SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL' ', NO 9, 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 2, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
RTwnYrcr 952 2 IYIarcYi 19oE
S~;LI~C`I~D T1~1~,SL~'~TIONS F'ROP~I
~tV01 L,I`,Tf iIYA ~IYSL ? "y NO 9~ 1.yE~'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E Street, N. W.
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 Approved For F,~Q~// ~I~~J~o~P oY~NNAYA MYs0300090009-7
Zssue No 9, September 1965
Page
Joint Operations of the Navy and Ground
Troops in Modern Warfare, by Vice-Adm Vo
Yakovlev
The Theory of the Escalation of War, by Capt
lst Rank A. Kvitnitskiy and Capt (Res)
Yu. Nepodayev (Based on foreign press materials)
l~.
Notes on Source
Voyernaya N~rsl' (Mil'itsry Thought) is a manthlj~ organ of the USSR
Mi~:istry of Defense, prinked by the ministry's Military Publie,hir~g
House, Moscow. The selected translations, below, are from Iseue No 9,
September 1965, which was signed for the press 18 August 1965.
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 Approved Fo'~e~'2~0~$1~9.~-~I~~D~~~5F~~88~p0~9~$~~
waRrA.~:c
CPYRGHT
In the last few years the military press has illuminated problems
of the strategic use of .naval forces in modern warfare in the battle
against the enemy naval strike forces Ln his bases and in remote ocean
and sea regions. There have been many articles, especially in she
foreign press, devoted to the most difficult problems of combating 8-
tomic missle submarines at sea. The great attention to these problems
and the definite interest on the part of the x~eaders is ~juatifiable,
since in one way or another they ?reflect the main substance of naval
actions in wartime.
Moreover the questions of ,joint naval and ground force operations
in coastal areas under conditions of nuclear warfare and in limited
wars have, in our opinion, not yet beefs eluc 3dated in the necessary
manner. At times one encounters statements that such operations have
lost their former meaning because the gra~ind troops with their high
maneuverability and nuclear rockets do not require the support ~f na-
val forces. In ttie boolc ~emaya Strate i a Military Strategy) it
is stated that the navy cannot be attached t o ground theaters of opera-
tion since under present?day conditions it iLs chiefly called upon to
fight on the high seas, frequently far removed from the ground theaters
of military operations.
This statement, correct in principle, does not Rt all mean that
the problems of naval suppox~t to the ground troops in coastal areas
should not be given serious .?on~sideration. It is pointed out on page
~+OQ of the same book that "although the task of support to ground
troops will not be one of the chief miss?Lons of the navy, its execution
demends considerable efforts."
In connection with this we would like to paint out on the basis
of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, and also considering the
level of preparation of the navy? its equfpment status and the views of
foreign specialists on the use of naval forces. tPie meaning and nature
of joint naval and ground operations in modern warfare.
During, ?che years of the Great Patriotic War, thf outcome of which
was decided on the ground fronts in Europe, the Soviet Navy directed its
main efforts toward active support from the sea of the ground troops, at
first in defensive and then in offensive operations in the coastal ~~reas.
Many examples can be cited of we~.lmorganized and sk!_llfully conducted
joint combat operations of ground and naval forceF,, which had an excep?
tionally great significance in the course of camp~,aigns and the war as a
whole.
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 ~-'p~?vl~?b~rtF~tleR~ 84?+Q~iFO~I~ 1~lre~-~~~~~~~~3~~~~Qr~oopi~
defending Odessa, Sevastopol' and 'the North Caucasu8, the Baltic fleet ???
the troops defending the Moonzund Islands, Hanko Peninsula and Leningrad,
and the Northern Fleet ~-?- the troops on the Pybachiy Peninsula. Without
such support it woreld have been impoF~sitile to have had such a long, stub???
born heroic defense of these and other cities and areas, which checked the
onslaught and tied down for a long time huge numbers of Ger~mmn troops oper-
ating in the coastal arE~as.
IJith the move of the central fronts to t:~e offensive, joint amphibious
operations in the areas of No?vorossiysk, on t~ Kerchenskiy Peninsula, and
in the Baltic and Barent~+ Sea permitted us in a comparatively short time
to crack the reinforced defense of the rascist lea?man troops in ?the coastal
areas and to mount a decisive offensive there ale o
Tn the course of the war the Soviet Navy, actively supporting the
defensive and offensive operations of the ground forces in the coastal
areas, reliably secured their strategic flank-~ from enemy navla striKesa
Chiefly for this reason the Nit'ierite naval forces were not able even
once during the war to attack our coast from the sea, even though they had
a large number of special landing ships, surface gun boats and a consider-
able quantity of planes.
Yt must b~ said that many statements from the experience of the organ-
ization and execution of point naval and ground force operations condus:tc:d
during the Great Patriotic War' preserve a practical value even now. In our
opinion they are fully applicable in tie combat and operational training of
the coastal military district troops and naval farces.
The point ground and naval combat operations in modern warfare have
in their goals missions and scale a tactical, operational and even a stra~
tegic nature.
The article examines ?tl-~e joint operations of naval and ground farces
which have chiefly an operational nature, ieeo such operations subordinated
to the achievement of operational goals of unions of these types of armed
forces conducting the war in the coastal areas of the ground fronts.
Questions on the ,joint oiler?ations of the navy and ground troops now
occupy one of the important places i n the military training of the armed
forces of the LISA and other NATO co~xntries. Military leadership in the
~ devotes mach attention to this.
According to the foreign press many exercises of the last few years
have regularly worked problems of the support by carrier strike commands
of the LYS and England to ground troops in coastal areas s.fter a redevelop-
ment of these commands following an exec+ition of missions by them in a ao-
called "all-out nuclear attar_ko" Much attention is given along with thiB
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 A ~r~c~r IeO0~'1~?~~A-F~~t.&5~~~h6c7AQ~9~~Qd~c~
ar y n different theater's with partfcipati.on by units and commands
of marines, landing force, and equi~~ment, aviation and combat ships
American naval epeci~.lists consider thhat combat operations
f
o
landi:~g .forces during sea mo?u?ement and in the landing phase must be sup???
ported by naval strike force~-, and above all by car~rier~ strike commandso
Speaking befur~e officer~~ of. the Na~;r and Marine Corps, YJS Secretary
of the Navy N'itze briefly laid otYt thc; sequence of a typical, in his
opinion, operation of the 19'70 ?s~ "After a~~~?iation of the carrier com?-?
mends Yeas lowered the combat potential of the 'enemy air forces to an ac?~
ceptable level, moderni~;ed landing fc~r~ces are landed to sei.~e the areas
of interest." Speaking on the most immediate aspects of tr~,~ining for
troop landings, Nitze pointed out that in ttge ear~1~+? '197Or~ the ~ Navy
will be capable of moving and Yanding the ecb:elons of an entire divi,~ion
and a Marine air wing onto enem~r~ territory, delivering them to the
landing area with a speed of 20 knots? ~Ct is envisaged ?that by lg7y
these fig'ur'es will have doubled,
It is considered that the YES na?~ral for:e-~ will have to carry out
different missions in the most ?rraried re$~ions of the earth ? CommandPx~?-
in-Ohief of Amphibious Force~? of the ~ At:imntic Fleet '~'ice?~?Admiral
J. Me~ain, in the artic'Le "Naval i:Daneling Operations fn the 1Vext Decade,"
says that amphibious landings ar'e now and will remain in the fut;~a?e one
of the basic forms of combat activity of the Navy, and that the readiness
for the~.r conduct will as befure have for the i~ Navy a vitally impor?~
tent sig.~ific~nce.
Thus i.n devoting great attention to the t?rainirg of navy and
marine forces for landing operations, the American military leadership
is gofng on the basic strategic concept expressed by the words of
Admiral Ricketts ~rhich have a frankly aggressive natures "We mlr.~t
have such naval forces as will allow u~ to carry the figh~c ~~ both
at sea and on the ground ~?~ to the enemy?s territorN?a"
An ac clue partner of the YIDS in NATO, West ~:ermany is also pushing
for the landing gaining of troops. The hest p?erman goverrunent plans
to purchase in the SSA 300 helicopter's to be~ used above all for the rapid
transfer of ground units and landing elements. One of thet missions of the
West Berman Navy is considered to be tb.E landing of amphibious forces.
All military conflicts in the last l~ years in which the Y~'A has
been the aggr~saor have lbcen charcter~ized by a thrust from the yea by
American ground trcop~e and marines in the capacity of amphibious landing
forces for crushing national l;.bera~ufon and revolutionary movements in
countries which have taken an independent path of development.
pprove or a ease -
cont?d)
 Ap~r~gv~YE~r~~,12~~(~/~Q8/~~ ; CIA-R~DP8i5T~08~5R000300090009-7
, r cx+~mp ey n ~.ep ember 1950 in Korey,
when tt'ie rU"~a Na?vy~ landed a m~;~or amphibious fo~~ce of ~~5,000 men. T'he
landing was supported by 300 ships of'vr?arious classen and more than 800
planes . Tn duly 1958 the American Nav;y~ landed 5, 000 marines in tlhr~ port
of Deir~ut to put down a Yiberation movement in Debanon. During the
O'ari.bbean crisis in October~WNovember Y96~ ~the~ same kind of YVg amphibious
landing force was in tihe waters of the v"aribbesn in readine~+s to land
on she coast of free O~sba. Tn tie course of an aggx?essi?ve colonial
war again~wt the people of ~ou?th V'iet~iam, who arc struggling far free=
dom and independence, the i~ Seventh Fleet in l~iar~ch '196'5 landed 3,'S00i
mt~rines in SoY:.th 'Vietnam, and carrier avaition together with Asir Force
units continues the piratical raids on the populated points in the Uemow
cratic ftepuhlic of 'Vietnam.
Great changes in the chars-cter and depth of ~oin?t naval and ground
operationss in coastal areas were introduced with the rearment of na~ral
ships and aircraft with nuclear mirssiles capable of destro~~ing at long
range not only sea, but also ground targets, and also the enuipping of
ground troops with rockets of vac ing type? and with cauickmmoving
motorized means.
As is ]mown, naval support of ground troops in the past was con?~
ducted with the ai.m of facilitating the movement of units and soyedininLL?
ayes along the coast, or of defending them inparticular against landings
or strikes by enemy surface vesffiels from the sea. Tn operatior.~s s~-~
porting ground troops from the sea the most important ns,vy missions were
the landing of tactical and operational forces, fire support of units
and aoyedine~~fyee with ahips? gunsp destruction of the enemy nava'1 forces
asrxppor~ting hi~a troops, interdiction of sea lines of comtaunication aup?~
plying the enemy troops operating on the coast, and also the defense
of sea communications supplying the friendly ground troops.
Tt seems to us that in a nuclear war the prir~c,iple formes of cone
3ucting,~joint naval ground troops operations are preserved. however
the rate and depth of such operations is increased considerably;, and
the missions executed by the navy take on another content.
d'oint navy and ground forces operat~ians in modern warfare find no
less broad an application than in earlier wars in offensive and defenm
sive operations of the troops of a front in coastal areas. They can be
of the nature of daily combat operations or of differing ope~?ations, for
example the destruction of enemy naval forces opposing the friendly
ground troops on the o~oaat9 providing amphfbious landings on t?he coast,
and on islandsy repulsing landingag destruction of enemy ground elements
which have been surrounded and forced to the sea; securing the sea move
menns of troops and cargo to friendly forces operating on the coast;
disruption and destruction of enemy sea shipments.
PYRGHT
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 Ap~~~,c~~~~`~~~ ~~/9i~'Crl~4'~~8g~Ok~~~t0~t1i~0?flA9A~ ~7ong
orces an ong range mean,a of destr.~uction (rockets and air'cr'aft),
naval operattiona in support of coastal ground troops encompass not on]_y
the coastal gone of the sea, but also apr'ead to its ai~rtant r~egionso
Let, us examine in thus regard the solution of a
roblem i
i
p
n po
nt
operations such as the destruction of the naval forces of one aide which
are opposing from the sea the ground troops of the otheTM' combatant
During the Second Wox'ld War ground tr'oope operating along a coaa?t
were sub3ect to gunfire from su.*~face ships from distances of 30-35
kilometers and bombing by carrier and shor'e~~-based aviation free distances
of two to three hundred kilometer's. Tn this regard naval support of
ground troops by the destruction of enemy ships bombarding the shore
with guns or bombing it with carrier afrcraft were in the nature of
shore operations of surface toY'pedo~gun boats, cutters, occasionally
submarines, and also mine~vtorpedo and bomber' aircr~af'ta
Under pregenta~day conditions ground troop$ can be struck from the
sea by long~r'ange missiles from surface ships, and in a n~unber~ of insa
tances even from submarines "Polaris" ,= type missiles), from considers
able distances "m 2000 kilometers and more. r."'arrier aircraft in support
of ground troops can oprr~ate from ditstance:s of up to 2500 kilometers .
The presence in th.e navy of atomic submarines a.nd naval r.~ccket and anti?y
submarine aircraft armed with long.=range rockets and improved means of
search, detection and destruction of the unfriendly missile submarines
allows us to destroy the naval strike forceas of the hostile aide in
remote regions of ?the seas and oceans beyond the range of their weapor_a
(missiles and cax^rfermbaaed aircraft) whic~4 could be used against the
ground troops ashore.
Missile and gun surface s.+~ip,s, torpedo cr~;;tera and naval shore
missile installations can be s~xcceaasfully used independentl;,r and in
conjunction with gio?und troop rocket units and aviation i'or the des
truction of the enemy naval strike i'or'r.es operating rgainst ground
troops in the coastal area
Oonaeduently the depth of naval support to the offensive operations
of ground troops in a r.oastal area has fncreaa~ed tr~n~r times Tf before
it was limited by a width of the coastal area calculated fn tens of
kilometers, then now it has increa~?ed to h~u;ndreds and even thousands of
kilometers and can exceed the range of fire of enett?-y missiles and the
radius of action of his aviation.
A characterie~tic trend of modern military operations at sea is
their ever increasing connection with the battle on land. Tr~fs can then
explain the in~:reaae in the numbe;~' of amphibious lan~fing operational in
the Second World War as compared with the First. T'f in the Ffrat Tm~
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 CPYR
prdx~ a~6"tely~6~~~~~w~~~ `off t~'~8m0~~~g~~P~b~b9goa~0~0~t~9A'?fl9-7ap..
HT
Nuclear and otherr,m~ana of mans destruction, if examined in a mili-
tary-scientific perapecti.ve, do not lower the actuality of amphibious
landing operations on coasts and. islands as ~. more active form of ,joint
naval and ground forces operations and of ~aniona of other' types of ar;~ed
forces e
The landing of amphibious tactical and operational elements on a
shore, on a flank and in the rear of a defender in order to support the
movement of attacking ground troops will also find broad application in
nuclear warfare. The uce of amphibious landing fox?ces to seize fortified
islands having an operational, and at times a strategic significance will
in a number of cases be the only means of possessing them
A distinguishing feature of modern amphibious landings care the high
rates of sea movement and landing abhors, provided in tYt navy by new high-
apeec~, landing ships and landing equipment, and also by the effective
neutralization Of the enemy antilanding defense by nuclear missile strikes
of the~navsl forces and aviation The speed of these means have doubled
in comparison with those of the Second World War This allows a shorter
time of movement and delivery of the "landing farces tc the points of
landing, and also an in~;?~eas~e in their mac~euveraoility is avoidtng the
attacks of submarines and of surface forces of the defending side during
the sea movement.
The use of special ahipa -- landing helicopter carriers and landing
ship-docks -- in sanding operations makes it possible to begin the
landing of advance detachmentta ashore from ahipa located beyond the range
of ahore~~artillery and to land th~ae detachments by helicopter and high-
speed landing craft in a short period of time. Landing helicopter car-
riers and ship-docks can take the personnel and combat equipment of the
first landing waves from an unprepared shore and land them on an unpre-
pared coast b3- helicopter and high-speed landing craft. This considerably
shortens the time for delivery and landing of the landing elements, and
also decreases the possible losses due to actions of the antilanding de-
fense forces of the energy.
In addition, accordit,.. to the views established in a number of
countries, the development .;~ ship power systems, the introduction of
new principles of engine operation, and the conatruc tion of ahipa and
landing craft, for axample in tte USA, of the hydrofoil and air cushion
types permit an incr~eaae by several times in the speed of sea movement
and support the impetus of landing the forces ashore
It is held the,t an amphibious landing will be preceded by a nuclear
blow by the attacker on the ob~ectivea of the defendero Thua, in parti-
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 PYRGHT
ppKau~at,rmneKe~.~a~r;~u~.~~~:b~~~i~ut~~?~~c~~.~.~y~orv~;h~ beginning
of a landing by amphibious elements onto ahor~e immediately after powerful
nuclear strikes are inflicted (a11~~~out nuclear offenaivc) to aei~e certain
areas and to support offenaivc operations of ground troops.
ror this purpose the American na?v~y has in fta arsenal approximately
2l~0 1ar~ge, although elowK.speed, 'landing craft of Second Wor~la War' vfntage,
which are gradually being ;;~eplaced b;y new ones with improved equipment and
rate of speed of SO knots. In addition the ~~"S Navy has six landing heli-
copter carriers, of which three 'have been r~eee~uipped from aircraft car
riers of the "Essex" type and tht~ee are of athe new "Iwo .~Nima" tyre of
special construction (two helicopter~carriera of this type are being
conatr^ucted) . Each of these ahipr~ has a water displacement of approxima~-~
tely 18000 tone, a speed of 20 knots . , and is capable of rnov'f ng and
landing by helicopter 2000 men with equipments T'he YN~N. is building
landing transport-~docka with displacement of13,g00 Mona and a speed oi'
20 knots Each of them is capable of tr~an-~porting and l+snding approxima-
tely 1000 men and up to x'000 tons of cargo on special floating craft
The basic nucleus of the landing fox~cea, in?the opinion of the Ameri-
cans, will be the ma~rinea, who will be landed in~, the f irat wa~c The
ground force units have the miss ion of widening the cgptur~c~d 'beachhead
and are landed in tte second and following wa~vea
In conducting mayor pre:sent~,day' 'landing opermtions it? is considered
that all classes of militar~;~ shi?pa and craft and a'll t;~pes of naval
weapons can be used. The views Gf the Americans are, for example, that
during the landing aircraft carriers will carry out afar defense ?taaka anal
will provide direct air~aupport and antisubmarine defense to the landing
detachments . Cruisers and destroyers have the taalcrs of ffre~ suppox t
for the landing and antisubmarine and air clefenae. :~ubmarinea may 'land
reconnaissance elements ashore and participate in the fight agaia~nt enemy
submarines. Minesweepers fulfill the misaian of clearing t':le: 'beach ap~
proachea of mines . tipec ial material=technical suppl;y~? r~hii,s and craft
under these conditions a"llow the landing forces 'to operate f'or long
periods without rettax~ning to base.
The nature and pecuiiaritiea of conducting amphibious opera?tiona in
support of offensive grovxnd forces can bc~ seen in the experience of the
mayor exer?c ices of the Amcx~, can armed forces .
The landing of the fix?at wave is to be acc~~mpliahed by helicopters
from the landing helicopter carriers and also "by amph%bior~ landing craft
from cargo transports, troop transports and special landing ship~Ldocks.
After the cargo transports, troop transports and special landing ship-
docks. After the first wave is landed the large tahk 'landing craft apm
proach the shire and discharge heavy combat materiel and equipment. Sn
order to exclude the posaibi'lity of large 'losses of landipg forces from
pprove or a ease
~ ~COnt'd)
 nYxcr?~6e~~prih~~A2s~A4~~A~~~nie~~~~i~L~Ti~x~R1 ~7"Ot~fOc~ain O~Ii~ee
HTE?orcea moat 'be widely dispersed and ;tile coavtal vectors designated for
landing spots muvt be widely ve~parated one from the other
Recently, according to forefgn press reports, the intensity o:~
training iu landing operationv in the Y}~ Navyy has noticeably increased
Severa'1 mayor amphibious landing exer~cives have been conducted, One of
them was t'he combined exercise of the naval forc:ea of the ~YS and Spain
under t:'~e title ?V~iteel Pi.ke~l" in October 19G~+o A reinforced C7S marine
division numbering 2,000 men wav transported across the Atlantic and
landed on the southwevt coast of Spain in an area to the north of the
powt of Cadiz In addition the landing included t'hr_: participation of a
reinforced battalion of Spanish marines numbering 1800 men The exer~
clue included the ~~articipation of appr'oximately' 120 combat ships,
landing transports and craft of the b~ Military Sea Transport Service
including approximately SO Yandfng~ and tranvport ahipv, 30 combat ships,
l j rear vupply vhipa and the strike aircraft carrier "Indepenr3ence" )
and alvo 14 vhips and craft of the Spanish navy,
The struggle for vea communications will always be an i~zalienable
part of naval operations in s9.apport of gr.?ound troops of the coast fronts
The vecuring of sea ro~xtes of vupply of cargo and reinforcemet~.ty to the"
troops operating in coastal areas has been and uridrsubtedly will be one
of the important missions of the nary. On the vuccesvful accc~mplivh-~
ment of thin in a number of caves w~.ll depend the success of ground
force operationv, both offensive, acid defensive, along the coast.
T~'ie necevvity arives in ground force offenv~.ve operationv- in coavtal
areas for the navy to pro~~?ide sea, deli'very' to the landed forces of rev
inforcemerits and cargo until the moment that they:l.inls up with the
troopv of tha front.
The combat asr~urance of uninterrupted vupply to commands of the
ground troopv and other ar~mv of the armed forces situated on islands
can become one of the moat important funcitonv of the naval forces in
?joint operationv or in everyday combat operations
In the organizatdon and conduct of ground force defenvive operationv
in coa3tal areas the onerationa of the naval forces in securing sea shier
ments of reinfor~ementy and cargo will find a ~rcad application when only
vea routes of commL~nication can be us3~ed because of the geographic and
operational conditionv of the aituation-
During the yearv of the Great Patriotic War the operations of our
Navy in securing mea shipments of reinforcements ana supply cargoes to
the troopv defending Odessa and Sc~rastopol' on ?the Black Sea, the Oran
iCnba~~a beachhee,d and the ivlands~ in the Gulf of Finland, the Kybachiy
Peninvula in the Barents Sea and many others, had a decivive effect on
the sJ~c~l~~v~~l ~~' F~eY~a~2~}AA/(~'/d~~~1~~~5T00875R000300090009-7
8 (cont'dl
 It is also known how important a ro3.e was plr~yrd b the I,ado a ?i~. tary
PYRG T ~'~'~~ ~6rA~@Y~AbA~0~9t1~L9~ :~c?k/~~Qf~&ST~~;O(~~~8~e9~~artroea
e Road of Life ) t~o blockaded Leningrad and the for~cea of the L~enin~?~
grad front
The combat opcr.~atione; of naval for~cea in aecur~ing aea ahipmer-ta of
troops and cargoes can in a number of indtancea become entirr. op~tratione
in which, in addition to naval a~1i,p~a and aircraft, there will be parti~~
cipation by soyedinendyea and 'iYriits of the air defense of thr. country,
rocket tr~oopa and front aviation.
The air defense of convaya af. transports during aea movement is one
of the important forma of cor.;nat security of aea shipments o.f troops and
cargpea demanding the ,joint efforts of the navy and the front The aye-~
tematic operatfona of naval. forces in disrupting or deatr~oying ~nea ship-~
menta supplying the opposing enemy coastal command have a clir~ect influ??~
once on the atabflity of thin command and will facilitate a successful
troop of offensive in the coastal ar~eaa
Coordinated operatfona f'oi the encirclement and deatr~uction of a
hostile enemy command forced to the aea can have an im'por'tant place i?i
,joint naval and ground force operations in coastal areas They nava'L
forces in thin case tray be faced with the teaks of a aea blockade of the
forces surrounded on land, the prohibition of the delivery of r~efnfor~ce~~
menta and auppliea, and also the destruction of combat ships and trana~~
ports in an attempt at evacuation by aea The use in these operations
of ships and naval aircraft armed with rockets with nuclear and conven~?
tional warheads will afford the possibility of inflicting f'r~orl long
ranges and with high accuracy powerful destructive blown on the Aorta
and assembly points of the enemy troops and of fbrmationa oi' transport
and combat ships of the enc-my at. aea.
A classic example of euc'h operations from the history of the G'~reat
Patriotic War fa tl~~c ,joint operation of troop~~ of the Foua^th 'Ukrainian
Front, the Tndepends~nt C'oasta'l A.tr~y and the Black Sea FYcct in liquid-~
sting a major command of Fascist C~az?rnran troops text. off in ttze Grimca
during the period 3 through '13 May 'Lq~+4. ^''hankW to a skillfully organ~?~
ized and aucceaafu'lly executed coordinated ac?tior; of our' naval and
ground forces in this operation, tb~ Faacia~: ~serman command did not auc~=~
ceed in the planned evac~.tation of its troops from Sevastopol ~ ~ The Ger~~
man 17th Artt~y lost mo.e than 100000 dead and capt:ar~-.d and did not euc~~
ceed in arriving at thc~ :faasko~KiaYrine?+r areas Moi eover all the enemy
equipment was left in the ~;'rimea,
Combat operatfona of aubtnarine~;, ~ n.~ped.o cutters and aircraft of the
Black Sea Fleet in destroying at aea the en~.my means of transport of
troops and auppliea disrupted the sea del'ivrr'y of enemy reinforcementas
This supported the success of our ground forces in the rou~c of the
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9 ~'cont~d)
 Faec i9~p~r8ro~d ~~pnRre~e~-s~.~~00:Q10$d~fl9~rrC1?l/~-nR~P+$rSaTflf~r8~t5F~~Q~04~Ot9n7
CPY GF~`~ course oi' its evar,t,rmt,tnn.
Whtle eupport,ing the prcnznd troops 1r7 ~?naetal ar~ee, the navy could
rer,eive the mteaion of dt.ruption oC dcetrurtion nC ehi.pmente of rein~?
forcemente and e~,r~pli~a to ti^,~ forc~a nl' the opposing er~erny command.
With a poorly developed r~aiLroed and h1.p,C~we~+ network ashore where
the enemy forcre are op~;?at,ing, the un~ cif' a~a rotixtee of r.ommunication
!'or the ehipm~nt of r~inforr.emenLa, timrn,~nttiorc and proviatonn ecnutree
n~i crccptionaLly important atgnff'tcarrc~ ~'h~te afNnfficanc~ ie incr~aaeci
and becomes d~ctetv~ in the fnetanr.^ wh~rn the trannf~t of troop sup-
plire to the front lime b,~ ylr ~,kr~i.i.coTitera ox fixed wisp, eirr.raft) for
eny parttcular r~aeone to hl.ndered, quite i.imit~d nr ~nt1,r~ty precludrd
According to fipuree in the Am~r?ican press, the r~nutrern~nt to eup-~
plies for one infantryman comprtees an avr_rage of not, lea than 1 2
fond per month, C'onaequently, for thc~ supply of ono rc~l.nfnrc~~d diviafon
numbering 25,000 mop, it would rr,ra~,cf.rr_ ~ monthly sea dcl.ivrry o.f not lees
them 30,00 tone of various cargnca , A dccrrnee ,.n the rruentity cal' mill-?
tary cargo delivered by acs and a lowering oC this norm could sharply
lower the combat capability of units end aovedineniyee of the ground
forces. Sea shipments of tronpa and cargoes preserve their urgency also
berauae military equipment of larger aizc~a cnn be deliverrxi to the troops
in this way. This cannot be arhiev~~d by air shipment
Under these conditions ti:e active combat of naval forces supporting
ground troops with an aim of disrupting or destroying hostile sea ahip~-
ments acquires great meaning. Atomic missile eubrnarines and naval
rocket-?caz?r~ying aircraft are capable of inflicting powerful nuclear mia?~
ails blows on the ports and trnnaport deliver~;~ and pick~?up points. EnE-
my con~oye and single transports eroeaing the sea can be eub~ectad to
strikes of missile and torpedo s ubmarinea, naval rockPt:-carrying and
long range aircraft, and also surface missile ships, anti on the approa-
chew to delizery ports can in addition be subjected to etrikea by rocket
and torpedo cutters and shore missile installations wC~ich are mobile
It is known form the experience of the Great Fatriotic War that
thanks to the active operations of the submarines, aircraft and torpedo
cutters of the Northern Fleet against ttze German sea routes of communi-
cntion along the north coast of Norway n great number of hostile trana-
porta with troops and cargoes making deliveries of reinforce_menta to the
front lines were sunk Having en~ountereci the stiff dQPenae of our
tzoopa and not being in receipt~of the necessary reinforcements by sea,
the Faaciat Grerman troops could not conduct active offEnsive operations
in the Werth and were themselves forced to ro over to a protracted de-
fense of almost the very same p~r!.tiona from which they had begun the
war
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gcont'd)
 CPYRGHTI
? vperatlone to r'crpule~ amphibious laniitngn ?~?-? mtl?.anc:inp; oper'atforla
-- acquire a especial ur~poncy a'Long with arnphtbiou~n 1e.ndinge in the
sphere oP ,point naval and ground f'or'ce operationv?
During the Sr_cond World War', in spite oi' the pi?c~at poeeibilttiev of
one eidn to organize a cieci.ol.ve r~et+ivt;ance and to take rneaoureo to dev~~~
troy a landing attempt by tlir, other vide, there was not one irr,atanre
where a strategic arnphibi.ouv landing was df.r~xpteci and onl;y~ two invtancev
where ,Tapanee~~ landi.nge~ wer'c~ foiled ?-~- on Midway and in Port Mo:~~vby
(l~ew Quinea) The aucceov of all the etrat~~ic landings waa explained
not bx a weakner~v in the means of combating the landings, but by the
generally .favorable military?}~olLtical ~dit~wa,tion for they irivader~v?
Thus it wav in t"re Iti'or~way of+c.~ration conducted by the ~;:~er~mane, during?
the .','apaneve landings on ielandv in the Pacific,., and in the course of
Anglo-American landings in hfox'~lh Africa, Ital;~, Normandy and other arena.
Av wav shown by the Second World War', antilanding operations were
a more complex form of mi.litar'y oper'atfonv. "~"'rie vpccial difficu?,ty in
organizing an antilanding ope.rat;lon aro~ee l;ecauae ?r~econnaiaance d~,sa
on the intentions and actions of the nervy making the landing waa de~?~
layed. The diff'icv~ltie~a in t'hs~ timely diaco~re:~y' of the: intentfona a-?
bout the landing operation forced the defender's t.o ciepl.oy their forcer.
in variouo formations on a broad front, while the attacking rside con~??
centrated overwhelming naval and air forc:ev on a relatively narrow vec~n
for of the front and there a?~xccenafuil;y' overcame the antilanding defenaeo
Under prevent conditions with technical. means of reconnaiaaance
and long range detection of a landing at sea,, highly maneuverable nigh-
epeed striking forces of the navy and air force, and alvo missiles with
nuclear and con?F?entional war'headv, there ar'e opportunitiea~ to detect
the enemy i.n a timely manner and by the point efforts of tti.e navy and
commando of other arme~ of the a'r'med forces 'to bz~eak up his landing at
sea, far from the apirroach to the l.ariding area.
The chief conditiono for tr.e suucea~aful c:ond~uct of antilanding
operations are well organized and conotant r~eccnnaisvance and observa~
tion in the naval thcatesr, which perm:ty t'he ;,timely detection of p;:e--~
parationa for the landing e-nd tl'ie deployment; of forces foie it~e repulse,
and also a high state of readine?av of naval forces in cooperation with
av2dtion, ground tt~oops and combinationv of other ar?ma of the a2"med
forces for the ro~^t of t'he Landing attempt at sea ~i~here will be great
significance in a percisely organized and centrally located control of
the forces in the operation, which assures the timel;~~ and successful
direction of vt~ike commands of t?he naval forces atomic au'bmar~inea,
aircraft and surface misvile ships) and tl:e inflfction of coordinated
powerful blows againot the landing detachment`s of the enem,~ at see
The succevv of ,join?t operati.onv brj? the: navy, ground ~tr~oopa and
_,. _
pprove or a ease
I1
 otheA~i'~9v~ ~bt ~~s~~~eia-~,ra~~~.1~~~~5~,7~~R~-~A~~~l4~i.~3a
landin a will to a great degree depend on the welt organised and rracti~-
cally prepared coordination of aYl farces taking part in the operationa~
C PY HT
qn antil.anding operation can begin with nuclear missile strikes from
submarines, naval aviation and in some instances strategic missiles a.-
gainat por~ta and points of troop embarkation and loading of rni'litar~y
equipetent onto landing ships, as eat;ablished by x~econnaiasance. `The con-?
voy and combat formations of the landing deta~chtnents dtia,r~ing their movement
at secs can be kept under the continual in'lftuence of faster atomic subl-
marinea and aurf'ace ships armed witi`i missiles and long-.range homing tor~-
pedoea with conventional and nt~.cleai~ war~he~adsy and also of carrier-~ and
shor~e?-based aviation. Using nuc::lear~ warheads of high gain it ie possible
to inflict great losses on the landing detachments.
In cane a portion of the landing eFiipa b?reaki~ through to the landing
area, its final destruction will be a~comxlidhed by surface ahipa and
naval ahore?-based missile installations, misse~ile and artillery firepower
of the ground troops, front aviation and combittatiun~i of the Oru;he~r ax~ma
of the armed forces.
The z^eadineas of forces and means for antimissile and antiaircraft
(including also antihelicopter) defense of the coastal x^egiona, and also
the defense of the ground forces and naval farces defending the coast
against weapons of tnaaa deatr~uction taken on ari exceptionally important
meaning.
The joint operations of naval f orcea with the ground tr~oopa, con
~lpcted according to a unified plan, directed toward the achievement of
a common operational or atrategic goal, united b~r? a common idea and mu?~
tually agreed upon for time, place and strike ob~jectivea, are the highest
form of coordinated actionrr of aovedinenivea and combinations of vai?iotaa
arms of the armed. forces.
Further improvement and development of tike details of the methods
of ,joint operations of t~.val and ground forces will raise even higher
he level of combat readineaa of our armed fOrCeao
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CRYRGHT
1. Voyennaya etra_ tee, edited by Mareu V.D., Voyenizdat, 1g63, p. 370
2. Arm3i-NaW-Air Force Journal end RPgieter, January 18, 1964.
3? U. S.,..Nave~l Institute Proceedings, January, 1963, p. lOs-111.
~._._..-
4. ~~ p? 36.
5. Die Welt, August 28, 1964.
6. Navy Times, October 31, November 11, 18, 1964.
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 Approved For Res~.b9/0~1 w ~;+ C~~~;~T~By~q~t000300090009-7
CPYRGHT by Capt. 1st Rank A. Kvi.itni'cski.,y a.nd Capt. ~R~'sa y,'+~.~ l~cpr~dayev
'~ece>zt eve;rnts sktow tkaat ?America,rn ra~.l,i.nt~ c?;k.rcl,es are expa;~d.,~,ng ?t?uy~.e f,:~c~t~:
r.,f m3.l.it~.ry px~eparatic+ns a.~ad a:re kzEat;'!.xag up *,kae i;atA~a,Lic~?~.al. s~,.t;.u:~.?r~.~:ra ?~;a
wkai.~?e kaFa.~. America.~n imp`rialiam ~~~~,rn~n.n~: recn~.cil..e :~.?tsel.f tQ:, t,kae anew dis~
tri.brxtl,aA of farces ir~a the would are~aa.9 T~ri.~;h a, weakexai.;cg of :~.ts~ s~?~rat~~i,i,!:
pasiti.ons aa~.d a decisi'v'e strengtkaeni:~;g o.f ~t;;;ae~ y~ositioKas rrf t~,a~ r.~~;~:;~r~t;r~Les
o:f the sr.~ci.alist commu~,i.i;y of a~at;f.cros.
US military thought is strer,xrir;~sly seeka.azg ways azad met?k.~~rds c:+f s~truy!g~??
g1e wit.'a t;lhe peaceful, system of sorial:k.sm. 'd'L~i.s kLa.r; res~~a.l.ted Y.~cz ?tkxe appea.Y?..,
a;~ce i~a the US of a great; number c?f varir~~yc; mi~;+,it,ar^~r t;?~~~,eor~.es ~tl crlnr.;epts.
Considering it; useless to give a critfcal. anal.ys~',s of eac?~.~ of tkiem,,
we will dwell only on those concepts ~a;f modern m:i.li.t;ary strategy whic~r~, a?re
current; in the tTS at the present tl.me and wkric:;~~, are maaxifested in some de?a
gree in coabcret.e actions of the pol..t~.caL and mil.i~,ard+? l,ea.ders:aip of t:kac tTS~
T'~.e :~i.glaest poiitycal categorYy wh,3.c'~.,i isa A:Lac~ US def,e:rmi~:es ?tkP.e mil.j~m
tart' st:~?ategic line of 'the L1S mil:~.ta,ry c~omr.7a;,zd is the so~-wal'l'ed :national
strate~r~ Its basis i.s the striviz~.g rf US mol~c~poy.l.st;ic; ca.pl.tal to ackai.eve
world domination and destroy the wc.rld system of soc3.a.l.ism. Therefore, c:f
course., this strategy in its essence is not a~ati~a~ts.T,,. I~~? ~,s an expressir~n
of ~,ri.e aggressl.ve aims of Americanz l.cnperialism amcl Baas not,~?.in,; ix~. N~ammc;~: ?~~*i.t:;~
wit, the goal's and tasks of the American natir_,:~~
tT,S ~.a+,ional stratagyo in the form in wh:i.ro~: it appears a?t tkae pz?eseaat;
time in tl~e works of ,American military tkaeorists and spee~?zes c>f IYS pol.z-?
tical leaders, ~ is summed up in the formula of 10protrac,ted aonfl,ict . ?A .Its
maims conteaat is'active struggle9 ua~.li.m??.tea as to ~:;~me,, spLaere or mea*~{s~
with the socialist camp and the staves affiliated wit;L?~. it,, i?~ w~.ic::.~ VOarmed
action. against the ccmmunist .ystem wora.ld always be cr?nsidered along with
political., educational and organizatirraal, measux'~rs directed toward. tkie iso~-
la?tio~a and complete discrediting of t;kae enemy.0?l
According to US views, t?protrac^+,ed cox~.flict" is made up of two
closely inter-connected elements, the ?U~^ol.d war" and aot,ual. armed ~:~anflict.~
The "cold war" has already been treated i.n oo,r ~~a?a.rnal.3
The second element of LIS national strategy is actual armed c:on;fli~:t,,
or as i? is often referred to by US mi.litar,~ theoreticia:asA tae `"kLot. wars ??
In +;his field tie primary role is assigned t,o strictltiv military s?tra~?
tegya It should be emphasized. that the definitio:~ of m:f.litary stra;;egvy as
the officially accepted sum of views on the preparation for and conduct of
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 Ap#9i?~'~ ?~" ~g~?t-Rn~~~~~~t~,~~i~~t~3~~~i~7.~~1.~s~~b~,n~~cpe~~d9obsolet?e
in the, US. It is remarked that "the changed aaature of national, strategy
makes purely military si;rate~}r more impossible . In the field of national
strategy there is no cleaxly defined line between the military and polities
cal spheres of conflict. "
In other words, US military theoreticians emphasize the continuity and
organic unity of the political and military spl~Leres of conflict. This
phenomenon is called in the US the "pollticalization pf strat~~y", i.e.,
emphasizing the role of political factors in military strategy.? Eere it
may be appropriate to present the military~?philo~ophical definition o,f
military strategy which in recent years has been accepted as "classic" in
the West: "the working out for ourselves of a certain modus vivendi (in
this case, from of actions) and the persistent imposition of it on the enemy
so that any possible method of solving a problem by the enemy would b~
favorable for us and unacceptable to him."6
According to American views, this definition fairly completely re~
f:.ects the content of the new US min ttary stratege~-'the stratei3y of "flexor
iblr response,",adopted in 1961 to replace the obsolete strategy of "massd
iti?e retaliation."
$owever, when they say that the strategy of "massive nuclear retalia~
tion" is obsolete, fxom this it should no?i, be understood that it has out-
lived its time and has been consigned to the archives as unsuitable. This
strategy has, only been supplemented by the theory of "li.mited war"9 whose
creators have tried to provide grouxx3.s for aa~d justify the use of tactical
nuclear weapons on the battlefield. This theory has recr~ived official
recognition, but nobody has rejected the strategy of "massive retaliation"
or total nuclear 'war. They remain as the "highest,, most destructive ,form
of ~iuclear conflict. "7 But eve3~. the theory of "limited war" has not en-
compassed the problem as a whole. There have continued searches for such
a military strategy as would provide foY~ the waging of wars of any kind:
total nuclear, or limited, with or without the use of n+aclear weapons
Such a strategy, in Amesa3.can opinion, was that proclaimed by Kexnaedy
and confirmed by Lyndon ~Tohn,'son, of "flexible reaction," i.eo, `'a strategy
making possible the elimination of various threats to American security,
from direct attack on the territory of the US to subversive interfe ence
in the affairs of governments of any countries allied wit~g the USo'~
Consequently, the strategy of "flexible reaction" promotes still
further expansion of the sphere, of .outbreak of armed conflicts &,i'ld ran re-
sult only in increase of ir~teraational tension because of the increase
in the number ~of potential hotheads of war. The new US strategy, x~ro-
viding for "active response on all front's" in anticipation c~ probable
armed c~.ashes, is entirely a result of the aggressive national strateg~r of
the US in a general plan o.f carrying on a wide-scai.e and extensively planned
"protracted conflict" wit:r the socialist countries and tkLe peoples whd are
pprove or a ease
'S
 stru~~ F~e~el#~~~/09s?t~~-~Q~i~`r~8~x`'~~~~~~Q~~-7
formula, "protracted conflict."
'CPI~RGHT
What are the essential elements for carrying out the strategy of
"flexible resista~,~ce "? US military t,li~oreticians and leaders consider the
first such eleme,trit to be "dependable complexes of means of delivery of
nuclear weapons to the targets; the Sew'GRKI, ?Yb~~.la:aced armed forcesy de~
ployed. abroad, " the third, ''a powerful US stra~;egic reserve, " the fourtkr:,
"effec+?+ve means of transport; " and t~,he fiftkz, "an effective system of air
and anti-missile defense of the US.'?9
T!~us the strategy of 10flexible reaction" prrnrides for various methods
and principles of preparing .for and waging armed conflicts. In particular,
some of these methods are called for by the strategic concept of P?counter~
force." The essence of this concept is more clearly set fort?'s in ~tb,e works
of H. Kahn, G. S;~yder, T. Shelling, and A. Waskow; 10
Thus, in Kahn?s book, '?On 'T'hermonuclear War, Y? it is stated that the
strategic concept of "counter-force`'B envisages such a quantity of weapons
as will make. it possible: not only to strike acounter-blow in case of
attack, but also to achieve victory. "
According to this concept, "the military power of the US musf. stand
in opposition to that of the enemy, and at the same t3?me exceed z,t. "11
The creators pf the concept of ?ccounter_force, which is moss prevalent
in the US Air Force, asse'r-t that thermonuclear warfare on any scale may be
conducted by the method of "counter-force, " i . e . , without affecting a
great part of the population and social structure of the warring co?wa-
tries, 12 but directing blows only at military targets.
This concept has been further developed in the works of T. Shelling
and Ws.skow, and, in particular, of t12e staff of the Hudson Institute, a
research organiza ;ion which analyzes internati onal s.nd military problems,
the director of which is H. Kahn.
Now it may be said that the strategy of "flexible reaction" combines
the most varied methods and means of waging armed conflict, with and within
out nuclear weapons. This strategy, as follows from the statements of
American theoreticians and of the US military-political, leadership, canm
not be derived from a single concept or method of waging war. It is rather
a collection of those concepts and methods from which tk~e politician or
the strategist is to chose those most. appropriate to a given concrete situ-
ation. "The main success of our strategy," writes T. Shelling, "is the
categorical nature of threats.. He who makes a threat must not refrain from
the actions called for by the threat if the enemy has paid no attention
to it. ~ 13
A consistent, gradual increase of threats and, military efforts in
carrying out the strategy of "flexible response" should be, in the opinion
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~6
 Ap' ~~'~~'le~?~ ~~a~~esr~cT~~o?~o~Q
4~
~ ~
;
,
~et. ' s has been chore cl~arl f .t d con~-
~~
e so-called theory
"escalation, which is applied both to the h
t
o
and the cold war. As H.
Kahn says escalation is a consistent increase of 'rhe scale of threats and
military pressures in a limited. conflict under coriditir~ns where it is
not possible for the opposing side, at each given moment, to counter with
even greater pressure. In other words, escalation is ?'cornpetition in
risk to be taken by one's own side:'?Ql~~
Escalation finds application primarily in conditions of international
military-political crises and. military intervention i
n the affairs of
underdeveloped countries. Atypical example of putting this theory into
? practice is the US intervention in Vietnam. "US aggression is expanding
day by day, and taping on a dangerous character. :fit is being carried out
in accordance with the so-called theory of ?moving up the ladder,? rung
by rung, which should result in ever wider intervention in Vietnam and
Southeast Asia," stated L. Longo in a report to the point plenum of the
Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Italian Com-
muni~t Party. 15
For determination of the intensity of a crisis, there has been intro-
duced in US military-theoretical writing the co;r~cept of "degree of escala-
tion", which in each concrete case is related to the goals set up in this
crisis, on the one hand, aa`td. to the corresponding measures , to taken, on the
other. For exan.ple, in Kahn?s opinion, "the degree of escalation during a
crisis, or in the course of actual warfare, i,s determined by such factors
as: l) the nearness of genera], wa,r; 2) tkre existence of precedents; 3) the
resoluteaess or irresoluteness of t1ae sides; ~+) the existence or absence
of loss [or damage; ushcherb]; 5) the degree of use of .force already caused;
and 6) the intensity of the thz~eats. " :8:ere trae l.evel,s of t.kae development
of a crisis are arranged in the rrder of its successive aggravation on a
so-called "ladder of escalation, beginning w9.tkc E~~.sily adjustable disputes
and ending with unco;ntrollabl,e total nuclear war. At the same time it is
noted that "the detrelopment of a crisis 3oes not necessarily go t;hro~agh all
the steps."
According to Kahn's definition, the "ladder of escal.ation1? is an
arrangement for systematic study of a crisis, 10a coraven~.ent li.sti.ng of the
basic alternative courses of action among which the strategist should choose,ro
A tYPical structure of tae 1Bladder of escalation" in an arched conflict
takes the following form. 2'he whole ladder is broken into "groups of steps rr
corresponding to the basic stages of the development of the crisis. Each new
measure or action in a given group actually aaeans a rise by one "step".
Each shift from one step to another., higher one involves ny.~merous al,terna~-
tives, in their nature not going beyond the limits of these two steps. In
other words, the decision of both sides must be such that they do not pro-
voke an involuntary rise in the intensity of the conflict to the ne~:t step.
y ozmulated in th
o.f
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- 17
 A~p~ev~6r~t~tl~e~.20~@~i?fl :t~{d~8~1TQ$$~i,`~~~-~40~~tc
and tactical, according to the level on which they arise or are applied.
TIt is anted that with balancing strategic capabil3,ties on both sides, a
strategic a sealation is less probable that a tactical one. This is because
it is very difficult to prohibit military commanders on the battlefield
from using their tactical nuclear weapons. Certain theroeticians think in
general that the strategic decision cannot eliminate the danger of the
so-called spontaneous tactical escalation, bro~ight about by the twe sides
in combat simply " in the heat of b~.?ttle." ,There are enumerated seven
"steps of escalation", corresponding to the stages of aggravation of a
crisis and differences in the seriousness of a conflict already begun.
According to Kahn, they may be arranged in the fol,owing order, according
to the degree of increase in the intensity of the conflict.
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18
 PYRGHT
pprovedlFor~~I~~~i~0~~n/(~8/09 ?CIA-~,~P8~5T00875R000300090009-7
uvering. is s made up of disputes which
can easily be settled, military-diplomatic acts, and resolutions oP
parliaments or official pronouncements of heads of states about their
intentions. In this no disruption of the equilibrium is yet observed.
Actually, all this amounts to diplomatic actions and steps which,
as Kal1n says, "burn no bridges," and assume the possibility of poli-
tical maneuvering. TFie use of armed force is e~.ther completely
excluded, or else is only very Incidental, as a show of force, and
then not in t.ie first steps, belt only in the last step of this
group.
At least three steps can be distinguished in this groupe L) an
"imaginary crisis" amounting to a clearing up of the subject of
dispute; 2) unfriendly non-military acts; and 3) official declarations
of the intention of the parties making them to begin escalation in
case the other party does not yield. An example of the latter is
the resolution of the US Congress in August 196+, after ships of
the Seventh Fleet apQeared in the Gulf of Tonkin. In it, as is
known, there was asserted the determination of the President of the
U5 to take all measures, including the use of armed forces, to help
ary member of SEATO.
The last step of this group may be regarded as transitional to
a new level of escalation, i.e., to a new group of steps, combined
in the concept of the "traditional" crisis,
II. Ordinary "traditional" crisis . From a military point of
view, this group of steps of escalation, apparently, is the begin-
ning of the preparation of a theater of military operations It
is caused by a disruption of the balance by one of the sides. It
begins with a strengthening by the partier; of their posit3.o:~s. And
this is the first step of escalation at this level. Open demonstra-
tion of will and determination is considered the main stimulus here,
At this level the parties may resort to the f'pll.owing successive
measureE: 1) a show of force; 2) parteial mobilization (delay of
demobilization); 3) some elements of economic warfare (emi~argo,
peaceful blockade, etc.); 4) "anonymous" acts of violence and
"incidental" minor armed clashes (most often, border or perispheral
sea clashes).
These successive measures also constitute four steps of escalation
in the period of aggravation of international tension.
It is characteristic that carrying out each of these measures
assumes different methods and ways. For example, a show of force
can be made in two wayse directly and indirectlyo In the first
case, one side or the other shifts naval or air farcesp mobilizes
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provoca ive training and maneuvers i,n the
crisis areas openly and even with a maximum of publicity. In the
second case there are such things as tests of missiles, orciinary
maneuvers outf,ide the crisis zone, etc.
Examples of partial mobilization in crisis si~buations are the
call- ups of reservists by the President of the United States during
the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Caribbean crisis in 1962.
The last step of this group-- "anonymous" acts of violence--is
a transitional step to a new leve?~ of escalation--to a serious
crisis, if the parties do not agree to adjust the dispute by a de-
marche. This step, as Kahn puts it, is "the threshold of war," and
frc:~m a military point of view, obviously, this whole stage must be
considered a period of completion of the preparation of a theater
of military operations and the beginning of strategic or correspond-
ing operational-tactical deployment of forces, depending on the
magnitude of the crisis and the dimensions of the area it involves.
"Anonymous" .acts of violence (i,n the terminology of Kahn and
other theoreticians), acts of successive increase of strains in the
crises of the cold war and ii,. Armed conflicts, consist of illegal
acts to confuse, frighten, weaken or demoralize the enemy. Among
them, for exs~mple., are pointed out such acts as bomb explosions,
instigated and carried out by persons unknown, assass,i.nations of
individual citizens of the enemy country, border provocations, etc.
III. A serious crisis 3.s a special kind of prelude to nuclear
war, In this stage of aggravation of the crisis, nuclear war is
already contemplated as possible. This stage, or level, of escala-
tion begins with a declaration c. a condition of "super-readiness,"
after which there may follow small-scale non-nuclear clashes . The
latter may grow into limited non-nuclear war, the lbeginning of which
is supposed to have been officially declared. During this war there
may be "involuntary" use of tactical nuclear weapons, followed by a
so-called nuclear ultimatum. Tn case of further intensification of
the crisis, it is assumed there will be a limited (20~,) evacuation
of the population of cities located in the zone of probable nuclear
attacks. This measure is supplemented by an "obvious show of
force" and "justified attacks on elements of the armed forces."
These two latter actions signify the "limit of non-application of
nuclea'- ~~eapons . "
Concretely, this stage of escalation breaks down into the fol-
lowing steps:, 1) a decisive military confrontation in some limited
region; 2) a provocational breaking-off of diplomatic relations,
signifying the determination of one of the parties to resort to open
use of force; 3) the establishment of a condition of "su er-re "
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expressed in the dispersal of strategic fords, the cancelling oi'
leaves, the cessation of normal military training, and the bringing
of al... units into complete combat readinesay and 4) non-nuclear war,
signifying open transition to organized uoe of force.
The last step already goys beyond the limits of a aer~ous crisis
and may be regarded as the threshold to a new level of escalation,
or, 9,n Kahn's words, "t~~le limit of non-use of nuclear' weapons." In
the opinion of American strategists, the US "police action" in Korea
corresponded to this step of escalation. The peculiarity of this
step is that the war, even, though fairl;/ intensively waged, remains
local, and neither of the sides makes use of its most effective
weapons, i.e., nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical ones,.
As an additional., measure in the last step of this stage of
escalation, one of the parties may stage a sensational show of
force. In essence it would be to frighten the enemy by the use of
a powerful weapon in such a way thai; it would not cause any apparent
damage. The explosion of a nuclear wettpun at a great height over
the territory of the enemy is considered the most suitable for such
a demonstration. An example of "~justific~d attack on e?ements of the
armed forces" might be the destruction (including that contrived by
a secret plot) of an enemy submarine which was carrying strategic
weapons and carrying out maneuvers near foreign shores
IV. Acute crisis. This begins with the cautious, selective
use of nuclear weapons, accompanied by an official declaration of
nuclear war limited to purely military goals and targets. The
first use of nuclear weapons would have as its aim not so much the
destruction of enemy military ob,jeetives, although it w~u1.d be
directed exclusively against them, as the restoration of the
balance, or, as Kahn puts it, "to exert bargaining pressure (vytor-
govat') on the enemy " In this stage great importance ~~s assigned
to convincing the enemy that more bombs and missiles may follow the
first if he does not yield or agree to a reasonable compromise. The
highest step of this stage is considered the evacuation of up to 70
percent of the population of large cities and an official declaration
of limited war with the use of nuclear weaponso This last step is
intended to establish limits for those forms of nuclear operations
which the attacking party intends to undertake, and to make clear
what kind of retaliatory blow he is ready to adept witho+,~t creating
conditions for continuation of the escalationo
The steps of this level of escalation are less clearly defined
than in the first three examples. Great stress is laid on unusual,
provocative and other extraordinary measures, the nature of which is
not revealed. That is probably because the authors of the theories
of "escalation" are themselves unable to have a clear picture of the
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 PYRG
probably actiann of the nidan in eon~liti.onn of thQ beginning of
Limited nuclear warfare, on~~r_cinlly Eainc~s, for rxomple, NATO plnnninK
vrgonn ara still debating whether nuc:h warfnr~e in i-or:nible at all
T in P.Lrope. N~v??rthelons, an in obvious i'rom the? utatrmontcl of NATO
military loaders and t!.3 ntrntcgintu, Lhe moat imi-ortant a:lm of the
iJS armed forcers in, and will be in t.ha future, to by in u position
to curry on nuc:h warfarcr ice i~,rrope, and mainly ir; Ruropa,
V. The diplomacy of nuelaar rer~nure. Thin in cullyd "the
thrnnhold of control nuclear war', war between the E-rincipal nuclear
powers. Here the following steps of aggravation of tree situation
ara assumed: 1) a demonstration oi' a nuclear attack on an unpopu-
.toted part of the territory of the enemy; 2) ciemonr~tration attacks
on purely military ob~ectiven, which ,~o not co-.rue any csacondary
destruetion; 3) demonstration raid:; on various inz~tallationn and
targets (including cities, with preliminary warning and evacuation
of their populations); 1~) attacks on the populati:.n with selective
use of bacteriological, biological and radiological weapons; 5)
comp?ete (95 percent) evacuation of the population of cities;
6) mutual nuclear counterattacks of a limited nature (i.e., ex-
cluding the destruction of cities). The last two me~~-~res bring
tY~e belligerent sides right up to a "central nuclear war", which
is divided into two independent stages, depending on whether nuclear
weapons are used only against military ob~ectivea, or against any
targets, including cities.
It is characteristic of this level of escalation that nuclear
warfare between tY,e nuclear powers is here considered controllable.
The creators of the theory of escalation propose to begin this war-
fare with a demonstrative explosion of a multi-megaton nuclear
charge somewhere in the desert, in a peripheral part of the country
of tY:e enemy, ar in an adjoining sea area, in order to cause only a
psychological effect, and not to invite a retaliatory nuclear attack.
'!'he American theorists believe that neither a demonstration blast
on foreign territory, nor selective attacks on military objectives
which would supposedly not affect the population near them. nor even
tt-.e destruction of va~uable structures of or installations (bridges,
dams, gas plants, irrigation systems, etc.), in conditions of a non-
nuclear war already in progrsss, will cause immediate and automatic
escalation of such a war into unlimited total nuclear war. The
guarantee of this would supposedly be a firm and stable "balance of
terror", depending on the existence on both sides of powerful factors
of mutual restraint.
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VI. Strategic ernl;ral war. It iu thought that nuclear war
betwQen the principal nuclear bowers would begin with a f
r
l
o
ma
declaration of war, after which there would be a pause, d~-;uted to
~,iaking the final decision. A formal declaration of war generally
might mean that the side making it did not intend immediately to
launch an all-out nuclear attack, but was ready to wait for con-
cessions. The idea of strategic central ~rar assumes the possi-
bility of carrying out simultaneously or at different times
strategically important operations in peripheral areas. The step
following the declaration of war would be an attack on the most
important part of the armed forces in the plan of the strategic
conception of "counter-force." It is assumed that the war would
slowly develop further with the aim of destroying the armed forces
of the enemy and would lead to unlimited nuclear attacks predomin-
antly on military ob,~ectives not located in large cities or their
vicinity.
~r'II. Central war, involving the civilian population.
The nuclear attacks, previously launched only against military
objectives, would be gradually extended to non-military objectives
as well. It is expected that this would cause the strategic central
war, not touching the cities, to grow into a war for the destruc-
tion of material resources, national wealth, and people. Massed
nuclear attacks on sources of national power would grow into
uncontrollable total nuclear war, which Kahn Dells "spasmodic."
With regard to the methods of using nuclear weapons in the
various stages of escalation) tk~ere are 18 different kinds of nu-
clear attacks conceived of according to this theory. It is thought
that at the present time there have been developed, accepted, and
recognized as classical the following three kinds of attacks an
all-out attack, aimed at the total destruction of the material wealth
and resources of the country; a mixed attack, with destruction of
both material resources and armed forces9 and a counter-attack
against military objectives and targets. It is pointed out that these
"classical"'forms of attack are not the only ones to be parried out
by the combatants in the various stages of intensification of the
armed conflict. In this connection there are distinguished two addi-
tional kinds of nuclear attacks for which the US must be ready--the
attack "not fixed as to place" on military targets and objectives,
and the pin-pointed attack on military targets which does not touch
the large cities near them. Incidentally, there is now intensified
debate about these two forms of attaek in US military cis?cles.
But even these, in Kahn's opinion, are far from sufficient for
carrying out all possible tasks of the strategy of "flfsxible response."
It is thought that in the future there will arise the question of such
attacks as that with aim of partial reduction of the power of the
pprove or a ease
 T armed forces of the enemy; the attack only on material resources;
systematic attacks against the sources of national, especially
military, power, pursu:!ng the aim of crushing the armed forces and
putting military objectives out of action; nuclear counter-attacks;
demonstration nuclear attacks launched with very powerful weapons
on unpopulated areas on the periphery or in the vicinity of the
country of the enemy; etc. Studies are now being made as to how
expedient and how effective such attacks would be.
A cc.~npletely uninvestigated field of nuclear warfare, which the
American theorists propose 'i~ examine, includes: secret or "anony-
mous" nuclear attacks of a provocative nature; special selective
attacks with the aim of overturning a certain regime or changing its
nature (it is anticipated that such attacks would be launched against
administrative centers, key points of the communications and trans-
portation systems, etc.); nuclear attacks on military targets and
objectives with serious consequences for the natural. environment;
nuclear attacks on cities and material resources which have an
effect on natural conditions; nuclear attacks making it difficult
for the enemy to repe~ir the effects of destx~aetion and damage; and
nuclear attacks intended for coercion (sha.ntazh) and disruption of
the morale of the enemy and his will to continue the war.
In the US it is thought that the process of being drawn into a
nuclear war would be exceptionally smooth and gradual and would have
almost no effect on the level of international tension or even on
the general situation. The American "limited. nuclear war" theorists,
G. [H.?] Kissinger and M. Halperin, assume, in particular, that this
smoothness will be achteved because of the use of nuclear weapons
of low power: nuclear "bazookas", grenades, etc. Nuclear weapons
of low and extra-low power, s,cc;ording to Kahn, make the p ocess of
development of nuclear war so smooth that finally even the subse-
quent use of nuclear weapons cf great power should not cause a
serious movement upward on the "ladder of escalation."
According to the views of some US military specialists, the pro-
cess oP escalation as such assumes movement both u
and do
th
p
wn
e
"ladder", i.e., toward increase of international tension and intensi-
fication of the conflict, or toward peaceful adjustment and com-
promise. The latter alternative, which consists of a decrease in
the degree of risk, or of refraining from carrying out the proposed
tasks is called de-escalation in the US. They a.istinguish two
aspects in this: de-escalation from to*aer rungs of the ladder, and
de-escalation 'from upper rungs. These two aspects differ mainly in
their consequences. It is thought, for example, that in the first
case these consequences might take the form of fear, or an easing
of the situation of the weake2? side; a decline in spirit (temperament),
a sobering, or a demoralization of one of the opponents; a prepara-
tion for new attempts to aggravate the crisis an eve~,~pQ~~_~t~~p~iy~_ ,
~I[
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 PYRGH~f
-~-~- aims--race; -a decrease in tensions or a new agreement, new military
alliance, condominium, etc. De-escalation from upper rungs may
result either in a formal agreement for a cease-fire, and the con-~
elusion of a treaty of peace, or in an intensification of all forms
of activity characteristic of the lower steps of escalation--in other
words, in active cold war--or., finally, in serious social and
political changes in one or. both hostile camps.
The ehtory of "escalation," presented in the works of H. Kahn
seems hazy and inadequately substantiated ii' only because, in 9
spite of Kahn's statements about the gradual transition from one
step to another in the aggravation of the crisis, there are no
guarantees or means of slowing down this rise except the tacit agree-
ment of the parties. Kahn's proposition about limiting the scale
oP the conflict by the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons
of low power cannot be taken seriously. L`ven Kahn does not deny
the weakness of this argument when he writes that the importance of
victory in a nuclear war is sa great that each side will be inter-
ested in increasing its effor+.,s, calculating on gaining an advantage,
if it is sure the other side will not do the same thing. And since
there is not and cannot be any such assurance in any of the situa-
tions presented by Kahn and in the absence of any means of influencing
the decision of the enemy except the immediate raising of the stakes
(stavki), the only criterion of all escalation turns out to be the
risk~~involved. Iri other words, the basis of the theory of "escala-
tion , like that of any other theory linking nuclear war with in-
crease of pressures according to any kind of "understanding", is
military-political adventurism.
Very indicative in this connection is the statement of A, Waskowe
"It is very possible that under ac:tusl conditions the unprecedented
dimensicYis of the catastrophe which has begun will make individuals
and whole nations behave not in the 'rational' way which was outlined
in the calculations It has already been shown that in periods of
extreme aggravation of the international si+.uation, political leaders
become not very receptive to the warnings and threats of probable
enemies."16 The theory of "escala+,ion" does not become any more
complete by the addition to it of Gen Lo Norstad's idea of the
"pause." I~ is thought that this pause w~auld scour at the beginning
of any open armed conflict, and would make tree antagonists adopt a
new, better thought-out decision as to the possibility of continuing
the war. It is characteristic that until recently most of the
American authors in one way or another took a common ground with
Kahn in the approach to working out msthods of carrying out the
strategy of "flexible response."
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It should be noted that a certain tendency to regard the probable
development of nuclear war as a successive raising of the stakes in
a "protracted conflict" is observed also in new works of several West
European military theorists, including B. Liddel Hart, E. Kingston-
MacClure, P, ~n~.lois, S. Delmar, and Beaufre.
Thus, for example, in analyzing the theory of "escalation", the
French military theorist, Gen Beaufre, writes that the whole problem
of "escalation" amounts to a determination of '"whether, or not an
incidental or premeditated use of tactical nuclear weapons aimed
at achieving a local success, will provoke a terrifying retaliatory
attacks leading to nuclear catastrophe."17
Strongly recommending to the French command 'the American theory
of "escalation" as a basic strategy, Beaufre writes ?"We may be
sure that the use of a limited amount of nuc7.ear ammunition would
not lead to escalation," since in this situation "the danger of
strategic escalation would play a restraining role."18 An obvious
,contradiction in the views of US and French military theorists is
evident since the former think that strategic. decisions are not a
restraining factor on the tactical level, while the latter do not
see a danger of spontaneous escalation of the conflict directly on
the battlefield.
Moreover, almost all the works dealing with escalation are based
on one rather disputable position, i.e., that in the course of any
controllable war there may be achieved a certain tacit agreement
between the combatants as to possible courses of action, aims which
can be pursued, weapons which can be used, and even methods of
armed conflict. With the existence of multi-megaton nuclear and
thermconucle~::. weapons and perfe~~ted means of delivering them to
targets, along with the state of extreme nervous tension during
modern armed conflict, especially conflict between nuclear powers,
such a "return to a knightly tournament" is either a fantasy, or an
attempt to mask the true state of affairs, i.e., to conceal the
inability and the impossibility of U5 "nuclear strategists" to find
ways of implementing the strategy of "protracted conflict" with a
minimum degree of risk.
The theory of "escalation" of war has the aim of giving freedom
of action to ..JS reactionary circles in unleashing any war, even with
the use of nuclear weapons, in the interests of monopolistic capital.
With this theory American militarists are trying to disguise the
destructive nature of modern war, to legalize it as a means of
deciding all controversial international problems, and thereby to
frustrate the struggle of peoples for peace and complete general
disarmement.
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 However, any attempt to put such a theory into practice would
prove fatal for its initiators.
Notes:
1. G. Niemeyer, National Securit , Praeger, New Yor, 1963, p 263
2. F. Milley, The Politics of Western Defense, Praeger, New York,
1962
3? Voyennaya Mysl~, No g, 196+, PP 74-78
~+? W. Kintner, National Securit , p 386
5? W. Kintner, National Security, p 387
6. T. Shelling, Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., 1960,
p 161
7? S. Possony, National Security, p 536
8. J. Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, Harper, New York,
1964, p 249
9? R. Coacklay, National Security, p 252
l0. G. Synder, Defe~?rence and Defense, New York, 1861;
T. Shelling and M, Halperin, Strategy anCi Amps Contr~~l,
New York, 1961; H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, New York,
1960; and A. Waskow, The Limits of Defense, New York, 1962
11. J. Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p 253
l2. A. Waskow, Evolution of American Military Doctrine (The Politics
and Economics of Disarmament, , ed. by S, Melman, Boston, 1963,
p 468
13. T. Shelling, Strategy of Conflict, p 188
14. H. Kahn, National Security, p 7
15? Pravda, 23 April l 5
16. A. Was'-ow, "The Evolution of American Militar Doctrine, (The
Politics and Economies of Disarmament , p 17
17. Beaufre, Dissuasion et Strate ie, A, Colin, Paris, 1964, p 72
18. ibid., p 7
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