SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO 2, 1964

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 20, 1965
• Content Type: TRANS

\ CIA FDD TU.NS NO ,,,,,(1yIET MILITARY
a or 06-
I'OURNAT' VOYFNNAYA '-]`/JYSIT NO ' 1964 '
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLAT I ON
Number 934 20 July 1965
SOVIET MILITARY iffEORETICAL JOURNAL 1TO:aNNAYA My.?JL Nc 2
, 1961i-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E Street, N. W.
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SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 2, 1964
Table of Contents
Pac,.0
The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Education of 3oviet
Troops, by Lt Gen, M. Kalashnik and Col S. Il'in (Not trans-
lated)
The Conflict Between Communist and Bourgeois Ideology and
"Psychological Warfare," by Col A. Ratnikov (Not translated;
has since appeared in an unrestrict.A. publication)
Some Questions of Meeting Engagements of Large Tank Groupings, 1
by Maj Gen Tank Trps A. Zhilin
Engineer Support of Operational Regroupings; by Col V.
Shchedrov (Not translated)
Response to the Article on the Theory of Operations Research,
by Engr-W Yu. Pevnitskiy, Engr-Lt Col N. Bazanov, and
Engr-Capt V. Malinovskiy
Preparation of Operational and Tactical Problems for Electronic
Computers; by Engr-Col S. Perepelitskiy and Lt Col I. Rybolov-
skiy
9
20
The Development of Soviet Military. Science After World War II,
by Maj Gen S. Kozlov 28
The Unified Automated Control System of th3 US Armed Forces,
by Engr-Col V. Lebedev
The New System of the Supreme Military Control of Great Britain,
by Col (Res) Ya- Malevskiy (Not translated)
A New Work on the History of Military Art; by Cols V. Istomin,
P. Biryukov, and Ye. Fedoseyev (Book. review -- Not translated)
Forces and Means of Combatting Submarines; by Capt let Rank
Yu. Kolesnikov
50
56
Cybernetics in Military Affairs; by Maj Gen Arty V. Rozhdestven-
skiy 61
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Voyenna,ya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR
Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing
House, Moscow. This translation is from issue No 2, February 1964,
which wan signed for the press 6 February 1964. Articles marked "not
translated" above are not considered of oufficient interest to warrant
dissemination.
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SOME QUESTION[ OF MEETING ENGAGEMENTS OF
LARGE TANK GROUPINGS
CPYRGHT by Maj Gen Tank Trps A. ZHILIN
There is no doubt that in operations conducted by ground troops
in a nuclear war meeting engagements will arise frequently. This is
especially true of tank troops, which have high mobility, striking power,
and maneuverability) and stability against, nuclear strikes. Of great
interest are engagements of large tank groupings which are called upon
to exploit fully the results of nuclear strikes for the final defeat
of the enemy and the accomplishment of the operation's objectives in
the shortest period of time.
Such meeting engagements may arise in the most varied situations,
both at the beginning and during the course of offensive operations.
At the beginning of operations meeting engagements are most likely
to occur if both sides simultaneously attempt to achieve their objec-
tives by a decisive attack. In this case a tenk grouping will conduct
an engagement on the main axis in coordination with neighboring group-
ings of ground troops attacking on other axes.
Entirely different conditions may arise for tank groupings in a
meeting engagement during an offensive operation of one of the sides
or during action in the operational depth, especially when cut off from
other forces. Here a tank grouping of the attacking side must conduct
a meeting engagement with large operational reserves of the defending
forces, which also have a considerable number of tanks and which are
striving to achieve success with nuclear strikes followed by a power-
ful counterthrust. If a tank grouping of the attacking force becomes
separated by a considerable distance, its troops will sooner or later
have to conduct an engagement independently.
It must be assumed that such meeting engagements will begin with
nuclear strikes of rocket troops and aviation and will have a purely
tank character and large scope. They will usually evolve on a wide
front and to a great depth under complex, rapidly changing situations,
and will be distinguished by exceptional intensity, dynamism, and
varied operations of tank troops.
Obviously, the employment of means of a higher command in such
a meeting engagement is not excluded, since this engagement is not
an isolated occurrence, but an integral part of the operations of
both sides. Therefore, each side tries to achieve the most decisive
objectives, not only to destroy the opposing grouping, but to complete
the operation in the shortest possible time, primarily with its tank
grouping.
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-mese oojectives can be accomplished only through the coordinated
efforts of rocket troops, tank soyedineniya, and support aviation. The
most illportant principle for ensuring success in tank meeting engage-
ments is the forestalling of the enemy in all operations. This prin-
ciple, especially in meeting engagements of large tank groupings, in
our opinion, is becoming more important. Tank troops, it would seem,
have the greatest potential for accomplishing this. Success can be ex-
pected by the side which is able to forestall the other side in deliver-
ing nuclear strikes, in achieving and maintaining fire superiority and
superiority in the air, and in advancing ahd deploying tank soyedineniya
and chasti for tank strikes from the march.
Nuclear weapons and their effective use by rocket troops and avia-
tion will be of decisive importance to both sides, since in modern meet-
ing engagements, including those involving large tank groupings, they
will be the main force for destroying the enemy. A powerful nuclear
strike at the beginning of a meeting engagement can play a most impor-
tant rola. Forestalling the enemy with an effectively delivered nuclear
strike will unquestionably have a real influence on the success of opera-
tions of large tank groupings. However, this strike alone will obviously
be insufficient for the total destruction of the enemy. 13oth the at-
tacking and defending forces will try to deliver successive nuclear
strikes against nuclear means and tank soyedineniya as they appear when
enemy objectives are still in the concentration area, during an advance,
and at the beginning of a meeting engagement.
An important requirement is the use of a large part of the nuclear
ammunition against the main forces of t%a enemy rather than an equal
distribution or their use against secondary targets. When destroying
an enemy tank grouping it should be remembered that its nuclear weapons
are primary objectives.
In addition to nuclear means wide use will be made of conventional
means: aviation strikes in support of a tank grouping (with nonnuclear
ammunition) and the fire of artillery in the tank grouping.
We especially wish to emphasize the important role of aviation
both in operations in support of a tank grouping and in providing cover
for it by countering enemy aviation during a meeting engagement. In
meeting engagements of tank groupings, the majority of targets of both
sides will be mobile, Aviation will therefore be the most effective
means of destroying the enemy. To a certain degree it will be given
preference by 'both sides.
In certain areas, especially in the area of a battle of tank chasti
and podrazdeleniya, action against the enemy may be limited to ground
means of destruction.
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As concerns troop operations of a tank grouping in a meeting en-
gagement, one of the basic conditions for their successful execution,
as we have already noted, is the forestalling of the enemy in the de-
ploznnent of tank soyedineniya and the launching of thrusts 'rom the
march, with the maximum exploitation of the results of nuclear and.
air strikes to complete the defeat of the enemy in short periods of
time.
The Great Patriotic War showed that in large tank meeting engage-
ments the main condition for achieving success was the forestalling of
the enemy in deploying tank soyedineniya and launching thrusts from
the march against the flank of the enemy's main tank grouping. The
meeting engagement of the Third Guards Tank Army with units of the en-
emy's First and Fourth Tank Armies during the Kiev Offensive Operation
of 1943 and that of the Fourth Tank Army of the First Ukrainian Front
with the First and Eighth tank soyedineniya and other soyedineniya of
the enemy tank grouping during the L'vov-Sandomir Offensive Operation
in July 1944 were won in this way.
We are fully aware that the means of armed struggle and the con-
ditions and ways of conducting operations, especially meeting engagements,
have changed greatly. In contrast to the past, when tank troops were
the main means of defeating the enemy in a tank meeting engagement,
the main means today, as has already been stated, are nuclear weapons
employed by rocket troops and aviation. Tank soyedineniya and chasti,
possessing great striking power, are the main means of completing the
defeat of an enemy tank grouping with the maximum exploitation of the
results of the use of nuclear weapons against it.
This is why the main principle of tank troop operations in a meet-
ing engagement in the past, the forestalling of the enemy in deploy-
ment and the launching of thrusts from the march, will, in our opinion,
not only be fully preserved but further developed.
A large variation in the forms of operational maneuvers and the
methods of combat operations will be characteristic of modern meeting
engagements.
Tank groupings of both sides will be able to use the most varied
forms of operational maneuvers. The main forms will include the fol-
lowing: a flanking maneuver and the delivery of a tank thrust by the
main forces against the flank and rear of the enemy's main grouping;
a double envelopment and the delivery of tank thrusts simultaneously
or consecutively against both flanks of the enemy grouping; the delivery
of a powerful frontal tank thrust by the main forces to split the main
enemy grouping.
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In situations involving the advance of tank (;1Juptics of both sides
in several directions and the development of a la:eting on a wide front
and to a great depth, with dispersed troop formations, a form which
provides for the simultaneous or consecutive delivery of a number of
thrusts by tank soyedineniya and chasti from several directions will,
in our opinion) be characteristic.
Modern means of combat and the great striking power and mobility
of tank groupings make it possible for both sides, by maneuvering ex-
tensively, to use any of these forms and to conibine them into different
variations or alternate them during a meeting engagement. However,
these forms will not always be equally suitable. Depending on the ac-
tual situation, the use of this or that form may prove inexpedient or
ever. impossible. We will try to explain this briefly.
The delivery of a flank thrust by the main forces of a tank group-
ing in a meeting engagement is, of course, the most suitable for swiftly
completing the destruction of the enemy. If conditions are favorable,
obviously neither side will hesitate to deliver such a strike. More-
over) each side will do everything it can to create these conditions
by making appropriate use of nuclear weapons, conducting maneuvers with
tank soyedineniya, and containing the maneuvers of enemy troops.
The delivery of a flank thrust by the main forces of a tank group-
ing, in our opinion) is especially practical when a meeting engagement
occurs at the beginning of operations, when troops will assume the
offensive after an advance from the depth, and also during operations)
when the position of the tank grouping in respect to the enemy favors
such a thrust.
A situation may arise, however) in which this would require the
execution of a long and difficult maneuver by large forces of tanks
and the negotiation or detour of wide zones of destruction and radio-
actively contaminated terrain with a high level of radiation. If
this takes too much time, making it impossible to forestall the enemy
in deploying and delivering a thrust, such a maneuver may be inexpedient.
It must also be remembered that modern means of reconnaissance
enable both sides to detect a maneuver of large enemy forces, which
in turn presents them with an opportunity to destroy them with nuclear
weapons. Also, while one side is executing a flanking maneuver the other
side will not be inactive. It is therefore necessary to take all meas-
ures to ensure that one's own flank will not be exposed to a thrust
during the delivery of a flank thrwt.
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ot:JA;L:u.Lua. a a.urtl ?I operational maneuver in ameeting
engagement of large tank groupings it is necessary to consider the
time factor. It played an important role in the past. Under modern
conditions, considering that the use of nuclear weapons in a meeting
engagement can quickly change the situation and that the meeting engage-
ment itself is characterized by sudden changes and swift maneuvers,
the importance of the time factor for making a maneuver for the delivery
of a sudden and powerful tank thrust during the intense struggle to
gain and maintain the initiative has increased immeasurably.
A frontal salient thrust by the main forces can be advantageous
when the Enemy's main tank grouping has been considerably weakened by
nuclear strikes or if it has not had time to deploy. Moreover, a frontal
thrust will be expedient if the situation and time do not permit making
a maneuver for a flank thrust in a short period of time. The use of
this form of operational maneuver reduces the time needed to prepare
for a meeting engagement, facilitates the swift delivery oi a power-
ful initial tank thrust, and eliminates the necessity of complex re-
formations and relocations of troops (the advance and deployment is
made along the shortest axis). In addition, during a frontal salient
thrust there may be more favorable conditions for the maximum exploi-
tation of nuclear strikes for swift penetration into the depth of the
enemy's operational formation, for gaining time, and for seizing and
holding the initiative in a meeting engagement.
On the other hand, delivery of a frontal salient thrust by the
main forces can, for example, be disadvantageous for a tank grouping
which has sustained heavy losses and become weaker than the grouping
of the other side or which has an insufficient amount of nuclear ammuni-
tion.
Delivery of a flank or frontal thrust during troop operations
on a wide front and along different axes does not mean that all troops
of a tank grouping will necessarily operate in the same way. In our
opinion it is expedient to launch a flank thrust with part of the forces
simultaneously with, or even during a frontal thrust by the main forces,
using the favorable position of one's own tank chasti, the operations
of troops along separate axes, the gaps between combat formations, breaches
created by nuclear strikes, and exposed flanks. Each side will try to
use these gaps and breaches for swift penetration into the depth of
the enemy position following nuclear strikes.
During the delivery of a frontal thrust, a flank thrust can be
delivered by the tank grouping's second echelon or reserves which in
these cases are intended for increasing the force of the thrust by
the first echelon, for completing the annihilation of the enemy group-
ing) and for developing the attack in depth.
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grouping, contain enemy operations, and repel thrusts with separate
i-chasti on the axis where the enemy grouping will launch a thrust with
its rain forces.
The selection of a form of operational maneuver in a meeting en-
gagement depends to a large extent on the operational formation which
exists or which can be created at the beginning of the engagement.
At the beginning of the engagement this formation may be single-eche-
long or double-echelon. A single-echelon formation is unavoidable if
the second echelon has already been engaged in a preceding attack and
there has not been time to restore it. A double-echelon formation is
naturally more desirable. A second echelon, or at least a strong re-
serve, can exert a timely influence on the course of a meeting engage-
ment, especially in developing the attack and exploiting the results
of nuclear strikes against the enemy in those areas where the troops
of the first echelon are unable to do so (because of heavy losses or
strong enemy resistance).
In determining the forms of operational maneuvers and the methods
of combat operations of a tank grouping, it is also necessary to take
into account the technical capabilities of the tank soyedineniya to
execute a maneuver. The separation of attached or supporting rocket
troops and their ability to quickly prepare for rocket launchings to
forestall the enemy also play an important role.
Speaking of technical capabilities, we have in mind primarily the
rated cruising range of the tanks. The results of incorrect evalua-
tion of technical cappabilities in the last war are well known. In
particular, delayed refueling in a number of cases placed tank armies
in a critical situation. For example, during the L'vov-Sandomir Opera-
tion soyedineniya of the Third Guards Tank Army and the Fourth Tank
Army had to wait nearly 24 hours for fuel on the approaches to L'vov
and as a result were temporarily unable to continue the execution of
their assigned mission. This slowed the rate of advance and allowed
the enemy to become organized to a certain degree, which had an adverse
effect on the course of the entire operation.
Under modern conditions failure to considDr technical capabilities
can lead to still more unfortunate consequences. Therefore, in plan-
ning maneuvers of a large tank grouping over a great distance, includ-
ing those for delivering a flank thrust in a meeting engagement, the
supplying of tanks with the necessary amount of fuel, their timely
refueling, and the activities of the repair and reconstruction service
must be considered. This is especially important in those cases in
which an operation does not end with a meeting engagement (and this
will often happen), and the tank grouping is required to continue the
attack to a great depth.
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ment, in comparison to those of the past, will, of course, have a num-
ber of special features connected with the nature and conditions of ini-
tiating and conducting a meeting engagement. First of all, consider-
ing that tank soyedineniya and chasti can advance and deploy for a meet-
ing engagement in wide zones and along separate important axes, it must
be assumed that their operations will develop differently. One chant',
located in a more favorable position, can go over to the offensive from
the march and swiftly develop the attack to a great depth: exploiting
the results of nuclear strikes. Another, encountering strong resistance:
will have to overcome the enemy. A third will be subjected to a nuclear
strike and will have to repel the enemy. The simultaneous entry into
battle of all chasti of a tank grouping from a single line, as in the
last war, will obviously be difficult today. Waiting for chasti which
are late in advancing and deploying for their simultaneous entry into
battle can only result in a loss of time and, consequently, a loss of
the initiative. Therefore, the consecutive entry into battle of tank
chasti from different directions as they approach and deploy will be
most common under modern conditions. This will apply particularly
to those chasti operating in arels where nuclear strikes are delivered
against the enemy.
This does not mean) however) that the efforts of the tank grouping
will be dispersed. On the contrary, in all cases there must be a con-
centration of the efforts of rocket weapons and tank chasti on the most
advantageous axes. A decisive attack by the main forces of the tank
grouping with the maximum exploitation of effectively delivered nuclear
strikes can bring about the destruction of a larger grouping whjch has
not had time to deploy.
Under favorable conditions, especially in areas of nuclear strikes
where the enemy has been safely neutralized) tank chasti in a number of
cases can from the very beginning of an engagement successfully advance
in approach march formations and even in march formations under the
cover -)f strong advance detachments, deploying into combat formations
only upon contact with enemy troops. This, in our opinion, is a new
characteristic of a modern meeting engagement connected with the effort
to exploit the results of nuclear strikes as swiftly as possible.
After the defeat of tha enemy in a meeting engagement, a tank
grouping will usually continue to develop the attack to accomplish the
final objectives of the operation. This mission may be assigned to the
tank grouping during a meeting engagement if motorized rifle troops
arrive in time to complete the annihilation of the enemy.
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CPYRGHT
AppiroxteddlooReWisealMOMROU Q
ling tank tank groupings in a meeting engagement. The wide zone of combat opera-
tions, the speed of operations) and the sharp changes in the situation
during the battle naturally require the use of those forms of control
which will make it possible to direct troops in disconnected and some-
times even isolated areas, at various depths) and quickly influence
the course of the, engagement. Depending on the oituation, both central-
ized and decentralized control can, in our opinion, be used in a meeting
engagement.
During the organization of a meeting engagement and at itsbegin-
ning it must be assumed that each side will attempt to centralize con-
trol in order to make the most effective use of all troops through the
close coordination of their efforts for delivering the most powerful
initial nuclear, aviation) and tank strikes. For this, troops will
naturally be directe from the main command post.
During a meeting engagement auxiliary command posts may be organ-
ized for the control of tank soyedineniya operating in secondary or
isolated areas or at a considerable distance from the main forces.
In this article we have examined only certain questions concern-
ing the conducting of meeting engagements of large tank groupings in
modern offensive operations. Unquestionably) this important subject
requires further study and development.
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THE THEORY OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
CPYFiglif nt by Engr-Maj Yu. PEVNITSKIY
Voyennaya Mysll, No 7, 1963, published an interesting article by
Maj Gen Engr/Tech Serv I. ANUREYEV, Engr-Lt Col V. BORISOV, and Lt Col I.
SHCBERBAKOV,."The Tasks and Content of the Theory of Research Operations."
An in evident from its title, the authors attempted to define to a
certrin extent the comparatively young, let us call it an applied,
scierxtific discipline -- the theory of operations reseaich.
It should be noted that among specialists working in the field of
practical application of the theory of operations research there is still
no uniform opinion on a considerable number of problems of the
methodology of this new scientific discipline. In particular, there
are differing concepts. What place does this discipline have among the
others? Can the theory of operations research be identified with the
totality of mathematical methods for conducting research? In what direct-
ion should this theory be developed? How should specialists in
operations research be trained?
First of all we ought to consider the definition of the theory of
research operations as a scientific discipline. The authors of the
article gave the following definition: "The theory of operations research
defines and analytically describes law-governed factors in various
processes for the purpose of deriving quantitative bases, or recommendations
made on the basis of them, for decision-making" (page 17). We can
begin an analysis of this definition if only from the specific question:
why only describe analytically? After all, the authors, themselves
subsequently discussed analytical and conjectural modeling. This is
one of-the instances when the authors' positions characterizing the
content of the theory of operations research differ from the definition
of this new discipline accepted by them. But es we already noted this
was essentially a specific question. It is Important to establish how the
given definition differentiates the theory of operations research from
other scientific disciplines. Take structural mechanics, for
example. This science also defines and analytically describes the
principles of distributing stresses in beam and girders for the purpose
of deriving quantitative bases for decision-making in building bridges
and other structures. But is structural mechanics operations research?
Obviously, no, although the tasks we are discussing, whIch structural
mechanics is confronted with, completely fit the definition used by the
authors of the article. We conclude from this that the definition
referred to does not reflect the basic content of the theory of
operations research and does not permit determination of the place of this
scientific discipline among other disciplines, and, therefore, requires
definite clarification.
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. -
0., ,' ' ? ?fi nocaccaey econcep of
_cperations as involved in the name of this scientific discipline. By
RGH TrPeration should be unaerstood any purposeful action; that is, any
organized action, or more precisely any action being organized. Thus,
the theory of operations research by its very title is ,eoncerned with
research of various processes, the basis of which is formed 'ay. the
actions being organized. Since the problem of researching extions
being organized is worthwhile: then one of the main questions which the
theory of operations research must answer is: how expediently organized
are the actions? The second and main question arises aa a logical
sequence to the first: what must be done to organize the actions most
expediently?) From here it is evident that the ultimate goal must be to
obtain practical recommendations which will permit the manager to reach
a decision more soundly-- that is, to control rationally. (The term
"optimum control" is not used here intentionally. The concept of
optimum presupposes reaching the maximum or minimum of any one criterion
or criterional function. The manager who makes the decision by no means
always has thd possibility of using as the basis of his decision any one
criterion but has to compare the results of estimates of various
criteria.)
Thus we have examined what the theory of operatior4 research studies
and for what reason this is done. A final question remains: how is
the research done?
Before answering this question it is necessary to .well briefly on
the similarity of elements of the actions being organized. Processes which
are seemingly completely different outwardly are similar in many
respects if one digresses from the concrete form of the process and examines
its abstract,nature. For example, if we carefully analyze a number of
processes, beginning with the simplest, most ordinary and ending with
more complex,processes, then such processes as the flow pf clients
through a barbershop, documents within an institution,4nd aircraft
through an air defense system; they prove to be similar,in their abstract
form. They are all characterized by having essentially one logical
structure -- the clients which enter a service system, shaving in
each case several channels; either they are serviced in 's, definite
period of time or, if there are no free channels, turns are organized, or
they leave the system.
The theory of operations research should expose the abstract nature
of operations and create models of various operations whIch will permit
making a quantitative analysis.
As a summation of these discussions we can propose. the falowing
definition of the theory of operations research. The theory of
operations research is a scientific discipline which is concerned with
analysis of Similar elements of various operations (actions being organized),
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CPYRGH
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o similar structures, and with quantitative analysis og them for the
purpose of reaching a scientific basis for rational decisions
acceptible by executing organs in control processes.
As can be seen, this definition of the theory of operations research
permits characterizing the nature of this scientific discipline on the
one hand) and on the other hand defines its place among the other
scientific disciplines as an integral part of the general science of
control -- cybernetics.
Now we come to another incorrect position, in our opinion, of the
article of ANUREYEV, SHCHERBAKOV? and BORISOV. In discussing the correla-
tion of cybernetics and the theory of operations researdh, the authors
made some misjudgements in defining these scientific disciplines and as
a result came to the conclusion that "it is incorrect t9 consider the
theory of operations research as an integral part of cybernetics" (page 26).
First let's look at their definition of cybernetios. "Cybernetics,"
the authors Wrote, "is the science of control. Xt establshes the general
principles of control processes independent of their physical nature and
provides general methods of describing and studying the processes of
control by means of the theory of algorithms and the information theory"
(ibid.). In the authors' opinion, from this definition it follows that
the algorithm, and information theories must be a part of cybernetics
and, obviously, the theory of operations research does not belong in
cybernetics. We will return to this definition of cybernetics
later.
The authors' second premise is the definition of operations research
as "the theory of decision-making (note that this definition does not
agree with the definition used in the beginning of the article) . The
authors further claimed that this theory "establishes the principles
of the processes of decision-making in numerous fields of practice and
provides general methods of studying and finding the optimum
resolution of a large circle of practical problems" (114d.) , emphasizing
by this, apparently, the practical direction of the theOry of operations
research in contrast to cybernetcs.
The authors' third premise is, apparently, included in the following
phrase: "It cannot be forgotten that the problems resolved by operations
research methods arise outside the sphere of control and these
problems are the overwhelming majority" (ibid.). By asserting this the
authors olmiclaay want to suggest to the reader that the majority of
problems whose resolution is the concern of the theory of operations
research lie outside the sphere of control; that is, outside the competence
of cybernetics. This is clearly mishmash. Here the authors in fact
identify the theory of operations research and the methicias used by the
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theory of operations research. The methods of the theory of operntions
research are the methods of mathematics, and in practice almost all
scientific disciplines use certain mathematical methods.
Thus, from that fact that operations research methOs -- that is,
generally speaking, certain mathematical methods used forFesclving
problems lying outside the sphere of control -- it does not at all
follow that the theory of operations research lies (even if partially) out-
side the sphere of control. Moreover, it can be proveh that the theory
of operations research is concerned exclusively with the processes character-
ized by purposeful activity and these processes to a certain
extent are definitely associated with control, since control, according
to Academician A. I. BERG's definition, is the process of changing
a complex dynamic system from one condition into another by affecting
its variables. (Kibernetiku na sluzhbu kommunizmu, Cybernetics at
the Service of Communism; A collection of articles edited by
Academician A. I. BERG; Vol I, The State Publishing House for Power
Engineering Literature, 1961).
Every kind of purposeful activity is always associated with
decision-making; that is, with affecting certain parameters of a system
for the purpose of changing it into a condition needed by the person making
the decision. The theory of operations research is concerned with
preparation for these decisions; that is, selection of parameters
which it is expedient to affect for changing the system,into the
necessary conditions, and analysis of the ways of influencing
these parameters. Thus, the theory of operations research is not outside
the sphere of control.
We cannot agree with the definition of operations research
as the "theory of decision-making." It is very tempting to give a
brief definition of a scientific discipline, but in doing so
essential traits of that which is being defined must not be overlooked.
The meaning can be distorted, which strictly speaking, happened in this
case. If the authors definitely wanted to give a brief definition, it
would have been more accurate to say: "Operations research is
precisely concerned with preparation for decisions and not with
decision-making. This is a very important detail and it must be
emphasized rather clearly.
Finally, we will diu3s the definition of cybernetics. In
principle the definition given by the authors was accurate with the
exception of the final phrase (by means of the theory Of algorithms and
the information theory) which unjustifiably limits the scope of
cybernetics. Apparently, to include an enumeration of the methods or
theories used by a scientific discipline in its very definition is
useless in general, for such a definition quickly becomes obsolete as
new theories and methods are developed.
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it should be noted that since it is a general definition to a
considerable extent it conceals certain details which are *portant
from the point of view of the question under consideration here on
the association of cybernetics and the theory of operations research.
We can introduce here, for example, a definition of cybernetics as
a science "on the common characteristicsof control processes, on the
optimization of control (on optimum control), and on the use of
information for optimization of control." (Kibernetika, Cybernetics;
Philosophical and Sociological Problems; by I. NOVIK, The State
Publishing House for Political Literature: 1963, page 34).
Analyzing this definition from the point of view of the
applicability of its positions to the theory of research operations it
is not difficult to note that:
First), the theory of research operations also proposes an
abstract approach to the control processes; that is) it is interested in
their abstract nature more than their specific;
Second, the theory of operations research is concerned with
problems of the optimization of actions; that is, optimization of
control;
Third, ,the theory of operations research certainly proposes ido
a certain extent the use of information on the course of a process
(or analogous processes) for control optimization.
At the same time, however, the theory of operations research and
cybernetics are not synonomous. In contrast to cybernetics, which is
concerned with analysis of any possible processes of control in nature and
society, the theory of operations research is concerned with a comparatively
narrow circle of control processes -- only those control process in the
realm of man 'n activities. Fro 71 here it directly follows that the
theory of operations research is an integral part of cybernetics.
It is necessary to discuss still another of the articles
positions. The authors offered 2 varieties of the method of mathematical
prediction -- mathematical modeling and estimate of effectiveness. In
our viewpoint this division is not competent from a methodological
standpoint.
?
Actually, the meaning given by the authors to both concepts is
essentially an estimate of effectiveness. On the one hand, that
which the authors call mathematical modeling is never an end in itself,
but is always conducted to estimate the effectiveness of the processes
being modeled. On the other hand, that which the authors call estimate
of effectiveness is also mathematical modeling, since mathematical dependence
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paramenters characterizing these actions is nothing more than a
mathematical model of these actions. A characteristic feature of
such a mathematical model is that only a definite element of these
actions is actually modeled (described by mathematical dependence).
All the remaining elements of the actions are the parameters, which are
essentially the results of an earlier modeling of these, elements of the
actions.
Thus, the authors? position on the method of mathOatical
prediction of actions could, apparently, be formulated in the following
manner: Mhthematical prediction of actions is an estimate of their
effectiveness by means of mathematical modeling of these actions. If it
Is necessary to interprete the mathematical model itself, then this
can be done, using the concepts of direct and indirect modeling fitting
the concepts of mathematical modeling and estimate of effectiveness used
by the authors.
In conclusion let us examine the problem of training cadres of
military specialists in operations research. By propobing inclusion of
a course on operations research in the programs of sppb?adary and higher
command educational institutions, the authors raised an extremely
important question concerning the profundity and depth of commanders'
knowledge of operations research methods; that is, the readiness of command-
ers of various grades to use in their practical work various methods of
analysis fromthe arsenal of the theory of operations research.
Such a.measure would undoubtedly be an extremely important step
toward the broad introduction of scientific methods In the practice
of troop control. But this is only one aspect, thoughjt very importaat
one, of this problem. The second aSpect is associated with broadening
the front of work in the field of operations research and with the
creation of new developments in applying the metheds of this scientific
discipline to resolving practical tasks. Thus, the quedtion is about
highly qualified cadres of military specialists who are .able to
use the apperatus of the theory of operations research In practice to
perfection, and, moreover, who are able to make their contribution to
the theory of operations research.
These specialists will apparently need: comparatively high
mathematical training; the ability to digress from the concrete forms
of certain actions and to expose their abstract structure; 'a knowledge
of the specific nature of military actions; and the ability to
expose factors which cannot be ignored without distortion of the
real nature of military actions in building mathematical
models.
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Officers having operational-tactical training experience
difficulties to a greater extent when they begin the study of
operations research than do officers having engineering or
mathematical training. These difficulties, being a consequence of
insufficient mathematical training, are understandable in the
all previous training and work experience of operational officers is
associated with examination of concrete forms of phenomena with all
the abundance of details inherent in each concrete form.
Officers having engineering or mathematical training experience
difficulties to a lesser degree, perhaps, when they begin working in
the field of operations research. This is explained by their lack of
operational training; that is, by a comparatively poor" understanding
of the problems of control of combat actions and general experience
in the forms and tactics of the combat employment of various arms of
the Armed Forces. This experience is naturally acquired in joint work
with operational officers. However, in our viewpoint, it would be
expedient to teach these officers the fundamentals of operational art
in a system of special courses attached to command academies.
Comment by Engr-Lt Col N. BAZANOV and Engr-Capt V. MALtNOVSKIY
In modern combat, which is characterized by fast-moving actions and
the employment of powerful weapons of destruction, particularly
serious consequences might becaused by inaccurate operational calculations.
They can be excluded by conducting comprehensive and thorough
analysis of planned operations on the basis of modern mathematical
methods. --
The more complex combat weapons and tactics of armed conflict
become, the broader and more diverse is the use of mathematical methods
of research in the Armed Forces and the more important is profound
understanding of them by military specialist of all grades.
In light of these pproblems, we believe ymaapaya Itlysll is showing
useful initiative by publishing articles on the role of mathematics
and cybernetics in military affairs and, particularly, in troop control.
Especially significant are those articles disclosing the problems and
content of the theory of operations research, which is Concern,.c1 with
the development of methods for analyzing operations and determining the
best (optimum) alternatives for using resources. Whereas the 1956-1962
articles discussed the general traits of this theory and identified
it as a part of cybernetics, the article of Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv. I ANUREYEV,
Engr-It Col V. BORISOV, and Lt Co].. I. SHCHERBAKOV, published in 1963
disclosed the problems and content of the theory of operations research
on a good military-scientific level and in more detail.
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r 1 e authors o n question succeeded in
correctly presenting the problems and content of operations research.
We fully share the authors' viewpoint on the expediency' of
preserving the term "operations research" in viev of the fs,,ct that today
it has already practically demonstrated its viability. As for conformity
with the operational meaning of this concept, the working practice of
groups occupied with operations research shows that it is always easy
to define the concept in question.
We cannot help but agree also that one of the reasons for
wide spread use of quantitative analysis methods in military affairs was
the introduction in the troops of new, powerful weapons of destruction:
namely nuclear weapons, for which very little error in estimating
the results of their use is tolerable, since even insignificant mistakes
in this could lead to fatal surprises.
However, there were positions in the article with which we cannot a-
gree. Contradictions made by the authors are evident even in their
definition of the theory of operations research. In the, beginning of the
article it was correctly asserted that the theory of operations research
defines and analytically describes the laws of a course of events
or phenomena for the purpose of placing at man's disposition
quantitative bases for decision-making in controlling these events and
phenomena, but at the end of the article the authors clained it to
be a "theory of decision-making" and said that this theory "establishes
the laws of the processes of decision-making." With st7gtements like
these we positively cannot agree.
The fact is that the process of operations research does not examine
how decision are made, but only provides quantitative recommendations which
help to reach the most correct decision in a complex situation. Of
course, operations research can influence the decision-Making process.
But the principles of applying this theory's methods in researching the
processes of decision-making are the same in researching any other
process.
The process of decision-making might involve the theory of
research operations, for example, if it is necessary to determine the
best organization of work in an apparatus, staff, or institution for
reaching a decision in the fastest time with the least expenditure of
resources, etc. As a result of research like this, quantitative
recommendations will be obtained which the chief will need to reach a
sound decision on reorganizing the work of his apparatus, staff, or
institution.
In defining the place and role of operations research methods 'in
the processes of decision-making, the authors made a number of
stipulations which contradicted their main, and in our viewpoint
accurate, view on this aspect. The authors stated that operations research
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pprovc or c casc
provides a quantitative basis. As an example, they cite the task of
assigning targets to weapons by operations research methods to inflict
maximum losses on the enemy. In their opinion such a target assignment
is the sought-after solution to distribution of nuclear strikes on targets,
and the commnder has only to be guided by it.
The authors forget that in analyzing the results of the distribution
the commander for many reasons might not agree with them. In particular,
in a certain situation the criterion for assigning weapons to inflict
maximum losses on the enemy might not suit him and he will deem it
necessary to consider an alternative in which the maximum destroyed
targets will be taken as the criterion of distribution. He might
indicate the relative importance of targets and require target assignment
to be carried out in these conditions. When analyzing: the results of
assignment might be made more precise by allccating additional weapons or
by partial redistribution of them within the proposed alternative.
All this shows that the one who makes the final dicision is free to
disagree (wholly or in part) with the quantitative recommendations. At
the same time, he might completely agree with the results of the
calculation, but in this case they will remain only the basin for
the final decision made by the commander with regard to a whole
number of factors and considerations which could not be expressed quantitat-
ively. Therefore, the authors are incorrect when they Claim that in the
event man disagrees with the obtained quantitative recommendations, his
actions will never be the best and will not be free from gross errors.
The authors correctly noted that operations research "must supersede
rough comparisons of a qualitative character and replace them with
quantitative mathematical bases" (page 19). But we cannot agree that
operations research will replace all subjective considerations,
such as intuition, for example.
Dialectical materialism considers that intuition is the result of
previously acquired experience, skill, and knowledge and that it plays
a definite role in cognition.
A man who uses operations research methods in cognition of predicted
control processes improves his experience and knowledge; that is,
he continuously increases his intuition in this field and in turn
influences the development of these methods. It is certain, for
example, that all the most important factors of phenomena in the
processes of prediction will be selected on the basis of
common sense, which, in turn is based on experience, skill, and knowledge
-- that is, on intuition.
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of distribution of each element of an operation in researching it by
means of a conjectural model is formulated on the basis of common sense.
We believe that analytical methods, which are the basis of operations
research, must not be looked upon as the antithesis of common sense or
as a substitute for intuition, but as a method making it possible to
join the experience or the intuition of specialists of a given field
for achieving results which go beyond the limits of the experience or the
intut ion of any individual person. Morever,,in combdt-Oonditions,
situations are possible in which it will be possiiile to reach decisions
by intuition alone. Therefore, it is important that our commanders
develop intuition and acquire knowledge and experience which can be
gained in peacetime by means of operations research methods)
particularly for predicting actions (for example, modelimg various
actions on a computer).
In examining the mathematical apparatus and methods of operations
research, the authors, in our viewpoint, artificially divided the method
of mathematical prediction into two varieties: mathemagcal modeling
and estimate of effectiveness. The fact is that a mathematical model
is almost always a means of estimating the effectiveness of a modeled
operation or phenomenon. On the other hand, when determining the
indicators of effectiveness, the creation of a mathematical model of
the process whose effectiveness is being estimated, is obligatory.
Almost always the researcher of an operatJon has to express the system
under study in the form of a model. In all cases, however, they must
correspond to real situations and be suitable for use and prediction.
It is not clear what the authors mean by research of a mathematical
model. Optimum meanings of the paramenters of an operation are also
established according to certain indicators of effectivenss. This again
shows the artificiality of dividing the methods of mathematical
predicition into two varieties.
In our viewpoint, the authors were wrong in stating that to obtain
optimum resolutions in the field of troop control the approximation
of the method of estimate of effectiveness "is more than compensated for
by the rapidity of obtaining optimum resolution" (page 23). In the
first place, if one agrees with this way of compensating for
methods of approximation of resolutions) then it will turn out
that one might not deal with more precise methods of calculation,
since they, as a rule, are more unwidly. In the second.place, methods
of approximation yield only approximate, but not optimum, resolutions.
In reading the article one gets the impression that problems of
prediction appeared only in the postwar period. We cannot agree with this
either since scientific methods have always been methods of prediction
to a certain extent. Science has always had to predict the most expedient
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metnoas of action. Almost all problems of a military nature have
always been decided on the basis of methods of prediction. Of course, the
old methods: of scientific predictioa are for the most part unsuitable
for resolving mdern problems. From here comes one of the tasks of
the theory under study-- to develope and improve methods of research,
primarily methods of prediction.
In conclusion we will dwell on how the authors discussed the
connection of cybernetics and the theory of operations research.
Without denying the close cooperation of these scientific directions,
they sharply differentiated them according to subject, purposes,and
methods. They wrote: "it is incorrect to consider the theory of operations
research as an integral part of cybernetics;" and further: "there is
a close cooperation of the two new scientific directions which differ
according to subject, purposes, and methods" (page 26). But a little
earlier, when pointing out the connection of cybernetics and the theory
of operations research, the authors argued that their methods coincided
exactly.
Comrades ANUREYEV, BORISOV, and SHCHERBAKOV refused to consider
the theory of operations research as a part of cybernetics on the basis
that the problems resolved by operations research arise outside the
sphere of control processes, the general principle of which are
the study of cybernetics. The authors did not cite any examples in
support of their conclusions.
In our viewpoint, an impending decision cannot be outside the
sphere of control processes since its acceptance is unavoidable associated
with the presence of the controlling object and the object of control.
Since this is so, operations research cannot be separated from
cybernetics. This theory is an independent scientific direction
but remains a basic part of cybernetics. In our opinion, there is no
necessity of limiting the field of operations research. It can be
assumed that in practice almost any application of the mathematical methods
of quantitative analysis for the purpose of obtaining best organization
of an operation, the best use of weapons, the best organization of combat
actions, etc. are fields of operations research.
Now that our Armed Forces possess the most powerful types
of weaponsend are being equipped with perfect combat equipment,
employing them most effectively is an extremely serious task. That is
precisely why it is so important to introduce operations research
methods in the work practice of management organs of the Armed Forces.
In light of this, the necessity of close coordination of operational
officers with mathematicians and of appropriate instruction of
the former and the latter with the aim of training specialists who
will be able to utilize operations research methods effectively is
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ro ems for Electronic Computers
by Engr-Col S. PEREPELITSKIY and Lt Col I. RYBOLOVSKIY
CPYRGHT
The article by Col P. MYASOYEDOV and Lt Col K. SAMIGULIN,
"Methods of Preparing an Operational and Tactical Description of
Problems To Be Solved by Electronic Computers" (Voyennaya Mysl',
No 8, 1963), concerns one of the most important questions in
the sphere of automation of control. Experiments in the solution
of problems by universal computers in the process of military
games and training exercises have confirmed, repeatedly and
convincingly that the quality of solutions and the possibilities
of practical application of results depend to a large extent on
the quality of preparation of problems from an operational and
tactical point of view, i.e., on the extent to which the operational
and tactical essence of a problem and its content and methods of
solution have been investigated and prorfred.
We share the authors' point of view on a number of points
discussed in the aritcle and would like to make a few comments
and express our opinion concerning the role of military specialists
in the preparation of problems for electronic computers.
As the authors of the article point out correctly, the central
part of the preparation of such problems is the development of a
method of solution. However, in making this statement, they merely
refer to the preparation of initlal data, i.e. the requirements
concerning the form of presenting the results of a solution, as
well as a nuniser of other secondary questions. The author say very
little about the most important part, i.e., the development of a method
for the solution of problems, claiming that this requires "ingenuity,"
"creative initiative," and "careful analysis" on the part of the
researcher. Furthermore, they claim that "most of the operational
and tactical problems are solved by common methods. Therefore, it
is possible to find a way for the solution of any problem, regardless
of their special features" (page 32). This is not quite correct,
since every problem actually requires its own method of solution, and
only the method of preparation is common to all. However, these methods
of preparation have not been sufficiently elaborated and have not
become available to military researchers. To a certain extent this
situation may be explained by the level of mathematical training of
officers, i.e. tacticians and operators. Therefore, in practice,
there is now a fairly distinct division of labor in the preparation
of problems between officers of an operational and tactical specialty
and specialists in mathematics.
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CPYR e
Approv. R FRkileiqqyWJZOWICIP.t1L9Pai.cq`1,),.J.LaiLi x c. ? I on:. e 0111pUt01.11 DP8,51-09?755Q 0 p 09090006 -0
includes the followinL; staues: 1. sr;A.oction of problems which may
Hi-suitably be solved by electronic coruter!;; 2. elaboration of an
operational and tactical alL;orism; 3. operational and tactical
description of the problem; 4. mathematical description of the
problem; 5. elaboration or a mathemaLical algorism; and finally,
6. prok;raminc; of the problem.
The questions examined and decidnd in the first three stages
are mainly operational and tactical, while those in the last three
stages are mathematical.
As it appears from the designation of the first three stages,
we distinguish between the operational and tactical elaboration of
a problem. i.e., the creation of an operational and tactical algorism,
and the description of the problem. We believe that the preparation
of a problem involves the development of a method of solution, which
would subsequently permit the use of a mathematical apparatus and,
consequently, the use of an electronic computer.
While the elaboration of a problem is a creative, investigative
process based on a search for an acceptable method of solution, the
description of the problem is a statement of results of such research.
It is intended for mathematical specialists and permits them to make
a moeful study and understand the essence of the prepared problem,
as veil as the sequence and methods of its solution by commanders.
Whenever military specialists are sufficiently trained in
mathematical research methods, there is no need to prepare detailed
and cumbersome descriptions, since the military researchers will
be directly involved in preparing mathematical algorisms for the
problems. Such a possibilit:, l'as been confirmed by experiments
made in several military academies.
In our opinion, the general pr:..o.ciple in the preparation of
problems from an operational and tactical point of view consists
in finding the most efficient sequence in the actions of commanders
at all levels of a definite control stem for the solution of
such i slaems by them. In this connection the following should
be detrained: which factors and circumstances are being taken
into consideration, and which factors are not considered; whether
the solution of a problem by other methods (if such exist), without
the use of computers, is sufficiently accurate; and whether the
sequence used in a solution without computers would be the most
appropriate for a computer solution. On this basis one should
prepare a new sequence of actions, most appropriate for a computer
solution, and a list of factors to be considered.
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? '
- TaTiTilla I!,1! a I. me al veal 1 ..k74.--71 ? ? .
e autlors of the article have given their principal attention
PYR1H Tto those problems which already have quantitative methods of solution
l
(they call them, not quite accurately, "manual methods"). In our
opinion, military researchers do not encounter any special difficulties
in the preparation of such problems. It is much more difficult to
deal with problems which have had no quantitative solutions up to the
present time and which have been solved mainly by "an act of will,"
i.e., on the basis of experience, intuition, and approximate estimates.
In preparing such problems, the following points should be elaborated:
statement of the problem; selection of criteria; indication of factors
determining the process ana results of solution, as well as their
evaluation; determination of component parts (stages) of the problem
and of the sequence of their solution; and preparation of a book
diagram of the solution.
The statement of a problem includes a brief explanation, without
unnecessary details but sufficiently accurate, to indicate the start-
ing point for the solution of a problem and to explain what should
be obtained as a result of its solution. It is also customary to
state the conditions of the solution.
For example, the statement of a problem concerning the distribution
of forces and equipment of an air army in carrying out an attack may
include the following basic date: bases and troop composition of the
air army; combat readiness of chasti and soyedineniya; resources
apportioned to the air army (nuclear and conventional weapons, fuel,
etc.); and data on enemy air defense (insofar as known to intelligence).
It is necessary to establish what weapons should be used, and at what
time, against certain targets. The conditions for carrying out a
combat assignment are as follows: the attack is to be made in the
daytime (or at night); information is included on anticipated weather
conditions, and the order and methods of coordination.
For the purpose of distributing the forces of an air army, it
is necessary to know the requirements for such a distribution. In
this case it is not enough to indicate that the distribution must be
"the best possible" or "most efficient," as it is sometime3 done by
operators. One must establish the specific requirements which should
be met in order to make the distribution most efficient. These
requirements are determined by appropriate criteria.
The selection of criteria is an important and complex matter.
It is not possible to swell on it in more detail within the confines
of this article. However, it should be noted that as far as the
formulation and selection of criteria are concerned, all problems
to be solved by computers should be divided into two groups. The
first group includes problems connected with the determination of
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CPYRGHT
co o corn at equ.pment for example, range and
flight duration of aircraft under different conditions, detection
lines, geodetic and initial data for guidance systems in rocket
launching, bombing, etc.). The formulation of problem of this
group usually causes no difficulties and is always the same. Neither
does the selection of criteria present any difficulties.
The second group includes problems connected with the evaluation
of effectiveness of combat actions and the search for the most
favorable solutions (or the moot favorable alternates of combat
actions).
In the solution of such problems, their formulation and the
selection of criteria depend to a great extent on the conditions
of combat actions and on the results which a commander wishes to
obtain on the basis of the solutions.
Thus, in solving a problem concerning the didtribution of
forces of an air army, the following criterion may be established;
destruction of a maximum number of enemy targets with the use of all
one's forces and with a preaccepted level of losses. In this
connection one may also establish a certain level of damage to be
inflicted on enemy targets, and a certain guarantee that such
damage will be inflicted. Or, for example, one may require that
the expectea amount of damage is inflicted according to a Given
guarantee, and with a minimum use of nuclear ammunition. In both
cases, the degree of damage and the amount of guarant:eed probability
may vary. In the above cited examples, we have cases involving different
criteria.
One should keep in mind that the formulation of a problem and
the selected criteria affect the content and sequence of a solution,
the mathematical apparatus to be used, as well as the time required
for the computer solution of a problem. Therefore, it is very
Important to approach the formulation of a problem and the selection
of criteria very carefully and to prJsent them in such a way as to
leave no room for doubts or ambiguities in the process of the
subsequent mathematical treatment of the problem.
Unfortunately, the authors of the article completely disregarded
this question, when speaking of the preparation of problems.
After formulating the problem and selecting the criteria,
it is ,:..ustomary to develop the operational and tactical algorism of
the problem. This term has recently come to be interpreted as the
strict sequence of actions, logically leading to the receipt of an
answer to a certain question.
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n working out such an algorism, an operational and tactical
specialist makes use of his experience and practical skill acquired
in thc solution of similar problems without the use of a computer.
The preparation of an operational and tactical algorism usually
begins with establishing the number and sequence of stages, which
constitute the component parts of the whole problem. One should
always try to find a sequence enabling one to use the results obtained
in preceding stages as initial data for the solution of subsequent
stages.
The development of an operational and tactical algorism is based
on the widely used method of formalization of processes and phenomena.
The essence of this method consists in breaking up the processes
under investigation into the Greatest possible number of stages and
in discovering the mutual relation and dependence between them. This
study makes it possible to establish the principles of the process as
a whole. If the. study reveals cause-and-effect relationships between
individual stages of the process, and if these relationships can be
expressed formally (in the form of logical rules, mathematical
functions, charts, or tables), the strict sequence of actions obtained
in such a manner will make it possZble to solve problems of a definite
type and may be put into practice with the help of a computer.
It should also be noted that the process of developing an
operational and tactical algorism does not require an obligatory
determination of mathematical functions (although that is desirable).
On the other hand, in preparing such an algorism, one should be
concerned not only with distinguishing stages of the problem and
establishing relationships between them. One should also (whenever
possible) indicate the principal methods for solving these stages.
In order to be able to indicate such methods of solution, the
researcher must compile a list of factors determining the course
and result of the problem's solution, or of individual stage
solutions, to determine which are the most important factors, i.e.,
which of them have a substantial effect on the result of the solution.
As a rule, it is impossible to take all of the factors into con-
sideration. Only an operational and tactical specialist, who has
a good understanding of the substance of the problem to be solved,
can indicate which factors should be considered, and how this should
be done, and also which factors may be disregarded in certain cases.
This is, essentially, what any commander does when he makes a decision
after examining the combat assignment and evaluating the situation.
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The discovered factors may be divided into two groups. The first
group includes factors which have already been evaluated anci considered
in a quantitative sense; for example, the effective strength of troops,
the technical characteristics of weapons of attack and defense, temporary
characteristics, etc. In the case of such factors, it is sufficient
to determine the range of fluctuation of possible values lthin the
limits of a certain problem and the required precision in regard to
such values.
The second group of factors includes those which have not yet
found a direct quantitative expression and are usually evaluated
qualitatively. These include, for example, the political attitude
and morale of the troops, the degree of training, the quality of
leadership, and the organization of control. A machine solution of
problems requires either the finding of possibilities for a
quantitative determination of such factors, or a complete ommission
of such factors. From the above cited enumeration it appears that
these factors are very important and that they should not be omitted.
One of the most important tasks of military researchers is to
discover ways for a quantitative evaluation of the influence of
factors included in the second group. In a number of cases this has
already been done. For example, the indices used in evaluating the
quality of training of bomber crews include the probable deviation
of bomb dispersion for excellent, good, and satisfactory crews, or
the time spent on a bombing run.
The principal method in the solution of a particular problem
consists in discovering the physical essence of the influence of
certain factors on the solution of the problem as a whole, or on the
solution of its individual stages; after that one may seek ways to
determine the quantitative characteristics describing this influence.
For example, in considering questions concerning the motor
transport of ground echelons of units of the air force rear service
area, the condition of roads is influenced mostly-by the weather,
as it may effect changes in the degree of road passability. The
quantitative expression of this influence may be the average speed
of movement of various transport vehicles on various types of roads
and under various weather conditions. On the other hand, in solving
problems concerning aerial photography the ,ame factor, i.e., the
weather, will have the greatest effect on the visibility of targets
and, consequently, will influence the flight altitude and the required
accuracy in approaching the targets. These factors can already be
determined quantitatively.
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Apo:MA focileistasgh2MQVCRIP4iRglaggcW?Ft9A
3gpop0006-o
problem, an understanding of relationships between these stages, and
the consideration of factors influencing the course of the solution,
CPYRGt7111.1 make it possible to construct a block diagram for the solution
of problems.
In our opinion, the authors of the article have not used a very
suitable example of a block diagram for the solution of problems.
The illustrated diagram does not correspond to any operational and
tactical or mathematical algorism?. The operations of addition,
subtraction, division, and others, are elements of a mathematical
algorism (or rather of a program of solution), and the term
"particular problem" applies only to those cases where so-called
complex problems are solved. In our opinion, the block diagram should
include the order and sequence of solution of all stages of a problem,
with all of its possible ramifications determining one out of.
several
several possible ways of the further solution, depending on the
results obtained in the preceding stage.
After developing an operational and tactical algorism of a
problem, the military researcher prepares a description of the
problem according to the following plan: general characteristic
of the problem (purpose, content, acceptible assumptions and
restrictions); formulation of the problem (aim of the solution,
initial data, required result and conditions); suggested or
existing methods of solution (operational and tactical algorism);
temporary characteristics of the problem (requirements concerning
frequency and allowable time for solution by computer);
and explanations (other possible formulations, reference literature,
etc.).
In conclusion, it maybe noted that it has not always been
possible to obtain a mathematical solution which corresponds
completely to the prepared description. In addition, the conditions
assumed during the preparation of a problem may not always correspond
to actual conditions of combat operations; this limits the possibilities
of making use of the problem. An important practical conclusion
maybe drawn from this fact in regard to the use of computers in the
work of staffs. A commander (staff officer), who uses the results
of a computer solution of operational and tactical problems, must
thoroughly understand the essence of these solutions and must know
the type of conditions for which they were dbtained. He must evaluate
each time whether the obtained results are the ultimate ones for a
specific situation, or whether they represent merely an approximate
quantitative basis for making a decision.
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CPYRGHT
APpr?Wittgli??eatirtgnf(td&OPITig IgniimfarireUrUinergvUeUba-Udetailed
knowledge of all factors and conditions which were definitely assumed
in the preparation of a problem. A clear understanding of these
queJtions will help a commander to find the best method of using the
obtained results. During the course of combat operations, certain
conditions may develop which would make it pointless to resort to a
computer solution of any particular problem. This indicates that
questions pertaining to the preparation of operational and tactical
problems for computers are extremely important, since they determine
not only the degree of automation of control processes, but also
the methods in the use of computers by commanders and staff officers.
Therefore, we would like to emphasize once more that the problem
discussed in the article by MYASOYEDOV and SAMIGULIN ls of great
theoretical and practical interest and is greatly in need of a
thorough discussion.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MfLITARY SCIENCE AFTER WORLD WAR II
by Maj Gen S. Kozlov
CPYRGHT
The slightly less than two decodes which have passed since World War
II have been filled with events of tremendous historical significance.
Extending to all fields of social life--political relations, economics,
science and technology, ideology--they could not fail to find expression
also in the military field, and particularly in military knowledge and
science.
The transformation of socialism into a world system and the growth
and strengthening of its vital forces were an expression of the main
laws of our time. In peaceful competition with 'capitalism, socialism
has steadily won one position after another. The relative share of the
socialist system in world production has increased. The rates of develop-
ment of socialist production forces are.steadily outstripping those of
the most developed capitalist countries and have reached an unprecedented
high level. "The successes of socialist production of Soviet science and
technology have enabled us to accomplish a real revolution in the military
field," said N. S. EMBUSHCBEV in his historic report to the 22d Party
Congress.
The policies of the CPSU, the increased defense power of the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries, and the peace-loving forces throughout
the world have created practical conditions for averting a world war, have
changed the balance of forces in the international area in favor of peace
and socialism, and have deprived imperialism of the power to decide the
question of war and peace at its will. Consequently, there has been a
radical change in the conditions for the outbreak of war, the threat of
which continues to exist as a result of the aggressive policies of imperial-
ist circles.
The revolution in the military field has taken place not only in the
field of material means of waging war, but also in the realm of ideas. It
has required a radical review of existing military-theoretical views, a
working out of new principles of military science, and a thorough develop-
ment of all its constituent parts and branches on a new basis.
As a consequence, these scant two decades represent an important stage
in the development of military theory, and deserve careful study.
A generalization of the experience of the retent past, unquestionably,
is of great interest from the point of view of Solving practical problems
of today. Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy has repeatedly pointed out the impor-
tance of work in this direction. In this connection it is appropriate also
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CPYRGHT
App6oyeshi-prawmffowimAn6RNitillg? wig?NnutWusuaruR6uexistence
of the history of military science, that is, the history of military-
theoretical thought, and also the history of military art, the generaliza-
tion of combat experience of the past, is completely in conformity with law
[zakononerno]." (R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY. Vizi1ant37 Stand on Guard of Peace.
Voyenizdat, 1962,p 51)
For the development of military theory, World War II, like any great
war, was a great stage, one which saw great advances in the military field.
It may be said that it completed the development of military art and science
on a certain level, attained by the means of combat and the ways of using
them up to that time. At the end of the war there appeared the first begin-
nings of essentially new possibilities of armed conflict, and proppects of
a completely new character of such conflict were opened up. This was ex-
pressed in the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, the wide use
of radio-electronics, of jet engines in aircraft, and of rockets.
Inasmuch as what was essentially new in the military field did not at
once, with full recognition, break through in the realm of ideas, did not
immediately gain recognition and win firm positions, so all the post-war
years may be distinctly divided into two main periods, sharply differing
in their content and direction, according to the views and tendencies pre-
vailing in them.
In the first post-war period the development of Soviet military theory
predominantly proceeded along the traditional path of generalization and
analysis of the experience of the past war, of working out on this basis
conclusions and recommendations for the conduct of armed conflict by
ordinary means. This period may be considered as 1946-1953.
The second period, lasting till now, had and has as its main content
the recognition of nuclear weapons as the chief means of combat. This
period in turn may be divided into two clearly defined stages. During the
first of these, as there began to be a distinct awareness of the new factors
in armed conflict which has demonstrated new qualitative characteristics
and unprecedented prospects for the future, there occurred an agolizing
reappraisal of the previous experience and, mainly, an adaptation of the
new weapons and means of conflict to the old views and concepts. This
transitional stage encompassed the secon half of the 1950's. Finally,
when the new hadtriumphed completely, there began the stage of wide dis-
semination of the new ideas and an intensive working out of them. Beginning
at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's with the ap-
pearance of such progressive means of delivering nuclear warheads on the
target as strategic rockets, this stage continues to the present time.
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CPY GHT
crura yo w? 1 n le ilts of a journal article it is impossible
to describe and analyze ,completely and deeply enough the exceptionally
rich content of the numerous and various factors in the development of
Soviet military science after World War II. We intend to limit ourselves
to an elementary formuLation of the problem, without pretending to any
exhaustive treatment, or infallibility of our judgements.
* * *
During a great war_all the pre-war principles, recommendations and
conclusions of military doctrine and of the military science which sup-
ports this doctrine are put to serious, severe, practical tests. War
is the great tester of the truth of any military theory. All of Wend
War II had this significance for Soviet military science.
During the war there met in fierce conflict not only various kinds
of armed forces, but also different military doctrines, and through them,
the the theories on the basis of which these forces were prepared, armed
and trained, and carried out combat actions. Unquestionably the result
of the war depended to no small degree, along with other determining
factors, on the state of the military theory of each of the sides, and
on the capability of the military personnel to put into practice their
military knowledge.
The Victory of the Soviet armed forces in a difficult war against
Fascist Germany was a triumph of Soviet military science, the basic
principles of which withstood the test of fire on the battlefields of
a world conflict unprecedented in scope and bitterness.
The eight years after the war were the first complete period in
the development of our military theory. They were concerned with the
generalization of the vast experience of the war and its formulation
into ordered theory.
There is no doubt that all parts and branches of military science
underwent development during the mar. However, the accumulated facts
and first conclusions required scientific analysis, establishment of
the theoretical bases, and being put in final form. The experience
and practice were extremely great and varied -- it all had to be ex-
amined, retaining what had the right to inclusion in theory, and casting
aside what was incidental and not to be regaxded as material for the
future.
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PYRGHT
' CIA-RDP85T00875RQ00300090006-0
ApproveglfdDCARAIMM27/99Rne objective value of this colossal exrerience
was t a great degree undermined by the discredited methodology of
scientific investigation in use at that time, which was born of the Stalin
personality cult. Soviet military science even before the war was pro-
claimed as "Stalinist", and Stalin was considered its creator and founder.
(See, for example, the article by K. Voroshilov, "Stalin and the Build-
ing of the Red Army" Izvestiya, 21 Deceffber 1939) Any further develop-
ment of military theory depended on his pronouncement -- direct or implied.
If there was no opinion from this authority on a certain problem of
military theory, either working it out was not undertaken at all, or, at
best, there was an attempt to fit the problem under one of his remarks,
even if it were. far removed from the subject or made with regard to a com-
pletely different matter.
Nevertheless the vital experience of the war, especially in the sphere
of tactics and operational practice, was so Important and obvious that it
.did not get stowed away in dead dogmas, but forced its way through subjec-
tive, obstacles, and scientific theory got the necessary formulation.
It vas worse with the higher fields of military theory -- the general
bases of military science Erad strategy. In them the views of Stalin
dominated completely.
Immediate sources for the development of military theory in the first
post-war period were the printed issuances which came out during the war,
including regulations, manuals, instructions, directives and orders, other
operational documents, bulletins, periodicals, military-historical ac-
counts compiled on a documentary basis, etc. The personal experience of
generals and officers working in the field of military science, particularly
in military training institutions, helped to understand the materials) to
compile them in proper form and to systematize them, and in enriched them,
made it possible to make useful theoretifal generalizations.
But the books and speeches of Stalin served as the source for the
most extensive generalizations, particularly his book, "The Great Patrio-
tic War of the Soviet Union." On a level with these sources, considered
basic, stood such publications as the biography of I. V. Stalin, a number
of articles published in the periodical press on Stalin's seventieth
birthday, and K. Ye. VOROSHILOV' book, "Stalin and the Armed Forces of
the USSR," which also appeared in connection with this birthday of Stalin.
All of these, and many other materials, published during this period,
were of a plainly apologetic nature, promoted the spread of the cult of
personality, and did much harm to the scientific study of the experience
of the past war.
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AMPPOtetVFOUrrikeitaSeo2002081g9E,SiMeRPMTAQUARP,V09911q1a6A
the letter of Professor RAZIN, and the above-mentioned book of VORWHILOV.
In his answer to Prof. RAZIN, Stalin, in an intolerable manner, tried
to diminish the importance of Lenin as the real founder of Soviet military
science and to ascribe that role to himself. In VOROSHILOV's book there
was tendentiously set forth the role of Stalin in the Soviet military
structure for the whole period of the existence of the Soviet state and
its armed forces. To him was ascribed all initiative and all the successes
achieved in this field. He was called the creator of all the victories
won by the people and the army in the civil war and in World War II, and
the founder of Soviet military science.
The anniversary report devoted to the 30rth anniversary of the Soviet
Army and Navy was also of a certain importance to Soviet military science
in this period. In this report, expressing the ideas of Stalin on pro-
blems of military science, an attelipt was made officially to define in
general form the boundaries of Soviet military science, its subject matter
and basic content.
Without introducing any thing essentially new in the understanding
of the essence of the subject, and repeating in less precise form the
well-known Lenin principle of the determining effect of economic and
morale factors on success in modern war, the report gave 6,round for ex-
cessively widening the interrretation of the subject of military science,
increasing in it the importance of economic and morale factors. It
correspondingly diminished the importance of military art. It should be
noted that still earlier, by the well-known thesis about the constantly
operating factors, the role of military art was reduced to the organizing
capabilities of command personnel. Tn the report it was identified only
with military plans.
This was no accidental formulation, but a strictly though-out con-
cept. A plan is the embodiment of the Intention of the military leader.
Carrying out the plan requires only the organizational capabilities of
those who are to execute it. Thus was increased the importance of the
personality of the "genius leader" and lowered the creative role of the
masses, who were regarded only as "cogs on the wheel" -- executors of what
hae been outlined for them in advance from above.
Pushing into the foreground the problems of the knowledge and consider-
ation of econmtLe and morale potentials (in particular as they were fully
rxpressed, including, as eirThasized the report, the needs and capabilities
of the population) limitic_;ly expanded the subject of military science,
deprived it of its definitiveness, and made it a "science of sciences",
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CPYRGHT
NTO6F Q / 9 : I -RDP85T00875R000300090006-0
AMPUA9Y4WW ARAPrig WItary researchers to the necessary con-
sideration of the economic and morale and political fetors affecting the
course and outcome of the war, defining their real place in military science,
distinguishing as to what in this field military science would study in-
dependently and what it would receive in ready form from other sciences,
using it for its own purposes, this formulation continued the lack of clarity
and the confusion. Military-scienWic thought was directed to the study
of a multitude of problems only indirectly related to armed conflict, as
a result of which there was a dissipation or duplication of effort, and
the most important objects of study of military science either were last
sight of (like strategy, for example), or were regarded as of tertiary
importance.
The one-sidedness to which this formulation led undoubtedly retarded
the development of military theory. This was all the more so because of
the fear of stepping out of the bounds set by the authority and of differing
with his statements and evaluations. From this, dogmatism and the citing
of authority arose and flourished, and for research there was substituted
the explanation of, and finding grounds for, already stated theses.
Stalin's scornful statements about atomic weapons were the reason Irby
our military thought was not directed in time to an objective and far-
seeing evaluation of the new instruments of warfare, to the discovery and
analysis of new phenomena of armed conflict and of the revolution in
military affairs which had developed. Going contrary to obvious facts,
study of the problems of the military art was turned to the embellished
past and confined to the experience of the past war.
In spite of the expansive interpretation by Stalin of the field of
military science and of the whole stifling atmosphere of the period of
the cult of personality, in the first post-war years, by the efforts
of officers and generals who had participated in the war, the theory of
military art did undergo generalization and crystallization, especially
the art of tactics and Operation. Having demonstrated its superiority over
the military art of a strong and skillful enemy, our military art, we may
say, became Oassic for the typical conditions of continental practice
of World Wer II.
Effective means were worked out of carrying on combat by combined-
arms forces, involving all kinds of forces, closely cooperating with each
other, in various terrain conditions, seasons, times of the day, and
weather. The role and place in combat of each of the instruments of war-
fare was clearly lefincd. There developed the possibility of making more
precise the forms of organization of military units, making them correspond
fully to the nature of the battle being carried on by conventional means.
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33
ractical otandards were worked out for the uce of various means of
combat, determined by the need to carry on successful battle against a
strong enemy both on offense and on defense. The theoretical bases were
established for the most rational combat formations, sequence of comthitting
to action troops and weapons, and precise direction of them. All this was
in conformity with the main idea -- ceaselessly to increase the force of
attacks all the way to complete defeat of the enemy.
The combination of the power of massed attacks with maneuver was
recognized asthe heart of tactics. Tactics were basically orientated to
the following: on the offensive -- on the creation of an impregnable,
solid, deep, prepared defense. Thus tactical operations in theory were
aimed at the most difficult conditions of battle, and this was correct.
But as a matter of fact, at the same time there were canonized in tactics
uniform methods of operations, corresponding to the former nature of com-
bat. There is every basis to think that in tactical theory, the experience
of the war underwent predominantly quantitative changes.
As a result of the extensive and varied experience of the war, Soviet
operational art achieved the greatest development. In this, too, was
evidenced the priority of Soviet military science in elaborating this
branch of theory.
Theories of army and front offensive and defensive operations, their
preparation and execution, were precisely formulated. There were defined
the types of operational obuyedineniya, their composition and, size, and
the nature of coordination in operations of various scales. The theoreti-
cal ba61s was established for the various kinds of reserves of the Supreme
High Command as a means of effecting the conduct of operations by branches
Of the armed forces.
There were worked out the general fundamentals of operational art
applicable to operational obllyedineniya of ground troops, and also of other
branches of the armed forces (Air Forces, Navy, and FM Strany Troops),
and the theoretical fundamentals of the operational rear. It may be said
that the theory of the conduct of operations of various scales within the
land and land-sea theaters of operations, on the basis of the armament,
technical equipment, and organization of forces which had developed in
conditions typical of World War II and the immediate post-war years, was
worked out with great completeness and was notable for its flexibility.
And, although it contained some stereotyped patterns in the sequence of
operations and the methods of use of forces and material, it was undoubtedly
a great achievement of Soviet military-scientific thought.
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3)4.
PYRGH?
ApproVadRocReteavitiZORMN:tWErf8ATA8c7r. ?RD nap been noted above,
Q0300090006-0
here the personality cult and the subjective and idealistic aspects of
methodology attending it were particularly felt. It was considered that
cince higher military leadership remains the prerogative of the "genius
leader" it was not subject to elaboration on a lower level.
"An absolute contradicticu arose. The principles of the Marxist-
Leninist method of acquiring knowledge were being violated. These re-
quired that one examine all the inter-relations and dependencies of
phenomena of the same order on an objective, concrete-historical basis.
Stalin himself often brought forth the well known thesis which gives the
decisive role to strategy in relation to the other parts of military art.
This indisputable methodological principle required that the art of tactics
and operations be developed in conformity with the aims and principles of
strategy. At the same time, even for the more or less wide circle of
leaders, strategy remained a secret and taboo subject, the prerogative and
the product of the creative genius of one man. Thus for the subordina-
tion of theparts of the military art there was practically no guiding and
determining source, except the most general directives, often bordering
on abstractions.
Therefore strategic theory was mainly reduced to the study of strate-
gic operations which, as a matter of fact, differed in content from opera-
tions on a front level in only a few, primarily quantitive, respects.
However, the general interest in military science, caused by an aware-
nes' of its importance from the experience of a long and bitter war, could
not die out, even though it was restrained by the personality cult, and,
in response to persistent practical demands, it led to the creative elabora-
tion of problems of military theory. Even in the years of the personality
cult, the Communist Party spirit did not fade, the efforts of the Party
to strengthen the defense of the country did not cease, and fruitful scienti-
fie studies and elaboration of theoretical problems were carried out.
It is important to note that the experience of the war, along with
the interest in military art, also occasioned great interest in the general
bases of our nilitary science. There arose no doubts about the superiority
of our military science to the military theories of imperialism, and in-
quisitive scientific thought wanted to know the sources of this superiority,
wanted to know the principles and leading tenets of our science, and to
have a clear picture of its subject matter and content.
The great attention paid to working out the general bases of our mili-
tary science must be considered a favorable thing in the development of
military science in that period. There was begun again a study of the place
in this science of the problems of economic and morale factors in armed
conflict, to whibh great importance had been assigned in the period of the
formation of Soviet military science (the 1920's).
II ?
? A
? ? ? ? ? ?
??
35
A ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
AloVedcFtergektrase120013/08/09c GLA-FaBinitatOgaiRM3A9Wq;91-?
trem deour] in the final analysis decisive, importance for the outcome
of the war of the econonex structure of the counthry, its political or-
Gprization, theaLLItude of the great masses of the people to the aims of
the war, and 'heir willingness to make unheard-of sacrifices for the sake
of victory.
The decisive role of the leadership and the organizational and
ideological work of the Communist Party is the mightiest factor in making
it a reality.
In 1951 the problem of the place of the theory of military economics
in military science underwent wide discussion. This problem was rightly
presented, but to this day it is one of those least elaborated in theory.
The point of view presented in the discussion was that military science
could not be limited to a consideration only of the general laws of develop-
ment of socialist and capitalibt economics. Military science must know
the operation of these laws in their concrete expression under war condi-
tions, for only then can it correctly consider the economic capabilities
both of its own country and that of the enemy. Thus there arises the
necessity of establishing within military science a branch of knowledge
which would especially study the economic capabilities of the country as
applied to carrying out war-time tasks. Such a branch might became "the
theory of. military economics," as a constituent part of military science,
along with the theory of military art and the theory of the moral factor.'
This statement was received not without a fundamental clash of opin-
ions. No one really denied that military science had to concern itself
with problems of military economics or "the theory of the economic sup-
port of the conduct of the war," as it was proposed to call it. Opinions
differed on the matter of classification. Some asserted that it was in-
correct to insist on an independent theory of military economics, since
strategy was concerned with this question. Others said that this was the
concern of military geography. There was also the opinion that the
problem in its general formulation was studied in the bases of Soviet mili-
tary science, and indirectly in the respective parts and branches of mili-
tary theory.
The discussion, although it culminated in the publication in the
journal Voyennaya Mysl' of an article summarizing its results, neverthe-
less produced no practical results. However, it certainly promoted a
more correct picture of the subject matter of military science and the
range of tasks to be taken up next.
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PYRGHT
.851:00875R00030Q090006-0
ApprOlLYWO&Fed@g&099M3/WIS*FWnoma.cs there aeveloped a discus-
sion o: military geography. It was, on the one hand, a continuation of
the preceding, and on the other, the expression of a desire to define
accurately the bounds of military science, its subject and content.
The discussion of military geography was of positive value. It
helped to outline correctly the boundaries of this discipline and to
clarify its place in the system of military science. Attempts of some
scholars to gain recognition for the right of military geography to be
concerned with the theory of the economic support of the conduct of the
war rejected in the course of the discussions. Military geography was
correctly defined as that branch of military science which studies the
current level of the political, economic, natural, and military capabili-
ties and conditions of various countries, theaters of military operations,
and individual regions from the point of view of view of their effect on
the preparation for and carrying out of armed conflict.
In this same period there was first presented (in 1952) the problem
of the role and place of the mility-technical sciences in the system
of military fields of knowledge. This drew the attention of the military-
scientific community to a new, emeiting factor which is imperiously thrust-
ing itself into the subject of military science and lawfully expanding
its content.
There was also discussion, in passing, of Soviet military pedagogy,
which disclosed the necessity of providing a more solid scientific base
for the practice of educational work and the training of the armed forces.
Unfortunately this useful discussion was not carried to the end, because
some military leaders incorrectly (in our opinion) denied the existence
of such an independent theory as military pedagogy, and limited it just
to the bounds of methodology.
In 1953 a discussion of the nature of the laws of military science
arose in the military press.
It is easy to see that this question, presented for discussion, had
a most direct relation to the subject of military science and its general
theory, for the very existence of military science is justified only if,
in the field of the phenomena studied by it, laws operate. The discussion
produced little that was useful, for many of the speeches bore the stomp
Of scholasticism Or dogmatism, proceeding not from experience or practice,
but from quotations. For example, by analogy with the presentation of
the problem of the laws of economic development, the existence of a general
law of military science was considered self-evident, and it was only necessary
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to44HiRtggeFIli. -1:Las tacy were unable to do. However, a positive ef-
G_Mcct of the discussion was that there was a confirmation of the interest
in the philosophical problems of military science, the need for a pro-
found elaboration of its content, and a still more careful study of the
nature of armed conflict and of the laws pertaining to it.
The discussion of the subject and content; of Soviet military science,
published in Voyennaya aroused great interest. This discussion arose
on the basis of an article by four authors published in this journal. With
no pretense to priority or infallibility of their views, the authors under-
took to summarize and give some results of the numerous discussions which
in various forms had taken place on this subject during the post-war period.
An attempt was made in the article to give a definition of the subject of
military science. It was noted that war, as a multiform social-historical
phenomenon, occupied the attention of many sciences: social-political,
economic, historical, and others. Military science cannot and ought not
try to encompass all aspects of -uch a complex phenomenon as war. It an-
alyses the means by which war is waged, the conditions in which it takes
place and which affect its course and results. Based on the Marxist-Lenin-
ist teaching about war, which reveals its social-historical nature and the
relationship to it of classes and states, as on an ideological-theoretical
basis, military science studies the specific expression of war, arned con-
flict, using within necessary limits the achievements of all other sciences.
However, the task of military science is not limited just to the investiga-
tion of the methods and forms of conducting armed conflict. It analyzes
the means by which the war is waged, and the conditions in which it takes
place and which affect its progress and results. Military science studies
the historical experience of armed conflict, predicts its possible nature
in the future, and reveals the laws of armed conflict which arise in var-
ious historical conditions and depend on the effect of various factors.
So we cannot reduce military science just to the theory of military art.
Its content embraces a number of theories, in their totality and inter-
relationships reflecting all the aspects of military affairs of armed
conflict. In its general form, military science is the theory of military
affairs.
Military science must not be regarded as a conglomeration of military
knowledge. It is an orderly system of fields of knowledge relating to
armed conflict. In this system there are bases common for all its con-
stituent disciplines -- a general theory, or, -s M. V. Frunze said, a
general part of military theory (H. V. Frunze. Selected Works, Voyenizdat,
1951, p. 159); there are the principal parts -- the theory of military
art, as it has come to be called, consisting of strategy, the art of
operations, and tactics; and there are the auxiliary derivative and support-
ing disciplines -- military history, the theory of training and education,
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CPYRG
Appramedf calitit6?A.30W0?4.0.6igif"RPARTA91?-7/5R?)9,M9-2P.9?Rn?6-?
important
and continually developing part of military science is the group of military-
technical and special military sciences which reflect the tremendous
T qualitative rise and the great variety of the instruments of war, equipment
and armament.
Such a complete, detailed and inter-related representation of military
science should have helped military cadres correctly define the role of
military theory in the preparation, instruction and training of troops,
the securing of combat capability and a high degree of combat readiness
of troops, for the sake of successful carrying out of military operations
on all levels.
During the discussions many useful and interesting opinions were ex-
pressed which promoted a more correct and accurate definition of the sub-
meet and content of military science, and at the same time give evidence
of the still inadequate working out of a number of problems of military
theory.
After the death of Stalin, changes in military-scientific methodology
and military-theoretical thought did not take place at once. The correct
approach to overcoming the consequences of the personality cult was not
found immediately, and military scientific work did not at one sweep free
itself from methodological errors. The spirit of quotation, of dogmatism,
continued by inertia to dominate the first year in scientific work. It
required the life-giving influence of the 22nd Party Congress to find the
necessary ways and methods by which to cleanse military science of every-
thing left deposited by the years of the personality cult.
However, already in 1954 steps were taken for a complete restoration
of Lenist norms and methodology of scientific acquisition of knowledge.
Articles 'appeared which correctly evaluated the role of Lenin and of the
Lenin theoretical heritage as the basic stroehouse of ideas forming the
basis of Soviet military science.
There began the second post-war period of development of Soviet
military science (1954 - 1960). The first, but constantly more decisive
steps were taken toward trying to understand the new phenomena of arm
conflict, connected with the appearance and furious development of nu,'
weapons.
At first there was a purely quantitative evaluation of the new means
of conflict. They basically tried to regard them as some new quantitative
expression of the chief factor in armed conflict -- fire power. Although
the new directions in the main correctly orientated military practice to
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1MMOMMEmmemmeL
hiUU8tbK001/3UMUUUti-0
UAW MitarlyCCMittifiteft.2iiiziOalgighcRWP P-une new weapons, tnelr was
an attempt to adapt them to the established methods and forms of carrying
out military operations, which Soviet theory only recently before that had
so well worked out, based on the experience of the recently ended war.
Then gradually theory began to work out more precisely and in a more well-
grounded manner the principles for carrying out armed conflict using
weapons of mass destruction. As we became more acquainted with the pro-
perties of the new weapon, with the quantities of it available, and with
the improvements in methods of delivering it to the target, the methodn
,
of combat operations became more decisive and original. The purely J
quantitative considerations, which accompanied the first introduction Of
the new weapons, began to acquire a more and more clearly expressed
qualitative nature.
The practical situation confronted the researchers with a multitude
of new, important and basic problems, for it was not possible to draw
from previous experience any conclusions with regard to the use of the
completely new means Of warfare.
Theory defined the radical change in the nature of war which resulted
from the revolution in military affairs, which revolution in turn re-
sulted from intensive scientific and technical progress and from the
rapid development of the forces of production.
The bold and thorough exposure by the party of the personality cult,
naturally provided an immediate basis for questioning the infallibility
of the many theoretical principles which had been put forth during that
time, the inadequate scientific ground for which had been felt from the
very beginning.
One of the serious problems which for a long time occupied the atten-
tion of military researchers, and especially those writing for popular
consuiption was the thesis of the permanently operating factors which
decide the outcome of a war. Formulated during World War II, in the main
it conformed to the concrete historical conditions, and, not containing
anything essentially new in comparison with the basic ideas of Lenin,
it was disseminated as some kind of a Stalin discovery, having a univer-
sal character and not limited to any one period of history. To this
thesis were devoted many studies, articles and monographs, which basically
did not go beyond interpreting it and trying to elevate it to a basic law
determining the course and outcome of any war. Such exaggerated evaluation
of this theoretical position led to one-sided conclusions, to expanding
the subject of military science and lowering the place and importance in
it of military art.
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APProvgare.WEVRI?StrghrtIVEMIP841eSitoNn iNSP54131860,YRPtic.Pe Pro-
crustean bed of a single formula made it possible to seek anew to under-
stand all the multiform conditions and factors affecting armed conflict.
T Soviet military science flexibly and creatively solved this problem on ,
the basis of painstaking study of the totality of the real situation, con-
sidering and anticipating with the necessary completeness everything that
contributes to the attainment of victory in a war against a strong enemy.
The chief importance of the 22nd Party Congress was not just that
its favorable influence made possible the restoration of Marxist-Leninist
methodology of military knowledge, although this was very necessary and
important. The main thing was that the influence of the congress aroused
the creative activity of the masses and fostered the bold posing and
working out of a multitude of new problems connected with using the Lein
military heritage, and concerning the general bases of Soviet military
science, particular those new problems brought into being by the rapidly
advanced revolution in military affairs.
It may be asserted that the main task of Soviet military science in
this period is seeking to understand and to provide the theoretical basis
for one of the greatest revolutions in military affairs, a revolution of
which we are contemporaries. Discovering the sources, the reasons, and
the determining conditions of this revolution, our military science, sup-
proting firm Marxist principles, has been proceeding from an analysis of
the level attained in the development of the forces of production, of
scientific and technical process, of the main characteristics of the his-
torical epoch of the direction of politics and of the balance of forces
in the international arena. It has established that the basis of the
revolution in the military filed has been the unprecedented rise in the
level of the forces of production. The furious pace of scientific and
technical progress, accompanying the transformation of society, has made
possible the creation in sufficient quantities of various, essentially new,
instruments of warfare, of a new weapon, distinguished by unheard-of ef-
fectiveness and special qualitative characteristics unlike anything which
ever existed before in this field. All the newest achievements of science
and technology are being rapidly and extensively incorporated in the arming
of armies and navies, and are being used by imperialism in the development
of an arms race unprecedented in the scope and quality of instruments of
war. The gap between scientific and technical discoveries and their ap-
plication in military affairs is becoming ever less and less.
These objective material conditions were necessary preliminaries Zor
the revolutionary transformation of Soviet Military affairs in the face
of the threat of imperialist aggression; Forcdd to enter into competition
with imperialism in the quality and quantity of armament, the socialist
state, relying on its historical advantage, has been able to attain
superiority in this regard. The Central Committee of the Communist Party
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43.nArtpmmediEorSialspargh2PQM41119doCtAsKPIMURFAM.N3N9WMAnds
Eliot' development in this field, have undertaken bold and decisive measures
for a radical improvement of Soviet military organization. Soviet science
and industry have provided our armed forces with the most powerful in-,,,
struments of war -- nuclear weapons of various TNT-equivalents.
At first the only means of applying the nuclear weapon to the target
was the aerial bomb, and the means of delivering it, the bombing plane.
At this stage of development of the new instruments of war, their unusual,
special qualities were not yet fully recognized. They were to a certain
degree regarded as some.kind of quantitative modification of means of
conflict from the air.
The new quality of nuclear weapons of mass destruction became fully
evident when, in addition to the nuclear bomb, there was created in suf-
ficient quantity and high quality the new powerful means of its delivery
to the target -- rockets, especially long-range ballistic rockets.
Rockets of various types, ranges and purposes -- operational-teactical
and strategic (inter-continental and global) -- in combination with nuclear
warheads have become precisely the means which have radically transformed
conventional means and methods of armed conflict. The whole character of
war is changing -- the role and importance in it of branches of armed forces,
the sequence of operations, the possibility of achieving strategic results
deciding the outcome of the war. It has been necessary to reevalwte f4,tors
in the progress of the war. The importance of the morale factor has Lrnii:i
to a tremendous degree.
Regarding, from the position of Marxiam dialectics, moder war as.a
single process, Soviet military science has repudiated the unfounded at-
tempts to make the subjects "naval warfare" 'and "air warfare" independent,
and consequently to developme along with military science a "naval military
!*
science" and "air military science".
Discarded also was the attempt to regard strategy as something separate
with regard to branches of armed forces involved. There was firmly estiab-
lished the concept of strategy as a single theory, by which are guided all
the armed forces within the limits of armed conflict jointly conductediml.
subordinated to common goals.
In the realm of military art, a new relationship has been desiL;11,
between the traditional methods of carrying on armed conflict: the .clf:Con-
sive and the defensive. There have arisen new, previously unknown pheno-
mena of armed conflict -- strategic nuclear strikes, rightfully assuming
their place in the framework of armed conflict as a new category.
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YRGHT
pprov ease us c ence s revea e a cse new phenomena of armed
conflict, has defined the essence of the deep revolutionary processes which
are taking place in military affairs, and has studied and evaluated the
conditions in which they arise in response to laws. As a result it has
been able to give an orderly, scientifically-grounded presentation of the
character of modern war, depending) unlike the past, not so much just on
the experience of past wars, as on scientific prediction of a possible
future war.
In the second post-war period of development, Soviet military thecly
was enriched by new works in all its branches. A great role in this was
played by the military press and scientific and technical journals which
published original and useful studies by many authors) the number of which
is steadily growing. Great monographs were produced on important problems
of military theory, including those on strategy. This part of military
science, like military history) which had been especially harmed by the
personality cult has been completely freed from its consequences. Mere
have been published many works which have completely restored the histdri-
cal truth with regard to the civil war and Great Patriotic War. Reader:,
have received volumes completing the description of the history of the
civil war, and a number of monographs correcting mistakes allowed in the
elucidation of military events of 1917-1920. There were restored to
their importance the works of a number of Soviet military leaders who had
been victims of unfounded repression in the period of the personality
cult. The basic six-volume work, "The History of the Great Patriotic War
of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945," was published in which with great complete-
ness, scientific objectivity, and party spirit the causes, course, and
results of this great achievement of the Soviet people are studied. There
have been published a number of other substantial works on the history, of
this war.
The October nen= of the C ntral Committee of the CPSU was of grOlt
importance in this period for strengenthing the power of our armed forces.
The Plenum restored the Leninist party principles of leadership of the
Army and Navy, violated by the former Minister of Defense, ZHUKOV, who
followed a line of curtailing the work of party organizations, political
organs, and Military Councils and elminating the leadership and control
over the Armed Forces by the party, its Central Committee, and the
government. Separating the Armed Forces from party leadership and in-
fluence) ZHUKOV also did irreparable harm to the development of military
theory. The latter was orientated to narrow professionalism, apolitical-
nets and subjectivism. The Plenum resolutely condemned and rejected th!
cult of his own personality implanted by ZHUKOV.
The extensive and many-sided theoretical development of problems of
military science in the pctiod after the 20th Congress and up to 1960,
92' 1361Y5FRIM136669061N3Q6 wa?
AnclgOVIWA N9An,e 1;06AKW
AP
14111WITdbeirEgrtil ary fie1r9thetnys s0 of the new phenomena of
arnegiaAlateraio fk Oita' 201003/WP C FAIR D PRZTOO 8176 R00080003000660(:or,y
with'ehE use of new methods of research on the basis of mathematics Itnd
cybernetics, made it possible to predict scientifically the nature of u
future war. A scientific and technical basis was established for modern
Soviet military doctrine, which was called upon to change the doctrine
which was in effect before that, which had depended on the experience of
two world wars waged by the ordinary instruments of warfare of the first
half of the 20th century. Developed on the basis of the guiding directivn
of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and of the data of mili?
tary science, the doctrine includes a comprehensive evaluation of the char-
acter of modern war, i.e., of its social-political and military-technical
essence, sets forth the principles of military structuring, and recommends ,
the basic means of conducting warfare with consideration of its new phenomena.
Just what are these new phenomena of warfare, the rise of which is
reflected objectively by the revolution in military affairs, in the prac-
tices of war -- phenomena which are the primary subject of the study of
military science?
It is generally recognized that the essence of these new phenomena
consists in the fact that the use of the nuclear weapon, especially with
the aid of strategic rockets, gives war an unprecedented destructive
character and inter-continental scope, and favors the conduct of a swift-
moving war, which, depending on the conditions of its origin) however,
may also be protracted.
The destructive nature of the war is determined by the power of the
basic instrument of warfare, the nuclear weapon, especially in ,combination.
with other potential means of mass destruction -- chemical and bacteriologi-
cal weapons, which the imperialist aggressors propose to use extensively.'
In combination with the practically unlimited range of the chief
means of delivering these charges to their targets -- intercontinental
rockets -- the massed use of nuclear weapons is capable in an extraordin-
arily short time of putting out the war any enemy by the destruction
not only of his main forces on land, air and sea, but also of targets clin
in his deepest rear. All this is essentially changing the whole character
of war, which, as N. S. KHRUSHCHEV has pointed out, has become something
quite different, and is waged quite differently, from what It used to be.
Strikes by strategic rocket troops, in combination with strikes by
long range aircraft and rocket-launching submarines will be basic for
the course and outcome of a nuclear-rocket war, a war in which the princi
pal means of destruction will be nuclear weapons, and the main means of
delivering them to targets, rockets of various types and purposes -- this
under conditions of daily combat activity of PVO troops, faithfully protect
Ing the main instruments of warfare, groups of troops, and important tarot:.
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ARP riclitPcifect r tIPAs RAW 09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R0003.00090006-0
?....,PYroltravto.
icico f the e air. Tne role of othr
types or armed forces will consist mainly of carrying out military ol)or-
tiono of various scaleu, aimed at taking advantage of an completing the
results achieved by the strategic attacks, and also at breaking up) ward-
ing off and weakening such attacks by the enemy.
By virtue of this, the sequence, relative subordination and interd-
pendence of military operations of various scales is changing, as in the
inter-relationship of types of operations.
Different from all past wars, there has appeared the possibility of
achieving a strategic result) the goal of the war, not by a sequence of
gradually accumulated tactical and operational successes, but mainly by
direct strategic attacks. In conditions of such a war, it is difficult
to imagine the possibility of conducting a defense on a strategic scale
in the principal theaters of military operations. In war) it appears,
meeting offensive operations of sides will predominate.
In such a war the economic capabilities of the country will be demon-
strated mainly in the period preceding the war, in preparation for it, anC,.
to a less degree in the course of the armed conflict) since the latter will
most probably be of short duration and do destructive that industry will
prove to be limited in its capabilities of affecting the course of milit6.ry
operations, at least in the beginning period of the war. In case of a
protracted war, the economic factor will take on an importance still
greater than formerly) since the terrific destruction caused by nuclear
attacks will require great efforts for the restoration of the military-
economic potential) and only an economically very powerful country will
prepared for waging modern war will be able to cope with such a task.
The morale potential in such a war should possess special strength
and elasticity, for the psychology, will, and state of mind ,)f the
people will subjected to unheard-of trials throughout the whole war, anC,
particularly in its beginning period.
In general, the nature of such a war will be such that the bnni.n;.:
period, and the result of the military operations carried out then, will
be of the greatest importance for its outcome.
Having revealed and substantJated the typical characteristics an.
the laws of nuclear-rocket war, military science has established the ncc:n-
sary theoretical base for modern Soviet military doctrine, on the basin
of which there is taking place further improvement of the Soviet military
structure.
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CPYR
Annrriici
CICIMCCI
Acceptance for guidance of the modern military doctrine, the basic
(31-grinciples of which were set forth by N. S. KHRUSIICHEV at the Fourth
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1960, meant moving on to the
next stage of the second period of the post-war development of Soviet
military science, which is continuing at the present time.
The 22nd Congress of the CPSU, which adopted the new program of the
Party, was of inestimable importance in the development of Soviet mili-
tary science.
By the 22nd Congress the radical reorganization of the Soviet Armed
Forces had been largely completed, as a result of which their power and
combat readiness had immeasurably increased.
The Leninist Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by Nikita Sergeye-
vich KERUSHCHEVI played a leading and organizing role in the reorgan-
ization of the Armed Forces. The correct military-technical policies of
the Central Committee, the successes of industry, the outstanding achieve-
ments of Soviet science and technology have made it possible, in a
relativel short time, to establish a powerful, qualitatively new, material
base for arming the Army and Navy with modern military equipment, especially
rockets.
The 22nd Congress summed up the results of the military build-up
during the preceding years. The program of the CPSU deeply revealed
the traits and characteristics of the epor.th we are living in, the social-
political essence of modern wars, their typical features. The principles
of the program, as Marsu MALINOVSKIY Minister, of Defense, noted in his
speech to the Congress, are of essential importance for the correct de-
termination of the paths of our military structuring and the solution
of problems connected with preparing the people and the army for the deform
of the docialist Fatherland.
In the resolutions of the 22nd Congress the role of science was
emphasized; it is now becoming a decisive factor in the growth of indus-
trial power.
The principle also points to the growth in the role of military scienc,
the necessity of still closer contacts of it with other sciences, especi-
ally the technical ones, and the use by it of the most modern methods of
research on the basis of mathematics and electronic computer technology.
In his work devoted to the problems and tasks of modern military struc-
tureing in the USSR, "Vigilantly Stand on Guard of .Peace," Mar SU R. Ya.
MALINOVSKIY, Minister of Defense USSR on the basis of the directives of
the party set forth in N. S. KHRUSHCHEV's report to the Fourth Session of
the Supreme Soviet, described modern Soviet military doctrine, showed the
role of military science in its formation, and emphasized the close
? ? ii? SSSSSSS
Ill
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connection between military matters and ocientifiqund technical progress.
"J.n setting forth the characteristics of the Soviet Armed Forces in the
present stage," ho wrote, "it should be noted that their power depends.
upon achieving an advanced military science."
5R0003000911 s ? s
The basic object of study of military science is armed conflict, since
it represents the specific character of war. At the same time, certainly,
it cannot ignore political, economic, geographic, national, and other fac-
tors which have a great effect on armed conflict. It considers and evau-
ates them in the interests of victory over the enemy. "Therefore on'
should refrain from an expansive interpretation of the subject of milit-ry
science. This comes from under-evaluating its specific field of interest.
At the same time military science must not be permitted to ignore the data
of other sciences, which help to understand more deeply the political
essence of war and the conditions in which armed conflict is conducted."
Along with this one important feature of military science was empha-
sized whch occupies a border-line position between the social and the
technica sciences. To it belong some features of both fields of human
knowledge.
Military science is of tremendous importance for the combat-readins
of the armed forces. N w it is unthinkable to direct troops, to instrue,
and train them, without scientific knowledge, or contrary to science. and
the further military affairs are developed, the greater will be the role
of scientific theory, which makes generalizations from experience and
illumines the way for practice.
Having performed its assigned role in the preparation of doctrine,
military science, under conditions of putting this doctrine into
practice, continues to develop in two directions. On the one hand it
is called upon to provide scientific grounds for, and more deeply develop
the formulated demands of doctrine, and assure its effectiveness. On
the other hand, it must not limit its research and development just within
the framework of existing doctrine, but look ahead into the future far
enough so that no new phenomenon in military affairs, no trend in its
development, will escape from its field of vision. As such new qualitative
changes accumulate as require changes in doctrinal views, science presents
its recommendations.
While recognizing as a basis fdr the conclusions of military science
that the most probable future war will be a world nuclear-rocket war,
our doctrine, in complete conformity with the conclusions of military
science, does not ignor other methods of waging war which may arise both
within the framework of a nuclear war as well as in a war in which
nuclear weapons are not used.
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....... ta,:reuamirttn..1.1,?.va
VP VT., P Vo V 0 i VII VII IVIS
le i i.ary sc once s a cOns-an y dove oping system of rcJ,unlL knowledge about military matters, about armed conflict. The need VGV
it will not decrease until that day when mankind is freed from the threat
of war. So long as this danger actually exists from the side of imperial-
ism, the Soviet state is compelled to improve its Armed Forces, keeping
them in full readiness for a crushing repulse of any aggressor if he
dares to encroach on the peaceful, creative work of the peoples who arc
building socialism and the communist society.
In this connection) our military science continues to face great,
varied and responsible tasks, put forth by the policies of the CPSU and
the Soviet government, by the whole course of historical development)
and by the difficult problems presented by the continuing revolution in
military affairs.
These tasks in general form are defined by the pr)gram of the CPSU,
which oblige the Armed Forces of the USSR "to display unabating vigilance
with regard to the aggressive schemes of the enemies of peace, to be
always on guard of peaceful labor, in constant readiness for armed de-
Cense of their Fatherland." The CPSU considers it necessary to mainthla
the defensive power of the Soviet state, its Armed Forces, on LI 1J%el ,11Leh
,ill assure a decisive and complete defeat of any enemy which dL:rs
crouch upon the Soviet Fatherland. The keystone of the military structure
Ls the leadership of the A med. Forces b,0 the Communist Party, the strengthen-
ing of the role of the party organizations in the Army-and Navy. The Party
does everything so that the Soviet Armed Forces maybe a precise and smooth-
running organism, may possess the most modern means of protecting the
Fatherland) may have a high quality of organization and discipline, and
may perform its tasks in an exemplary manner.
The Party is tirelessly concerned with the development of whole-
hearted devotion to the cause of communism on the part of the command,
ooliticul and technical cadres of the Army and Navy. "It considers it
necessary," announces the program, "that the command personnel have a
Cirm mastery of Nbrxist-Leninist theory, have a high level of military-
technical training, and meet all the requirements of modern military
theory and practice."
Military theory never loses sight of the problem of the role of the
commander, the military leader, in conditions of modern war. Our science,
having successfully overcome the consequences of the personality cult,
is singularly correctly solving this problem on the basis of Marxist-
L ninist theory. Guided by the views of the Communist Party) our military
science attaches great importance to the leaders, whose xole, especially
in military matters, must not be under-estimated. Precise directives on
this matter are given by the materials of the 22nd Party Congress. "The
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authority of the party officials, of its leading figures, is a great pop-
T session of the party. While rejecting the personality cult, we by no
means put aside the problem of developing leading figures of the party
and strengthening their authority. What is all amounts to is that the
party leaders have moved up from the party masses by virtue of their
talents, their political and administrative qualities, and have been
closely connected with the communists and with the people. This was
the way the formation of party leaders operated during the life of Lenin.
And so it should be now." This principle applies fully also to the mill-
twey leaders of the Armed Forces of the socialist state, who are nomin-
ated by the party and worthy of the trust of the people and the government
-- true and devoted sons of the socialist Fatherland.
Based on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war, which Is developing
and being enriched as an ideological-theoretical foundation on the great
wealth of Leninist fundamental ideas in it, on the achievements of
advanced science and technology and on the vast historical experience
and practice of military organization, progressive Soviet military science,
personified by a great army of military scholars and practical workers
in military affairs, is responsibly fulfilling its duty to the Soviet
Armed Forces.
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ThORKRIM FlagEMseo2iRr000{0?y/OBL:mColil,-RtpePNTA1875R0003
Armed Forces by Engr-Col
V.
CPYR=MEVUH
Radical changes in the nature of modern warfare brought about by
the appearance of nuclear-rocket weapons required the creation of a
suitable armed forces control system based on the broad use of auto-
mated system. In the first stages of development, these systems were
primarily adopted into a control system for the separate branches of
the armed forces -- the air defense forces, the air forces, the navy,
and the ground forces. This, however, proved to be inadequate for the
present time. Time magazine pointed out that "the armed forces control
system was designed in such a way that during a general war it might prove
to be in the position of a chicken with its head cut off. In the event
its mind and nervous system are destroyed, its muscles with start to
twitch convulsively and uncontrollably." (Time, 28 December 1962)
The following shortcomings of the present armed forces control
system were noted in the US press. First, it is not automated enough,
which does not allow the government to react quickly to changes in the
international situation. Second, it does not have reserve command posts
and does not define a precise order for transferring functions when one
control organ or another is destroyed. Third, the control organs are
inadequately protected against weapons of mass destruction and cannot
provide contrinuous control in conditions of great destruction, radio-
active contamination, or under the actions of chemical and biological
weapons. Fourt, the control system involves separate lines of communi-
cation belonging to private companies, various institutions, and branches
of the armed forces. The communications lines and installations are
vulnerable and are not protected against nuclear strikes. Radio links
are inadequately protected from interference and do not meet security
requirements. The system does not provide for proper control over
nuclear weapons, which would exclude the possibility of accidental
or ill-intentioned use of them without the sanction of the supreme command.
AS a whole the present control system does not ensure unified control
of all branches of the armed forces, either in peacetime or wartime. That
is why it became necessary to create a centralized automatic control system
which would guarantee continuous control of the entire military machine,
even in the event its separate elements are put out of action.
This was especially emphasized by professor 0. Morgenstern of Princeton
University, who is a US Department of Defense consultant. In the January
1963 issue of Fortune magazine, he wrote that for the US at the present time
there is no more important problem than that of creating an accurate
structure of command and control of the armed farces and the government.
"It is absolutely necessary," he declared, "for us to be sure that in
talnar=babg 111WitareA6g4gkegAMOcOlgRIC/DOMS56.76-o
50
CPYRGHT
Approved For Ra lease 2000/nRinci
Arm- : so: resoliagasigelliele
If we do not provide a satisfactory control system, we will be deprived of
the possibility of undertaking the optimum political action in time of crisis,
which could affect the very existence of the nation." US military leaders
express similar thoughts.
Considering the importance of this problem, the Secretary of Defense
submitted a special report to the government on the necessity of developing
a unified automated system of control of all the armed forces on a national
scale. Together with this, he recommended a radical reorganization of the
existing control system.
On the basis of this, in 1962 the decision was made to develop the sys-
tem which became known as the National Military Command System (NMCS).
(See diagram.)
The development of technical means of control, particularly means of
communication and computers; accumulated experience in developing large
automated systems for controlling troops, weapons, and combat equipment;
and especially systems for controlling strategic forces, weapons of
attack, the combat actions of ship soyedineniya, and active air defense
systems with the successful application of computers for resolving special
problems in the Department of Defense and other government agencies were
the main prerequisites which made it possible to create this system.
The armed forces control system of the country, as the Secretary of
defense pointed out in the report, will be used in the interests of
the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
their deputies and aids.
The most important elements of the NMCS system
posts, the centers for processing data, the apparat
ligence information, and the lines for transmitting
this system with joint and special commands.
will be the command
us for collecting intel-
the data connecting
The main command post is planned for location in the Pentagon. It
is already completely staffed withpersonnel ard will carry out command
functions in peacetime and in periods of limited and general war until
a higher authority considers it necessary to transfer control to the
reserve posts of this system, or to any other center. For this purpose,
the creation of three reserve posts is foreseen, one of which is located
on a renovated turbojet aircraft -- the KC-135 tanker, and is Already
in operation. The second reserve post is being built on board the heavy
cruiser North Hampton, and the third in Fort Ritchie.
Lines for transmitting data to the joint and special commands and
to services and administrations of the Department of Defense are being built
on the principle of communication from above to below. They must provide
AftilrakildcPWR4fesi4On2SIORNA94 (fgrRigit86TM4VIA5R000300490:00:64trategic
means of delivering nuclear warhead to target. i(glectronick. April 1961)
The NMCS has also been entrusted with the task of providing an emergency
government line of communication in the event the civilian system for control
of the country goes out of operation.
"Contracts have already been concluded for developing the apparatus of
the NMCS system. Appropriations for its realization were foreseen in
the budget for the 1964-1965 fiscal year. The program is planned for reali-
zation in 3-5 years. Approximately 300-305 million dollars will be
required for this.
In view of the complexity of this program, realization of it will
be accomplished gradually. At first, this system will provide for col-
lection and display of data on the dispositions, degrees of readiness, and
combat capabilities of the armed forces of the US, its allies, the neutral
countries, and the enemy, This sane system will report data on the condi-
tions of the US armament, including the number, type, and disposition of
it, and also information on the world military-political situation.
In developing the NMCS system, it is supposed that a high degree of
standardization of various blocks and assemblies le Abe achieved. For
unification of various sub-systems, special standard transitional equipment
is being developed. It will make it possible to use any of the present
systems of data display from any computer. Use of the transitional equipment
will make it possible to include already existing sub-systems in the projected
system without revising the whole complex.
In planning the system they are trying to avoid those shortcomings
which appeared in the creation of the well-known Sage air defense system.
After this complex and expensive system was put into operation, it turned
out that the operators could not receive all the information they needed
from it.
The NMCS system is supposed to be built with such calculation that
it will be able to adapt automatically to unforeseen requirements as
they appear. It can be revised while in operation.
The system of transmitting wartime data will be based mainly on
the recently created unified global communications system of the US
armed forces. It includes the Stracom strategic communications system,
supported by communications centers in Fort Dietrich, Matyland, which is
expected to .accomplish automatic communication of 275,000 telegrams a
within the US. Two other communications centers in Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, and Camp David, California, will provide a volume of 200,000
reports a day.
The system also includes the USAF global communications network 'being
developed by Project 14801.0 connecting 80 command posts (60 in the US and
20 overseas). It will inAoo l ude the copirmini
era cf6ittriOnlio66MOYaoti. -o
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defense forces -- NORAD, counting nearly 6o million channel miles and
connecting NORAD bases in the US and Canada, and the BMEWS system with
its networks stretching from Alaska to England, and a nuMber of other
networks.
To increase the reliability of international communications, the
global system in the nearest future is supposed to be augmented with
ml,tichanneled lines of communication using artificial earth satellites.
The first experimental launchings of communications satellites Echo,
Courier, Syncom, Relay, and telstar, despite a number of difficulties,
proved the feasibility of their use for military communications.
The global communications system will cooperate closely with a
special network of government establishment serving 8,000 establishments
in 1,750 US cities and with the largest private lines of communication,
thus providing an outlet to civilian communications networks, leasing
a number of lines, and developing communications in strategic directions
in the interests of the US armed forces.
Control and construction of the military communications system
has been entrusted to the Defense Communications Agency. The center
of control of this system is located close to Washington. It permits
viewing signal panel and makes it possible to control them by means
of the M-200". computer. This network will service all branches and arms
of the armed forces and services of the Department of Defense. It
is supported by four basic communications centers in Europe, Alaska,
the Hawaiian Islands, and the US. Four IBM-1410 computers are being
installed in these centers for controlling the switching of channels.
The main centers will united nearly 6,5000 separate lines of communication
in 70 countries, being joined by 79 main transducer centers'.
Responsibility for development of this system of control of the armed
forces has been placed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Communi-
cations Agency, and the directorate of defense research and development.
A special group has been created in the Joint Chiefs of Staff which
has been entrusted with the elaboration of operational data on the system
with consideration for the needs of the President and the Secretary of
Defense. These data would form the basis for the technical planning of
the system.
Together with the creation of the NMCS system, the US command for
several years has taken all measures to protect various government organs
from nuclear rocket strikes and to ensure the survival of the whole armed
forces control system in wartime.
In October of 1961, the News and World Report published an article
IOitEhe
riiitRtlieiSth20013/00/00ePOPPROPOST 0 093 (14N409 6ggve rnme nt
which will operate in deep caves in an emergency capital capable
of surviving a nuclear attack. c,
mon
?
was note n . a . tic). a spec a commun ca ions system
using cables and radio has been planned to ensure the activity of this
government. To enable it to withstand a nuclear strike, special struc-
tures are being built for it.
In addition to this, a special line of succession has been established
which envisages the order of succession of presidential power to one of
20 high ranking officials.
The reserve government, composed of surviving high ranking officials,
is to be located in an underground capital 480 kilometers west of Washington.
Government agencies will be located in a so-called government arc stretching
several hundred kilometers. According to the author of the article, there
ar 94 secret centers in this arc which have been prepared for the disposition
of government agencies. A number of the centers, concealed in the ground,
are able to withstand explosion, radiation, and are able to protect the
officials from radioactive and chemical agents. Some of the centers are
located in natural shelters. At the present time, 30 general government
departments have personnel who constantly work in 52 emergency centers.
Outside this federal arc there are another 400 government establishments
dispersed throughout the country from which the departments and other
government organs must exercise control ofthe state and the military
machine in the event the permanent center are destroyed.
Each secretary or prominent government official has clearly defined
duties in the event of war. For example, the Secretary of Commerce
is responsible for providing repair and movement on the highways and
railroads, for regulating the use of convercial aircraft and ships, deter-
mining the meteorological situation, and for forecasting the movements
of radioactive clouds. The Secretary of Agriculture, together with other
tasks, is responsible for the organization of a rationing system for
the distribution of foodstuffs.
A sequential transferrence of command functions in time of war has
also been developed according to the chain of command. In the event the
Pentagon is destroyed, the function of the general headquarters will
transfer to one of several smAll Pentagons located close to Washington.
One of these reserve centers of control is located in Fort Ritchie,
50 kilometers north of Washington. It is a 3-story building with the
solid blast-proof doors. It is situated in a natural mountain cave.
Each of these little Pentagons will have constant radio and telephone
contact with the President and with the eight district headquarters.
In addition, they will be connected with the headquarters of the Strategic
Air Command, which is responsible for delivering nuclear strikes on the
enemy, and with the headquarters of the air defense -- NORAD. Both of
these commands will also have sheltered command control centers.
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? ? ? - siXrraaarWffarA111111/1111:1111gOILIPIM=1.-???/ ? Bailin'
CPYRGHT
A
One of them, the sheltered command post of the combined commands
of antiair and antirocket defense of the North American continent is
being built in Cheyenne Mountain. According to the US News and World
Report, a million tons of granite have been extracted from the mountain
and underground corridors and rooms nearly five kilometers long have
been built there. CUB News and World Report, 23 September 1963)
The NORAD command center will consist of 11 armored rooms. It will
be located at a depth of more than 700 meters. Eight larger buildings
will have three stories 18 meters high. Thr, total area of the underground
buildings will exceed 16,000 square meters, They will provide working
places for 250 men to work simultaneously, and in the event of war, bedrooms,
dining halls, and hospitals for 750 men will be organized in them.
Entrance to the shelter will be protected by massive explosion-
proof armored doors weighing up to 14 tons each. Special filters will keep
out radioactive dust, chemical agents, and bacteria.
Steel armor around each building is intended not only to protect
from the effects of strikes, it also provides F;hielding for radioelectric
apparatus from the powerful electromagnetic waves arising from nuclear
explosions.
The complex of buildings will have its own systems of water supply
and electric power, heating facilities, and air conditioning systems.
In the communications network center will be six independent outlets
to lines of communication. Radio and radio-relay communication is installed
with the command centers of the continet and there will be direct lines of
communication with the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, the
Pentagon, and the White House.
Security and survivability of the lines of communication of the
mcs system are achieved due to the use of various modern means of
communication: shortwave and ultra-shortwave system, wide-band cables,
frequency-division multiplexing apparatus, lines of ionosphere and
troposphere dispersion, superlong waves, and the use of satellites and
communications rockets. The corrrolex of communications facilities will
also include national government and private communications networks.
Providing stability for transatlantic lines of communication calls for
special concern.
Americans recognize that the present technology of security is
inadequate. Moreover, providing security is considered a difficult task.
One of the ways of resolving it is to develop special wide-band equipment
which will permit transmitting digital data and teleghon
llVRFIe iF e it
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ebFrWa*0208aeWM I !' under-
'water cables).
se zoo./.8.9 cip,Raps5TOG.,
.
?
FT)D TRAN:
CFbYRGHT TheAPIMINled Fe64RleithIget2000k68/6491q4141RDP85cUMISRMIKIV0090006-0
effort to create an armed forces control system which would satisfy
the requirements of modern war, and they are spending enormous efforts
and means for this purpose.
Undoubtedly, the development of complex radioelectronic complexs, exten-
sive work in the creation of underground command centers, and procurements
of numerous and diverse equipment is of considerable advantage to US monopolies.
Therefore, plans for the creation of such organs of control as the national
NMCS system are finding great support from them and are widely discussed in
the press.
FORJES AND MEANS OF COMBATTING SUBMARINES
by Capt 1st Rank Yu. KOLESNIKOV
Among those works systematizing information from the foreign press on
the contemporary level of forces and means of combatting submarines, the
book by A. A. KVITNITSKIY is one of the most successful. (A. A. KVITNITSKIY.
Boriba s podvodnymi lodkami, Combatting Submarines, bases on foreign
materials. Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1963 128 pages.) Although not large in
content the work as a whole gives an idea of the level and paths of
development of antisubmarine forces and meanr: abroad, above all in the US
Navy.
The ruling circles of the US pay particular attention to the development
of forces and means of combatting submarines and to antisubmarine equipment
of sea and ocean theaters. Expenditures for these objectives are characterized
by the following data (Electronic News, July 1963):
Articles of Expenditure
Total for antisubmarine
defense measures (millions
of dollars)
1961-62
approximately
1500
1962-63 1963-64 Estimated
approximately More than 2000
1800
That part of the above for
researc and elaboration of
means for detecting and 233 300 373
destroying submarines
(millions of dollars)
A great scientific and technical apparatus is being enlisted to elaborate
new and perfect existing types of antisubmarine equipment in the US and
significant productive power is being emplojed. More than 200 firms are
working in the field of electronic equipment for antisu marine systems
and antisAMEMWIAQEBZWaggsaUtaintlaiti-RDP85T00875R000300090006-0
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alsodeocribos haw this part of the military budget is being
CPYRGHT
spent in the US.
The author acquaints the reader with the general organization of
antisubmarine defense in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters (Chapter 1).
He cites information on the depth e the coastal antisubmarine defense
of the North American continent (600 miles), indicates measures for
augmenting antisubmarine forces in ocean theaters for the past three
to four years, and also on the development and training of antisubmarine
forces and means, and hates the views of the US command on the organization
of antisubmarine defense by soyedineniya of combat ships and convoys in the
ocean (sea) when nuclear weapons are employed.
Existing US means and systems for detecting submarines are examined
in the book and the basic characteristics of various types of this equipment
and immediate prospects of development are given (Chapter 2). Aviation
means for detecting submarines are radar equipment on the aircraft R2V
Neptune and Lockheed P3V-1 Orion, towed sonar devices employed by helicopters
and dirigibles, and aviation sonobuoyb and magnetic detection devices.
Concerning shipboard means of detecting submarines interesting informa-
tion was given on sonar gear installed on US Navy surface ships (AN/SQS-23,
AN/SQS-26) and on submarines (AN/BQ-1, AN/BQS-2), towed sonar systems
for surface anti-submarine ships, including the new killer system with
variable depth sonar.
The readers attention may be drawn to information on the equipping
of the Atlantic and Pacific coast; of the US with stationary sonar systems
under the conditional designation Project Caesar and to the work underway
in the US to perfect stationary systems for the long-range detettion of
submarines (Projects Artemis, Atlantic). Not of limited interest is the
information on the elaboration of the computer Cyberton for identifying
submarine targets, a brief interpretation of means of search, and the
creation in the US of means for detecting submarines based on non-acoustic
principles (analyzers of diesel tzchaust gases present in the atmosphere,
infrared instruments nothing the ).eat traces in water where submnrines are
moving, and instruments for registring radioactive traces of atomic
submarines).
The examination of hydroaccnstic and other systems emphasizes
the statements of foreign specialists that despite significant successes
of the US in this field the creation of an actually effective means of sub-
marine detection has not yet been effected.
The author devotes the third chapter to the characteristics of
basic systems and models of modern antisubmarine armament on ships and
aircraft of the US Navy in addition to antisubmarine ships of England,
France, Italy, Sweden, and Norway. The reader may acquaint himself
leti*anittfoorerteleass12010/08109e: ChAiREIP8570/871%1903aNkapfirg.
baulAppeavecinFolf1Relepse0208010BialimatA-RDMINWO8TWOONOW90000150
GEHEisubmarine systemTerne, a means of detecting submarine targets, destroy-
ing them, and directing fire, is examined in more detail than other depth
charge devices. Here the characteristics of various types of antisubmarine
torpedoes are given and also information on the projected standardization
in the US of four torpedo types -- Mac-37, Nk-44, Mk-45, and Mk-46 -- which
arm antisubmarine surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. Discussed
in more detail (as much as information published in the open foreign press
permits) are the new complexes of the US antisubmarine armament -- the rocket
torpedo Asroc for surface ships and the Subroc for submarines; designs for
US ship armament according to weapon types are reported; consideration of
foreign specialists on the ways to perfect rocket torpedoes and particularly,
on the physical bases of gravitation, are introduced effectively. Moreover,
there is some brief information onbomb and torpedo armament of US antisub-
marine aviation and on eht search for a technically acceptable version
of an aviation antisubmarine rocket-torpedo.
Acquainting the reader with US carriers of antisubmarine weapons --
surface ships, submarines, aircraft and helicoptars (Chapter 4), the suthor
reports information on ships of post-war construction: the US Leahy and
Coontz Class Guided Missile Frigates; on the improvement of antisubmarine
and antiaircraft armaments on various types of US destroyers and on the
apparent tondency to refit a number of ships for landing antisubmarine
helicopters. There is a brief statement on US measures for construction
and development of antisubmarine ships on hydrofoils and air cushions,
including air cushioned ships with atomic-powered engines.
The author presents the views of the US command on the role and
signfficance of atomic (special construction) and diesel submarines
for executing antisubmarine missions. The characteristics of various
types of American antisubmarine aircrafts are given: the P2V-7 Neptune,
Grumman S2F Tracker, Lockheed P3V-1 Orion, P5M Marlin; the Canadian CL-
28 Argus, in addition to US and Canadian helicopters.
In the last two chapters of the book aspects of combat training of
Navy antisubmarine forces personnel are examined and certain sides of
the tactics employed by them are elucidated. In the examples of exercises
and maneuvers carried out by the US Navy in recent years, independently
and jointly with other navies of the capitalist states, the author shows
the scope of antisubmarine soyedineniya, and discloses the tendency of
the foreign press to highlight successes allegedly achieved in the course
of combat training of US antisubmarine forces.
Thus, A. A, KVITNITSKIY's rather short book acquaints the reader
with the basic aspects of the activities of the US and of several other
states in the field of developing forces and means of combatting submarines,
and particularly with the methods for executing this mission.
0846-1bitifiR6
I??210i310703/69 ft431As PMPEXII0108 76P 660311:0:690 006 -0
ApprovggbFpftgglws@AOQAM/0@oirgAtillegggiVARPOPPAR0q?t0 it s
content. Of the 126 pages of tL book only the last chapter (116-126)
speaks of the tactics of antisubmarine def:mse forces and meant). It
seems to us that it would be more applicable to call the book differently
-- "Forces and Means of Combatting Submarines."
It would also be more expeLient to expand the fourth chapter somewhat.
After the characteristics of the carriers of US antisubmarir.! weapons
it would follow to dwell briefly on the development of antisubmarine
forces in other NATO countries. In support of this thought we introduce
the statement of the US Vice-Adm G. Tech [sic]: "The navies of a majority
of our allies have significant forces designed basically to combat enemy
submarines. Thus the West Germany Navy can be employed to combat Soviet
submarines in the Baltic Sea. The Turkish and Greek fleets should help
us to stop the exit of Soviet submarines from the Black Sea through the
Dardanelles. The Italian and French fleets have the mission of being in
readiness in the Mediterranean Sea. The Norwegian and British Navies
must help us to combat enemy submarines in the Norweigan Sea and in the
Danish Straits." (U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1963) He
speaks further on the hopes placed on the antisubmarine forces of Canada,
Japan, and demonstrates to the reader this association of antisubmarine
forces even if only about their technical level.
Of well-known interest, for example, is the decision of the Canadian
Minister of Defense on the construction from 1963 to 1968 of eight frigates
armed with antiaircraft guided missile complexes and helicopters with
variable depth sonar (Canadian Shinpinz. and Maritime Engineering News, 1962)
and also the proposed placing of a heavy antisubmarine helicopter on two
of the last (of the four being built in Canada) escort destroyers of the
Mackenzie Class and carrying out plans for antisubmarine helicopter carriers
of small displacement (for nine helicopters).
There are also insignificant inaccuracies in the book. Thus, on page
61 it states that "the warhead of the rocket-torpedo Asroc is...the acous-
tical antisubmarine electric torpedo MK-44 with a conventional change."
It should have said: According to other information -- with a conventiond
or nude's:: charge. This is important.
When the principles for employing the rocket-torpedo Asroc (page 62)
are stated one is given to understand that they must be launched in all
eight directions one after the other when in fact they can be employed
singularly and
In examining the question of the place of US Navy aircraft carriers
in the antisubmarine defense system (page 79) the opinion of foreign
specialists on the inexpediency of rearming obsolete aircraft carriers as
antisubmarine defense helicopter carriers is pointed out and nothing
is said of the plan being worked out in the US for designing antisubmarine
m
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59
PYR
GHTirc1iaPiNaiel4fxgrAtIPM@ENOPM/89 igebfiCTINTOECLUGWPRNMOSIN4 rs
of antisubmarine airplanes and helicopters equipped with constant and
variable sonar devices. As c, result there is established a not fully
correct representation of existing and future helicopter-carrying ships
in the US Navy.
When considering the views of the US command on the meployment of
antisubmarine forces in war, the author combines concepts which are
different in content: "BlockadIsig submarine bases and the areas where
they are deployed, "we read," can be effected by means of organizing power-
ful antisubmarine from moving through antisubmarine barriers, seaching
for and destroying them in deployment areas are all various methods being
considered by the US command for combatting submarines.
On page 27 there is an inaccurately formulated thought: "The chief
distinction of modern positional systems consists in their being designed
for long-range det.Aion of submarines and defense (the emphasis is ours--
editor) of a wide coastal area primarily againts rocket-carrying submarines."
But systems for the long-range detection of submarines, while insuring the
dissemination of responsible and factual observations; still do not in
themselves exectte the mission of defending the coast from anybody. If,
as a further component of these systems, the US designs underwater platforms
which are armed with self-guiding rockets or torpedoes (U. S. Naval Institue
Proceedings ,1963) then the term "coastal defense" to some degree depending
on the range and accuracy of detection and fire) will be justified.
On page 38 the river is presented with the foreign sensation of the
alleged creation in the US of the hydro-acoustical system Amfar [sicej
for super long-range active detection of submarines and of a certain
British hydro-acoustical system for super long-range detection, allegedly
capable of detecting submarines when they lea,re their bases. It seems
to us that it would follow to refrain from repeating this completely
unreasonable boasting of the foreign press which is recognized by everyone
as a means of propagandizing the Atlantic power of NATO.
It would be better to combine the last two chapters. If this were so
it would be possible to coordinate several examples of tactical combat with
submarines with the experience of exercites carried out in recent years by
the antisubmarine forces of the US and NATO Navies.
And finally, a small detail, concering the publisher. The binding of
the book is decorative. It does not Go with the austerity, conciseness,
and practicalness of the book's content.
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Approved For Release 2000j081Q9taGIARVIRENIWZ.5110.00300090006-0
by Maj Gen Arty V. ROZHDESTVENSKIY
CPYRGHT
Our military literature has been enriched by an interesting and
necessary book. Its author, M. N. GONCHARENKO, is known to Soviet
readers by the first edition of his popular work, Kibernetika v voyennom
dele (Cybernetics in Military Affairs), published in 1960 (the second,
revised edition was published in 1963 by the Dosaaf Publishing House, Mos-
cow; 344 pages), and also by his popular scientific book, Rakety i,problema
antiraket (Missiles and the Problem of Antimissile Missiles), published in
1962.
Even though the period between the first and second edition was relatively
short, i.e., 3 years, important events had taken place in the life of our
country, the most important one being the 22d Party Congress which adopted
a new CPSU Program. It is stated in this program that in the not too dis-
tant future "the introduction of highly perfected systems of automatic
control will be accelerated. Cybernetics, electronic computers and control
devices will be widely applied..."
The party and Soviet government are giving much attention to the develop-
ment and introduction of cybernetic systems in our country and have supplied
our Armed Forces, on the basis of cybernetics, with first-class military
equipment. The book is devoted to this urgent, present-day topic.
The book under review contains a great deal of factual material, which
is generalized with a wide knowledge of the subject. The second edition
has an interesting introduction and includes several new chapters: "Cyber-
netics and Its Problems in Military Affairs," "Problems in the Use of
Cybernetics for the Solution of Operational and Tactical Tasks," "Modern
Means of Communication and Cybernetics," "Electronic Trainers and Teaching
Machines," and "New Developments in Electronic Computers."
The book includes information on the latest achievements in the sphere
of general and military cybernetics, the latter being one of its applied
branches. The author presents to his readers the basic ideas and principles
of general cybernetics, defines and describes the content of military
cybernetics.
The book describes the control of troops and rear services of armies
and of military equipment by means of instruments and machines of technical
cybernetics.
The author believes that the law of dialiectics concerning the
transition from quantity to quality serves as the basis of military
cybernetics, on which science will be able, in the next few years, to
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The author aptly quotes the prophetic words of Lenin, which were spoken at
,GAIre outset of socialist building, saying that "from now on all the miracles
of technology and all the achievements of culture will become the property
of all people."
Leading bourgeolc scientists have misgivings about the further develop-
ment of cybernetics. The creation and successful perfection of so-called
cybernetic teaching machines, in the opinion of N. WIENER) founder of
cybernetics, constitutes a threat in the event of their imprudent use in
military equipment. A machine "thinks" more quickly than a human being and,
at a moment of danger, men may not have enough time to think and to
switch off a machine promptly, while the machine at this time, having
received information and processed it "with the speed of lightning", will
"push a button" to trigger the weapons of world destruction. It is known
that a modern machine, playing a game of chess, is also to beat its pro-
gramer. What assurance can there be that a machine, in the above described
situation, would lct "reasonably?"
The scientist quite rightly sees the greatest danger in the planning
of a third world war ani warns against the use of cybernetic machines in
such a war.
Cybernetic technology is the technology of the developing Commhnist
society. Therefore, it is based on a social problem, and N. WIENER, as
a bourgeois scientist, does not understand this.
M. N. GONCHARENKO writes in an absorbing manner about the history of
numbers, magnitudes, and computing; he shows how gradual progress has been
made in comptuing, resulting in modern, electronic, high-speed computers
which make 100 billion computations per workday. The author includes
interesting examples for the practical use of electronic computers in
military meteorology, in the launching of artifical earth satellites,
as component elements of combat systems, etc.
The book explains the fundamentals of military cybernetics, which
is the basis for the development of new devices for the control of equip-
ment and troops.
The readers learn about interesting, adaptive, automatic control
and regulation systems. The interest in this type of cybernetic adaptive
systems is caused by the fact that they have long-range importance in
military engineering. For example, there are now in existence antitank,
antimine, naval, reconnaissance, and other types of "systems," used
by the navies of foreign countries.
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T is the key to an understanding of its essence. Usually, this kind of
material is hard to read, as it abounds in camplicated mathematical
formulas. However, the author has avoided the use of complicated formulas
and has replaced them with popular explanations, thus making a very dgfi-
cult onction of cybernetics understandable to all readers.
We might mention here that it is greatly to the author's credit that
his popular explanation of cybernetic principles does not detract from,
the scientific content of the book.
The chapters dealing with the use of cybernetic machines in modern
branches and combat arra of the Armeu Forces are filled with extensive
factual material. Numerous examples relating to foreign armies illustrate
the use of cybernetic machines and devices in aviation, antiaircraft
defense, artillery, rocket troops, and in the navy. In particular, the
book gives a description of the complex control system "Subik" [Subic?],
the "Malafon" guided antisubmarine missiles, and the new "Typhon" air de-
fense system on ships. The author also writes about the use of cybernetics
in the navy for navigation purposes and for precise launching of rockets
from submarines and of artificial earth satellites. Description are
given of the cybernetic, tactical, communications system "Basic," the latest
type of printing apparatus, a station for tropospheric propagation of
ultrashort waves, and a system of artifical earth satellites as means of
communication.
The book contains very detailed material on the use of cybernetics for
the solution of tactical problems (pages 174-216). There is a line diagram
for "Field Date -- an automatic control system of US Ground Troops, and
a description of an artillery center for fire control. An example is
given for the solution of a tactical problem by an electronic machine,
mad several types of cybernetic machines used in the UB Army for reconnais-
sance and for securing combat formations, are described.
The use of electronic trainers in the training of pilots, cosmonauts,
and other specialists is discussed. Possibilities are offered for the
use of teaching machines in the training process, thereby replacing teachers
and instructors.
The book describes the achievements in air defense (pages 133-173).
Cybernetic control systems for active air defense are discussed. The "Sage"
system is described in detail and critically evaluated. In addition, the
author discusses the fact that the design and control of artificial earth
satellites is based on the use of the achievements of cybernetics.
The publication of this successful popular-scientific book is a great
contribution by the Dosaaf Pdolishing House to the propaganda of new
technical equipment, thus furthering the education of technically competent
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and a thirst for knowledge and who are studying military affairs. One may
say without exaggerating that Cybernetics in Military Affairs is a valuable
contribution to our Soviet popular scientific-technical, literature. The
book is devoted to the leading, current topic of our time. Awide circle
of military readers will find in it clearly understandable and interesting
information on the most modern science, i.e., cybernetics and its applica-
tion to military affairs. The book includes many good sketches and diagrams.
Those who read Cybernetics in Military Affair() will enrich their knowledge
and widen their horizon. It will be useful to' have this book in one's
personal library.
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