SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO 5, 1965

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090008-8
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 121
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 5, 1965
• Content Type: TRANS

TRANk.irove
IJR,NAL VOYENj\TAYA
()vt,i,miii,,R 1965
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OP
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STA TES oFt.0
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLAT I ON
Number 949
5 November 1965
SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 5, 3965
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Washington, D. C.
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FDD TRANSLATION:
SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYSL'? No 50 1965
Table of Contents Page
Historical Exploits of the Soviet People and Their
Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic Val', by Mar
SU R. Malinovskiy
The Communist Party as the Inspirer and Organizer of
Victory in the Great Patriotic Wars by Army Gen
AoYepishev 30
Soviet Ground Troops in the Great Patriotic Wars
by Army Gen P. KUrochkin 149
The Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic Wars by
Chief Mar Avn K. Vershinin 66
The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic Wars by Flt Adm
S. Gorshkov 83
PVO Strany Troops in the Great Patriotic War, by
Col Gen Avn G. Zimin 100
The Use of Arms Against the Economy, by Col A. Elbakian
and Lt Col (Res) G. Gendler (Review of book Voyna I ekonomika
vooruzhennoye vozdeystviye na ekonomiku voyayushchikh
stran v pervoy i vtoroy mirovykh voynakh (War and Economics --
'The Influence of Armed Conflict on the Economy of the
Belligerants in World Wars I and II) 77 Not translated)
Notes on Source
Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) is a monthly orgau of the USSR
Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House
Moscow. This translation is from issue No 5, May 1965, which was signed
for the press 8 April 1965. Articles marked "not translated" above are
not considered of sufficient interest to warrant dissemination.
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Historical Exploits of the Soviet People and Their
Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War
CPYRGHT
by Mar SU R. MALINOVSKTY
Twenty years ago, on 9 May 1945, our valiant Armed Forces, which had
distinguished themselves in battles from the Volga to the Elbe, jointly
with their Allies forced fascist Germany to a complete and unconditional
surrender. This was an event of enormous historical significance. Our
planet celebrated this victory with gun salutes and general rejoicing.
And there was certainly cause for rejoicing, since the war had ended
victoriously against the most frenzied and violent detachment of world
imperialism, i.e., German fascism, the dominant force of worldwide re-
actionary politics, inhumanity, race hatred, and other kinds of savagery.
For the Soviet people, the period of the Great Patriotic War was the
most difficult and at the same time the most heroic period in the history
of the defense of our Motherland. The greatness of our victory lies in
the fact that we defeated and forced to capitulate a treacherous and very
powerful enemy, i.e., Hitler's Germany. Before its attack on the Soviet
Union, the army of fascist Germany had advanced victoriously through
Western Europe and the capitalist world had not found the strength to
defeat, or at least to stop the fascist hordes. Only after reaching the
English Channel did they cease to advance. However, the strength of this
army wEw infinitely smaller compared to that which the fascists hurled
against the USSR.
Filled with savage hatred toward the first socialist country in the
world, the imperialist predators repeatedly carried out armed attacks
against the USSR, but were always duly repulsed. Nevertheless, the
imperialists would not leave us alone, but continued to prepare a new.
assault against the Soviet Union. They planned on a shattering defeat of
the first socialist country in the world in the course of World War II
with the use of blitzkrieg methods.
World War II began on 1 September 1939, when Hitler's Germany attacked
Poland without a declaration of war. The governments of Great Britain
and France were forced to declare war against Germany so as not to dis-
credit their reputation in the eyes of the world; however, they were in
no hurry to offer real aid to their ally. Thus, 20 years after World
War I, the world was once more involved in an even more bloody slaughter.
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niVIRWRIVialigitat5NeViiegiqt:sCIIKAPrTs?,11PAnifriVeTilgleig
? 0 The
CPYRGHToverful imperialist coalitions, i.e., one side represented by Hitler's
Germany Which bad suffered defeat in World War I, fascist Italy, and im-
perialist Japan, which countries considered themselves as being unfairly
treated in the distribution of the spoils of war among the victors, and
the other side represented by the old colonialist powers of Great Britain,
France, and also the US.
This was a manifestation of the irreconcilable conflicts within the
camp of imperialism. After the occupation of Poland, fascist Germany met
little resistance in occupying Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and
Luxemburg; it defeated the French and British armies in Northern France
in the period of three weeks, forced the remains of the defeated British
troops to retreat to the sea at Dunkirk, and then forced the French govern-
ment to capitulate. Such a rapid defeat can be explained not so much by
the strength or military art of the invaders, as by the tolerance of
fascist aggression, attempts to turn it against the Soviet Union, and
direct betrayal of national interests on the part of ruling circles of
France and Great Britian, wLich were sympathetic to fascism at heart.
This was the result, during World War II, of the policy of encourage-
ment and indulgence toward the aggressor on the part of ruling circles
of Great Britain, France, and the US. This policy may result in the
same consevences in our time, if the peace-loving nations fail to prevent
the German revanchists from gaining access to nuclear weapons. History
has cruelly mocked the simple-minded British and French politicians. The
Western powers would have been quite strong enough at least to seriously
undermine the strength of the fascist army, if not to defeat it completely.
As a matter of fact, the allies had 142 full-strength divisions against
135 German divisions. The allies had more than 3,000 tanks and over
2,700 aircraft. The peoples of Europe had to pay a high price for the
treacherous politics of bourgeois governments. They were forced to pay
for the anti-Soviet course of their govenaments with a painful defeat,
with endless suffering under the 4-year fascist occupation, and with
hundreds of thousands of human lives.
After completing military operations in the West and strenahening
Its rear area, fascist Germany began direct preparations for war against
the USSR in the summer of 1940. Having taken possession of the huge
economic resources of occupied European countries and mobilized the
military economy of its allies, Germany reached a production level which
was 1.5 to 2 times greater than that of the USSR. This permitted Germany
to supply its multimillion army with arms and combat equipment and to
achieve a high level of motorization.
Together with political and economic preparations for war against the
Soviet Union, the fascist armed forces were being trained directly for an
attack against our country. (cont'd)
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The numerical strength of armed forces of Hitler's Germany at the
time of their attack against the USSR had almost doubled as compared with
the beginning of World War II. The Ground Troops had 214 divisions and
two brigades (including 21 tank divisions and 14 motorized divisions),
11,000 tanks and assault weapons, and about 78,000 guns and mortars. At
the beginning of the war against the USSR, fascist Germany had over 10,000
combat aircraft.
On 18 December 1940, Hitler issued secret directive No 21, giving the
initial data for immediate Planning of the predatory attack against the
Soviet Unim. It stated that "the German armed forces must be prepared
to defeat Soviet Russia in the course of a short-term campaign... The
principal forces of Russian ground troops, located in Western Russia,
must be destroyed in bold operations by means of a penatrating, rapid
advance of tank wedges... The final aim of the operation is the creation
of a barrier against Asiatic Russia along the line Volga-Arkhangel'sk.
Thus, in the case of emergency, the last industrial region of the Russians
in the Urals may be paralyzed with the help of aviation."
In planning the "blitzkrieg" defeat of the Soviet Unior, Hitler's
strategists were intoxicated by their easy victories in. the West and
their plan "Barbarossa" was based on many preconceived notions. They
overstimated their own capabilities, underestimated the capabilities of
our country, and counted on completing military operations against the
Soviet Army within 6-8 weeks.
While working out their military plans, the fascist leaders also
developed a monstrous program for the destruction and f,nsiarement
of Soviet people, as well as plans for economic plunder, acmording
to which all the resources of our country were to pass Into the hand6
of German ipperialtsts.
The party and the Soviet government, understood that sooner or
later the aggressive forces of imperialism would attack us. Therefore,
Soviet foreign policy directed its attention toward a further strrigth-
ening of international positions by a consistent ani determined strug-
gle for peace and collective security, while internal policies were
concerned with a further strengthening of the Soviet social and state
system, the development of economic power, and the strengthening of
Soviet defense capabilities.
As a result of th fulfillment of prewar 5-year plans, the USSR
had been transformed into a powerful industrial and collective farm-
ing country; it had gained complete economic independence from capi-
talist countries, and had considerably strengthened its defense capa-
bilities. At the beginning of World War II, the Soviet Union carried
out additional measures for increasing production capacities of the
defense industry.
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8-8
Ixrat the beginning of the war, we did not have time to organize the
" mass prod) tion of arms, and especially modern coMbat equipment, in
the necessary volume. This placed our country in an extremely dif-
ficult situation at the, beginning of the war against fcist Germany.
Despite these shortcomings, the Soviet Armed Forces were suffi-
ciently powerful on the eve of the attack by fascist Germany, so that
they were able to stand up against such a strong enemy as the fascist
army, and later succeeded. in increasing their forces and defeating the
enemy in the course of an intense struggle.
The_s-PlritiaLasolLIE:LIAII4atim25.12;kreSoviet Armed Forces DiXr-
the Great Patrietic'War
In, the early dawn of 22 June 1941, fascist Germany made a sur-
prise attack against the Soviet. Union. A 5.5-mi1l1on army of fascists
and their allies, composed of 190 divisions, completely equipped, armed
to the teeth, and well trained, treacherously invaded the territory of
our Motherland without a declaration of war and contrary to the exist- ,
iae Soviet-German non-aggression treaty.
Against. this powerful army of the enemy, concentrated at the border
in three strong, compact groupings, the Soviet Union had troops of the
five border districts with a total Strength of 2.9 million. On a 4,500-
k11,ometer front, these districts had 170 divisions and two brigades,
dispersed up to 500 kilometers from the border into 'the interior of the
USSR. Although we were not greatly inferior to the eneMy in the number
of divisions, the enemy actually had great superiority in manpower, in
the degree of organization of soyedineniya, and in the full strength of
peasonnel, combat equipment, rear service unitsy transport facilities,
im7.tors, and. commmaicatIon facilities, and, consequently, in the mobility
and control of troops.
The troops of our military border districts, which were at their
pexmanent locations, had been engaged in combat training and were not
deployed and prepared to repulse a.seaTaise enemy attack. Therefore,
only 33 divisions, which were aspax the border, met the attacks of the
powerful enemy grouping between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathians.
Why Was it that our Armed Forces had not been made combat ready?
This happened because 1. V. Sta in, who concentrated in his hands the
highest power of the state and Party in it entirety2 had made an
error in evaluating the military 'and political situation on the eve of
the war. This resulted in, strategically incorrect decisions which
became evident in the failure to cake prompt measures for putting the'
Armed Forces in combat readiness. lie hoped until the last day that
he would be able to avert an attack by fascist Germany against the
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CPYRGH
?
?
DpreNerVECIERItleitStailnaniergIA.ARREMIgggc513PARAN99NPLaSets. evident
from the reassuring statement by Tass on 14 June 1941 "The rumors con-
T ca4ning a German intention to break the pact and. to launch an attack
a,ainst the USSR are completely groundless; and it is assumed that the
recent transfer of German troops... to eastern and northeastern parts of
Germany are motivated by other reasons which have no connection with Soviet-
German relations."
This statement dulled the vigilance of Soviet people and dis-
oriented them In regard to the necessary measures in case or war.
I. V. Stalin was in possession of reliable data concerning the im-
pending attack by fascist Germany agianst the USSR, but he looked upon
these data as provocations. Therefore, he not only failed to give per-
mission, but actually prohibited troops to be moved closer to the bor-
der and deployed for defense, so as not to give Hitler any ground fbr
accusing us of breaking the non-aggression pact. Only at 1230 a.m. on
23 June, when it had been learned from reliable sources that the fascist
army would attack the Soviet Union on 22-23 June; the command of military
border districts was given the order to put the troops An combat readiness
in order to repulse a possible attack. Imagine, only a "possible attack,"
while the airplanes of Hitier's Germany were already engaged An air bat-
tles over Sevastopol and other cities. These orders were so belated that
in some cases the troops heard about them only after they had already
engaged in combat with the enemy.
The difficulties in organizing the and conducting combat operations
of the Red Army ver also caused by the belated preparationb, by the Ger.
eral Staff of covPr plans) the delay in concentrating and deploying troops,
and the inadequate preparation of the area for war. The new, improved com-
bat equipment; which was supplied to the troops, had to be mastered during
combat.
The surprise attack of the enemy against our country forced all
Soviet people to interrupt their peaceful occupations and to tale up arms.
A new period in the lives of our people had begun -- the period of the
Great Patriotic War.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war) caused by the treacherous
attack of Hitler's Germany, was the principal factor which completed the
change in the character of World War II. It became a just war of
eration against countries of the fascist bloc. The USSR became not only
the leading force of the anti-fascist coalition, which included countries
with different social'and ecnomic systems, but also the center of attract-
ion for anti- fascist forces struggling to save world civilization from
the fascist threat.
(cont'd)
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CPYR
ApptizirvedkErg Reieaset280L0108a9decIARMATONPAWMP9A99M8of
the attack and the-greater readiness of their troops for combat operations,
GOe assault groupings of the enemy penetrated into the interior of the
country. The commitment of covering units at different times and the lack
of strong reserves near the direction of the main enemy attachs placed the
'colrering troops in a difficult situation. Despite heroic and extremely
stiff resistance; the covering troops were unable to withstand the heavy
onslaught by superior enemy forces.
By carrying out surprise attacks against our airfields; the enemy des-
troyed many aircraft and large numbers of personnel and acquired great sup-
eriority in the air; in the zone adjoiningthe border enemy aircraft flew
unhindered and at will.
Troop control became extremely difficult as a result of damaged co-
mmunications systems; caused by mass air attacks and actions of sab-
'otage groups of the enemy. The lack of communications made it Impossible
to obtain news on the situation of troops; which led to the making of
inappropriate decisions; i.e.; the decisions were incredibly late.
Having seized the initiative, the enemy continued to develop the
attack.in the principal directions. Our troops met the attack with ex-
tremely stubborn resistance. Even the first battles on the Soviet-Ger-
man front showed the fascist invaders that they were dealing with an
entirely different type of soldier than in Western Europe. The official
diary of F. Haider, former chief of the German General Staff; contained
the following entry on.29 June: "The mews from the front confirm that
the Russians are fighting tc the last man.. The stubbron 'Russian re-
sistance has forced us to conduct our battles according to all the rules
of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West we could take eer
tain liberties and deviate from some of the regulations, but that is now
out of the question."
And it was really so. Soviet soldiers; educated by the Communist
Party in the spirit of 'boundless devotion to their motherland; did not
waver in the terrible hour of danger; they did not lose courage or admit
defeat, but skillfully met the attacks. of the enemy forces which were
superior in number. In doing so; they showed ardent'pettiotisM, unprec-
edented courage, heroism; and a quick grasp of military affairs. They
fought valiantly, defeating select fascist troops which had invaded. the
USSR.
(contvd)
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A
CPYRGHT
?
?
?
pp roved FtwiReteAsteWINOWO9bDWOMP8gWO:482460400GOANDORAwhich our
fearless soldiers fought, superiority was on the side of the enemy who was
armed to the teeth'. Under the assault of his superior forces the Rea
AaTy was forced to retreat into the interior of the country in the
course of heavy fighting.
Li the first days of the war the party and governments regaizing the
complexity of the situation and the danger facing our motherland, mob-
ilized all resources of the country to repulse the enemy, and first of
all, to deploy and strengthen the Armed Forces. TO increase party in-
fluence in the army, party and Komsotol Members were mobilized; they
have always, and especially in times of severe trials, represented the
backbone of the army, being a model of courage and daring.
Under the most difficult conditions, the party and Soviet.govern-
ment carried out a large-scale reorganization of the whole USSR national
economy to put it on a wartime footing. An enormous job was done in
evacuating many hundreds of. industrial enterprises from western regions
to the east; these enterprises later played en important role in
strengthening the defense capabilities of the country.
The leading and inspiring role of the partys and its closes inde-
structitae unity with the peoples were decisive factors in successfully
overcoming the eevere military hardships during the initial, period of
the war.
The fascist army,. making the most of its surprise attack and the
superiority of its combat equipments-advanced 600 to 850 kilometers along
the principal axes by the end of September 1941. The stubborn defense
of the Soviet troops in some sectors, the .heroic defense of Leningrad,
Kiev, and Odessas and the intense fighting in the area of Smolensk-Yelunya,
-- these were the cliffs on which the plan for a 'blitzkrieg" prepared.
by Hitierus strategists began to be shipwrecked-
Howevers regardless of everything, Hitler's command attempted with
all possible means to seize Moscow and Leningrad before the onset of
winters to occupy. the Donbass and Crimea, and to end the war victoriously.
Having taken the strategic initiatives the German command continued the
offensive against Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donbass in the fall. of 19411
delivering the main Tow In. the Moscow direction. In this area. Hitler's
troops concentrated 38 percent of their infantry dividions and 64 percent
of tank and motorized divisions operating on. the Soviet-German fronts and
after establishing a three- to eightfold numerical superie.rity in the dir-
ection of 'the principal attacks, they began the offensive against Moscow.
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YRGHT
ApproVeduFWRIffitike 21)010/08009c:cetAIRDABSIT008.75R0100311(109001084 and
ended with a complete defeat of the enemy and a loss of a large number
of enemy personnel and combat equipment.
The success of thc defensive battles near Moscow was helped cOnsid-
erably by our counterattacks near Tikhvin and. Rostov-on-Don and by the
heroic defense of Sevastopol', witch tied up large forces of the enemy
In this way, the enemy's plans for the occupetion of Moscow, Leningrad,
and the approaches to the Caucasus were defeated; and as a result, their
estimates for a speedy, victorious termination of the war proved wrong.
Although the Red Army was successful in its difficult0'defensive
operations and in the ,..!ounterattack near Rostov and Tikhviny the sit-
uation for the Soviet Union in early December 1941 remained extremely
tense because of the loss of important economic regions. Only owing to
the extensive organizational work of the Communist Party and the selfless
work of Soviet people, we were able in December to prevent the level of
industrial production from dropping any further.
Despite the difficult situation, we were able to concentrate large
strategic reserves in the Moscow direction and to launch a counter-
offensive on 5-6 December. Unable to sustain the heavy attack of the
Red. Army, the German fascist troops began to retreat, abandoning their
combat equipment, ammunition, and vehicles. This counterattack later
1.e., in the winter of 1941-1942, became a general strategic offensive
ai the Red Aany.
The attempts of falsifiers of history to explain the defeat of
fascist troops near Moscow by the severe winter weather do not stand up
to criticism, since climatic conditions had an equal effect on us and on
the fascists.
,The principal, condition for our success near Moscow wasthe in-
creased skill and the high fighting and moral. qualities of the Red law.
After routing the best divisions of the enemy, our army ahcieved truly
outstanding victories in the first year of the Great Patriotic War and
,the first large-scale defeat of the fascist army in the second year of
the world wax. With this victory, the Bed Army discredited the myth of
the invincibility of Hitler's Germany and put an end to the plan for a
blitzkrieg" Germany was faced with the necessity of conducting a pro-
tracted war, andthis was a serious strategic defeat.
(cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
I 4
ApprovZONtheRkileasle200016a109rivell*RDP8670011135R000341)109004k8durina
the winter campaign, of 1941-1942, the situation continued to be ueriouo
for the Soviet Union. The enemy was about 120 kilometers from Moacow,
and strategically important regions were still in hia hands. Leningrad
was blockaded. Millions of Soviet people wer languishing in faseist cap-
tivity. We were forced to use considerable forces for the protection of
Far Eastern and Southern borders. At the same time, nothing prevented
Hitier's command from increasing its strength on the Soviet-German front.
Plundering the occupied and ensalved countries of Europe; the rulers of
fascist Germany acquired an abundant supply of manpower and combat equip-
ment for their army. The fascist army remained a strong and dangerous
enemy, prepared to launch a new offenisve. The US and Great Britain fol-
lowed a policy of delaying the opening of a second front, even though they,
together with Candada, had about 6 million men under arms by that time.
The Soviet Union continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders
and was essentially alone in withstanding the powerful. enemya
Having concentrated 216 divisions and 21 brigades at the Soviet-Ger-
man front by the summer of 1942 with the help of his allies, Hitler gave
the order to 'rout the principal forces of the Red Army and to achieve a
fast victory. However, at this time Hitler's command, despite the in-
crease in number of its divisions 3 did not dare to advance in three
strategic directions, as in the beginning of the war; but chose only one
direcUon, i.e., the southwest. Having concentrated more than 37 per-
cent of infantry and about 53 percent of tank and motorized soyedineniya
in this direction, the enemy launched an offensive. Suffering enormous
losses, the enemy was able to penetrate our defenses and to reach the
Voaga and the foothills of the principal Caucasian range An difficult,
exhausting battles.
However, the eneny was unable to inflict a final defeat on OE. "The
German troops were unable to encircle any large Russian forces; as had
been done in the preceding year. The Russian command. learned to avoid
encirdiement in a skillful manner. There was an absence of 'weapons and
prisoners as the true spoils and criterion of victory..." These ware
the words of Kurt Tippelskirch, paraphrasing Klaus ewitz. (Results of.
World War 11, Publishing House for Foreign Literature; 1957) P
_ _ _
The enemy was involved in protracted and exile.uating battles on tb
Volga. Here, on a 650-ki1ometer sector of the front, 49 divisions and
two brigades were in action, in addition to a. large number of special
chasti. These battles clearly revealed that invincible strength which
the fascist army did net have, and could not possibly have, i.e. the
mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, their assurance in the just cause of the
war, and their high political consciousness and superiar moral stamina.
This is what made it possible to upset the plans of Eitier's command.
(cont'd)
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CPYRG
ADdWiRfHT t'divrfiirdi'iado6,118110VtiMulitbOitel-400, thbrOti9.60.64' uP
i ;(2?tural mportant inauotri
a anu aLriculL
reions 01 'WA: uountry.
1)is considerably undermindd our forces. However, in the Call of 19420 a
orGanized military economy had already been established in tie
,:ountry through the efforts of the Communist Party and of all Loviet
people. After the reorganization of industry to meet; wartime needs) the
Bed Army received an uninterrupted and ever increasing supply of arms
and comabt equipment. There was also a chanGc in the quality of military
personnel., which became seasoned and hardened in heavy battles. The com-
manding officers gained the necessary experience in leading combat op-
erations under difficult conditions. ' All this enabled the Red Army to
prepare and carry out a powerful counterattack near the Volga strong-
hold.
At the beginning of the counterofftrisive the Red Army was not in-
ferior to the enemy in number of troops and, particularly, in their
quality. On the whole, both sides had almost equal forces.
On 19 November 19420 troops of the Southwest and Don fronts, and one
day later those of the Stalingrad front, bean the offentivc. During the
forst days of the offensive, the Red Army broke trhough the well fortified
enemy defenses and destroyed 22 choice enemy divisions and 160 individual
chasti with a total of 330,000 men. ? The history of military art knows of
practically no other enmples of this type for the encirclement nnd de-
struction oi a major strategic grouping, whenthc forces of both sides were
almost equal.
The German fascist army suffered a very heavy defeat, which seriously
undermined its moral and physical strength and considerably lowered its
offensive capabilities. The strategic initiative was snatched from the
enemy and was taken over bythe Red Army.
The battle on the Volga played a very important role in achieving
victory over Hitler's Germany. This battle daaonstrated to the whole
world the power of the Red Army and of the Soviet Union as a whole, which
was strong because of the high consciousness of the masses and the moral
and political unity of the people, and because of the superiority of the
Soviet socjal and state system over the capitalist systems and the super-
iority of socialist econeomy.
The battle on the Volga also contributed to a considerable inten-
sification in the struggle of peoples of European countries, which were
occupied by fascist Germany, for their liberation. It strengthened the
anti-Hitler coalition. The military prestige of Hitler's Germany declined.
Disorder and vacillation became more prevalent in the fascist bloc.
(cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
iqp 0 y?pleilWaic,i)gg /606mov.itotoRttp m
ainroosowneoBtoogated by the
--
ec. my, have een making every effort since the war in trying to prove
that the victory on the Volga was not the result of improved combat qualities
of theRed Army and of advanced Soviet military art, but was caused by Hitlex's
ineptitude; the weakness of the troops of Germany's allies; and the climatic
conditions. To this we may say:: "You can't go very far with deceit!"
The persistent attempts of falsifiers of history to belittle the scle
distort the meaning; and conceal the reasons for our great victory in the
battle on the Volga; to ignore the mistakes and miscalculations of German
generals and embellish the actions of the German general, staff; are based
on crude juggling of facts and lies. Soviet military historians must
struggle actively and consistently against attempts of bourgeois fals-
ifiers to deceive the masses. It is our duty to revere the truth about
the great 'exploits of the Soviet people in, the monumental battles of the
past war and to bring this truth persistently to the attentio.n. of millions
of people.
As a result of th 1942-1947, winter offensive, tin Red. Army advanced,
600-700 kilometers to the west. By this time the general militaszy-pol-
itical situation had considerably improved for the USSR and had greatly
deteriorated for fascist Germany. Our country became stronger with each
days, While fascist Germany not only foaled to approach, but even moved.
farther away from its cherished goal, i.e,, the destruction of the Soviet
Union.
Despite the fact that, in the battle of the Volga and during the
following offensive, we taught Hitler's army a lesson which cost it
enormous losses, and the fact that it never quite recovered from our
shattering blows, 1Litler7s generals failed to draw the necessary con-
clusions.
In the spring of 1943, they began preparations for a new offem4iwe
on the Soviet-German front in the area of the Kursk salient. As a result
ofutotal" mobilization, the Hitierites were able to throw new hundreds of
thousands of men Into battle, as well as considerable material resources.
They were able not only to replace the losses in combat equipment and arms,
but also to increase the output of military products By the summer of
1943, the fascist army numbered 10,3000000 men in its ranks, including
62682)000 men in the field. forces. From this number, the German troops
on the Soviet-German front had 4,800,000 men, or 71 percent, and together
with the allies the total amountedio 5,300,000.
The Red Army at this time had 60440,000 men in its field forces.
Thus, we exceeded the enemy in manpower 1.2 times, and even more than
that in combat equipment.
(cont'd)
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offensive. The mad Fuehrer assured his soldiers 'that thio would be 11(2
last offensive, which--according to the plans of fascist ctratcGioto--
was to bring Germany the long awaited victory. Hitler turned out to bc
correct only insofar as this was actualg7 the last offensive for Gormawil
and it was no longer able to recapture the strategic initiative until It'a
cap itualation.
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Even the large number of new and highly publicized heavy tanks,
with ferocious-sounding names like "Panther" and "Tiger", failed to
help the offensive of Gorman fascist troops. In a defensive battle,
the Red Army wore down And exhausted the elite fascist divieions and
forced them to retreat, first to the initial assault positions, and
then further to the West. In this manner, this offensive of the Ger-
mane on the eastern front was also a complete failure. The fascists
were not saved by the summer which, they had hoped, might help them
to make use of their still very great capabilities and achieve a vic-
tory. On the eve of the battle of Kursk the fascists had bragged:
"In the winter you drive us with sleds, and in the summer we drive
you with tanks." Here it might be appropriate to remember the mili-
tary proverb: "Do not brag going into battle, but brag coming out of
battle."
The victory of the Red, Army near Kursk was one of the greatest
victories in the Great Patriotic War and World. War II. Our troops
routed up to 30 select divisions of the enemy. Tank units of the
Wehtmacht suffered a particularly heavy defeat by Soviet troops.
In the battle of Kursk, the Red Army definitely broke the bakbone
of the German fascist army.
The German defeat in the battle of Kursk increased the conflicts
within the fascist coalition. Italy was eliminated from the bloc.
Hitler's demand to assign at least a few divisions from the "Center"
army group to Italy was not carried out, because the increasing strikes
of the Red Army had prevented it. This circumstance created favorable
conditions for developing the amphibious landing operation of British
and US troops which had begun in the Mediterranean,
Falsifiers of history try to belittle the enormous importance
ofetne Red Army victory in the battle of Kursk with the intention of
coveringup the adventurous character of the German plan of offensiye,
whitewashing Hitler's generals, and at the same time placing the er)
tire blame for the defeat, as before, on the inadequacy. of Hitler.
However9 they will not succeed in doing this.
The historic victory of Kursk demonstrated the further growth in
the power of the Soviet Union and its armed forces. While the defeats
on the Volga and near Kursk had catastrophic consequences for the
Hitierites, they opened great vistas for a final victory of' our troops.
The battle of Kursk marked the beginning of the summer offensive of
the Red Army. By the end of 1943, two thirds of the Soviet territory,
which had been temporarily occupied by the enemy, was liberated.
Thefollowing year, 1944, was the year of decisive victories
of the Red Army at Leningrad and Novgorod, in the western Ukraine and
AptiAaanlear keliAgr2006708M-qaMAREER364ATEP816Fkr00.030009061)8-aed
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(cont2d)
AnoyAMOMMIJA424 FiliibM?SLAQ OMR% :gilbtgr-/Fo'??TRIV5MPRPORPCM?8-8
major offensive operations which ended, as a mac, with the encircle-
ment and destruction of strong enemy ,:;roupings. The liberation of
'3oviet territory from occupying forces was basically completed In
1944, and military operations were transferred to German territory.
The Red Army honorably fulfilled its international duty. It gave pow-
erful support to the peoples of Europe in their struggle for libera-
tion. The fascist occupying forces were expelled from Rumania, Bul-
garia, most of Yugoslavia, Finland, a considerable part of Poland, and
most of Hungary. Our troops entered the territory of Czechoslovakia.
The Red Army routed the German troops in northern Finland and liberated
the northern part of Norway. Under the direct influence of the Red
Anny victories, the peoples of Albania and Greece drove out the occupy-
ing forces from their countries.
Fearing that the Red Army would complete the defeat of fascist
Germany alone, without allies, the United States and Great Britain
landed their troops on 6 June 1944 on the French coast in Normandy.
The principal forces of the German WehrmAcht were stationed, as
before, on the Soviet-German front; therefore the US-British command
was able to act with a certainty of success. And even though the
eetablishment of a second front in Western Europe was very important,
the main theater of operations remained on the Soviet-German front.
The offensive of US-British troops in Europe, even though it was the
Largest one they had conducted so far, could not be compared in scope
and results with the offensive operations of the Red Army. It is
sufficient to say that from the moment of landing until the end of
1.9bk the US-British troops routed not more than 60 enemy divisions,
while the Red Army during this period completely destroyed or captured
7.)( divisions and 2)4 brigades, and routed. 219 divisions; during the
cntirE year the Red. Army completely destroyed or captured 126 divisions
c:.5 brigades, and routed 361 divisions and 27 brigades. These are
ne far7.ts.
In 1945, the Red Army struck a blow at the enemy on a front ox-
'ending from the Baltic lo the Drava River, which Vni unprecedented
fore. This attack ended with the great historic victory of the
:-n0 Let, people add its Red Army in the Berlin operation. Fascist Ger-
nany was conquered, and this signified the victorious end of the Great
FeLriotle War and the end of World War II in Europe. During the final
of the war, the armies of the restored countries of Poland,
C:crhoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria joined the Bed Army in combaf,
operations against their common enemy.
The German people had to pay a high price for Hitler's military
adventure. During World War II, Germany lost about 13 million people,
of which number up to 10 million persons perished on the Soviet-German
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CPYRGH
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T hordes, but the horrors of the bloody war have not been forgotten
by the people. And how could they be forgotten, since the Soviet peo-
ple and their army had lost 20 million human lives in this war and had
suffered material losses estimated at the astronomical figure of' 2
600 billion rubles. At a cost of aupreme effoTts and great
sacrifices, the Soviet people routed the most, ferocious and most preda-
tory force of' world imperialism, i.e.? Hitler's Germany, The Great
Patriotic War, Which taught the aggressors a stern lesson, provided
incontestable evidence that any attempt to use German militarism against
tve Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp would be doomed
to failure.
Our victory in. the Great Patriotic War became possible because
the struggle of the Soviet people and their army was headed by the
glorious Communist Party, which was the inspirer and organizer of all
vi.tories. The party inspired the Soviet people to valiant efforts
and combat exploits by ardent appeals, tireless practical, activities,
and an inexhaustible faith in victory over the enemy.
The great hardships of the most destructive and devastating war
provided convincing evidence of the great spiritual strength and the
inflexible will of the people which defended the achievements of the
socialist revolution with weapons in their hands. Socialism has given.
Mr people insuperable strength. This incontestable lesson of his-
torical significance, which resulted from the Great Patriotic War,
should be thoroughly learned by present military adventurers.
In the incredible hardships of the past war, the prophetic words
of the great Lenin, the creator of our state, came true in every respect
"It will, never be possible to defeat a nation, in which the majority
of workers and peasants have learned, experienced, and seen that they
are defending their own Soviet government -- the governmeni, of the work-
ing people, and that the victory of the cause wnich they are d,:fending
will enable them and their children to enjoy all the blessings of col-
to..tre and all the products of human labor" .:121121.ete Coll.sction of
Worts., Vol. 36, page 315).
The exploits accomplished by the Soviet people on the battle fields
of the Great Pavriotic War, their selfless labor in rear areas, and
'the endless sacrifices made for the victory of the just cause, wdll
always be rememberei by future generations.
On the day of the 20th anniversary of the great victory we, the
Soviet people, and all progressive mankind, turn our thoughts with
a feeling of deep love and gratitude to those millions of valiant, sons
and daughters of our people, who gave their lives for the independence
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enemy of mankind. The victory in the Great Patriotic War demonstrated
the inexhaustible vitality and the enormous superiority of the social-
ist system, which is the most advanced and just system in existence,
as well as the incalculable strength and inflexible will of the Soviet
people, and the might of our Armed Fordes. The Great Patriotic War
Tlee proved :convincingly the ever increasing role of popular masses in
achieving a victory.
The struggle against fascist Germany was made a great deal more
complex because the German economic potential was based on the resources
of nearly all Europe and considerably exceeded the economic potential
of the *Soviet Union. However, our socialist country had very great
advantages in the economic organization of society, and in the superior
character of its social system. The selfless labor of the Soviet
people and the gigantic organizational activity of the party ensured
the victory of our military economy over the German fascist military
economy. AS a result of its victory, the Soviet Union defended its
socialdst achievements, considerably increased its international pres-
tite, and regained the areas which had been previously torn away from
The victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany brought free-
dom and national independence to the peoples of Poland, Rumania, Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Subsequently'
the peoples of these countres, who overthrew the reactionary regimes
of capitalists and landowners, began to build socialism. The victory
ovPr fascist Germany liberated the peoples of Finland, Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Austria, France, and other countries of Europe from
th,:- brown plague. Under the influence of this victory, the struggle
of wide popular masses in all capitalist countries was activated, while
tht- roLonial and dependent countries experienced an unprecedented up-
,lutgr of the national liberation movement.
The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces and Their Military Art
Dring the Great Patriotic War
The Great Patriotic War was a severe test of Soviet military art
and of the organizational principles in the building of our Armed
Forces.
The great art of conducting armed combat against the huge German
fascist army, which was technically well equipped and prepared for a
large war, was not mastered suddenly. There were many difficulties,
trials, and errors on the way to this goal.
(cont'd)
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II ?
ore-e4eVeilfet#16)Mtri bt wiNdiattrowskomooloW454/3
Pg?
s in he'developmen; of Soviet military art and
of the organizational forms of troops, were not duly promoted and put
Into practice in'the operational and combat training of troops on the
eve of the war. The principal reason for this was the paralyzing at-
mosphere of the Stalin personality cult.
The unfounded repressions which struct the commanding cadres of
the army and navy in 1937 resulted in the extermination of a large num-
ber of experienced commanders and political workers, especially those
in leading positions. A whole number of military districts, fleets,
armies, corps, divisions, and military educational institutions were
actually deprived of their leaders. The repressions against military'
cadres caused enormous damage to the combat capability of the Armed
Force, and this was one of the main reasons for our setbacks during
the first period of the Great Patriotic War.
The Stalin 7?ersonality cult had an extremely negative effect on
the development of Soviet military thought. Arbitrariness and dic-
tatorship in matters of theory made it difficult to master Lenin's
heritage of military theory and paralyzed the initiative of mdlitary
scientists and practitioners. Even the positive and progressive as-
pects in the theory of military art were ignored in the practice of
operational training and organizational development on the basis that
such progressive aspects had been advocated by military leaders stib-
ject to repressions. Creative research on problems of military theory
was replaced by a search for ready-made formulas and quotations. Ps
a result, may problems of military theory and practice were solved
in a subjective manner 'before the war, without giving due considera-
tion to the changes which had occurred in the means and. methods of
conducting armed combat.
As a result, just before the war the theory of strategy, opera-
tional art, and tactics had considerable gaps. Our military 'theory
did not fully take into acc=nt the peculiarities of a mobile war if
the latter should suddenly develop. The commanders and staffs did not
undergo the proper training in the leadership of troops, and the cmtrol
of manpower and equipment in such a war.
Military theory failed to give proper attention to the develop-
ment of offensive and particularly of defensive actions of troops.
The inadequate treatment of problems of defense had a negative effect
on the practical skill of conductInA defensive operations on a stra-
tegic and operational scale. Defense, as a rule, was organized hastily,
on a wide front, with an even distribution of forces and equipment a-
long the front. Defense did not have the necessary depth and It bad
a linear character. Counterattacks with forces of mechanized corps
failed to produce an effect because of their hasty organization and
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stability of defense. This was explained
partly by the lock of effective antitank equipment, and partly by the
inefficient use of standard field artillery against tanks.
At the beginning of the war, our troops were also engaged in some
offensive operations. However, even they had serious shortcamings.
First of all, one should point out the unjustified haste in the prep-
aration of these operations. The failure of most of the offensive
battles and operations was, to a considerable extent, the result of
poor organization and inadequate supply of artillery and air support
for the troops. The assault crxoupings which had been formed did not
have the required superiority in manpower and equipment over the enemy.
Therefore, as a rule, the operations did not achieve their purpose.
All this was explained largely by those gaps in our military the-
ory and operational training of command personnel and staffs Which
existed in the prewar period.
During the first days of the war, our troops suffered great los-
ses of manpower and combat equipment in fierce battles. The great
losses in as and combat equipment of the field forces, and the sharp
decrease in the supply of combat equipment from industrial enterprises,
ferced us to make important changes in the organization of troops.
11, became necessary to break up tank divisions and to organize sepa-
rate tank brigades and battalions in their place, as well as to reor-
ganize motorized divisions into rifle divisions. It was also neces-
ary to break up the commands of mechanized and rifle corps and to
transfer their personnel as replacements of losses in front and army
c'Dmmands of the field forces, as well as to man the staffs of reserve
frmalions. Ail this was done under the stress of circumstancees, such
as lack of arms and equipment, and not on the basis of theoretical
reasoning.
During fierce, defensive battles in the summer and early fall
of :1941 on the Leningrad, Smolensk, and Rostov fronts, commanders and
:7eaffs gradually acquired a great deal of experience; they began. to
imp.rove the organization and conduct of combat operations and their
(o711 of soyedineniya and chasti became more effective and flexible,
This was particularly evident in the counteroffensive near Rostov-on-
r:Dy Tinkvin, and Moscow.
The success of the counteroffensive near Moscow was achieved
d.,spite enormous difficulties, and with a ratio of forces which was
not in our favor; it was achieved by our soldiers inflexible deter-
mination to win and by the perfected military art of the Soviet com-
mand. The close cooperation of fronts in launching attacks, the prompt
eommitment of reserves, the coordinated actions of infantry, artillery,
`?? ev-? III I; U-
18
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cont'd)
CPYRGHf
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raids of cavalry corps in the enemy rear area, -- all these factors
contributed to the success of the counteroffensive near Moscow.
However, despite some successes, our higher military leaders
did not yet have sufficient experience in the organization and con-
duct of offensive operations on a large soae, simultaneously along
the entire strategic front. In solving these problems, the military
leaders made serious mistakes and miscalculations in estimating the
enemy capabilities, selecting the direction of principal attacks,
utilizing forces and equipment, and in the control of troops.
These mistakes and miscalculations became evident during the
winter and especially during the summer campaign of 1942. The Soviet
command tried to conduct offensive operations, simultaneously in dif-
ferent directions, with strategic aims; during these operations it
was planned to rout all the principal enemy groupings, operating on
the SovietGerman front. However, the necessary forces and equipment
were not provided for this purpose, even though the command personnel
had gained considerably more experience.
As a result of the dispersal of forces on the entire front, the
incorrect evaluation of enemy capabilities and plans, and the serieus
shortcomings in the organization of offensive operations, it wae not
possible to reach any of the goals of the simmer campaign. The enemy,
who was not tied down in western Europe, was able to assemble superior
forces and to launch a determined attack which was successful. Our
troops, having been defeated on the soutii wing of the front, were forded
to retreat to the banks of the Don and Volga rivers and to the foot-
hills of the principal Caucasian mouatain range. In the following de-
fensive battles in the Kharkov and Voronezh directions, the Soviet
command made use of the newly activated tank army and separate tank
corps for carrying out counterattacks.. Howe-ter? the hasty organiza-
tion of the counterattacks resulted in the fact that these powerful
assault forces were used piecemeal, without the necessary artillery
and air support, i.e., making the same mistakes which occurred in 1941.
However, the mistakes and miscalculations in the organization and
conduct of operations during the 1941-1942 caripc.,f.gn. had some. effect.
They were subjected to critical analysis and. the Swiet commaad drew
many useful conclusions from its experience. During the following
years, our strategic command began to make objective evaluations of
the enemy, to refrain from overestimating its own forces, and to be
more precise in correlating the strategic aims of armed combat with
the possibilities of achieving them. The strategic command becane
more skillful in concentrating superior forces and equipment for the
purpose of achieving decisive results in campaigns and strategic op-
erations. r
App ro
1.?
19 (cont'd)
ApiiiiiiVediratuketeatef2000t0 atm taietlgoReR85f008r7D5R0003.0009(1088-8
organization and conduct of offensive operations and battles, and in
the combat use of artillery, tanks, and aviation. The instructions
(31-asued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces concerning artil-
lery support of offensives and concerning tile principles of combat us
of tank and mechanized corps played an important role in improving
the operational and tactical skill of commanders and staffs.
Owing to the efforts of rear services workers we were able to
replace the losses in the' field forces; by the end of 1942/ it was pos-
sible to organize the Third and Fifth tank armies, 20 tank corps and
7 mechanized corps, and 27 artillery divisions, and to create air ar-
mies on all fronts. As a result, the striking and fire power of the
Soviet Army was sharply increased and favorable conditions developed
for the further improvement of military art.
A total of 17 tank and mechanized corps, several artillery divi-
sions and air armies took part in the operations carried out by our
troops in the area between the Volga and Don rivers, and along the up-
per and central sections of the Don, in the winter of 1942-1943. For
the first time since the beginning of the war, tank and mechanized
corps were. used in these operations for carrying out the maneuver of
encircling large enemy groupings. These corps also played the princi-
pal role in routing the operational reserves of the enemy and in pur-
suing him to a great depth. In these operations, artillery and air
support was fully provided for the breakthrough of enemy position de-
fenses.
The encirclement and destruction of an ixportant grouping of
German fascist troops in the battle of the Vol.ga were accomplished
with equal forces on both sides. This outstanding victory has been.
duly conside.rd as a superior achievment of military art in world his-
tory,
The combat use of mobile troops in operations of the 1942-1943
winter campaign provided many valuable data for improving the organi-
zational structure of tank armies, tank and mechanized corps, and meth-
ods of their operational use and control. They also provided valuable
experience in supplying artillery and air support for the breakthrough
of enemy position defenses, in the combat and operational formation
of troops, and the organization of coordinated action in combat or op-
erations. All this was taken into consideration and put to use by the
Soviet command in preparing for the summer-and-fall campaign of 1943.
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.LLsy tin
Army with new equipment and of improving its organizational forL.- had been
completed. By July 1943, three tank armies and nine separate tank and
mechanized corps were newly organized. The operating fronts had a total
of five newly organized tank armies, each consisting of two or three tank
mechanized corps, as well as 24 separate tank and mechanized corps. The
organization of tank ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya became more flexible
and easily controlled.
The number of personnel in rifle divisions decreased and at the same
time the amount of automatic weapons and antitank weapons increased. By
this time the adminiCizations of rifle corps had been reinstated. For the
purpose of increasing the fire power of combined-arms and tank armies,
army artillery in the form of gun artillery, tank destroyer, and mortar
regiments was incorporated in the TIO personnel of the armies. Artillery
breadthrough corps were also formed.
Both homogeneous and mixed air corps and divisions appeared in the
air armies. The aircraft fleet was newly equipped with improved types of
fighters, ground attack planes, and bombers.
In general, the necessary conditions had been created by the beginning
of the summer-and-fall campaign of 1943 for conducting large-scale opera-
tions with decisive goals.
The battle of Kursk was the central, decisive event of this campaign.
This battle became a real school of strategic and operational-tactical
skill of the Soviet command cadres. The Soviet Supreme Command, which
had all the necessary forces and means of offensive at its disposal,
chose the most favorable type of military action for that particular sit-
uation, i.e., .defense, in the course of which it was planned to wear out
and drain the enemy assault groupings which were ready for offense, and
then, passing to a counterattack and genzral offensive, to finish them
off and thus reach the strategic aims of the campaign.
In the engagements at Kursk, the methods of organization and conduct
of defensive and offensive operations and battles were further developed.
The defense of fronts and armies had great depth. In addition to the
tactical zone of defense which consisted, as a rule, of two strips with
an extensive system of trenches, army and frontal strips were prepared;
strong reserves were stationed there in advance, which were intended to
strike counterattacks against penetrating enemy groupings. The antitank
strongpoints and areas formed the backbone of defense. The defense of
Kursk was too strong for the enemy. The enemy assault groupings were
halted and defeated practically within the boundaries of tactical depth.
(cont'd)
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Tile offensive operations of fronts rind armies were noted for their
high skill of organization and conduct of the breakthrough of a strong
Tenemy position defense. This was achieved by a large-scale concentration
of artillery and mortars in the breakthrough sectors with a density of
150-200 guns and mortars per kilometer, deployment in depth of combat
formations of rifle divisions and corps, and sustained, heavy fire
against the defending enemy from the beginning to the end of the break-
through. To develop a taecical breakthrough into an operational one,
the fronts began to use newly organized tank armies for the first time.
Their actions in the operational depth were in most cases noted for their
high degree of aggressiveness and maneuverability.
All the achievements in the sphere of strategy, operational art, and
tactics gained in the battle of Kursk were further developed in the oper-
ations of 1944 and 1945. Their characteristic features were an extreme
clearness of purpose and high degree of success. This was achieved by
a correct choice of the directions of main attacks, concentration of
superior forces and equipment in these directions, and the selection of
the most effective methods and forms of conducting combat operations.
The principal methods of combat operations of the Soviet Armed
Forces during 1944 and 1945 were the encirclement of enemy groupings
and the splitting up of the enemy front into isolated sections.
During the offensive operations, Soviet troops demonstrated high
skill in forcing wide rivers. Such rivers as the Dnepr, Vistula,
Danube, nnd Oder were forced on the move. The German fascist command
was unable, at any of these rivers, to create a unsurmountable defense
and to check the rapid advance of our troops.
The conduct of subsequent offensive operations in great depth and
without lengthy preparations indicated the high operational maturity of
our command cadres and the combat skill of the troops. Such operations
were conducted by a number of fronts in the western and southwestern
directions during the final stage of the Great Patriotic War.
After defeating Hitler's war machinery in the Great Patriotic War,
the Soviet Armed Forces demonstrated to all the world the unquestionable
superiority of Soviet military art over the military art of fascist
Germany. This superiority was the result of historic advantages of the
Soviet social and state system, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces, the
perfection of their organization and technical supply and the high morale
of Soviet soldiers, who were inspired and guided by the Communist Party
to fight against a treacherous, strong enemy.
The extensive and comprehensive combat experience gained by our
Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, unequaled by any other army
in the world, belongs to us in the full sense of the word. A thorough
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CPYRGHT
APPipeasiFeqUiRg4rt2h9,93gicigaiPW'PrPla9PIn5c1PWLCI3cg? gge?C)r8etained
their significance in present times is an important took of our theoret-
ical work.
The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Postwar Period
The results of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War are
harJ to overestimate. As the result of important political events,
mainly the formation of a world system of socialist countries and a
powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement in different parts
of the world, the distribution of forces in the world arena has changed
radically in the postwar period in favor of peace and socialism. All the
common people in the world have begun to act with greater determination
in the struggle for peace. The peoples of the socialist camp, headed by
the Soviet Union, are leading the fighters for peace.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government, consistently carrying
out the policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social
systems, have repeatedly made proposals concerning a sharp reduction of
the armed forces of the great powers.
Immediately after the war, the Soviet government considerably reduced
its armed forces by inactivating large numbers of soyedineniya and chasti
of the Army and Navy. Soviet troops were withdrawn from Norway, Finland,
Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Iran, China, and Korea, where
they had been during the war. Another great reduction in the Armed Forces
in 1948 represented the final stage of their transition to peacetime condi-
tions.
However, the ruling circles of the US, Great Britain, and West Germany
did not heed the peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union. Under the false
banner of defending the so-called "free world" against the "threat of com-
munism", the US imperialists began to form and strengthen aggressive blocs
and to surround socialist countries with military bases. An intensive
armament race developed in capitalist countries. Militarist circles of
the US and Great Britain placed their trust in nuclear weapons.
Under these conditions our country and other socialist countries were
forced to strengthen their military power, so that they would not be unarmed
in the face of aggression. While reducing the Army and Navy, the party saw
to it that their combat strength would be increased instead of being
decreased.
Owing to the concern of the Party and Soviet government, which skill-
fully guided the efforts of scientists, engineers, and workers, the US
monopoly of nuclear weapons was eliminated soon after the war, i.e., in
1947. Soon after that, we were able to create powerful rocket carriers,
considerably outstripping the United States in this respect. New types of
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PYR
a rAi/iPgWetOjEffmRMatstrngEP,oqMP9vbRWPMT8EFATNqlqR99R9RAA.
HTcationo equipment, and other combat means, were developed. All branches
of the Armed Forces were motorized and mechanized. Troops began to be
supplied with rockets.
In addition to the technical re-equipment of troops and their improved
organization, much attention was given to a scientific analysis and inves-
tigation of the extensive combat experience accumulated during the war
years. Regulations, instructions, and guide lines were worked out, which
regulated the combat training and daily living and service conditions of
the Army and Navy under peacetime conditions. At the same time a number
of measures for the training of military technical cadres were taken.
The principle of one-man command was widely developed in the Army and
Navy. Combat and political training was subordinated to the requirement
that troops must be trained to defeat a strong, technically well equipped
enemy.
In this manner, from the end of the war and during a period of 7 to 8
years, our Armed Forces made great progress in the sphere of combat training
as well as in their technical development, as compared with the period of
the Great Patriotic War. However, at that time the basis of power of the
Army and Navy was still represented by conventional weapons and combat
equipment, which had been used by us in the past war.
It should be noted that the achievements in the building of the Armed
Forces gained during this period could have been even greater, if it had
not been for the difficulties resulting from the Stalin personality cult.
Only the 20th Congress of the CPSUI which decisively exposed the per per-
sonality cult, opened wide vistas in all spheres of Soviet development,
including the military sphere.
An analysis of events, presented at the 2oth Party Congress, showed
that the military threat coming from the imperialist camp has not been
removed. Therefore, we must always maintain our Armed Forces on a level
which would guarantee the defeat of any aggressor.
The next stage in the development of the Armed Forces began in 1953.
At that time a hydrogen bomb test took place in our country, and the mass
production of various types of rockets was organized, which were to serve
as the principal carriers of nuclear weapons. There was a high-speed
development of various types of rocket and nuclear weapons, atomic energy,
electronics, automation, and mauy different technical means of armed
combat. This made it possible, in a relatively short period, to supply
the Soviet Armed Forces with the most modern combat equipment, including
such formidable weapons as intercontInenbal ballistic rockets with power-
ful thermonuclear charges.
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CPYRGHT
ApprovecirrinATALfibm 451g1/4/9.i.G.AtigkliVIPWAFP99140PANINIAtkear
weapons, rocket equipment, and other modern means of combat into all
branches of the Armed Forces, a new stage in their development began
in 1960.
Strategic Rocket Troops were formed in our Armed Forces. On the
strength of their qualities they became the main branch of the Armed
Forces. However, while creating and developing the Strategic Rocket
Troops, we were aware of the fact that in a modern situation it is
impossible to solve all problems of war with only one type of troops.
Therefore, we retained the other branches of the Armed Forces at a
certain numerical strength and in a reasonable proportion; in parti-
cular, we consider it premature to "bury" the infantry, as some people
do.
The deep social-economic, political, and cultural changes which
took place in our country during the postwar period, resulted in quali-
tative changes in the personnel of the Armed Forces. The complex modern
equipment and the new methods of warfare place higher demands on human
beings, and our soldiers, who are educated in the communist spirit and
have a wide cultural horizon and a high degree of general education,
are prepared to fulfill their military duty honorably.
The technical re-equipment of our army required the solution of
another complex problem, i.e. the training of necessary cadres, which
would be able to operate the modern equipment. The number of officers
with higher education, and particularly of engineers and technicians,
was sharply increased in the Army and Navy. From 1953 to 1960, the pro-
portion of officers with higher education was more than doubled; the
number of engineering and technical cadres increased by 38 percent, or
was more than doubled as compared with the number at the beginning of the
war.
The Soviet people, in honoring the heroic team of the Voskhod-2
spaceship, Col BELYAYEV and Lt Col LEONOV, are honoring not only the
conquerors of space, but also courageous officers of the Soviet Army.
We greet in them the entire valiant corps of officers of our Armed
Forces, who reliably defend the achievements of Socialism.
The revolution in military affairs has had a decisive influence on
the methods and forms of armed struggle. In the postwar development of
the Armed Forces, problems relating to Soviet military science and mili-
tary doctrine have been of major importance. Our close attention should
continue to be given to these problems in the future.
(cont'd)
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YRGHT
The Agv d For Re easw . -RD
iet Armed Forces in Their Present Stage of Development
In preparing for the start of a general thermonuclear war, the US
and its partners in aggressive blocs continue an unrestrained arms race,
create huge reserves of rocket and nuclear weapons, furiously fan the
flames of war hysteria, engage in direct military aggression in Indo-
chine, and aggravate the international atmosphere.
As in previous years, the US has again made huge allocations in the
present fiscal year for a further increase in the number of rocket units
armed with Minuteman rockets and atomic submarines with Polaris missiles.
Great Britain occupies the second place in the imperialist camp, follow-
ing the US, in the scale of its nuclear armament. France is speeding up
the building of its awn nuclear strike forces. The revanchists of West
Germany are becoming more and more insistent in demanding rockets and
nuclear weapons. During a number of years, the US has been supplying
the Bundest:ehr with means of delivering nuclear charges to targets and
training West German troops to conduct combat operations under conditions
of a rocket-nuclear war.
The Pentagon strategists, who are trying to prevent the disintegra-
tion of the principal military grouping of imperialists and a weakening
of their own positions in Western Europe, and to achieve a general intensi-
fication of NATO's aggressive actions against the Soviet Union and the
whole socialist camp, have persistently tried to force the creation
NATO's notorious multilateral nuclear forces.
Under these conditions the Soviet Union has been forced not only
to preserve, but to improve its army in every possible way and to maintain
it in constant combat readiness. At present the Soviet Armed Forces are
successfully performing the tasks prescribed by the 22nd Party Congress
and the CPSU Program. Equipped with powerful rocket and nuclear weapons
and other modern military equipment, they have grown into a mighty mili-
tary organization; in cooperation with the fraternal armies of Warsaw
Treaty countries, our Armed Forces are capable of reliably defending the
honor, freedom, and independence of peoples of all socialist countries
against any encroachments by imperialist aggressors.
Owing to the concern of the party and government, our Strategic
Rocket Forces have been equipped with the most modern intercontinental
and global rockets, which can be kept for a long, practically unlimited
time in the highest degree of combat readiness for inflicting shattering
thermonuclear strikes against an aggressor; which can be launched from
occupies positions in any direction, to an unlimited range, and with a
speed many times greater than the speed of sound; which are invulnerable
in flight, and highly accurate in hitting the target.
(cont'd)
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11111111111111111=111111?1
Ap
CPYRGHT
?
proved k9S Ili#Offg0341091011:11; 41MIN&W%90toRgige?23.?41-ity are able
at any minute to fultill their main task, i.e., to protect the territory'
of socialist countries against ,nuclear attacks and against weapons of
enemy air-space attacks. The basis of their combat power is now made
up of qualitatively new arms, i.e., air defense rocket troops and fighter
aviation, equipped with rocket-carrying fighter-interceptors.
The air defense rocket troops are equipped with the latest types of
surface-to-air rocket complexes for various purposes, including long-
range pilotless interceptors, which are unequaled in their conbat capa-
bilities, particularly their operational capability at low and high alti-
tudes and their accuracy in hitting targets.
Modern supersonic rocket-carrying fighter-interceptors, including
those for long-range operation, are capable of destroying cruise missiles
and carrier aircraft at any altitude and with any speed of flight.
The combat capabilities of. our Ground Troops have also increased
greatly. Their fire power and striking power have increased immeasurably.
The operational-tactical rocket troops, equipped with nuclear charges,
represent the main fire power of the Ground Troops. They can hit any
enemy targets at great distances and thereby quickly achieve a turning
point in a combat situation.
Our tank troops are now organized into powerful, mibile tank ob"ye-
dineniya, soyedineniya, and chasti, equipped with first-class tanks.
They have a high ability to withstand enemy nuclear attacks, high combat
readiness, mobility, and striking power, and are capable of quickly pene-
trating into areas of nuclear blasts and completing the defeat of the
enemy..
Our glorious infantry, which distinguished itself on the battlefields
during the past war, has become completely motorized. Our motorized rifle
troops are now equipped with armored vehicles with high cross-country
ability, tanks, and other modern types of weapons, including first-class
automatic small arms and powerful antitank weapons.
The WO Troops of Ground Troops are also evipped with their own
surfact-to-air guided missile complexes, antiaircraft artillery, and
various types of radiotechnical equipment.
Qualitative changes have taken place in the airborne troops, and
their soyedineniya and chasti are now equipped with the most perfected
means of combat. The airborne troops have modern, self-propelled, power-
ful weapons, both long-range and close-range, and highly mobile motor and
tractor equipment. Our military transport planes are capable of trans-
porting not only personnel, but also rockets, tanks, guns, motor vehicles)
as well as various types of parachute landing equipment, which makes it
possible to drop troops together with weapons and combat equipment into the
enemy rear_area.
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APPfgekintroMIPMFMNIRe: rCjai remen s an er
Warfare. Our combat aviation 1..s become rocket-currying. It ..,.1-
PYRGHTneniya and chasti are equipped with supersonic aircraft armed %Ith nuclear
weapons and new rocket weapons. Our rocket-carrying aviation, which has
aircraft exceeding the speed of sound, capable of reaching tremendous
altitudes, overcoming hUge distances, and striking heavy blows at the
enemy, is prepared to destroy reliably from great distances not only :;6A-
tionary objectives, but also tall, mobile, ground and maritime targets.
Various aviation rocet1 of the types "air-to-surface" and "air-to-air"
have now become the principal type of weapon, both for supersonic rocket-
carrying aircruft and for fighters and fighter-bombers.
Our Navy also fully meets the requirements of modern warfare. Its
power is based principally on atomic submarines, equipped with rockets
and torpedoes with nuclear charges. The 11,Aval rocket-carrying end anti-
submarine aviation has undergone a great development.
Soviet atomic rocket-carrying submarines have practically unlimited
radius of action and are capable of striking blows with ballistic, self-
guided rockets from a submerged position, from distances of several thou-
sand kilometers. Our Navy is supplied with everything necessary to defend
Soviet shores, foil attacks of an aggressor from the sea, neutralize enemy
assault groupings, and strike shattering blows against aircraft-carrying
and rocket-carrying ships and submarines of the enemy.
The large-scale use by all branches of the Armed Forces of rockets
and nuclear weapons, and of new equipment facilitating the effective use
of such weapons, made it necessary for our command cadres to develop and
master modern methods of warfare. Methods of conducting combat operations
of troops during the initial period of a war are being studied success-
fully. Special attention has been given to the preparation and practical
study of measures to maintain high combat readiness of troops, as well as
methods for the reliable repulse of a surprise nuclear attack by the enemy
and the wrecking of his aggressive plans by timely delivery of shattering
blows against him.
The Communist Party has educated the Armed Forces in the spirit of
Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, in the spirit of
friendship, mutual aid, and military cooperation with the armies of
socialist countries. With the formation of a world system of social-
ism, the international obligations of the Soviet Armed Forces have
increased. In defending the state interests of their motherland, our ,
Armed Forces are always ready to fulfill to the end their international
obligations toward fraternal peoples of all socialist countries.
Truly fraternal relations have been established between the Soviet
Armed Forces and the armies of Warsaw Treaty countries, as well as other
socialist countries. The Soviet Union has always rendered selfless aid
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CPYRGHT
PPsvgfarRfig8gfgOD/08/09 CIA-RDP85.T00875R000300Q9Q008-8ln ast
countries in supplying tneir armed rorces with
modern weapons and combat equipment. The socialist countries coordinate
their defensive measures, exchange experiences in combat and political
training of troops, organize joint exercises of staffs and troops, conduct
troop maneuvers, and arrange mutual visits of ships. Many officers of
fraternal armed forces are being trained in Soviet military academies and
become thoroughly familiar with progressive Soviet military science.
The Soviet Union is a peace-living country. It tries to live in peace
and cooperation with all peoples. The Communist Party and the Soviet gover-
nment have consistently fought for a relaxation of international tension,
for the prevention of a new thermonuclear world war, and for peaceful coex-
istence and regulation of acute international problems.
However, there are still reactionary forces in the world which are
plotting a new world war, hoping to halt the advance of history with the
help of arms. Theze forces, headed by the frantic US imperialists, have
recently increased their dangerous provocations. The US imperialists are
continuing to plot against heroic Cuba, they are practising open military
intervention in the Congo, expanding the undeclared war against the people
of South Vietnam, organizing attacks against Laos and Cambodia, and per-
forming acts of direct aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam.
As indicated in the decree of the March Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee CPSU: "At present, particular importance has been acquired by the
joint actions of communist parties of all countries, and of all peace-
living and democratic forces, in repulsing the aggression of US imperialists
against South Vietnam, in defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
and in defense of (all) peoples subject to imperialist aggression."
The Soviet Armed Forces are vigilantly watching the intrigues of US
reactionaries. The ruling circles of imperialist countries cannot help
realizing that if they take the risk, of involving mankind in a new thermo-
nuclear war, they will only hasten the complete and final destruction of
the capitalist world which has outlived itself.
The Soviet Armed Forces, which are equipped with everything necessary
to restrain any aggressor, are a reliable shield of the Soviet Union and
of the whole socialist camp. Together with the armed forces of fraternal
socialist countries, the Soviet Armed Forces are confidently guarding
peace and vigilantly protecting the creative labor of their peoples, who
are actively building communism.
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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090008-8
The Communist Party as the Inspirer and Organizer
of Victory in the Great Patriotic War
by Army Gen A. YEPISHEV
CPYRGHT
The 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in the
Great Patriotic War is a festive occasion for the peoples of our coun-
try and for all progressive mankind. Millions of Soviet people, for
whom the grim and heroic period of the post war is a par.... of their own
lives, celebrate this glorious anniversary with deep emotion. This im-
portant date also stirs the emotions of those who were not personal
witnesses of or participants in the events of the terrible war years,
but whose fates were also decided in the fierce battles against the
fascist invaders.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War had
an enormous effect on the whole course of social development. Few
events in history, even those which are remembered from generation to
generation, can compare with the past war in its consequences.
The echoes of the great victory are now heard in the mighty ad-
vance in the building of conmunism in our country; its fiery reflection
is seen on all the banners of socialism which were raised in postwar
years over a number of countries of Europe and Asia, and over revolu-
tionary Cuba -- a country of the American continent.
The battles on the Saviet-Gernan front, which were unprecedented
in their scale and fierceness, continued for almotA; four years. They
demanded the greatest concentration of spiritual and material forces
of the Soviet people. Our country had to endure particular hardships
during the early period of the war, when the Soviet Army was forced to
retreat under the pressure of German fascist hordes, leaving behind
native cities and villages.
The most severe trials, which would have broken any bourgeois
state, did not cause the Soviet people to waver and did not weaken
their determination to fight and win. The war, which had from its
very first day become a mortal combat between a socialist state and
a fascist state -- the product of extreme imperialist reactionaries
demonstrated the incontestable superiority of the economic, politi-
cal, and military organization of socialist society and its dominat-
ing Marxist-Leninist ideology. The greatest advantages of socialism
over capitalism were brilliantly put into effect owing to the daily
and wise leadership of the Communist Party, which guided the country,
the people, and the Armed Forces.
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CPYRGHT
Forty-five years ago, in March 1920, V. I. Lenin stressed the
decisive importance of party leadership during the years of the Civil
Mar. He stated: "And only owing to the fact that the party was stand-
ing guard, that it was strictly disciplined, and that its authority
milted all departments and government offices; because hundreds, thou-
sands, and finally, millions of people acted In unity in accordance with
the slogan given by the Central Committee and because countless sacri- ?
flees were made, -- for these reasons the miracle, which occurred, could
take place. Only for these reasons, and despite the repeated campaigns
of imperialists of the Entente and imperialists of the whole world,
we were in a position to win." (Complete Collection of Works, Vol.
4o, page 240).
This conclusion drawn by Lenin may be fully applied to the Great
Patriotic War, the most difficult of all wars whihc our country has
ever experienced. Party leadership and the great political., ideologi-
cal., and organizational work of the party in front and rear areas made
it possible to overcome the serious setbacks of the initial period of
wart to halt the enemy ?who had not experienced defeat in the war against
bourgeois armies, and then to rout completely the imperialist army of
fascist Germany -- one of the strongest armies in the world -- and
the armies of its satellites.
During the war years, the party added brilliant, unforgettable
pages to its history. Each one of them. arouses in all Communists and
all Soviet people a feeling of pride in the great, achievennnts of the
party and a desire to do everything passible for a successful perform-
ance of the grandiose tasks of communist building, included in the
CPSU Program, In turning to these pages of party history we find
high standards of determination and ability to orientate correctly in
a complex situation, to choose suitable forms and methods of work
which meet specific conditions, and to strive for the best possible,
effective results. These standards have not lost their validity up to
the present time. The experience in mass organization, gained by the
patty during the war, is a most valuable asset and is helpful even to-
day in solving the most complex and vital problems concerning the fUr-
ther.strengthening of the Armed Forces and. tibe defense capability of
the Soviet Union as a whole.
At the beginning of the war, the party and the Soviet people were
faced with the most difficult tasks of transforming the country into
a single fighting camp and of converting all the work to wartime needs.
The transition from peace to war is always very complex in the life of
every country. It was extremely complicated for the Soviet Union be-
cause of a large number of unfavorable conditions of an objective and
subjective nature.
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PYRG
pprovcd ror Rcica3c : CIA-
The easy victories of the Hitlerites in Europe gave them an ad-
vantageous military-strategic position, and enabled them to deploy
_-1-almost their whole active, highly mechanized Ground Forces, large forces
of the Air Force and the Navy, against our country. Hitler's military
command had previously concentrated the troops directed against our
country in large groupings, and had thereby gained an important superi-
ority in forces and equipment on the principal strategic directions
in the early part of the war. At the beginning of the war against the
USSR, the German fascist troops had already gained considerable combat
experience and were ready to inflict powerful blows.
Fascist Germday had placed at its service an industrial base which
included the production capacities of eleven occupied European countries
and considerably exceeded the industrial base of the Soviet Union.
This explains, to a large extent, the fact that despite the htge increase
in economic. capabilities of the USSR, achieved during the prewar Five-
Year Plans, the armament of our Army and Navy at the beginning of the
war was still lagging behind that of Hitler's troops.
All this could not fail to influence the course of the armed strug-
gle and the situation in which our country found itself, after engag.;.
ing in single combat with German fascism; the party was required to ex-
ert enormous efforts to change the course of events at the Soviet-German
front which was extremely unfavorable during the first stage of the
war.
Among the reasons for the difficult and extremely dangerous sit-
uation facing the Soviet Armed Forces and the country as a whole at the
beginning of the war, by far not the least important wer the great losses
suffered by party, government, and military cadres as a result of un-
justified repressions during the time of the personality cult. The
serious mistakes and miscalculations permitted by Stalin in evaluating
the military and political situation on the eve of the German fascist
attack also had a negative effect. However, the personality cult, de-
spite all of its harmful consequences, could certainly not change the
nature of the socialist system, or shake the theoretical, political,
and organizational foundations of the Communist Party. The party re-
mained the collective, leading, and guiding force of Soviet society.
In the war against fascism, during the most difficult period in the
life of our country, the greatness of our Leninist party, the power-
ful, effective strength of its ideas, and the wisdom and insight of its
policy became even more evident, and its authority as a leader and
organizaer of the people increased even more.
In all of its activities, the Communist Party was guided by V. I.
Lenin's instruction to the effect that "once it comes to war, every-
thing has to be subordinated to the interests of war, the whole internal
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CPYRGHT
? ?
6 ?
Apmegf FareRggnagy2igs01040 Lb. attay125tT00?4pj 5 Ra0n2 ORO Or 0 078
e slightest
hesitation in this respect is permissible." (Complete Collection of
Works, Volume 41, page 117.)
As the first condition of mobilizing all forces of tne country
and the people for repulsing the enemy, it was necessary to achieve
a complete break in the consciousness of workers of ind,ustry, transport,
and agriculture, and of army and navy personnel; it was necessary to
reach a point where they would completely renounce their peacetime
attitudes and would have a clear idea of the character and scale of
military problems facing the country and of the requirements made by
war to all Soviet people. With Leninist directness, the party told
the people the truth about the terrible danger threatening the coun-
try and about the difficulties which had to be Paced on the way to
victory. An editorial in Pravda, 24 June 1941, stated: "We are not
counting on an easy victory. We know that victory over fascism and,
over the foreign hordes which have invaded our country will be diffi-
cult and will demand many sacrifices... The decisive hour has come...
Victory depends on us -- our selflessness, our discipline.. .and our
readiness to sacrifice everything for the sake of victory."
In a directive to party and soviet organizations dated 29 ;bane 1941,
the Central Committee of the party and the Council of People's Commis-
oars presented an extensive program for the struggle against the German
fascist invades.
Workers and peasants, scientists and cultural workers, and person-
nel of the .emy and Navy of our country responded eagerly to the party's
appeal to engage in a selfless struggle against German faseism. Our
people will never forget the highly patriotic atmosphere of the meet-
ings which were held in the first days of the war throughout the coune
try. The Soviet people assured the party of their readiness to give
all, of their strength to the cause of victory.'
From its very first day, the great Patriotic War became a war of
all the people. The Party must be given, credit for this, as it was able
to explain to the Soviet people the just character of. the ware te de-
fine Its aims clearly and precisely, to maintain and otremethen the
Soelet people's confidence in victoryesen under the most difficult con-
ditions, and to inspire theel to great leeroic feats in the name of free-
dom and independence of tteir country and the bright future of all man-
kind.
In carrying out its wartime program and striving to transform the
country into a single fighting camp, the Communist Party did an enor-
mous amount of work for the purpose of adapting the structure of party
and state organs, and the level of their political and organizational
activities, to the new, military conditions and tasks.
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Ammoyediziatileigmaiwommipik-APPomPRIPPWRNSWer
In the country, i.e. the state, military, and economic leadership,
(31-0.n the organ which would be able to unite the efforts of the front
and rear areas, and the activities of all government institutions and
organizations. The State Committee of Defense, established on 30 June
19411 became such an extraordinary organ.
Somewhat later, city committees for defense were formed in a num-
ber of cities near the front, i.e., in Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol',
Murmansk, Rostov, Kursk, Voronezh, Tula, and several others. These
committees included the first Secretaries of oblast, city, and rayon
party committees, the chairmen of executive committees of soviets of
workers' deputies, and other responsible party, soviet, and military
workers.
Wartime conditions required the creation of a number of new peo-
ple's commissariats and administrations. Thus, for the purpose of more
efficient supervision of the military economy, the all-union people's
commissariats of tank and mortar industry, and the main administrations
of military industrial construction and material reserves were forme,
and the rights of military commissars were expanded. For the sake of
strengthening party influence on the solution of important economic
problems, substantial changes were made in the structure of central and
local party organs. For the same purpose, the number of Central Commit-
tee party organizations at large industrial enterprises, construction
sites, and transport enterprises, was increased. In November 1941 the
Central Committee of the Party issued a decree concerning the formation
of political sections in MTS's and sovkhozes. A muter of other equally
important measures were carried out in the reorganization of party and
state organs. The purpose of this reorganization was to permit the
party to include in its range of influence all fields of activity and
all spheres of public life connected with the conduct of war.
The Central Committee gave particular attention to the fact that
the party apparatus should show a maximum degree of efficiency, initia-
tive, and operational ability, and that it should serve as a model in
this respect for the whole state apparatus.
Party organizations served as an example everywhere for the effi-
cient implementation of directives of the Central Committee. They worked
with particular intensity in areas near the front in the Ukraine, Belo-
russia, Moldavia, the Baltic republics, and the western part of the
RSFSR, rendering direct assistance to the Soviet Army, and aiding the
formation and equipment of new chasti and soyedineniya and their rapid
advance to the front. Party organizations made it possible for plants
and factories to convert to wartime production at high speeds; and
they supervised the construction of defense installations, the formation
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YRGHT
APPE'Vaesal-u se 2.00U/013/09 LAA-Kl..Wob I OW ibKUUU.SUULMUUt3-13
sili.lE lakePart loan detachments, and the evacuation of civilian?
and material valuables to the rear area. Oblast'? city, and rayon
committees of the party worked arount the clock.
The war gave priority to problems, of strengthening the Armed Forces,
and educating military personnel in the spirit of courage, daring,
heroism and the constant desire to perfect their combat skill and their
ability to fight against a strong, experienced enemy. These problems
were given major importance in the activities of the party. From the
first to the last day of the war, the party gave unremitting attention
to increasing its guiding influence on the Armed Forces and to the
organization of effective party-political work among the troops, which
would both in its form and its content fully meet the requirements
for a successful solution of complex military tasks The party car-
ried out a redistribution of its forces, which was unprecedented in
scale, and sent its very best party members to the front. At the same
time it effected a number of other measures to further the continuing
growth of the party nucleus in the Army and Navy.
The Central Committee sent a large number of the most experienced
party cadres into military work, and they took an active part in the
leadership of troops. Almost one third of the members of the Central
Committee served at the fronts during the Great Patriotic War. In
addition to members of the Central Committee, 120 seeretaries of cen-
tral committees of the communist parties of union republics, and of o-
blast and kray party committees, as well as thousands of other lead-
ing party workers, joined the Armed Forces. Many of them were, members
of military councils, chiefs of political administrations of fronts and
fleets, and of political sections of armies and flotillas.
In addition to the transfer of parf.y members to responsible party-
polifical work in the Army and Navy, the party mobilized large masses
of communists to serve at the front as political fight5is, i.e., rank-.
and-file Red Army men. They gave reliable support to smmanders and
political workers, acted as leaders for non-party members, showea a good
example of order and discipline, and served as models of enduranee,
equanimity, daring, and initiative in combat. During the first 6 months
of the war, in addition to party members who were drafted into the Armed
Forces in the regular ca71-up, over 100,000 party members and candidates
joined as a result of party mobilizations. By tbe end of 1941, party
organizations of the Armed Forces included more than a million commu-
nists, I.e., twice as many than before the beginning of the war.
During the years of the war, a total of over 1)600,000 party mem-
bers and candidates from local and regional party organizations went
to the front; this number included about one million men who joined the
Army and Navy during the first 6 months of the war.
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OS ? CIA-RuPao u0K7oRuOu300090u0o-8
APPONMEdViIift*Meaing*-rotces playea an extremely important
role in the early part of the war. Naturally, it could not be carried
out with the same intensity, or remain the principal means of strength-
ening army and navy party organizations, during all the following stages
in the struggle against the German fascist invaders. Therefore, during
the entire period of the war, the party regarded as its mbst important
GLAask the increase of party membership in the troops by recruiting the
"best soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the fight against
German fascism. Questions concerning admission to party membership
were handled in a new manner in the Army and Navy. It became evident
at the begtnning of the war that the requirement contained in the regu-
lations, according to which recommendations for admission to the party
could be given only by party members who had been in the party at least
3 years and had known' the applicant for at least one year, was imprac-
ticable in wartime situstions and represented an artificial obstacle
to the growth of party ranks. With this in mind, the Central Committee
issued the following decision on 19 August 1941: "Red Army soldiers,
and connanding personnel. of the Red Army, who have distinguished them-
selves in battle and have served as models of heroism, and who have ex-
pressed the wish to join the party, may submit recommendations from three
party members of one year's standing who have known the applicants
for even less than one year by having worked together. In this case,
the applicant must present a combat efficiency report from the politi-
cal leader of a podrazdeleniye or the commissar of a chast'."
On 9 December 1941, the Central Committee issued a new decree,
which made it possible to admit soldiers who had distinguished them-
selves in combat to party membership after a 3-month period as a party
candidate.
This relaxation of the rules concerning admission to party mem-
bership was completely justified at a time when the fate of the Soviet
state was being decided and when each communist was required to be con-
stantly prepared for self-sacrifice. In passing these decisions, the
Central Committee was guided by V. I. Lenin's statement that the party
trusts "a party member who comes to us at a difficult time." (Complete
Collection of Works, Vol. 39, page 361)
By the end of 1942 party organizations of the Army and Navy had
more than 2 million members. Therefore, during the period of only
one year the number of party members in the Armed Forces had almost
doubled. This made it possible to increase party influence on the
masses of military personnel and it was one of the major factors de-
termining the great turning point in the war against fascist Germany.
During the 4 years of the Great Patriotic War, party organiza-
tions of the Soviet Army and Navy admitted to their ranks about 4 mil-
lion party candidates and over 2.5 million party members. The number
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of communists with the troops increased more than fivefold, and by
July l95 it had reached almost 3 million. Party and Komsomol members
represented about one half of the entire personnel of the Armed Forces
by the end of the war.
All communists, no matter whether they were commanders of fronts,
members of military councils, or rank-and-file soldiers, showed an
equal degree of high responsibility for the fate of their socialist
Motherland, and for the victory of the great cause of the Leninist
party. They were faithful to their duty and fought the enemy selfr
lessly and with unflinching steadfastness. Together with the commu-
nists, Komsomol members fought in the first ranks of defenders of the
Motherland. It is characteristic that party members and candidates
constituted almost two thirds of all servicemen who were awarded the
tiUe Hero of Soviet Union during the war, while almost 50 percent
c)! those who received orders and medals were communists and, Komsomol
meMbers.
The party demanded that all commanders seek the support of party
organizations and make full use of the leading role of communists in
solving all combat, training, and educational tasks. At the sane
tine the party required political organs, and party and Komsomol or-
ganizations, to increase the scope of their activities, improve their
ideological content, and fully subordinate party work and all efforts
of communists to the further strengthening of combat capabilities of
the troops.
Military councils of fronts and fleets, and of armies and flo-
tillas, played an important role in the life and combat activities
of troops. During the entire period of the war, military councils
were, and have remained up to the present time, the most authoritative
organs through which the party implements its policy in the Armed
Forces. Without military councils it would have been impossible to
carry out successfully-the comprehensive and complex tasks, which
faced the Soviet Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic War.
The growth of party influence on the troops, the improvement of
party-political work, and the elimination of the breat between the
activity of political organs and the specific tasks of chasti and .
podrazdeleniya, which was beginning to show at one time, was consid-
erably aided by the reorganization, on the initiative of the Central
Committee, of sections and administrations for political propaganda,
with their limited functions, into political sections and administra-
tions. Political organs received more extensive rights. This increased
their authority, revitalized organizational party work, and made it
possible to exert direct party influence on all aspects of military
life.
S. STI
III I; I" A ?g?; el; ?egg iii-iii; ;
37
YRGH
APPRIalii4giffMalfteN?240g9ei YritcifiDwPegi-PrPt8e7naret?03(3.:(43gs?1%3r-8
the activities of political organs, party, and Komsomol organizations
in the Armed Forces, and in showing constant concern for the enrich-
ment of party-political work by new and more effective forms and meth-
ods, the party gave the utmost attention to the content of such work,
insisting that its ideological trend should meet the conditions during
each stage of the Great Patriotic War and should Correspond to the
solution of specific tasks in battles, operations, and engagements.
During the early period of war, when heavy defensive battles were
waged at the front, the whole content of party-political work was de-
termined by the party appeals: "Fight to the end!" and "Not one step
backward!" During the second and third periods of. the war, when our
Armed Forces were engaged in driving the enemy from the Soviet land
and rendering aid to the peoples of Europe in their struggle against
the fascist yoke, party-political work was aimed at strengthening the
spirit of offensive among Soviet soldiers and at achieving a speedy
defeat of the enemy. Each day of the Great Patriotic War confirmed
the words of V. I. Lenin, who said that "wherever political work among
the troops is conducted with the greatest care, there will be no lack
of discipline, there will be better order and morale, and more victor-
ies." (Complete Collection of Works, Vol. 39, page 56.)
Party-political work in the Armed Forces, which rallied the ranks
of military personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet govern-
ment, developing in the soldiers a sense of selfless devotion to their
socialist Motherland and strengthening their readiness to fulfill their
patriotic and international duty, became during the war one of the
most important sources of the moral and political superiority of the
Soviet Army and Navy over the troops of Hitler's Germany. and its al-
lies.
Many books have been written and will continue to be written
about the exceptional determination and inflexible courage of Soviet
soldiers, educated by the Communist Party. It is quite impossible
in a journal article even to list the names of well-known heroes in
the struggle for freedom and independence of our country. We want
to point out only the fact that the heroism of Soviet soldiers was
truly on a mass scale and many glorious names still remain unknown.
The title Hero of Soviet Union was awarded to 11,525 servicemen for
outstanding combat feats. More than 7 million soldiers, sailors,
sergeants, officers, generals, and admirals were decorated with or-
ders and medals of the USSR for distinguished combat services.
In giVing particular attention to the increase of spiritual [moral]
strength in the Arm and Navy, and the achievement of moral and politi-
cal superiority of Soviet troops over the troops of fascist Germany,
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.-PLune- uommuruorcerviry was guiciecFoylhDePg atemen s of v. I.. iienin. to
AOL, ALIaNifludRul abwa 00 t
the effect that even people who are most loyal to the cause of the
CPYRGHT revolution will be quickly destroyed by the enemy if they are not
adequately armed and supplied with food, and not trained.
. .
? 4
Our party consistently implemented the Leninist principles of
building the Army and Navy, which are the foundation of the vital
activity of the Soviet military organization; the party furthered
th,t development of military theory in every way possible and persist-
ently introduced the latest achievements of military art into combat
practice,
Under the most difficult wartime conditions, the party trained
remarkable Soviet command cadres, thereby replacing the losses inflicted
on the Armed Forces by the unjust repressions of 1937 and the follow-
ing prewar years. Reared and promoted 'by the party, the military lead-
ers had all the necessary qualities to lead the troops successfully
In the war which was being waged with the most defininte political
goals, and which was noted for its unprecedented scope of armed combat.
Commanders at all levels demonstrated high party qualities and excel-
lent organizational abilities in the course of the war.
The victory of the Soviet Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic
War was achieved by the selfless efforts of all Soviet people, The
Armed Forces received great help from the partisan movement in. rout-
ing the German fascist invaders. As a result of the organizing and
guiding activity of the Commanist Party, the partisan movement devel-
oped on a wide scale in all of the areas under temporary occupation,.
The leadership of the partisan movement was in the hands of a special
commission. attached to the Central Committee of the party,
The armed struggle conducted in the rear of the enemy by tens
and hundreds of thousands of partisans, in the Ukraine, Belorussia,
Moldavia, the Baltic republics, and the western regions of the RSFSR,
was a logical result of the moral and political unity of Sovdet so-
ciety. Its traditions are rooted in the history of our people, who
were never reconciled to the presence of foreign. conquerors in their
country.. The Communist Party gave the partisan movement its organi-
zational forms and ensured its high effectiveness.
The victorious outcome of the war was decisively influenced by
the fact that the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, created
a well organized and speedily growing military economy despite all war-
time difficulties, and steadily supplied the Armed Forces with every-
thing necessary for combating the enemy, while at the same time pro-
viding an adequate supply of goods and food for the civilian population.
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YRGH
Appmetzgarimepasmopsepicmt:eiffivrpTiveRIERP.I0UPti8
crease of activity and initiative of the workers; el socialist compe-
tition for assistance to the front became widespread throughout the
country; and various patriotic projects of workers were undertaken.
Leading workers increased their established output norms fivefold,
tenfold, or twentyfold. The flow of arms and ammunition to the front
increased with every day, with every weSk, and with every month.
As early as 1942, the Soviet Union had surpassed fascist Germany in
the output of basic types of arms and combat equipment.
Owing to the titanic efforts of the Communist Party, the Soviet
military economy reached an extremely high level of development in
the course of the war and successfully endured the "single combat"
againat the military economy of German fascism. Public ownership
of means of production, and a planned use of material resources for
the most complete satisfaction of urgent Wartime needs, were the sources
of inexhaustible economic capabilities of the Soviet Union in its war
against Hitler's fascism.
The war years were a period of constant growth of the Communist
Party's guiding activities. It was party leadership that indicated
the shortest way during the war to an effective use of the advantages
of a socialist economy, of the Soviet political system, and of our mili-
tary organization -- which was a new type of organization. In this
connection one should not fail to stress the great importance of the
foreign policy of our Leninist party in the victorious conclusion of
the war.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which was skillfully guided
by the Communist Party, foiled the attempts of the imperialists to
create a single anti-Soviet front and to solve their conflicts at the
expense of the USSR. The party's outstanding achievement was the
formation of an anti-Hitler coalition, consisting of the Soviet Union,
England, the US, and other countries fighting against fascist agres-
sion.
The establ t of allied relations between the USSR and capi-
talist countric -II West represented a most important turning
point in intern,* relations during the period of World War II.
This turning point occurred not only as a result of objective circum-
stances, but was prepared by the foreign policy activities of the
Soviet Union. It became possible because the .Communist Party constantly
followed V. I. Lenin's precepts to the effect that a strong enemy may
be defeated "only with the greatest concentration of effort and with
the mandatory, painstaking, careful, and skillful use of... .any, even
the slightest, opportunity to acquire a powerful ally, even though
he may be temporary, unsteady, unstable, unreliable, and conditional."
(Complete Collection of Work-, Vol. 41, page 55.)
Aso ST-I
III I; I" ???; II; ?III 111'111; ;
CPYRGH
uz - - . -4- III U I- -.-; -gig gig-gig;
? yl .ne'may f no many ac s w ch prove that
in a number of cases the Western powers, pursuing their imperialistic
aims, did not hesitate to commit direct violations of their allied
duty during the war years. However, it remains an indisputable fact
that even under such conditions the anti-Hitler coalition was suffi-
ciently strong and, in the final analysis, brought the war against the
fascist bloc to a victorious end, while at the same time the Soviet
Union was making the decisive contribution to the defeat of the fas-
cist aggressors,
The wartime experience once again provided convincing evidence
that cooperation between countries belonging to opposite social sys-
tems is possible and expedient. The Communist Party showed the ut-
most flexibility and insight in its foreign policy and provided the
Soviet people and their Armed Forces with increasing international
support in their heroic struggle against fascism.
The Leninist internal and foreign policy of the Communist Party,
its correct leadership in the military, economic, and other spheres
of life of the Soviet Union, and its inspired ideological education
work, which aroused the Soviet people to legendary exploits in rear
areas and at the front, had a decisive effect on the victory of th-
Soviet Union over Hitler's Germany and its allies. This conclusion
has been confirmed by all the experience and the whole history of the
Great Patriotic War.
The war clearly demonstrated the invincible strength of the Marx-
ist-Leninism and the revolutionary energy of the party became the
powerful force in the strwegle against German fascism which led the
Soviet people to the great military victory. These ideas, which were
dear tb the heart and easily understandable to the people and the sol-
diers of the Armed Forces, inspired them with a strong faith in the
invincibility of the Soviet socialist system, and resulted in high
political consciousness and convictions of our people and our army
and navy personnel.
The turbulent war years strengthened the Communist Party and
it became more Closely linked with the people and the great masses
of soldiers. It is significant that about 9 million leading Soviet
people joined the party as candidates or members during the war.
This was more than twice the number of party members and candidates
in June 1941. Despite great losses among communists at the front,
the party membership had considerably increased by the end of the
war and the party had grown stronger in every respect. The Soviet
people and their Armed Forces have always recognized and continue to
recognize in the Communist Party their wise, experienced leader and
guide.
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PREL9frgEQ.Eilfitcgfga Pigq91a.amilimPsts, IZing force of
Soviet society, directs the tireless energy of our heroic and victor-
ious people toward peaceful constructive labor and toward the solution
universal, historical tasks in the large-scale building of commu-
sm. The workers of our country and the personnel of the Soviet
Army and Navy warmly support the general Leninist policy of the CPSU,
which was worked out at the 20th, 21st, and 22d party congresses and
included in the CPSU Program. This was clearly shown by the nation-
wide approval of decisions of Central Committee plenuts; Which took
place in October and November 1964 and in March 1965.
The principal aim of foreign policy activities of the Communist
Party is to assure peaceful conditions for the building of a commu-
nist society in the USSR and the development of a worldwide system of
socialism, and together with all peace-loving peoples to save mankind
from a new destructive war. While consistently defending the Leninist .
principle of peaceful coexistence, the Communist Party persistently
calls for a termination of the cold war which has been poisoning the
international atmosphere for the past two decades. The party has de-
clared the unfailing readiness of the Soviet Union to return, in its
relations with the US, England, and France, to the situation existing
during the war against the fascist bloc, i.e., to resume an effective
cooperation, which is to be subordinated to the interests of world-
wide peace. The party believes that since fruitful cooperation between
countries belonging to different social systems was possible and feas-
ible during the war, it can and should be accomplished under peace-
tine conditions, particularly now, when the question of war and peace
has acquired acute importance and has become a matter of life or death
for hundreds of millions of people.
In showing sincere concern for the strengthening of peace, the
Communist Party and the Soviet government have worked out a large num-
ber of specific, effective measures aimed at a relaxation of the pres-
ent international tensions. The Soviet proposals, submitted for con-
sideration to the United Nations, provide for a reduction of military
budgets of great powers, a withdrawal of all foreign troops to their
own national territories and the abolishment of foreign military bases
on foreign territories, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,
prevention of its further spreading, creation of nuclear-free zones
in various parts of the world, and cessation of all types of nuclear
teating.
However, the peaceful policy of the Communist Party and the So-
viet government has met with stubborn resistance on the part of the
more reactionary circles of imperialist powers. They have not ceased
the armament race, which was begun almost the next day after the end
of World War II. According to official data published by NATO, mili-
tary expenditures of NATO countries during 1964 increased sharply
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42
CPYRGI-
Am
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and have reached almost 76 billion dollars. Over 54 billion dollars
of this amount is spent by the US. During a one-month period, coun-
T tries of the NATO bloc now spend an amount on armament which would
be sufficient to cover all expenses for irrigating the Sahara desert.
US imperialists and their partners in aggressive, military-politi-
cal blocs have deliberately aggravated tensions in regard to natters
of mutual interest of the two systems, and have engaged in constant
provocations which may at any moment thrust mankind into a new and
even more destructive, nuclear, world war.
The 20th anniversary of the defeat of fascist Germany is an ex-
tremely appropriate occasion to remind people of the threat to world-
wide peace caused by the reckless policy of Western powers, mainly
the US, aimed at restoring German militarism and encouraging revan-
chist aspirations of West Germany. Ignoring the lessons of history
and neglecting the interests of their own security, the Western powers
are now once more placing arms in the hands of those who, during the
lifetime of one generation, kindled the devastating fires of two world
wars. With the support of the US, England, and France, West Germany
has created one of the strongest armed forces in Western Europe. The
aims of West German revanchists correspond entirely with the plan of
creating NATO multilateral nuclear forces, both the US and the British
versions of the plan giving the Bonn militarists access to nuclear
weapous.
The military preparations of imperialists, who still hope to es-
tablish with the force of arms the complete 'domination of the capitalist
system on our planet, and to hinder the further development of the
workers' liberation struggle, present the greatest threat to the se-
curity of nations and the future of all mankind.
In view of the present correlation of forces in the world, the
imperialists have no chance whatsoever to carry out their wild schemes.
Moreover, as compared with the recent past, there is now a real pos,-
sibility to prevent a new world war. However, while indicating this
possibility, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union warns all peace-
loving peoples against any, even the slightest signs of complacency
and unconcern in the face of the military danger created by the ag-
gressors. The party cautions that aside from the current real pos-
sibility of preventing a war, there is a no less real military dan-
ger, which is more threatening than in the past because of the appear-
ance of nuclear weapons. This does not signify, of course, that any
possibility of a war with the use of conventional weapons has already
been eliminated; however, the main factor which the imperialists are
counting on is a surprise nuclear attack.
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CPY
1
;MO
A . . . - . 11"2 rrl rrT7MasToTatagisTe1:11?1 ri al TJA-11 isTokir/LirloTolok4sToToleToTeoRilk:
In view of a real threat of a nuclear attack, counteraction to
the aggressive plans of imperialists is a matter of supreme importance,
and the role of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are prepared to rout
GH Iny aggreelor, no matter what weapons he may use of what forms of
using such weapons may be available to him, is truly invaluable.
The Party Program, and the documents of the 20th, 21st, and 22d
party congresses, contain basic directions concerning the ways of
further strengthening the Armed Forces and the defense capability
of our country, and fully take into consideration the experience of
the Great Patriotic War and the entire history of Soviet military
development, the characteristics of the existing international situa-
tion and of the present period in the development of the Soviet state,
and the latest achievements of military theory and practice. The
Communist Party, the inspirational force ar: organizer of our victory
in the Great Patriotic War, is directing all work in the field of
Soviet military development, considering it a most important element
in the overall party and state activity in the present stage of the
struggle for communism.
The carrying out of the tasks set forth by the Party Program for
the creation of the material and technical base of communism is of
primary importance for raising the defense capability of our country.
The plans for the building of communism are peaceful and creative plans.
Along with the development of science, each new step in technical prog-
ress and further rise in industrial production strengthens the material
and technical base of the defensive power of our state. The Communist
Party and the Soviet government are greatly concerned that every'pos-
sibility opened up by the development of science be utilized for the
improvement of the supply of technical equipment to all branches of
the armed forces.
With the aim of assuring constant military superiority of the
Soviet Union over a potential enemy, there will be in the future, nat-
urally, ever new tasks set forth for the development and introduction
into the armed forces of the most effective means of armed conflict
which the revolution in military affairs gives rise to.
The creation of all the necessary conditions for the most complete
utilization of the capabilities of the socialist economy and for the
constant technical improvement of the Armed Forces is one aspect of
the party leadership of the vitally important strengthening of the de-
fense of the country. Another aspect of the Party's directing activity
in the field of military development is constant concern for the de-
velopment and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces as a military
organization of the new type, with its characteristic traits caused
by the social-political nature of the Soviet state and our country's
entry into the stage of advanced building of communism.
Appmvpri Fr1r RPIPACP 9nnninging ? ciA_PnpgsTnnR7spnnnnnnncinnnR_R
44
CPYRGHT
.0, ? 01 741 ? II 111
br. a ? : nd e people, const u :ng t e most val-
uable possession and the most important characteristic of the Soviet
military organization, was manifested with special force during the
Great Patriotic War. In the precess of further development of social-
ist statehood and the total combination of socialist social relations)
this unity has been made still more firm. The party is bringing up
communists and the whole Soviet people in the spirit of constant, read-
iness for the defense of the fatherland, of love for our army of the
whole people. It demands of all social and state organizations persist-
ent work in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the workers.
.The party is developing the Soviet people's love for their army,
respect for its glorious combat traditions, faith in the power of its
armament, and desire to fulfill in an exemplary way the military duty
to the Fatherland. Only in this way is it possible successfully to
carry out the tasks of preparing the Armed Forces and the country as
a whole for the victorious conduct of modern war.
The Great Patriotic War completely revealed the oharacteristic
trait of our Armed Forces of devotion to the ideals of socialist in-
ternationalism. The Communist Party, in all its activity in guiding
military development, takes into account the necessity of fulfilling
the international Obligations of the USSR. In the Program of the CPSU
it is Stated that the Soviet Union considers it its duy to be concerned.
not only with its awn security, but also, along with the other eoun-
tries of socialism, with dependable defense of the Whole socialist
camp. The efforts of the party are directed to war strengthening
In every way the military cooperation of the socialist countries and
the operational collaboration of their armies. The recent meeting of
the Political Consultative Committee of the states of the Warsaw Pact
once more convincingly showed that the countries of socialism are firmly
united and ready to meet any aggresSion with. shattering resistance.
The Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers'
Parties, which took place in March, 1965, was of great importance for
the farther strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the forces
of socialism.
Our Armed Forces, as the bulwark of the security of their Father-
land and of the socialist countries, is a mighty factor for the pres-
ervation of peace in the whole world.
One of the principal sources of strength of the Soviet Army and
Navy lies in the fact that their development is carried out by the
party on a strictly sdientific basis, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist
theory.
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Ajapt01011531Viiiiniearita2M9MegheenAAPPARNA7 C/APPRPPE938-8
cpyRGHind of the extensive qualitative changes in developments in military
affairs is the foundation of Soviet military doctrine, which in its
present form makes it possible successfully to solve many problems of
the further improvement of the Armed Forces
The Communist Party constantly reminds us that failure to attach
sufficient importance to the prompt and thorough working out of urgent
theoretical problems cannot be allowed in any field of state activity,
especially not in Military affairs, where even what may seem at first
glance a slight mistake may do irreparable damage. In organizing
the training of military cadres, the party considers it essential that
the command personnel have a firm mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory
and military science, have deep military-technical knowledge, and meet
all the demands of modern military theory and practice. The party
program emphasizes this as one of the main conditions for the further
strengthening of the Army and Navy.
At the present time all of us are guided in our daily activity
the resolutions of the 22nd Congress, of October, 1964, and the
following Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Central
Committee, as is known, has decisively condemned manifestations of sub-
jectivism and laissez faire in the building of communism, and has pointed
out the inadmissibility of premature conclusions and hasty decisions
and actions, divorced from reality; of boasting and idle talk; of de-
votion to administrative procedures, and Ignoring what has already7
been worked out by science and practical experience.' All this is es-
pecially important, too, for our military development. Successful
accomplishment of the difficult and responsible tasks which face the
Armed Forces is possible only on the basis of a genuinely scientific
approach to each of the problems, raised by actual experience in the
practice of troop leadership.
The scientific and technical revolution has brought about a com-
prehensive change in military science, depending on the data of many
sciences and usin6 zhe methods of Marxist dialectics, is called upon
to make scientifically based recommendations and to bring to a clear
focus the basic problems of modern war and the development of the
armed forces. In this connection, the free exchange of opinions on
actual problems of military Science is very Important; in this, not
only should the various points of view be expressed, but there should
be drawn definite, concrete conclusions, leaving no possibility of
disorientating our military cadres in the fundamental problems of So-
viet military development. In other words, the creative working out
of modern military theory should actively promote the practical solu-
tion of the problems we face.
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PYRGHT
ApprovegorMamO0/19g09_: QIA RDP 87?R000nlq9 p
inc systematic tnedirectiTana organizing Uence
of the party on all aspects of the life of Soviet society is fully
demonstrated in the development of the Armed Forces. One of the most
characteristic traits of the present stage of Soviet military develop-
ment is the steady rise in the importance of party-political work,
the growth of the party element in the troops, and the strengthening
of the vanguard role of Communists and Komsomols in the military units.
Mobilizing the personnel for exemplary fulfillment of the soldier!s
duty, the military councils, commanders, political organs, and rarty
and Komsomol organizations are arming the soldiers with a Marxist-
Leninist world outlook and are bringing them up in the spirit of So-
viet patriotism and socialist internationalism, in the glorious tradi-
tions of the ,Communist ijarty and of the working class, and are culti-
vating in the Armed Forces of the Soviet state a spirit of irreconcil-
ability to all manifestations of bourgeois ideology and to all devia-
tions from the standards of communist morality and ethics. All the
powers and resources of party-political work are directed toward devel-
oping in each Soviet soldier the qualities of an active builder of
communist society, a steadfast defender of the Fatherland, capable of
successfully carrying out his military duty in the most difficult con-
ditions and of withstanding all the trials of modern war, however
severe they may be.
An important indication of the growth of the influence of the party
is the strengthening of the party nucleus in the Armed Forces. Commu-
nists are members of the organization of revolutionary activity. It
is they who set an example of communist attitude toward their military
duties, who step forward as the pioneers of the new, who support and
spread advanced experience in the training and indoctrination of troops,
who serve model of meeting the demands of discipline, of serious
attitude to mastering combat equipment, and who bring the spirit of
party loyalty, creativity, innovation, and revolutionary zeal into
all our work.
During the past seven years, i.e., since the October (1957) Plenum
of the Central Committee CPSU, the party element among the privates
has increased by 10%, and among the non-commissioned officers, by
two and a half times. Now almost 90% of the officers, generals and
admirals are Communists or Komsomols. Ninety-eight percent of the
companies, batteries and comparable units now have party organizations
and party groups.
These figures speak for themselves. We are justly proud of the
successes achieved in equipping the troops with modern, combat equip-
ment, and of the fact that our armament, in its deciskire forms, is
superior to that of the probable enemy. But .also important is the
fact that this armament, created by the labor and genius of the Soviet
Anorctvecl I-or Release 2UUU/U13/09 : C;IA-KIJIJob I UU?IbRUOUSUUUOUU?-?
people, is in the hands of communists, whose distinguishing trait
has always been and still remains self-sacrificing service of the
Fatherland, fearlessness in battle, devotion to the great cause of
communism, and ability to lead the whole mass of people in the mili-
tary service, to rally them around the Party, the Leninist Central
Committee, and the Soviet government.
The leadership of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party and the
strengthening of the role and influence of the party organizations
among the troops is the main foundation of Soviet .Alitary development,
the chief source of the might of the Soviet Army and Navy, and a deo
cisive factor in the invincible defense capability of our country.
CPYRGHT
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? an
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090008-8
SOVIET GROUND TROOPS IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
CPYRGHT
by Army Gen P. KUROCHKU
World War II lasted six yearn. During that time four years of un-
abated attention of all mankind was riveted to the main and deciding event
-- the heroic struggle of the Soviet Army. The fate of fascist Germany,
whose defeat greatly accelerated the end of the entire World War II, was
really decided on the field of the Great Patriotic War. There are indis-
putable facts attesting to this.
The greatest number of armed forces was deployed on the Soviet-German
front by the contending powers. Interesting in this regard may be a com-
parison with World War I. Whereas at the beginning of 1917 the countries
of the Entente and the German-Austrian Bloc had 756 dividions in their
armed forces, at the beginning of 1944 in active armies of both sides on
the Soviet-German front alone there were 774 divisions (estimated) - more
than 11 million personnel, Throughout the entire war this was the most
active front and the greatest in length. Combat operations were carried
out uninterruptedly on a front extending 4000 to 6000 km and to a depth
of 2000-3000 km.
During the first three years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet
nation, in essence, fought face to face with fascist Germany. During
this time on the Soviet-German front were located from 63 to 87 percent
of the most combat capable personnel of Hitler's troops, from 63 to 76
percent mortars, 54-67 percent of tanks and assault guns, and 41-60 per-
cent of combat 'aviation. Active on other fronts were 0.8 to 6 percent of
the divisions of the fascist army, and the remainder of its forces located
in occupied countries and in Germnay itself, were, in reality, reserves
for use primarily in the struggle against the Soviet Army. Even after the
opening of the second front in Europe a large part of the armed forces aid
combat material of fascist Germany continued to be used on the Soviet-
German front. Additionally, a considerable number of the forces of fascist
Germany's allies carried out combat operations on this front. It is known
that before World War II many leading military ideologists of imperialistic
circles, reflecting the fear of the bourgeoisie before the people, dis-
claimed the roi.e of the national masses in modern warfare, promoted a
diverse kind of theory of destruction of the enemy by a small professional
army, attempted to oppose technology to man, proclaimed the decisive role
in warfare of technical means of fighting, giving preference to its var-
ious forms.
The war convincingly showed the groundlessness of all these theories.
It not only required the creation of multi-million-Len armies, in which the
decisive role would be played by men skillfully managing combatant tech-
nology, but confirmed the fundamental position of Soviet military science,
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PYR
whi A ?NI': 'Mt' , C ory
contemporary warfare is achieved by the united forces of all branches and
Ffrarms of the armed forces.
At the same time in this war, since the decisive combat operations were
unfolded in the land theater, the lcaaing role belonged to the ground troops.
The ground troops were the main force, with the help of which the contend-
ing sides attempted to attain the main objectives of the war.
Continental strategy was the basis of the German-Fascist military doc-
trine. In April 1940, the former chief of the general staff of the German
land forces General Beck wrote: "For Germany the outcome of the armed
struggle la being decided on land.. To win in a land war or to hold out in
such a war depends in the first place on the land army." (L. Beck. Studies.
Stuttgart). 1955) p 137) The composition of the German Armed Forces during
the period, of preparation and conduct of the war against the ,EioNdst Union
corresponded to just such a point of view'. The main position in the
German AYmed Forces was occupied by the ground troops and by aviation
intended for combat in continential theaters. The Navy was given consid-
erably less attention. Of all the capitalist countries German had the
most powerful ground txoops and aviation..
Ratio of Various Branches in Armed Forces of Fascist Germany in
World War II (in percent)
Branch of
Armed Forces
Time Period
Up to,
June
1941,
To the
Endof
1941,
On 1
MAy
1942
On 1
Noir
On 1
Jul
1911.3,
On 1
Jan
1911.11.
On 1
Jun
1944
On 1
Jan
1945
Ground Troops
61552
6 556
7,247
7,459
7457
7,.090
6,900
5,513
Ti.2
t9.1
71.0
70.b
69.7
67.6
73.7
Air Force and
1,735
1,914
1,924
2,011
2,011
1,919
2,000
1,453
Air Defense
14.8
20.2
18.9
19.1
19.6
18.9
19.6
19.5
Navy
574
622
629
650
650
726
800
510
6.2
6:5-
6.1
6.1
6.3
7.1
7.9
6:8
SS Troops
352
398
110,11.
420
282
436
500
3.8
4.2
4.0
4.0
2.7
4.3
4.9
9,213
9,500
10,204
10,540
10,300
10,169
10,200
79476
Totals
'100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
(cont'd)
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? ? ? - ? ? - see s: s ii 1 iT1.1.1 isTsT:W.1 asTsTskisIsTelasTsTsing:
CPYRGHT
?
It can be seen from the table, that during the course of the entire war
the basic mass, of Germany's armed forces consisted of ground troops. They
contained more than 70 percent of the 'personnel. A significant position was
occupied by the Air Forces, also operating primarily in the interest of the
ground troops and containing approximately 20 percent of all personnel.
The Navy had approximately seven percent of the personnel. It is character-
istic) that the German-fascist military leadership attempted to maintain the
ratio of the variou armed forces at one level throughbut the entire war.
The German-fascist army was quite well provided with technical equip-
ment. Although the infantry continued to remain the main arm of the ground
troops a considerable portion of the ground troops consisted of artiliery
tind armored troops. Thus) on 1 June 19114, thecomposition of the ground
troops of Fascist Germany was as follows: infantry- 39.6 percent, arti11ery-
23.7 percent, tank troops - 13.4 percent, engineer troops - 5 percent, sig-
nal troops - 2.1 percent) miscellaneous and rear area troops - 16.2 percent.
The tremendous armed forces of the enemy, and primarily their prin-
cipal conponent -- the ground troops, were pulverized in the battles on the
eastern front. In just the summer campaign of 1941, in ground troops a-
lone, the German-Fascist army lost 742,000 men, whereas in the war against
Poland, France, England, Norway, Belgium, Denmark) Holland and in the Bal-
kans the Hitlerites lost 418,805 men. In all, on the Soviet-German front
there were completely destroyed, captured, forced to surrender and disbanded
as the result of losses 507 out of the 587 Genan-Fascist divisions against
which the Soviet ground troopf, fought at different times and which were re-
peatedly re-established by Hitler's command in the course of the war. Out
of the total amount of personnel losses of the German-Fascist army, equal
to approximately 13.6 million men, more than 10 million men, or 73 percent
occurred on the Soviet-German front.
The problem of the strategic utilization of types of armed forces was
successfully solved in the Great Patriotic War. Proceeding from the basic
position that victory in war can be achieved Only by the combined efforts
of all branches of the armed forces, Soviet military strategy provided for
the harmonic development and the logical utilization of the strongest side
of each of them. At the same time the experience of war showed, that the
roes and importance of the various branches of armed forces andtheir
proportionate influence were unequal.
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(cont2(1)
I iTalriT4ta.11:11rai 1A 1 1?I!/ TIE /
RGHT
Ratio. of Branches in Soviet Armed Forces in World War II (in
percent)
Branch of
Armed Forces
On 22
Jun
1211.1
Ground Troops
80.7
Air Force
8.7
Navy
7.3
PVO Strany
Troops
3.3
Totals
100
Time Period
On 1 On 1 On 1 On 1 On 1 On 1 On 1
Dec May NovJul Jan Jun Jan
1911.1121.1_ 1111 12411 12111 12121 ' 1945
81.4 87.2 86.6 87.0 86.0 84.5 83.4
6.2 7.1
4.5 4.8
4.8 4.7
100 100
8.1
3.8
6.2
5.7
5.5
6.2
5.1
4.2
3.8
4.4
4.3
3.9
3.0
3.5
4.1
100
100
100
100
100
From the table it can be seenl.that during the course of the war the
Soviet Limed Forces consisted primarily of ground troops, which contained,
on the average, up to 85 percent of all personnel. The supporting Air
Forte and Navy contained approximately 6 percent and 5 percent of the per-
sonnel'respectively.
. The outcome of the Great Patriotic War was. decided on the land fronts
by the ground troops. Their .combat operations were actively supported by
front lines, and sometimes also by .)ng-range bombardment aviation and the
navy. That the ground troops bore wie greatest burden of the war com=
parison with the other armed forces in borne out by the fact that they suf-
fered the largest loss of officer personnel.
In the years of the Great Patariotic War the ground troops developed
according to the econotic capabilities of the country, and also according
to the demands t!nd conditions of armed combat. In their ranks were tifle
troops, armored and mechanized troops, airborne troops, artillery, cavalry,
and Aso special troops: signal, engineer, anti-chemical defense, road
building and others. The main trend in the development of ground troops was
the increase in their striking and ,fire power, in their maneuverability and
mobility. Not all combat arms developed equally and uniformly.
(cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
-III I: i? -555 111-111:
pprove 2sT easeaea o gruncl roops.consioted of rifle troops. Others with
a large proportionate ratio were the artillery, the armored and the engineer
troops all operating primarily in support of rifle troops both on the attack
and the defense. At the beginning of the war more than 50 percent of
ground troops were ftfle troops. The significant losses in the Soviet Army
at the beginning of the war, especially in tanks and artillery2 the necessity
for creating strategic reserves, the increase in the length of the front re,
quired the formation of more rifle soyedinrmiya. In connection with this
their numbers continuously increased. As early as 1 November 1942, they
contained about 65 percent, and by the end of the war - approximately 70
perce,..., of the entire quantity of combat troops in the ground forces.
During the war the numerical strength of rifle 'troops' increased three times.
During the war the rifle troops demonstrated high combat qualities and the
capability to operate in any terrain, daring any season of the year or any
time of the day; also, the capability to accomplish the most complex
combat missions in cooperation with tanks, artillery and avaltion. The main
burden of combat during a break through, an attack in difficult terrain, the
seizure of important occupied objectives, fell to the infantry, and it suf-
fered the greatest losses in combat. Sufficient to say, that more than half
of the losses in command personnel in the ground troops occurred in the
rifle troops. In its morale and its ability to wage combat operations un-
der the most complex conditions, the Soviet rifle troops far surpassed the
German-fascist infantry. Together with this, during the course of the war
the inadequacy of the striking force and mobility of rifle soyedineniya,
lacking tanks and the necessary quantity of transport equipment, became
Increasingly evident. The infantry gradually gave way to the more powef-
ful and maneuverable motorized and tank troops.
Armored and mechanized troops, having greater fire power, high man-
euverability, good armored defense, were the main striking force of the
ground troops. In the pre-war years Soviet strategy, in the main, cor-
rectly evaluated the role of tanks in a future war and directed. great
attention to them. At the beginning of the war approximately 25 per-
cent of the personnel of all ground troops were armored troops and they
were numerically second to the rifle troops.
However, the armored troops were not at once able to accomplish those
missions, which were supposed to be assigned to them. As a result of un-
favorable conditions arising at the beginning period of the war, they
suffered great losses. Large soyedineniya of armored troops, formed on
the eve of the war, as a result of significant losses suffered in border
engagements, were disbanded. Separate tnak brigades and regiments were
formed and for a long time carried-out primarily missions of supporting
and escorting infantry.
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(cont 'd)
RGHT
t was only from Jie spring of 1942, when industry increased the out-
put of tanks, that the capability again presented itself forthe formation
of large tank soyedineniya -- tank and mechanized Corps, and subsequently
oryedineniya -- at first of nixed composition, and afterwards of homogeneo1-U0
tank armies, which were used as mobile groups of armies and fronts. The pres-
ence of tank armies and corps made it possible, in cooperation with combined-
arms armies and aviation, to carry out large operational missions. Simultan
eously there was an increase in the quantity of tank soyedineniya designated
for the support of rifle troops On the battlefield. From that time on
there was a continuous increase in the proportion of armored troops. On
1 November 1942, seven percent of the ground force personnel were in the
armored troops. Later on in the armored troops there was an increase in the
number of tanks, and afterwards in self-propelled artillery gun carriages.
There was also an improvement in their quality, in their organizational struc-
ture and in the art of their utilization.
Thanks to the mass application of armGred troops it became possible to
break through the enemy's defense on the main axis of advance in shorter
periods of time, to develop a swift offensive, to crush or encircle and
annihilate large groups. On the whole the application of armored troops
exerted a decisive influence on the change in the methods and forms of
carrying out combat operations by ground troops. Operations assumed a
maneuverable character : were Conducted to great depth and at high tem-
pos. In face to face combat with enemy tank groupings the Soviet armored
troops were ultimately victorious.
A large proporticn of ground troops consisted of artillery. On the
battlefields of the Great Patriotic War the artillery provided the main
assault, fire power of the ground troops. Of all the ground Arms it had
the greatest power and range of fire. The artillery also had the capability
of maneuvering on the field of battle. These characteristics in many re-
spects defined its role and significane during the course of the war. In the
ground troops the artillery provided the principal means of fire neutral-
ization on the offense and defense. The assumption, that in connection with
the increased significance of tanks and avaiation the role of artillery would
be decreased, was not confirmed throughout the war. The necessity of neutral-
ization of a strong defense, of fighting against tahks and aviation led
naturally to a growth in the quantity and to an improvement in the quality
of artillery.
(cont'd)
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ApprovedirOPEReFeian2b60/009cirGAIRDP85T130805M*300%0,30848th an over-
all increase of troop artillery i was the creation of a large number of
PYRGHT powerful soyedineniya of the Reserve of the Supreme Headquarters (RGK), de-
signed for swift maneuver with the objective of reinforcing troops along
the most important and responsible axes. Although at the beginning of the
war the RGK artillery was small and included only five percent of the guns
ahd mortars of the total quantity in the armed forces, ttLt the end of the
war it had approximately 50 percent. In November 1942 thr proportion of
. . RGK artillery .in the ground troops reached 10 percent.
Rocket-launching artillery, a very promising type of weapons developed
very rapidly in the years of the war. From separate batteries, used at
the beginning of the wars, it increased to entire guards divisions, with
a single-volley capability of up to 3,500 shells. With the application
of rocket-artillery the fire power of ground(troops sharply increased.
One other important mission carried out by artillery should be men-
tioned, -- that was the fight against tanks. The use by the enemy of
large masses of tanks required the creation of a large quantity of art-
illery anti-tank brigades and regiments. In connection with this during
the years of the war the quantity of anti-tank artillery increased almost
five times. It also maintained its importance as the main methods of fight-
ing against tanks throughbut the entire war.
Characteristic in the use of artillery during the war was its decisive
massing along the main axis, the development of high densities totaling by
the end of the war 250-300 guns and mortars on each kilometer of front of
breakthrough, a sharp increase in the density of fire, the simultaneous
fire neutralization of the enemy's defense to a comparatively great depth,
wide maneuver on the battlefield, and successful combat against enemby tanks.
In numerous operations of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet artillery showed
its complete superiority over the artillery of Fascist Germany both in the
quality of its guns, mortars and combat vehicles, :and in the art of massing
and controlling artillery fire. By the completion of the war it had a. smooth
organization and tremendous combat experience, which has not lost its sig-
nificance even up to the present time.
During the war the cavalry was also used. Before the war in connection
with the extensive motorization and mechanization of the army, Soviet
theory, on the whole, correctly determined that cavalry would not be able
to play the same role as it had played in previous wars. Therefore, a large
part of the cavalry soyedineniya was disbanded, and their personnnel were
used to fill the ranks of the mechanized corps. At the beginning of the
war in the ground troops there remained only 13 cavalry divisions. However,
In connection with the great loss of tanks in the early period of the war
the question of the creation of maneuve'mble mobile soyedineniya of the
basis of the horse cavalry was again raised- At the beginning of
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(cont'd)
PYR
wiikkeovgt FidiPIRteffatiriod#1040191F 01W-RECPBSTOOMRTY003010096301V8Ice
owed, their use did not achieve the desired results. The calavry suf-
fered great losses from the heavy artillery fire and air attacks; it
could not fight against tanks; and its striking power was insifnificant.
Therefore, by NoverMber 1942 there remained only 28 divisions. They
were reorganized into cavalry corps, which indepently or together with
mounted-mechamized groups, were used for the development of the sucCess
of frontal operations. Attacking in close cooperation with tanks and
under air cover, usually over very difficult terrain (in wooded-marshy,
mountain-forest or desert), the cavalry successfully accomplished its
mtssion. Nevertheless, the war confirmed that the horse cavalry as a
combat force was a thing of the pass.
Engineer troops and signal troops developed greatly during the war.
The continuous growth in the sweep of combat operations, the use on the
fields of battle of large quantities of ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya
equipped with a considerable quantity of technical materiel, required
an increase in engineer facilities and management. Engineer troops were
used not only on a tactical, but on an ever-increasing operational scale.
They were used directly for breaking through strongly fortified defense
zones, for assuring the success of river crossings, and also as mobile
defense detachments, which substantially increased their role and import-
ance. The requiremunt for communications equipment also continuously in-
creased and the number of signal troops increased more than four times
during the years of the war.
One should not omit the airborne troops. The la. Army was the
originator in the creation of large airborne soyedineniya, and their
development Was given significant attention. By December.1941, there
were 38 airborne brigades. However, the complexity of the situation,
the unavailability of the necessary quantity of troop transport aviation,
the weak armament of airborne troops made it impossible to use them
directly on a large scale. Nevertheless the experience gained in their
use near Moscow, on the Dniepr, and especially during the route of the
KVantung Army? once again confirmed that these were promising troops,
which could be used extensively in the conduct of operations in great
depth and with specific targets,
In such a manner, in the years of the reat Patriotic War each arm
of the ground troops was developed in conformity with the over-all im-
provement of the Soviet Army and the character of the accomplished mis-
sions. Eore andgore attention in this development was given to the art-
illery, armored, engineer and signal troops.
(cont 2d)
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, C IA \ 1,D D \-T RAN '3 NO ' 9497 '
, SOVIET MIL ITA
d For Rei................5,...75R0.3....00....
, .9,, 0,. i , .. . ,
3-0131.NAL VOY NNAYA I,' ,,,, ' NQ 5 , 19-65 , ,
'' NOVEMBER 19 6 5 TRANS ' 4 9
CPYRGHT
M
We'Sn02019. 1 greal: potential cabilities. On the whole the
AlWaYAFST :
organizational structure and composition of the ground troops met the
demands of the war being waged. At the same time, combat experience
showed that Soviet ground troops needed further improvement --cr in-
crease in their fire and assault power andtheir maneuverability was required.
The ground troops, as the main arm of the armed forces, successfully
accomplished the important missions which strategy, operational art and
tactics assigned to them.
Soviet military strategy accomplished the missions ensuing from
the politics of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. All
the important missions which strategy assigned to the Armed Forces
were accomplished primarily by the ground troops. In conformity with
the situation as it developed in the course of the war, ground troops
had to carry out two types of military operations: the strategic de-
fense an,1 the offensive with its variation -- the counter offensive.
As a result of fascist Germany's sudden treacherous attack, and of
the unsuccessful outcome of combat operations at the beginning of the
war and the difficulties arising in connection with this. Soviet troops
were called on three times to wage important strategic defensive operations:
of necessity in the spring and fall of 1941 and the summer of 1942, and
by design in the summer ar 1943. The difficulty- of conducting the de-
fense consisted of the fact that even before the war questions concerning
the preparation and conduct of strategic defense had not been sufficiently
worked out since it was considered that the defense would find application
only an army scale.
In actuality the ground troops had to condpct the defense along
the entire Soviet-Gernan front, to a great depth, employing on each
strategic axis several front-line ob"yedineniya, which prepared and
conducted the defense with the particiaption of aviation, and on the
coastal flanks in close cooperation with the navy. Characteristic
features of the defense were the increase in iL.-; stability and .activity,
the correct determination of the probable direction of the main assault,
formation in depth of defensive groupings, the prepalation of terrain from
an engineering viewpoint to a great depth, and the perfecting ofmcans
andmethodo of its conduct.
In the course Of the defense Soviet ground troops successfully
accomplished all missions assigned to them. They harassed and bled
white the ground troops of the enemy, conducted offensives, stabilized
(cont 'd)
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the
str?Wal yyrklileW1243861138/NkselikaRCR8510)385-51R0003a0N9M18-41e
HT arnPt
ivw rces rustrated the enemy,plan of "blitzkrieg" warfare and in the
battle of Moscow, Kursk, and on the Volga they created the oonditions
for shifting to the counter-offensive, which was completed with the
destruction if the enemy's assault groups and the initiation and consol-
idation Of the strategic initiative by the Soviet troops. -
The strategic offensive was theprincipal method of operations of the'
ground troops of the Soviet Armed Forces. The destruction of the major
groupings of the German-fascist troops on the principal strategic axis
was their main objective.
Strategic offensive operations were distinguished. by their decisive
Character, the large sweep along the width of the front and the depth
of movement, by the scale of the participating forces and by the results.
The offensive was conducted in a zone from 500-1,400 kilometers and to a
maximum depth of 600-800 kilometers. A large quantity. of technical com-
bat materiel was used to attain the objectives of the 'operations. Thus,
In the Belorussian operation more than 4,000 tnaks and self-propelled
artillery, 5,327 airplanes, and 31,000 guns and mortars were used, and
In the Vistula-Oder operation even more ..combat materiel was used: 37,033
guns and mortars, 7,042 tanks and self-propelle artillery, and 5,047 air-
planes.
During the strategic offensive there was skillful organization of
coordination between fronts and groups of fronts, between oryedineniya
of armed forces add soyedineniya of arms both along one axis as well as
'along various strategic axis.
The objective of strategic operations were? attained by various means.
In the years of the war the ground troops completely mastered the art of
preparation and conduct of operations in encirclement and destruction of
major groupings of enemy troops, and of operating on important strategic
axes. Such operations were a major contribution to the theory andpractice
of Soviet military art. 'Besides, each of the operations was distinguished
from former OneG by its distinctiveness and originality. Of special in-
terest from tl.apoint ofview of the development of the Soviet military art
was the encirclement of major groupings of the enemies to a great depth
as a result of swift pursuit (the 100,000 man grouping in the region of
Minsk in June 1944 to a depth of 200 kilometers, and the 60,000 man
grouping in theregion of Pozan in January 1945 to a depth of 300 kilometers).
Characteristic of the majority of encirclement operations ;as the destruc-
tion of the encircled groupings in short time periods, which was achieved
by the creation of internal and external fronts of encirclemenL, and the
rapid dispersal and piecem,.. 1 destruction of the enemy.
(cont 'd)
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?
ArumRvo Earfe.4 pat zysl ac Is I :1Wet 6.t Ittlion5061996661S28 applic
te .11 the op dntering of the
Soviet tgtroopsu oyAll -
strategic front of the enemy, the piecemeal destruction of his major
groupings, and the liberation of a large territory. It also made it
possible to operate at a high tempo. A prime example of such an operation
was in the Vistula-Oder cperation.
The Soviet Armed Forces advanced consistently toward the final ob-
jective of the war, accomplishing in turn a series of strategic missions
and attaing intermediate objectives. Moreover, each mission was ,
accomplished in the land warfare theaters and required a considerably
long period of time. An important achievement of the Sofiet ground troops
was the conduct of a system of united, indivisibly successive and simul-
taneous interrelated strategic operations of a group of fronts with the
cooperation of ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya of other branches of the
armed forces.
Most frequently operations of groups of fronts were carried out
sequentially both along the front and in depth. The conduct of con-
secutive strategic operations on various and distantly separated sectors
of the strategic front forced the enemy to transfer his forces from one
axis to another, which facilitated their piecemeal destruction.
Simultaneous strategic offensive operations were most characteristic
of the second half of, the war, and mainly in the closing period, when the
capabilities of our economy in supporting the strategic operations of the
ground troops were considerably expanded. The effect of these operations
wasmost impressive.
In the years of the war the Soviet strategy was led by the Leninist
principle, that without powerful reserves andtheir skillful exploitation
it was not possible to successfully wage an armed struggle. The Soviet
command, correctly understanding the role and significance of reserves
gave special attention to the creation of reserves of grpund troops. At
its disposal the Stavka had combined-arms armies, tank armies, rifle,
tank and artillery corps and divisions, various and special chasti and
soyedineniya, and, at the beginning of the war, also combat engineer
armies. At tames entire front lines ob"yedineniya were in reserve (in
the battle of Moscow in 1941 and in the battle of Kursk in 1943).
The strategic reserves were the principal source of replacements for
the ground troops operating on the front, and guaranteed the naintenance
of the required superiority over the enemy in manpower and facilities.
These reserves contributed to the intensification of efforts onthose axes
where their utilization would be most effective and most influential in
the development of offensive or defensive operations.
(cont'd)
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A Virdift dfriM eces@c21080/0/1/091:e113114-RD Fta5T0132a5 80112cM9Q8984-
wired from the Soviet command the organization and execution of efficient
and uninterrupted strategic coordination. Since the ground troops formed
PYReH-phemain branch of the armed forces, coordination with other branches of
the armed forces was organized primarily in the interest cll.' the ground
troops conducting strategic offensive or strategic defensive operations.
This amounted to coordinating the efforts of all branches of the armed
forces and of the partisans in reference to target, time, and location,
in the definition of the role and mission of each front and branch of
pervice? and also in the determination of the form of the conduct of a
strategic offensive, of the sequence of accomplishing'mistions and the
means of their fulfillment.
In distinction from the German-fascist army, in which the ground troops
had their won command and general staff, the strategic leadership of the
Soviet ground troops was carried out directly by the Stavka of the
Supreme Command through the General Staff, staffs of axes, and represent-
atives of the Stavka. The Stavka assigned missions to the fronts, con-
cerned itself about their detailed security and controlled the accomplish-
ment of assigned missions. Most frequently the Stavka secured coordination
of activities of fronts or groups of fronts through its representatives.
These representatives traveled to the fronts where they checked troops,
familiarized themselves with the situation and executed overall leadership
of the operations. The Stavka summoned the commanders, listened willingly
to their plans, considerations, calculations, introduced' amendments, and,
where necessary, also changed them. On the whole the. Stavka
system of leadership proved its value.
The experience of the war showed that Soviet operational art, already
worked out in the pre-war years, correctly reflected the objective regular-
ity of contemporary operations. In the course of the war front and army
obuyedineniya set remarkable standards for the conduct of defensive and
decisive offensive operations as well as in the methods of their pre-
parations and execution, all of which wereperfected throughout the war
with the increased deployment of forces and the accumulation of combat
experience.
One of the characteristic features of the defense of fronts and armies
was the high degree of activity. The defensive troops persistently
carried out all forlog 6f reconnaissance, skillfully organized systems
of fire, carried out counter-preparations, inflicted massive blows maneuvers
by forces and materiel from unattacked sectors and rear positions.
(Cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
II ?
6%; 75,41)06 3.blob gmedg troops
w n ows cf powerful enemy
kPl3C409cfreVnilab?POidgteaVnAdifkg6190rbs
forces. The trend of its developments was toware. the proper determina-
tion of regions and boundaris upon whose retention depended the stability
of the defense; toward the creation of the most expedient formation of
troops, engineer equipment for the terrp.in? and organization for anti-
'Walk and anti-air defense; toward conduct of counterthrusts and extensive
maneuvers by forces and facilities toWard perfecting of corrdination
between arms and with other brar..thes of the armed forces; and toward
the efficient command of troop. The high degree of mastery in the
accomplishment of front and army defensive operations was borne out by
the defense of Moscow, Leningrad aril Sevastopol; by defensive operations
In the battles of Kursk, on the Volga, near Lake Balaton, and others.
A considerable advance was made in the art of ground troops ? prep-
aration and conduct of front and army offensive operations. For their
preparation great attention was directed to the accurate assesment of
enemy forces and defensive PositiDns. The breaking open of the ever
intensifying defense required a skillful concentration ofpowerful. groups
at areas of breakthrough, and also the creation of second echelons,
mobile groups and reserves for the development of the offensive.
In the strategic offensive frontline obuyedineniya operated in the
first strategic echelon along the axis of the main or secondary assault.
Their compositiun was determined by their utilization. The combined-arms
army carried out combat operations on one operational axis in close
cooperation with other armies of the front. It was located in the first
or second, operational echelon of the front, on the main or secondary
axis. A mixed-composition tank army usually operated in thefirst
echelon of the front on the axix of the main assault. A homogeneous
tank army composed thenobile group of the front. For piercing a week
enemy defense tank armies were successfully used in the first operational
echelon of the froat.
The normal mission or an operation included crushing enemy resistance,
liberation of territory, aald seizure of important operational objectives.
A most common form of offensive operation of a front and an army was
the frontal assault in the center or on one or both flanks with further
development of the offensive with the objective of encirclement and
destruction of large ermy dispositions.
(cont'd)
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PYRGH
AflptiaktittiRlfgetialsdE2000/M19 oeli1ADR4500174391:914A019&1914t3
most decisive form of an operation... In those cases when, because of
the conditions of the situation, it was impossible or inexpedient to
encircle the ehemy?,fronts? making use of the results of heavy
neutralization of the enemy's defenses by artil&gry and aviation, in-
flicted a one-two frontal assault to a great depth, split enemy groups
into separate units and destroyed them piecemeal. Such 'a frontal assault
proved to be no less decisive a farm of operatiOn than encirclement.
An important problem which had to be solved by Soviet operational
art during the war was the problem of piercing a stongly fortified
tactical zone of defense where the enemy, in order to hold the position,
utilized the maximum of available forces and material. The success
of the entire operation was, very muth dependent upon the successeul
solution of this problem.
The piercing of a deeply echeloned defense was accomplished, as a
rule, along several axes, which created the '?onditions for dispersing
the enemy front. The successful application of large masses of
artillery, tanks, avaition, engineer equipment, and operational
deployment of troops in depth along selected axes assured a powerful
blow during the breakthrough of the enemy's defense as well as the
development of an offensive to a great depth, and also the repelling
of counterattacks by large groups of forces.
.The piercing of the enemy's defense and the destruction of his
operational reserves created the conditions for the development 'of
an offensiv6 along his flank and in depth, for encirclement and
destruction of enemy troop dispositions on one or several fonts.
After the breakthrough troops switched to pursuit, a.leading role
in which was played by armored andznechanized soyedineniya and
ob"yedineniya. An achievement of Soviet operational art lies in the
development of the theory and, practice of the forcing of Ilrge water
obsta-les from the march by ground troops followed by the seizure
:711d retention of .operational bases
In such manner, characteristic Of offensive operations of ob"yedineniya
of ground trooparwere: specific objectives and forms of achieving
them; high tempo; creation of the proper grouping of forces and material
for the conduct of an operation; the perfecting of means of pursuit
and the forcing of large water obstacles; the crease in the sweep of
offensive operations; extensive maneuver by forces and during the
course of an operation; skillful deception of the' enemy and the
achievement of surprise; imirovement in the organization of coordination
and :control of troops...
(contld)
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CPYRGHT
3p rovcofrOtr fk.i.TgaW2Offb/9135119-t:ieskiRDP85T0-018715R000300:0?10008-8uch
a degree of development and success if tactics had not advanced
along with them. During the course of the war both the overall
tactics of ground troops, and the tactics of arms was constantly being
perfected and was distinguished by flexibility, skillful combination
of various forms of fighting, persistence in the achievement of the ass-
igned objectives, comprehensive use of technology9 outstanding art of
maneuver, well-organized control of soyedineniya and chdsti.
The tactics used by the ground troops during the Great Patriotic. War
included all forms of fighting in comformity with the developing sit-
uation. The basic forms of combat operations were offensive and de-
fensive.battles? with the predominant role played by the offensive.
Off enisve battle was a combined-arms battle and was characterized
by the mass application of troops with various armament and combat
material. Success in battle was achieved by the combined efforts of
all arms and aviation. However y the leading role in the breakthrough
of the enemy's tactical zones of defense was assigned to reinforced
combine =arms rifle soyedineniya coordinated with artilleryy tanksy
and aviation.
Defensive battle of groupd troops in theyears of the Great Patriotic
War was also developed as a combine-arms battle. Rifle troops, exten-
sively using favorable conditions of terrain, fire and communication
trenches, various types of obstacles and powerful fire, skillfully
maneuvering, demonstrated that they were capable, in coordination with
other arms, of withstanding the ati;acks of large enemy forces over
extended periods of time and could firmly hold occupied positions. Only
the coordinated action of all arms and aviation guaranteed the success
of defense of chasti and soyedineniya of ground troops.
The Great Patriotic War multiplied, enriched and raised to a high
level the theory and practice of Soviet Military art. In the years of
the war Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics successfully
solve the problem of the preparation and conduct of offensive and defensive
operations and battles in themost varied geographic conditions and at
any time of th: day or year.
Bourgeois falsifiers of history try to explain many of the failures
of the Hitlerite army on the Soviet-German front to the unfavorable
weather conditions, the great distances, and Hitler's clumsy leadership.
(cont'd)
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PYRGH
alit:Wel:a PO
ary macn
entire Soviet
military art,
10161A?1219toTY3 attuk4413P80.eroiRARM3qcoti000's*ist
me was achievedas 'a result or the heroic efforts of the
nation and its army, the advanced character of Soviet
and its superiority over bourgeois military art.
The basic principles of Soviet military art were conclusively
formIllated and perfectedin the Great Patriotic War and during this
time the most important problems of the conduct of armed combat were
solved. Foremost among such problems should be regarded the utilization
of branches of the armed forces and of the arms.
The leading role in the conduct of war belonged to the ground troops
In distinction from other braches of the armed forces the ground troops,
as a result of their varied composition and armament had great capabilities
for the conduct of independent operations on the land theaters of the
war, on which were unfolded theprincipal events and on which occurred the
decisive battles and engagements. Throughout the entire course of the
war they formed the basis of the Soviet strategic groupings. All the
important missions assigned inthe past war to the armed forces were
decided primarily by the ground troops. On the defense they were the
force which broke up the asault of the enemy; they re-established the
strategic front and themselves inflicted powerful counterblows and con-
ducted counterattacks. On the offensive they were also the decisive
force, accomplishing the breakup of the enemy's strategic front, the
destructton of his troop dispositions and the seizure of his territory.
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party and
the Soviet government, guided by the Marxist-Leninist principle that
the composition and form of organization of the army usually adapts it-
self 13c the forms and methods of war and that the saturation of the
army with new combat matetiel requires organizational changes of troops,
accomplished a great deal of work in the reorganization of the Soviet
Armed .Forces. In connection with the development of nuclear and rocket
weapons, in the post-war years a new main branch of the armed forces
appeared -- the accomplishment of basic strategic missions. There
has also been a distinct growth in the role of the PVO Strany Troops.
(cont'd)
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CPYRGHT
rtinnegiNgteAWINFINellitietgriTehrtte
9 ,stipt360bIgifbIeg4round
? organizationally.
In the post-war years they have been radicea,P..y reorganized. Despite the
fact that the ground ,troops are not now the main arm of the armed forces,
they have been assigned, as in the past, a 'significant role in armed com-
bat. At the sane time the most important principle of Soviet military
art -- the attainment of victory in war by the combined efforts of all
branches and arms of the armed forces -- has not lost its significance.
In the organization of the armed forces, as in the past special atten-
tion is being given to the harmonic developnent of the branches of the
armed forces and the arms, and being taken into accoant is the fact
that in the course of a war roles may change depending on the con-
ditions of the situation and the character of the missions. The com-
bat experience acquired by the Soviet troops during the Great Patrioctic
War hells in the solution of this complex problem.
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Approved FoirhEteleasean9/0814AigAtELDFAROMPFMAR? 90008-8
by Chief Mar Avn K. Vershinin
CPYRGHT
The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War occupied the leading place in
the mighty struggle of the nations of the world against the German fas-
cists and their allies. From the beginning until the end it exerted the
decisive influence on the vistorious outcome of World War II and left a
deep impression on world history.
A significant role in achieving the historic victory belongs to our
glorious air forces, which in close cooperation with the ground forces and
the navy took a most active part in all of the most important operatfons
of the last vex and conducted intense combat operations throughout its
duration.
In the course of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Air Forces had
to fight against a strong and skillful enemy -- fascist Germany's air
forces, which had a wealth of combat experience at the time of the attack
on the Soviet Union. Much depended on the outcome of this fighting.
Hitler's command massed nearly 5,000 combat aircraft for the strike
on the Soviet Union. In accordance with the blitzkrieg doctrine, a de-
cisive role in achieving victory was assigned to the air force as well as
to tanks and mechanized troops. It was stated in the "Barbarosa Plan"
that the mission of the air force was to consist of "paralyzing and li-
quidating the Russian air force as much as possible and. to support the
operations of the army in its decisive axes."
By the beginning of World War II the air forces of the economically
developed and militarily strong states had developed into an independent
branch of the armed forces and by its capabilities became a factor of
operational and strategic significance. Their role was continuously en-
larged during the war and the air forces became the second most signifi-
cant branch of the armed forces. They largely determined the nature of
the ensuing struggle.
In the last war aircraft were already highly maneuverable and car-
ried very powerful means of destruction. They alone were able to. operate
against targets deep in the enemy rear and were the most active means of
air defense. In the deep offensive operations characteristic of the last
war, aircraft strikes on the enemy's tactical and operational rear and
his communications, support by aircraft of armored troops, strikes on the
enemy directly in the field of battle, cover of friendly troops from the
air, and reconnaissance were exceptionally important. It was not possible
to count on success of offensive operations under the conditions of the
last war without air supremacy.
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CPYR H
314(190008-8
provedifingnigesghaOMPRtirGIARPAPM5Mgclavo y supported ground
troops and the navy, fought intensely against enemy air forces, continu-
ously provided the command with necessary reconnaissance data, and in-
flicted strikes on communications lines, delivery routes, and military
industrial targets deep in the enemy rear.
Routing the fascist German air forces was one of the most important
tasks of the armed conflict. Our air forces were the chief means of de-
stroying fascist German aircraft. Of the 66,000 aircraft lost by the
Germans on the Eastern Front, 13,000 were shot down by antiaircraft artil-
lery and 53,000 were destroyed by Soviet pilots (76 percent were shot down
in aerial combat and 24 percent were destroyed on enemy airfields).
Victory over fascist Germany and its allies was achieved by the com-
bined efforts of all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces with participa-
tion of allied troops of the anti-Hitler coalition. But the decisive role
in the victory was played by the Soviet Armed Forces, including our Air
Forces. The following data testify to this: Whereas the air forces of the
US and England made more than 4,100,000 combat sorties during the nearly
six years of World War II (1939-1945), the Soviet Air Forces made nearly
41000,000 combat sorties in less than four years of the Great Patriotic
War, inflicted heavy losses on enemy troops and combat equipment, and in
fact destroyed the basic resources of the fascist German air force. The
German air force lost two thirds of its aircraft on the Soviet-German
Front.
The main efforts of our air forces in the war were directed to troop
support, fighting for air supremacy, and aerial reconnaisLance. It took
45, 35, and approximately 11 percent of combat sorties to accomplish the
main missions respectively.
The most important principles for the combat employment of aircraft
in armed conflii.t were based on the general positions of Soviet unitary
art, which in prewar years had envisaged the coming war as a maneuvering
var in which victory would be possible only by the combined efforts of all
branches of thee armedforces.
The air forces were assigned an important role in joint operations
with ground troops and the navy. Independent operations in destroying
targets deep in the enemy rear were also envisaged for the air forces.
In connection with the rapid development of aviation and all its
growing capabilities, military theory was confronted duriug the prewar
years with the problem of fighting for air supremacy. Soviet military
science viewed air supremacy not as an end in itself, but as a prereq-
uisite for the successful conduct of operations by ground troops and the
navy. These views on the role and purpose of the air forces basically
proved to be correct and found practical confirmation in the course of
the Gre Pa otic
CPYRG
8/09 ' CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090008-8
APRPOSI tgraMagrle ORP
CL......ore, 'that fighting for air supremacy erupted
FrEhe first day of the war. It was fought with great intensity and temporary
success. Owing to its perfidious and surprise attack, the fascist air force
managed to seize it in the beginning of the war. But by the middle of the
summer of 1943 the German air force, suffering enormous losses, lost air
supremacy, which finally belonged to the Soviet Air Forces.
The German command had placed tremendous hopes on the air force in
Ito attack on the USSR. It counted on destroying the main strengths of
Soviet aviation in the first days of the war by sudden, powerful air strikes
on airfields situated in the Western military border districts and thereby
provide freedom of operation for tanks, mechanized troops, and bombers.
The surprise strikes of the German air force on airfields closest to
the border did inflict serious losses in our country's aircraft. However,
the Soviet people manfully withstood the enemy's perfidious attacks and,
carrying out the will of the Communist Party, succeeded in restoring the
resources of our air forces. Our pilots opposed the numerical superiority
of the enemy air force with high combat mastery, heroism, and courage, con-
tinuing the best traditions of the veteran Soviet pilots who courageously
fought in the years of foreign intervention and the civil war.
Due to the ever increasing opposition of Soviet fighter pilots, the
German bombers, though they had a numerical superiority, were almost to-
tally repulsed from striking airfields, and their fighters were forced to
engage in active aerial combat in the interestrA of self-def,nse by the end
of the first month of the war.
In the fall of 1941, when fascist hordes were at the gates of Moscow
and a fatal threat hung over the capital of our country, Soviet pilots
each made 5-6 combat sorties per day under exceptionally difficult condi-
tions and with great effort selflessly operated day and night in any weather
conditions. At that time the Soviet air force inflicted heavy losses on
the German air force for the first time in World War II, shattered the
legend of its invincibility, and won air supremacy in the area of decisive
battles, which had a significant effect on the success of the counterattack
of our ground troops. This was the first tangible victory of Soviet avia-
tion over the German air force.
It is significant that in the beginning of the war the main striking
power of the German air force was 52 percent bombers and 32 percent
fighters, but in the course of the war, particularly after the summer of
1943, the German command had to radically change the proportion of the arms
of its air forces. The forced transfer of the German army from the offense
to strategic defense, particularly in the air, along the entire Soviet-
German front; enormous losses of bombers; the continued growth of active
Soviet aircraft -- all this led to the fact that the proportion of enemy
bombers at the end of 1944 was significantly decreased and the proportion
of fighters increased.
`So ?1-?
- III I;
68
I ;
?III 111'111;
CPYRGHT
pprovep Fajlelefse 2000/08/09 : CM-
en' picture was obae.Pved in the Soviet Air Forces. In the
beginning of the war the proportion of our fighters was 56 percent, but by
the middle of 1944 it had decreased to 47 percent. (Archives of the Min-
istry of Defence, f. 35. op. 107559 d. b. d. 116). In connection with the
cambility of operating aircraft from the ground; that is, the capability
of concealing bases, aircraft losses on airfields were relatively few and
fighters continued to be the decisive force in the struggle to maintain
air supremacy. They continued to inflict heavy losses on the German air
force and to destroy its aircraft in aerial combat. Soviet fighters dis-
rupted enemy bomber strikes on our troops, repulsed their raids on cities
and the most important rear targets in the country, and escorted bombers
and ground attack aircraft to their targets and back.
The second stage of the fight for air supremacy was the battle on the
Volga. Significant numbers of our aircraft participated in it. Gen A. A.
NOVIKOV, who was still commander of the Air Forces then, came to coordinate
the operations. Enemy aircraft suffered heavy losses in the bitter and
prolonged air battles near the Volga. Hitler's generals were forced to
recognize the air force's defeat. In a book written by a group of gen-
erals and officers of the former fascist German Wehrmaeht it is noted
that: "The German air force suffered great losses. From 19 November to
31 December 1942, the Germans lost nearly 3,000 aircraft. As a result,
the resources of the German air force were even more weakened. The Rus-
sian Air Force, on the other hand, day by day became more and more strong
with respect to both quality and quantity, and their losses were decreas-
ing each year." (Mirovaya voyna 1932-1945 gE (World War 1939-19)4.5), For-
eign Literature Publishing House, 1957, page 481).
There is no need to comment on this evaluation. We can only add that
LA-5's, the newest type of fighters, began to arrive at the front at this
time and control of our fighters by radio from the groune. and in the air
became organized. The first experience of this type of control was ac-
quired in the 13th Air Army of the Leningrad Front. Then in August of
1942 it was gradually introduced into the 16th and 8th Air Armies, which
were in the fighting on the Volga, where command posts for controlling
fighters were deployed over the battlefield.
The acquisition of new types of aircraft with better characteristics,
especially in vertical and horizontal speeds, proved to have an important
effect on improving the tactics of fighter operations. This was apparent
in the transition from defensive aerial combat in banked turns to offen-
sive combat employing maneuvers in the vertical plane. Fighter combat
formations were dispersed according to altitude, front, and direction.
The aircraft pair, which made it possible for our pilots to improve
searching for enemy aircraft in the air and to increase fighter maneuver-
ability in groups became the basic combat formation. All this taken to-
gether gave favorable results. Air supremacy was finally transferred to
our pilots and at the outset of the counterattack of Soviet troops near
the Volga it became is? - ? ? ia
ANSIVVOCKOtteReheaSes2DP/Of3M6 91.%11314RP4iTiq??ZgI I29?19(Ps99A986grio.1
og
fighting over Kuban' in the spring of 1943, where the German air force
lost 1,100 aircraft and their best pilots. (Archives of the Ministry of
Defense, f. 319, op. 4798, 1. 47, 1. 81)
In intensity and number of participating aircraft on both sides
this air battle was one of the largest of the entire war. According
to calculations from the command post ot the 1:th Air Army, which the
author commanded during the war, during the most intense days of the
engagement 'a defeated enemy aircraft wati seen falling every 10 minutes.
Our aircraft 'succeeded, not only in seizing the initiative in thc air,
but also significantly shook the confidence of the German pilots in
their forces. The outcome of this battle changed the subsequent course
of the conflict to the advantage of the Soviet Air Force. As was noted
at the time in a critique, by Mar AvnA. A. NOVIKOV, commander of the
Air Forces, the vertical stack combat formation developed by pilot
A. A. POKRYSHKIN was once and for all put into operation in this battle.
While the air battle at Kuban' was being waged, two air operations
were conducted to destroy German aircraft on airfields by the forces of
several air armies and long range aviation on Instructions from the
Stavka of the High'Command. The first was accomplished from 6-8 May
1943. 17 airfields on a 1,200 kilometer front sustained strikes.
Up to 500 enemy aircraft were destroyed as a result. The second air
operation was conducted from 8-10 June. Strikes were inflicted on 28
airfields. During the second air operation on airfields the German
air force lost up to 580 aircraft in June, which also favorably affected
the air situation by the beginning of the decisive battles at the
Kursk Bulge.
The final stage of the fight for air supremacy was the battle
near Kursk? in which the chief burden of fighting the German air force
was carried by our valiant fighter pilots. In the first days of the
fighting our aircraft gained supremacy in the air and held it firmly
on all fronts until the end of the war.
By this time the proportion of aircraft resources had sharply
changed to our advantage. In two years the German air force had suf-
fered heavy losses on the Soviet-German front, particularly in per-
sonnel. By the end of 1943 it had already lost approximately 50,000
men. The German command could not replenish the losses and their num-
bers by 1944 had decreased to less than one half the former level.
Throughout the entire war the Soviet air force did not experience a
shortage of flying cadres. After the considerable losses of aircraft
on airfields in the beginning of the war, some pilots were left without
aircraft and they were called "baseless ones." From May 1942 to Decem-
ber .1944 the number of pilots increased 50 percent in accordance with
the growth of aircraft production.
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Appfpoctomwreeoggw)tatireltronal'inntil?ions waysearn
broadened as a result of measures taken by the Communist Party and the
Soviet government. During the war enrollment in them was increased,
the length of training was shortenedl and re-training and refrer
courses for flying, command, technical, and political cadres we
created. All this made it possible to carry out the plans for training
air force cadres.
By t.e aummer campaign of 1944 our air force was almost five
times superior to the enemy air force. This created advantageous con-
ditions for maintaining supremacy in the air and for inflicting se-
vere strikes on enemy troops and rear targets.
The number of combat sorties testify to the strengthening of
the Soviet Air Forces and the weakening of the German air forces dur-
ing the war. In 1942 our air forces made nearly 611,000 sorties;
in 19411. nearly 882,000; and in the four months of 1945 nearly 607,000.
According to our observations, the German air force made 493,000 pas-
ses over the front line; in 1944 approximately 258,000; and in the
four months of 1945 only 70,000 in all.
From the first days of the war our bombers delivered blows on
targets deep in the rear of fascist Germany and its allies. Although
the flights of our long range bombers to enemy rear targets did not
cause particularly great destruction, they had an important military
-
political significAnce. They disorganized the rhythmical operation
of military industrial enterprises; forced the German command to im-
pose blackouts in all large cities and withdraw from the front consider-
able air defense resources to protect cities and numerous rear targets
In Germany and its allied countries; exposed Goering's boastful state-
ments and Hitler's propaganda lies about the destruction of the Soviet
air force; and raised the morale of the Soviet people and their sol-
diers.
The main blows of Soviet bombers were delivered on enemy troops
and combat equipment on the battlefield in the tactical and operational
depth, which directly aided Soviet Army troops in resolving the main
mission of the war -- destruction of fascist Germany's powerful. ground
forces.
In the offensive operations of Soviet troops, which were unprec-
edented in scale and intensity, the air forces concentrated on destroy-
ing enemy personnel and equipment and on covering friendly troops.
Beginning in the fall of 1942, continuous air strikes were developed
and later were employed widely in the form of ?the air offensive. The
air offensive invariably led to appreciable operational results since
the enemy was continuously subjected to powerful massive air strikes
one after the other by our ground attack aircraft and bombers.
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AppkiigdY89?111;16Aet2Ottf/08?41911141APRBIPSEPT00875111000319MQ008 -8
quanTity of aircraft in the air armies, correct use of reserve air
corps, and their skillful deployment.
GHT
The power of Soviet air strikes on enemy troops grew continuously
during the war. Here is how data on beveral of the most important
operations characterize this process: over 1,000 aircraft participated
in the counteroffensive near Moscow, approximately 5/000 took part
in the battle at Kurt, nearly 5,000 in the Belorussian Operation,
and approximately 8,500 in the Berlin Operation. The number of com-
bat sorties of our aircraft increased accordingly. In the Moscow
counteroffensive, Soviet aircraft made 16,000 combat sorties in the
interests of the attacking forces, in the Volga counteroffensive nearly
36,000 in the Kursk counteroffensive nearly 90,00, and in the Belo-
russian operation more than 153,000 combat sorties.
The air forces played an important role in supporting the com-
bat operations of armored tank and mechanized obuyedineniya and
soyedineniya. When tank armies and tank and mechanized corps entered
into battle, the main efforts of ground attack and fighter aircraft
were concentrated for their support and cover. As a rule, from one
to two ground attack and fighter divisions were assigned for support
and cover of the operations of a tank or mechanized corps in the op-
erational depth. Ground attack aircraft and bombers supported the
operations of advanced detachments and the main efforts of tank and
mechanized corps, contained and destroyed withdrawing enemy chasti?
destroyed bridges and crossings in his route of retreat, and engaged
approaching enemy reserves. This Beverly slowed down the tempo of his
retreat, halted the advance of his reserves, and made it possible for
our mobile troops to forestall the enemy in taking up important opera-
tional lines. In addition, aircraft reconnoitered enemy withdrawal
routes and guided tankmen to important objectives.
It should be particularly noted that in the last war aerial re-
connaissance was one of the most important means of providing the com-
mand with timely intelligence information..
Long range aerial reconnaissance regiments reconnoitered at depths
up to 500 kilometers and more. The scale of this type of reconnais-
sance was comparatively small due to the limited number of these air-
craft. Periodic visual observation and aerial photography of the enemy's
basic communications made it possible to disclose in good time the most
important directions of railroad and motor vehicle transportation
and the areas of concentration of enemy troop groupings, which were
subsequently subjected to strikes by our long range aircraft.
Considerably more attention was given to systematic operational
and, especially, tactical reconnaissance by reconnaissance aircraft
as well as ground attack and fighter aircraft, which were the principle
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CPYRGHT
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WIal
reconnaissance at depths up to 100 kilometers.
Non-T/0 reconnaissance squadrons and regiments of fighter-reconnais-
sance aircraft atta7hed to the air armies were created in the fall
of 1942 fur this purpose, which provided increased intensity and qual-
ity of aerial reconnaissance.
The Soviet Air Forces were also widely used for detailed aid
to the partisan movement. In the interests of partisans, aircraft
made more than 109)500 sorties, including more than 13,000 landings
at partisan sites. Regiments of long range aviation and the Civil
Air Fleet delivered to partisans about 13,000 tons of ammunition, ar-
mament) medicines, supplies, and other cargo. More than 83,000 par-
tisans were delivered into the enemy rear and from partisan areas
to the main land. The seriously wounded and sick were systematically
evacuated from partisan detachments, which made it possible to save
thousands of lives of Soviet patriots. Our air force was of cons id.
erable help to the partisans of Poland, Yugoslavia, Albania, and other
countries.
The great victory of our people was a very law-governed thing.
It was not military luck nor accident that brought the brilliant vic-
tory to the Red Army and complete defeat to Hitler's army. Naturally,
luck effected combat operations during the war to a certain, degree.
But in the final count the outcome of the gigantic confrontation was
decided by a number of objective laws. The most important of these
was the superiority of the economic and political organization of the
socialist state, its advanced Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the in-
spiring, wise leadership of the Communist Party. The basis of the
military idight of our state was comprised of the unswerving will of
the Soviet people for victory, heroic labor, and the socialist economy,
which had a definite effect on the course of the entire war.
On instructions from the party and the government, collectives
of aircraft designers and engineers headed by such outstanding figures
of aviation science anq technology as A. N. TUPOLEV, N. N. POLIKARPOVy
S. V. IL'YUSHIN, V. M. PETLYAKOV, P. 0. SUKHOY, A. A. MIKULIN, A. D.
SHNETSOV, V. Ya. KLIMOV, knd the young designers A. I. MIKOYAN, A. S.
YAKOVLEV, and S. A. LAVOCHKIN created new types of fighters, bombers,
ground attack aircraft, and aircrsft engines which. our industry put
into production in the second half of 1940. Our homeland, particularly
in the first months of the war, was confronted with. an extremely dif-
ficult situation. However, the Soviet economy was so streng and viable
that it withstood the most difficult tests. An historically unprece?
dented rebuilding of all branches of the national economy of e huge
state into a militatry economy occurred in an exceptionally* short pe-
riod of time and an extremely unfavorable situation. The Soviet mili-
tary economy not only recovered from an unexpected, dangerous blowy
but created the necessary material prerequisites for conducting a
great war, for winning victory over the fascist aggressor.
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PYRG
App1499ediForfteMater2050/08113.9arglAeREIRPUIMPROgamtswom
entire war was the production of combat equipment, armament, and ammuni-
tion. It was absolutely necessary to surpass the enemy with regard
to the military economy. The military and political leaders of fas-
-Feist Germany faced the very same problem. But the Soviet military
economy won out over the Germany military economy. The following sta-
tistics clearly demonstrate this. From June 1941 to June 1945 our in-
dustry produced an average of 27,000 aircraft annually. During the
1941-1944 period the German industry delivered to the front 78,900
combat aircraft, an average of 19/700 a year. Our victory was achieved
despite the fact that Germany at that time far surpassed the Soviet
Union in the production of such basic strategic materials as coal and
steel.
It should also be emphasized that throughout the war the number
of planes produced by the aircraft industry srew continuously. In
1943 1.5 times more planes were produced than in 1942, making it pos-
sible to surpass the enemy considerably in numbers of aircraft by
the summer of 1943. As for the foreign aircraft turned over to us
on lend-lease, the proportion of them in relation to those delivered
by Soviet industry was insignificant. Moreover, the number of for-
eign aircraft turner over to us in most difficult years, 1941-1942,
were generally very few and only in 1943 and especially in 1944 were
more aircraft delivered from the US and England on lend lease; how-
ever, this was already belated help.
Our industry surpassed the German industry not only in numbers,
but also in quality of many types of weapons, including combat air-
craft. During the war almost all equipment and armament in the air
force underwent fundamental changes.
The competition between the fascist German industry and ours
for qualitative superiority in aircraft equipment went on throughout
the entire war. The German air force entered the war armed with
the latest aircraft. The Soviet air force was basically armed with
obsolete aircraft. Just before the war new types of combat aircraft
were produced in the USSR, but they were not serially produced in
mass. In the first half of 1941, industry produced only about 2,600
new type aircraft (Yak-1, MiG-31 LaGG-31 11-2). This could not es-
sentially effect the qualitative relationship of the air strengths of
the sides. In addition, the majority of the aircraft positioned on
airfields close to the state boundaries were lost in the first hours
of the war. Several new types of aircraft did not satisfy the changed
conditions of armed conflict since the Germans had already succeeded
in modernizing their fighters, having armed them with aircraft cannons.
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CPYRGHT
?
proved iEkft RWlefiiien200019803ArglAhRIIPSEMOMR11603130Wcia.e8it be
especially important. During the war the tactics of the air
force arms and the operational art of the air forces constantly pres-
ented to the design bureaus and the aircraft industry ever higher de-
mands, the basic ones of which were: increasing the maximum speed,
rate of climb, ceiling, and range of aircraft; improving cannon arma-
ment and increasing the bomb loads; increasing aircraft maneuverability
and engine power; and improving the quality of equipment. In resolv-
ing these complex problems the heroic labor of the Soviet people yielded
remarkable results. By the beginning of the second period of the war,
our air force basically had been re-equipped with new combat equipment.
Improvements in combat aircraft were chiefly made by way of in-
creasing their maximum speeds and perfecting their weapons. During
the war our air force was armed with the latest aircraft: fighters
La-5, Yak-9, Yak-31 La-7; and bombers Pe-2 and Tu-2, which were not
inferior to German aircraft of the same type. The 11-2, the only ground
attack plane in the world armed with cannons. rocket shells? and bombs
of various purposes and calibers, including antitank bombs, and pro-
tected by armor from infantry fire, was an exceptionally successful
aircraft for supporting ground troops directly on the battlefield
both on the defense and in the offense. Its role in the past war can-
not be over estimated. In a future war a similar aircraft might also
be widely employed.
German aircraft construction could not stand. up to the competi-
tion. It could replenish the enormous losses which the German air force
suffered for the first time on the Soviet-German front only by pro-
ducing current types of aircraft. During the war the Germans intro-
duced only one new fighter, the FV-190, and made two modifications
of the Me-109.
Fighter aviation underwent the greatest development. This was
quite natural since it was the chief weapon of the struggle for air
supremacy. Our new types of fighters surpassed corresponding enemy
aircraft in almost all basic performance indicators. In the process
of serial production and modification of aircraft, the flight speed of
fighters was increased 70-120 kilometers per hour. The fire power of
aircraft was increased considerably at the same time. Insteat of 7.62mm
caliber machine guns, cannons and rocket shells were installed.
One of the main sources of victory for our air force came from
mobilization of the workers of the rear of the country for the mass
production of aircraft, engines, weapons and ammnition, material and.
technical means, and the successful training of air cadres atid re.
serves. The Soviet people gave every kind of help to strengthen the
air force. By its labor savings of 2,360 million rubles, which were
put into the country's defense fund, 2,565 combat aircraft were
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acquired. Anna Selivanova, a Saratov collectiveilikopfteWged
pligtated fiCifclieltas3302QQOAQ8pci cilATIRAP?.?1T94/
Hn- band was fighting. Our descendants will remember with irspiration and
gratitude the feat of the Soviet workers in the war, who, living by a
single thought -- everything for the front, everything for victory --
succeeded in providing our troops and air forces with everything necet-
sary in conditions of unbelievable difficulty and deprivation.
The training of air force reserves was on. of the difficult and
important problems which had to be resolved during the war. Reserve
air regiments and then air brigades, which on the whole coped with
their tasks, were formed at the beginning of the war. In the first
months of the war, reserve air ob"yedineniya were created in the form
of strike and reserve air groups, which were sent to reinforce the front
air forces. Beginning with the summer of 1942 the foundation was laid
for the formation of 10 reserve air corp. By ti a end of the war a-
bout 55 percent of the aircraft in our air forces were in air soyedineniya
of the reserve of the Supreme Command. The presence of this reserve
permitted the command to accomplish a broad operational maneuver along
the front by air forces and to create the largest air groupings for
ground troop support by the beginning of the offensive operations.
Fundamental changes in the organizational structure of our air
forces were made during the war. The experience of the first months
of the war showed that the existing organizational structure was con-
trary to the principle of massing aircraft on decisive axes. Aircraft
were dispersed equally in many combined-arms armies. Although this
created advantageous conditions for coordinating the air force with
ground troopE directly on the battlefield, it at the same time deprived
the command of 'Ulf: possibility of concentrating the efforts of all
aircraft on decisive directions and disallowed centralized control
of it.
In the fall of 1941, during the counteroffensive of Soviet troops
at Rostov and the battle of Moscow, massive employment of our aircraft
in the axes of the main strikes of ground troops was accompll6hed for
the first time. This experiment fully justified itself and in this
connection the Soviet command decided to combine the aircraft of fronts
and combined-arms armies into front air armies, which were created in
the May-October 1942 period.
The creation of air armies and their continual strengthening
made it possible to quickly concentrate large forces of aircraft on
decisive directions and to employ them massively both for support
and cover of the troops of front strike groupings and for ensuring su-
premacy in the air.
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CPYRGHT
a
A
pr Stifin
'hiliticRtioeibtixlit-M5061Afgt tAttutsouslY
ea. cturi.nghe war, acqa r p 1
ng more c early ?efined. forms. The
greatest share of bomber, fighter, ground attack, and reconnaissance
alrcraft were included in the air armies. In addition to the air
arrO.es, independent combat missions were carried out by long range
aviation, reserve air corps, fighter aviation of PVO strany, and naval
aviation, which was used to strengthen front aviation when necessary.
Correspondingly, front and long range aviation often supported the
operations of the fleet and its aircraft in littoral axes.
The organizational forms of the aviation rear also underwent de-
velopment. By the fall of 1941 aviation bases had been abolished.
There were replaced by regions of aviation basing, to which airfield
servicing battalions (BAO) were subordinated. Each BAO was intended
to service one air algiment. The aviation rear was reorganized fo.
the purpose of improving the maneuverability and uninterrupted support
of the combat operations of aviation chasti and soyedineniya.
The high moral and political qualities, conscientiousness and
creative activity of all air force personnel. were on of the decisive
aspects of the successful fulfillment of the combat missions confront-
ing aviation. Air force political organs and party and Komsomol organi-
zations did a reat deal of work in instilling in aviators a. high moral-
political consciousness, patriotism, military duty, hatred of the fas-
cist German invaders, selflessness and heroism.
Soviet air force personnel wrote many brilliant pages in the r!cra-
bat chronicles of the motherland in the years of the past war. Our ae-
rial warriors bravely defended the cities of the homeland and the iu-
dustrial centers of the country. Day and night, in any weather, they
pounded the German fascists on many fronts, from Murmansk to the Gau
csus Mountains. Their comrades-in-arms on the ground -- the aircraft
technicians, mechanics, vehicle drivers, soldiers of the airfield ser-
vicing battalions, and repairmen -- provided hIgh combat readiness
for aircraft.
In the conflict with the enemy thousands of aviators displayed
self-control, heroism, bravery, and courage. Many of them, whose
feats glorified the grandeur of the spirit of Soviet man, the power
of our weapons, and the superiority of the socialist social and state
structure, are not among us today, but they will live eternally in
the memory of our grateful nation as an inspiring example for the
living.
The past war showed that heroism is normal behavior for the So-
viet man. It was not a natural impulse but a high awarenees of duty
to the fatherland that led our airmen to heroic feats. It was not
just individual pilots and aircraft crews who displayed heroism, but
whole air force podrazdeleniya, chasti, and soyedineniya.
77
Hundreds of airmen of man natton - ?
Apple** far fit BERN Jaw
;1d5?
by Russian pilots IVANOV, SKVORODIN) CHERKASHIN, MIKHAV1?
HI-U2ASOV; by Ukrainians SHEVCHUK, VDOVENK00 GOMONENKO; by the Cossack,
ABDIROV, and the Jew, IRZHAK; in all more than 100 Soviet pilots.
Our pilots demonstrated courage and bravery combined with strict
conscientious discipline and high combat mastery which amazed the
world. Even in the most difficult days they were constantly striving
for perfection of combat mastery. Fighter-pilots I. IVANOV) D. KOKAREV,
L. BUTELIN, P. RYABTSEV? N. IGNAT'YEV) A. DANILOV) and A. MOKLYAK in
the first hours of the war made ramming attacks which required enor-
mous effort of will and extraordinary flying ard military skill. In
all our pilots made more than 200 ramming attacks during the war.
17 pilots did it twice and A. KHLOBYSTOV did it three times and B.
KOBZAN four times. Communist Sr Lt A. GOROVETS is the only pilot in
the world who succeeded in destroying 9 enemy aircraft in one aerial
fight.
The combat efforts and feats of pilots received general public
recognition and high evaluation from the Soviet government. More
than 200,000 airmen were awarded orders and medals) 2,120 were awarded
the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 65 were awarded two Gold Stars,
and the world renowned pilots A. POKRYSHKIN and I. KOZHEDUB, who are
today Soviet generals, are Thrice Heroes of the Soviet Union. USSR
orders were awarded to 65 percent of air force soyedineniya and chasti.
The majority of chasti and soyedineniya received the honorary names
of Moscow, Orlov? Kiev, etc. They were cited 319 times in orders of
the Supreme Command for successful combat actions in operations. Hun-
dreds of generals and officers were awarded the orders of Suvorov,
Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, and Aleksandr Nevskiy for courageous
and skillful leadership of the combat operations of air chasti and
soyedineniya.
The birth of the air guards was connected with the increased com-
bat mastery. Beginning in December 1941, air chasti and soyedineniya
began to be awarded the honorary titles of "guards" in recognition of
special combat services. This honorary title was awarded to one third
of all air force chasti and soyedineniya. The members of guards units
were the bearers of advanced combat experience and were the most cap-
able and disciplined airmen. The strength of the guards units con-
sisted of the it that they fought bravely, artfully, with initia-
tive, and tried to get the maximum effect from combat equipment and
weapons.
Beginning in the fall of 1943 French patriot pilots of the Normandy-
Nieman squadron, later a regiment, began to participnte shoulder to
shoulder with Soviet airmen in battles against the fascist Germans.
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004d Poway Iegisk0000168ligiaS AeRRIEMTWia.Zi NO PQMP439?-?zech-
oslovakia were involved in aerial combat against the fascist air force.
After the liberation of Rumania and Bulgaria, Rumanian and Bulgarian
air units entered into the war against the German.. The Soviet gov-
ernment highly appreciated the combat services of the pilots of our
fraternal states and awarded them USSR orders and medals.
After the victorious ending of the war many air force heroes
steadfastly began to generalize their combat experience. Acquiring
deep and thorough theoretical and military-technical knowledge, they
*proved their flying skill. Former front-line pilots were the first
to master flights on jet aircraft. Many of them became prominent
air force commanders, political workers, and engineers; and several
became scientists. They pass on their experience to young airmen and
educate them in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland.
A famous galaxy of air force commanders was born during the war!
Mars Avn P. F. ZHIGAREV and A. A. NOVIKOV, commanders of Air Forces
the Red Army; Chief Mar Avn A. Ye. GOLOVANOV, commander of Long
Range Aviation; Mar Avn F. A. FALALEYEV, commander of aviation of
South-West Line; Mars Avn F. A. VOROZHEYKIN and S. A. KHUDYAKOV, chiefs
of staff of the Air Forces; Mars Avn S. A. KRASOVSKTY? S. I. RUDENKO,
V. A. SUDETS, N. S. SKRIPKO, Ye. Ya. SAVTTSKIY, F. A. ASTAKHOV, F. A.
AGAMTSOV? S. F. ZHAVORONKOV; Gens P. F. POLYNIN, I. P. ZflURAVLEV,
N. F. PAPIVIN, S. D. RYBALTHENKO, 1. M. SOKOLOV, N. F. NAUMENKO, S.
GORYUNOV, M. M. GROMOV, T. T. KHRYUK1N; Gens A. K. REPIN, I. V.
NARKOV. and V. N. KOBLIKOV, leaders of Aviation Engineering Services
of the Air Forces; and Gen N. S. SHIMANOV, A. G. RYTOV, and N. S.
RONOZANOV, political workers. 12 commanders of air armies were awarded
the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and Gens KHRYUKIN, SAVITSKIY?
POLBIN? and Chief Mar Avn NOVTKOV were awarded the title of Twice
Hero of the Soviet Union.
Many airmen, having begun the war as line pilots, ended it as
commanders of outstanding squadrons and regiments. TI,c;Je were remark-
able air soldiers, the sons of our nation, educated the party and
the Komsomol, infinitely devoted to the socialist fati..erland.
In the years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet aviation traversed
a glorious path of difficult struggle and victory. Together with all
of our armed forces it grew in numbers and was reorganized qualitatively.
Its cadres, having gained a wealth of combat experience, grew and be-
came stronger. The moral-political unity of our nation, its lofty
patriotism, the wise leadership of the Communist Party, the vitality
and power of the Socialist economy which provided the front with first-
class combat equipment, the advanced nature of Soviet military art,
the heroism of Soviet soldiers and their high combat skill -- all of
this made it possible for the Red Army and its force to achieve
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coAlpiftbevetbECOROOPfhaOggPga946144004aleigREE5WWW8-8
merged strong and pOwerful from the difficult and protracted war.
The hopes of world imperialism that the war would weaken and exhaust
the Soviet Union completely collapsed.
The wealth of combat experience acquired by our air force during
the war and the creative use of it promoted the rapid development of
the operational art of the air forces and the tactics of arms of the
air forces. The experience of armed conflict put a number of pre-war
theoretical principles on the employment of aviation to a severe test
and repudiated those which did not satisfy actual conditions. In .
addition, it permitted our military science to more fully disclose
the laws of armed conflict with the massive employment of aircraft
and, with regard to them, to find more rational methods for the oper-
ational and tactical employment of aircraft.
It is difficult to overestimate he significance of the enormous
combat experience gained by our air force in the last war. No other
army in the world has so much comprehensive experience in the employ-
ment of aircraft in widely varied conditions of a combat situation.
This expl.rience is of great significance for the further building
of Soviet aviation and it can be used successfully by the air forces
of fraternal socialist countries. It is an inexhaustible source for
the development of Soviet military art in the field of aircraft em-
ployment. And although the rapid development of nuclear-rocket weap-
ons required the development of new methods of combat operations,
this in no way depreciates the value of the experience of the past
aar in those areas which retains their significance in the changed
conditions.
Soon after the end of World War II the reactionary imperialist
circles of the US, England, and France, by a number of aggressive
actions and provocations, intensified the international situation,
started an increased arms race, and built military bases around the
socialist camp, confronting nations with the danger of a new world
nuclear-rocket war.
In accordance with the demands of the Central Committee of CPSU
and the Soviet government to reliably ensure the defense capability
of our country and to frustrate the aggressive plans of the imperial-
ists, we are harmoniously developing all branches of the armed forces,
including the air forces. The role of aviation in a war, should the
imperialists unleash it, will be great.
Our scientists, designers, engineers, and workers of the aircraft
industry are creating first-class jet combat aircraft. in which pilots
will be able to resolve successfully the combat missions assigned to
aviation in a nuclear-rocket war. Our jet combat aircraft can achieve
speeds exceeding the speed of sound almost three time s4 reach MaK
-8
and A Mime lelasea2 004;MQ8 AO? Fig09.8 R000 30oou
CPYRG
-so ?T7.
n addition to the qualitative improvement of combat planes, air-
craft rocket equipment has undergone enormous development. A number
of modern types of guided aircraft rockets, missiles, and cruise mis-
siles have been created. Bombers have been made into long range super-
sonic rocket-carrying aircraft, armed with rockets with powerful nu-
clear charges and able to deliver nuclear-rocket strikes on the ag-
gressor from great distances without entering the air defense zone
of the target. This has greatly increased the combat capabilities of
aviation. Air-to-air rockets have replaced cannon and machine gun
weapons on fighters. Into the armament have come radar systems for
controlling rockets and intercept stations and radiotechnical Systems
making it possible to launch rockets and drop bombs from maximum and
minimum altitudes at maximum speeds, day and night, in simple and
complex weather conditions.
Simultaneously with the increased flight speeds and altitudes,
the operation of jet aircraft from. dir airfields limited in size has
become a reality.
An exceptionally important role is being acquired by our Military
Transport Aviation, which is equipped with the latest transport air-
craft and helicopters and is able to transport over long distances and
at fast speeds not only troops, but also heavy types of combat equip-
ment, such as guns, ballistic surface-to-surface rockets, armored per-
sonnel carriers, tanks, and other military equipment.
Modern aircraft, being complex units of the latest equipment,
present increased demands on the military-technical and special train-
ing of airmen. The conditions of a nuclear-rocket war will require
high moral-combat cualities and strong physical development. That
Is why we cannot forget about the training o4: aviation cadres even
though we have new, powerful combat equipment. It will not be the
equipment itself that will fight but the soldiers who skillfully wield
this complex combat equipment. In a modern war, which will be distin-
guished by exceptional violence and resoluteness of purpose as never
before, the role of the man-soldier and the significance of military
discipline and organization increases.
If the imperialists unleash a new war its outcome will be decided
by .soldiers who wield modern combat equipment to perfection and who
are utterly devoted to their nation and to communism.
Our country holds first place in the world in the manned explora-
tion of space. We are proud that our military aviation was the cradle
of cosmonautics, that from its ranks emerged the first cosmonauts --
Yu. A. GAGARIN, G. S. TITOV, A. G. NIKOLAYEV, P. R. POPOVICH, V. F.
BYKOVSKIY, V. M. KOMAROV, P. I. BELYAYEV, jd A. A. LEONOV. The flights
of the cosmonauts are a further step forward in the development of
fatherland aviation.-
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.500090008 8
IVItriRektaa$0216601i86193: arziAliiiaWNIFie&OPARON) 08-8
20th anniversary of victory over fascist Germany and are working on
the building of communism with enormous enthusiaism, every military
aviator, from the soldier to the marshall; is even more deeply idbued
with a feeling of personal responsibility for fulfillment of the pa-
triotic and international duty of an armed defender of the country
which won socialisml'which has paved the way for all progrensive man-
kind to a beautiful future. Further increasing the combat readiness
of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are standing La guard of the great
achievements of socialism, peace, and the security of nations, is a
thing of honor for every soldier of our air forces.
CPYRGHT
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Approved For ReieaseROMWOURATRINAMIXAMINIMM0008-8
by Flt Adm S. GORSHKOV
CPYRGHT
Two decades separate us from that May day when the last salvos of
the was in Europe resounded and the triumphant milti-colored fires of
salutes signaled the long awaited Victory holiday. The complete and
unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany inflicted colossal ruin and
brought dountless suffering to the peoples of many countries, - the result
of a war unleased by German militarists with the instigation of inter-
national reaction. The decisive role in the crushing of Fascism, in the
destruction of its war machine, created according to the latest word in
bourgeois science, was played by the Soviet nation and its valorous Armed
Forces, raised on the call of the Communist Party for the sacred Great
Patriotic War.
A more cruel, merciless, destructive and bloody war than World War
II has not been recorded in history. In this most painful of human
tragedies our government of workers and peasants, the first in the world,
passed the difficult examination with honor and emerged the victor in the
mortal battle with the forces of international reaction.
Especially difficult for our Homeland was the initial period of the
Great Patriotic War. The temporary advantages of the enemy, his attack
reinforced by treachery, a certain degree of superiority in the quality
of armament and in the combat experience of the ground troops, aviation
and navy made themselves felt.
The lack of preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces for repulsing
the enemy's sudden attack, the shortages in equipping the arms with the
latest combat material and shortcomings in its development had a negative
influence on the course of the armed conflict.
In each of the branched of the armed forces the defects were felt
differently. In the ground troops, for example, they made themselves
felt in full measure. In the Navy their influence was less, but also
had an effect on the fighting at sea, and more so since the situation
in regard to naval activities could not help but reflect on the situation
as it developed on the land fronts where, in the final analysis, the
outcome of the war was decided.
The Soviet Navy began to be rehabilitated by the will of the Party
immediately after the end of the civil war. Its combat might grew in
proportion to the strengthening of the economic power of the government.
By the end of the 1930's our industry mastered the construction of ships
of all classes as a result of which the Norther, Red Banner Baltic, Black
and Pacific Fleets were supplied with the newest type "Kirov" cruisers,
high speed destroyers, escortlantisubmarine and other type ships. In
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PYRGH
kbViihiti6VoSiakdiatitidi200811f0310libre Wiedifilf' %fa gag WOMP(tig 00nod els
or foreign mavies. However, in certain aspects of armament ours, just as
well as many of the foreign ships of prewar conattuction, did not fully
meet all the necessary requirements for modern naval combat. Their anti-
aircraft armament was weak, and this factor considerably complicated the
carrying out of missions in open seas under active opposition of bomber
and mine-torpedo aviation, which waslAittthe beginning of the war, one of
the basic striking forces of navies. This had a serious effect on our
Navy as well, one third of its losses in ships and transport vessels being
caused by enemy aviation.
The fact cannot be disregarded that our Navy had a small number of
ships with powerful artillery armament, as a result of which, at the
beginning of the war, they operated under extremely great pressure, and
in subsequent periods their utilization 'was purposely limPted by the
Supreme Command, which, naturally, could not fail to have an effect on
their operations.
Another vexing fact was that our Navy - a recognized pioneer in the
development and use of mining and mine oweeping weapons - did not have at
the beginning of the war an effective means of fighting against ground
type and other non-contact type mines. And it was precisely,due to the
use of such weapons in great quantity that the German Navy could inflict
serious losses in ships and vessels of the English.and!French,Navies.
The development of subh weapons was under way in or Navy, but at th4
beginning of the war had not yet been completed
The equipment which the Navy had for searching submarines was
ineffective. It made possible the detection of submarine:Tropeller
noises, but it did not provide the possibility for obtaining the necessary
data for use of the ships' principal antisubmarine weapon - the depth
both, which in any case was not distinguished for its high destructive
qualities.
The Soviet Navy had a rich heritage of combat experience from the
Russian Navy in amphibious landings. In the 1930's for the first time
in the history of naval art bur Navy developed the theory of naval landing
operations. Several of its recommendations were put to the test in prac-
tical combat training. At that time serious attention was not given to the
creation of amphibious transport or amphibious landing equipment. All our
fleets entered the war without a single ship of special construction and
oily one brigade of naval infantry was deployed in the Baltic. This signi-
ficantly complicated operations of our fleets and flotillas in making
amphibious landings, which was an important part of their combat activity
in that period of the war.
Our fleets did not have any special surface ships capable of supporting
an amphibious landing. It was then:considered that this mission, as well
as, by the way, the overall fire support of ground troops from the sea
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App rovedaldid Rai easte1.241140/684919921CdifetREDPFmo a ammo vim amp -Se stroyerS
and ships with large caliber armament - cruisers. The gunboats of that
CPYRGHT Period were re-equipped transport vessels, predominantly of old construction
with low speed and armed with several medium caliber guns. Besides this
there were not very many of them available in the Navy. The Navy also had
only a limited quantity of cruisers. The destroyers were mainly earmarked
for combat engagements with "their own kind" that is, with surface forces
of the enemy. And this is the mission for which they prepared. The devel-
opment of means for them to fire at shore targets was a secondary mission.
The submarines in our fleets were assigned an important role in the
battle on the communications lines and in the protection of our shores
from attacks of enemy surface ships. Most of the operational submarines
were new, perfected combat ships, constructed with due regard for the
latest achievements in submarine design and the development of the anti-
submarine forces of our probable enemies. However, as soon as they were
earmarked primarily for operations in the Baltic and Black Seas:, then
their range and their capability to operate independently was calculated
on this basis.
Our naval aviation was inferior in quality to that of the enemy. The
naval air forces of fleets were equipped with the very same planes, basi-
cally antiquated types, as the other branches of the armed forces. These
planes could more orless still successfully operate against slow moving
targets on land, but they were of little use for carrying out combat
missions at sea. Because of the limited speed, range and carrying capac-
ity of the planes, naval aviation could not effectively use torpedoes
against ships at sea at great distance from their airports.
The naval fighter aviation was also not distinguished for its good
qualities. The small tactical radius and the short flying time capa-
bility of the fighter planes actually limited the use of naval surface
forces in zones within reach of enemy aircraft since they were without
cover even at comparatively short distances from our shores.
Planes of the newest types and models were just making their appear-
ance in the fleets in limited numbers and the flying personnel had not
yet been trained.
The combat training of our fleets in peace time was directed to the
development of the tactics of the naval battle. The main attention was
given to the organization of a combined attack of surfact Ships, torpedo
boats, aviation and submarines against groupings of enemy surface ships
in the open sea and against mine-artillery positions in narrow waters
and on the approaches tl the main naval bases. Also developed were so-
called raiding operations which, according to contemporary concerts,
consisted of carrying out attacks against ports, naval bases or groups
of ships in the enemy's coastal waters by our surface ships and torpedo
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blikoraisel3bPaulattlEtaSte. 2Afie/Qa./PURMID WNW WPC TM? I I ons
6 .-
were limited primarily to carrying out tactical missions.
All regulations and instructions of our Navy, both in the period of
its reconstruction and in the pre-war period were permeated with an offensive
spirit. However, the combat preparation of fleets was in known contradic-
tion to the demands of. the orders and instructions. The working out of the
basic missions of combat preparedness was carried out in limited regions of
sea theaters located not far from our shores. And in this was demonstrated
that very same defensive tendency in the use of naval forces in war which
was the rule for the period of its rehabilitation, which, of course, was
reflected in the trend of preparation of the leading cadres of the fleets.
Even in the conditions when the course for the creation of a large ocean
navy was already established and the naval forces contained submarines with
a sufficiently.large cruising range, there was never any real consideration
given to the possibility of conducting combat operations in the ocean with
even one of them.
These elements of a defensive tendency in the use of naval forces
manifested themselves also in the distribution of submarines by theaters.
Out of 249 submarines available at that time in the Navy, there were 90
in the Baltic Sea and 51 in the Black Sea, but in the Barents Sea, where
the conditions for getting out into the ocean were most favorable, at the
beginning of the war there were only 15 submarines.
The result was that the combat capabilities of such a powerful long-
range weapon which our Navy already had at its disposal, - its submarines,
primarily cruising submarines, were artificially limited, and wittingly so,
by the narrow limits of their predominantly tactical use, mainly in nearby
regions.
Long before the war our probable enemy was conclusively determined,
which provided the possibility for purposeful preparation of all branches
of the armed forces and, in adequate time, to coordinate their efforts for
battle against a continental country. Nevertheless, combined operations
of all branches of the armed forces were given little attention. The nec-
essary unity of views of command personnel of the brandhes of the armed
forces on the principal questions of combined operations of fleets with
ground troops on the coastal axes was not attainech Tactical coordination
of ships with chasti of ground troops was worked out only in broad outline,
and pre parations for making landings were placed in the background.
All this, in the final analysis, had a negative effect on the course
of the armed conflict; in a series of instances it was the reason for the
non-coordination in operations of ground troops and forces of the fleets
at the very time when the direct support of operations on coastal fronts
made up the greatest part of the Navy's efforts in all our naval theaters.
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Approveacar lik'dgaSert21340t#8REOptiligiAIRDP135?00.716RelikWil00901)1183-80f central
aaministrations and fleets, as well as within soyedineniya of ships and
naval shore chasti, hindered the full scale preparation of the fleets for
PYRGHT the war.
Great harm was done in the strengthening of the combat might of the
Navy in the most important period of its development by the unfounded
repression in the period of the Stalin cult of personality, as a conse-
quence of which guiltlessly suffered and perished talented leaders of the
Navy such as V. M. ORLOV? M. V. VIKTOROVI I. K. KOZZIANOV, K. I. =HENN,
R. A. MUKLEVICH, G. P. KIREYEV1 A. K. SIVKOV, G. S. OKUNEV, many commanders
and political workers of soyedineniya and chasti. New cadres were promoted
to their positions without wartime naval combat experience against inter-
ventionists. Many of them had not yet been able to acquire the necessary
skills in leadership of Navy soyedineniya and obnyedineniya, which they had
to accumulate during the course of the war and not during peacetime. And
nevertheless, despite all this, on the whole the combat prepardness of the
fleets on the eve of the war was high, which was one of the most important
results of the titanic work of the Communist Party in uniting and directing
all personnel of the Navy in maintaining each ship and chest in constant
combat readiness.
The maintenance of constant combat readiness in the Navy promoted the
introduction from the start of World War II of a new system of combat
training which made it possible for ships, chesti and soyedineniya to work
out their training assignments throughout the entire year.
A rather significant factor was the fact that in all our fleets during
peacetime conditions a system had been efficiently worked out for putting
the forces of the fleets in an unusually high state of combat readiness,
and also the fact that all changes in the theaters of operations were being
studied and taken into consideration. For this reason various measures
of deception used by the German command; in order to hide preparations at
the beginning of the war, were unsuccessful. Our fleets noted many of these
preparations in sufficient time. In particular it was determined that the
number of German transports located in Soviet ports was systematically
being reduced. The last German transport departed from Tallin on the night
of 21 June, which was only one day from the start of the war. And since
fleets noted other changes in the situation on the seas as well; it enabled
them to take timely measures of a defensive cheracter. When the limy
received the warning from the National COmndssariat about the threat of an
immediate enemy attack, all our fleets were quickly able to carry out
measures for immediate preparedness for repelling the attack.
The Navy did not lose a single combat ship from the first enemy attack
despite the fact that many naval bases were subjected to enemy air attacks
during the very, first hours of the war. The enemy was not able to attain
his most immediate objective - the laying of magnetic mines in regions of
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bdaegeA6V191,4PADNOttlelPARMAMOdifoagfbmwsntlY
Our fleets in the very first days of the war carried out offensive
Toperations, combining them with the accomplishment of plenned,defensive
measures. Surface ships and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet carried out
retaliatory blows on enemy naval forces in the Constantsa Naval Base and
on the oil industry regions of monarchical Rumania. Submarines of our
fleets put to sea to search out and destroy enemy combat ships and trans-
ports. Aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet carried out attacks on
planes in neighbbring air bases which were preparing for mass attacks on
Leningrad, and planes of the Northern Fleet attacked enemy communication
centers in the region of Petsamo-Kirkenes. The Danube River Flotilla made
a number of landings as early as the fourth day of the war and controlled
the southern babk of the Danube from izmail to Pereprava2 a distance of
76 kilometers. Ships of the Pinsk Military Flotilla inflicted great damage
on the enemy forces in the West Bug Paver.
There was a day to day increase in the combat activity of our fleets .
in face to face battles with a strong naval enemy which had at its disposal
powerful durface forces and a submarine fleet and was supported by three
air fleets and in addition had important strategic advantages. Whereas
each of our fleets under the pressure of the developing situation had to.
operate only in its awn theater without any help from other fleets, the
enemy had the capability of quickly shifting his forces between theaters,
reinforcing the most important axes of advance. Although the main missions
of the Fascist-German Navy were directed against the English, French, and
subsequently the U.S. Navies, the German command constantly maintained
strong forces of ships and aviation in our naval theaters, often rein-
forcing them at the expense of their ocean forces and the forces in the
North Sea.
Thus, in the days of the most intense battles for Leningrad the
German command concentrated large forces of surface ships in the Baltic
Sea for destruction of our fleet. Such groupings of ships, along with
battleships, were also made in the north when the enemy wos striving at
all costs to break through our outer sea lines of communication. An
assault force which included a corps of dive bombers was transferred from
the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea during the period of the defense
of Sevastopol'.
In addition to the German surface ships, submarines and aviation,
also constantly operating in our naval theaters were the naval forces of
Germany's allies: Norway, Finland, Rumania and Italy.
Despite the fact that our Navy-entered the war without combat experi-
ence and that the conditions for its employment continued to become more
complicated as the result of the loss of a number of naval bases, it
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A pprdig6f0F*rfaitteaserD000V0810.211tQlAsillaP?53408/715134/900etagieViiiiieAr over a
powerful enemy. On the Barents, Baltic and Black Seas, under varied condi-
tions of time and weather our aviation, submarines, surface ships and espe-
CPYRGHT cially torpedo boats persistently searched out and destroyed the enemy at
sea, in coastal waters, in ports and' bases
Along with the unceasing operations against strong enemy naval forces
there was an unending battle being waged on the sea lines of communication.
During the war our surface ships, aviation, torpedo boats, destroyers, and,
in a number of cases, coast artillery desteoyed enemy troop transports and
freighters. There was hardly a day during the war without some success for
our Navy in this mission. Even when it was necessary for the Baltic Fleet
submarines to travel along the entire Gulf of Finland, which was literally
strewn with mines, in order to attack the enemy's lines of communication,
the enemy constantly Mit the strong attacks of our Navy. Submarines,
aviation and torpedo boats of the Northern Fleet kept the sole route used
for reinforcing German troops in Norway and transporting nickel from Pet-
samo under constant attack. The Black Sea Fleet also inflicted great
losses on enemy shipping.
The effects of the destruction of enemy naval transports on supply,
and consequently on the combat capabilities of his troops, can be judged
by the fact that one transport of average tonnage (5;000 - 6,000 tons)
carried as much freight as could be hauled by no less than 250 railroad
cars during the same period of time. If the freight consisted of bombs,
then such a ship could carry enough for loading. k,750 - 2,000 planes, If
the ship was loaded with fuel, then on..one trip of an average sized tanker
there was enough fuel carried for refueling 1,300 - 1,500 twin-engined or
4,000 - 5,000 single-engined planes, or 8,000 - 10,000 tanks.
As a result of intensified attacks on the enemy's lines of communi-
cation during the war our Navy destroyed more than 1,300 transport ships
and other transport equipment of the enemy with a total capacity of more
than three million tons and sank more than 1,200 enemy combat and auxil-
iary ships.
During the course of the war the transporting of troops and their
protection occupied an important place in the combat operations of our
Navy. This was of special importance in the north after the enemy cut
off the NUrmansk railway and our country established sea transport com-
munications with the Allies. On the Black Sea the Navy forces were
vitally important during the period of the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol',
the North Caucasus and in the course of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing opera-
tion; in the Baltic Sea - during the defense and evacuation of Ttllin
Khanko and the MOonzundskiye Islands, for the maintenance of communications
with the island base in the Gulf of Finland, for the subsequent extension
of the front to the west and in the liberation of the Baltic Republics.
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n e em ,IMPQrUnt, R?PitAGME4 Elonikliataeetpxyggigotillas
WatiMIN6eS gr3 nisehesen ortroops a supplies over the frontline
waterways, especially over Lake Ladoga during the difficult conditions of the
FMRGHTbattle of Leningrad, and on the Volga.
In all our theaters of operation during the war over the interior water-
ways there were transported more than 100 million tons of various kinds of
freight, a considerable portion of which consisted of petroleum and petro-
leum products. Over the outer sea lanes the Navy transported 17 million
tons of freight.
Behind these figures are concealed thousands of combat runs of ships
and flights of planes, many hundreds of combat .clashed with surface ships
and submarines, the repulsion of attacks by many thousands of enemy planes,
the negotiating of dense mine belts, the selfless and heroic acts of our
sailors who glorified the Soviet Homeland by their feats.
Our Navy did not limit itself by the force of the developing circum-
stances on the Soviet-German front onLy to fighting the enemy's naval
firces at sea and to operations aimed at the destruction of sea lines of
communication. In the difficult conditions of the initial period of the
war, when it was a question of the life or death of the Soviet government,
our fleets represented powerful striking forces capable of sharply chaneng
the situation along the coastEC axes. For this reason they had the respon-
sibility for a significant share in the battle for maintaining the firmness
of the coastal floras of a 2,000 kilometer front extending from the Arctic
Ocean to the Maack Sea.
And the more complex the situation became on land, the more decisive
and active became the operations of our fleets in the fulfillment of
strategic missions - the defense of the coastal flanks of ground troops,
large naval bases, administrative and political centers and ports.
The Northern Fleet, by the attacks of its ships and planes against
enemy dispositions striving to get to Murmansk, bu its amphibious landings,
by the operations of naval infantry on the shore and by the destruction of
naval transports, played, a decisive role in breaking the offensive of the
enemy on the northern wing of the Soviet-German front. Everything that
the Northern Fleet then had available was directed at the land front and
only because of this were our troops, consisting of slightly more than
one rifle division, able to stop the penetration of an enemy mountain-
chausseur corps on the distant approaches to MUrmansk. This had an
exceptionally important Operational-strategic and military-political sig-
nificance: the retention of the ice-free port of NUrmansk and the navel
base of Polyarrnye made possible the use of the shortest sea route for
connecting the Soviet Union with the outside world. This also provided
the Northern Fleet with capability of successfully defending its lines of
communication, of attacking the sea lines of communication of the ene
err. ???,????????,r,"",,,,...1111,0?Amil.
90
IIIIMINIIIIIN
cont'd)
CPYRGHT
and operating with the ggg
ARKOM36EW.ReilmsN.29Pudt1
role in these operations.
NgigPi00901o'wiadredra? on
ble
The Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which was under the command of V. R.
TRIBUTS during the war, in the most critical period of the battle on the
near approackes to Leningrad provided expetionally great help to the heroic
city, defending, along with the troops, Tallin, the MOonzundokiye Islands
and the Khanko Naval Base, pinning down in these regions 100,000 of the
enemy forces.
The firmness of the defense of the City of Lenin, especially at the
beginning of its siege, to a very great extent can be attributed to the
operations of the Baltic Fleet in assuring the retention of the Oraniyen-
baum base of operations.
The powerful long-range naval guns of the Fleet served as a reliable
fire sheild and were the basis of the defense of the near approaches to
the heroic city. Its striking power was sppplemented by the stubbornness
of the Baltic chasti of naval infantry in the defense, the irresistible
counterattacks of the sailors and by the daring operations of the naval
landing personnel.
The decisive operations of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, its operations
together with the ground troops and aviation in the heroic defense of
Leningrad frustrated the enemy's plans to use the Baltic Sea as an important
line of communications for supplying his "North" and "Center" Groups of
Armies operating on the Soviet front.
The successful and prolonged resistance in the deep rear of the enemy
In the Odessa defensive region, the garrison of which consisted to a
considerable extent of Black Sea sailors commanded by Rear Adm G. V.
MUKOV, was only possible due to its support by the aviation of the Fleet,
by the shins' guns, and by the continuous supply to the 1--,ieged city of
troops, ammunition and other necessities for the defense by ships and
craft of the Black Sea Fleet.
The heroic defense of Odessa, which pinned down almost the entire
Rumanian Army for almost two months and cost them heavy losses, stemmed
the movement of the southern wing of the "South" Group of Armies and disre-
puted the strategic plans of Hitler's command at the beginning of the war.
Later on, when the defense of Odessa lost its strategic significance,
the Black a Fleet evacuated the Primorskaya Army to Crimea where it played
a signific,t part in the defense of SevastopoIl.,
In the defense of Sevastopol', unexampled in heroism and duration,
with the decisive role played by the Black Sea Fleet, a 300,000-man enemy
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CPYR
for$04AgwDatfikfhagelpt0609A
t _PA=R1:1085V606751(0003613a9117008elluded
from no suri ng orces o the Wehimacht which was developing an attack
to the south under conditions most unfavorable for us. The retention of
Sevastopol' in our hands also prevented the enemy from using the Goa route
En the Sea of Azov for supplying his South Group of Armies and prevented
a breakthrough of the Fascist troops to the ports of the Northern. Cauca-
BUS.
The heroic defense of Sevastopol' will remain in history as an example
of the courage of the Black Sea sailors, of their combat coordination with
troops of other branches of the armed forces, of their wholehearted loyalty
to their Homeland. And in this considerable role were played by the Com-
mander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Adm F. S. 0XTYABR'SK7Y, and the Com-
mander of the Ptimorskaya Army, Mhj Gen I. E. PEERCV.
In the developing battle for the Caucasus the threat of its capture
by the enemy became very real and in connection with this there was an
abrupt change in the political situation on the Black Sea - the possibility
of the entry into the Izar of Turkey, which was displaying a wait-and-see
attitude. The fate of the Black Sea Fleet depended on the retention by
the Army of the Aaucasian coast. However, the stability of the ground
troops defending the coastal regions in the Caucasus, in their turn, could
only be secured by the operations of the Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet was
thus faced with a new strategic mission - to secure the stability of
coastal forces of the Black Sea forces of the Transcaucasus front. And
this mission was successfully accomplished.
An exceptionally important role in the support of the ground troops
on the coastal axes was played by the daring and decisive operations of
the Fleets' air forces, which, in numbers, not infrequently exceeded the
combat strength of air armies of fronts, and whose personnel were highly
skilled in combat flying. Chasti of naval aviation successfully destroyed
the enemy's planes on the ground, routed his reserves, and provided direct
support to the shore-based troops.
Pilits of the Baltic Fleet under the command of Col Ye. N. PREOBRAZHEN-
SKIY (subsequently Hero of the Soviet Union and Col Gen of Aviation) carried
out air strikes against Berlin for the first time in August 1941.
Participating with its basic forces in the defense of large coastal
administrative-political and military-economic centers, in the first months
of the war the Navy sent about 4o,000 officers, petty officers and seamen,
well prepared graduates of naval service schools, to the land fronts. The
25 brigades of naval infantry which they formed distinguished themselves
by their exceptionally fine combat qualities.
In the most critical period of the battle of Moscow, seven naval rifle
brigades were included in the troops of the Western Front. Featless in
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YRGHT
edtFtrcRtlinste20100/02/09aielkdROPOLVW8ZWOONCLOWOHmeurt
?pions, inspired the personnel of other branches of the armed forces to
heroic feats. The commanders of aoyedineniya of ground troops were excep-
tionally high in their praise of the combat qualities of the combat seamen.
Thus, speaking of the Guards chest' of Captain First Rank SUKHIASHVILI,
Maj Gen A. I. L/ZYUKOV remarked with pride that, "compared with its endur-
nnce and tenacity the glory of many famous exploits of earlier Guards' units
is eclipsed."
The chief of the pilot section of the First Assault Army, Brigade Com-
missars.LISITSYN, more than once emphasized that "the sailors are our best
component. They are brave, resourceful and disciplined fighter 3. The
Fascists fear the sailors." "Once," he related,-,qIihaCoecasitirr.td1Jitter-
rogate a German officer. He was very defiant, repeating endlessly: 'Our
army is invincible, our army is the best in the world.' When I told him:
'What the devil kind of fighters are you when one platoon of sailors routed
a: battalion and occupied a village,' he jumped up from the chair and shouted,
'Oh, those rabble of yours, damn them. I have fought through many European
countries and was victorious everywhere. Those men are a'different breed.
They have stigmatized me and my men forever."
In all,tthe:Navy provides:1_39(4000 men to the Red Army, not counting
the approximately 100,000 naval infantrymen in chasti of the fleets and
flotillas who participated in the defense of naval bases and islands and
in naval landings.
With the winning of the strategic initiative by the Soviet Armed
Forces the cooperation with coastal troops continued to remain one of the
most important missions of the Navy. The scale of operations carried on
by the Fleets increased, but the conditions under which they were conducted
became complicated because of the sharp deterioration of the strategic posi-
tion of our Fleets back in 1941. And, despite this, they proceeded with the
accomplishment of new responsible missions to the full measure of their
strength, and'capabilities. For the Red Banner Baltic Fleet this amounted to
participation of its aviation, naval rail and long-range ships' armament as
well as brigades of naval infantry in the breadthrough of the Leningrad
blockade, transporting of large contingents of troops to the Oraniyenbaun
assembly area, carrying out amphibious landings, air strikes and artillery
fire against shore-based enemy units, and increasing the scope of operations
against sea lines of communication aimed at the destruction of troop trans-
ports participating in the evacuation of Libya, Memel, Swinemunde (Swinou-
jscie) and other ports.
The Black Sea Fleet's landing operation at Novorossiysk laid the
foundation for the liquidation of the enemy's Taman' beachhead. This also
made possible the forces crossing of the Kerch Strait and the seizure of a
beachhead on the Crimea for the assembly of the Separate Primorskiy Army.
This was followed by naval operations which cut off the escape route of
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Ieircbskrgq.oitagiiin2d 0tra4MPTIPME
our country
JOIT territories of Bulgaria and Rumania.
The Northern Fleet made a great contribution to the overall effort of
the route of the enemy in Karelia and in the liberation of northern Norway.
As a result of its amphibious landings and the combined action of ground
troops the Pechenga region was liberated and Pechenga and Kirkenes captured.
During defensive battles and offensive operations of the ground troops on
the coastal axes, our Fleets, using various combat chips and craft poorly
adapted for the landing of troops made mere than 110 amphibious landings
involving a total of 250,000 men.
It is appropriate to mention here that the fascist German Navy,
having at its disposal specially designed landing ships and hav/ng
acquired combat experience in conducting large amphibious and airborne
landings in Norway and on the island of Crete, limited itself to weak-
hearted and, moreover, unsuccessful attempts at ma4ing small amphibious
landings on Lake Ladoga and in the Gulf of Finland. And this was, assuredly,.
the result of the active operations of our Fleets in all theaters of opera-
tions.
The securing of the inland water lines of communication and the support
of ground troops was greatly aided by the Military Flotillas: Azov, Ladoga,
Onega, White Sea, Volga, Danube, Dnieper, and others, formed during wartime.
The operations of the White Sea Military Flotilla were especially notable,
guaranteeing the functioning throughout the war of the lines of communication
connecting our northern ports with Novaya Zemlya and protecting the ships
and convoys sailing the Northern Route. The Ladoga Military Flotilla pro-
tected the "lifetime" - the sole route connecting besieged Leningrad with
the rest of the country. The Caspian Flotilla reliably defended our primary
"petroleum" line of communication on the Caspian Sea.
The sailors of the Danube Military Flotilla fought their way in pitched
battles 2,000 kilometers up the Danube. Its combat colors are decorated
with the Orders of the Red Banner, KUtuzov and NaRlimov for participation in
the liberation of six European countries from the Fascist yoke.
The Dnieper Flotilla fought its way along the Pripet, Berezina, West
Bug and Vistula Rivers, along the canals of Poland and Germany and ended
up on the Spree River in the Berlin operation.
During the entire war the forces of the River Flotillas alone ferried
more than 2.5 million men during the forcing of large water obstacles.
The brief but offensive-operation-filled combat activity of the Pacific
Fleet, (commanded by Admiral I. S. YUMASHEV), the North-Pacific and Amur
Military Flotillas played an important role in the quick capture by our
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(cont'd)
Applf0YeelaFeraligeMitgPAMPo'fedfiggeIgg8M29/313aaggrEM8r1 number of
Korean porto and in the movement of our troops into the deep interior of
Manchuria.
CPYRGHT
In the postwar period much work has been done abroad on the history of
the Second World War. Their authors often strive to diminish the role of
the Soviet Union, its Armed Forces, and particularly the Navy in winning
the victory over fascism. They viciously criticize the so-called "Russian
viewpoint" on the conduct of naval warfare attempting to prove that in the
past war our Navy allegedly did not conduct any naval operations, but lim-
ited itself to the accomplishment of frequent tactiCal missions in support
of ground troops. Such an approach to the appraisal of the combat activ-
ities of our Navy is, to say the least, superficial. Behind it is hidden
a reluctance to acknowledge that the Soviet Navy throughout the entire war
fulfilled, under complicated conditions, exceptionally important strategic
and operational missions which were dictated by the requirements of the
armed struggle in the main theater of the Second World War, that is, on
the Soviet-German front.
The Soviet Navy assured the Firmness of the strategic flanks of the
ground troops and their comprehensive support in defensive and offensive
operations, and it successfully accomplished its combat missions at sea
defeating the naval might of the enemy on the Barents, Baltic, Black and
Japan Seas. It fully justified the faith of the Soviet people and ful-
filled its obligation to the Homeland.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War once again confirmed the
correctness of the basic position of our military doctrine, that victory
in battle with a powerful enemy can be won only by the combined efforts
of all branches of the armed forces and by their close coordination,
that even in a battle with a continental enemy, the Navy plays an impor4,-
tent part. Only by the combined efforts of full-blooded, well prepared,
prudently deployed and thoroughly supplied forces can the military might
of an aggressor be broken and complete victory achieved.
From the very beginning of the war our Navy was faced with many
great problems of the technical and operational-tactical plan. It was
necessary in the shortest possible time under conditions of strenuous
armed conflict not only to eliminate peacetime deficiencies, but also
to accomplish the most urgent mistions connected with the conduct of
combat operations.
And it should be stated that the admirals and officers of our Navy
were equal to the demands made upon them by the war. Perfected methods
were found for employing naval forces in offensive and defensive operations
in combination with ground troops. Practically speaking, the organization
and methods of carrying out landing operations with poorly adapted equipment
Icont'd)
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were develo 144 WAUSI4AnNWRiff '611414 in
..zcafirrS) "464tihrtEVNYEE66-WIldbe-?rom the land were solved, in-addi-
GhUdon to problems dealing with the organization of coordination, the control
of forces, and the safeguarding of their activities.
During the war new artillery systems, mines and minesweeping weapons,
radar and sonar equipment were developed and installed on ships. Soviet
industry prOduced a sufficient quantity of shells, torpedoes, mines, anti-
submarine depth bombs and other combat and technical equipment to supply
the Navy. However, whereas the production of planes, tanks, guns and other
combat materie1 was fast and increased consistently to fill the basic
requirements of the frontline, the replacement of losses in.ships, as a
result of the loss of several of our shipbuilding plants and for a number
of other reasons, was a considerably more complicated matter.
During the war, for the most part, small combat ships and boats were
built. Even during the conditions of the Leningrad blockade small gunboats,
minesweepers, submarine chasers and tenders were built. Despite the fact
that the ships which made up the basic complement of the Fleets were not
renovated during the war and were becoming obsolete, all our Fleets ended
the war with a sufficiently great combat capability and did not lose their
priority position in their theaters of operation.
Drawing on the experience of the past war's operations made possible
the accomplishment of a serious step forward in the perfecting of naval
armament and aviation. And although this experience was taken into account
in the development of a new material-technical base for the Navy, or funda-
mental changes in the trend of future development of the Navy took place.
Just as before, preference was given to the construction of surface ships
with large caliber guns, and in the views regarding the use of navel
aviation there were still the predominantly defensive tendencies.
Such a situation is explained by the fact that our Navy acquired its
combat experience in a continental war, the decisive battle of which took
place on land. And our military thought of that time, correlating the
experience of that war, continued to be guided by former concepts that the
basic purpose of the Navy consisted of cooperating with ground troops on
the coastal axes and of defending the shoreline from attacks from the sea.
Not the least position in the development of these views were the erroneous
opinions of several combat commanders who considered that a battle with
modern naval forces of an enemy could be fought without relying on the
strength of naval forces. They considered that even amphibious landings
in modern conditions could be made by use of the amphibious equipment of
ground troops alone. The dissemination of these incorrect views formed
part of the basis for the slow evolution in this area of our military
thought after the end of the war, which, of course, could not help but
have an effect on the trend of naval development and the operational
and combat preparedness right up to the middle of the 1950's
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CPYRGHT
fo
81'11:6f0ai% 1660/6tes FlearcebPi36M13/181kfteSDasinsooan in the
PrFAISIttion or rorces in he international arena and in the armed forces
of different countries as well. Whereas before World War II the imperialist
camp wan opposed by the only socialist government in the world - the Soviet
Union, at the end of the war there emerged, grew and rapidly developed the
collaboration of the socialist governments - the great camp of socialism.
In the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Army and Navy opposed a conti-
nental enemv, the military might of which was determined primarily by the
strength of its ground troops. Now, however, against the socialist bloc
are deployed armed forces of aggressive military blocs in which the domi-
nating position is occupied by the so-called naval powers. In their armed
forces the navies are allotted the primary role. The navies of this
coalition of governments, primarily the U.S., England, and sometimes France,
have a large concontration of nuclear power and they are earmarked for
carrying out strategic missions in a new war being prepared by the imperi-
alists against the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist camp friendly
to it. At the present time, for example, the surface ships and submarines
of the U. S. Navy carry about one-third of the strategic nuclear weapons,
and by 1970 it is proposed to increase this amount to one-half of all the
strategic nuclear-rocket potential of the American Armed Forces. The
advantages of mobile carriers of nuclear weapons over stationary launching
sites are generally well kliolqn.
The imperialists of the U.S. thrust plans for the creation of versatile
nuclear forces upon their NATO partners by means of which they intend to
grant primarily seaborne nuclear weapons to the Bonn revanchists.
Never before in the sphere of naval operations has such a strik:ng
force been concentrated, and never before were the aggressive forces so
favorably situated or had such great hopes of the possibility of attaining
with the help of the Navy important strategic results in a short time as at
present. For this reason operations in the naval theaters of a war, if the
imperialists unleash it, will have paramount strategic significance, as a
result of which they will begin to show ever-increasing influence on the
overall course and outcome of the armed struggle. They will compose an
important part of the efforts of the armed forces in the destruction of
the aggressor and they will be conducted in strict coordination with the
operations in other spheres of the armed struggle, for only by the common
efforts of all branches of the armed forces can the might of the enemy be
shattered and vibtory won.
On the other hand, the military and economic might of the coalition
of aggressive imperialistic governments to a great extent depends on sea
and ocean lines of communication, which also increases the role of the
naval theaters. And in this also may be demonstrated a basic change in
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tATildAndtqctilgr#eWAS?Agg?00ffaiPYW4MPEWRANUR2Write-
GKiled at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and had a manifestly
continental character.
In contemporary conditions the role of the navy is considerably
increased even in peacetime. In the economics of countries of the social-
ist camp the importance of the peaceful use of the seas and oceans acquires
ever greater significance. The fishing fleets are increasing. Peaceful
trade is being developed which calls for rapid development of the Soviet
merchant fleet. This also dictates the necessity for further reinforcing
the naval power of our country for the reliable protection of the govern-
mental interests of the Soviet Union on the seas and oceans.
In spite of the erroneous views on the significance and course of
development of the Navy existing in the post war years, the Central Com-
mittee of the Party on the basis of scientifically determined trends of
development of science and technology worked out in the middle of the
1950's new courses for the construction of the Armed Forces, including
also the Navy. Its role and place in the defense of the country were
reconsidered.
Nuclear-rocket weapons introduced into the armament caused a revolu-
tion in the conduct of war. And by the will of the Party one of the first
branches of the armed forces in which deep-rooted, fundamental, in fact
revolutionary reorganizations were begun was our Navy.
Soviet shipbuilders created atomic submarines and these rightfully
occupy the role as the main striking force of our Navy. Naval aviation
was reorganized. Equipping it with rocket-carrying jet planes with great
flight range increased its striking power many times. The fleets have
been resupplied with new multi-purpose surface ships capable of operating
successfully in a nuclear war. Our Navy has landing ships. Naval infantry
has been created. Shore units have been equipped with rockets.
In conformity with the modern technological base of the Navy, the
nuclear-rocket weapons and the conditions of armed combat on the sea, new
methods of utilizing its power in a nuclear war have been developed. The
organization, combat preparedness and the training of command cadres have
been carried out in conformity with modern military doctrine.
As a result of this a well-balanced Navy has been createo . short
period of time, the leading role in which is played by the subrine forces
and naval aviation, both equipped with nuclear-rocket weapons. In the last
10-15 years it has become a fully modern navy capable of accomplishing
strategic missions of an offensive character in a nuclear war.
(cont'd)
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App
CPYRGHT
w@gegirearoOfigariMenritiokAlglirotet8def=a=
oceans and ih coordination with other branches of the armed forces., of
inflicting a. decisive defeat on an aggressor if he should dare unleash a
war against the Soviet Union and socialist countries friendly to it.
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Great Patriotic War
by Col Gen Avn G. Zimin
CPYRGHT
One of the characteristic features of the Great Patriotic War was that
the Soviet Armed Forces were opposed throughout its duration not only by
the main mass of Hitlerite Germany's ground troops, but also by a large
share of her air forces. Operating as the main forces in the interest of
ground troops support, the fascist German air force at the same time tried
to conduct massive raids on our administrative and political centers, im-
portant industrial and economic objectives, and railroad lines. The enemy
tried with air strikes to disrupt mobilization measures, isolate the active
army from the rear of the country, and undermine the economic potential of
the Soviet state and the morale of the population. It has been definitely
established that during the war there were nearly 304,000 enemy aircraft
flights in the country's target areas, conducted primarily for the purpose
of bombing or reconnaissance. This was approximately 21 percent of the
total number of enemy aircraft flights on the Soviet-German front.
Naturally, the combat activities of PVO Strany Troops, which defended
Soviet cities, important enterprises, and communications networks and in-
stallations from air attacks, were strategically important and were an
integral part of the efforts of the armed forces in routing the fascist
German invaders.
In executing their combat missions, PVO Strany Troops destroyed more
than 7,300 enemy aircraft during the war, more than 10 percent of all
German air force losses on the eastern front. It should also be noted
that their antiaircraft artillery participated in repulsing enemy tank
attacks on the approaches to Kiev and Dnepetrovsk, Leningrad and Moscow,
Tula and Voronezh, Volgograd, and a number of other cities. PVO.Strany
soyedineniya and chasti were often used to support front and army oper-
ations and to isolate encircled enemy groupings.
However, the contribution of PVO Strany Troops to the common victory
over the enemy was not at all limited to those losses which they inflicted
on enemy air and ground forces. PVO Strany Troops must also be credited
with successfully repelling the majority of air raids; preserving such
important centers of the country as Moscow, Leningrad, and many others;
and keeping the railroads, by which the fronts were supplied, in operation.
These results, which cannot be expressed quantitatively, are apparently
more important in their military and political significance than the
direct losses inflicted on the enemy by PVO troops.
Among the measures for increasing the defensive might of the Soviet
state which were conducted by resolution of the Communist Party on the
eve of the Great Patriotic War, work on the creation of a reliable air
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A
CPYRGHT
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aerense for the country occupied an important place. The necessity of
developing and improving it was connected with the growing significance
of the economic and moral potential in the war and the real danger that
the numerically strong air forces at the disposal of the aggressive
states would have an effect on that potential. A strong and thoroughly
prepared air defense was regarded as one of the most important conditions
for preserving the stability, productiveness, and high activity of the
rear of the country and its ability to ensure the conduct of intense and
prolonged military operations against a strong enemy under conditions
where aircraft would be massively used. Moreover, air defense was also
assigned the role of a shield which would have to provide air cover for
the mobilizational deployment of the armed forces at the beginning of the
war. All these fundamental positions were reflected in Soviet military
doctrine of the pre-war period and, correspondingly, in the practice of
military construction.
PVO Strany Troops were rather rapidly developed in the years pre-
ceding the Great Patriotic War. New chasti and soyedineniya were created
and obsolete armament was gradually replaced by more improved equipment.
Immediately before the war, in 1940-1941, fighter aviation began to
receive Yak-1, Mig-3, and Lagg-3 fighters, which were not inferior in
performance characteristics to the best models of foreign fighters of the
day. The armament of antiaircraft artillery chasti was renovated. They
received 85 and 37 millimeter antiaircraft guns, which were accurate,
rapid-firing, and highly maneuverable; and the new PUAZO-3 antiaircraft
director. Aircraft warning service troops (VNOS) received new models of
radar detection stations -- the RUS-1 and RUS-2.
However, the quantity of new armament and combat equipment in the
troops at the beginning of the war was not great. Up to 90 percent of
the aircraft fleet of fighter aviation was composed of obsolete 1-16,
1-153, and 1-15 fighters. Two-thirds of the medium caliber antiaircraft
guns were due for replacement. The air observation system was altacst
wholly based on visual observation. In June 1941, PVO troops had only
34 radar detection stations, and 28 of them were of the very imperfect
RUS-1 type. They could determine only the fact that a target had inter-
sected a definite line. Only 20-25 percent of air warning service chasti
were provided with radio communications equipment. The number of fighters
in the troops was 40 percent below full-strength, antiaircraft guns --
15-30 percent, antiaircraft machine guns -- 30 percent, and searchlights
and barrage balloons were nearly 50 percent below full strength.
The allotment and disposition of PVO manpower and equipment was sub-
ordinated to the task of providing cover for objectives in the coinatry's
territory within the range of enemy aircraft. PVO Troops covered almost
all the most important industrial and economic centers and railroad
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feFlitell4M2t00/08-100er019k4ROMMOBAIR43003110.69.000f3e8and
a oqg the Transcaucasus sector of the border to 200-500 kilometers. In
yRGHT the center of the country, Moscow had a strong air defense.
At the beginning of 1941 all territory that was under threat of air
attac4 was divided into air defense zones which coir,..Aded territorially
with corresponding military districts. The air defense zones were di-
vided into air defense regions which usually included several air defense
points. Overall direction of air defense on a nation-wide scale was ex-
exerted by the Main Administration of PVO (Glavnoye upravleniye PV0),
which was subordinated to the Peoples Commissar of Defense, and which was
in charge of the problems of planning, operational employment, accounting,
armament, and combat training of PVO troops. As for the air defense zones,
they were to be controlled by the commanders of military districts through
subordinate zone commanders.
The creation of PVO zones brought about a definite order in the or-
ganization of air defense and increased the responsibility of military
district commands for coverivc objectives in the country and for the
combat training and supplying of PVO soyedinendya and chasti. But it had
no effect at all on the forms of operational and combat employment of PVO
troops. The zone commander and his apparatus did not have the technical
facilities for controlling troops in the course of a battle. Moreover,
in thw PVO zones only PVO ground forces -- antiaircraft artillery, anti-
aircraft machine guns, searchlights, and barrage balloons --were united
in an organized manner. Fighter aviation was subordinate to the zone com-
mander only operationally, and in all other aspects was subordinate to the
commander of air forces.
The main efforts of PVO troops were concentrated for covering the
most important targets. Thus, more than 40 percent of al/ medium caliber
antiaircraft batteries and significant forces of fighter aviation were
involved in the defense of the three most important centers of the coun-
try -- Moscow, Leningrad., and Baku. A perimeter defense using various
PVO forces and means, which were echeloned in depth, was organized for
covering the major objectives.
All problems of combating the air enem7, including detection by
reconnaissance means, interception by fighters, and firing by antiair-
craft means, were resolved independently within the framework of PVO ob-
jectives and. points. The possibility of receiving help from soyedineniya
and chasti which were covering other objectives in the course of repulsing
an air raid was almost totally excluded, owing to the absence of effective
means of reconnaissance and control and the rather limited range of
fighters. Therefore, the air defense system of the pre-war period basic-
ally had a strongly pronounced center or point nature.
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A
CPYRGHT
Dproved ftoffeeteng612000/08M948CdiAnIRCIR8151094Z5ROPPPA9g20Mining
command and engineer-technical cadres. The oldest academies -- the
Academy imeni Frunze, the Artillery Academy imeni Dzerzhinskiy, and the
Electrotechnical Academy -- were drawn into the training of highly quali-
fied commanders and engineers for air defense. However, the leading
nucleus of PVO troops on the eve of the war was considerably weakened by
the massive repressions associated with the cult of Stalin. Leaders of
the PVO administration of the Workers and Peasants Red Army -- Army Com-
mander 2d Rand A. I. Sedyakin and Col Gen G. M. Shtern; many PVO division
and corps commanders; and also prominent scientists, among whom was the
outstanding designer of the first radar stations -- P. Oshepkov, were
victims of the purge.
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War our country had on the
whole fairly well developed air defense that basically corresponded to
the level of development of the means of air attack. It possessed a con-
siderable quantity of manpower and equipment which were ready to combat
the air enemy in daylight. However, the capability of PVO Troops to re-
pulse surprise air attacks and to conduct combat operations at night or
in poor weather were severely limited due to the almost total absence of
radar equipment. Their level of combat training in no way corresponded
to the seriousness of the situation. Re-armament of PVO chasti was in
full swing in June 1941. Many chasti which had received new equipment
did it have enough ammunition for it and, naturally, had not suffi-
ciently mastered it in practice.
Hitlerite Germany's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union put the
troops of border military districts, including border PVO zones, in an
extremely difficult position. The delay in reaching the decision to put
the armed forces into combat readiness and the inefficient transmission
of the appropriate crders led to the fact that the massive intrusion into
our air space by enemy aircraft at the dawn of 22 June 1941 was for many
chasti and soyedineniya situated along the border completely unexpected.
They frequently engaged the air enemy only after bombs were already ex-
ploding in the vicinity of the objectives being covered. Many antiair-
craft artillery chasti were in camps or at firing ranges at the beginning
of the war. The complexity of the situation was particularly aggravated
by the fact that the fascist German air force strikes on airfields put
out of commission a considerable share of the Soviet fighters which were
based along the border. The main burden in repulsing the air raids under
these conditions was carried by antiaircraft artillery, which in addition
had to engage enemy infantry and tanks.
Deployment of air defense was accomplished in different periods of
time after the war began. In the strip directly adjacent to the western
border (to a depth of 200-250 kilometers), antiaircraft artillery chasti
took up their positions on the morning of 22 June. In the depth of the
country deployment of antiaircraft artillery was completed somewhat later.
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CPYRG
*pp ;OW dtE. r113,1084VeanPingntibglAIRLIERTAANIMINagg,n9
taken up firing positions by 1900 hours on 22 June. By 1800 hours on
23 June, that is 37 hours after receiving the order, the entire air
defense system of the capital had been put into readiness for repelling
'the enemy raids. Leningrad PVO chasti were completely deployed by mid-
day on 22 Juno. However, the formation of new chasti occurred 2-3 days
later than called for in the mobilization plans. On the whole the de-
ployment of air defense in border zones and in the vicinity of Moscow
and Baku was accomplished in 2-3 days and in the area east of Moscow in
a longer period of time.
The combat actions of PVO Troops in repelling enemy aircraft raids
in the first hours of the war were unprecedented in scope and ferocity.
They were deployed along a front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea to
a depth of 250-300 kilometers. The Germany command used three-fourths of
its combat aircraft (3,900 planes) for the attack on the Soviet Union.
In addition, Germany's satellites -- Rumania arAL Finland -- had nearly
1,000 aircraft. PVO troops withstood the powei.ful enemy air force strikes
and basically succeeded in preserving the objectives being covered and in
maintaining their combat efficiency. In repelling enemy aircraft raids,
which were chiefly directed against airfields, groupings of ground troops
and railroad centers in the front sector, HO troops inflicted heavy losses
on the enemy. For example, pilots and antiaircraft gunners of PITO chasti
covering the city of Kiev destroyed 93 German aircraft in the first five
days of the war. Chasti of the 4th PVO division, which was defending
L'vov, shot down 25 enemy bombers in the same period of time, and chasti
of the 11th PVO brigade (located in the defense of the oil region of
Dragobych Borislav) downed 15 aircraft. PIM Troops selflessly combated
enemy air and, frequently, ground forces on other axes and objectives also,
weakening enemy forces with their blows.
As the Soviet troops withdrew, the zone of fascist German air force
operations was extended more and more to the east. In this connection,
the air defense of Moscow and Leningrad and objectives in the Donbass and
Zaporozh'ya regions, and coverage for important bridges on the Volga was
organized as early as June - July 1941 by resolution of the State Defense
Committee.
PVO soyedineniya and chasti located in the depth of the country,
right up to the Volga River and in places farther east, vere gradually
included in the struggle against Hitler's air forces.
Subsequently, air defense for the large industrial centers along the
Volga and for the Volga waterways was created.. The organization of air
defense for Ural objectives was begun in 1942-1943. However, because of
the sharp turn in the course of the war, this work was suspended.
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PVO Strany Troops carried out widely varied missions in various
stages of the war. They covered cities and railroad stations, sea and
river ports, airfields, power stations, bridges, dams, and locks. They
escorted trains and ships. They participated in covering attacking and
defending forces. They provided landing operations and conducted other
operations. However, throughout the war they had two main missions:
defense of the important industrial and economic centers and objectives,
and cover for railroad lines of communication near the front lines.
The first of these played the dominant role. From 60 to 90 percent
of fighter aviation and medium caliber antiaircraft artillery, from one-
third to two-thirds of small caliber antiaircraft artillery, and the
overwhelming majority of antiaircraft searchlights and barrage balloons
participated at various periods of the war in the defense of the coun-
try's large cities and important industrial objectives.
The combat activities, of PVO Strany Troops in repulsing fascist Ger-
man air force raids on Moscow, Leningrad, and Volgograd were particularly
sharp and intense. It was in attacking these objectives that Hitler's
air force acted in the greatest numbers, with great persistence and te-
nacity, employint the most varied tactics and methods. In these battles
against the attacking air force, PVO Strany Troops revealed most dis-
tinctly the strong and weak aspects of our air defense and the errors
and shortcomings in its organization, supply, and training. The most
appreciable enemy air force losses were inflicted here, which to a cer-
tain degree enabled our air force to gain strategic supremacy in the air.
The air defense of Moscow was a classic example of a strongly devel-
oped, powerful system for covering a huge center, where the idea of
massive employment of forces and means was conducted with the greatest
continuity and realized with the greatest effect. By the time of the
first raid (22 July 1941), 602 fighters, 1,050 medium and small caliber
antiaircraft cannons, and 336 antiaircraft machine guns were counted in
the defense of the capital. (Archives of the Ministry of Defense, f 741,
op 708648, d 1, L 19) Subsequently, the number of antiaircraft weapons
in the Moscow PVO system nearly doubled. The general depth of the de-
fense with regard to the basing of fighter aircraft reached 200 kilometers,
which ensured cover for the main objectives of the entire Moscow industrial
region. No other large city, either at home or abroad, had such a powerful
cover during the whole of World War II.
For more than four months in a row (from 22 July to the end of Novem-
ber 1941), the fascist German-air force tried to make systematic air raids
on Moscow,, alternating massive attacks with operations by small groups.
However, they met very strong resistance from fighter aircraft and anti-
aircraft artillery each time on the way to the target, which was an insur-
mountable barrier for the majority of the attacking aircraft.
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Of the 3,800 enemy aircraft which entered the zone of the capital's
antiaircraft fire during the war, approximately 250, that is 7 percent,
made it to the city. To all intents and purposes this signified the
downfall of the widely publicized air attack by atler's Luftwaffe. The
enemy air force, despite enormous efforts, did not succeed in causing
substantial damage, nor did it disorganize the life of the capital as
the political and military center of the country, even when it was in
the position of a front-line city. In this connection it is to the point
to note that the English air defense could not handle a comparable mis-
sion in the fall of 1940. The massive raids by the German air force on
London in September and October of 1940 (the so-called big blitz) com-
pletely disrupted life in the capital of England. Because of the bomb-
ings, 1.5 million Londoners were evacuated to the countryside. As a
result of the raids, nearly 50,000 people were killed in two months, and
many times more were wounded. Mare than a million homes were destroyed
or seriously damaged (New Times, No 7, 1)4. February 1964, p 27).
The best air squadrons which had participated in bombing cities in
Poland, England, France, and Belgium, were rendered ineffective on the
approaches to Nbscow. In all, 738 enemy aircraft were shot down by the
PVO troops defending Nbscow. In addition, PITO fighter planes covering
troops in the battlefield on the Western Front and striking airfields
destroyed 367 enemy aircraft. 1,300 destroyed enemy aircraft -- such
was the result of the bitter fighting by PVO troops against the enemy
air forces in the historic battle for Nbscow. In battles on the closest
approaches to Nbscow, PVO soyedineniya and chasti by their operations
were a great help to the ground troops in foiling enemy attempts to con-
quer the city.
The air defense of Leningrad was accomplished in an exceptionally
complex and unusual situation. Having failed in its attempts to storm
the city, the fascist German command in the fall of 1941 drew on its air
forces for barbaric bombing of blockaded Leningrad. The directive is-
sued for this purpose read as follows: 'The Fuehrer has decided to wipe
the city of Petersburg off the face of the earth. It is planned to
blockade the city tightly and by shelling it with artillery of all cal-
ibers and by continuous bombing from the air to level it to the ground.'
(Eyurinbergahlz_212I22221, Sbornik materialsa_z_dvukh tomakh (The Nurem-
berg Trials, A Collection of Materials in TwoV7111171B7), vol I, 3d edi-
tion, State Publishing House of Juridical Literature, 1955, p 783) Es-
pecially difficult were the first months of the blockade, when enemy
aircraft methodically tried to bomb the city day after day, operating at
times in large numbers, sometimes in small groups, and sometimes by sin-
gle aircraft. PVO Strany Troops, together with antiaircraft chasti and
the Air Forces of the Baltic Fleet and the Leningrad Front, used every
possibility to repulse the raids. During September, when enemy aircraft
were operating in daylight hours, PVO forces successfully parried the
massive blows. However, they could not effectively combat the air enemy
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CPYRGHT
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A
proWbdiWRizikaas61211a0N18/0/ibt Ce14W1PKAIRffic?1R99PN9R Thalng and
there were very few night fighters at that time. In October and Novem-
ber 1941, when the enemy began to operate at night, 720 aircraft out of
the 840 participating in the raids penetrated to the city. The greatest
amount of fires and destruction occurred in these months as a result of
the enemy bombings. In succeeding months the effectiveness of the air
defense of Leningrad considerably increased as a result of improved
combat and logistics support for the troops, increased numbers of
fighters capable of night combat, and improved methods for vectoring
them.
In covering the city from the air, PVO Strany Troops, in coopera-
tion with PVO chasti and Air Forces of the Leningrad Front and the
Baltic Fleet, repulsed during the war 272 fascist German air force raids
and destroyed 1,561 enemy planes on the ground and in the air. In addi-
tion, in defending the lines of communication by which Leningrad was
supplied with provisions, weapons, and ammunition during the blockade,
PVO soyedineniya together with fighters of the front and the fleet shot
down 591 aircraft. Having successfully warded off the greatest share
of enemy strikes, PVO saved the most important objectives of Leningrad,
ships of the Baltic Fleet, and kept in uninterrupted operation the "road
of life" which connected blockaded Leningrad with the country.
At the forefront of the struggle against the German fascist in-
vaders in the period of decisive events were the PVO troops covering
Volgograd. At the end of August 1942 they were the first to engage the
German tanks which had broken through to the approaches to the city and
simultaneously to repulse the massive strikes by Hitier's air forces,
which were unprecendented in numbers.
In the first days of the battle on the Volga, German bombers lit-
erally hung over the city. They made 800, 1,000, and 2,000 sorties
per day for bombing the city. The Stalingrad air defense region, de-
fending an objective more than 60 kilometers long, had approximately 80
fighters and 500 antiaircraft guns in all to counter these forces.
In the unequal fighting, PVO troops did not succeed in protecting
the city from the destructive bombings, despite the massive heroism of
personnel. However, the enemy was forced to pay a costly price for the
raids on the objective and the troops defending it.. From July to Decem-
ber 1942, 709 German aircraft were destroyed by PVO Strany chasti.
In the course of the defensive battle, chasti of the air defense
region together with front aircraft and army antiaircraft artillery
covered the combat formations of the 62d Army, Volga crossings, and
sectors of the railroad by which Volgograd troops were supplied, thereby
aublanting the defense and preparing conditions for a counterattack. In
the final stage of the battle on the Volga, PVO Strany Troops chasti par-
ticipated in isolatinKXrom ai
C A k1511-*IfaahlR15Off066?biftelumbe
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poomr teOUARgem, tomeme4 am-Rwaraoaans000mosiniofirhe
inuusWal and economic centers and objectives in the depth of the
country also made an important contribution to victory over the enemy.
Reliable protection from air attack was one of the factors enabling our
economy to achieve superiority over Hitlerite Germany in the field of
military production.
Air defense for routes of communications was the second most im-
portant mission for PVO Strany 'Troops. From one-tenth to one-third of
all fighters and medium caliber antiaircraft guns and from one-fourth to
one half of all small caliber antiaircraft guns and machine guns were
used to accomplish this purpose in various stages of the war. The com-
bat activities of PVO Strany Troops in covering railroads in the Great
Patriotic War was very closely associated with the course of combat op-
erations of ground troops and basically consisted of protecting front
routes of communications from air strikes to a depth of 300-500 kilome-
ters from the front line. Beyond the boundaries of the front strip, only
bridges crossing large rivers (Volga, Don, Dnepr), and also certain im-
portant objectives on the main lines leading to Moscow were covered.
This was necessitated by two circumstances. First, the greatest
amount of German air force activity throughout the war occurred over the
battlefield and in the front strip. Correspondingly, in this strip were
concentrated the main efforts of front PVO soyedineniya, the boundaries
of responsibility for which closely bordered the front lines. Secondly,
obnyedineniya of our ground troops at times did not have sufficient forces
and means for covering important objectives of the operational rear.
Therefore, the Supreme Command assigned to PITO Strany Troops part of the
missions for covering front objectives, particularly front railroads.
While covering important front lines of communications, PVO Strany
Troops in certain cases waged bitter combat operations which in scope
were not inferior to the air battles for Moscow. Characteristic in this
respect were the battles in the region of the Kursk staging area. In
May and June 1943 alone, the German air forces made about 4,300 sorties
for the purpose of boWng the railroad lines by which troops of the Cen-
tral and Voronezh Fronts were supplied. The enemy tried to disrupt the
flow of fresh forces, armament, fuel, and other materials to a grouping
of Soviet troops who were occupying the defense in the area where the
German command planned a smimer offensive. Important railroad junctions,
stations, and even certain routes of communications were subjected to
large-scale raids dozens of times. The brightest chapter in the combat
operetions of PVO troops in this period was the repulsion of massive raids
on the Kursk railroad junction. Nearly 800 enemy aircraft took part in
the largest raid (2 June). In close cooperation with fighter planes and
antiaircraft weapons of the fronts, PVO Strany Troops fought the air
enemy on distant and close approaches to Kursk for almost 23 hours. The
German air forces lost 162 aircrECt here, but they could not destroy the
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Ap
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PrqW414fifi9ifiasSM9a?/?Skingl,AbiRg?53-9RW?FIRNP9P/49)??4 any Troops
and front aviation the enemy's attempts to prevent a scheduled buildup of
manpower and equipment in the Kursk staging area, which were subsequently
used in the course of decisive battles in July and. August 1943, were dis-
rupted.
The strategic air supremacy won by Soviet aircraft in the Kursk
battle forced the enemy air force to forego completely raids on objec-
tives in the rear of the country and to limit the operations against
lines of communications and objectives on offensive fronts. Correspond-
ingly, the center of the burden of combat activity for PVC) Strany Troops
was transferred to front areas.
The swift advance of our fronts to the west required PVC) troops to
organize quickly an air defense for important objectives and, especially,
lines of communications in liberated territory. This mission was first
carried out by the advancement of part of the forces of front PVO soye-
dineniya. Later, chasti of fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, and
control organs from regions deep in the country, which the enemy could no
longer reach, were transferred. New PITO soyedineniya were formed from
these units.
Gradually setting up air defense behind, the advancing fronts, a sig-
nificant number of soyedineniya of PVO Strany Troops moved into the ter-
ritory of Rumania, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany. Here, while
covering front lines of communications, large cities, and important in-
dustrial areas, they took part in the final operations of The Great Pa-
triotic War.
The war years were a period of rapid development, increased combat
capabilities, and orgalizational improvement for air defense.
The well-organized military economy created by the efforts of the
party and the people equipped PVO Strany Troops with effective armament,
combat equipment, and ammunition in sufficient quantity. Fighter avia-
tion r'lasti were fully supplied during the war. They received La-5,
La-7 k-7, Yak-9, and Yak-3 aircraft, which possessed high performance
chara, eristics and powerful cannon and machine gun armament. The speed
and range of these fighters were nearly 50 percent greater than those of
fighters at the beginning of the war.
Medium caliber antiaircraft artillery was completely re-equipped
with 85 millimeter antiaircraft guns. In 1945, antiaircraft chasti began
to receive 85 millimeter guns with considerably greater operational alti-
tudes than the 1939 guns of the same caliber.
Radar equipment underwent particularly high development in the war
years. In significant numbers, PVO chasti were equipped with gun laying
radars, aircraft control and early-warning radar stations, azimuth
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scanning radar stations, searchlight radars, and combat means for air-
craft communications and control. As a result of this, the range and re-
liability of air target detection was increased, the combat might of
fighters was enhanced, and the fire effectiveness of antiaircraft artil-
lery and the operations of antiaircraft searchlights were increased.
The number of PVO Strany Troops by the end of the war had doubled
the number at its beginning. Moreover, the number of medium caliber an-
tiaircraft guns and fighter planes were twice the former number and the
number of small caliber antiaircraft guns was ten times the number in
May 1942.
Great changes occurred in the organization of the troops. It was
already apparent in the first months of the war that the existing organ-
izational structure did not satisfy the nature of the military operations.
With the Red Army withdrawing it was necessary to regroup the forces and
means of PVO Strany for the organization of: air defense of new regions
and objectives. However, the Main Administration of PVO, not having the
functions of operational control, could not handle this task. The front
commanders, to whom border PVO zones were subordinated, used PVO forces
and means basically for coverage of front troops, and in a number of
cases for antitank defense. Coverage for the main objectives of the
country became secondary in a number of cases. In this connection, by
resolution of the State Committee of Defense, the post of commander of
HO Troops of the territory of the country was established in November
1941. Attached to it were a staff, a Main PVO Administration of the
Territory of the Country, and an administration of fighter aviation. PVO
Strany soyedineniya and chasti were taken out of subordination to military
districts (fronts) and were subordinated in all respects to the commander
of PVO Strany Troops, except for the forces and means covering Leningrad
which remained fully at the disposal of the front command. Instead of
zones in the European part of the Soviet Union (with the exception of
the Transcaucast.$), corps and division PVO regions were organized.
Fighter aviation, however, did not become an organizational component of
PVO Strany Troops.
The next step in improving the organization of the troops was the
complete usbordination, in January 1942, of all fighter aviation assigned
for coverage of objectives of the country to the PVO Strany command.
From this time on the principle of centralization of control spread to
all PVO forces and means, both operationally and tactically. Conditions
took shape for more flexible, operational leadership of PITO troops and
for their conducting maneuvers within the boundaries of the regions and
objectives being defended. Together with this, PVO Strany Troops ac-
quired all the basic features of an independent branch of the armed
forces: in resolving a strictly determined number of missions of a
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CPYRGHT
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00_03000900Q8-8
ovettirdegel EOM APlitt a CIALIWPARVALEa. arm special organs of con-
trol which were directly subordinate to a higher military control.
In the middle of 1943, in connection with the increasing number of
PVO regions and the broadening space being del ended by them, two air de-
fense fronts were created to subdivide control of PVO Strany Troops: the
Western Front (commanded by Col Gen M. S. GROMADIN) with headquarters in
Moscow, and the Eastern Front (commanded by Lt Gen Arty G. S. ZASHIKHIN)
with headquarters in Kuybyshev, All air defense was subordinate to the
commander of artillery of the Soviet Army. To assist him, a Central PVO
Staff, a Main Administration of PVO Fighter Aviation, a Central Air Warn-
ing Service Post, and certain other organs were created. The creation of
the fronts substantially improved control of trooL__ under the conditions
of rapid advancement of the Soviet Army to the west. However, control of
the post of commanixer of PVO Strany Troops was dictated by subjective
considerations and did not satisfy the needs.
By the ned of the war PITO Strany Troops was composed of four fronts:
the Weste:n (commanded by Col Gen Arty D. A. ZHURAVLEV), the Southwestern
(commanded by Col Gen Arty G. S. ZASHIKHIN), the Central (commanded by
Col Gen M. S. GROMADIN), and the Transcaucasus (commanded by Lt Gen Arty
P. Ye. GUDYMENKO) with headquarters in Vil'nyus, L'vov, Moscow, and. Baku
respectively.
The exceptional diversity of the problems being resolved and of
conditions of combat activity, and the increased combat effectiveness of
the means of defense and attack served as powerful stimuli for the de-
velopment of the military art of PVC Strany Troops. The wide use of
maneuvering operations was new in the tactics of antiaircraft artillery.
A rigid system of antiaircraft coverage, as the experience of combat
showed, could not react quickly to changes in a situation. Therefore, by
1943 each front PVO region began to assign a share of its antiaircraft
artillery, antiaircraft machine guns, and searchlights for operations in
maneuvering groups which were used at the discretion of the soyedineniya
commander for destruction of enemy aircraft in their flight routes, for
temporary coverage of small objectives, etc. Antiaircraft armored trains
were widely used as a maneuvering means. By the end of the war there
were 102 antiaircraft armored trains in PVO Straw Troops.
The tactics of group combat were thoroughly developed in fighter
aviation during the war, and methods of hunting and intercepting air
targets at night and of combating reconnaissance aircraft were worked ovL
The correlation of various methods of fighter operations were changed.,
Relying on radar detection systems, fighters could at ,times refrain from
continuous patrolling and could take-off from alert positions on the air-
field.
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YRGH
ApprovednFerReidaSeonikiliefilfieliactiAtglagggq.918WW9NCEP9a?ds of
the combat operations of PVO Strany Troops was that they frequently went
beyond the tactical range and became operational. The repulsion of mas-
sive enemy air raids directed against important centers and objectives of
the country took the form of a number of interrelated engagements and
battles united by a common plan which continued for several days and even
weeks and were characterized by a great spatial scope and the participa-
tion in them of hundreds of aircraft, large forces of antiaircraft artil-
lery, and other PVO means. This was demonstrated in the repulsion of
raids on &scow, Leningrad, objectives of the Kursk staging area, and
several others where enemy air force operations were virtually countered
by PVO Strany troops operations. These events objectively testified to
the birth of the operational art of PVO Strany Troops.
Radar equipment undoubtedly played an important role in the forma-
tion and development of this art. As the system of reconnoitering the
air enemy was changed to radar systems, the PVO command was able to be
constantly aware of the aerial situation in the entire zone being de-
fended, to foresee its development, and, judging from this, to ensure the
coordinated operations of troops located in the given region according to
an overall plan. It became possible in the course of a battle to maneuver
fighter aircraft: from one direction to others for the purpose of creating
superior strength over the enemy. Thus, to repulse the raids on Kursk in
1943, fighter aircraft based within a radius of 200 kilometers from Kursk
were used. In 1944, several fighter aviation regiments which were cover-
ing Yiev and Zhitomir were used to repulse the night raids on. Korosten?.
In other words, aircraft began to be used in the interests of cover for
all objectives located within their range. That is, a trend was set for
changing from point air defense v,o defense of all targets located within
an entire region. This is one of the most characteristic features of the
operational art of PVO Strany Troops.
PVO Strany Troops operations were usually conducted by all or by the
majority of the forces of a PVO army in close cooperation with neighboring
air defense ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya, and at times with the PVO
troops and fighter aviation of fronts and fleets. In this connection,
methods of operational coordination of ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya of
PVO troops with ob"yedineniya of ground troops and the navy, particularly
metliods of organizing reconnaissance of the air enemy and mutual warning
planning, and conduct of combined operations of fighter aviation ad anti-
aircraf+ artillery, were thoroughly developed during the war.
Of considerable interest are the principles developed during the war
for the or2c:,:ional employment of various PVO forces and means of the
various branches of the armed forces operating in one zone and resolving
common missions (for example, the experience of the defense of Odessa,
Leningrad, and certain other objectives). Experience showed that it was
most expedient under these conditions to create a unified PVO system that
hafili3OV4geE141139iftii?ihn?949?Ati,C51.9):Pedieititt06?62'66W?666?1 of
included the forces and means evr all
112
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CPYRGHT
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rovfetar yie
In_ougoarMdp,n tl-PNLIREAttgetobt3igzegy3M90008tigically con-
`LI a pkgFilce of preparing and conducting operations
by PVO ob"yedineniyal both independently and in cooperation with other
branches of the armed forces.
Ap
As a whole, air defense of the country emerged as a combination of
all government measures having to do with the field of strategy. It was
created and developed according to a single plan on a nation-wide scale.
Dispersal of PIN troops efforts to regions and to the most important ob-
jectives and the coordination of their efforts with other branches of the
armed forces was carried out by the Supreme Comnand in accordance with
the strategic missions being resolved in various stages of the war.
The important strategic significance of air defense of the country
and the dependence on it of the status not only of the work of the rear
of the country, but also the development of military events on land, sea,
and in the air was demonstrated with maximum clarity in the first days of
the fighting against the fascist German. invaders. The lessons of the war
irrefutably testify to the fact that the most crucial period for air de-
fense troops was the initial period, when the main mass of the air forces
were used to seize the strategic initiative, and that the key to victory
over a strong air enemy is a high combat readiness of all PVO forces and
means. Almost all the great failures of PVO troops and the extremely un-
favorable development of events at the outset of the mar, and the gross
deficiencies which showed up in the repulsion of raids on Gore's* in
June 1943 were first of all connected with insufficient combat readiness.
The Great Patriotic War made it possible to accumulate a wealth of
extremely instructive experience in the organization of air defense and
the conducting of combat operations by PVO troops. Many theoretical and
practical suppositions that were worked out in the course of combat
against the fascist German air force have not lost their significance
even today. But it must be born in mind that in the final stage of the
war air defense troops operated in rather uncomplex situations. They
seldom had to repel massive enemy air raids that were concentrated in
time. They definitely did not have to combat self-propelled missiles,
ballistic missiles, or conduct operations under conditions attending the
employment by the enemy of interference by radio and radar PVO systems.
Therefore, in practice the endency of the means of defense to lag behind
the means of air attack was less noticeable in our air defense than in
the West, although in certain types of activities it was clearly evident
throu6nout the war.
Particularly evident was the low effectiveness of fighter aircraft
at night. Of the 3,930 aircraft shot down by PVO fighters during the war
in aerial combat, only 301 were destroyed at night. Even in the fighter
units defending Moscow, where the best trained pilots were serving, only
7 percent of enemy aircraft were downed at night.
PYRG
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ele)us4i thmr6:6615tgoatsv6entiototompptor
e'dT"thr_irst-attedipts was the equipping:
in 1942, of the Pe-2 aircraft with the "Gneiss" radar apparatus. By the
end of the war the Soviet aircraft industry was turning out fighter-
interceptors equipped with "Gneiss-2" radar. However, as use of them on
T the front demonstrated, these were imperfect aircraft. They were merely
the first step on the road to creation in post-war years of valuable all-
weather interceptors.
The need to increase the altitude range of antiaircraft guns was
distinctly felt in antiaircraft artillery, since the flight ceiling of
reconnaissance aircraft was raised and they became invulnerable to anti-
aircraft fire. Immediately after the war, therefore, work which was begun
in the pre-war period on the creation of large caliber antiaircraft guns
was renewed; and the development of a principally new weapon -- surface-
to-air guided rockets -- was accelerated
In, summing up the results of the combat activities and development
of PATO Strany Troops during the war, it can be noted that, despite the
difficulties and certain failures they successfully carried out their
assignments and at the end of the war emerged stronger, numerically
larger, and enriched'with a wide-range of combat experience.
As in all branches of the armed forces during the wary the high
moral and combat qualities of Soviet soldiers -- faithfulness to military
duties, massive heroism, and unswerving will for victory -- were dis-
played in PVC) Strany Troops. Fighter pilots, antiaircraft artillery
gunners, searchlight operators, and air warning service soldiers per-
formed many heroic deeds in carrying out their combat missions, which
have entered the chronicles of the war for all time.
The first to receive the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union
were fighter pilots -- Jr Lts M. P. ZHUKOV, S. I. ZDOROVTSEVI and P. 1.
KHARITONOV. Covering Leningrad from raids of enemy aircraft, they downed
several enemy bombers during the first days of the war by using ramming
attacks. The ramming tactic was the weapon of fearless, unsurpassed
masters of aerial combat. The pilots who were protecting Moscow from air
raids used it with particular skill and aggressiveness. More than 20
ramming attacks were made here, including the first night ramming attack
in history -- successfully performed by Jr Lt. V. V. TALALIKH1N, and the
first high altitude ramming attack -- performed by Lt A. N. KATRICH.
Fighter-Pilot Lt V. Ye. KOVALEV, of the 6th PVC Air Corps, displayed ex-
ceptional courage in repeating the feat of Capt GASTELLO on the approaches
to the capital.
The combat activities of soldiers in other arms was also marked by
glorious military feats. The feats of Lts. G. M. VOLMANSKIY and P. N.
PETRUNIN, antiaircraft gunners; Sgt ZORNIKOV, chief of an observation
et
AtroVes5hr-ofiTenenE0091M -ghe
79 ADVAIROP861700816R0003000101:1013
chronicles of thc war as models of fearlessness and courage.
iiik.
IA sovIET , -
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Ap p rove &Pot Reline* 2000/0810SemQ1A9ROP18151:13000W5140083 =MOW 8e. nd. fear-
lessly in PVO Strany Troops. In numerous battles against the enemy they
served courageously, prudently, and clamly.
Under fire of war PVO soldiers reached manhood and their combat
skill, fortitude, and staying power grew. Many PVO chasti and eoyedi-
neniya which distinguished themselves in battles against the German
invaders were decorated with combat orders and awarded honored titles.
17 fighter aviation chasti and. Noyedineniya and many antiaircraft chasti
became members of the Soviet guards. A great number of PVO soldiers were
awardei the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Many thousands of sol-
diers, sergeants, and generals were decorated with oreers and medals.
In the two dec:Ades that have passed since the victorious conclusion
of the Great Patriotic War, deep, truly revolutionary changes have taken
place in all fields of military affairs. Massive numbers of new combat
means have entered the troops -- nuclear weapons, various classes of
rockets, and radar apparatus, calling for radical changes in the nature,
scale, and methods of conducting war. It has become possible in the
first minutes of military operations to deliver blows of enormous de-
structive force on the most important elements of the military and
economic power of hostile sides, no matter where they may be located,
close to state boundaries or deep in their rear areas. The increased
significance of the surprise facto:', and the possibility of decisively
influencing the course of armed conflict or even of predetermining the
outcome of a war by the surprise, massive employment of air and apace
forces immeasurably increased the role of air defense. Under modeeLn con-
ditions a strong, effective, constantly operating air defense is One of
the criteria of the preparedness of the country militarily. It is called
upon to protect from enemy nuclear strikes the population., the economy,
and the armed forces and to ensure the vital activities of the state ani
the use of our means to punish the aggressor.
Therefore) in the system of military construction. the Soviet govern-
ment is paying special attention to the development and improvement of PITO
Strany Troops and to maintaining them in a status which will ensure the
repulsion of any strikes by the air and space forces of an. aggressor. Ac-
cording to their technical nature, modern. PVO troops are completely unlike
the troops of the Great Patriotic War period. Owing to the outstanding
achievements of Soviet science and technology and the enormous successes
in the development of a socialist industry, they have been armed with.
principally new, highly effective means for combating an air enemor --
surface-to-air guided rockets, rocket-carrying aircraft complexes for in-
terception, various radio electronic equipment, and automatic control
systems. Our scientists end engineers also created complexes of various
means for protecting our motherland from nuclear-rocket attack. The
sphere of operations for PVO Strany Troops has widened significantly.
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employment have changed. In connection with the intentions of US im-
perialists to harness space forces to the chariot of war, the necessity
..j-has arisen of keeping under control not only air space, but also cosmic
space. The missions of PVO Strany Troops today have gone beyond he
limits of combating offensive enemy aircraft. They must alvo be obit to
intercept and destroy ballistic missiles and space means of attack. In
other words, a modern air defense must be antiaircraft, antimissile, and
anti-space. A high combat readiness of air defense troops and their
ability to counter immediately acts of aggression and attempts by impe-
rialist states to violate Soviet aerial boundaries vith hostile inten-
tions have acquired a more decisive significance that ever before.
The complex process of changing PV0 Strany Troops into a new quali-
tative condition continues in cur time. And it is being done without
ignoring the experience of the Great Patriotic War, but by using every-
thing instructive and valuable that it gave to the theory and practice of
military affairs. The glorious combat traditions/ heroics, and feats of
the past war, which for the new generations of solditrs serve as models
of selfless service to the fatherland, have also been taken into the ar-
mament of the troops.
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