missiles for launching is measured in very short periods of time and
must be carried out in strict correspondence with the assigned program.
The activities of the air defense and antimissile defense crews are also
highly limited in time and take place in a complex and constantly chang-
ing situation. All this sharply increases the demands made on the sensory
organs of the person, as well as on the intellectual and emotional-will
power elements of military activities,
In addition.to this it is also necessary to remember that in a future
war it will be necessary to function under conditions created by the use
of weapons of mass destruction. Powerful nuclear blasts with their blinding
flashes and high temperatures, areas of extensive fires and destruction,
large areas of radioactive.and.chemical.contamination, instantaneous mac,s
losses of personnel and materiel -- this is far from a complete picture of
modern. combat. In such combat the nervous system of the soldier will be
subjected to superstimuli. If ordinary disturbances (noise, bright lights,
low or high temperatures) exert an inhibiting effect on human activity,
super-stimuli may completely disorganize a person's entire behavior, dis-
rupt the performance of firmly learned and habitual functions.
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RGHTPit9VeidEgrq0e??%P9,94*.Q9kiPIHNP18T9?,81TFP:513?991r9:11T41?of
i:ronucing an appropriate effect
capabilities into account, peculiaies of human se-nsory eruns, human
intelletua:t and motor activity, or, speaking in geneLak, tne peculiax
of human psyche in the past, when the .a2:.1Lament, materiej and oon-Ltons
of thelr Use WYCO not as ,7omplicatcd, an accurate considn.at.:.en nfhumaa
capabilities was, perhaps, not aways ff.00s-sary. At the pfl,nnT.,
however, it :MpOSSA):ie to gec by. without such a .c..ondie:rati.on.
As commonly known at the bogi):,ning of World War IA some typ,,; of m7,1tary equipment did not produce the result expectd of it when it was
designed. Because of the numerous 'n Lakes made by the per5onnel uslng
such equipment there occurred frequent hreakdowns and accidents, which
decreased its combat efficiency, it is also neesary to point ou,: the
fact that the training of specialists took a very long period of tame.
The training of an American fighter pilot at that time took about one-
fourth of the pilot's total time in the servioa and c-ost0,000 dollars.
Special analysis indicated that al tUs, for the mc,,z.t part, occurred
because of a failure to take into aczeunt iiic.tors as the physaolo-
gicai and psychological pecullares of the person%el in the (123igning
and creation of military. equipment, Snbequently, as a result of engi-
neering-psychological research, it was possible i.ncreac the effi-
ciency with which the military eq:Apmewt was used, at the same time accel-
erating the training of the persoyine. The resolution of technical ques-
tions, with a consideration of the psiohophysiological pec.,.;Iiarities of
the 2ersonnel, promotes an incrcal,t! in the combat ability of the troops,
and, in the end, increases the economy fcatures and the efficiency of the
equipment being designed,
As reported in the foreign px.css the US Aix FA..4.-c. annuany loses
between 300 and 400 pilots and about FAO .aircraf.4 Statstics have :indi-
cated that hiiman eiTor is thc main cause of accdents,..:: incorrect identifi-
c:.,tion of instruments, impcxfezt depth percept.ion or an IDCOITOCt determnation of the aixtraft posit?on, opeiatj.on of ':.:Col'itr0;.5,
Between .953 and 196S the ,t)t of accidentsinvoiv.ing arc aft 7.o;,t some
7/21 million dollars in the US. American psycholog'its worked out the
ANIP (Army Navy Instrumeltation Program), which changed the representation
of certain flight parame):exs, pacticularly during landings, from instrument
readings to television :mages This 7,y1:7em el:iminated man/ of the errors
foTmorly made by pilots. It is interestf,ng to note that the cost of s.eien-
tific research and design wori performed in a:.cordance with the AN-A) pro-
gram came to a total of only 26 million dollars over a ten-year period.
During the postwar years a certain mount o?. experience was acquired
ln collaboration between the designers and pVi:ioloOsts, psychoLogists
and doctors during the design of some type5 of military equipment. This
first of all applies to air force and air defense equipment. Not too much,
however, has been accomplished thus far. The combat training of military
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pilots evidences the fact that not everything is taken into account in the
design of aircraft cockpits. Officer-aviators V, Ochakov, An Paterkin and
P. Sablin, for instance, write that at first glance the cockpit of a modern
missile-armed aircraft appears to be ultimate perfection. The designers
made sure to equip it with all that is necessary to control the operation
of the numerous units of this most complex machine. At the same time, how-
ever, they note, it is important to remember that, in the last analysis,
the machine is controlled by people, and these people have a certain limit
to their.physiological_capacities. There is such a large number of switches,
levers and.dials_that in some situations it is practically impossible for
the pilot_to_find_the ones. he .needs, particularly if time is of critical
essence. The letter writers categorically protest against an increase in
the number of instruments, which no longer ease, but, on the contrary, com-
plicate.the pilots work.
Similar examples may be also cited with regard to other types of wea-
pons and equipment. They all indicate that under the present-day conditions
there is an immeasurable increase in the role of military psychology in gen-
eral, and in military engineering psychology in particular.
Military engineering psychology is usually understood to be a branch
of military psychology studying the role and functions of man in the control
of complex military equipment for the purpose of achieving its most effi-
cient utilization On the one hand military engineering psychology rests
on the theory of the art of war, on general psychology and the psychology
of labor, while on the other hand it rests on the technical and mathemati-
cal sciences: theory of automatic control, theory of information, theory
of mass.operation? etc.
The role.of military engineering psychology increases in the course of
the technical rearmament of the forces. It was born in the 1940's as in
independent. science in connection with the tasks that had to be resolved in
the design of military equipment. At the present time the military psycho-
logists are engaged in a detailed study of human functions in the operation
of aircraft, radar equipment, missile complexes and. other types of complex
military equipment. In the US, for instance, psychological research was
primarily concentrated in the air force. Now special attention is being
devoted to an investigation. of. the role of. humans on board a space ship,
in the interests of the military utilization of space.
What problems does military engineering, psychology resolve?
The most important program is the determination of the optimal distribu-
tion of functions between man and military equipment. This is particularly
important with regard to automated systems which functions should be dele-
gated?to the machine, and which ones should be left up to humans? This, to
a great extent, pr::determines not only the reliability and accuracy of the
gntire sarstem
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Tile distribution of functions between man and machine is, first ef
all, a psychological question. Engineering psychology permits the most
comprehensive analysis of the possibilities available to man and machines,
and helps to determine the functions and efficiency of each of them. The
continuous development of technology and the perfection of personnel makes
it necessary for engineering psychology to periodically re-eValuatc the
functions of homans and machines.
The practical resolution of the given problem insistently demands a
detailed determination of the psychological structure of the human opera-
tor's activities, as the most important link in the control system. Spe-
cial research carried out by psychologists indicate that the structure of
this activity is highly peculiar and complex, since it is associated with
the utilization of clearly expressed "game" control systems and with the
resolution of operating tasks. The specific features of this activity is,
first of all, the remote control method of operating weapons, equipment
and processes. The thing is that tne actual missiles and targets, as a
rule, are inaccessible for direct perception. The operators of a radar
station, for example, do not see the actual targets they are tracking,
while the operators of the control systems of some missile installations
see neither the target, nor the missiles themselves. This peculiarity
gives rise to a number of individual operations decoding of information
being perceived, restoration of information either lost or distorted by
noise, analysis of the information for' sense, and other operations?
It is also necessary to say that the activity of the operator, parti-
cularly a military operator, has not yet been fully studied. This to a
great degree explains the difficulties eneountered in the creation of
theoretical informational models describing the behavior of the operator
in various systems. In all cases when determining the place and role of
the operator in technical systems profound knowledge and an all around
accounting is required of the possibilities of the person's analysers
(sensory organs), the maximum speed with which he can act, his accuracy,
reliability and resistance to interference when working. It is necessary
to know these characteristics for each of the stages involved in the work
of the operator both in the perception of information and the resolution
of problems, and in the performance of various operations in response.
The limits of sensitivity of human analysers are ccmmonly called thres-
holds. Stimuli are not perceived beyond the upper and lower thresholds.
The resolving power of the eye3 for instance, under favorable comAtions of
visibility on the average is equal to one angular minute, Objects with
smaller angular characteristics are not perceived by the eye. The thres-
hold of discrimination is reversely proportional to the contrast threshold.
The latter is equal to l?5-200 percent (in the sphere of medium brightness).
Under normal conditions the eye reacts to colors having wave lengths of
from 380 to 760 mm. The human audio analyser distinguishes sounds within
l62O cycles er second Lb ex thousand
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The. humanAotteeption time for elementary information and for its pro-
cessing_comes.to an average of 0.25-0.30 of a second. The minimum reaction
time to signalsiraming. in rapid succession is around 0.25 of a second, with
intervals of from 2.57 to 2.91 seconds between the signals, while the mini-
mum interval between the signals must be no less than 0.5 of a second. If
tho interval is less the reaction to the next signal is delayed.
It should. be mentioned that the limits of human sensitivity are not
permaneetIy unchangeable. They depend on the influence of external factors
and, in addition to that,. as it will be pointed out later, they change in
the process of. training and with the acquiSition of practical experience.
Modern psychology has hundreds of characteristics similar to those
cited above. Their correct accounting will substantially incru,3e the
accuracy. and efficiency with which the equipment is used. -Ihe importance
of thislecomes evident if it is taken into account that the probability
of error free work by a system ar; a whole is equal to the product of the
probability of error free work or each element. The least accurate ele-
ment in.the control systems turns out to be man. A decrease in his errors,
in a number of. cases, may be more effective for the entire system, than a
decrease., in the errors of the machine links. There is, for instance, no
point in making a super accurate instrument, if the scale is calibrated
so that the. operator can make gross errors in taking the readings from it.
That is_why an incomplete, iind all the more, an inaccurate accounting of
the psychic possibilities of man lead to a sharp decrease in the effective-
ness of the various systems, and sometimes completely nullifies the techni-
cal possibilities of such systems.
The problem concerning the reliability of human work has been studied
much less than the problem concerning speed and accuracy of human actions.
At the same time, in the opinion of many scientists, this is important not
only for technology, but also for modern psychology. This refers to a
determination of the length of time during which the operator can perform
various operations with an assigned degree of accuracy, a determination of
the manner.in. which. his soetilled reliability changes in the course of the
day, the causes of these changes, etc. The reliability of the operator is
associated with his working ability, and with the degree of fatigue. It
was not by accident that so much time was devoted to questions concerning
fatigability of humans,. particularly in the process of receiving and pro-
cessing information, at the XV Inter-national Congress on Applied Psychol-
ogy. The reliability of the work performed by operators depends also on
their capacity for observation, in other words, their mental and sensory
viii/ance. The thing is that constant observation of homogeneous signals
quickly brings about the state of fatigue and drowsiness, which decreases
vigilance. Under conditions involving monotonous observations the opera-
tor can miss an important signal. The struggle against such phenomena is
also a task of military engineering psychology.
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ine reliability of the operator also depends on his resistance to
interference, i.e., on his ability to work in a concentrated manner under
conditions involving distracting stimuli (noise, vibrations, high or low
temperature). The problems of the operator's resistance to interference
has not yet been adequately studied. The available research material,
devoted, in part, to the influence of noise and vibration on humans in
aircraft, submarines and tanks, indicate that external interference cause
perceptible shifts in an entire series of physiological and psychic func-
tions, at the same time deaccelerating sensory-motor processes. The
influence of such interference is intensified particularly in dangerous
situations, causing affective psychic states in humans. These states are
expressed mostly in tenseness, which seems to bind the operator, and when
it changes into fear it disorganizes all of his activities. In view of
the fact that the combat work of a soldier-operator will take place in
most cases in dangerous situations, the problem of tenseness is not only
a specific problem, but one of the most important problems of military
psychology in general and of 'military engineering psychology in particular.
Unfortunately this problem has also been investigated only to a limited
degree. The initial results that are available indicate that military
engineering psychology can contribute something useful in this respect
as well.
In order to achieve an optimum distribution of functions between the
operator and the military equipment it is necessary to know the mechanisms
of the informational activity of humans, their capability of receiving,
processing, storing and transmitting information.
It is known that the human brain consists of 12-16 billion neurons
and has a colossal capacity for storing information: from 1.5-106 to 1021
binary units4.
Humans, however, utilize less than half of these potential possi-
bilities. The thing is that information flows to the brain several times
slower than it is processes in the brain. The "input" of information is
carried out through the human analysers and therefore depends on their
transmissivity.
The transmissivity of the visual analyser, at first glance, may
appear to be most significant. It is, for instance, equal to 58 binary
units per second in the identification of digits, and 91 binary units in
the identification of letters. This, however, pertains only to the sim-
plest information, to the resolution of elementary identification problems.
As the task is made more complicated, the transmissivity of the visual
analyser drops sharply. It also depends on the signal time, their content,
the degree of fatigue and the training background of the operator.
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Such a substantial diversion between the information storage capacity
of the brain and the possibilities of feed information to it poses an
exceptionally important problem before science the problem of the optimum
information coding. The latter presupposes the resolution of such problems
as the selection of the optimum character of the signals, the saturation of
each signal with information, the determination of the permissible rate at
which the signals may be ii,:esented in different forms, and under different
working conditions.
Military engineering psychology resolves these questions primarily as
they apply to the work of military operators. The resolution of the ques-
tion concerning the analyser that could be used to the best advantage for
the 'transmission of various signals (visual, audio, etc.). The reading of
aircraft instruments, for instance, is primarily a visual. function. As a
result of this the visua1 analyser is overloaded, and the pilot tires easily
which leads to errors in aircraft cortrol and often results in accidents.
Engineering psychology research indicated the realistic possibility of eas-
ing the load on the pilot's vision by shifting part of the visual signals
to audio signals. The results that were obtained confirmed that a more
optimum distribution of signals among the different analysers facilitates
control. of the aircraft and makes it more accurate and reliable.
Humans are not as fast as machines, they are not as good as the
machine in their resistance to interference, in transmissivity and in
other parameters. A modern electronic computer, for instance, is capable
of performing 10,000 operations per second, while a neuron of the visual
analyser is capable of only several dozen operations per second. There
occurs the question whether man should be completely exclude from the
control system? It turns out that this is impossible to accomplish. Man
is not chained, by a program, and he possesses great sensory (perceptional)
flexibility, i.e., he has the capacity of properly evaluating signals
within much greater limits than a machine, he can react to the most unex-
pected signals, and also select the most economical methods of action in
a situation that.may develop, etc. Man, therefore, is the most universal
and plastic link in the control system.
An important problem of military engineering psychology is the pro-
vision e the designers with necessary data for the design of new types
of military equipment (particularly units involving the reflection of
information being received,, and controls). The participation of military
psychologists is necessary in all stages of the work -- from the design
of the system to its implementation into serial production. They will
help from the very start to correctly distribute functions between man
and machines and bring the design into correspondence with human capa-
bilities, thus avoiding numerous unfortunate blunders.
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AtirnicttedsFclraggArefflo3PRigri9e:sqM.P.Phas now peen carried out in the field
of engineering psychology, devoted to the design of the eperatort' work
places, the determination. of the most effective forms and dimensions of
instrument dials, and to the study of aircraft controls.
The principles involved in the distribution of fittings on the control
panels have now been more or less determined. The 'Rain principles is the
principle, of significance, in accordance with which everything associated
with the performance of the main operation must be located in the most con-
venient spots, in a scientifically important one. It demands the grouping
of indicator instruments and controls according to their purpose. The fre-
quency of use principle should also be mentioned, in accordance with which
the instruments used most frequently must always be "under hand."
Quite a few special investigations were devoted to the problem of the
readability of the indicator instruments, with the aid of which information
is transmitted from the machine to man in the present day control systems.
Just recently the prevalent opinion was that the larger the instrument the
greater the speed and accuracy with which it is read. Research determined
that dials with a diameter of around 75 mm are read best if they are located
no more than 75 cm from the operator's eyes. The efficiency with which the
dials are read is, in general, determined by their angular dimensions.
According to the results producedlby the experiments the optimal angular
dimensions of the scales are within 2.50 - 5.00. As far as the calibration
of the dials is concerned, the minimum width of the lines on the dials must
be 1.5-2 times greater than the threshold width. In the case of small air-
craft instruments, for instance, the lines must be 0.8-1.0 mm wide, while
the lines on the larger instruments must be 1.2-1.5 mm.
When using symbol indicators the first place position in identification
accuracy is possessed by digits formed by straight lines. In many control
systems a. considerable effect is produced by the use of combination indi-
cators, for instance, those combining radar images with symbol indication.
Color coding, i.e., the utilization of color as a signal, particularly
violet, blue, green, yellow and red colors (depending on the demands made
on the dials and their purposes), is very effective?
Until recently, in designing controls, economy of working motions of
the operator was the main consideration. In accordance with that principle
it was consireered that of all the possible motions executed by the operator
those requiring the least effort should be selected, covering the least
distance. Such an approach proved to be somewhat incorrect.
Present day research in the field of engineering psychology indicates
that the economy of motions prineiple is not the main factor in the design
of controls. Principal errors made by the operator are caused not by the
extra efforts and motions, but by the improper design of control panels,
which do not provide optimal conditions for action in accordance with the
task. m
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that he confuses. the controls, forgets to execute necessary
actions, and ,performs the reverse moticns. All this, in tiw
last analysis, is associated iiith the f'iifficullies of dist:
guiahing controls and relating them to the readings on the
indicator instruments. Military engineering psychology is mak-
ing concrete recommendations for the best distribution r-f con-
trols in the aircraft cockpits.
Interest: is presented by data concerning the highest effi-
ciency whic) is attained in manipulating cont::.ols, thc5MTciai.
and time ch,?::.:!cteristics of whose movements -rn coordinated
with signal. It has been proven that the (Y'Ficiency of work
done by a pe on increases '.'en specil inicator instrumens
are used sng the results of klis Tct4on.1, i.e., wher there
is feedback.. in the control pron.s. 'i ,.s permits an immediate
rectification of any error and increases the safety in the
operation of various systems.
Still, despite the positive results that have been attained
this field can be considered as having been fully elaborated at
the level of present day military practice. The psychomotor
sphere of .the operator's activities should be studied. The
concept that the "button" activity of the op2rator is elemen-
tary from the viewpoint of its dynamic qualities, is far from
the truth. An investigation of this question indicates that
even the simplest motions have a complex structure. For instance
when dressing a button the fingers perform over 60, and when a
toggle switch is tripped, .over 80 micro-motions. The motor
activity of the operator as a whole Must be just as complex in
the light of such data We know very little about that however.
At the same time a detailed knowledge of these questions would
permit a new approach to the design of controls, and could open
up new ways of rationaling the operator's work.
On the whole the task of military engineering psychology
consists not only of adapting the equipment to man as well as
possible, but also, on the contrary, of "adapting" man to the
equipment as. well. This gives rise to as important a problem
as the elaboration of scientifically substantiated recommenda-
tions concerning the development of sensitivity, m-mf)ry, rapid
thinking and psychomotor qualities in the military personnel.
Practice and special research convincingly indicate that
.there are great reserves available for increasing the sensory,
motor and intellectual possibilities of humans. It is known,
for instance, that the rosolving power of the eyes of trained
aerial photo interpreters, (binocular vision) is equal to sev-
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rilots can detect: a 1A-27. change in the number of engine revolu-
tions, wl?ereas ordinary people can detect a fM-107, change in
engine revolutions.
in order to utilize these psycho-physiological reserves
'Jpecially (7cganized training of the soldiers is required. Con-
sequently pliitary engineering psychology is capable of making
a substantial contribution to the training of Soviet soldiers,
partibularly of the engineering troops,. Let us not, by the way,
think that the method of training military operators is just now
making its first steps and does not yet have a sufficient theo-
retical-pedagogical basis. The participation of military engi-
neering psychology in the design of trainers, training display
stands, and other training aids.
Military engineering psychology must have its say in the
programming of training as well: it must determine the trans-
missivity of various analysers, the necessary time for presenta-
tion of information, the adaptation of so-called "training
machines" to man, etc. The errors that have occurred in this
sphere are associated with the inadequate elaboration of theo-
retical fundamentals of programmed training, in part, with the
underevaluation of the data in general, pedagogical and engi-
neering psychology. Here military engineering psychology links
up with the psychology of labor, pedagogical psychology and
militaly psychology.
An investigation of the possibilities of simulating psycho-
logical processes, primarily those of perception and reasoning
with 17(:! aid of electronic computers, is of considerable signi-
ficance among the other problems of military engineering psycho-
logy. The role of this problem increases with the further
impleme'ltation of automation into military practice.
The simulation of psychological processes also has con-
siderable practical significance in the creation of automatic
identification machines that could interpret aerial photographs,
read topographical maps and various graphic combat documents,
and could also preceive oral commands.
This is an exceptionally complex problem, for the perceiving
mechanisms must simulate not only complex analytical-synthetic
processes of semantic perception and identification. The per-
ception devices created in the US, of the "perceptron" type, have
thus far been able to identify only simple objects on aerial
photographs with precise outlines.
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One of the premises for the further automation of the
identification process, the creation of more perfect auto-
matic machines, is the study and simulation of various psychic
operations, of which the act of perception is formed.
Some of the important problems faced by military engi-
neering psychology are also the study of group activity of
military specialists in the controlling process, study of
certain linked psychic and functional. relationships, an increase
in their independence, as well as study of the problem of psycho-
physiological compatability. The latter is a boundary problem
between social and engineering psychology. It is also necessary
to mention the problem concerning the selection of operators for
various branches and arms of the armed forces on the basis of
psychology testing.
In the past few years there has been certain animation
in the sphere of military psychology and pedrogy, and a number
of textbooks and collections were published. Unfortunately
almost all of them .fail to illuminate questions pertaining to
military engineering psychology, inasmuch as there is still a
lack of experimental and statistical materials. The urgent
nature of the problems that have arisen requires a broader
development of special research in military educational estab-
lishments and the scientific research institutions.
Notes:
1. Engineering psychology, a comparatively new science,
investigates the relationship between man and machine in
"man-machine" systems. This article examines the military
aspects of engineering psychology in the light of the revo-
lution, in military :=7cie-Ince.
2. Electronic Information Display Systems, Washington-London,
1963
3. The resolving power of the eye is its ability to distinguish
two objects at a certain ditance.
4. The binary unit oi information , is the amount of information
received as a result of the one time selection out of two
equally probable possibilities. This involves two arbitrary
opposite signs (+, -; 1.0 and others. Binary,units serve to
designate any letter or digit with the aid of different com-
binations of only two signals in the preparation of textual
or digital information for processing 4y computers.
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Approvea ror Keiease ZUUU/Uo/UU : UIA-KUVUO I UUd/OKUUUJUUUUUU11-4
Notes:
5. Inzhenernaya psikhologiya sbornik statey (Engineering
Psychology. A Collection of Articles (Translated from
English) , "Progress" Publishing House, 1964;
Problem inzhenerno sikholo?ii (material- 1-y lenin-
gradskoy on erentsii po inz enernoy psik, (Pro-
blems of Engineering Psychology Material: . the First
Leningrad Conference on Engineering Psychology) , Publish-
ing House of the Academy of Sciences ESFSR, Issue No 1,
1964; Iv3ues 2 and 3, 1965.
CPYRGHT
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STRATEGY AND TRANSPORT
CPYRGHT by Maj nen Tech Trps Ya. SHEPENNIKOV and Col Ye. NENSBERn
It is genekuly known that military strategy depends, to a
decisive degree, on the state of countrY-; economy, part of
which is transport. Prom' its Si,oe stracerv? .xerts a most direct
influence on-i:he developmpnt of the entire _ransportation system.
To he sure, in various historical periods and in different States
this interdependenbo was manifested Lo an unequal degee and in
vaz-ious forms. Howcver, to the extent of improvement of the
armed force3 and military art and the raising of production and
means of communication to a higher level, the recrprocal influ7
Jence of strategy and transport steadily increased, which has
been particularly demonstrated in recent years with the. radical
change in the methods and means of armed combat and the notice-
able increase in the capabilities of all types of transport.
In contemporary conditions the overwhelming majority of
technical, technological, economic and organizational problems
concerning the improvemerit and utilization of the transportation
network to one degree or nOther affect the interests of mili-
tary strategy. This is completely natural inasmuch as the con-
ditions and operation of the transportation network in peacetime
to a great extent determirgthe capability of its use both for
the timely strengthening of the defense capability of a country
or military coalition, and for supporting the combat operations
of armed forCes in case of the outbreak of war.. For e)cample,
the construction of new and the reconstruction 'Of existing com-
municationfnetworks, the development of junttions and other
connecting points of the various types of transport, the modern-
ization of rolling stock, the improvement of methods and equip-
ment for the control of traffic, etc. are of very important
significance for strategy. All of these factors to one degree
or another influence the organization of the movement of troops
and their supply of all the necessities for waging combat opera-
tions. 1
That is why one of the important missions
the systematic study of the ..routing, condition
the communication network which can be used to
wage war. An evaluation is made both on one's
territory of a probable enemy of the condition
and the transportation objectives of strategic
of strategy is
and capacity of
prepare for and
own and on the
of communications'
importance, the
possibilities of their use, and also the means, methods, prior-
ities and time periods of influence upon them in case of need.
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ApproxteelfrAtift9te@sliivROP/a?/0..PAPROPPPPIT-cfleg5FPYRNN989.1/11.mpor t ant to
GHIorrectly determined requirdd time periods, volume of military
transport and required carrying capacity of the routes of com-
munication. Strategy determines the requirement of armed forces
and, within fLs own resources, of transport maintenance and ser-
vice (rehabilitation, exploitation, and other factors), directs
their preparation and implements the general management of the
activity of military transport services.
Agencies of strategic leadership should plan measures
directed at a shielding (defense, protection) strategically
important transportation objectives from enemy attack, and in
case of destruction of important equipment and installations on
the routes of commuhication provide for the possibility of mov-
ing troops on foot and shifting freight traffic from one type
of transport to another.
In the solution of its problems military strategy is
guided by the principle of the greatest combined use of all
types of transport as, in cortemporary conditions, nut one of
them individually is in a condition to insure the accomplish-
ment of all wartime transportation. The strategic leadership
has at its disposal a special military-tran6port apparatus.
Its structure depends on the composition and organization of
the armed forces and also on the system of governmental control
of transportation, and therefore in various countries it is
different. However, these agencies have basically similar pur-
poses and responsibilities. As a rule in both peacetime and
wartime each of them:
prepares and presents to the strategic leadership materials
(calculations, projectq, plans, etc.), whiCh are necessary for
solution by the government of national overall transport prob-
lems, in particular the preparation of networks for operation
during wartime;
insures, controls and considers on the basis of instruc-
tions of the leadership, in coordination with governmental
economic, transport and ()the). agencies, the implementation of
decisions applicable to these problems and individual ques-
tions;
takes necessary measures for the timely fulfillment of
the requirements of the armed forces for movements and trans-
portation using all forms of transport;
directs the organization, training and operation of the
military transport services.
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PYRGHT
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Pile work in the military transport agencies of subordinate
management echelons is conductel in accordance with these basic
'functions of the higher military transport agency.
One of the most important missions of military strategy
consists of the determination of the special purpose orientation
and methods of develppment of the transportation network to meet
the conditions and character of the conduct of the war.
In socialist countries the complex development and use of
types of transport as component parts of a single network and
the coordinated implementation of transportation is accomplished
in accordance with the national economic plans.
In caFitalist countries transport companies also fully
understand the economic advantages of mutually coordinated devel-
opment of railroad networks and highways, oil and gas lines,
water routes and airlines. This also explains the urge toward
amalgamation of various types of transport into single transport
monopolies. Such a tendency is especially strikingly apparent
in the US where railroad companies are joining with motor trans-
port and river transport enterprises. There is an expanding
sphere of mixed transport of commercial freight using not only
containers but also piggy-back service (truck trailers trans-
ported on rail flat-cars, ferries, boats), containers on wheels
(rolling stock with chassis, trailer and brake devices adaptable
for both rail and highway movement), and river?and sea-going
craft.
The movement of freight using containers, piggy-back
service and container cars is most-widely used in the US and
West Germany. Thus, in 1963 in the US alone,about 800,000 flat-
cars were used only for piggy-back- service; in West Germany
container cars replaced abotA 400,000 two-axle'frei-ght cars.
In Canada almost 200,000 flatcars were loaded with containers
and truck trailers - 35 percent more than in 1961; and the
extent of mixed rail-motor vehicle transport also increased in
France and England.
On this basis there is also an ever expanding introduction
of combined movement of troops and equipment using various types
of transport under the centralized direction of the.military
transport agencies. Depending on the scale of the movement
(intercontinental, within the limits of adjoining-theaters,
insidea single theater of military operations, etc.) their man-
agement is concentrated in the hands of the. military transport
agency of the corresponding command (supreme, high command in
the_theatar s_fi
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RGHT963 Derense Department organized on a trial basis the
mixed container transportation of military freight from central
warehouses located in the interior of the country to bases of
troop units located in West Germany. The 'movement was accom-
plished according to a single plan in the sequence rail, sea,
again rail, and followed by motor vehicle transport with direct
trans-shipping of the containers (freight car-ship -- freight
car;-motor vehicle). Delivery of the freight shipment took 10
days.
Analysis of historical experience and the research of
foreign military specialists reveals that development of means
of communication, taking into account the requirements of the
national economy and the considerations of strategy, promotes
an increase in the economic and military pitential of the coun-
try and creates the most favorable conditions for transportation
support of operations of armed forces in the course of a war.
There exist two different methods for development of the
network. If one proceeds primarily from considerations of the
development of the economy th7en it is most rational to estab-
lish on the main axis of transport high capacity rail lines,
motor vehicle highways and other main lines with large traffic
capacities. This makes it possible to concentrate high capacity.
freight and passenger traffic on a comparatively small number
of such main routes, to put them into operation in short periods
of time, and to make the most economical and effective use of
transportation facilities. However, in wartime such a network
will limit the possibility of dispersing hauling,.loading and
unloading of troops and cargo. In addition to this, it is very
vulnerable and the rebuilding of destroyed major objectives
(for example, rail centers) requires large expenditures of time,
personnel and resources.
Taking this into considerations all developed countries
of the world are increasing the density of the networks of
routes of communication in order to create the most favorable
conditions for transportation support of possible operations
of armed forces. In this manner vitality is increased and the
capabilities for dispersing transportation and increasing the
maneuverability of transport and the like are being expanded.
In the years of the first 5-year plans, preceding the
Great Patriotic War, in the interior regions of our country,
especially in the eastern part possessing enormous natural
resources, in the interest of building the socialist economy
there was developed the construction of new and the reconstruc-
tion d'Fei
vehicle
16
?
A p gnotaettF 0 dielelasp 211MCi81119S CtIA-F4PP Wn.(14 8 NV OROPMU 1fr tworks were
established. And during these years there was in essence
created an entire network of qualitatively new routes of
communication with considerably greater capacity than form-
erly. It is important to note that the increase in trans-
portation operations proceeded considerably faster than the
increase in the extent of routes of communication; ,:hat is,
the'nes-EWork was used more ihtensively on a continuing basis
(table 1).
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CPYRGHT Approve:41 Fnr RPIPaSP 700010R109 ? cIA-RnpR5TnnR75Rnnnfinnn9nni 1-Lt
Table 1
Increase in 1940 in Relation to 1928
(1928 e Teals 1)
Type
Transport
Freight
Traffic
Passenger
Traffic
Distance
Remarks
Rail
4.4
4.0
1.38
Ministry of Trans-
port railroads
River
2.3
1.8
1.5
Routes for general
use*
Motor Vehicle
Oil Pipeliner!
44.o
5.8
4.9
am on
4.5
2.5
Hard surface roads
Mainline pipelines
*Sea transport service in not included in view of its connectionwetth
foreign trade. communications.
The progress of the transportation system in our country played a
definitely positive role bpth in the Initial period of the war and in the
future course of military operations.
In wars of the not too distant past, depending on the dimensions of
the territory of a country, the enemy's means and methods of influence and
the protection from them, strategy made an entirely different demand on the
transportation network in the rear of the country,and on that in the theaters
of military operations. of miiitn,ry orciltttnm, In
probable theaters of military operations great attention was devoted not only
to increasing the density of the transportation network, but also to increas-
ing its vitality to the depth of the range of weapons of destruction which
the enemy had at his disposal.
In contemporary conditions the directed purpose and methods of develop-
ment of ti-t transportation network and timely :_)reparation for operation
at the beginning period of a possible war would have to be changed. Currently
military operation can be spread over the entire territory of a country. All
branches of the economy of a country, including the transportation system must
be prepared for this in advance, and that factor, of course, must be taken
into consideration during peacetime development.
The solution of problems raised in the area of transportation for the
years 1961-1980 by the CPSUXXIInd Party Congress plays and will continue
to play a role of no small importance in the preparation of the USSR for the
jjiuveJ Fvi Relecte 2000/0 . -R/T05T00075R0003000
CRYRGHT
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prevention of possible aggression and for the repulsion and immediate rout
of the enemy. Among the important problems to be solved in the interest of
the national economy are: the expansion of transportation and road construc-
tion; further technical renewal of railrold and other types of transport;
significant increase in the speeds on railroads; ocean and river wateeways;
coordination of the development of all types of transport as component parts
of a single transportation system. In accordance with this at the present
time the construction of new and the reconstruction of operational routes
of communication, primarily on those axes where the growth of transportation
requirements is most intense, are being expanded and accelerated. For
coping with large volume freight shipments in short periods of time and for
the economic use of transportation facilities on these ages there are being
developed main lines equipped with powerful equipment possessing high trans-
portation and traffic capabilities. Going into operation are railroad lines
with electric and diesel-electric .re'action, deep-water river routes, developed
seaports and canals, motor vehicle roads with improved surfaces, mainline
rail- and gaslines, and important airlines of Union-wide significance. In
conformity with the development of the mainline systme, inner-region trans-
portation construction is also being accomplished.
Characteristic in transportation machinery building is the inerease in
tractive power and in the freight and carrying cpapcity of rolling stock. Of
course, to meet the demands of economy other types are also produced; for
example, boats for small rivers, small capacity cargo vehicles, etc. At the
same time the traveling speed of transportation equipment is also increasing
(design, road, cruising). In the course of the next few years the development
of the indices on individual lines might be brought to the following magnitudes
(table 2).
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Freight Lift Speed
Transport Units
or Capacity
(km/hr)
Remarks
Freight Train
8,000-10,000 tons
100
Gross weight
Express train
1,000 persons
140-160
On some lines up
to 200 i/hr
Tanker
80,000 tons
35
In the future., up
to 11-5 km/kr
Cargo Ship
12,000-15,000 tons
120-130
On hydrofoils
-
Truck-trailer
large capacity
70-80 tone
80-100
On roads of
categories I - II
Passenger plane,
jet
200 persons
1,000
In the fixture 12D
to 2,000-3,000
km/hr
The increase in carrying caparv-ity and speed of transport units is being
combined with improved routes, control, sitgla.1 and communications equipment,
and with the ever-increasing introduction of automation, remote controls and
other types of the latest te.chnology. Servicing of the rolling stock classi-
fying and. loading-unloading operations are being concentrated in Darcy! trans-
portation centers equipped with large-scale means for the complex mechaniza-
tion of labor consuming work.
Of important significance is the accomplishment of a complex of large-
scale technical, technological and organizational measures for the purpose
of coordinating the development of all types of transport as component parts
of a single transportation Ftystem. The distribution of transportation between
types of transnort is beinc; im-nroved?. In the design, conBtx..ut.l.ion and reConstrup-
tl?n nutes of oommunicatIOrs uwd jointly for Pomplcx tranb porttan thircii.S.behig d e-
'velopect a closer correlation of the traffic and carryin6 capacities ruid
the operational capacity of components of terminals and transshipment )orts
etc., and coordination of basic parameters of rolling stock especially
applicable to the conditions of the productivity of transshipment (reload-
ing) work. Important also is the increase in the production of containers
and piggy back trailers, rolling stock for theit transportation and also for
the mixed transportation of various types of freight for direct shipment,
as well as the coordination of traffic schedules and technological processes
at junction points of various routes of communication. Special agencies
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CPYRGHT
Amotelifigr SietiOWR29ffiOM9 glIMNPok5DP?T5IN9P.Pc9R9R1,1, he omb IncA1 (q)emL t I Y1
Of various types of transport, and the planning and. Implementation of trano-
portation. The direct cooperation of transport and other agencies participa-
tina in the organization and implementation of transportation is also beinn
improved.
Scientific and technical collaboration and reciprocal assistance in pro-
duction between socialist countries in the building of transport equiament
and meachinery and the technical use of all types of transport is constantly
expanding. International freight and passenger movemento, the greater part
of which are transported by railroads, are being accomplished accordina to
coordinated plans.
In conformity with the trend of development of transport, military strtt-
egy defines general principles and concrete methods for its timely preparation
for steady operation in wartime, taking into consideration. the probable character
of a future war.
It can be anticipated that in a contemporary war transport will suffer large-
scale losses: it is possible that there will be complete or partial destruction
of many important transportation centers, large briclges, ports, canals, lo?ks,
and main civilian airports, as well as power failures on the main electric rail-
roads. From the very first hours of the war it is possible that the trans-
portation system dill be cut into a namber of mutually isolated regions and
sectors with a considerable portion Of the latter iocatcd in zones of strong
radio-active contamination. The transportinn apacitT of all types of
transport will decrease shortly. Together with this along the netwcrIc of the
communication routes there must be carried out was movements cf troop the
transportation of materiel and other movements which must be accomplished in
very compressed time periods.
In peacetime the greater portion of transportation is accomplished by
railroads. In the Soviet Union; for example, in 1965, of the total freight
hauled according to plan the proportim of rail traasport was approximately
70 percent, maritime (inclusing foreign trade) - over 14 perceat, mainline
oil-pipelines - almost 6 percent, motor vehicle over 5 percent, river less
than 5 percent, and air - 0.1 percent. According to current calculation in
1980 the rail transport portion of the over-all freight turnover will be re-
duced to 58-55 percent, and the others will have a corresponding increase to
42-45 percent. As for the absolute volume of freight. turnover of the railroads
during the period 1966-1980, it should increase approximately 2.4-2.5 times.
A corresponding change in the proportion of freight turnover of individual
types of' transport will take place also in many other socialist countries.
In case of an outbreak of war the role of various types of transport in
the implementation of transportation will be substantally changed. Rail-
roads and internal waterways with large hydrotecbnical facilities might be
dIstroved inema will be possible
QATFOTRelSe14619068Rilt 61A-Kr6FteriAnMb030110g011at-4
Omyru. er complaetion of a l'arge volume of work. Less vulnerable are pipe-
CPYR(HT rtwari Pnr Raloacci 9nnninRinci ? ri A_pnpRgTnnR7gpnnnlnnnanni -A
I. Li( (t.A.) n.j.,? :OA.] Icf..!:1) /LTA! 11101,1.1.1.' ron(0;?
eip.1.1.1)mer1i., is required for tliteir 1est,i)rati(,r.1.
1#.ne; p..!.t.:1,)ary.1.1. and
Proeeeding from the l'ore;,,,oinr., weuld. be 1.(n.Leal. at the benintann: niLld.
0 a ?,/,'L 1 t!) aseLjo. 1,hi: Walla ti.,11.1;1pOrtatiOn. t.?.( ;f101:0.1. VC 11 .I.C.Lu Line
rring port,. However, in app.Lientl.c,n thlic net prael,.iieel. th.k:y canin-ik un-
Ond..1 1. 1 unally pitiCe ra Lread trans port; in. al I. )I :1.( ? . i L.it trnot,
)tulL on the fact that in theatern 0 In! .)1Y IL) bo possible 1.,e
mein! ma:nimum use of motor vehicle and ti. r tranepor (in additien, to pump 1v L
inroegh pipelines), or to use rn..Lirolids for almost al.. t]yansportation
.in or Of the. C pun' i;r .!7,11(2 f.r.31:, pinCe it In I;1197/1.1 tha t the enemy
steive to deliver pe-,,rerf:n1 nue-Lear rt on obje(A.:tes located. in the
rear areae, of the comtry. in the second. place, the deneit,y uS tie,: rail-
road system in many of the in regions Is lo on than that, for cen.mple?
t ht! IP.: stern theater of :ailltary operation. Thus, L:ivinc, the average
nallread density of the USSR a value of 100 percent, and comparing it with the
(1.(inr_;-_;.-!...y of several of the Union Repn-nlics, then, for exnmple, in Kazakhstan
the reiative magnitude nould be abeut 70 percent, whereasin Belorussia it
.Lecreancs approximately l .5 times) in the Ukraine almost 6 titne s, and in
12,a1tie almost 7 -tines The density of .the railroad network is even higher
tel other soe.Lal.Lot countries of F;urov.-.. For example, in Rumania it Is approx-
imately )i..6 km per 100 sq. 1:in of territory, in Poland - 8. 5, in Hungary - 11.1,
in Czechoslovakia - 12.1t rind in East Germany - 15 km per 100 sq.. km (Socin,list
and Cajzitalist Countries in Fic;unes. Gospolitizdat, 1963. Data compiled for
1961- In)(72 and rounded off to 0.1 km per 100 sq. 1;w.)
Without the help of motor vehicle, pipeline, and, whore possible, also
air transport, rear area railroad lines will not be able to operate. Consequenty,
for the movement of troops, hauling of freight and other transportation all
available routes of eommuniteation and transportation equipment jhould be used
in the mont e::pedient combinations. The principle of their combined and mutually
coordinated use fully preserves its importance both in theaters of military
operations and in the interior regions of the country.
In this connection it is necessary to establish Which specific combinations
and forms of coordination of various types of transport will be most rational
and in accordance with this develop basic means for the primary support of the
operational capability of systems in strategically important sectors. Military
strategy and the theory of military communications are involved in the solution
to these problems.
The greatest difficulty in the organization of transport work arises in
connection with the destruction of objectives on railroads and inland water routes.
There are varied means for overcoming such bariers. The selection of the mast
rational of them depends on many conditions of the actual situation. However,
in any case the factor of time, which usually is determining, will 'lay the main
role.
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CPYRGHT
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Thus, st'or example? to restore de:.3t1'oyed. locks and reestablish through
traffic of ships along a canal. in the beginning period. of' war will not be
pf.vsible primarily because cri? lack of time. For this very reason it will
not lie possible in a timely manner to restore a blocked. tunnel on a railroad
line and open it again for the through traffie of' trains.
.En tubr3 period 'railroads can be re c s t ructed for the thrcu gh traffic of'
t rains til rough sonic d stroyed j tine t ions; a...ad temporary railroad bridges could
be built (varteties of short t(..!rf?:..onntruction, .I'loating? etc). Productive
work at time will be made difficult by obstacles, fires and the high. level
of radiution. It, should olro be taiien account that the traffic capa-
city of' temporary installations and structures is usually not so great. For
example, in re-rout,:i.ng train traffic because of' a destroyed. bridge from a
double-track span ro a single-track temporary detour provided by a short,-
term construction, bridge, the traffic capacity will reduced several times in
comparison with that over the direct route prior to the destruction. If, on
the detour, ills required to use another ,ro.d, less powerful type of locomotive
or to decrease the weight of the trains the.n the traffic capacity will be
reduced even more.
Depending on the conditicaL,4 of !7;itu.atior. -in, the interior regions
of the country and. in the theaters of militanr operations, over various sec-
tors of the transportation system and for different distances there can also
be made direct rail, motor vehicle; river and air movements, and also troops
can be moved on foot. In theaters of military operations and in regions of
combined operations of ground troops, movements of large and individual units
will be completed on foot and, the transportation r.q' mir,ere1. by means of
through services, with parallel use. of' motor vehicle and air trnasport and
field.s pipelines.
As is known, armament, composition, organization, military art and also
stratesy depend primarly at', a given (noment (-i.e.' the degree of production attained
and on the means of communication. With tie development of railroads, the in-
crease in their traffic capacity and in the fre:ight carry:inFr cpapcity of roll-
ing stock, tempos and volume of military transport increased and the concen-
tration of troops and their supply was facilitated.
The specific influence of the condition of the railroad ystem on the time
periods of strategic deployment of' troops can be seen in the example of Germany
and Russia during the first world war. Germany was able to complete strategic
deployment of 'the 13th. day after the notice of mobilization, whereas Russia,
becuase of the lack of a developed railroad system and front line roads along
the western border, only on the 214-th day. It is natural that already at that
time both the Russian and -the German general staffs were very interested in.
planning the development of the communications network on the most important
strategic axes. This is natural. because the construction of railroads on the
6.4..ons during that time,
413Povce-fl PSPOWseaMMtrOlib Pdbetliktlit&OOMMOCr1000.91704-44
as, on the other hand, now also, was one of the main phases of preparation for
23
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CPYRGfire war. Tbasy if it can be so expressed, is the transport support of sper
fic strategic plans and intentions, whe.reas the efforst directed at increas-
ing traffic capacity of all roads in the country, the improvement of roll ii
stock, etc, to a definite degree is the result of the general requirements w:
strategy.
And what now is the influence of strategy on the character of development
of the transportation system and trarsport in general?
Thorough research of this problem is considerable practical interest.
In this regard it is necessary to cOnsider the constant grown in the volume
of transport work and under DOW conditions. It is sailleient to recall the
characteristics of transportation support for the forward movement of large
troop formation, so changed in their composition. For the accomplishment of
this important task all types of transport are now involved, and, of course,
this situation indicates an entire complex of porblems, the solution to whicl
is possible only bylong-term and timely preparation.
During conditions when the continental armed forces consisted only of
ground troops and the routes of communication were very poor-4 developed,
military operations were conducted primarily along roads. The role of the
old Smolensk road in the Patriotic War of 1812 is generally known as well as
the memorable strategy of the "echeloned" war of 1918-1920. At the present
time in their sectors of oeprations troops will strive not only to use the
entire network of existing routes of communication, but also lay new routes
idetereverr they are required. For now, as never before, the strategic mobility
of troops and their capability to accomplish swift regroupings and maneuvers
are conditioned by the operation of rail, otor vehicle and other types of
transport. The success of the development of contemporary operations in
any active military theater depends directly on the condition of routes of
communication and transport equipment.
And what about r-viewing the changed military requirement for materiel?
It is not simply the fact that it has sharply increased. Completely new types
of sup9J.y loads have appeared requiring the development of special rolling
stock. The change in the compostion of supply loads has also had a marked
influence on the development of transport. During the Great Patriotic War.,
as is known, by volume the shipment of fuels and lubricants was less than that
of other freight. Now, in connection with the completion of the process of
mechanization and motorization of troops, the volume of fuel transport has
increased so much that previous means of transporting it are no longer satis-
factory. Experience itself gave rise to the problem of the development of
stationary and field pipelines, soft containers and other equipment facilita-
ting the delivery of the tremendous quantity of fuel from supply bases to
the troops.
In such manmer, the revolution in the military_fieldying rise to a
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development of transport which required a sharp increase in its vitality and
readiness to support military operations characterized by the broad scope,
great depth and high tempos of their conduct.
In the article have been reviewed several points characterizing the re-
ciprocal influence of strategy and transport. Now it is generally recognized
that strategic plans will be practical only when they take into cinsideration
important economic factors including the condition and capability of the trans-
portation system and transportation agencies. Together with this, on the basis
of newly equipped transport and the appearance of new lines and technical
equipment, there can be and should be introduct.1 appropriate corrections in
strategic plans.
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ON MEANS and METHODS OF PROGRAMMED TEACHING
Book Review by Engr Col N. BAZANOV and Engr Lt Col V. KOSHUTIN
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CPYRGHT
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programmea training nave recently been given in-
creasing attention of both scientific workers and teachers. Interest in this
subject is explained not only by the need to seek new means and methods of
teaching, caused by the tumaLtuous development of science and technology, and
by the ever increasing voluno of knowledge, but also by the fact that very
hopeful results have already been attained in this fieldn
A number of specialized works were published on the theroy and practice
of programmed teaching. They include the book by A. V. Prokof'yev. The
author, a military pedadogue, presents the reader with materials pertaining
to the practice of programmed teaching in military educational establishments
and in the units.
The book reviewed here is devoted not so much to theoretical questions, as
to the means and methods of programmed teaching, i.e., to the practical as-
pct of thiS field and, naturally will evoke the interest primarily of those
who are directly engaged in teaching, and are vitally interested in increas-
ing the effectiveness of teaching.
Proceeding from the fact that teaching is a controlled process, the author
briefly cites the shortcomings of the ordinary teaching system, which is pri-
marily of a group and mass nature, where the weak reverse link between the
student and the teacher does not p:v.it sufficient control over the assimi-
lation of material by the students. The book provides a very competent des-
cription of the essence of programmed teaching as a process in which the
present day group and mass teaching processes are given individualized fea-
tures and incorporate elements of constant control over the assi,vilation of
various material. From the definition of the essence of programmed teaching
it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that the widespread application
of such teaching will allow a sharp increase in the effectiveness of group
and mass methods of teaching.
Principal attention in the book under review is concentrated on the means
and methods of programmed teaching. After defining certain propenuisite 7'_71.-
itial concepts, the author describes the methods used in propvring teaching
materials for the programming of textbooks and teaching machines, and explains
two main ways of arranging materials for the textbook or machine (linear and
ramified program). Some chapters are devoted to a descripition of various
models of machines designed in various educational establishments of the
Soviet Union and abroad, and to a classification of programmed textbooks
and teaching machines. A special chapter describes an automated class and
teaching equipment.
In conclusion the author attempts to sutriva2i.: the experience acquired
in the utilization of programmed textbooks and teaching machines both at home
and abroad. By way of an illustration of programmed teaching he cites some
statistical data concerning the progress of the students enrolled in conven-
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r;HT There is no doubt that this book will be of considerable help in the de-
velopment and pe-fection of the means and methods of programmed teaching and
will therefore evoke a certain amount of interest in-the reader.
We would like to direct the readers' attention to certain elements of a
general character that are important in order to understand the principles
and the role of programmed teaching.
UnLil recently there existed different viewpoint; regarding the role of
the methods of programmed teh-ching, regarding the poosibilities of programed
textbooks 1,4pd particularly, of the teaching machines. Some tended to consider
that the cibation of sufficiently complex teaching machines, with a high level
of automation, would permit the automation of all aspects of the teaching
process, including final examinations and the planning of the teaching pr.
cess itself. Here, it appears to us, it is necessary to caution the teachers
against an over evaluation of the role of automated teaching, which reduces
the instructor to the position of an operator of an "automatic teaching ma-
chine." With regard to this question we hold the view that machines and
prOgrammed textbooks serve to supplement and improve the pedagogical process.
The assertion that "the automatic machine teaches man" as a paraphrase of
"the automatic machine controls the blast furnace process the programs for
the teaching machines are compiled by the teacher. Furthermore these pro-
grams required considerably more creativity than that required in the conven-
tional teaching system.
With respect to this question the author of the book under review adheres
to an opinion with which it is impossible to disagree: "Teaching machines,
programmed textbooks and the entire method- of programmed teaching merely
,supplement and improve the peduogical prOcess (italics ours, reviewer) of
which the teacher is an integral part. The role of the teacher remains a
leading one. His functions are made somewhat more complicated., and require
a different approach to the teaching porcess, particularly in the preparation
and conduct of classes involving the use of teaching machines or programmed
textbooks" (page 26).
Moreover, methods of programmed teaching can hardly be considered univer-
sal and applicable to all the disciplines. The sphere of their effective
application, apparently, will be limited to the so-called "exact sciences."
The utilization of machines, let us say, in the study of such scientilic
disciplines as philosophy, and minor strategy will inevitably lead to the
"cramming" of the students with simplified, schematized answers, and, con-
sequently, will result in the impoverishment of knowledge. This is men-
tioned by the author in passing at the end of the book. It would, however,
be useful if the spheres of application of programmed teaching would have
been defined not only with regard to different disciplines, but also (even if
hypothetically) with regard to the different segments of those disciplines
where the new methods are generally effective. The foregoing should also have
been 41.ersmitkattiq vmhzatimmdsm-Rop85Too875Rnoomoo9oolt4
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A. V. Prokof'yev also does not shut his eyes to the shortcomings of the
new teaching method: the certain probability of an accidental "guessing" of
the correct answer when the correct answer must be selected from a few al-
ternative answers; the difficulties involved in the preparation and pro-
gramming of the material for teaching; the unnecessary expenditure of the
students' energy on parasitic operations, and other shortcomings. It must be
assumed, however, that with a wise approach to the matter these shortcomings
will be eventually eliminated as experience is accumulated.
Indices such as progress of the students, "speed" with which the material
is assimilated by them, the time spent by the teacher on the programming of
the material, the skill level of the teacher, as well as the cost involved in
the teaching of one student) should be the criteria for determining the ef-
fectiveness of programmed teaching. All this, naturally) is based on a com-
parison with the conventional teaching system
HT
The author, utilizing the accumulated statistical data, shows the doubt-
less advantages of programmed teaching over conventional teaching methods.
The criteria he choses, for evaluation, however, consist only of the pro-
gress of the students and the time spent on the course or part of a course.
Let us quote from the book: "... In one of the institutims of higher educa-
tion the average grades earned in experimental courses on pulse engineering
and porpagation of radio waves, which were based on the programmed method of
teaching, were 0:2 and 0.5 points higher than the grades earned by the con-
trol group, while the time spent on the experimental course decreased by
15%-18%. The experiment was conducted during one semester using 52 hours
of study material" (page 146). Unfortunately A. V. Prokof'yev does not show
the degree to which the teacher's work was further complicated or the increase
in the amount of time required for his work with the new teaching method.
On the whole it may be said that the book presents doubtless interest to
the military teachers in the military educational establishments, and parti-
cularly in the units. This book is, first of all, useful to those who are
making the first steps in the field of programmed teaching. The examples
of programmed textbooks and teaching machines given in the book are not the
only ones in existence noreare they mandatory. The creative thought peda-
gogue can create more perfect devices, which may be distinguished both by the
complexity of the programs, and by their design features.
In our opinion, however, it is necessary to beware of haste in this matter,
to avoid groundless implementation of programmed teaching devices into any
teaching process. It is also important to avoid thP vulgarization of the
very idea by creating "automatic machines" with a selective system of answers.
Each step must be checked out in practice, so that a true perfection of
the military teaching system would yield a real increase in the effectiveness
with which highly skilled military specialists are trained.
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1. A. V. PROKOF'YEVI Programmirovanoive obucheniye, mashi d a
21224911palm (Programmed Teaching. Machines for Teaching), Military
Publishing House, 1965, 164 pages.
CPYRGHT
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SOME PROBLEMS IN THE METHODOLOGY OF SOVIET MILITARY-HISTROICAL SCIENCE
CPYRGHT
by Col V. SOLOV'YEV
A
The Communist Party, true to the precepts of Lenin, pays great
attention to the development of science. It develops it policies on
a strictly scientific basis, guided by objective laws of social
development, collective reasoning, and the experience of the masses.
The Party Program points out that social sciences constitute the
scientific foundation of the development of society. The application
of science is becoming a decisive factor in the tremendous growth
of productive forces. The role of science in the whole life of
society, including the military field, has grown to a tremendous
degree. Without its comprehensive development, any field of human
activity is condemned to stagnation.
The necessity of a scientific approach to the solution of the
problems of life, and the difficulty of these problems, places on
workers on the theoretical front great and responsible tasks. The
party demands of scholars that they permit no manifestations of sub-
jectivism in their activity, that it he based strictly on objective
data, and that they carefully check their conclusions in practice.
Under present conditions, when the development of science in-
sistently demands the extension of knowledge, broad generalizations,
and ever improved methods of analysis, Marxist-Leninist methodology
has assumed especially great importance. As is known, the achieve-
ments of science are directly related to the methods of acquiring
knowledge, the development of which assures the success of subsequent
concrete research. And it is perfectly natural that in recent years
problems of methodology have attracted great attention and have be-
come the subject of discussion at a number of authoritative scien-
tific conferences. There is no doubt of the positive significance
of the conference of military historians held in March, 1965,
devoted to the methodology of military-historical research, and of
the revised report of Col A. N. GRYLEV on the subject discussed,
published in Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military-Historical
Journal), No 7, 1965. But this is only the beginning of a great and
extremely necessary work which it is necessary to carry on a wide
front.
For several decades the decisions of the party on military matters
have been guided by Lenin's thesis that "without science it is im-
possible to build a modern army" (Complete Works, Vol 4o, p 183).
This statement is especially true now, when the world has witnessed
3praefiarRatftg68/A :14VR91589jrrbolisitnillee4sgoongli14 en a revolution
is tt ing place in military affairs.
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Problems of the defense capability of the country and of the
HT organization and conduct of armed conflict have become immeasurably
more difficult in our era. Only a strictly scientific approach to
military problems, and a decisive overcoming of voluntarism and
subjectivism assures the making of correct, well-founded decisions.
In this connection, there is an increase in the importance of
creative mastery of dialectical materialism as the methodological
basis of Soviet science, and of the role of research on problems of
the dialectics of knowledge and the dialectical forms and methods
of thinking.
The tremendous experience of more than a century irrefutably
confirms that the Marxist dialectical method correctly reflects the
objective laws of the material world, and therefore serves all sciences,
including the military one, as a perfect instrument for the cognition
of reality. The indisputable truth is that the study of the very
complex phenomena of war and military affairs must be conducted in
accordance with the laws of materialistic dialectics and be based on
them.
Marxism-Leninism is for Soviet military science and its constituent
part, military history, a world-outlook and methodological foundation.
The strength of Soviet military science is rooted in its resting on
the most advanced philosophy of our time. However, Marxist dialectical
methodology does not replace the methods of other sciences, but is
their common philosophical basis and serves an an instrument of cogni-
tion in all fields. The methods of military science, including those
of military history, have a more particular, applied character: they
are concerned with concrete ways, measures and means of obtaining and
processing factual materials. Methodology and method are closely
linked with each other. The methods of acquiring knowledge, used by
the different sciences, are extremely varied. Among them are some
that are common to many sciences, but there are also specific methods
for each separate science.
War, as an extremely complex social phenomenon, is studied by
many sciences. Military science studies the laws specifically of
armed conflict, which develop both on the basis of its dependence on
political, material and psychological conditions, and as a result of
the interaction of causes and circumstances peculiar to armed conflict
itself.
iSoviet military science includes a system of sciences: the general
theory of military science, the theory of military art, military-
historical science, the theory of training and indoctrination of troops,
military administration, military geography, and military-technical
sciences. Each of these has itwArtiwt7g03/430:16egbitic24be studied
a AP Inv et54E0 liAiP IC-MAP Wad' sc I searcM.
CPYRGHT
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Scientific research in militaxar science is progressing on a wide
scale. A great many different probbims, faa ramoved from one another,
are being studied. Even in a single field of knowledge many problems
are being studied which are not closely connected with one another
and rewire different approaches, different ways and methods of research,
and various combinations of them. Moreover, the methods of research
are determined not only by the subject studied, but by the goal and
expected result of the research.
Thus there cannot exist a single, universal method of research
for all the branches of knowledge making up military science. The
choice of methods, ways and means of acquiring knowledge is a dif-
ferent and important process on which the results of the work depend
to a great degree. Some methods of research can be successfully
applied in a number of the fields making up military science, and
they may supplement one another. Others can be used only in a certain
field. In the theory of military art, exercises and maneuvers, command-
and-staff exercises, war games, etc., are used as such specific
methods of research (they simultaneously serve as operational training).
They cannot always be applied in military-technical sciences. At the
same time there are inherent in military science such methods, common
to many sciences, as the method of observation, the comparative method,
the mathematical method, and logical methods.
The radical changes taking place in military affairs require not
only an acceleration of the tempo of scientific research, and in
many fields a change in its direction, but alse the improvement of
old, and development of new, methods of research. The need for this
arises from the internal logic of the development of sciences and
from the new practical requirements. The development of science is
Inevitably accompanied by the improvement of old and the appearance
of new ways of research.
This process has been reflected iv many divisions of military
science in recent years, but unfortunaaely, not very extensively yet
In military history. It must be said that the methods in this field
have changed very little. This is espeaially intolerable since the
subject of its study has undergone great changes. A study of the
experience of the Great Patriotic War and of World War II as a whole,
In many ways different from wars af previous eras, and the radical
changes caused by the post-war revolution in military affairs, which
have already become a subject of study for military history, have
placed before military history tasks which demand an improvement of
it methods.
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APPEiVi*Filf.ROPIGE4R9.91,0/01141:ciA-P,Ii1??TC5187MP01:9,91.r?911-4hitAory
-IT of military art, and the development of the armed forces and military
eqpipment. Its aim is to determine the general principles inherent
in wars and military affairs in a certain historical epoch. It
studies all these problems in close connection with the political,
economic and other factors affecting military developments. Naturally,
military history interacts with general history, using its conclusions
for evaluating the political essence of wars, the economic potential
of the belligerent countries, etc.
The most important component of military history is the history
of military art which engages in the study of the principles of the
development of military art, and the means and methods of solving
strategic, operational and tactical problems.
The task of military history is to generalize, on a strictly
scientific basis, the experience of military organization and of armed
conflict. Combat experience, gained at the cost of severe trials on
the battlefields where the Soviet people have defended their freedom
and national independence, serves as one of the most important founda-
tions of Soviet military science and is an effective source of develep-
ment of military science and of the armed forces. Of great importance
is the theoretical interpretation of problems concerning the place
of military history in military science, its relation to the practice
of military development, and the discovery of the directions in which
the creative efforts of military historians should be mainly concent-
rated.
Speaking about the dependence of the metY-A of military-historical
science on the subject of its research, it is aecessary to start
with the fact that it is a border science--it is a part of civilian
history, on the one hand, and of military science on the other.
Military history's subject for research is a certain group of facts
and laws which are studied by general history, and a group of facts
and laws which are the subject of military science. Needless to
say, Soviet military history should use both the methods of general
history and those of military science. The interrelationship of these
methods is determined in each case by the specific content of the
subject being studied.
One of the most urgent methodological problems which Soviet
military history faces is the correct solution of the problem of the
relationship between the historical and the logical in its research.
This question is closely conneced with the problem of overcoming
subjectivism in military-historical science.
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CPYRGHT
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A deeply historical world-outlook is inherent in Marxism-Leninism.
Marx and Engels wrote in German Ideo42gy: "We know only one, single
science, i.e., the science of history. History can be looked at from
two sides; it can be divided into the history of nature and the history
of man. But both aspects are inseparably connected; as long as man
exists, the history of nature and the history of ma a will have a mutually
determining effect." (Works, Vol 3, 1955, p 16). This formula expresses
the idea of the historical viewpoint as the chief methodological require-
ment and general principle of all sciences.
Lenin firmly emphasized the necessity of an "absolutely historical
analysis of the problem of forms of conflict" (Complete Works, Vol 14,
p 2), and pointed out that it was most important "to look at each
problem from the point of view of how a certain phenomenon in history
arose, what were the main stages through which this phenomenon passed
in its development, and from the point of view of this development, to
see what this thing has become now" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 39,
p 67). This Lenin thesis shows better than anything else the place and
role of military history in the system of knowledge of military science.
A most important task of military history is the study of those
processed and principles which have determined military developments
in the past and, in a changed form, continue to affect them under
present conditions. The disclosure of cause-and-effect relationships
and basic principles makes it possible correctly to understand the
process of military development and to foresee the nature of armed
conflict.
Marxist-Leninist methodology demands that phenomena be studied in
their development and change. It starts from the premise that the
most profound theoretical conclusions are attainable if they are based
on the generalization of concrete historical material. Logic should
rest on history,but at the same time history cannot help resting on
logic. A most important principle of the dialectical method is the
inseparable relationship of the logical and the historical. The unity
of the historical and the logical is of decisive importance for under-
standing the relationship between the history of some Phenomenon and
the result of its development. Marxist dialectics perceives the logical
as the concentrated theoretical expression of a historical process.
The logical method of cognition enables one to see what new thing has
come into being, to discover the principles of development, and to
develop general concepts and formulas.
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Aoorovcd RcIcac 2QQOIQ8IO IA I1pP85TOO8ThI100030009Ou
At tri same time um nisu.ori(Fai method cannot be presented as just
a description of facts. It should disclose the same lawn of develop-
ment of phenomena as the logical method; however, not in abstract,
theoretical form-- but, as Engels said, by tracing the "actual develop-
ment" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol 132 1959, p
the concrete events, and the activities of classes, parties, and
Individuals, and by investigating all these phenomena in the conditions
In which they arose and developed.
The logical and historical methods of acquiring knowledge inter-
penetrate each other. They cannot be opposed to eae_ other. The
logical method presumes having recourse, when necessary, to the
elucidation of concrete events and facts, while the historical method
should disclose the principles of historical development.
It is an intolerable situation when a historian substitutes a
repetition of previously approved conclusions and sociological formulas
for concrete research work. This results in substituting for analysis
of typical facts a one-sided selection of "examples", which gives rise
to dogmatism am', scholasticism, deprives science of its connection
with real life, and leads to the disappearance from historical works
of scientific generalizations and conclusions. The materialistic
methodology of history provides guidance for research, but is not a
means of constructing certain abstract outlines to which historical
facts may be adjusted. The role of theoretical generalization in
military-historical research should not consist, as it often has in
the past, in illustrating certain theses stated by somebody, or in
selecting examples confirming laws and principles in military matters
which have long been well known. Such "historical research", naturally,
does not meet the demands of scientific search for knowledge.
As has been repeatedly pointed out in our military press, a real
shortcoming of much of our military-historical literature is its
descriptive character; the lack of analysis of events and phenomena,
of generalization of facts; a withdrawal from the important problems
of military-historical science and the history of military art; and
dogmatism. This trend reveals itself most fully in the "insignificant
themes" of a number of articles on military-historical matters in the
periodical press, and in the insignificance of the subjects of some
dissertations being defended, and even of certain monographs. A deci-
sive strpggle against the gap between history and theory, and
against an indifferent attitude toward theoretical interpretation of
military-historical experience continues to be an essential task of
the day.
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CPYRGHT
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ScienWic research presupposes the posing of an urgent problem,
the answer to which was not previously, known. Herein lies the meaning
of reuenrcn work. Only a correct, scientific solution of a problem
can provide the recommendations needed by the practice of military
development.
It is true that during the postwar years Soviet military historians
have gathered, systematized and described an immense amount of factual
material on the history of the Great Patriotic War. There have also
been compiled basic works like the multi-volumed history of that war,
monographs on the most important operations of the past war, research
on the history of the military art, and many others. However, there
still has not been overcome the lag in analysis and generalization of
the many-sided experience of the past war; which is very important for
our country and its armed forces.
A correct combination of the historical and the logical has become
especfally urgent under modern conditions. The rapidly developing
revolution in military affairs requires interpretation of its complex
processes apd their origins.
The use of the historical method in military-historical science
presumes the discovery of facts and, on the basis of their description,
the re-crehtion cf the most accurate possible picture of the events
being studied. Inasmuch as the military historian has the task of
tracing the process of development of events, he cannot limit himself
to a photographic fixation of any one of them. In other words, in the
description of a war, a campaignlan operation; or a battle, he must
arrange the facts in their interrelationship with one another and trace
their development.
The success of military-historical research is determined at the
very beginning by the ability of historians to establish correctly the
range of facts which is to become the subject of their study. This is
the basis for further theoretical work. Mistakes or negligence allowed
here lead to failures in conclusions and generalizations, and cast
doubt on the scientific values of the research. Of course; no research
in any one field can cover the inexhaustible number of separate facts
making up its content. The selection of certain facts and the ignoring
of others is permissible and necessary in any research, including that
of military science and military history.
. Military researchers should be unswervingly guided in their work
by the extremely important instruction of Lenin about the necessity for
setious, scientific approach to the selection of facts. In the field
Of hbcial'phenomena there is no procedure more wide-spread and more
ill-founded than the picking out of individual facts and playing with
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examples mercileooly castigatlilg such procedures, Letho taught that
"it is necessary to endeavor to establish a foundation of accurate and
indisputable facto on which one could rest securely and with which one
could confront any of those 'general' or 'approximate' arguments w)lich
are so misused in some countries in our time" (Complete Collected Worll.s,
Vol 30, pp 350-351)
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this Leninist
principle of military science. It, undoubtedly, is one of the basic
criteria in determining the scientific quality of a work and the
correctness of the conclusions drawn. The slightest departure from
it leads to the most undesirable consequences. Prosposals based on a
one-sided selection of facts do not rest on a scientific basis. They
may have the most unfavorable effect on the development of military
science, and on practices which are based on such recommendations.
It is necessary to see to it strictly that the factual basis of
military-historical research is many-sided and does not miss important
facts. However, it also should not be overloaded with a greai; quantity
of insignificant facts.
A materialistic and dialectical approach to the facts being studied
and the establishment of causal relations and interrelationships make
it possible to establish correctly that necessary "foundation of facts"
'withdut which there can be no military-scientific research. In our
opinion, military historians must strive to interpret critically and
master completely all the specific methods and means of classification
and processing of facts which have been developed by the best of their
predecessors.
First of all it should be said that study of the experience of the
past cannot be based only on favorable examples. A one-sided approach
to the study of wartime experience creates a distorted picture and leads
to one-sided conclusions and to the embellishing of reality. In this
case the sphere of research fails to include the real activities of
command cadres, aimed at the overcoming of difficulties and mistakes,
at carrying out assigned missions in spite of all obstacles, -- i.e.,
everything which constitutes the essential part of the organizational
capabilities of command personnel.
Military historians, in creating a "foundation of facts" for their
research, should be concerned about the reliability of sources used in
their work (most often these are written documents), should determine
their political trend and establish how complete is the information
provided by them and the degree of accuracy and reliability of this
information. Historical documents may be a weapon of political struggle.
For theresearcher it is important to understand in what circumstances
the source came into being:, and what influence aoc66930666/fficis, ideology,
and bieffrellegeFfir-qtleMADRIASigt.: ea-INfepuis7oKu
38
CPYRGHT
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In evaluating the reliability of a source it should be determined
whether there are any contradictory data in it, or disagreements with
other sources. Military documentation presents favorable opportunities
in this respect, since the same events are reflected in documents
Issued by various echelons. Only by strictly considering all these
circumstances can the truth of events be established.
The selection of facts depends greatly on the subject of research,
its aims, and the level on which it is conducted -- tactical,
operational, strategic, or one encompassing the phenomena of war as
a whole. In research on problems of the history of military art, in
most cases it is necessary to work with documents which describe the
conditions in which the battle or operation being studied took place,
the composition of our own forces and those of the enemy, their morale
and combat lpalities, the decisions of the command (our own and the
enemy's), and the organization of contro34 to deal with data on the
preparation for a battle or operation, the organization of coordina-
tion, and the carrying out of command decisions by the operating
units; to work with documents describing changes in the situation in
the course of combat operationsand the new decisions made by the
command on the basis of these changes, the role of arms of troops and
branches of the armed forces in the achievement of victory--i.e., the
whole complex of data which reveal the results of combat operations
both of our troops and those of the enemy.
Just this cursory listing of some groups of facts typical of
military historical research shows what a wide range of material it
Is based on. Obviously this material should not be used in military-
historical research in the form of a mass of uncollated facts, but in
an orderly, systematic form. Facts in such research are most often
set forth in chronological and logical order. And when some problem
of military science is being studied, a certain part of the work
(the introductory chapter) is devoted to a review of the consecutive
development of the problem, i.e., of those stages which preceded its
present status.
In re-creating a picture of military events or describing the
processes which have taken place in military affairs, the historian
places them in a certain order and a certain relationship to one
another, and determines the role, place and importance of certain
facts. This task becomes more difficult as the scale of the events
being described expands. It is easier in describing a battle; it
presents more difficulty in describing an operation and its dif-
ficulty greatly increases in setting forth events on a strategic
scale, or that of the war as a whole. In this case the researcher
deals with a great number of Interacting phenomena in the armed
conflict and with more complex processes, and has to consider all
Appffikt*Or gle611% latratin9?. infk-eDiatttoet75R000mimaincli -.tither factors
on the course of the armed conflict,
39
Approy,ecKpriftlajwipq9i0k09 CIA-RDP85700875RD003000908114 .
- 171:1.47., e a ullo, tne ul!iicuitly of
the tasks performed by the historian in recreating a picture of the
past. He said:: "In the study of hie pry, what troubles and torments
the student most is historical perspective, the interrelationship of
phenomena, and their relative importance. Being guided by one's
personal evaluation, it is easy to exaggerate or underestimate some-
thing which one has not experienced personally, and thus the facts
may be so presented that what results is not a picture of what hap-
pened, but a hullucinatory reflection of ones awn imagination, a
specter sulstantiated by documents" (Voprosy istorii, No 7, 1965,
p 210.
In military-historical works, the description of events, situations,
and command measures is of great, importance and occupies much space.
The historical method here does not appear in pure form, inasmuch as
the selection, classification and grouping of facts also includes the
logical method. Incidentally, Engels pointed out this fact in his
definition of historical and logical methods.
Description is the stage of scientific research which prepares
for the transition to theoretical interpretation of the material.
Without description of facts, it is impossible to explain them, but,
on the other hand, description alone does not make a science.
Description and explanation in military-historical research are
closely interrelated; dia/ectically, one shifts to the other.
It is not permissible for military-historical research to remain
In the stage of description of individual episodes of military history,
without going on to generalizations and theoretical conclusions; it
must not fail to present a profound revelation of the cause-and-
effect relations of phenomena and to trace, on the basis of concrete
materials, the effect of the laws of armed conflict, and the laws of
the development of tactics, operational skill, and strategy. No
matter how conscientiously an author tries to collect and describe
his material, unless his work contains some theoretical generalizations,
some posing of problems, it will not be of much importance and will
-ibute relatively little to today's military science and practice.
,ng with certain successes in systematizing and describing the
i'an.s of the past war, there have been substantial deficiencies.
Many documents continue to remain outside the field of vision of
military historical research. Statistical data on many quantitative
characteristics of the past war are in an unsatisfactory state;
among them are those describing the scope of the armed conflict.
Statistical data provided in the published works are often contra-
dictory. The "mathematization" of military-historical science
deserves serious attention. Mathematical methods make it possible
to disclose quantitative principles in the phenomena being studied.
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As we know, the importance of computer techniques is rapidly increasing.
Ih mahtr fields of knowledge computers are being used more and more
frequently. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of military history,
although it presents a wide field of activity for the use of
mathematical methods.
CPYRGHT
Inasmuch as armed conflict is a process involving two sides, the
researcher should strive to gain possession of the facts which
adequately describe the actions of both sides. However, a major
shortcoming of many works of military history is the one-sided
exposition of the armed conflict and of the war as a whole. In these
works the facts describing the condition of the forces; actions; and
decisions of the enemy are analyzed very inadequately.
No substantial improvement in this respect has been noted in
recent years. The publication and dissemination among scholars of
documents and facts casting light on the planning of the armed con-
flict by the Nazi German command; the status of the military economy
and the psychological potential of the fascist bloc, and the opera-
tions of the Wehrmacht and troops of Germany's satellites on the
Soviet-German front (which should constitute an important part of the
"foundation of facts" in military-historical resirch)--these, in
our opinion, have been accomplished far from effectively. There is
a similar situation with regard to the publishing of materials on
the politics, economics and combat operations of the armies of the
US and Great Britain during World War II.
Uatil these shortcomings are eliminated, military science in
many fields will rest on inadeq4ate data of practical experience,
and military-historical thought will not have that broad basis of
-facts which the development of the military aff irs requires. The
Creation of a system of scientifically well-founded information in
relation to problems being studied by military history is an important
and urgent task.
In our opinion, the study of facts of military history should be
carried on from three viewpoints. First of all, for recreating a
picture of the past, the historian examines groups of facts as
phenomena. This work is accomplished in the descriptive part of the
work on military history, and it is insufficient for a scientific
exposition of the subject. Further; using the historical approach,
the researcher should give a retrospective evalution of the facts
being considered, i.e., show them as the results of a preceding
development. In military-historical works, this is accomplished
most often in the introductory part; which contains, along with a
description of the circumstances in which the everts take place;
information on how these circumstances developed (for example; the
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atrdt&gic operation, the operatf.onal situation, eto.). And finally,
the group of facts being studied must be considered from the point
of view of the effect they have had op the further development of
events.
The logical method finds widest application in the study of
specific problems of military history and the history of military
art.
In studying problems of the tactical and operational level, the
military historian, on the basis of a study of concrete facts,
should give an analysis of the situation of the battle or operation?,
make a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the forces of the two
sides; and determine how correctly the command evaluated the enemy
and the capabilities of its own forces, how weLLthe decisions it
made met the situation, whether preparations for the operation were
carried out correctly, whether all possibilities for the achieve-
ment of victory were utilized, what factors promoted or hindered the
achievement of victory, and at what costs victory was achieved. The
attention of the resaarcher is concentrated on such problems as the
choice of direction of the main attack, the depth, tempo and duration
of an operation, the disposition of combat formations and the organiza-
tion of coordination, the forms of operational maneuver, the organiza-
tion of troop control, and the logistical support of troops.
In studying one or even several battles and operations, the
historian deals with a comparatively limited number of facts, and
this, naturally, gives no basis for broad conclusions and generaliza-
tions. However, even in such cases his principal task consists of
revealing how, in the specific conditions of a particular battle or
operation, there were manifested certain laws of armed conflict, and
what effect subjective factors had on the outcome of the battle or
operation. In evaluating such works, we should proceed on the basis
that it is not enough to know the laws in general; it is necessary
to fol3'ow consistently the nature of their effect and manifestation
in the concrete conditions of a battle or operation.
The logical element assures a more profound and diverse character
in the study of a number of operations or battles. Here the nature
of the generalizations and conclusiono has quite different qualities.
The wide rangevorobservations makes it possible with more assurance
to discover the factors, laws, and those aspects of phenomena which
contribute to victory or lead to defeat. A persistent struggleris
needed to make military-historical works go beyond the bounds of
superficial illustration of already well-known laws and principles.
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CPYRGHT
Arirrtwari Ft-tr Palaacch 9nnninRinci ? rha_pnpAcTnnR7gpnnnlnnnanni 1-4
In the study of a number of operations or battles the nature of
description in works of military history also changes substantially.
Their descriptive part rests on a much broader basis of facts and
observations, the elements of classification and groupings of facts
occupy a much larger place in them, and the comparative method is
more extensively used. In other words, in the descriptive part of
generalizing military-historical works the elements of logical
analysis are considerably more extensive than in works devoted to
description of individual battles or operations. Here the relation
of the logical and the historical appears in a fuller, more developed,
interpenetrating form. The logical method of research has extensive
application in the exposition of problems of the history of military
art, when, on the basis of factual data, a study is made of the
principles in the development of the armed forces and combat equip-
ment and the methods of using them in battles operations, and in a
war as a whole.
Above we have considered some of the typical groups of facts
with which a military historian deals in trying to analyze the laws
of military actions on an operational and tactical scale. A different
range of problems arises in the study of war as a whole or of its
separate periods and campaigns, the economic and psychological
capabilities of one's own country and of the enemy, problems of the
organization and training of armed forces for war, etc. This type
of research requires the study and comparison of even more complex
and diverse groups of facts. Thus, in studying problems of strategy
it is necessary to examine the facts which characterize the inter-
relationship of strategy and politics, the economic, ideological,
and diplomatic preparation of the country for war, mobilization and
operation plans, the training and disposition of reserves, border
security, organization of bases and routes of communications, the
nature and purpose of war, methods of warfare, forms and methods of
command of operational ob'yedineniya, the course of the war on the
strategic level, the material base of the warp etc.
In atudying the phenomena of armed conflict, the researcher must
proceed from the basis that, despite its decisive influence on the
course of the war, armed conflict cannot be studied in isolation from
other forms of conflict, but that its development and laws are closely
related to the politics, economics, and psychological-political life
of society, the status of science and technology, etc. The study
of the effect of these factors on armed conflict is a most important
task of military science, and especially of military history. The
laws of armed conflict reflect multilateral relations and processes,
and interact with each other. It must be taken into account that
the effect of these factors in military operations on various levels
is not identical and is exercised throuAll various intermediate links.
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In studying the course of armed conflict and problems of the
history of military art, it is very important to reveal the cause-
and-effect relation of important phenomena in a battle, an operation,
a campaign, a period of war or in the course of the war as a whole.
This; as a rule; requires examination of events in chronological
sequence (and the overwhelming majority of works on military history
are written in this way), careful consideration of the importance of
material and morale factors in the armed conflict; the factors of'
time and space, the influence of subjective factors on the develop-
ment of battles and orations, etc. In bringing to light the causes
and effect of some event of the war, the military historian must not
lose sight of his main goal--the objective investigation of the
causes of victory or defeat of troops, both our own and those of the
enemy.
? Since any of the events :studied in relation to a war, an operation
or a battle has 1.-ts own sequence of development and causal inter-
relationships; the logic of military-historical research demands
that these processes be revealed in the concrete events being studied.
The next step in the work should include a generalization of the sum-
total of observations, the exclusion from them of what is incidental
and not characteristic; the discovery of a certain repetitiveness of
phenomena and interdependent relations, and finally, the formulation
of a hypothesis.
Military science and its component part, military history (like;
for that; matter, any other science) cannot do without scientifically
based hypotheses. The very process of the discovery of laws of
armed conflict and of the relations of interacting phenomena pre-
supposes the presentation by the researcher of certain hypotheses,
of well-founded suppositions, based on the study of facts. In
further work and in the consideration of a wider range of facts,
they provide a certain direction to the research and will be either
confirmed or refuted. In the process of discovery of the laws of
armed conflict, in searching for the correct solution of the relations
between the whole; the particular and the individual, the develop-
ment of hypothesis is an important and necessary stage in scientific
investigation.
Unfortunately it must be admitted that in works of military
history the scientifically well-founded hypothesis is rarely en-
countered. This applies equally to dissertations on subjects of
military history, including those for a doctor's degree.
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? CPYRGHT
?
ApprovediPArdUleate 2606108109 stiliaRDP85170087.5f2Q41311.0939011I+ advancing
it, the author admits the possibility of its being mistaken. The
real enemy of science is dogmatiz certainty of the abaolute truth of
hypotheses, refussl to test them in practice and against new facts.
And this is a direat route for the entry of subjectivism into science,
capable of doing serious harm to military history. The scholar must
be a strict Judge of his own hypotheses and genelalizations. Dogmatic
conviction of the absolute truth of a stated proposition leads to
curtailment of acientific search, to stagnation of thought. Dogmatism
is the enemy of science. it goes hand in hand with subjectivism,
being, essentially; its opposite side.
A specific feature of military-historical works on a tactical.,
operational or strategic level is the fact that problems of military
art have a prominent place in them, and that they analyze the sub-
jective activity of commanders. In the solution of this complex
problem, the logic of military-historical research requires both
consideration of the important objective factors affecting the course
and results of the armed conflict and the war as a NNhole (of which we
have spoken above), and careful analysis of the actiity of a military
leader.
It is very important to trace in historical facts the role of
the subjective factor of the conscious, purposeful activity of the
people's masses in the'course of a war. Turning possibilities for
victory into reality in a battle, an operation, or a war depends much
on the actions of the commander. The subjective factor can in large
measure affect the objective conditions for waging the armed conflict.
In this connection it should be stressed that with the growth of
the power of weapons the influence of chance on the course of the
armed conflict has likewise increased. Correct consideration of
this factor is of special importance for the initial period of the
war. Under modern conditions a miscalculation in evaluating the
military-political situation on the eve of' war; or delay in taking
steps to repel aggreasion2 can lead to extremely serious conse-
quences and fatelly affect the course and even the outcome of the
war.
This situation is directly related to the work of the military
historians. It is no secret that in many military-historical works
very little attention is paid to the creative activity of the military
leader, to his decision-making process. And this is of very great
importance for the development of tactical; operational and strategic
thinking. In this respect, nothing can take the place of past
experience, especially that of the Great Patriotic War.
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CPYRG
Ab44614t/ IF& R6Iskite 204101106/09 1.:OCIAIRDPS5T1008175 R08030110900A1 -4,f armed
-IT conflict, and also of the principles of military art on which the
military leader depends in his practical operatiens enables the
military historian to bring out how, in a concrete situation, these.
principles were applied, to what extent they correspond to objectlye
laws, what new constructive ideas the military leader introduced ir
accomplishing bis tasks, what wac the result of his actions, and
what determined it.
The success of this work depends on scientific honesty, ad-
herence to principle, objectivity and lack of bias, and communist
party spirit in approach to the study. The science of military
history can be of assistance to practice IA the solving of very
complex problems presented by the revolution in military affairs
only if it provides a scientific analysis of the past, presenting
neither an embellished nor a dark picture of it. Historical truth,
objective reality, the interests of our people and the building of
communism completely coincide.
Mar SU M. V. ZAKHAROV is profoundly right in pointing out the
special danger of subjectivism in the military fiebd. He remarks
that those historians are justly nriticized who, in evaluating
certain operations of the Great Patriotic War are guided not by
what military-political and strategic significance these operations
really had, but by what positions are now held by the people then
charged with commanding them. The higher the positions they hold,
the more it is said, the importance of the operations has to be
built up and emphasized. And so they build them up and magnify them,
as though they do not suspect that herein they are departing from
the party positions of principled scientific workers and slipping
down into the positions of scientific toadies. And it is well known
that where toadyism begins, science ends, objectivity ends, and
subjectivity takes over" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 February 1965).
Marxist-Leninist philosophy proceeds fror the premise that prac-
tical activity must be based on correct ideas about the external
world, and about what is true. It most definitely comes out against
subjectivism, against depicting the present or the past from a pre-
judiced point of view, whether better or worse than actual. The
struggle to eradicate once and for all this anti-scientific, harmful
and abnormal practice, resting like a heavy burden on military
-
historical science, is an important task of Soviet military historians.
It is necessary to follow consistently the teaching of Lenin: "It
is not a matter of who is looking at it, nor who is interested in it,
but what it is, independent of human consciousness" (Leninskiy
sbornik, Vol XI, p 385). We must remember the angry condemnation by
Lenin of the subjective concoction, "the game of examples."
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CPYRGHT
Approved re nfddb1/68/bg :stetk-RDTP8161418b7BRO6Or30069t161 114 the consistent
application of the principles of dialectical materialism in. theoretical
and practical work, and the study of phenomena from the point of view
of the interests of workers, which comp3etely coincides with the
scientific reflection of reality.
The tremendous and diverse military experience of the Soviet
state is of great value for strengthening the defense capability of
our country. Treating it in a slighting way is intolerable. Combat
experience has been paid for in blood, and can be acquired in no
other way. Especially necessary is a comprehensive analysis of the
complex processes which took place in military affairs during the
Great Patriotic War and World War II, and also in the postwar
period.
However, another aspect of the problem should also be soberly
analyzed. In periods of rapid development in the military field, it
is dangerous to neglect changed conditions of conducting combat
operations, and to adapt to them former experienac, gained in a dif-
ferent historical situation and on the basis of obsolete combat
equipment. While seeing a certain continuity in the development of
phenomena and intently analyzing the origins of new methods of
armed conflict, a researcher should not allow the routine pattern
of old practices to conceal what has developed in the military field
as a result of the use of new powerful means of armed conflict and
of a change in the situation. The historical principle does not
consist merely in seeing the historical roots of new phenomena. It
is no less important to interpret correctly the changes that have
occurred and the full extent of the difference between the new and
the old, to reveal the special features of the new situations, and
to utilize to the limit the possibilities of the new weapons, new
equipment, new social relations, and changes in the human material.
The old experience-in the new circumstances has to be revised
critically; it should help to understand more deeply the new tenden-
cies, and bhould not conceal them.
The task of military science is not only to reveal those aspects
of past experience which can be useful in JcArn conditions, but also
to promote timely elimination of obsolete principles, methods and
means of. conflict which were effective in the past but have now
become old, fixed routines which. hinder the development of military
thought and the solution of practical military problems.
The solution of this difficult problem requires a correct under-
standing of the'specific manifestation in military matters of one of
tne basic laws of dialectics--i.e., the law of the negation of the
negation. Marxist philosophy teaches that the new, in replacing the
old, retains from the latter everything that is valuable and positive.
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,T
V ? AD131"18VtilF6MeleaSO2600WaYbgle. 860415P89-PISOMR300030009961914Y not
skeptica negation..., but negation as an aspect of relationship,
of development, with a positive content." (Philosophical Notebooks,
1934, p 216). The dialectical approach to military developments
warns against the under estimation of some phenomena and the over-
estimation of others, and against one-sided solutions.
Approaching the development of mTlitary affairs historically, we
should disclose the processes which have brought the present into being
and see the processes which are determining the future. The require-
ment of Marxist dialectics for a combination of the logical and the
historical in military science is demonstrated most fully in just
such an approach.
The October, November and March plenums of the Central Committee
CPSU, held under the sign of Leninist demands for theoretical and
practical work, have occupied an important place in the life of our
country. They brought into the life of the Party much that is new
and restored a genuinely scientific Leninist style. The Party is
consistently eliminating elements of subjectivism and improvisation
in the solution of problems of the state, the economy, and party
organization. This is giving new, powerful stimuli to the further
flourishing of science in our country.
Purposeful, creative work, based on the principles of Marxist
dialectical methodology and on a careful study of past experience,
and directed toward the solution of urgent scientific problems which
are closely tied to modern military requirements, -- this is what is
required of military-scientific cadres. The comprehensive study of
problems of methodology of Soviet military science whould have an
Important place in the accomplishnent of these tasks.
CPYRGHT
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AN ANSWER 10 OPPONEJITS
CPYRGHT
by Mhj. Gen I. ZAVIYALOV
An article "The Types and Forms of Military Operations," published
in the January 1965 issue of Voyennaya Mysig, has provoked a fairly wide
exchange of opini ens on the problems mentioned in it. (Voyennuallyslt,
Nos 6,7, and b, 1965). The most serious objections were to the thesis
that military operations are divided into only two kinds, offense and de-
fense, and that nuclear attacks cannot be considered as an independent
kind of operation.
Some comments cast doubt on the statement that in a nuclear war a
strategic defense is possible, and that, the combat, actions of rocket troops
and PVO Strany troops will take on the form or the corresponding operations
5hieh they sunporl;/. There was also expressed the opinion that attacks
of naval and UiT forces cannot be regarded as either offense or defense.
Hence, obviously, itis necessary to explain a number of the theses
advanced by us.
First, we.refer.to our assertion that military operations by their
nature --i.e., by their basic; most essential characteristics--are divided
into two kinds, offense and defense, and that no other kinds of operations
exist in armed rionflict.
We start off from the proposition that an attack and its repulse; or
offense and defense, are two dialectically interrelated activities, one
flowing from the other, two aspects of a single process--armed conflict.
They cannot exist separately, one without the other. Moreover, in the
operations of both sides there always exist elements both of offense and
of defense. There is never offense or defense in "pure" form. Thus,
during an armed aonflict, in its. various stages or in particular regions,
water;areas, or air spaces, each of the belligerents, while basically
carrying on one of the two kinds of operations, at the same time is forced
to carry on also the Other, even though on a smaller scale. The front as
a whole may be attacking, but certain of its armies and smaller units
may be on the defensive. On the other hand, during a defensive battle,
armies and certain of their units may shift to a counter-attack, i.e.,
conduct offensive operations. In a battle and in an operation, effensive
and defensive activities are carred on simultaneously. In other words,
during armed conflict each side has to attack ani defend simultaneously,
repulse attacks and launch counter-attacks.
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iiPTYPALF.Rjr tly? re are tne moot varieL IQiid.0 oLc.:o1iib5,1: operatA one:
attack and. counter-attack? meeting engagements? assto.ulL and counter-
assault, retreat and pursuit., reconnaissance and. security measures.
But in all this diversity of activities there are certain common
characteristics by which they necessarily belong either to the offense or
the defense.
What are the basic and most characteristic attributes of the offense
They are two the launcLing of attael;13 with weapons, and. movement of the
troops forward. Here the main characteristic, the essenLial basis of
offense is the strike for only by the use of all kinds of weapons is it
possible to inflict heavy losses on the enemy and deprive him of the
capability of offering resistance. Some of .my opponents associate the
offense primarily with forward movement of troops, with occupation of the
territory of the enemy. In their opinion, without such movement there is
no offensive. But everyone 'mows that the advance i.. primarily for
troops to occupy the most favorable position for the launching of attacks,
for taking possession of territory in case of retreat of the enemy or his
loss of combat capability as a result of attacks:, in order to deprive him
of the possibility of using his weapons. In other words? advance of the
troops is to a certain degree subordinate to the attack.
In the early stare of development of the military art, the weapons
of the armed forces were only cold steel, and. in order to attack the
enemy, the belligerents had to come together, or one of them occupied a
fortified position, and the other had. tc move up to :it. With the develop-
ment of firee.rms? the need for such proximity gradually disappeared.. The
more the range and. destructive power of the weapons increased, the less
became the need for movement. While even now the infant3.7? with its weapons
of close combat, when rIm. the offensive, is almost al-erays on the move, the
artillery makes such shift of position only to change firing positions,
when its range is inadequate for effective fire on the enemy. The air
force, for launching attacks, changes its airfields even less often. As
to strategic rocket troops, their effer.tive range is so great that they
need not shift posi-L:on at all. Thus one: of the characteris,1;ics of the
offensive, movement forward, has disappeared completely for strategic rocket
troops.
Defense also has two basic characteristic.. the first is repulsing
the offensive of the enemy by launching counterattacks on him With weapons,
and. the second is holding the most favorable positions for combat opera-
tions. Here again the attack plays the principal role, for only it is
capable .of inflicting losses on the enemy and breaking up his offensive.
Holding of positions is of subordinate importance. It is required for
creating the most favorable conditions for the use of weaponds to inflict
maximum losses on the enemy as he approaches the defensive positions, and
also to protect the defending forces and their combat equipment form the
blows of the enemy, using terrain, engineering installations, and various
means ofprcromsfiEcisieR4ipasp 7nnninFung ? ciA_RnpRsTnng7sRnnwinntvanni -a
5
PYRGHT
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`..cliub the main aharacteristic of bs th offense and defense has been and
still iL; the attack. The difference between these two kinds of operations'
censists in the ways in which the attacks are launched and the means of
destruction are used, determined by the aims of the armed conflict.
Disputing this thesis, i.e., that armed conflict is a two-sided
process characterized by a combination of offensive and defensive
onera,dons, Gen V. PETEENED asserts that what is typical of modern
co,.ai..)11:: is not offense and defense; nob attack and protection against
I t, lduL at'alck on the attacker) using primarily nuclear weapons.
There is no doubt that in a future war attack on the attacker may
prove to be the basic, decisive method of operations, especially at the
beginning of the war, since strategic nuclear weapons art already in
their launching positions and ready for immediate use. But even in this
case, when both sides simultaneously begin extensive offensive operation's,
using nuclear weapons, defense as a form of armed conflict does not lose
its importance.
It is quite obvious that attack on the attacker cannot continue very
long. There can be one of tiJo outcomes of such a conflict: either one
of the sides will be completely overwhelmed) and the war will end with
that, or it will suffer such losses that it will be much weaker than its
enemy and will be forced to acRipt on a large scale defensive methods of
operations. Moreover, the very process of attacking the attacker is not
completely devoid of defensive activities. For example, rocket troops,
in order to maintain the capability of launching attacks on the enemy,
must themselves be dependably protected and secure from his blows from
the air. And this requires a well-organized, strong air defense, and the
building of well-protected launching positions. In a nuclear war between
sides relatively equal in strength, that. side will have the advantage
which uses its nuclear power with the greatest effect, best organizes
its protection against the nuclear attack of the enemy, and is able to
repulse his attacks 'with greater skill- Therefore it would be incorrect
to think that in a nuclear war there is possible only such a combination
of Mnds of operations as an attack on the attacker, or an offensive
against the side on the offensive, and to deny the possibility of other
combinations?for example, an offensive against the defender or an
offensive against (pursuit of) a retreating enemy. There' are no bases for
thinking thus. Even in nu.clear-war:, offense and defense will be used in
the most varieC. combinations.
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atruLdenLaLLy, cue auuacy, on 1,110 RG1AIC1SJ1 is not somethin new, OV
characteristic only of nuclear war. It Ls nothing other than the sfunui-
tancous shift of the belligerents to decisive offensive operations with
RGHThe aim of most quickly using their weapons for inflicting attacks on
the enemy. As a result of such operations, there take place meeting
engagements, which are well know to us from past wars.
Continuing to develop their objections on this uurtter, GEN PETIMIKO
an some other Lhink that the concepts "offense" and "defense" are
applicable only to the operations of ground forces .? But to say this is
to deny the obvious situation that in the air and on the sea the opposing
sides are also attacking each other and resisting attack. Just as on
land, the armed ccsfflict in the air and on the sea is nothing other than
the launching of attacks and the repelling of them by tse two sides, i.e.,
offense and defense. And although N. V'YUNENKO says that the attack is
not necessa/lly a constituent element of offense and defense, we cannot
imagine either an offensive or a defense without attacks, any more than
We can imagine assaults (udary) cutside of an attack (napadeniye), or
defense without repulse of attacx. This situation is equally true for
all kinds of armed forces and for all levels of military operations,
tactical, operational, and strategic.
Of course, offense or defense for each branch of armed forces has its
own characteristic features. But the main, basic features for these kinds
of operations are common to all of them.
Showing the "inconsistencies" of our positions on kinds of military
operations, some of my opponents state that under modern conditions
strategic defense is not applicable. Thus, in the opinion of PELRIINKO?
an attempt to apply in a rocket and nuclear war( "defense on a strategic
level would inevitably lead the armed forces, and consequently the
country, to defeat." (Voyenna2-2. 1/Porsl', No 6, 1965, pp 26-27).
Approximately the same point of view is held by Mar Su V. SOKOLOVSKIY,
Gen M. CHEREDNICHENKO, and Col. V. LARIONOV (id, pp 27-34)
However, these views, as can be concluded from the comments received,
are probably the result of their authors considering the concepts
"strategic defense" and "defensive stratea as identical; with this, of .
course, it is impossible to agree. These are completely different categories.
Defensive strategy means refraining from active offensive operations. It
Is erroneous in its basis and unacceptable to us. Strategic defense de-
termines only the scale on which this form of operation may be undertaken
iu a nuclear war, without it being necessary at all that the armed forces
as a whole carry out strategic defense.
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PYRGHT
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The military doctrine of the Soviet Union; in its political aims, never
has had and cannot have an aggressive character. Our country has never
attacked anybody, and does not intend to attack anybody. A war of conquest
is alien to it, as it is to all the socialist countries. But this does
not mean at all that in a war the Soviet Union would conduct only defensive
operations. If the imperialists commit an act of aggression against us,
we will unleash the most decisive, active'offensive, using all the military
might of our armed forces. The 'enemy's attack will be answered by us with
an attack of still greater force, using to the litit the offensive
potential of our armed forces, which has immeasurably Increased with the
development of nuclear weapons, for a decisivc and quick defeat of the
aggressors. This constitutes the basis of our strategic concepts.
At the same time we cannot underestimate strategic defense, either.
Its role in modern war arises from the necessity of accomplishing that
very important, primary mIssion of the armed forces of frustrating the
nuclear attack of the enemy.
Of course, strategic nuclear weapons have a special place in accomplish-
ing this mission. They primarily and mainly are called upon to destroy the
nuclear weapons of the enemy. But nuclear strikes at the enemy's msans
of iraclear attack can scarcely achieve their complete destruction. :these
means are dispersed over great lard and water greas, are well protected
under ground and under water, and a part of them under any circumstances
will go into action. So the destruotion of them in flight will be a basic
element in modern strategic defense. In other words, strategic defense
in a nuclear war is primarily air defense (antimissile, anti aircraft,
and anti space), to be carried out over the territory of a whole country.
In speaking thus about strategic defense2 we at the same time emphasize
its exceptionally great importance for the defense of the state, we shcw
that a tremendous role it will play in a future war, what an important
place it will have among all the other methods of operations, and we call
attention to its very great spatial dimensions and to the participation
in it of a great quantity of men and equipment. And this does not at all
distort the concept of "strategic defense", about which V. PETRENKO is
worried:
At the same Lime, it by no means follows from these propositions
that defense can be the predominant form of operations. But apparently
SOKOLOVSKI( and CHEREDNICHENKO consider my statements to mean just
this when they write that they are deeply convinced that "if eather of
the sides were to carry out strategic defense even if this is meant to
apply to the activities of PTO Strany troops), it will inevitably suffer
defeat."
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YR
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It is ai.iiculu uo concede that they reject strategic defense altoghether.
Irhis is confirmed by the following position stated by them: "Now both
GHisides will attack simultaneously, and firaL of all with the principal
instruments of warfare--rockets and nuclear weapons, anl likewise they
will simultaneously defend themselves primarily by the means of anti-
air and anti-missile defence. They will also car:y on other military
operations," (Voyennaya Mys11, No 6, 1965, p 20. Consequently there
will be both offense and defense, with defense no-; on a tactical or
operational level, but on a scale of the whole country, with the par-
ticipation of all the PVO troops or a great part of them, with the aim
of repelling a nuclear attack of the enemy. And you cannot call such a
defense anything but "strategic."
Certain doubts expressed by A. YEE1MOVSKIY can hardly shake the
correctness of this position. He thinks that from the point of view cf
its mission the composition of the participating forces and weapons, and
the size of the area involved, anti-air defense is on a strategic level.
But since the operations of PVO troops ar divided territorially, they
may take place at various times and in various regions, and theit
principal efforts cannot be directed against the main grouping of the
enemy; consequently) anti-air defense cannot be included in strategic
operations.
However, as is known, primarily strategic operations are defined by
rtheij strategic purposes, by their role in the total system of armed
conflict, by the participation of a large number of ob"yedineniya and
soyedineniya, and by great dimensions as to area. From this point of
view there can be no doubt as to the strategic nature of the operations
of PITO troops. As to their being separated in time and space they do
not lose their strategic significance from this, especially since it is
incorrect to assume that the principal efforts of the PVO troops cannot
be directed against the main forces of the enemy. This thesis is refuted
by all combat experience. For destruction of the main grouping of the
enemy in the air, there are always concentrated such PITO forces and weapons
as are necessary for such a purpose.
We should like to note again that there can be strategic defense not
only against missiles, space satellites and aircraft, but also in the land
theaters of military operations and the sea and ocean areas contiguous to
them. And this is entirely natural- If one side conducts a strategic
offensive, the other side is forced to shift to a defense on a correspond-
ing scale. This position would be true even if the war should begin with
an attack on the attacker. In this defense large formations of all
branches of armed forces would participate,
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In objecting to our theses about the kinds of military operations,
some of the opponents rank the nuclear attack along uith offense and
defense., culling it too? a kind of military operation. But these are
magnitudes of a completely different order. As may easily be gathered.
ilrom everything said above, they cannot be combined. in one concept.
While offense and. defense are different aspects of one and. the same
process--armed conflict., the nuclear attack is a qualitative characteristic
of this 'process, indnit.cating by what means and methods the armed conflict,
offence and defense, will be carried on.
Attacks strategic nuclear weapons will be launched. first and c
foremost in the interests of the main kind of operations of the armed
C orce?-;, by which stratezr counts on achieving the aims o.g the war.
This Irina of operation, undoubtedly., will be offensive And consequently
its d.e.cisive force must be strategic nuclear weapons. !reliever:, this
does not e.Kclude the possibility of launching nuclear attacks also in
the interests of C.efense.
To regard. the strategic nuclear attack as an independent form of
military operations on a place with offense and. defense would be to
contradict the dialectics of armed conflict as a single process--attack
and its repulse, offense and. defense.
In the light of what has been said, It must be admitted that our
attempt to regard the war in the ether Lradio warfarig as an indepezident
kind of military operations is unsound, and. should be rejected as mis- ?
taken. The war in -the ether basically has the same two kinds of operations ?
off ensive and. defensive; it Is not carried on in isolation from the com-
bat operations of the aimed forces, but is an inseperable part of them,.
and serves the intere.ste of the defense or the offense.
We should. like to say a few words about the forms of military operat-
ions.
A.. IllaMOVSICE:..objects to the statement that the actions of PVO
Strany troops will be carried out in the form of different operations
(ope.ratsii). He gives as his reasons the fact that "the actions of
PVO Strany troops take place usually as independent ones:, carried out
by separate soyedineniya and, less frequently,' by obnyedineniya? and. are
of' local importance. :ilerefore the PVO Strany troops carry out not
operations, but coffeat actions, which take on the form of an operation
only when an operational ob"yedineniye has a compact distribution i-c7f
its force], covering a nearby group of major rear-area targets or
of troops 7 " (Voyennaya Mysl , No Y., 1965, pp 19-2Q). But this
reasoning cannot be accepted as well-founded.. What indicates an operation
is primarily the operational or strategic nature of the aims of the
operation, its importance in performing the missions in a gt.ven stage
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of the I7Z.%:1 the participation in it of operational obuyedineniya of
one or more branches of armed forces, and. the large area involved,
and in no case is it the compactness at' disposition of operational
obuyedineniya. Moreover., we cannot agree that the actions of PVO
troops are carried out by separate soyedineniya? less often by
obuyedineniya? and are of' local importance. Many operational obuye(linm-
iya, not only of the PVO Strany troops, but all the PVO resources of
the ground forces, navy, and fighter aviation, may simultaneously
participate in repelling enemy attacks from the air. The combat
operations will be conducted over immense areas and. be of exceptionally
great national., and not just local significance. The combat capability of
the armed forces and the ability of the state to perform its vital functions
will greatly depend on the successful repulse of a nuclear attack of
the enemy.
From the point of view of basic characteristics, the actions of PVC
Strany troops, must be considered. as taking the form of an operation..
And, despite all Objections, they are usually so planned. As to the
term; "combat actions", it does not and. cannot express any kind of form.
It is too indefinite and is used for a t'r,eneral designation of the
activities aC arrred forces, without regard to their scale or kind..
PETRIIIKO writes: "In missile and nuclear war there are such loical
forms of strategic operations as strategic nuclear attacks, the strategic
offensive in a theater of military operations, combat actions of NO
Strany Troops, and also the use of special farces and. equipment in space"
(Voyennaya No 6, 1965, p 26). It appears to me that the author
simply does. not want to distinguish between the kinds., levels, methods,
and forms of actions.
In conclusion, we should like to express our deep gratitude to all
the readers who have participated in the discussion of this vital subject,
those 'who have supported and refined the theses set forth by us, and
particularly those who, from their own points of view, have criticized
them. There is no doubt that the criticism has helped both the author
and many readers to analyze and correctly understand the problems raised
in the article under discussion.
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T)' TRANS 1..),NO ?9`,
r 0
OYENNAY
AIZCH 1.9 6 6.
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IT DliTENDS ON WHAT ONE MOULD GIVE UP
CPYRGHT
by Rear Ala (let) IC. ZOTOV
ALaost every time that new weapons are developed, there appear
opinions that we must immediately give up existing tactical, operational,
strategic or even general military views and work out essentially
new r..oneepts. And, on the ether hand, frequently attempts are made to
reject, or at least to belittle, the importance of the new weapons. BLit
century-old experience has shown convincingly that these extreme points
of a view are, as a rule, wrong. It is not only a fact that the new
for a certain period of time exists along with the old, but mainly that
the old.? as well as the new, always represents a diversity of elements,
connections, and relations of different degrees of importance and stability.
If some of them have no special roots in practical life, others., on the
contrary, rest on 'very firm ground.. Finally, there are certain laws of
long-term or even permanent effect. Incautious attempts to reject them
Off -hand can do nothing but harm. Therefore, major reorganizations in
the armed forces are usually carried out very circurn;:pectly.
From these standpoints, the article of Maj Gen I, ZAB 'Y.ALOV seems
timely and. useful. Welcoming its appearance, and. the many replies to it,
we also should like to make certain observations on the problems con-
sidered.
First of all, we cannot, agree in principle with ZAWYALOV's idea
of ranking as a military operation (along with. offense and defense) the
war in the ether," i.e., phenomena on an entirely different plane.
It is interesting to follow the arg-ument of the author. "Of course,"
he says, "in this kind of operations we shall encounter the same offensive
and, defensive, for it is impossible to imagine the war in the ether apart
from the interests of the offense or defense, But? "follows the antithesis,
"the fact is that this war is carried on siJiultaneously both in the
Interests of the offense and. the defense." And? concludes the author by
way of synthesis., "it may attain such development that in certain tases
it will dictate the nature of the operations of the armed forces of the
belligerents, and. from this point of view will take on a certain inde-
pendence" (p22). (Reply to the Article of Maj Gen I ZAVIYALOV? "The
TIoes and Forms of Military Operations", Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1965)
LFootnote presumbaly belonging to this paragraph, but not keyed to
anything above]
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PYRG
IciPPItdCied --raiii.Lkell6gb ob biciwo 91(;) lAkROP8STOP 8 ZSR000 3.Q.K19 11t4 excerj
wneLher lie is LaThing about the defensive or offensive nature of radio
-11-warfare itself, or about, the military operations (tactical, operational,
or strategic) which it is supporting at a given moment. The fact is IiiaL
this warfare alMost always includes simultaneously both "offensive"
operations (interfering with the radio communications of the enemy and
finding out about his operations and intentions) and "defensive"
operations (protection of one's own radio communications from enemy
interference and intercept). On the other hand, the whole complex of
radio warfare, as the author correctly states, is carried on both on the
offensive and the defensive. We only want to emphasize that whether
it be one or the other, i.e., more offensive or more defensive, is by no
means directly related to the operations it is supporting. Depending on
circumstances, radio warfare may tend to be 'offensive on the defense,
and be predominantly defensive on the offense.
Finally, it is true that radio warfare "in some situations will
dictate the character of the operations of the armed forces" in war-
fare at one level on another. But this applies to other forms of
support operattons as well--for 'example, to intelligence and supply
But from the fact that the results say, of intelligence may permit us
to move over to the offensive from the defensive, or, on the contrary,
make us take a defensive position, does it follow tImat intelligence has
"a certain indepandence" and should be considered one of thr? kinds of
military operations--in other-words, be placed on the aame level with the
offensive and the defensive? Of course noto
It is another matter that radio warfare represents a new phenomenon
of very great importance which, in comparison with the time of its appear-
ance in World War I; can now play a tremendous role, all the way up to
the strategic level. If one side or the other should invent a means of
ineucapablel absolute effect on all the radioelectronics of the enemy,
this would amount to deciding the outcome of the war as a whole, a
decision of a more or less offensive mature, but possibly, in some cir-
cumstances, even more or less defensive. But, In the first place, such
a thing is practically impossible, and in the second place, even in
this hypothetical situation, everything remains as it is; radio warfare
Is still radio warfare; offense and defense--still offense and defense.
We have dwelt in such detail ox. radio warfare because the solution
of the problem of nuclear attack is based on the same principles, despite
the fact that radio warfare is' a support operation; and nuclear attack
a foundation of military operations.
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PYRGHT
APProvg.OF.91(Fte)e299PMe869AbR-RIPPgiqq.R5R9.9PPR9intid4ve" really be
strategic? And is there a basis for (ilLsLill1d1s11ifle the nuclear attack
as a certain speciad kind of operation, to be ranked along with offense
and 'defense?
"In whet does the concept of 'the offensive" consist?" asks Oen
ZAV'YALOV (p 16), and he correctly answers: "In the launching of attacks
with tin use of various kinds of weapons. Jai the early stages of the
military arl,, these were the lance, the sword, thd spear, the bow and
arrow theil the firearm of the foot soldier, artillery; tanks, planes,
chemical weapons, and, finally, rocketE and nuclear weapons. The
offensive necessarily presupposes active operations, movement forward
toward the enemy, Vith the aim of attacking and defeating him. And
when we speak here of moving forward, we have in mind not only ground
troo,)s? hut also planes, ships, shells, rockets, etc." The author
conreeGly concludes "The attack is 1 one-time act of striking
(porazheniya) the enemy. It is intended to accomplish some pert'.cular
mission, for the attainment of a particular goal, and may be launched
by units of any size of all the branches of armed forces."
Thus the attach is one of the basic elements of armed conflicn,
with this element being very varied in scope. We may talk about fire
strikes, or attacks on tactical operational, or, finally, strategic
level, such as, for .example, the "ten decisive attacks" of the 1944
campaign on the Soviet-German front, One can also speak of psychological
(morallnyye) attacks Finally, one may regard a war as a whole as a
single tremendous political attack. To be sure, since the development
of the firearm, we have often used the word "fire" instead of the word
"attack" (as in the combination "fire and maneuver") but this
substitution, for obvious reasons, is permissible only in such combina-
tions. In all Other cases "attack" is used and accepted as the broader
and more flexible concept.
Thus a E.,gantic nuclear attack, planned for the beginning of a
great war, is a strategic offensive act, regardless of whether it is
"Initial", "preventive," or "retaliatory." In other words, we arrive
at the Conclusion that the eencepts, "offense" and "defense", on the
one hand, and "attack", on the other, are on different planes and must not
be confused.
Wow it is asked, can the concepts "offense" and "defense" be applied
to the operation of all branches of the armed. forces? Opinions in the
discussion of this question differ. Some think that it is possible to
speak about these kinds of operations only with reference to ground
troops, since only they move (on the "offensive") over certain. territory,
or defend certain lines,. Others, on the other hand, deny the significance
of such a division of operations even for ground troops.
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CPY
VIAMtirciVIERVFOr Releasei2000/138/119): CIA4RDE85TOD878R9.000110911.-41rilriv.;
that, in the first place, the telm "offehalve" is not applicable to
RGHITeir operations; naval forces conduct neither. au on:ens:lye nor a
defensive, but inflict attacks on the enemy; in the second place,
"the nature of combat operations of the navy. remains the same 'both
in a period of strategic defense and (taring a strategic offensive.
For example, the navy may land amphibious landing forces or provide
artillery support to the coastal flank of ground troops both in
defensive and offensive operations." (Voyenanya Nysi' No (, lc 5,
PP-34-35)
The second statemerru is more leas true, but only for the simple,
and already partly referred to, reason that the nature of operations
on various levels by no means coincide one with another. For cecample,
a strategic defense may be combined with an operational offensive; the
latter may require somewhere a tactical defense; etc. A bullet, says
Gen ZAV'YALOV, "is always on the offensive". But this statement is more
or less true just because, after all, the offensive or defensive direction
of the operations Of a higher echelon in most cases are reflected in
one way or another in the nature of the operations of subordinate
echelons. Thus, landing operations are more often required of a
fleet in offensive operations of a front to which it is subordinate;
on the other hands, the evacuation of troops from the shore, which
occurs on the defense, will almost never occur on. the offensive.
MAMAYEV's first statement is not true at all: because every
operation of the navy and of each of its sub-units (like we will
add, that of any other branch of service and its sub-units) always
has been, is, and will be either Offensive or defensive in nature.
Thus, escorting a convoy is for the fleet a defensive operation, but
an anti-submarine ship, attacking in this operation a submarine which
? it has discovered, is carrying out a tactical offensive. The forces
of a fleet, putting ashore operational tr tactical landing forces, is
thereby operational or tactically attacking, but at the same time a
ship, fighting back at enemy airplanes, is tactically on the defensive.
On this question Capt 1st Bank N.
support of his statements he refers to
of Japan in 1941. But this reference;
founded.
V'YUNENKO supports MAYAYEV. In :
the operations of the armed forces
in our opinion, is not well-
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CPYRGH
AjaprovId FE:6141:ter616 21detwo8/64(licibear4DP861;00075R0003op90011 -411c US .1: :tt
Pearl harbor "was nothing else but an attack (War)", an VVUNENM writes,
is true. But his statement that "in these operations ... there was
nothing that, could be called on offensIve--neither seienre of any area
against the resistance of the enemy, nor other marks of an offensive
operation." (Voyennaya Nysl , No (, 1965, p 22) is, to say the least,
accepting the des-Tred fact as the actual fact. In the Japanese general
strae,le offensive in the Pacific in the first half year of the war, tile
1.11 t,he US 1:1(!c?1, at Pearl Harbor wee nothing other than a major
offensive operation
We Hill sum up our strtements. Rockets and nuclear weapons have
completely changed the na.us..,:e of war, of an operation, or of a battle.
But can we conclude from this that we must reject the concepts of "offensive"
and "defensive"? Note that we are not rejecting the concepts of "tactics"
and "operational art" because of the appearance of these new weapons
And not just because armed conflict with such weapons will not exclude the
operations of other branches of forces, for which these eoncpts will
continue to keep their meaning, but also because the use of nuclear ?
weapons will be subordinated to certain strategic, operational and tactical
laws(zahonomernosti).
Almost the same tbing could be said about the categories of "offensive"
and "defensive". First, in many cases they will be manifested in, so to
speak, "pure form." Second, the inevitable counter-action (vstrechnyy)
nature of many of the operations still will not exclude the possible
display in each of them of offensive initiative, placing the enemy in
one way or another in a defensive position with all the ensuing, including
political and psychological, consequences. And while the politically
new social and economic structure always defends itself against the
reactionary forces of an out-moded system wich seek to destroy it, it
always has striven, is striving; and will. strive, as the experience of
history shows, toward cffensive operations, directly in a malitary
sense, i.e., strategic; operational and tactical. And this constitates
one of the important guarante3s of its success..
Essentially, Mur Su V. SOKOLOVSYIY and Maj Gen M. ClIEREDNICIIMO do
not dispute this; they believe that "rocket-nuclear and air-nuclear attacks
on economic and political targets, nuclear installations, and armed
forces of the agrossor are the mcst offensive kind of strategic operations
of all the kinds that have ever been used in wars. It will have the
decisive role in the defeat of the aggressor." (Voyennaya Mys11, No 6, 1265,
p 29) Precisely "the most offensive kind," contrasted with the defensive--
quod ernt itomonstrachun
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kanaily, tile nature '0.1 both the olfensive and the d.efenpe 1)r.ul now
greatly changed in most cases, but who would dispute that' ? However,
that is another question to which, incidentally, a great many articles
and studies have already been devoted.
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Approved ForRelialWRIMONOMAIRNIMUMOSCUOMMOWNAIRS
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Book Review by Lt Col Ye. RYBKIN
Thin collection of articles published by Voyenizdal in 1965 is made
up of materials previously published in our military press on this subject.
The articles examine the material-technological and social-political basis
of the revolution in military affairs and the principal forms of their being
influenced by scientific-technological progress. Much attention is paid to
the use of new weapons and to a revision, in connection with this, of a num-
ber of principles in the theory of military art; the content of Soviet mili-
tary doctrine is set forth and its interconnection with military science is
shown. In a number of. articles light is thrown on the tasks in training and
educating troops in connection with the new stage in the development of the
armed forces and special emphasis is given to the question of strengthening
one-man authority and troop discipline.
The goal of a selection of such articles is to delineate the character-
istics of the revolution in military affairs, and to give a more or less
general picture of it. It seems to us that the book must be evaluated from
this point of view. it must be said that the articles are auecessfully cho-
sen. At the same time it seems necessary to comment on the substance of cer-
tain principles expressed by the authors.
First of all there is the question concerning the essence and substance
of the revolution in military affairs. The answer to this question is given
in one degree or another in several articles. Thus, in our opinion it is
most clearly formulated in the article by Col P. M. DEREVYANKO:I'Bv the modern
revolution in military affairs is implied the entire sum of fundamental
changes in the means of armed couibat, in the mothods of conducting combat
operations, in the organization of troops, their education and training
the sum total of changes which have been realized during the last 15 years
in the most industrially and scientifically developed countries, and which
are connected mainly with the creation of rocket-nuclear weapons." (p. 101).
From this definition it follows that the revolution in military affairs
took place not only in socialist but in capitalist countries, too. Unfortu-
nately, this thesis has not been further developed "hut it would be highly
interesting to show the common characteristics and the principal differences
of such a revolution under the conditions of capitalism and of socialism..
The scientific-technical side of the revolution in military affairs is
shown fully enough in the book. In this regard the most interesting articles
are by Col Gen S. M. SHTEMENKO, Col Gen N. A. LOMOV and Col P. M. DEREVYANKO.
It is no ..,td that uninterrupted and ever-accelerating progress in the field
of natural and technical sciences promises further discoveries and makes
possible the creation of fundamentally new weapons. (p. 95)
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Ar644t1 PiOiRe1iiad4?; 20004/CiftiaCUVRIVWSQ8781Ra0.03000909,1 lia4d.rient ed. that the
era of the development of firearms ? in its 6.:46entia1. features, bad ended
(p. 99). This .was in the last quarter of the 19th oentury. Actually the
invention of automatic firearms weapOOS exended this era to some eat ents
but nevertheless it is already a thing of the past. The development of weap-
ons has found new paths. "It may be stated," it is further observed hat.,"t
speaking in the words of Engels, a new era in the. development of weapone?
based on the use of the atomic explosion:, ha a come" (p.99). 'ft eeem s to us
that one ought; to continue this thought, the era ef development of roeket-
nuclear weapons s in their essential featureas has already been delineated.
TbAlr further development probably will not lead to anything basically new
in that direction. However, the working out of methods s forms and means of
combat la continuing on an ever-increasing scaler Neat IA turn is the search
for a weapon that would be able to reliably and instanta:neously destroy
rockets with nuclear charges in flight and to hurl. them back into cosmde
space or neutralize the nuclear warheads of flying roekets (cef. po 75).
Apparently, it is Seat this kind of research that cou:Id bring something
fuadamentally new into the charaetel" of modern armed combat.
Very interesting is the article "military Doctrine and Militar, Doctrine,"
We would like to turn the readers' attention to the thought *hat military
science and military doctrine are developing perhaps in a parallel manner
but not quite uniformly or similarly. Each one has a dialectie of develop-
ment peculiar to it, as does every s Un eet, Mtlitary science is continually
introducing changes in its views. Bbypeirer, military doctrine does not react
to individual changes for some time but turns to them only when their (pan-
titive assumulation is definitely felt and requires an aldrupt change in basic
principles. At the same time military doctrine continues its development
even up to the change in its fundamental principles. But, of course, the
forms of its improvement must be different from the usual discussions on
questions of military science, for doctrine, expressed particularly in such
documents as regulations, bears the character of law. On its basis, direc-
tives and orders from the leadership of the armed forces are composed and
military development in a particular historical period takes place.
Reviewing almost all the questions touched upon in the book we note
that they concern only a rocket-nuclear world war. Eren the question *f
the necessity for preserving and developing the old, "classical!' branches
of the armed forces and types of troops and ordinary firearms is diaeussed
only in the light of such a war. However., one must not forget about the
"small wars," which the imperialists are continually waging. It is believed
that theoretical thinking ought to take this situation into account and give
more attention to the problems of conducting local wars.
The leading role of the CPSU tn conducting the revolutionary transfor-
mation in military affairs is noted in a number of articles (p. 9s 88-89,
104 and others). "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union," it says in the
book, "has opportunely aimed. soviet science and technology at mastering the
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nucleus, has correctly evaluated perspectives in the
development of rocket-nuclear weapons and their deciding role in the defense
of the country, and has quickly organized their manufacture and introonation
into the Armed Forces. The party mobilized our military cadres for Toaster-
ing the corresponding means and methods of conducting combat operations and
for educating and training personnel according to the conditions of modern
war" (p. 104).
The alathors of the articles in which this question is touched upon under-
line that the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government have
shown foresightedness and wisdom in their evaluation of the trend of develop-
ment in military affairs, and have correctly determined the character of a
poeoible war; and have done everything necessary to put the USSR Armed. Forces
and the defense capability of the country on the level required today..
In the book the readers attention it turned. to the fact that now "as
never before, the preAminary working out of all the basic questions of
future combat operations, while still in peace-time, takes on the greatest
significance" (p. 5). This thesis received Its proper development in the
article by Col Gen M. Eli, KALASHNIKOV and Col S. K. IL'IN "The Revolution
in Military Affairs and the Training of Soviet Soldiers," where special
attention is given to the conditions of personnel training. uTormerly, for
the purpose of accomplishing victory in armed combat," write the authors,
"It was possible to build up efforts for handling equipment and weapons and
for training cadres and the entire personnel gradually; during the warn
(p. 177). Now the situation is different. It presupposes transferring the
center of gravity of all per Ci. training efforts to peacetime. This is
undoubtedly related also to ideological training. "During peacetime the
moral strength of the troops must be raised to unprecedented heights by the
entire system of party-political work" (p. 177). With the beginning of
rapidly developing military operations there will be little time for system-
atic and thorough propaganda writ For this reason each soldier must be
morally ready for battle at any moment. And; what is especially tmportant;
he must fully understand the savage aspect of imperialism and know about its
plans and activities; and about Its criminal antipopular crimes.
The growth in the propertion of a country's military efforts in peace-
time bears the. character of a specific law of nuclear war. The effect of
this law-applies to all the branches in the military organization. It is
a pity that certain elements of the' effect of this Taw have not been fully
explained in this collectioa. in particular; on pages 46-47, where charac-
teristics of economic; moral-political and military potentials are given,
the specific character of their appearance in nuclear war; connected with
the effect of the above-mentioned law., is not revealed.
In the book much attention is given to problems of high combat readiness
of the Armed F6rces for an immediate strike against an aggressor who has
started a nuclear war. In a rituatian where the surprise factor and the
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;t;ed In th
antic:le by Army Gen A. A0 YE:PIM-M., troops must Matinually be in high
battle readiness. "Not days andmerthay as in the past. but hours and min-
Friutez.? or even seconds -- that is the period ef 'ff,;ime by whieh the degree of
battle readiness of troops is measured. To be always on the alert is not
easy, but it is extremely nece.ssary. And our soldiers undertstand this very
well -- from the private up to a h:!gh military commander.(p.
In this connection the book throws 11..Erliis on questions of the role of
the individual in war and. the organization oT troop control.
The question of sharply increasing the ind.ivid.ual responsibility of
each soldier for the work ass*aed, to him Ls raise?n various aspects and
In several articles. In an era of new weaponry the least lack of diec:F.pliee
or disorganization of even one man can lead to fatal results for tens and
hundreds of thousands of his comrades :in arms? No matter how complex and
powerful equipment macy be, the fate of a 'battle and, a ei4ar is decided by
"people who are masters of this equipment? strong in split and body., im-
measurably dedicated to the ideas of communism; and ready for any conibat
task, in spite of mortal. danger" (p.
The revolution in military affairs corresponds to deep changes even in
the development of our society, which is now rising to a qualitatively new
stage in the building of communism. One o.0 the most important featnrea of
these changes is the further widening of the front in the struggle for the
utmost;, comprehensive development of the human personality. The party re-
quires from us a more decisive struggle in order that not only "the masses"
but each individual be in the center of our attention. The Soviet government
is giving the individual more and more bleasings. The process of training,
education and guidance of each indtvidual for the time 'being still lags be-
hind the requirements set by the party and our entire society. So it is
even in the army. "Not the masses, not the personnel as a whole? but the
individual with his first name and surname," it says in, the book., "with all
his attending merits and deficiencies, with the peculiarities in the con-
stitution of his mind and his character -- that is the main thing in educa-
tion, the deciding link in the chain of work for any eaucator, be he comman-
der of a chast? or commander of a section., a party leacier or a Komsomol.
activist" (p. 17).
The requirements stress the urgent necessity for wide adoption in the
army of specific social research that involves the study of general social,
specific and concrete factors influencing the molding and education of an
individual up to his entry into the army and while in the army. It is about
time to create an institute or a scientific center -- laboratories for milltary-social research at least on public principles, on the basis of the
existing academies, sehools:, staffs and political organs.
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ApprovelliferaRafg 21939?M9-9dRAPIPP5ANNErgiggrli/'
eotbat and One-Man
authority" is very interesting. The dynamism keenness and fast-moving
quality introduced into military operations on any scale by rocket-nuclear
and any other type of the newest equipment immeauurably increases the re-
sponsibility of a one-man commander and increases the difficulty cf the
tasks entrusted to him. The author is right when he indicates the necessity
of allowing a one-man commander more independence and, initiative and of im-
planting in him a aense of daring responaibilitym and readiness to take p
risk-
In addition, one should net eampletely discard the opinion that in
eertain spheres of military Command there should be instancea of joint
forms of leadership" In realitym under. modern conditions the amount of
time at the commander's disposal has been ahortened and the flow of infor-
mation has grown. For this reason it becomes difficult for a one-man
commander to show the necessary apeedm efficiencym initiative and daring
without an all-around analysis of information" It turns out that the
commander's dependence on the staff gecqp working on the eollection and
analysis of essential date has grown. This reeults in, the necessity of
deciding questions in seeruhing for new, more flexible forms for a com-
mander's support by the staff group.
Unfortunately, thers ere some unclear formulations in the book. For
example, on page 49 there is some overlapping in the concepts of "types"
(tipov),vTorms"(vidov) and "ca' res" kkategoriy) of wars" It is known
that war may be considered as a twe-sided struggle and may be designated as
follow: "War between a socialist and a eapitali6t government," "imperial-
ist war on both sidea0" "civil war" and. so on. In this instance we are
dealing with the concept of "type" of 'war, which reflects its social-politi-
cal characteristics" War may also be evaluated as aetion of one of the
warring sides. In that case we would have to use the term "form" of the
war. This; according to the character of the struggle waged by one side,
the following forms are distinguished; 'war In defense of the socialist .
fatherland," "national liberation war," 'colonial war" and so on.
The word "category" applied. to war defines the ware according to their
scale, in which the social-political eontent should be apecifieally stipula-
ted. Thus, a local war can have to moat varied charaeterm 'beeiag imperialis-
tic only on one side (but on the other, of course, it is liberational!).
The most varied governments, including sceallet governments (for example
the Korean People's Democratic; Republic: 1950-1)53), can partietpate in a
local war. It seems to us that in using the words "type's "form", and
"category" applied to war it is essential to give more preelse definition,
One can scarcely agree with the statement wLich ignores the political
factor, 1. e.? that "the new means of armed combat define the decisive Ob-
jectives of a war" (p. 80). The degree of decisiveness of Objectives in a
p kivacnitikbiasliainftszatiAtcalRo MIT GOIMR012600 ONO (*Won ?
6
fity-OiRe(16Vtgrabh-idIDATOtki,IgittRYOM1/450bb01114trelopment of
mIlita PA-i.ue" hat q s?ea n? g warring country has ever profited by a
prolonged war" (p. 131) in alno incorrect. It all depend.? on the specific
condition/3. K1YTUZ0V in 1812, for example, depended mainly on a prolonged
war.
On the whole, the publication of the collection of articles" Frobleni
revolyinii v voyennom dele (Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs)
is useful for the masa reader: it will help him to become acquainted with
the easence of the revolution in military affairs and with the range of
problems resulting from it.
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