SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL, VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO 9, 1964

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 115
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 2, 1965
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
Number 896
2 March 1965
SOVIET MILITARY nrEORETICAL ,PRNALL VOYENNA lia2..L_N_L_YA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E Street, N. W.
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SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MZSL' No 9, 1964
Table of Contents Page
Questions of Educational Methodology in Higher
Military Educational. Institutions, by Chief
Mar Arnd Trps P, Rotmistrov 1
Organizational. and Legal Principles of the Structure
of the Armed Forces, by Maj Gen Justice I.
Pobezhimov and Col Justice P. Romanov 12
Ideological Work in the Armed Forces, by
Col V. Rodin 26
Comments on the Article "Augmenting Strategic Efforts
in Modern Armed Conflict, 'Dy Maj Gen K. Sevastvyanov,
Maj Gen N, Vasendin, and Capt 1st Rank No V'yunenko 34
Development of' Radioelectronic Means of Troop Control
and Methods of Their Application, by Maj Gen Sig
Trps I. Kurnosov 44.
Content and Tasks of the Theory of Operations Analyss,
by Maj Gen Intendance Serv A0 Moskvin, Maj S. Yeremin,
and Bo Finkel'shteyn 55
The 20th Anniversary of the Czechoslovak National Army,
by Army Gen Bo Lomsky 61.
Types of War According to the Pentagon, by V. Mochalov 81
Problems of Space De-P.ense and Means of Solving Them, by
Engr-Lt Col B. Aleksandrov 94
A New Look on T;:r.nl(R. War I, (1914-1918), by Cols
A. Strokov aud V Sekistov (Not translated)
Scientific Classification of Military Literature,
by Col M. Skovorodkin 105
Notes on Source
Voyennaya Mysl' Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR
Ministry of Defense, printed n-y- the ministry's Military Publiohing House,
MDSCOW, This translation is from .issue No 9, September 1964, which was
signed for the press 24 August 1964, The article, "A New Book on World
War I, 1914-1918," by Cols A. SMOKOV AND V. SEKISTOV, is not considered
of sufficient interest to rrant dissemination.
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Members of the editorial board of Voyennaya My-sit were identified
in issue No 9, 1964, and are listed below in the published sequence.
Ranks and additional known assignments have been supplied from other
Soviet press identifications.
N. A. RADETSKTY, Chief Editor [Lt Gen]
N. S. VASENDIN
V. K. GVOZD [Col]
V. V. DRUZHININ [Lt Gen, Candidate of Military Sciences,
chief of Radiotechnical Troops of PVO Strawy]
I. G. ZAV'YALOV [Maj Gen]
K. P. KAZAKOV [Mar Arty, commander of Rocket Troops
and Artillery]
L. P. KAZAKOV
M. Kh. KALASHNIK [Col Gen, chief of Agitatioa and Propaganda
Adfirinistration and deputy chief of Main Political Administra-
tl.on of Soviet Army and Navy]
S. N. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief Editor [Major Gen, miliary
observer for Novosti Press Agency]
Yu. V. LADINSKIY [Rear Adm]
N. A. LOMOV [Col Gen, Candidate of Military Sciences,
Professor, Military Academy of General Staff of USSR
Armed Forces]
F. M. MALYKHIN [Col Gen, first deputy chief of Rear Services
of USSR Armed Forces]
V. F. MERNOV [Lt Gen, Ministry of Defense USSR]
N. N. OSTROUMOV [Lt Gen Avn, member of Editorial Board
of Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika]
P. P. POLUBOYAROV [Mar Armd Trps, chief of Armored
Troops of Soviet Army]
P. A. SIDOROV) Executive Secretary [Col, editor for
Voyenizdat]
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by Chief Mar Armd Trps P. ROTMISTROV
The remarkable accomplishments of our socialist state in tht field
of science and technology and the rapid growth of the economy ,lave made
it possible to make drastic transformations in the technical equipment
of the Armed Forces. Nuclear-rocket weapons have become a decisive
factor in armed conflict. Scientific and technical progress has changed
the character of war and the internal make-up of every branch of the
Armed Forces, their organization, combat missions, and ways of carrying
them out. A number of important tenets of Soviet military science and
military art have also been given new content. One cf the fundamental
problems of modern military affairs -- the automation of processes of
controling weapons and troops -- is being successfully solved. The
c1--racter of modern war and the supply of troops with complex military
equipment call for a sharp improvement of the military and general
scientific and technical preparedness of command personnel of the Armed
Forces.
The number of engineers in the Armed Forces has increased significantly
in connection with the steady growth and increased complexity of military
equipment. To direct these engineers successfully and assign missions
to them correctly, the commander himself must possess the necessary amount
of technical knowledge.
It should by noted that command cadres, knowing thoroughly the nature
of modern combat and the capabilities of new weapons, possessing good
general scientific and technical preparation, and using modern mathematical
methods of research and electronic computers, already have the ala lity
to control combat and operations on the level of modern demands.
At present the trend in the development of military eapipment s aay
from various types of independently operating equipment toward semi-
automatic and automatic complexes, both in combat equipment and troop
control. In this connection, the necessity of improving the rperal
scientific and technical preparedness of both command and engineer cad.rs
has been clearly determined. This is very important the general
mechanization of the army and the automation of weapons and means of
troop control do .iot replace man but, on the contrary, increase his role
in the control of these weapons. Modern armament in the form of semi-
automatic and automatic complexes must be maintained by crews, and the
unskillful actions of one member of a crew may result in failure to
fulfill an assignment or cause the entire complex to malfunction.
Actual combat conditions require that each fighting man in a crew,
whether a sergeant or officer, be ready to replace one or perhaps
sever -i of s co
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necessary not on y o cons ex: present-clay regii rements, ou
see ahead into the future. Rapidly developing physics, chemistry,
radioengineering, bionics, astronautics, cybernetics, and other sciences
may produce in the near future discoveries which will lead to the crea-
tion of even more highly perfected combat equipment. Already modern
power plants and engines are opening new possibilities in the construc-
tion of military structures and armaments. Take, for example, work in
creating armament based on quantum generators. According to foreign
press information, it has already bassed from the laboratory stage to
the development of actual types of military equipment. There are other
real results in other fields of science and design.
Generals and officers must have, in addition to a good knowledge of
modern equipment in their specialty, a wide general military-scientific
and military-technical background. But at the same time we believe that
there should be some sort pf optimum limit in the training of seniav
officers. As for enlisted men and junior officers, it is completely
logical that training them in a narrow specialty such as the use of modern
weapons requires, first of all, an excellent knowledge of actual types
of military equipment. This does not, of course, exclude the necessity
of training them in related specialties. Thus, preparation for defense
of the country presents new demands both in the mass character of training
personnel of the armed forces and in the volume and level of knowledge.
In postwar years our armed forces successfully underwent an organiza-
tional and technical reconstruction. In a short time the newly established
rocket troops and reorganized air defense troops mastered complex equip-
ment and became highly combat ready. This was made possible not only by
the training of specialists of a broad profile in our military educational
institutions, but by the fact that at that time we had good specialists
of a narrow profile. At present our command and engineer-technical
personnel, having a good general development and comprehensive technical
preparation, can independently and quickly cope with military and technical
problems of any difficulty. Therefore, in the future military educational
institutions will be oriented to training speciallsts in specific fields
on the basis of broad general scientific and technical training.
Specialists presently being graduated from higher and secondary
military institutions have good political, military, general scientific,
and special technical training. They not only maintain the high combat
readiness of chasti and podrazdeleniya but, possessing knowledge of the
latest accomplishments of military art and scientific methods of employing
armaments and military equipment, make it possible to7rAiseAhe.tilitary
and technical culture of the army to an even higher level. Our military
cadres, completely devoted to thir Fatherland and the Communist Party
and performing their military duties in an exemplary fashion, are master-
ing the art of organizing and directing modern military operations and
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us to seek new ways of Improving the training and education of command
and enlisted personnel, taking into account the progress of science and
technology in all areas, Our armed forces and military educational
institutions are now receiving better educated, more cultured and
inquisitive youths having a broader technical background. This makes
greater demands not only on education but on training and makes it
necessary to find ways of improving the entire educational and training
process in military academies and schools.
An analysis of the training of officer cadres shows that sometimes
the measures adopted over a number of years for improving the programs,
plans, and methods of training have not produced the desired results.
The rapid growth of science and technology have made it. necessary
to include completely new subjects in the programs of higher military
educational institutions and to broaden the traditional "old" disciplines
As a result, a conflict has arisen between the ever increasing amount
of knowledge which must be taught and the amount of training time.
Increasing the amount of training time is not expedient; it c"Loes not
help to improve the system of education, or at best gives only temporary
successes, since the growth of military theory and military technology
continues without interruption and at an increasing rate while the amount
of training time has its practical limit. Moreover, the training period
of speciali,,ts is already too long. The Central Committee CPSU and the
Council ui Ministers USSR, in its dcree of 21 May 1964, pointed out the
necessity of shortening the training period of specialists with higher
and secondary special education.
The way out of this complicated situation can be found in the search
for more rational ways of organizing the training process and especially
its scientific planning. The fact is that in drawing up a training
program for 3, 4, or 5 years, depending on the training period of the
higher military educational institution, it is necessary to plan the
training process with regard to the demands which science and technology
may create during that period. To draw up a training program and plan
a training process from the position of the past is to fall hopelessly
behind and to prepare specialists for past, rather than future equipment
and armament. If the training plans and programs are drawn up on a
scientific basis, there will be fewer mistakes and deficiencies. A
scientific prognosis of the training process can be of real help in
solving this extremely complicated problem.
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bee54MARN'PEdrItAaRtigN6V-11111.1-65.icreaUcnuulons. The
minimum amount of knowledge which graduates must have, i.e. what must
be taught and in what quantity, is determined for each specialty. Having
determined this amcunt of knowledge, it is not difficult to determine
the training disciplines to be mastered and, having worked out the basis
of the courses, to determine the profile and auxiliary disciplines and
their dependence on each other.
This method of planning the training prncess makes it possible to
correct existing courses and disciplines and redistribute material
among them, eliminate certain courses, introduce new disciplines or
combine existing ones, ensure the logical sequence of courses and their
precise interrelationship, and completely eliminate duplication and
repitition.
Through a prognosis of the training process it is possible to sub-
ject the entire system of training students and officer candidates to
analysis and create a scientific basis for revising the training plan.
Good progress in this area has been made at the iigher Naval Radio-
electronics School imeni A. S. POPOV, where logical plans for individual
disciplines and courses as well as structural diagrams of the entire
training program have been worked out. The work of the school in this
area deserves attention.
Tile scientific method of prognosis makes it possible to plan the
training process for 3-5 years on a scientific basis and reduce to a
minimum deficiencies in training plans and programs.
In recent years research in the field of methods of instruction in
conformity with accepted laws concerning the relation of a school to
life has determined that the basic principle of the method of training
in higher educational institutions is the reinforcement of theoretical
knowledge in practical laboratory exercises and the wide use of visual
methods in teaching and eL,;dying equipment, not only in an assembly
where the composition of a certain unit or machine is visible as a whole,
but also in individual assemblies. Training experience in leading higher
educational institutions has shown that only by using this method can a
thorough mastery of the various disciplines be assured. One way of
improving training may be the use of programed training methods for a
number of subjects.
Much has already been written about programmed training in periodicals,
including the journal Voyennaya Mysl', and it has been discussed at various
conferences; but it should be noted that even fundamental questions con-
cerning the realization of the idea of programed training are still not
sufficiently clear.
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The general concept of programed trainin iV i ortance for
rONNIFRfitEelftawaatiMipeditilei 1-AtilPF1815/01)187. Anal in-
stitutions and in field units, but it is not some sort of unusual thesis
or sensational discovery. Programed training makes it possible to estab-
lish such control over the entire training process that an instructor
can know at any minute how each student is learning the training material,
i.e. whether he is forming correct ideas concerning the information re-
ceived, whether he correctly understands the meaning, thesis, and con-
clusions, whether he is able to use what he has learned in mastering
subsequent .;draining information and solving concrete theoretical and
practical problems. This enables the instructor to know what changes
to make in the training process and when to make them so that the
knowledge and skills of the student will be guided in the necessary
direction and produce the best results. Effective control of the
training process requires not only direct communication (the process of
presenting the training information to the trainee), but also feedback
in the training process -- control over the trainees learning process.
In programed training; control, or rather self-control, is supposedly
exercised after each dose of training material (a paragraph, part of a
chapter, etc.). Depending on his answer, the student will be instructed
to proceed to the next dose or return to supplementary explanatory material
of which he will have to confirm his knowledge with answers to questions.
Thus, in programed training both the content and the training process are
planned (programmed).
It is common knowledge that in existing traditional training the
training process is planned in a careful manner: training plans are
drawn up and discussed again by the chairs and councils of higher
military educational institutions, and then reviewed and approved by
the appropriate chiefs. In addition, each instructor, in preparing for
lessons, draws up texts and tries to forsee his own activity and that
of his students, and strives to create the best communication with his
students. This way of planning the training process will undoubtedly
be retained in the future, but, in our opinion, the prognosis of the
training process mentioned above must now be introduced into this
planning.
Since the amount and complexity of training material is increasing
each year and the number of students is also growing, the problem of
effectiveness of the training process is becoming more important The
accomplishments of modern science, especially radioelc-tronics and
cybernetics, are exerting a positive influence on the improvement of
training methods and on the theory of pedagogy in general. Existing
systems and methods of training are being improved on the basis of new
approaches to certain training processes and with the appearance of new
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and new methods of training and not by discarding proven methods.
Unfortunately, because 02 unwarranted haste in adopting primitive
technical devices in certain educational institutions and units, pro-
crammed training was reduced to checking knowledge by having students
select the most correct of several responses. It is perfectly under-
standable that in connection with such a superficial approach to this
new method the very idea of programmed training is often received with
reservations and sometimes encounters opposition.
Abstract, overenthusiastic articles and speeches about the con-
siderable accomplishments supposedly already achieved in programmed
training and an uncritical approach to every kind of translated articles
from foreign, especially American, literature has led certain comrades
to the other extreme -- to the overevaluation of the potential of
programmed training and to the loss of the feeling of reality in the
solution of this complex and important question. Greatly exaggerating
the possibilities of mathematics, cybernetics, and electronic equipment
in training, these comrades think that man's mental processes can be
controled in the same way as physical and chemical processes, by trans-
lating them into the language of mathematical formulas, and that all
that is needed is to build the necessary technical means. For example,
T. ROSTUNOV, in his book Programed Training and the Automation of the
Training Process, writes tha:; "the contemporary development of equipment
is making it possible to create various means of automation which permit
the automation of all aspects (underlined by Tie - R.) of the training
process, from entrance examinations to final examinations and the planning
of the training process." According to the author, "The training process..
to a large degree flows spontaneously, subject only to certain general
requirements," and "psychology and pedagogy... at present do not make any
real contribution to the development of the theory of training." Dis-
carding pedagogy with surprising ease, T. RUSTUNOV advocates the creation
of 'a special theory of training" using the achievements of mathematics,
cybernetics and other exact sciences and relegating pedagogy to a role
subordinate to this far-fetched "special theory." In the book there are
other statements and recommendations boasting of "teaching machines" and
"programed classes" which for the most part are far from perfect and
based on the method of selecting responses. Expelience shows that in a
number of cases conducting lessons in such classes does not improve the
training process but actually weakens it.
It is understandable that the manuscript of one of the first books
on programed training might contain a number of erroneous statements,
but its publication in large numbers without proper review and editing
is, in our opinion, unwarranted.
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PlacinK programed training in oseosition to existint traditional
PPE9W4FginiftgAgegt%2000(18neihglik ;II RafjCIQ7SRQ0033 eee%ts galland
ern-leous, as should proposals to immediately go over to the wide-scale
implementation of programed training in all military units and educa-
tional institutions.
The existing system of training undoubtedly needs to be improved,
but it has proven itself over a period of many decades. In our
educational institutions, including military schools, students are
acquiring scientific knowledge and skills which enable them to work
efficiently in their fields, and many develop, on the basis of this
knowledge, into outstanding scientists and engineers who bring glory
to our native land with their achievements in fields of science and
technology.
The problem of improving training cannot be solved only from the
standpoint of improving the conditions of the training process, dis-
regarding a fundamental principle in the Soviet educational process --
the inseparable unity of training and education. Unfortunately, certain
comrades do not consider these requirements; consequently, there is a
one-sided and erroneous "technical" approach to this important problem
in which the training process is examined from the standpoint of random
processes and the teacher and student are considered as links of a system
in which there take place various acivities connected with the process
of transmitting, processing, and storing information written in mathe-
matical equations with which control over the training process will
supposedly be maintained. From this, surprisingly, came approval of
the replacement of instructors with "teaching machines," the automation
of the entire training process, and the individualization of training
in the form of "independent training" with the aid of programed text
books or teaching machines on prepared texts, in which the quality of
learning is determined by the student's ability to select the correct
answer from four or five choices. Some seriously claim that this
"individualization" enables each student "to progress according to his
ability and to complete courses of study in different periods of time."
These comrades are forgetting that the mission of Soviet training
schools is not merely the transmission of knowledge gathered from pro-
positions, facts, figures, etc but the comprehensive training of Soviet
specialists, the education of students in accordance with the require-
ments of Soviet ideology and communist morality. The problem of
improving training in military educational institutions and units must
be approached from this standpoint.
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CPYR
Science has a great educational capcityl it forms a correct_ system
of AppEgvedpEordReleasen30098:1MacitGbo,e1MOMIAWQ410;ppig .q%Q2-4
victions, and the authenticity, usefullness and necessity of knowledge
received for the performance of military duties and a consciousness of
the rightness and inevitability of the triumph of communism. But the
Glgucational importance of training is not limited to the influence of
science; it is important how the student goes from ignorance to
knowledge, i.e. the very organization of the ucquisition of knowledge,
the method of training. In one ease this may be training based on de-
monstrations, the analysis of facts, the determination of cause-effect
relationships, and the discovery of inner connections, relationships,
and generalizations. Such training leads the student to an under-
standing of the correctness of the conclusions of science and develops
the mind and capacity for logical reasoning and practical thought.
Correctly organized training disciplines students, develops deter-
mination and stability in overcoming hardships and in seeingtalsks
through to their completion, encourages initiative) and accustoms them
to working under difficult conditions. On the other hand there is the
statement of truths without substantiations and demonstrations, based
on examples and elaborations which have been prepared in advance and
from which no deviation is permitted during the course of study and
barring attempts to solve problems independently, in one's awn way,
without prompting and instructions. This method of training does not
develop a student's capacity for logical thought, analysis, and critical
evaluation but weakens his will and initiative and leads to dogmatism.
In principle, of course, training material can be prepared in any
degree of complexity and according to any method and style of exposition
and presented to students in various ways by the instructor himself
(lectures, exercises, consultations, direction of laboratory work);
through textbooks, synolises of lectures, and other printed materials;
or with the help of technical means (film projectors, television, tape
recorders, slide projectors, trainers, etc,). But in the training process
we must carry out the ,,asks of educating w1.-rounded men who are able
to correctly construct their speech and express themselves orally. By
Improving a student's speech we develop his thinking ability, for speech
is an important element of thought. An instructor must always express
himself clearly, remembering that one can correctly explain only that
which he knows well. By helping a student to express his thoughts
clearly and accurately we are teaching him to overcome real difficulties
in mental work; we are teaching him to think.
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thoughts clearly and accurately, be able to speak fervently, passionately,
and convincingly, and fomalate an order logically, concisely, and clearly.
Therefore, the role of the instructor in training and education can not
be disregarded. It was for this reason that Mar SU R. Ye. MALINGTSKIY,
Minister of Defense USSR, considered it necessary to mention the fact
that while our higher military educational institutions are developing
scientifically based principles and methods of evaluating the effective-
ness of programed training systems, primary attention is being given to
the creation of a large collection of technical devices which are some-
times primitive, unnecessary, or already developed in other educational
institutions or units.
The unfounded use of these devices, mot of which are designed for
the select;,,n of suggested responses, harbors the danger of "coaching"
in trairiiu. and lowering the role of professors and instructors, espe-
cially in the study of operational-tactical disciplines and social
sciences. Excessive haste in introducing certain training methods and
technical devices into the training process without thorough experimental
checks can weaken the training and education of students and officer
candidates. The Minister of Defense instructed military educational
institutions to continue research with comprehensive pedagogical experi-
ments as a means of determining what is true and useful and what is
erroneous and to improve the scientific theory and methodology of training
on that basis; to conduct special conferences on scientific methodology
in 1965 for discussing the results of research in this field and drawing
up recommendations for the introduction of programed training into the
training process.
In our higher military educational institutions, instructors; pro-
fessors, engineers, and technicians will undoubtedly be called on to work
out questions of theory and the technical support of programed training,
which is one method of developing and improving training methodology in
these institutions. The organization and guidance of research work in
this field must be examined and made more concrete and purposeful. To
eliminate parallelism and duplication and to ensure the inclusion of all
important objectives and common views and methods of research, this work
must be planned and coordinated on an Armed Forces scale. To do this it
is necessary to first determine the criteria for evaluating methods and
technical devices and to develop common mathematical methods of processing
statistical materials. In a number of cases in the past, experiments in
this area were conducted hastily from the standpoint of methodology; the
collection of large quantities of statistical material did not always prove
useful; the work of many instructors and engineers was used irrationally;
and discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of programed training
were in some cases unfounded. For example, certain comrades carried
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ndividualization of training to the point where students studied
disc Meg FtPrpRNeWraRgigiN9tbCArRilanFTENURNOMPARQ2-4
each student could complete the course of study in a shorter period of
time then that prescribed in training plans. Thus, the time a student
would spend in a higher educational institution would depend on his
ability. But since in a given case lectures read according to a
schedule /4ould hold back the disorderly movement of students toward
graduation day, the authors of these far-fetched proposals recommended
replacing lectures and other group exercises with independent, in-
dividual study of training disciplines with the help of "programed
textbooks" and "teaching machines," leaving instructors on the staff
only for consultation.
In our opinion, such views on the training of military cadres are
simply uhacceptable, They do not take into account the specific character
of teaching officers staff work, joint, coordinated activity during troop
operations, and the necessity of studying modern weapons and their combat
use and maintenance. These elements must be learned in higher military
educational institutions since they represent the logical completion of
training, the final forming of a future specialist, and thy require
group exercises.
It should also be remembered that the mental quality of an individual
can fruitfully developed only in a collective, in the process of social
life. Owing to these conditions the individual is developed as a full-
fledged personality.
Programed training has many good, positive aspects. It increaseti
the time for independent work by the student; he will acquire many
skills in working with books and scientific literature; but at the same
time he will have less contact with his instructor. It is not sur-
prising that a number of comrades express apprehension. Won't the intel-
lectual world of a man be impoverished by these new methods of training?
Is it right to change over to industrial methods of automation in all
fields of training? In connection with this problem a scientific basis
for the amount and quality of information which a student can grasp is
needed. The limited memory capacity of the human brain must, of course,
be considered, as must the fact that without knowledge of certain facts,
information, and figures an officer can not perform his service duties.
When conducting research on this problem, it is important to remember
the words of V. I. Lenin at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian
Communist Youth Union: "We do not need cramming, but we do need to
develop and improve the memory of each student with knowledge of basic
facts, for communism will become empty, a meaningless sign, and a
communist will be only a simple braggart unless all knowledge received
is digested in his consciousness. You must not only learn these facts
but regard them critically so that you do not burden your mind with
unnecessary rubbish. but enrich your knowledge with those facts without
whicifqicigqeSkErKt,W!PMI2NNQP499macIA-RDP85T00875R000300090002-4
10
A
CPYRGHT
of the
-
PPrccnROnicO4Aitaq6Oqlrourttrd,tRtjrrs'ifOe1ssaqr8M?odelP.::'Lnellwil4
mands should be made of technical means during training. Theoretical
training and all technical equipment of the training process must promote,
first of all, the devvlopment of man's mental capabilities, i.e. the
development of such positive qualities as good judgement, flexibility,
breadth, depth, and speed of thought, the ability to analyze developments
and overcome negative thought qualities dullness, banality, narrow-
mindedness, and sluggishness.
In developing new methods and forms of training it is important to
take into account the fact that an officer in a military educational
institution must acquire knowledge not only in the field of theory, but
must study and learn to use mi]itary equipment. The accomplishment of
this task requires close ties between theory and practice. For example,
new trainers based on the principles of cybernetics, which react to
each incorrect action of the student, indicate the nature and reason
for his mistakes, and prompt him in performing the operation correctly,
can be very useful in studying questions of the maintenance of military
equipment and armament. However, in the study of military equipment
it is hardly expedient in all instances to place between the student
and the assembly being studied an intermediate device which at best
teaches only the nomenclature of the parts but does not facilitate the
acquisition of knowledge concerning the shape of the parts, the loca-
tion and function of a unit, or the interrelation and operating condi-
tions of parts in the assembly.
All these questions require accurate, scientifically valid answers,
and scientific correlation of experience and theoretical bases. The
development of new training methods requires a correct understanding of
the psychological nature of training; rational methods can be developed
on:11- on correct theoretical bases. Therefore, the first task of higher
military educational institutions is to develop the theoretical bases of
training and to test them with pedagogical experiments, proceeding from
a dialectical-materialistic understanding of the training process and
from the goals and missions of our schools, which are called upon not
only to arm students with knowledge and skills, but to develop their
abilities and educate them as citizens of a communist society.
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Approved kiFIRIAAET412606/48APPICRIRDP&5700811R000300090002-4
STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES
by Maj Gen Justice I. POBEZHIMOV and
Col Justice P. ROMANOV
CPYRGHT
The structure of the Armed Forces embraces a wide range of problems
and is determined by factors of an economic, socio-political, scientific-
technical, and organizational nature. Since the army is not only a
military organization, but also one based on state law, problems of
organization and law are of considerable importance. These problems
are formulated and worked out in detail in close coordination with
party instructions, which were stated in the recent decree of the
Central Committee of CPSUy "On Measures for the Further Development of
Juridical Science and for the Improvement of Juridical Education in the
Country." Soviet juridical science is faced with the task of studying
and analyzing the scientific principles of state administration and
legal control of public relations, which subject is directly related to
the problem discussed in this article.
The Soviet Colistitut ion and all Soviet laws, including military
regulations, consolidate the organizetional and legal principles of
military structure in the fon of universally compulsory instructions.
The organization of the army and all of its activities are determined
by the state system, by the social and economic structure of society, and
by the state policies, all of which leave their imprint on the whole
order of internal relations in the army on its legal positidn and
functions within the state apparatus, on methods of army administration
and control, methods of staffing, military training of citizens, the
character of discipline, etc.
At the same time the army, as a separate organism which has the
purpose of conducting military operations, has its own internal structure,
which is determined mainly by the nature of modern weapons and military
technology, and by the degree of development of military art.
In working out certain problems of military structure, all aspects
of military organizational activities are taken into consideration and
the data and methods of corresponding sciences, i.e., social, military,
technical, and other sciences, are utilized. For example, in studying
the general principles relating to the organizational and legal bases of
military structure and their relation to general principles of Soviet
state structure, the data and methods of legal sciences are utilized.
In working out the organizational structure of orally soyedineniya and
chasti, the determining role belongs to military art.
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CPYRGHT
Approved FeltaSte200010810940110441P8ST008.75R1000300090002g4cia1-
political and legal aspects of the structure of USSR Armed Forces are of
considerable importance in military matters. This includes the organization
of the Armed Forces, the system and methods of staffing, service relations
among military personnel, education and military discipline, military
control, and others. (P. KUROCHKiN, Problems of Military Administration in
Light of Present Requirements, ILy_silnala tlyp22, No 9, 1962, pages 24-26)
It is not possible to discuss all problems pertaining to organizationaL
end legal principles of the structure of USSR Armed Forces within the scope
of a magazine article; therefore, we shall dwell only on those aspects
which we consider the most important.
V. I. Lenin stated that war is part of a whole, and that the whole
is politics (Collection of Lenin's Works, XII, page )433). The military
organization of a country is indissolubly connected with its social and
state system, and with the class nature and type of state, of which the
Armed Forces are an instrument (V. 1. Lenin. Works, Vol. 8, page 36;
Vol. 24, 36)4).
Military organization, as a shere of state activities, is
subordinated to state politics and based on principles which are
determined mainly by the social and economic character of the state,
while the organizational forms of .Armed Forces, methods of staffing, aLd
methods of military administration and training, are closely connected
with the character of the state system of a certain country.
In Imperialist countries, which are characterized by their exploiting
nature, the army not only fails to be under the workers' control, but on
the contrary, serves as a tool of subjection and suppression of working
peol.I.e by the ruling class of exploiters. The bourgeoisie constantly fears
the prospect of losing control over the Armed Forces, one of the principal
stronghold:, of its rule. Therefore, the bourgeoisie actually, and sometimes
even juridically, eliminates the possibility of any important control
over the army by representative organs of state power, i.e, parliaments,
where democratic forces which are undesirable to the imperialist bourgeoisie
may predominate in the course of the intensifying class struggle. The
actual military power is concentrated entirely in the hands of executive
state organs.
Our military structure differs radically from the military structure
in capitalist countries. V. I. Lenin noted that "the experience gained by
the Soviet government in the sphere of military organization cannot be
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CPYRGHT
zcA015i-difedxF Of (Rige4sic2600/00033 .1(31WRIE1138,6110'01378.14/30087004)?0002-4
produce successful results only because it was accomplished in the spirit
of general Soviet building and on the basis of class relationships, which
infludence any sphere of building." (Works, Vol. 30, page 285).
This statement by Lenin leads to the following conclusions:
1. The principles of Soviet state structure and the principles of
military structure are the same to the extent that they-aradetermined
by the social and.dbonomic nature of the Soviet state; 2. The application
of socialist principles of state structure td military structure has a
positive influence on the strengthening of combat power of the Armed Forces.
In supervising the structure of the USSR Armed Forces, consistent use
is made of the Leninist principle concerning wide participation of workers'
masses in all activities of the Soviet state for the strengthening of the
country's defense capabilities. The Soviet people, inspired and led by
the Communist Party, are the decisive force in strengthening the defense
capability of the Soviet state and they participate actively and directly
in the building of the Soviet Armed Forces. This participation has various
forms.
The people exert an enormous influence on the development of all
military matters as a whole, mainly by the fact that they are the principal
force of socialist production, which fulfills the material requirements of
the front and rear services and creates the military-economic power of the
country. The role of economics grows with the development of military
technology, and so does the role of the workers. This applies not only to
those who, by their labor, provide the Army and Navy with material and
technical equipment, but also to scientists, engineers, and workers, who
create new types of equipment and weapons, thus contributing to important
changes in the methods of warfare. As a result of the constant concern of
the party and government and the selfless efforts Cf Soviet scientists,
designers, engineers, and workers, the Armed Forces are equipped with all
types of modern combat equipment, including powerful nuclear weapons and
improved types of carriers for these weapons, i.e., rockets of all classes.
The efforts of workers, engineers, and scientists in the Soviet Union
have created and helped to develop a special metallurgy, precision
instrument building, production of means of automation, atomic, rocket,
and electronic industry, modern aircraft construction, and shipb,41ding.
These branches of industry serve primarily peaceful purposes, i.e. the
building of the Communist society. However, in case of necessity, th-y
can be converted to the production of modern types of armament.
The participation of workers' masses in Soviet military structure is
confirmed by their honored, constitutional duty to defend their socialist
fatherland and to perform military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed
Forces (Articles 132 and 133 of the USSR Constitution), as well as by their
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CPYRGHT
Agg400)?iligi40114?4tAte tIAORIMPIVArintc
?
- ?
including defense, organizations (Article 126 of the USSR Constitution).
The Soviet Constitution states that the workers' masses, through the
higher organs of state nower, exercise control atd supervision over the
structure of the Armed Forces (Articles 1 Pero 3, 14, 18-b, 49, and 60 "e";
Par. 68 "d"). The executive and administrative organs of state power,
from the highest to the local level, which directly perform certain
administrative functions in the sphere of national defense, operate
strictly on the basis of and in compliance with law, and they are completeLy
accountable to and under the control of the corresponding representative
organs of state power, i.e., the soviets of workers' deprties.
The principle of national eality of rights for all peoples of the
USSR is consistently applied to the supervision of Soviet military
structure. This principle is also substantiated in the USSR Constitution
(Article 123). The Leninist national policy is one of the bases for the
structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are called upon to defend
the socialist achievements of all peoples of the USSR.
The Communist Party guides the Soviet state structure along the
Line of inviting the participation of workers of all nations in all
spheres of activities pertaining structure. The national military
structure is one of the forms of participation of workers of all nations
in the Soviet Union in the strengthening of its defense capability.
The principle of political and civil equality of servicemen is applied
to the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces in a consistent manner. Several
thousand servicemen are deputies to the Supreme Soviet USSR, to supreme
soviets of union and autonomras republics, and to local soviets of workers'
deputies, Together with other representatives of the working people, they
participate actively in the administration of the Soviet state, whereas
the whole bourgeois military system is directed toward the isolation of
soldiers from public and political life and toward transformation of the
army into a blind tool for carrying out the reactionary plans of imperiaJists.
An essential difference between the socialist and the bourgeois
military organizations is evideat in their solution of the problem of
correlation between military liecess:ty and legality.
This problem is resolved in a comprehensive manner in the works of
Lenin and in the decisions of the CPSU. According to V. I. Lenin, the
significance of legality does not diminish during the period of war; on
the contrary, it grows more important, The extraordinary circumstances
during war cannot justify any deviation from Soviet laws. On the contrary,
these circumstances must be accompanied by a marked increase in discipline.
and legality in the work of all government establishments and organizations,
ppr uvurut rWIctbG ?
15
CPYRGHT
off ,AriAlo+c Riire 11611itiol+m 9:- ??,ityt3rsikbizids6,mooriv
no exceptions wesoever. ric compliance w uh oviet laws during peace
and war is one of the important conditions for the strengthening of discipline
and the increase of combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Communist Party leadership is the main foundation of Soviet military
structure and the principal source of victories gained by the Soviet Armed
Forces. During the period of building Communism, the role of the MU in
supervising state and public organizations, and military organs, has
acquired more importance. The policies and directives of the Communist
Par41 and the decrees of the Central Committee of the party concerning
military structure, represent the ideological and theoretical basis of
Soviet military legislation.
The policies of the CPSU include decisions on all important matters
pertaining to the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces and the preparation
of the country for defense, in complete accordance with the instruction
of the party Central Committee that "the policies of a military department,
as of all other departments and establishments, are carried out on the firm
basis of general directives issued by the party through its Central Committee
and under the direct control of the Central Committee." (ETSS o Vooruzhenny-kh
Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza, the CPSU on the Armed Forces of the 3oviet Union.
Collection of Documents 1917-1958, Gospolitizdat, 1958, page 47). A clear
expression of the party's concern for the further strengthening of the Soviet
Armed Forces was the decree of the October 1957 Plenum of the Central
Committee CPSU "Concerning the Improvement of Party-Political Work in the
Soviet Army and Navy."
The problem of troop control occupies a special place in the comprehensive
process of building the Soviet Armed Forces. Upon the method used as a basis
depends, the structure of the army as a strictly centralized military organism,
the unity of education and training of soldiers, the state of organization
and discipline of personnel, and finally, the high combat readiness and
combat capability of troops.
The organs of Soviet military administration are charged with "Providing
for high and constant combat readiness of troops, speedy mobilization of the
Armed Forces, and a correct and most expedient combat utilization of troops.
In view of the special system of performing military service, and the specific
purpose and organization of the Armed Forces, their administration has
essential features differ-Mg from other branches of the government. Mar SU
R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY stated: "Military organization is a manysided process.
Therefore, its principles cannot be set up in a raw, as it is often done in
our literature. In our opinion, it would be more correct to separate them
into political and organizational principles in the training and education
of troops." (R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, Bditel'no stoyat' na stra-le mira,
Guard the Peace Vigilantly, Voyenizdat, 1962, page 33). The organizational
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CPYRGHT
? ?
cur
eqpi444#4.7A-10103c19606/PR liAc21kb16ittidipigik00.61L'01:6415. 7g-224.urc
- ? o aha.z tional- ego.. princip. es in ? e struct
of the USSR Armed Forces.
Centralization of leadership, one-man command, and military discipline
are the basic organizational-legal principles of Soviet military structure,.
These principles are most characteristic for the specific nature of military
administration and point up its difference from other branches of the Soviet
state administration. The need for cencralization in militlry administration,
as well as the need for one-man command and strict militj discipline,
derive from the specific nature of the Armed Forces, which have the pl..rpose
of conducting victorious armed combat, requiring a maximum coordination of
will and action., the highest degree of organization, coordination, and
flexibility of all parts of thE, military mechanism.,
The centralization of leadership of the Armed Forces, as a form of
military administration., enables the concentration :in central military
organs of all functions of general leadership., control and guidance of
activities of the entire military administration apparatus on all levels;
establishment, of a suprewr: c-.)mmand l*ihich is common to all branches of the
Armed Forces; the unconditional binding force of legal acts issued by higher
organs for lower organs, and the purely vertical subordination of lover
organs; and concession of the right to centr::.1,1 military organs, on the
of law, to regulate juridically the service conditions and activities of
troops.
The Communist Party and the Soviet gavernment have always attributed
great significance to the centralization of military affairs, ragarding
it as the most effective measure of organization and consolidation of
military efforts of all Soviet re:,?,blics on a national scale. The
resolution of the Fifty Al1-Rytssi:17:: Congl.ess of Soviets 'Concerning the
Organization of the Red Army" stated. ''A condition for success of all
measures pertaining to the creation. of .the army is consistent centralism
in military administration. ? ?"Li the draft, of the directive by the
Central Committee of the Rss.iar. (7omprinist, Party concerning military
unity of the Soviet replibl stressed that in order to
gain victory in the Civil War it. is necess...r.y to have "a sinEle command
for all detachments of the Red Army 'and strict centralization JAI. :tizposing
of' forces and resources of the s.,,,.71.a,).1st republics and particularly,
in making use of the entire apparatus of military supply and of railroad
transport, as a very important material factor in war, since it is of
paramount importance not only for military operations but al.S.) for sup:E.).lyinR
the Red Army with combat equipment., c:..othing, and food suoplle "
(Works, Vol. 29, page 373)
The 8th. Congress of the C.'omnp.mist Party, after repulsing the so-called
"military opposition" which defended the vestiges of "partisan methods"
(partizanshchina) in the army, stated in its decisions ? "The acquisition
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CPYRGHT
?fA1900MINI-RfriRtIbiAEgtODD/#8709rPairkaRIND8VF00876ROM001390002U4e state
apparatus for the planned building of a centralized army, which by virtue
of its unified organization and unified administration will be able to
achieve maximum results with minimum losses. To advocate partisan methods,
as a military program, would be the same as to recommend the return from
large-scale industry to domestic handicraft." (}SS v rezollyutsiyakh i
r2.9.212.enild_lovi_tonferentsiy i.plenumov TsK, The 0.P.5U in Resolutions
and Decisions of Congresses, Conference q and Plenums of the Central Committee,
Part I, Gospolitizdat, 1954, pages 432-433).
In accordance with decisions of the Communist Party, the first USSR
Constitution of 1924 confirmed) by an act of legislation, the unification
of military affairs on a national scale, as a result of which the united
USSR Armed Forces were created. As compared with other branches of the
state administration, the centralization of the military administration
has been most complete and most consistent.
At present, the principle of centralization in military adminir.tration
is growing more and more important. The appearance of rockets and nuclear
weapons has further increased the significance of centralization in the
control of coordinated actions by all branches of the Armed Fo:.7ces and all
combat arms, especially the Rocket Troops.
However, the principle of centralization does not c;:ignify that all
operational functions of military administration are concentrated in central
organs, or that lower-ranking organs are replaced in any way by organs,
or that the independence and creative initiative accorded to lower military
organs by military regulations is restricted. One of the important tasks
of legal controlofthe military administration is to establish a degree of
centralization of military administration fuictions which would be most
expedient and most consistent with present requirements. Local organs of
military administration are given a certain amount of independence in
selecting ways and means of carrying out orders and directives from the
center, and their implementation does not followa definite form, but allows
for initiative and a constructive approach. The lower organs of military
administration have clearly defined rights and obligations and they are
fully responsible for the supervision of their subordinated troops.
One of the most important principles in the structure of the USSR
Armed Forces, as stated in the CPSU Program, is one-man command. From
an organizational and legal standpoint, this means the concentration of
all leadership functions in one person (commander or chief); these functions
are related to command, political supervision, drill, administration and
supply, as well as control of the activities of subordinates. One-man
command also involves the establishment of rasponsibility of a single person
(commander or chief) for all aspects of life and activities in a military
unit or soyedineniye (etablishment or institution), together with personal
responsibility of officials for individual aspects of life and activities
in AftsirWideraFaigtelVa?e32660704Xf9 Eet*-11#0851rb Cit376ROMMUSb002 -4
18
CPYRGHT
0089tobcpstyeogeoW4ed by the
provealrofikeai'Aee 120100i3V9f:TISCREP86,
entire military histroy and experience of -..wiet military development. In
discussing one-man command as the only coi.cect system of work in the army,
V. I. Lenin stated in a speech at the Third All-Russian Congress of Councils
of National Economy, in January 1920, that the army had progressed, "by
natural de-Jelopment, from the state of casual, vague collectivity, to a
state of collectivity raised to a system of organization, and finally to
one-man command as the only correct system of work" (Works, Vol. 30, page
286). The unity of will and action of the military personnel is unthinkable
without the unity of troop control, especially now, under conditions
involving the use of modern weapons. This unity can best be achieved by
one-man command.
The task of legal control of Soviet military structure is to continue
strengthening the principle of one-man command and to provide the most
favorable conditions for a commander or chief to perform his leadership
functions and to develop his organizational abilities. For this purpose,
the legal norms have established rules confirming this principle and
favoring its consistent application, i.e the compulsory nature of orders
issued by commanders or chiefs; the strict order of subordination of officials
(functionaries); the conformity between the extent of rights and obligations
of officials and the nature of their functions; personal responsibility of
all servicemen and officials for the tasks entrusted to them; and encourage-
ment of reasonable initiative aimed at the best possible implementation
of orders.
One-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces is applied to all levels
of the military organism. The Minister of Defense, commanders in chief of
branches of the Armed Forces, commanders of.: military districts, and commanders
of chasti and soyedineyiya? are invested with individual administrative
power and corresponding rights, which are clearly defined by Soviet laws,
military regulations, statutes, and manuals.
One-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces does not exclude, but
presupposes the possibility and necessity of collective discussion of
decisions on more important matters, prepared by commanders or chiefs.
A preliminary, collective discussion, if it is expedient in regard to time
and purpose, is a most important means of utilizing the experience and
Imowledge of subordinates. It helps the commander to make the most correct
decision; it strengthens the active contact between the commander and his
subordinates; and it promotes the growth .of the latter and inspires them
to use initiative and a constructive approach in carrying out the commander 's
decisions. A commander, like any supervisor, must not only teach the masses,
but most learn from them. Naturally, the commander always retains the right
to made the final decision. This is an unshakable principle. However, a
commander must consider the opinions of subordinates and encourage them to
display reasonable, creative initiative. V. I. Lenin remarked that there
can be no success in modern war without conscientious soldiers and sailors
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CPYRGHT
ntoel:Ala
ilawliir.Rgoksi0b#0q4LLcn -108# tk0??0
guided toward the unconditional, prompt, and best possible execution of a
commander's order.
It has been confirmed by many years of experience, both during war
and during peacetime, that Soviet one-man command has combined in the best
way the one-man authority of a commander with the will of the collective.
A one-man commander, who is self-exacting in the highest degree, constantly
strives for improvement of his political and special knowledge; he serves
as an example of self-discipline and takes care of his subordinates. A
one-man commander never forgets that one-man command not only gives him
extensive rights, but also imposes a great responsibility. Only under
those conditions will he maintain an unshakable authority over his subor-
dinates and will carry out the principle of one-man command effectively
In all spheres of leadership and troop control.
The Communist Party has shown particular concern in making sure that
one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces should be in strict compliance
with their socialist nature and that it should exist on a party basis.
The main point in the party concept of Soviet one-man command is the
fact that each commaider, no matter What post he may occupy, carries out
the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and faithfully
follows the Leninist principles of party and state supervision in all of
his activities.
A Soviet commander can perform his resConsible duties successfully
if he will seek the support of the party organization in all his activities
and will skillfully vse the party's strength and influence in solving the
tasks entrusted to the troops.
Our party has nLaced great trust in military leaders by establishing
the principle, in the "Instruction to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet
Army and Navy," that "the commander of a regiment (a ship, or a
podrazdeleniye), or the chief of a military educational institution
(establishment), who is a member of the CPSU, seeks the support of the-
party organization La his work and guides the activities of tha party
organization toward a successful performance of combat task's and plans
for political and combat training, and toward the strengthening of
military discipline. A commander (or chief) who is not a member of the
CPSU, seeks the support of the party organization in solving these tasks."
In analyzing the past experience of commanders, who have skillfully
implemented this party requirement, N. S. EBRUSHCHEV stated: "...in the
army, a wise commander always seeks tie support cf the party and Komsomol
organizations. The more closely he cooperates with the party and Komsomol
organizations, and the more strictly discipline is maintained in a chast',
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CPYRGHT
1
the more successful a c woor. g-kt4:04
? u
0' All
khozyaystva, The Building of Comm: Pm in
Agriculture, Vol. 5, Gospolitizdat, 1963,
VON114?046?04;ogp
the USSR and the Development of
page 238.)
The Communist Party, consistently following the line of st'engthening
one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces, is aware of the fa3t that one-
man command has become increasingly important at the present stage in the
strengthening of combat readiness and in ensuring victory of the troops in
war. The decisive role in achieving victory in a rocket and nuclear war
will belong to those people who have mastered technical equipment and
military skill; who are endowed with high moral, political, and fighting
qualities; who clearly understand the just objectives of war; who are
educated in an active spirit of aggression; and wt.? have a high degree of
organization and discipline. The success of combat operations of our
troops will depend to a great extent on a centralized, flexible, efficacious,
steady, and firm control at all levels, on the basis of one-man command,
and on unquestioning obedience to a commander and faultless executicn of
his orders.
It is quite evident that the conditions and character of combat actions
with the extensive use of nuclear weapons will require that Soviet command
cadres have high idiological convictions, extensive military-theoretical
and technical knowledge, and a thorough understanding of the peculiarities
and potentials of new weapons, and be able to use them skillfully.
All this proves that under present condicions the practical implementa-
tion of one-man command makes higher demands on command cadres, requiring
more knowledge, higher moral, political and command qualities, organizational
abilities, and skill in the leadership of troopr.
Military discipline has particular imwrtance in Soviet military
structure; i.e., the strict and exact compliance all servicemen with the
order and rules established by laws and military regulations. V. I. LeniTI
demanded the highest degree of conscious discipline in the Red Army and
Navy. He stated that the army required rigorous, ironclad military
discipline (Works, Vol. 29, page 226; vol. 30, page 405).
Founded on Lei...mist principles, the CPSU has taken measures at all
1-tages of development of the Soviet Army and Navy to continue the strength-
ening of military discipline. This is quite understandable. Troop control
and success in training, education, and combat utilization of troops wouY
be unthinkable without firm military discipline and strict regulations.
Therefore, the general and continuous strengthening of military discipline
and the maintenance of strict military law and order are some of the most
important duties of military administrative organs, military officials,
and the entire personnel of the USSR Armed Forces. The establishment of a
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CPYRGHT
v.00Vistfgkel? .65-1411(1nel'
corre-t
favora o t e vc pmen an ma tbnaee
discipline, is one of the painicpataskr in the
pilitary structure.
SI
I ?
s
ig,Cib2 conscious, m a .V0-4
ry
legal control of the
Soviet military discipline is unthinkable without strict compliance
with Soviet laws; this is clearly expressed in the definition of military
discipline contained in the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed
Forces. Military discipline has a legal character. There is a deep,
organic connection between socialist legality and military discipline.
The fulfillment of requirements of laws and Military regulations is a
necessary condition for achieving order and organization in the troops,
accurate service performance, high results in combat training, and complete
elimination of military misdemeanors.
It should stressed particularly that the principal requirement of
military discipline is unquestioning obedience to the orders of commanders
or chiefs. The distinguishing feature of Soviet military discipline is
the conscious character of compliance with military order. M. V. FRUNZE
stated: "The ideology of the new class which has assumed power has found
Its reflection in the internal conditions of the Red law. The concept of
discipline has changed. Instead of mechanical submission, based on fear
and coercion, there has been created the discipline of a soldier-citizen,
who is aware of the necessity for subordination. Official barriers have
disappeared to a great extent, and the Red Army is the most democratic
army in the world." (M. V. FRUNZE, Izbrannyye proizvedeniyal Selected
Works, Vol. II, Voyenizdat, 1957, page T7)
Unquestioning obedience of subordinates to the orders and instructions
of chiefs is the pivot of military discipline. WfAhout it, the strength-
ening of combat capability and maintenance of high combat readiness of troops
would be unthinkable. The voluntary and conscious nature of obedience on
the part of the subordinates is the essence of socialist military discipline.
A number of legal conclusions are drawn from the requirements of
unconditional obedience, including the inadmissibility of personal, as
well as judicial argument against the orders of a chief; obligatory execution
of an order given by a senior dhief, even if it conflicts with an order
previously given by a junior chief; non-interference by local authorities
in the legal actions and orders of a military command; and a number of others.
According to the teachings of the party, particular attention should
be given to the inculcation and strengthening of a firm discipline among
the troops under present conditions. The latest forms and methods of
conducting combat operations with the use of nuclear weapons demand that
each podrazdeleniye, or chast', and each serviceman be in a state of constant,
increased combat readiness, high vigilance, and maximum discipline and
organization. Under present conditions, the achievement of victory requires
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CPYRGHT
of all
A0041eYFr1616#tlfzi5M36108761Z00b1060S0156.2A rs an instructions than ever e. ore in he history of the army. Discipline
in the army during peacetime most clearly indicates the state of combaG
readiness of the troops.
Communist Party and the Soviet government have shown great concern
for the furbher increase of combat power of the USSR Armed Forces, and for
the strengthening of socialist legality and military discipline in the Armed
P?orces, by their careful and thorough development, under the direct supervision
of the Central Committee of CPSU, of a Soviet military doctrine and its
corrseponding new military regulations, i.e., the Disciplinary Regulations
of-U e TTSSR Armed Forces and the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR
Armed Forces, adopted and confirmed by the 23 August 2.60 decree of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet U2SR, ard the Regulations on Garrison and
Guard Services, confirmed by the 22 August 1963 iftcree of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet USSR.
The study and practical application of new military regulations in the
Soviet Army and Navy is conducted by commanders, political organs, party
and Komsomol organizations, and the entire Army and Navy community, in the
interests of a further increase of combat power of the Army and Navy, a further
strengthening of discipline, and complete elimination of violations of
socialist law and military discipline by the troops.
Military discipline, as one of the types of Soviet state discipline,
reflects the specific features of military service and therefore has a
number of distinguishing traits RS compared with other types of state
discipline. Each serviceman has the sacred and inviolable duty to comply
with the law, to fulfill the requirements of the military oath and military
regulations, to endure all hardships and deprivations of military service
steadfastly, to be honest and courageous, and not to spare his blood or
even his life in the performance of his military duties.
V. I. Lenin stressed repeatedly that constant, strict demands must
be made by supervisors of their subordinates in the proce:q of Soviet state
administration, and especially in the administration of the Armed Forces.
Based on Lenin's precepts and CPSU instructions concerning ways and means
of strengthening discipline in the Armed Forces, the 1960 Disciplinary
Regulations state that firm military discipline among military personnel
may be achieved by developing high moral, political, and fighting qualities
and conscious obedience, and by maintaining firm military order in chasti
and on ships, as well as by the fact that commanders and chiefs must make
high demands of their subordinates, and by the commanders' skill in combining
and properly opplying measures of persuasion and compulsion in everyday
contact with personnel. It is particularly necessary for each chief to
conduct systematic and comprehensive educational work with all of his
subordinates as a whole and with each one individually.
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CPYRGHT
A RP?e lqn Iten
eduargr?volmguvome..-ratt.eatilf#tiggfOriVarEfrirarinCettrtll
requi,"ements of the military oath and of discipline, and the development
and strengthening of the servic;emen's sense of military honor and military
duty. The Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces require that
commanders at all levels discover the ceuses for disciplinary violations
by taking prompt and comprehensive action, and that they prevent misdemeanors
of servicemen. The Regulations demand an uncompromising attitude even
toward minor violations of military discipline.
Therefore, commanders and chiefs at all levels, in addition to their
daily concern for the needs of subordinates, are strictly obligated to
make severe but justified demands, and to instill film military discipline.
Higher-ranking commanders and chiefs not only make personal demands of their
subordinates, but educate them to be exacting toward their own subordinates,
while showing fatherly concern for their personnel. Higher-ranking commanders
support resolute officers, NCOs? and sergeants in every possible way.
A very important role in the further strengthening of military
discipline and elimination of disciplinary misdemeanors must be given to
the entire army community under the supervision of commanders and political
organs. Therefore the military regulations, especially Disciplinary Regulations,
assign great importance to the whole army community. A comradely discussion
among servicemen concerning a misdemeanor of one of their fellow-soldiers
has a great effect both on the guilty person and on the whole group.
However, despite the growirng importance of measures of persuas...on and
of encouragement in the system .of military educaticn, and in the strengthening
of military discipline and socialist legality in the Soviet Army and Navy,
the role of compulsion and punishment nust not be belittled. Both methods,
i.e., those of persuasion and compulsion, must be combined and used skillfully
in the painstaking daily education of subordinG-ces. At present, commanders
and chiefs at all levels are engaged in this 1;ype of work.
In strengthening military discipline, one of the most important ,Adms
in the .ctivity of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organi-
zations is the implementation of Communist ethics in the life of soldiers.
This work is based on the moral code for builders of Communism. The moral
principles of this code reflect the noble, spiritual nature of the Soviet
people.
Based on the principles of the moral code for builders of Communism,
the Soviet soldiers develop high moral, political, and fighting qualities:
such as life-giving socialist patriotism; infinite love for their fatherland,
the Communist Party, and the people; proletarian internationalism; hatred
for imperialist agressors; high vigilance; readiness for self-sacrifice in
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CPYRGHT
A
the_ylaiple
ppiRcpyn iciejAsy
q
.i66e(Esiiilifre9*-1*ITOVEPT601161xfsdfles6100234-ine
rsonne ; courage, sE ea -aWstness, and initiative in battle
against the enemy.
The ethical norms determining the behavior of soldiers are fully and
clearly incorporated in Soviet laws, in the military oath, and military
regulaticos. They reveal to the soldiers the purpose of thier daily,
socially useful, military work; the requirements of modern war; and the
ways and means of achieving true military skill, which is necessary for
victory over the enemy. The moral principles of Soviet people, which have
been confirmed by law, have become the law for all servicemen of the Soviet
Army and Navy.
A comprehensive and academic study of the principles underlyirE the
structure of the USSR Armed Forces, including organizational and legal
principles, will further the strengthening and perfecting of our Army and
Navy and the increase of their combat capability and combat readiness.
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IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN THE ARMED FORCES
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CPYRGHT by Col. V. RODIN
The past decade, a bright chapter in our people's battle for Communism,
was commemorated by huge successes in economic and sociopolitical areas.prvi
in the ideological activity of the par!..y. Freed from the dogmatism resulting
from the cult of personality, ideological work received new and powerful
stimuli for its development and perfection.
Presently the battle between the Communist and bourgeois ideologies
has become exceedingly acu4,:. On one hand there has been a rapid and all
absorbing growth in the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas on the whole
world and on the other hand the influence of the imperialist ideology has
sharply decreased. Thus, the ideologists of imperialism are placing their
stakes on ideological diversions and enlisting many various means of psychological
warfare.
The course of world development fully confirms the correctness of the
general line of the internation Communist movement which was worked out in
meetings of fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960, the vital force of the conclu-
sions and positions of the 22d, 21s, and 22d Congresses of our party,
and the Leninist Program of the CPSU.
However, as correctly pointed out oy Comrade M. A. SUSLOV in a report
to the Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU on 14 February 1964, our successes
may have been greater were it not for serious difficulties which arose in
the socialist camp and the Communist movement in connection with the schismatic
activity of the leaders of the Communist party of China.
Blinded by nationalistic arrogance the leaders of the Chinese Communist
Party, contrary to the general course of the world Communist movement, set
out on their own particular course, to all intentsfand purposes discarding
the Declaration and Announcement collectively worked out by the Communists
and party workers. Thus, the decisions of the June Plenum of the Central
Committee CPSU, which pointed out concrete methods for perfecting our ideological
weaponry and further elevating the spirit of incompatability toward any
hostile and antiMarxist opinions, acquire still greater importance.
The Communist ideology is the ideological basis of the moral spirit
of troops which is one of the most important elements in the combat strength
of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is namely by means of ideology that the
socialist social system renders its most concentrated and, in the final
account, decisive influence on the moral strength of the people and Army
and on the formation of high moral aad combat qualities among Soviet fighting
men.
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PYRGHT
As noted in the Program of the CPSU, the formation of a world outlook
A amon?; osAtiorers,39Artlii%/aavidiAsstprii-08}i3TNNA
Obtittitidisobmlitiem as a
P?IPPMflagMADEftnitr'systdm Orpliflosopinchl, economic, aria, sociopolitical
opinions, acquires primary importance in the modern stage of the development
of our society. A scientific world outlook plays a-decisive role in the
realization of the norms of Communist morals and enables them to be transform
into constant, vital reference points. A person's firm J.deological conviction
stipulates his correct relation to social obligations, .',.,o the group, and
to official responsibilities.
It is also important to note the importance of a scientific world
outlook in overcoming remnants of the past in the midds of men and in
the battle against the corrupt bourgeois ideology. The June Plenum of
the Central Committee CPSU as one of the actual tasks of ideological work
determined that it is necessary to protect the minds of the Soviet people
from the noxious influence of the imperialist ideology. A necessary condition
for the completion of this task is combat against the bourgeois ideological
influence on the Soviet people, including Soviet military personnel.
All of the best moral and combat qualities of a soldier, his loyalty
to military obligations, discipline, alert vigilance, bravery, and initiative,
depend to a decisive degree on his ideological conviction. The ideological
conviction of a man has a telling positive effect in a combat situation.
In the tensest moments of a combat, a battle of differnet motives and, feelings
occurs in the mind of a man, in particular between obligations and a feeling
of fear for his life. If victory is to be achieved byAhe positive qualities
in this pitched battle, the soldier's feeling of obligation must have firm
ideological and political guidance.
How is an ideological conviction formed? It would be a mistake to
assume that communistic beliefs are developed only by lectures, training,
and books. They are formed and developed primarily in a process of daily
practical activity, in combat, labor, and creative challenges.
Ideas become stable motives of conduct only when they control the whole
spiritual world of a man, subdue his feelings and emotions, and have an
active influence on his whole mental constitution.
It must be confessed that the complex process of the influence of ideology
on the psychology of a man has not been completely investigated in our
literature devoted to problems of education. Often in practice ideological
work is limited to the transmission of a determined sum of knowledge.
Experience shows that this is insufficient for the formation of a man's
ideological conviction. Ideological convictions are in the final count,
a synthesis of a scientific world outlook, emotional experience, and willful
acts of a man transformed into concrete practical actions. For this reason,
in educational work it is importent to combine the ideological influence
on a man with the overall development of his mental processes to produce
raitAYF4 kifipNae9Maikkii4grlicIRINISAitierngfitiiffilAnYitiVAAfi,gd Only
27
then will a soldier be able to overcome any tests of war. Modern combat
and ? .fl
weap2N? As
1
? ?
ROE FIRM eafOree WON% Nit40044?2 a 61901gFr
The huge destructive force of weapons and the danger of radiation have
intensified the feelings of war to an unprecedented degree. It is important
in these conditions that a soldier know how to master his own feelings.
Thus, his moral and psychological stability must be strengthened and he
must be trained in self control, discipline, and certainty in his own strength.
It is an undeniable fact that far from all instructors try to penetrate
into the inner world of the trainees to study the complexity and often
the contradictions of the process involved in the formation of ideological
convictions.
It must ue noted that a young man experiences both a physical and ideological
maturity during his years of military service. It is not necessary to
point out how important this period is.
Our Soviet school system is preparing and educating a worthwhile and
morally healthy generation of Soviet young people. Every year young people
enter our Armed Forces with excellent general educations and thorough
intellectual development unquestionably superior to the soldiers of the
bourgeois armies. Nevertheless, contradictions between acquired knowledge
and personal, primarily emotional, experience are often detected during
political and moral training. In his life a man meets many obstacles
and various good and bad influences in his immediate environment.
The consequences of possible incorrect training in the family, the
instilling in certain cases of bad esthetical taste, manners, and customs
which do not answer the high principles of the moral code of the builders
of Communism must also be taken into consideration. Tn one case this
is a temporary and superficial emotional attack or a fleeting frame of mind,
which does not penetrate to the depth of the mental processes, but in another
it is a conflict between a person's emotional condition and world outlook.
The task of the educator is to impart to the soldier a determined sum
of knowledge and by every means of education to destroy this negative L
emotional barrier, to eliminate all superficial personality traits foreign
to our society, and to evoke and strengthen positive social feelings
in the soldier by acting on his psychology and consciousness. It is
important to know the emotional state of the soldier well, to aid him
when he is disturbed or has doubts, not slipping, of course, into
superficial sentimentality. Naturally all this requires that commanders
and political workers be masters of pedagogy, that they have knowledge of
individival pecularities of people, and that they employ a fine approach
to training combined with tact and patience. This is the secret foundation
of carrying out ideological work with people.
CPYRGHT
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PYRGH
The program of the CPSU teaches that the communistic ideas should be
combined organically with communistic life activity for every man, group,
AppactvedfdatRielietase 21100L081019DrOb%-RDRIIST008E7c5R13410300090082-itr will
not only know how he must act, but thoroughly understand his actions and
behavior and discharge his military obligations and social responsibilities
with a deep feeling of moral satisfaction.
In the course of ideological and moral education in the combat training
process, those habits and skills which are necessary in military activity
are worked out according to how well the feeling of responsibility for the
destiny of their native land has been formulated among soldier. The
imparting of habits to people is a very complex and difficult matter.
There are elementary norms of conduct for people which have the force
of habit: bearing, precision, accuracy, tact, responsiveness, etc. These
useful qualities have a very important role in military activity and the
LIstructor's task is gradually and steadily to widen the circle of these
norms of conduct Imong soldiers. By observing these qualities on a daily
basis, a man does not always need to choose a motive for his conduct, since
they are already firmly established and have become second nature to him
so that he cannot act otherwise.
These habits are implanted among Soviet soldiers on the basis of a
deep ideological conviction.
The habit of obeying and automatically fulfilling the established order
of military service is worked out by means of all forms and methods of training
and education, not by mechanical compulsion. It is well known that coerdion
has never been successful in developing original creative initiative among
soldters for the fulfillment of assignments. Only high moral traits based
on deep ideological beliefs and highly patriotic feelingsof soldiers can
give full scope for transferring professional knowledge into first-class
combat skills and original military valor.
When speaking of the role of Communist ideology in strengthening the
moral spirit of troops we must keep in mind that ideas by themselves do
not decide the fate of any activity. Marx wrotE, "Ideas in general cannot
do anything. People who exercise practical force are needed for the
realization of ideas" (K. Marx aid. F0-Engels. Works, Volume 2,
Gospolitizdat, 1955, page 132Y In In this very concise and deep remark,
K. Marx defined his ideas concerning the combination of ideological and
organizational activity in the training and educating of people.
People must be organized in a certain. way for ideas to be materialized
into concrete practical results. The principles for organizing man's
activity have great importance in the implementation of high communistic
ideals. V. I. Lenin pointed out many times that moral strength can be
transformed into material strength only with splendid organization.
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CPYRGHT
IiingolifeettRig1001?447Writigittttel el 1-220#144
of class ideologies.
The ideology which is predominate in our Soviet society penetrates
all of military science and the whole complex copulation of interrelationships
between the army and the people and between military personnel of all categoties
within the limits of mili'Ary organization. It also is the ideal prerequisite
for the principles of the construction of our Armed Forces.
An understanding of the ideological content of the basic principles
of Soviet military construclion in its turn aids Soviet soldiers to
determine their conduct in t2e military group correctly and build relationships
with their comrades in service, both their seniors and subordinates.
One of the most important principles of the construction Of the Soviet
military is one-man command. In the L-plementation of leadership by-Tthe
Armed Forces into reality, the Communist Party demands that one-man command
be conducted on a party basis. The one-man commander is guided in his
activity by communist ideologies. He is accountable to the party and the
state and is the spokesman 'or the will and interest of the people. The
Communist party makes it incumbent upon Soviet leaders to study the Leninist
style of leadership and requires that they be trained to respect the creative
initiative of the masses and their group skills. The knowledge of how to
direct the activity of masses, to learn from them, and to study and
enlarge their skills is an integral trait of the Leninist type of leader.
V. I. Lenin decisively rejected any opposition to one-man command and collectivity,
considering such opposition dangerous and trending toward theoretical
confusion. He demanded the thoughtful combining of one-man command and
collectivity and spoke out Ezainst excessive exaggeration of boards, calling
them talking shops. In the Armed Forces one-man command is the principle
of military construction, but for its realization commanders of all ranks
must depend on party and Komsomol organizations in their activity.
The stable basis of one-man command in the Soviet Army and Navy has
always been the high consciousness of soldiers and their feeling of
obligation to their native land. However, at the same time one-man
command also assumes an administrative and legal constraint. Ideological,
moral, and just features in Soviet one-man command compose an. inseparable
unity and it is necessary to strive for their harmonious coordination in
practical organizational work.
The Leninist style of leadership invisages the correct combination
of methods of persuasion and compulsion. V. I. Lenin pointed out, "Persuasion
and compulsion, this is a contradiction of life assuming an inescapable
combination of two contradictory functions" (Leninist Collection XXXVI,
page 389). It is clearly evident that the combination of these contradictory
functions in practice is a difficult matter. V. I. Lenin pointed out that
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CPYRGH
we can combine "contradictory understandings in such a way that we have
?
AppMmaniSerA03/68Y6
Persuasion as as a method. of leadership, of course, cannot be understood
in the sense o'c "persuasion" when giving orders and directions or boiled
down to only brief explanations of work immediately before the execution
of a given task by a military group. There is nothing more dangerous than
this impression about the method or persaasion. A. S. Makarenko stated,
...when you must demand something, you must not cultivate a theory, but
demand and strive for the Calfillment of your demands" (A. S. Makarenko.
Works Volume 5, Publishing House of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences
RSFSR2 1951, page 147).
Persuasion is accomplished in the training process and in the course
of party-political work among troops by persistant, constant, and purposeful
educational work on the part of commanders. political workers, and party
and Komsomol organizations. The achievement of this goal must not be
limited to only official, planned undertakings. Soldiers must be ideologicall;
influenced daily by all means available, training activities, various forms
of mass political work, and all military training activities.
The chief role of Marxist-Leninist ideology as the moral basis for
the life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces is not only in its just
and educational influence on the conscioness of soldiers. It is the
ideological basis for military science and the ideological.and theoretical
preparation of military personnel and. it inescapably influences the developmen.
of military science and military theoretical research.
The influecne of Marxist-Ieninit ideology on the development of
Soviet military science is very important This is natural, since war is
the most extreme method of elimirsting contradictions between classes and
states. The ideology of ruling classes is the strongest influence on the
process of studying and enriching the skills of war and all practical
combat training of troops in peacetime. Military science, as the
theory of military affairs 2 is not only the accumidation of war experiences
for a certain historical epoch, &,..(4. the implementation in the military of
new equipment and weapons in peacetime, bo:, it is also the interpretation
of experience from the point of view of the rtling classes, their philosophica
opinions, and political views. M. V. Fmaze wrote "The military structure
of a given state is characterized by the d.ominat views and attitudes in
the military and, finally, by the very content of the principles of military
affairs determined by the whole social str,xtre of a given people and,
in particular, by the essence and characteristics of the ruling class
which is in power in the giren. peziod of time" (M. V. Frunze. Selected Worlus,
Volume III Voyenizdat, 1957, pages; 11-12).
Thus, Soviet military soiroe in determining the essence of the
moral factor and its role It. .gar sl:.;slies the whole aggregate of sources
App miveckirdt rifitehasaSe 080/08109 : CIAADPB5117004316F1000)00119000234.27, the
the socio-economic conditions of the life of the ncIlloftidiUrie..t.e.raud
,.,,,,puE_Spz -4
aims of ARrjr(gligCbEffoggieKkeuNPN9NOR.iidCiNgAt
degree of economic developmeirt of the country, the technical equipment
of the army, and many others including features of the psychological order.
However, out of this aggregate of sources, Soviet military science,
governed by the prinCiples of dialectic materialism, defines as most
important the social structure and the character and aims of war.
Scientific, Marxist-Leninist methodology and the just character
of political ideologies which are defended by Soviet military
science create favorable possibilities for the objective and universal
study and enrichment of the experience of war in the modern epoch,
for equipping troops with new weapons and combat equipment, and for
conducting the actual combat training of troops in peacetime. On
the force of tYir. Soviet military theory in all stages of the development
of the Soviet state solved problems for maintaining the states
defensive carability at a high level. However, in the period of the
Stalin personality cult subjective misinterpretations in evaluating the
experience of war were allowed, especially in the years preceding
world war II. These mistakes stopped the development of Soviet military
science. The elimination of the personality cult and its consequences
in all spheres of the life of the Soviet society had a beneficial influence
on the development of modern military science and produced a wide scope for
its development on the theoretical basis of Marxism.
Ideologies and policies of ruling classes have great importance
in the formation of the military doctrines of states. Soviet military
doctrine, as worked out by the Central Committee CPSU and N. S. KHRUSHUEV,
is characterized by scientific validity, and realism in its positions,
principles, and conclusions which have all' resulted from the pecularities
of modern war. Marxist-Leninist ideology enables Soviet military science
to analyze objectively the process of waging battle in the conditions imposed
by the revolution in military affairs, and predetermines a unity of
opinion and discussion on special military technical questions within
the framework of the community of ideological opinions.
The unity of opinions on the most important questions of the defensive
socialism is of great importance for strengthening the defensive
carabilities of the countries in the peaceful socialist system. It
must be pointed out in connection with this that every ideological disagreement
produced by the distorted interpretations of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism by the leaders of the Communist Party of China threaten
important damage to the general unity of the forces of all the
socialist states in light of the increased aggression by modern imperialism.
The nationalistic approach of the leaders of the Communist Party
of China, who advocate a theory of deperdence on their own strength,
undermines the very idea of mutual suppGrt in the Socialist countries and
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PYRGI:IT
threatens damage primarily to their own country, since such a theory will
lead inescapably tJ the isolation of China from the fraternity o_f the
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It can be seen by the schismatic actions of the leaders of the
Communist Party of China how misinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism
leads to fundamental mistakes in theory. They are negating the decisive
influence of the world socialist system on the course of the world's development,
struggling against the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of
states with different social orders, and attempting to overturn the conclusions
of the international Communist movement concerning the possibilities for
preventing war in modern conditions. The leaders of the Chinese Communist
Party are propagating an adventurous conception of a supposed necessity
for unleashing a war against imperialism without considering the deaths
of hundreds of millions of laborers and the destruction of whole countries
and peoples. After metaphysical consideration of the role of masses of
people in history, the Chinese leaders in their theoretical arguments
belittle the role of atomic weapons, calling them paper tigers. The
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are presently turning themselves
away from the peaceful communist movement in all fundamental questions.
The monolithic ideological solidarity of the fraternal parties of
the socialiTt countries and the strengthening of the friendship and solidarity
between the soldiers of the socialist armies on the basis of proletarian
internationalism compose one of the most important conditions for strengthening
the defensive might of the whole friendship of socialist nations.
The united and inseparable process of ideological work in the Armed
Forces has various facets and manifestations. It is quite obvious
that the basic area of the influence which the Communist ideology of our
society exerts on the combat capability of the armed forces cannot be
considered separately. The scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook,
as stated earlier, simultaneously is the ideological basis for the imparting
of high moral combat qualities among Soviet soldiers and penetrates the
organizational activity of commanders and political workers. And at the
same time it has great influence on the special and military theoretical
training of command personnel.
However, it is important to consider the pecularities and specifics
of the influence of various ideological forms on different elements of the
combat might of the Armed Forces. Philosophy, political ideology, and the
system of economic upinions acquire primary importance in. the course of the
ideological and theoretical. training of command personnel and all Soviet
soldiers. Ideological work in the Armed Forces assumes a harmonious combination.
of all ideological forms and means of ideological influence on the consciousness
of soldiers and has as its goal the constant maintenance of the combat
readiness of the Soviet armed forces at a high level.
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COMMENTS ON THE ARTICLE "AUGMENTING STRATEGIC aVORTS
Approved For ReleIttelQINFINGSVED:OWIRM085T00875R000300090002-4
Comment by Maj Gen K. SEVAST 'YANOV
CPYRGHT
The question of augmenting strategic efforts in modern armed conflict,
examined in the article by Maj Gen Kh. DZHELAUKOV (Voymmaya Mysl', No 1)
1964), is, in our opinion, a very urgent one.
The author correctly points out the sources and basic directions of
the augmentation of the strategic efforts of states in modern armed con-
flict and discloses the component elements and degree of this augmentation,
including its quantitative and qualitative side. However, we are per-
mittimg ourselves to supplement several propositions of the article.
The most important moment, ensuring the successful conduct of a war
and rendering a decisive influence on the possibility of the timely
augmentation of efforts, is seizing and maintaining the strategic
initiative from the very beginning of the war. This was extremely im-
portant in the past as the author points out. Now, When armies are
armed with weapons with unprecedented destructive capabilities, possession
of the strategic initiative can under certain conditions even predetermine
the cutcome of the war as a whole.
Only when the strategic initiative is seized at the very beginning
of a war can normal conditions be established for the growth of the
strategic role during its course, the necessary superiority in forces
and equipment over the enmy maintained, and the goals of the war achieved
most successfully.
However, in order to seize and then maintain the strategic initiative
in armed conflict it is necessary, in our opinion, to possess well-organized
recconnaissance, to constantly know the plans and intentions of probable
enemies, to possess powerful armed forces, equipped with modern weapons
and combat equipment and at a level of high combat readiness, and to have
state reserves of all types.
Considering the aggressive plans of the imperialist states' mili-
tary leaders, one must not exclude the possibility,of their unleashing a
war. Seizure of the strategic initiative will proceed under the extremely
complex conditions of the beginning of the armed conflict, with mutual
losses, much destruction, broad zones of radioactively contaminated
terrain, etc. In such a strategic situation the role of strategic
reserves increases with particular sharpness.
The armed forces of the leading states now have powerful means of
fighting which are capable of putting major groups of troops out of
commission at long range and which they had not had previously.
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34
Y KUM I
p4.a4c,NigaictomosogigotiwpAlf
00?kii
yises.
Aserves
for augmenting the efforts of the first strategic echelon -which will hardly
be in a position to execute alone the great number of important strategic
missions in the path to achieving the goals of war.
Thus, to carry out modern armed conflict successfully it is necessary
to have, in addition to a strong first strategic echelon, strong and well-
trained subsequent strategic echelons and the peacetime establishmerb
of powerful state reserves. This permits the power of the first strategic
echelon's strike to be increased at the necessary moment and preserves
the necessary force superiority in the theaters of military operations
and secures achievement of the goals of war within a short time. As a
result of the coalition character of a future war the strength and equip-
ment of strategic echelons and state reserves must now be examined not
within the confines of one state but on the scale of a coalition of
states.
Regarding the quantitative and qualitative aspect of strategic
reserves, the qualitative aspect, in our opinion, with the existence in
the armed forces of the chief states of principally new and highly
effective means of armed conflict, has now acquired a more important
significance than the quantitative.
Nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, not living
forces and conventional armament, will now play the main role in stra-
tegic groups. Hence, of course, man as the master of modern equipment
and the high moral and political level of personnel as a whole will,
as before, have great significance.
With the sharply increased scale of military operations the scope
of maneuver by strategic reserves is also increasing. The American
command, for example, suggests maneuvering them over great distances,
even from one continent to another and in a very short time. In these
conditions the role of mobility in troop operations in general and the
movement of strategic reserves in particular increases.
The maneuver of strategic reserves in modern conditions will proceed
from the very beginning under the active influence of enemy means of
mass destruction. In the past the only threat of action against reserves
in the depth were attacks by aircraft with conventional annunition,
which did not, by the way, much damage completion of the reexoupping of
troops. Now nuclear weapons and, other enemy means of mass destruction
can create great zones of destruction and radioactive contamination in
the path of the moving troops resulting in great losses. All this com-
plicates effecting the maneuvering of strategic reserves to a significant
degree or even wrecks it altogether. Therefore, old methods of carrying
out the maneuver of strategic reserves are now in many ways unsuitable,
And MidcrigOl AfeiSStiev5a08%41??Pa'-'6A5k
_BT00875R0003000900024
35
U1-)YRUHI
ineretpAgingAilsii1014? gUk4igtfatftg;yeyqurther
1 v.42-4
1";
If+ *s
developing military transport aviation, by creating sufficiently simple
flight apparatuses with vertical take-off and landing, in addition to
cushion-air apparatuses, and by introducing into the troops highly mobile
transport equipment reliably protected from the destructive factors of
nuclear weapons.
The significance of secrecy in regroupping, from its very beginning,
much increases in modern conditions. This is explained. by the fact that
enemy has effective means of recconnaissance enabling him to detect
regroupping at long range and to direct nuclear weapons against the
troops effecting the maneuver.
Concealment of the regroupping is effected by maintaining strict
secrecy over the plans and times for effecting the maneuver of the stra-
tegic reserves and equipment and by well camouflaging the troops while
in the areas in which they are deployed and while on the march. This
is achieved by skillful utilization of the camouflaging characteristics
of the terrain, by the despersed deployment of the troops and the efficient
formation of march order, by the timely exploitation of limited visibility
conditions, and by the application of diverse camouflaging means, in
addition to carrying out radio deception, counterradar deception, and
effectively combatting enemy air and ground reccoanaissance.
Well-organized protection against the effects of mass destruction
weapons is of no small significance. It is attained through thoroughly
organized radiation and chemical intelligence and timely warning to the
troops of radiation, chemical, and bacteriological danger, through
reliably protecting the troops against aerial strikes, not gathering
troops in narrow places, correct use of the protective features of the
terrain, and advanced training in measures for eliminating the after-
affects of the enemy attack.
There are still many other interesting questions pertaining to the
problem of augmenting strategic efforts in modern conditions which, in
our opinoin, have important significance for additionas in-depth exami-
nation of the problem as a whole and of modern armed. conflict in particular.
Comment by Maj Gen N. VASENDIN
Augmenting strategic efforts in armed conflict always has been and,
apparently, will be the most important theoretical and practical problem.
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CPYRGHT
Amm
YPAYOtretftf5W40601616624r and
0 tvOIF4)44616W601995
le i i as een re egate to nuc ear means? n discussing the
article by Maj Gen Kh. DZHELAUKHOV we are expressing our opinion on this
question.
The problem of augmenting strategic efforts in past wars was solved,
as a rule, by establishing numerical superiority of forces and equipment
on one or another sector of the front at a determined time. The composition
and novelty of the means of destruction, their fire power, and the combat
training given to troops has defined the qualitative side of this process.
Insofar as numerical superiority was seccessfully established, so was
the prt.lem itself successfully resolved. Thus, in the effective utili-
zation of force and equipment superiority, the skill of their application
in armed conflict has always been of no little significance.
One must presume that with the radically changing character of
armed conflict the essence of the very concept of "augmenting strategic
efforts" and methods of solving this problem have become different.
It is primarily necessary, in our opinion, to include in a modern
concept of "augmenting strategic efforts" in one theater of military
operations or another the very fact of the application of nuclear
weapons in a given theater. Nuclear weapons are a primary and necessary
means of effecting the augmentation of efforts. All remaining methods
of solving this problem stem from where, when, and how much nuclear
means are employed. The number of nuclear charges employed in any theater
of military operations or strategic direction and their total power
represents the quantitative side of the augmentation of strategic efforts.
Moreover, the power of the nuclear strikes may be accepted as a
criterion for the reliability of executing the assigned missions. This
criterion (-0 expresses the relation of the power of actual expended
nuclear charges in a given area (Mr) to the theoretically required
'
(estimate4 power (4)9 that' is K= nt < 1. Consequently, the closer K
will be to one, the greater the probability of achieving the objectives
(if, of course, all the initial data for calculation is correctly derived).
From the aforesaid it follows that the concept of the "growing
strategic role" in modern armed conflict means not only, as the author
of the article writes, "the ability of a given state or coalition of
states to increase the force of its resistence and at any given moment
to be stronger than the opposing side" (p. 24), but primarily the ability
of the armed forces of a country (coalition of countries) to deliver
nuclear blows of the required power in a given theater of military oper-
ations or in the most important strategic direction. This, in our opinion,
is the basic meaning of the augmentation of efforts modern conditions.
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U1-)YRUH I
The primacy of strategic nuclear weapons over other types of wea?ons is
alscActriralted E9r-a@lqUe Uggic14/9:gihakA- REFORWARIIClogiQ I is
d
tegic missions simultaneously, reliably, and in any theater of war.
The augmentation of strategic efforts depends, as is known, on the
character of the strategic missions executed in various periods of the
war.
In modern war, if the aggressive imperialist circles unleash one,
the belligerants will strive to seize the initiative and execute military-
strategic missions in the shortest time by employing nuclear means from
the first minutes of the war. The armed conflict will assume a fierce,
devastating, and destructive character. Strikes against the military-
economic areas of the belligerants, the disorganization of their rear
areas, and the destruction of strategic groups of troops will comprise
one of the main missions.
In the beginning period of the war augmentation of strategic efforts
will be manifested not only in the changing character of the operational
structure of the troops and their increase in number, but also in the
skill in the employment of nuclear means as a whole. Thus, the term
"augmentation of efforts" must not be examined in the literal sense.
The augmentation of efforts, in our view, consists in maintaining neces-
sary strike intensity until the execution of all missions is completed.
During the course of the war solving the problem of augmenting
strategic efforts depends on the character of the armed conflict and the
content of the missions directed at completing the defeat of enemy groups
of troops and the occupation of his most important areas and strategic
points.
Troop combat operations will develop simultaneously in several stra-
tegic directions and will be carried out in complex conditions of radi-
ation and mass devastation. The main means of armed conflict in this
period, in the interest of augmenting strategic efforts are nuclear-
rcket weapons. During the course of the war the strategic role will,
as a rule) be increased on basic strategic axes by delivering nuclear
blows, and also by employing frontal aviation in close coordination with
all brances of the armed forces. Etploying the results of nuclear strikes
ground troops will be able to execute assigned missions at a high tempo.
During the course of the war, the role of all ways and methods of
augmenting strategic efforts by branches and arms of the armed forces
will increase.
4E-X4-
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1 0 - JUL - 1 9 9 8 0 7:52
CPYRG
SareenSaan
Comment by Capt 1st Rank N. V'YUNENKO
The concept of augmenting strategic efforts, in the form presented
in the article by Maj Gen Kh. DZEELAUKHOVI does not, in our opinion, fully
meet the conditions for conducting modern large scale operations and war
as a vthole.
Specialists in a number of countries proceed from the fact that in
the beginning period of a war both sides will strive to employ within a
short time a large part of nuclear-rocket means accumulated in peace
time in order to inflict maximum losses upon the enemy as a direct result
of the first strikes. They present the further development of military
operations approximately as follows.
Following the first, most powerfull nuclear strikes, will come others
significantly lower in force. In other words, the intensity and power
of the nuclear strikes will gradually weaken as military operations unfold
their duration increases, sincereserves of nuclear ammunition will run
low and losses in means of delivery will increase as a result of previous
enemy strikes. It is to be supposed that the number of important stra-
tegic objectives undestroyed in previous strikes will also decrease.
For the armed forces of states having a relatively small territory,
the destruction of main groups, the devastation of the most important
administrative, political centers, the disruption of communications,
and the disorganization of the state and military control at a given
stage of the mar will, obviously, make any kind of organized action
simply unrealistic. Completing the defeat of armed forces in conditions
induced by us will require relatively small effort: occupy the terri-
tory of the hostile state, bring order, and render aid to the population.
At first glance the situation may be somewhat different when a
nuclear war is carried out by a powerful coalition of armed forces on
both sides, each having approximately the same nuclear-rocket potential.
Their conflict will be more intense. In this instance each of the
sides will strive to thoroughly weaken the enemy ( and consequently,
his retaliatory strikes) and at the same time to preserve fcr themselves
the necessary forces to achieve the ultimate end of the mar. Obviously,
in such conditions there will be no place for augmenting strategic
efforts as it has been conceived in the past.
The author of the article states that augmentation of strategic
efforts by means of employing nuclear weapons must now be understood
"not in the sense of the increase of the force of each suceeding blow...,
but as the growth of the sum power of all nuclear blows resulting from
their delivery in sequence." (p. 28) This, in our opinion, is an unin-
tentional attempt to preserve an old term, the meaning of which, as for
other principles of military art, has long changed.
PYR
If this re ommpilig voirdstarAe+FfaelekpRA,
war irfePiigliail
eis
ixralitigtheataETANOVS
irrespective of results attained in previous actions. In other words,
if earlier augmenting efforts was one of the means of achieving victory
("3-11 an operation or battle, then this concept, as it was expressed in the
article, becomes an end in itself.
As conditions for armed conflict have changed so must such an im-
portant principle as the augmentation of efforts also undergo change.
Thus, it hardly follows to preserve such a concept in theory, the content
of which does not correspond to concepts in modern conditions. This
concept is touched upon and examined in the article, if even to regard,
as the author does, maneuver by forces and equipment as being essentially
only a method for augmenting efforts in its former conception, not an
element of it.
Speaking of the substance of the augmentation of strategic efforts
relative to ground troops, PVO strany troops, air forces, naval forces,
etc, comrade DZHELAUKHOV maintains that the augmentation of efforts in
these branches of the armed forces will be achieved "mainly by Tay of a
quantitative increase and a qualitative improvement of the latter's
forces and equl.pment." (p 28). Such a statement, in my opinion, would
be basically correct for World War II.
The basic striking force of the navies of the leading countries in
modern conditions is atomic submarines, the construction and commissioning
into the fleet of which takes a long time, measured in months and some-
times years. It will obviously be very difficult to build such ships in
war time to commission into the fleet and utilize them for executing
combat missions, even if shipbuilding enterprises do not suffer enemy
nuclear strikes.
That feature of the navy which separates it from other branches of
the armed forces is the fact that it is difficult to replace seagoing
forces during the course of a conventional war, let alone a nuclear-
rocketwar. In past wars navies executed their combat missions with almost
the same basic forces and components they had on the eve of the war.
Ship construction during the war consisted only of repairing losses
incurred in combat operations at sea. There has been no case where a
significantly weaken navy has succeeded, as a result of the entry of new
ships of those class which had suffered losses, in sufficiently restoring
the combat might for subsequent struggle with a strong enemy in one war
or another, as there has been let us say, in the ground troops or in
aviation.
An exception to this was the events at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
The Japanese fleet succeeded in putting a significant part of the line
forces, considered the basic striking power of the US fleet, out of commission.
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CPYRGHT
App ?Rbg?Orgtonis, 15e0 .sys MeV PPA0.02Aelrlelnr
deck-based aircraft. The possibility of reproducing submarines is hardly
analogous to that held by Hitlerite Germany during World War II. Modern
means of destruction arc such that when successfully employed against
military-industrial centers, the mass construction of new ships and their
swift commissioning that took place previously will be difficult.
The American military leadership, for example, plans to build 41
atomic-powered missile submarines and to maintain a permanent fleet of
15 strike aircraft carriers in peacetime. 11"..,ase forces, it considers,
will be sufficient to execute all missions of armed conflict at sea in
a nuclear war.
Roswell Gilpatric, former US deputy secretary of defense, states
that US plans "f.a the event of war envisage the swift deployment of all
forces which have been brought or are being brought to a state of full
combat readiness... these conditions require the existence of actual
ready reserves in the first place and corresponding reserves of supplies
and weapons. It is quite impossible to consider that civilians can be
militarily trained and civilian industry switched onto military tracks
after the war has begun" (Foreign Affairs, April, 1964).
Consequently, in their opinion, it is unrealistic to count on
augmenting strategic efforts by placing new, more modern ships in the
fleet during the beginning period of the war.
The very picture of military operations in naval theaters is sub-
stantially changed. The nuclear strike has taken the place of the pre-
vious battle of grdups, let us say, of task forces of large surface
ships which conducted prolonged, single battles and which suffered,
as a result, approximately equal losses. It can be delivered by sub-
marines, aircraft, or these and others jointly. Thus, a nuclear strike
against surface ships, is, in essence, a one-sided action: rocket-
carrying aircraft or submarines can use their weapons without entering
the surface ships' effective ASW or PVO range. The latter, net able to
counterattack the weapon carriers, must destroy weapons, the rockets,
themselves or evade them.
In these conditions success may be predetermined, not by additions/
forces being put into action and not even by a corresponding number of
guns, nuclear charges, the speed of ships, and other factors, but primarily
by haw much the attackers succeed in achieving surprise, in selecting
the optimum form of maneuvs:17 and in selecting the array of forces sufficient
to destroy completely the detected enemy group. If this is achieved the
enemy can be destroyed as the result of one single effort -- one short
but powerful strike. Consequently, the necessity of augmenting efforts,
when applied to conditions for conducting military operations at sea, which
; A
? p sSvg obt Of. Ft- PAA750853051Y405R00 630 eRfo214-P,
? is no
e nger practical.
41
CPYRGHT
of tAPor8vtkprdezikbiprs% AS96911:14NAtikeDinigte05764069313019199)332-4
upposing side yparti ly or fully isolating them from the rear,
by destroying strategic reserves and actively struggling to interdict
ocan and sea lines of communications would, though indirectly, lead to
an augmentation of efforts. Of course, operations to isolate enemy
groups from the rear will have important significance. If the enemy
attempts to organize the transference of reinforcements to a given sector,
then it most likely will be only to make up for some of the losses suffered:
It will hardly be possible to achieve a significant transfer of forces
and equipment in such a malner.
The American military command suggests that air transports be
employed in order to relieved from shipping by sea in the beginning of
the war. But with the destruction and devastation which can be rendered
by nuclear-rocket weapons on e theater of military operational to fully
replace force and equipment losses by air transportation will not,
undoubtedly, be possible. If reinforcements are made in a theater of
military operations, significantly less effort will be required for their
annihilation than for the defeat of basic groups of forces which are
established and concentrated in a given theater of the eve of the war.
Thus, the concept of the augmentation of strategic efforts continues,
in our opinion, to lose its meanings because its main content in the past
-- the maintenance of constant superiority of forces over the enemy --
may now be achieved by methods completely different than before. In
part, the concentration of large groups of troops, artillery, and air-
craft in a given sector is not required. The delivery of powerful
nuclear-rocket blows against a resisting enemy, the correct selection
of the moment of delivering them, and the selection of corresponding
targets enables the superiority of the enemy to be reduced to zero on
any sector, both in the beginning of the operation as well as buring
its development. To do this it is necessary to execute a flexible
maneuver by forces and means, including rocket trajectories, between
separate sectors as well as within their boundries.
However, it is still prem.Jture to depart completely from this con-
cept. Applied to certain situations there are possibly times, even
in a nuclear-rocket war, when an augmentation of efforts analogous to
that which occurred in the past is required, as, for example, when
repulsing an air attack, for operations im_lv.Lng chasti and soyedineniya
of mechanized troops, and when landivg forces and forcing water barriers.
But such cases cannot in themselves represent the general rule, but are
exceptions and will take place on an operations and, particularly, a
tactical scale.
And in conclusion -- the elements for augmenting strategic efforts.
The author of the article regards them as maneuver by strategic rocket
means, by strategic aviation forces, by forces and means of the branches
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CPYRGHT
piiiyttrAVOTOPIThat.ProtiPMAT0111.
6'1500'62W
ion, measures for
weakening the operating strategic groups of the enemy, and also the
skillful maneuvering of the material and technical means, nuclear weapons
and, forces and equipment of the branches of the armed forces.
Through this treatment of the question the identification of the
forces and equipment used to augment efforts, with the methods for
employing them, is achieved. It would follow, in our opinion, to insert
Into the concept of "elements of the augmentation of strategic efforts"
the forces and equipment which can be utiJ ized in military operations
and to relate maneuver by forces to methods for effecting augmentation.
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DEVELOPMENT OF RADIOELECTRONIC MEANS OF TROOP
ApprovectlimeleifitaseMOMMIECKAIDENW9075R000300090002-4
by Maj Gen Sig Trps I. KURNOSOV
CPYRGHT
The effective use of nuclear weapons, which are the main means of
deotruction, and the successful operations of all b.1-anches of the Armed
Forces in modern war depend very much on the availability, perfection,
and operational reliability of technical means, primarily of radioelectronic
equipment used to control troops, combat systems, and weapons of armies
and navies.
Complex and responsible tasks concerning the achievement of a harmonious
cuurdination between the technical development of radioelectronic means of
control, including methods of their application, and the level of development
of the means of armed warfare confront military specialists of corresponding
fields of knowledge.
We shall con' ider that part of these tasks which is connected with the
control of troops and weapons.
A multitude of extensively used devices of various designs make up
the radioelectronic means of troop control employed in modern conditions.
These means include radios and radio receivers, radiorelay stations, video
communications apparaLus, and devices which improve the effectiveness of
wire communications.
It is well known that the single-channel simplex radios of World War II
as well as the radio communications channels which they formed were
sufficiently perfected for that time, but could not satisfy postwar require-
ments. On the basis of the achievements of science and technology in the
armies of the leading countries, a gradual process was begun for the
qualitative improvement of radio communications. Obsolete radios were
replaced by more mobile single-band, duplex, and multi-channel radios which
had increased range, speed of operation, and reliability.
With the implementation of short-wave and ultrashort-wave radios, much
attention was paid to the development of radiorelay stations to combine the
positive aspects of radio communication with the advantages of wire communi-
cations. Eadiorelay communications have provided a solution to the most
important problem of providing for the passage of a large flow of information
with sufficient reliability of transmission and have met all demands placed
upon them if the necessity of having a large number of telay stations is
not taken into consideration.
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UHYKUI-1 I
However, in spite of many advantages, there are also disadvantages
idnAiLfd Pr1P2I G seOOOAO9.0 IAADIR85T001:05R000308090(111284 is that
when a large number of relay stations are operating, interference is
increased on the lines and it is easier for the enemy to employ
countermeasures.
It became possible to overcome this serious disadvantage when
tropospheric radio stations were developed in many countries. Tropospheric
radio stations operate by using the phenomenon of the diffusion propagation
Of radio waves in upper layers of the atmosphere.
Tropospherid stations have overcome the basic disadvantages of short-
wave and ultrashort -wave communications, including radiorelaycommunicatiOns.
Operating within a rather wide range of frequencies, they provide radio
communications over distances of 400-500 kilometers without relay stations.
By combining a large number of communications channels with a
significant increase in range, tropospheric equipment allows communications
systems to be set up differently, the time spent on laying long lines to be
shortened, the reliability of the operation of the system to be sharply
increased, and the requirements placed on equipment and personnel often to
be decreased. Instead of 20 intermediate radiorelay stations on a 1,000
kilometer line, only 3-4 tropospheric stations are necessary.
However, these are not the only advantages which have drawn attention
to tropospheric communications. The use of these stations is most effective
in sparsely populated areas of the far north and in deserts where it is
difficult to maintain many relay stations. The US was first to use
tropospherid stations in arctic areas. One such line connects the coastal
regions of Alaska, British Columbia, and the United States. It has a
capacity of 240 telephone and telegraph channels.
It would seem that all problems connected with prnviding reliable
multichannel radio communications were solved with the introduction of
tropospheric radio stations. However, it soon was evident that only one
technical aspect of the problem was solved. With all elements remaining
stationary, especially in an air defense system, the use of tropospheric
stations obviously is useful from any point of view. But these stations
were not advantageous in mobile communications nets because of their poor
maneuverability. Large power transmitters of ten or more kilowatts and
cumbersome antenna systems were necessary for reliable communications.
Subsequent achievements of radio electronics allowed stations to be
developed which operate on the principle of ionospheric scattering. In
contrast to tropospheric stations, these ionospheric stations operate
within a narrow band spread of 20-50 megacycles, but they are as difficult
to maneuver as tropospheric stations.
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U1-)YRUH I
It has been reported in the US press that high altitude nuclear
e xplo s AtpleatiethE ardRatieta se-120:00M /08r1164ABFORWEIN/%754M083016110002 -4
rockets have considerable effect on Lommunications based on the use of
tropospheric and ionospheric scatter and disturb their operation for long
periods of time.
Presently new ultrashort-wave radio stations operating on a principle
using the ionized trails of meteorites in the upper layers of the etnmsphere
are almost in the operational stage in the armies of the, major countries.
When analyzing the technical capabilities for providing communications
in modern warfare, it should be considered that it would be difficult at
present to name any universal means which would completely fulfill all
requirements for controlling troops and weapons. For this reason it is
very important to make use of all available means of communications, giving
preference to one or another according to concrete conditions.
With the extensive use of radioelectronic devices for controlling
troops, many other shortcomings appear, besides those already mentioned,
which decrease the reliability of communications. Iaterstation interference
arises between operating radioelectronic devices, especially when they are
located within a limited area as may be the case with tanks, afteraft, or
ships. Thus, the development of equipment which can provide reliable ,
communications in conditions of strong interference is a very important
task for radioelectronic specialists.
In this respect work abroad is being conducted in two directions.
First, measures are being taken to increase the interference-killing
features of conventional radio stations by several means, in particular
by using a one side band of a radiated spectrum for communications,
employing more effective antennas, carefully selecting frequencies with
sets which automatically search ehd tune them, increasing the output of
transmitters and the selectivity and sensitivity of receivers, using
various filtering attachments, and training specialists in the skills of
working in conditions of strong interstation, natural, and man-made
interference.
Second, radio communications systems are being used which are based
on new principles to find a radical solution to this problem. In particular,
the development of the secret and reliable systems called the Phantom by
General Electric and the Rasep by Martin Orlando has been reported in the
press. Both are based on the principle of using a wide frequency spectrum.
They have a high resistance to interference from stations operating near .by,
provide signal secrecy, and allow for high speed of transmission. According
to its manufacturer, the Phantom system will function satisfactorily even
when the enemy knows its general principles of operation and it operating
frequencies. The Rasep apparatus has even better characteristics. Such
systems greatly increase the stability of radio communications in conditions
of strong interference.
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U1-)YRUH I
Intercommunication and remote control by radio and radiorelay means
AiiprocieduFabrsigttleaiset2110014/00u014-RDIPZERT0011751a00011k0a9p11021.4141 by means
of laying cables' in a commAnd post, for example in a front-line ob"yedineniye)
over 200 kilometers of cable must be laid, which requires much time, and the
stability of this type of communications is very low. When control posts
are being moved, this probled cannot be solved with the aid of wire communication
Presently attempts are being made to develop radiotelephone stations
which would be analogous to conventional telephone stations without connecting
wires. 'Mese stations are often referred to in the press as automatic radio-
telephone systems. The AN/MRC-66 mobile radiocommunications system developed
in the US Army is one such radiotelephone station. The system consists of
one central and 16 subscriber stations and allows duplex, two-way telephone
converstations to be held simultaneously. The subscriber station equipment
is installed in small vehicles. The power and consequently the range of these
stations can be regulated. They may be operated within 15-20 kilometers of
the central station.
Besides communication between functionaries of control posts, it is
possible with this or a similar system to go from a subscriber station to
a radio or radiorelay station to receive communications over longer distances.
When similar systems are used in large control paints, the number of subscribers
can be increased, the mobility of the posts themselves can be improved, and
certain conveniences can be obtained by using the radio and radiorelay
communications channels while in movement.
Attempts to use higher frequencies in areas of radioelectronics have
been noted in foreign armies. What is called the problem of closeness in
either is successfully solved by transferring to these frequencier While
the transmission of a televisi,x1 picture is not possible by long -nd medium
waves, a large number of high. quality radio transmissions are practical and
12 television channels can be easily used in a small portion of the meter
waves. Several thousand television channels are practical with decimeter
and centimeter waves. In the centimeter wave band, one transmitter has such
a wide range that all radio transmissions conducted on long, medium, and
short waves can be completed.
Also, by decreasing the length of the wave, the capabilities of radar
and radio telemechanics are increased since the directivity of radiation
is increased which in its turn provides higher accuracy in determining thL
coordinates of targets in space and greater range for radiotechnical devices.
When all of these circumstances are taken into consideration, it
becomes evident that there are many possibilities presented by transferring
to infrared and light rays. The amount of information which can be trans-
mitted by one transmittor and the accuracy of determining coordinates
are sharply increased in these frequency ranges.
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Inlat4ots)ifiiWaigvtr .41144144rec eA aiai11
it rays have
5,6 010006g-4
difficulty of generating and amplifying electromagnetic oscillations in
these frequency ranges.
According to the foreign press, intensive work is currently being
conducted to decrease the length of the waves generated by ordinary
superhigh-frequency generators. The development of these shorter wave
lengths is based on the use of klystrons, magnetrons, and other electronic
devices. The essential part of all of these generators is the cavity
resonator Which must be of a size that approximately corresponds to the
length of the wave of the generated oscillations. Obviously, the preparation
of these resonators for wave lengths smaller than one millimeter is a very
complex technical task.
Lately a completely different means, the use of maser amplifiers and
generators, has been suggested to solve the problem of decreasing the
length of the wave of orginary superhigh-frequency generators. Their
prindle of operation is as follows. As is known, atoms and molecules
are alvrays in certain energetic conditions or, as is usually said, on
certain energetic levels. Transfer from one such condition to another is
acconpanied by radiation or absorption of a strictly determined amount of
energy. If the energy is divided into electromagnetic oscillations, their
frequency depends only on the difference between the initial and final
energetic condition of the atom or molecule. Consequently, electromagnetic
oscillations of practically any wave length may be achieved with this method.
Generators constructed on this principle are being used extensively
for communications with apace ships and between space ships. When the
distance between two stations is increased, the directivity of radiation'
must also be higher to develop sufficient voltage at the receiver input if
the transmitter continues to use the same power. The inherent small size
of maser generators causes them to be far superior to other generators in
regard to directivity of radiation. Transformed solar energy may be used
as a source of power for them. The use of maser instruments also presents
significant possibilities for ground radio communications. A practically
unlimited number of telephone conversations and television programs may be
transmitted and received by means of one such instrument.
The use of maser instruments in radar also presents great possibilities.
Ordinary radars cannot differentiate between targets located near one another
because of their wide antenna radiation patterns. High directivity of
radiation greatly corrects this shortcoming.
The possibility of using artificial earth satellites to increase the
range of communications on ultrashort-waves was first noted by Professor
P, V. SHMAKOV of the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute. When the Soviet
Union launched the first artificial earth satellite in 1957, the realization_
of this idea became practical.
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CPYRGHT
Present:lyforeign scientists in articular in the US and En are
AP PlimtskfottMfitcias.*29QPIPflagd: gen? IRPFAR9PANCLOSIP *-icial
earth satellites as passive and active relay stations. A passive communicaticns
satellite is a metallic or metallic covered sphere with a diameter of several
dozen meters. When radiations from a powerful earth radio station are directed
to such a metallic sphere, it becomes a source of secondary radiations which
may be received at other places on the earth's surface when the artificial
satellite is within their line of sight. An active communications satellite
must contain reception and transmission equipment with antennas and power
sources. Thus, this type of communications satellite operates like an ordinary
relay station in line radio communications.
An active communications satellite may be used in either low or high
orbits. When these satellites are used in low orbits they are equipped with
devices to store information when passing over a correspondence station and
to transmit this information when the satellite is within line of sight of
a second station.
Direct communications between gro%And stations by means of an artificial
satellite can be achieved by placing the satellite in a high orbit. When
an artificial satellite is in an orbit of approximately 5,000 kilometers,
direct communications can be maintained over a distance of 4,000 kilometers,
However, this communication will not be continuous since the satellite is
within line of sight of a point no longer than 30 minutes when the satellite
has a period of revolution of approximately 3 hours. Calculations have
shown that 28 of these satellites must be launched and placed in a polar
orbit at altitudes of approximately 5,000 kilometers to maintain continuous
coMmunications.
The use of an active commmications satellite moving in stationary,
i.e. 24 hour, orbit at an altite of approximately 36,000 kilometers, thus
completing one revolution per day, presents greater possibilities for
achieving long-range communications. This satellite would always be located
over the same point on the earth's surface.
Wire means of communicatioos have undergone extensive changes chiefly
under the influence of radioelectronics. High-freauency telephone and
telegraph equipment which can ..se one tigc-way line to provide a large number
of communications channels is finding wide use in wire communications.
Balanced cables can be used for se7eral tens and hundreds of telephone
channels and coaxial cables can handle over a thousand such telephone
channels. The secondary multiplexing of coaxial cables allows them to have
several telegraph cominunicatione channels in place of one telephone chaanel.
Special attention is being paid to the problem of mechanizing the
laying of cables for wire communications.. There are devices abroad which
allow underground cables to be laid at a speed of 4-5 kilometers per hour.
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CPYRGHT
Experiments are being conducted with helicopters
The S WAN WA's CdAr-Ce09?:4 - tbeitOtti
that of joining individual operating segments of heavy cables and covering
lines,
-? ?
skiS!
-
There is no doubt that with sufficient development of
equipmen, wire communications will be used extensively in
in connection with radiorelay communications. Their value
those conditions when radio communications may be hindered
interference and cannot be used to control troops.
multiplexing
modern operations
is increased in
by manmade radio
The use of video communications for controlling troops is often met
with in literature. Facsimile radio, video telephone, and facsimile
television communications and television are all understood by the collective
term video communications.
All of these types of transmission, except facsimile radio communications,
require very wide channels are are practical ?illy when used on multichannel
radiorelay lines. In view of this, the US Army doubts very much the expediency
of the extensive use of television) facsimile television, and also video
telephone communications for conolling troops.
It is perfectly acceptable to use standard telephone channels for facsimile
radio communications. Facsimile radiocommunications apparatus is now available
which allows large messages to be transmitted at high speed. This equipment
is especially important for the rapid transmission of maps, graphs, charts,
and drawings.
In regard to television communications, certain excessiviely optimistic
opinions, including those of the US Army, have been changed to more sober
judtglents concerning its capabilities. Admittedly aerial reconaissanceAs
the only realm in which television is now being used. Further experimentation
is being conducted to develop sufficiently perfected television equipment
and methods for using it for troop control.
Of course, as radioelectronic means of control are perfected, the methods
of their use are modified. The development of tropospheric and iOnospheric
communications equipment, the evalution of multichannel wire and radiorelay
systems, and the achieved use of artificial earth satellites for communications,
which have all taken place in the better developed countries, allow a global
system of communications which operates reliably in any conditions to be
established. Considerable attention is being paid to secret communications,
the speed with which they can be set up and used, their maneuverability, and
their invulnerability from fire and radiotechnical influences.
Modern communications systems will be an aggregate of technically
developed nets and communications stations which are interconnected by
various multichannel lines. In accordance with inherent requirements,
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CPYRGHT
a system of control will always be developed for each system, but all systems
AppeaverbFoltRtaeaw20(0010840.904CitioaDETATMOURADMMQ002-4n operation
and battle. Finally, the development of radioelectronics makes it possible
for commprs and staffs to utilize modern means of warfare effectively and
exercise accurate troop control.
The use of radioelectronics for contrel of combat means is becoming
even more widespread. It is difficult to find a means of combat whose
effectiveness to some degree is not dependent upon radioelectronics. It is
not surprising therefore that the expenditures, for example, on the radio-
electronic equipment of modern aircraft or spaceships is approximately half
of their total cost. Without radioelectronics, long-range rockets would be
simply unthinkable.
The use of radioelectronics for controlling weapons and equipment is
called telemechanics or radio telemechanics. In the Military, telemechanics
are most widely used in various systems for controlling and guiding various
types of rocket weapons. They are also used in systems of autonomous
control, in which all necessary equipment is installed in the missile or
rocket and the flight order is determined prior to launch, and in remote
control systems, in which the flight of a missile is corrected by commands
or signals which are sent from ground stations. Another wide application
is in homing systems in which the missile is guided to the target by
signals radiated by radar apparatus on the missile and reflected by the
target itself. Finally, missiles may be guided by radionavigation equipment.
There is no need to elaborate on the importance of the role of radio
electronic equipment on guided missiles, for without it their effectiveness
would be so decreased that in. general their use would Ot-be expedient.
Radioelectronic equipment is aTso osed to control surface ships, submarines,
and torpedoes, and for the remote ecio.rol of mine fields
Lately the use of radio telemechanics for controlling aircraft his
received wider use. This is especially important when conducting aerial
reconaissance over regions strongly. protented by means of air defense and
when testing new types of flying a,epareto,s, With the high speeds of modern
combat aircraft it would 5e diff:inult veetoy an aircraft tO a target
without speCial radioelectronic systems, Therefore, such systems are finding
ever increasing use in both air defense and aviation.
Radioelectronic systems are used in many armies o control cannon and
machine guns, particularly on ships or heavy aircraft.
The triumph of radio telemachanics is the development and use of
apparatus to control the Vostok spaceships whose launch, flight, and landing
was carried out by the USSR with astonishing precision ay radioelectronic
equipment.
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CPYRGHT
Telemechanics present inlnortant ?ossibilities for controllin
armoredkRierirsi,R916kM174-10Q191?3(Y6: iagclif4i4PPligoilg5R99
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areas of strong radioactive contamination.
tanks
9R9Webtgh
Electronic computers are a special form of the use of radioelectronics
in military affairs and one of its greatest achievements. Presently many
problems involved in the control of combat weapons and troops are being
solved with electronic computers. Theoretical research is being conducted
in the armies of the best developed countries and the first steps have
already been made for developing a complex automated system for controlling
troops and combat equipment.
As reported in the foreign press, several automated systems of control
may be used in the armed forces, for example, in combined-arms, rocketry and
artillery, rear services, or air defense systems.
it must be pointed out that communications channels which permit the
transmission of large flows of information with high accuracy, for instance
no more than one distortion for 100,000 signs, are necessary for the successful
functioning of such a system. Thus, much effort must be directed toward
replacing several existing means with more perfected ones.
Electronics computers in automated control systems can summarize,
process, and visually portray data on friendly troops, enemy troops, and
the character of terrain. They allow operational and technical calculations
to be made on the correlation of forces; the combat use of nuclear wee- xas,
aircraft, air defense means, and radio countermeasures; and material and
technical support. Ground and aerial situations can be portrayed and various
types of reference data can be received on the output devices of electronic
computers.
The increasing use of serious radiotechnical devices for controlling
troops and combat equipment has correspondingly increased the capabilities
of radio reconaissance which is one of the most important aspects for
providing control. During World War 11 the German intelligence received
over 70% of their data on the enemy by means of radio reconaissance. Presently
almost all devices used for military reconaissance are based on the use of
radioelectronics. These include radio direction finders, radars, sonars,
heat seeking devices, radio receivers of vr.rious systems, infrared equipment,
et cetera.
Foreign armies conduct radio reconaissance by using radio receivers
for search and intqrcept v'fli automatic tracking and visual protrayal of
the intercepted signal. Sul..)lementary attachments to this equipment allow
the interception of such difficult transmissions as rapid operating, printer,
multichannel, and multiplex transmissions. They can also be used for decoding
and performing technical analysis of ..he complex forms of received signals.
The location of operating transmitters can be quidkly and precisely determined
by means of radio direction finders.
52
A
UI-'(FH I
Radiotechnica
DPUMEItERrsRell@aafr
0#3?'s1..,;14tg?P
I ? ..11
?
? I
It?iY6
of various radar devices which permit the detection
aerial, ground, or underwater targets at long range
their speed0
micampola2alitary
se'''!IiiTote a multitude
and surveillance of
and without ragard to
Air defense and radar reconaissance would no longer be effective
without the extensive use of radar. This, equipment may be used to observe
aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic rockets and to locate various
combat equipment to aid in the development of necessary conditions for
the destruction of these targets.
The most valuable quality of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance
is not only tna:, it can locate targets, but that it can constantly rToehme
the coordinates of these objects while they are in movement at long range
and at high speed regardless of the time of year, time of day, or weather
conditions. While radic techaiaal devices are carrying out this most '
important function, they remain essentially unnoticed by the enemy.
There is every reason to believe that the role of radiotechnical means
for conducting reconnaissance will grow in step with the extension of their
use for controlling troops and cambat equipment?
A great many various measures designed to, suppress the operation of
radioelectronie apparatus are being studied ir. countries hostile to us.
Consider only the question of using radiotechnical equipment, as advocated
by the foreign press, interfere with enemy means for controlling troops and
weapons.
As in other realms of military affairs, the role of radioelectronics
cannot be overevaluated easily here. Disrept ion of the operation of the
radioclectroaic devices, for example, in antiaircraft defense ard especially
antirocket defense in a general sense :1_inainates these systems. It is not
sarprising therefore that the main efforts in the realm of combatting enemy
radioelctronia means is directed toward suppressing various radiotelemetry
devices whict are the basis of the contr.D1 of weapons and combat equipment.
It has been noted that wark is being conducted in two main areas. One
area envisages the development of systems which interfere with the operation
of radiotechnical devices mounted in weapons of attack. Large power trans-
mitters deployed on the ground, in aircraft, and on ships or radiation
apparatus in antimissile missiles may be used for this purpose The other
area includes the development of means for suppressing a communications
sys-mi to a degree that the necessary commands for bringing various combat
complexes into combat readiness can no longer be transmitted.
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CPYRGHT
Both of these methods are combined into a defined rinciple governing
theirApproatedaForeRplepsze 3000104:109siCa-Rantung OfaCtiVANq -4
systems are equipped with radiotechnical devices to some degree and since
their effective use depends on reliable and accurate operation of radio-
electronic apparatus, means of combatting enemy radioelectronic systems
receive a great amount of attention in the armies of the NATO doUntries.
Basin emphasis is being placed on increasing the speed of detecting
operating radioelectronic systems and the accuracy of their suppressing them.
Tat ly many books have been published devoted" to such subjects as radio
counterrnasures, radio warfare, and combatting enemy radioelectronic weapons.
Often claims are made in literature concerning the possibility of completely
suppressing radiotechnical r'evices and cutting off the control of troops and
callbat complexes. Of course, the perfection of Aeans for creating radio
interference and the development of methods for using them are very important
tasks. However, it must not be forgotten that radiated interference not only
has an effect on the radioelectronic equipment of the enemy, but bhuthat of
friendly troops. For this reason the mass usage of all means will occur only
in those cases when it is not necessary to use friendly radiotechnical means
which operate within the same range of frequencies. Obviously, these moments
are rare in modern highly maneuverable combat action and the question of
this usage of radio suppression means will have to be decided individually
on the basis of the complexity of a situation.
All of these problems have caused radioelectronics specialists to
explore new frequencies, other methods of generating these frequencies, and
new ways for using radio interference means to derive a maximum effect
without influencing the operation of friendly radiotechnical neaps.
The basis developmental directions for the use of radioeisctronic
equipment to control troops and combat equipment have been pointed out in
this article. There are many other realms of military affairs where
radioelectronic means are considered as an organic or very important part
of equipmcnt. Finally; it must be said that the status of the teqhnical
equipment uf the armed forces, the increase in effectiveness of the means
of air defense, and the status of a defensive capability are completely
dependent -upon the level of the development and introduction of radioelectronics.
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Approved F?Edifigaandyna3/1 ?
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CPYRGHT
iq9,41INE89191RIME3911RNAg2-4
by Maj Gen Intend Serv A? MOSICVM,
Maj S YEREMIlio and Eto FINKEL'SIETEYN
Operations analysis is a new area of science which has not yet been
comyletely formulated. Possibly this is the reason why the development
and implementation of the methods of operations analysis sometimes encounter
incorrect understanding of the substance and problc as of this scientific area
on the part of certain generals and officers. %Don consideration of the
great importance of the extensive use of operations analydis methods in
military affairs, the conclusion must be drawn that the publication of the
article, "The Substance and Problems of the Theory of Operations Analysis,"
(Voyennaya Mysl' I No 7, l963)? was timely and very u:.;eful.
The large number of commens which have betn received concerning
this article indicate that the generals and officers of our Armed Forces
have a great interest in this scientific area.
As was correctly noted in the majority cf -the responses, the article
contained many correct ideas and interesting thoughts, but at the same time
it contained many inprecise formulations and debatable statements which
have been the cause of much enlivened, discussion.
The topics which evoked ,,he greatest differences of opinion were the
definition of the theory of operations research, the role of the commander
in the decision making process, the classification of accepted methods of
analysis, and the interrelation between the theory of operations research
and other sciences, particularly cybernetics.
We shall attempt to examine and analyze critically some of these
topics.
Two definitions of the theory of research analysis were presented in
the first anticle.. The first was, .he theory of operation research
determines and analytically describes the natural laws in various processes
to achieve quant itat lye farandations or recommendations based on quantitative
foundations for making decisions" (p 17 ) ? The second was that "operations
research is the theory of making decisions, It establishes 'general laws
for the processes of making decisi:ms in many practical areas and produces
general methods for investigating aid, finding optimal solutions to a great
number of practical problems- (..p 26
It seems to us that the first definition should not indicate that the
laws of' a process are described analytically since in certain cases they may
be described by other means., for ins-;:m.rice statistically. The second definiti-:,!...
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identAIVICIVOLftqbaeigfltsAr.?-ggM9litEnPINI5R0875R-1)0?00090002-4
eory or decision making
whose very existence may be doubted. It was not by chance that many authors
of responses objected to these definitions and offered their own which were
not always unsuccessful. Thus, Engr-Maj YU. PEVNITSKIY wrote, "the theory
of operations analysis is the scientific discipline concerned with the analysis
of similar elements of different operations or organized action, the structural
unification of different elements, the discovery of similar structures, and
the development of models of operations and their quantitative analysis to
achieve a scientific basis for the rational' decisions made by the executive
organs in the process of control" (Voyennaya Iva', No 2, 196)4, page 39).
In our opinion this definition correctly states the basic purpose of
the scientific discipline under consideration here, but its formulation has
two essential shortcomings. First, in spite of the fact that many words are
used, It contains terms which in themselves need defining, such as elements,
structures, and similar elements. Second, there maybe operations which do
not have similar elements and similar structu-es. A special instruction for
the determination of topics which are complec,uly divorced from operations
evidently would not seem rational.
Now let us consider the definition given by Maj Gen (Res) M. SMIRNOV
(VoyennaELSEL'? No 12, 1963, page 38). Concerning the object of the
theory of operations analysis, he writes, "this is the analysis of the many
various processes and phenomena of armed combat; the character of the
eombat activity of troops; the problems of commanding them in a nuclear
and rocket war; the application, use, and design of weapons and combat
equipment; and the methods of the troop control."
This difinition restricts the theory of operations analysis completely
without basis. It would be supposed that, this theory is of no concern to
operations of a nonmilitary character. This definition also has other
insignificant shortcomings.
It seems to us that before expounding on a concept of the theory of
operations analysis, we should determine our concept of operations in the
wide sense of this word
Theoverwelming majority of Soviet and foreign scientists working in
this area understand operations to mean the process of the work of people
and machines organized for the execution of determined tasks. On the basis
of this aeCinition we allow the inclusion of a great number of processes
related to military affairs, economics, and other realms of human activity
which have many analogous qualities. This last condition allows similar
mathematical methods to be employed for analysis of these processes.
This broadened interpretation of the term operation is objected to by
many militaly specialists who have become assustomed to using this word in
its narrow sense in strategic operations, frontal operations, etc. However,
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CPYRGHT
ApprONIKEPPIIWPaMingnal99thCIAIRPNAINFARNPAR9g9Vertkons in the
wide sense of the word is so widely accepted, as we have already stated,
that there is obviously no sense in using a new word for this same meaning,
although in principlc tha use of any new term is possible. The following
may serve as examples of the slmplest operations or combat processes which
are studied by mathematioal methods: ne processes of searching for and
detecting targets in aerial reconnaissance and detection by air defense,
antimissile defense, antislibmarine warfare, and other systems; the processes
employed by complexes for the destruction of enemy targets, such as the
launching of ballistic rockets, firing artillery, bombing from aircraft, etc.
the processes employed in defensive complexes, including both active and
passive means; the processes employed in deploying troops, combat equipment,
and support elements; and the processes employed in controlling the combat
activities of troops.
The subject or object of analysis in the science under consideration
here is the process which is directed to the achievement of a determined
goal. Thus, the process is understood as a whole phenomenon with all the
various factors which determine lts direction and final result. After the
understanding of the term operation in the wide sense of the work is
understood, a definition of the theory of operations to work out quantitative
bases to make decisions or give orders.
a
Professor Ye I.Enn, correctly pointed out in his article that the
course of a process Js usually determined by three groups of parameters:
1. Parameters which are determined beforehand and are not dependent on us.
These Include the characteristic's of means being employed and the laws of
nature which influence the course of a process, etc. 2. Parameters whose
value must be considered as recommendations for making a decision.
3. Chance factors which are not precisely known and are not dependent on
us, i.e., those factors which are governed by the laws of probability or
improbability which, for example, include enemy operations (ymnnaally.!111,
No 4, 1964),
When working out quantitative bases for making a decision, operations
analysts are concerned with the stuly of the influence of chosen values of
parameters of the second gronp on, the course of a process and its result.
We recall that the choice of the 2arameter values of the second group also
determines the decision for contrciling operations. Having considered that
certain parameters of the first and third group may have different values
in different situations, operations analysts consider the many varients of
the different value of the parameters of the indicated groups. Thus,
operations analysis is used for making a basic decision with any given
parameter values of the first and third groups, i.e., in any given conditions.
The theory of operations analysis has characteristic features:
1. A given process is studied as a whole. In other words operations
analysis is characterized, by a transfer from analysis of individual stages
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and aspects or a process, which is the concern of various special sciences
s'.4ch as the theories of firing and bombing, the theory of effectiveness, etc.,
to the complex consideration of processes. 2. As a rule mathematical models
of processes under study are developed for analysis. Depending on the
character of a process and the goal of the analysis, models may differ both
in the application of mathematical methods and in the character of the assmup-
tions? for instance simplifications accepted in constructing the models.
3. Objective laws of a process are discerned by using mathematical models.
Mathematical models make it possible to derive quantitative bases for
selecting rational means or plans for controlling a process. 4. The latest
computing equipment, means of conwinication, mapping, etc. are used in
conducting operPions research.
The purpose of the analysis of a control process and the role of a
commander in making a decision are very important to this discussion. We '
shall present our unde2standing of these topics.
ordinarily a rational decision is predetermined by the goal and tasks
of operations, i.e., it is directly dependent upon them.
Goals and tasks cannot always be successfully ex-pressed identically,
i.e., by means of a single formal cirterion. For example, when conducting
combat operations, we are of course interested in inflicting the largest
possible losses on the enemy and keeping our own to a minimum. However,
the time in which a combat operation is carried out is also important. Of
all possible plans, the one which permits a combat assignment to be executed
in the shortest time may be selected, but this plan for conducting an
cy.peration does not always keep the losses of our reserves to a minimum.
The following example may illustrate this point.
Suppose we have a combat assignment to seize a fortified town. It
maybe token by frontal assault. The losses inflicted on the attacking
troops is usually great, but the assignment is completed quickly. This
same assignment in be executed by laying seige to the town and bombarding
it with means of destruction. After a long period of time the enemy will
have to surrender the town without offering serious resistance. The
second method requires much more time, but it allows the combat assignment
to be executed with fewer losses of our troops in comparison to the losses
which would have to be endured in taking the town by frontal assault.
Thus, if the criterion of the plan of operations is the time required for
the execvtion for the combat assignment, preference must be given to the
frontal assault. On the other hand, if the criterion is the losses of
our troops, laying siege to the town is to be preferred. Mathematical
methods perm-t the optimal decision to be found with any criteria.
As long as we are interested in the losses of our troops, the enemy
losses, and the time for executing combat assignment in planning operations,
the following usually occurs. A basic or main criterion which produces
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AppparrAFRirs-PiE0aRe I99 810However,
a plan of operation is not selected from all possible plans, but only from
those in which the requirements of other criteria are met. For example,
=my losses may be selected as a basic criteria. Then, a plan is searched
for which will achieve maximal enemy losses while our losses and the time
required for the execution of the assignment do not exceed established
requirements.
The choice of a basic criterion and conditions limited by other
criteria is not made on the basis of one combat _assignment, but with
calculation of the more general problems of conducting a war. Existing
mathematical methods do not yet make it possible to derive constructive
methods of choosing a basic criterion and limiting conditions for particular
operations. The solution of this problem is presently entrusted completely
to the commander, i.e., to the person or organ entrusted with making the
decision. Obviously the collection of quantitative bases for making a
decision is not a single act. After receiving the results of calculations,
the commander may suggest that repeated calculations be carried out in
view of changing limiting conditions, cirteria, etc. The process considered
here is essentially a process with feedback in which the final choice of
a decision remains with the commander.
It must be noted that orginarily a mathematical model of a process
used to derive quantitative bases does not fully reflect the process itself.
It is constructed by schamatiing the process and does not take into considera-
tion many factors which may be essential. A commander cannot avoid the
influence of these factors when making a decision. This circumstance
reemphasizes the fact that the decision must be made by the commander and
that operations analysis like the automation of control does not decrease
the role of the commander but broadens his capabilities. Thus, we must
agree with the critics that the article imprecisely determined the distribution
of functions between commanders and operations analysts and did not emphasize
the decisive role of the commander, namely that he is the person responsible
for making the decision (ys=yEJLElf, No 71 1963).
Some authors note correctly that a commander must have a definite
understanding of mathemetics to skillfully evaluate and know7adgably utilize
the potential of mathematical. methods and the results achieved through
analysis.
The article, "The Substance and Pmblems of the Theory of Operations
Analysis" suggested that two different methods of mathematical prediction
be differentiated as mathematical modeling and estimating effectiveness.
This suggestion evoked criticism from several authors and not without reason.
Any model used in operations analysis as a rule determines the idea of
effectiveness to a certain degree. Mathematical models must be constructed
to determine effectiveness. Thus, there should hardly be any though of
dividing the methods of operations analysis into methods for evaluating
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CPYRGHT
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moaeling. mathematical moceling as a rule
is not done as an end to itself, but to evaluate effectiveness and determine
the dependence of effectiveness on many factors.
Much attention has been devoted to whether operations analysis is an
organic part of cybernetics. Here, we are in complete agreement with the
opinion of Professor Ye. VENTISEL' who suggested that there was hardly any
need for discussion of this question since nothing could be gained by it.
(Voyennaya Misr, No 4, 1964).
We shall touch briefly on the question of the interrelationship between
operations analysis anC military art. It is well known that the use of
mathematical methods in the natural sciences produces very advantageous
results. It makes it possible to express clearly and concisely those
existing laws inherent in phenomena. However, the use of mathematics does
not replace the work of appropriate specialists, but enriches and broadens
their capabilities. In spite of the many peculiarities of combat operations,
they lend themselves excellently to the use of mathematics in military
analysis. Military art is not replaced by these analyses, but instead
receives a powerful slIpplementary tool which has justified itself many
times in various realms of science.
Close relations between military art specialists and specialists in
the theory of operations research makes it possible to derive more valid
and thorough conclusions. A definite knowledge of mathematics on the part
of specialists in military art and a thorough knowledge of military art on
the part of operations analysts are essential aids in the fruitful development
of military art and the theory of operations analysis.
We note in conclusion that publication of the article "The Substance
and 7.'nblems of the Theory of Operations Analysis" in the journal Voyennaya
Misl' and the subsequent discussion are of great use. First, in spite of
the many points which lend themselves to agrument, the article contains new
and interesting opinions. Second, the discussion is attracting the increased
attention of military specialists to developments in the realm of operations
analysis.
We are in complete agreement with the position of Professor Ye. MUTSU'
that this journal should often publicize examples of successful decision
making involving methods of operations analysis. This will be the best
presentation of the most extensive use of these methods.
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?
5i-
?
Approved F EifiF2trats IMRE? alp pmungteRREE 9 112-4
by Anny e1i Bolgunir Lomsizr., Minister of National Defense of
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CPYRGHT
In the fall of 1964 the entire Czechoslovak nation observes the
20th anniversary of the Slovak national uprising and the 20th anniver-
sary of the Karpatsko-Dukelsky Operation, during which troops of the
1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR marched onto the territory of
their fatherland side by side with the Soviet Army) having seized
Dukla Paso in sustained battles.
The Czechoslovak National Army has traversed a glorious path. The
process of its building is inseparately linked with the struggle against
fascism, with the development of our whole society) from the national
democratic revolution and victorious February to the victory of social-
ism in Czechoslovakia, and with the building of a well-developed social-
ist society in the glorious days of present tines.
Every country has bright and shady pages in its history. In the
joyous present-day realities of socialist construction we ought to
remember those events which are dismal chapters in the life of our
nation. TO those chapters belong the Munich agreement and the subse-
quent period of occupation of the fatherland by Hitler's Germany,
bringirg to our people, just as to the other em3laved peoples of Europe,
infiete suffering.
The Czech and Slovak peoples, despite the cruelest persecution from
the fascist occupants, remained =subdued and carried on the struggle
against ?fascism with guns in hand, not only on the territory of our
country, but also on all fronts of the Second, World War. Our people under-
stood well at their most difficult hour that not everyone who pretended
to be a friend and ally of Czechoslovakia was determined to prove this by
their deea.s. The so-called western allies treated us this way.
As they say in a popular proverb -- a friend in need is a friend
indeed -- the Czechoslovak people are again convinced that their sole
friend and real aPy is the Soviet Union, which openly and repeatedly warned
of the eminent danger of Mach and consistently and boldly defended the
interests of the Czechoslovak people. To it belongs the highest merit in
liquidating the conseqpences of the shameful Munich capitulation.
On the eve of the 20th anniversary of the Czechoslovak National Army
we can confidently say, judging by the path covered by it, that thanks to
the great friendship and. alliance with the Soviet Union and its army)
thanks to our membership in the mighty world socialist system and the organ-
ization of the Warsaw Treaty, we can now direct all our efforts to making -
our fatherland more beautiful, richer, and stronger) and gather strength
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AcrtPrfrfkilaPrifilati9,369 a0Agig8ifteldclkaiiPIWM7.5R000300090002-4
In 1938, the fatal year of the Mach agreement, communists were
the only political force in our country demanding that the Czechoslovak
army be ready to defend our fatherland in the face of the growing
, threat of aggression from fascist Germany.
However, disregarding national interests, the ruling CzechosloVak
bourgeoisie and the then military command capitulated at the decisive
Ailment and surrendered the nation to Hitler into slavery. At first
Czechoslovakia was broken up and then, on 15 March 1939, it was
occuppied. The army's munitions fell into the hands of the aggressor.
The nation was consciously and deliberately disarmed.
- But the Czechoslovak people dil not give upl did not capitulate.
The struggle against enslavement of the coua..-7 by Hitler's imperialism
became the main turning point in the development of Czechoslovakia.
Only a struggle against the occupation could help us win freedom against
and restore the sovereignty of Czechs and Slovaks.
The program developed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for
a national liberation struggle was based on the party's policy in the
priod of the growing fascist threat to our republic. It was a continua-
tion and development of that policy. It envisaged not only restoration
of the Czechoslovak State, but also a struggle for something really new,
for a national democratic Czechoslovakia.
To do this, it was necessary to expand the struggle of the whole
country against the occupation forces under the leadership of the work-
ing class. Efforts for an alliance of our national liberation struggle
with the antifascist movement, in which the Soviet Union played a deci-
sive role, were an intzral part of the party line for expanding the
resistance movement for liberation.
The Communist Party, on the basis of objective requirements of the
liberation struggle, was convinced that the center of the struggle had
to be on a front within the country, and guided our people 'to an orderly
transition from lower forms of resistance to higher forms of the struggle,
to armed combat against the occupation forces, and thus showed the only
way leading to restoration of the nation's freedom and its social libera-
tion.
After 15 March 1939, the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie once and for all
lost its right to guide the nation and its fate. Its political representa-
tives,Alead
roviydwitieretaairdorabelad. alm6ipg5itotedimmogadtii.
62
:;:
r
14.
CPYRGHT
APPRATaralie48#PARP/g/22ridgib-RRP5Pol.:ZgEMPEPPAN
which envisaged: restoration of bourgeois social relations in the CSR
and oriented their foreign policy to that of Western imperialist states.
This was a concept of passiveness in the resistance movement, having a
goal of further limiting the scope of the people's armed antifascist
movement.
Comparing these different, and in many respects opposing, programs
for a national liberation movement, it is not difficult to understand
that the interests of the Working class, headed by the CPC) objectively
conformed with the interests of our people.
The working class of Czechoslovakia naturally relied first of all on
help from the Soviet Union. The Soviet natiun, true to the ideals of
proletarian internationalism, in the period of the Great Patriotic War
fought not only for the freedom of their fatherland and the independence
. of their people, but also for restoration of the national freedom and
-sovereignty of enslaved European nations.
Fascist Germany's insidious attack on. the Soviet Union and its entry
into the Second World War were the turning points in the struggle of the
enslaved nations of Europe, including the peoples of Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet Union -- one of the first of the great states -- recognized
the London Czechoslovak government in exile and the pre-war boundaries of
Czechoslovakia. Soon after the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet
Union, on 5 July 1941, the USSR asked representatives of the Czechoslovak
government to conclude an agreement on joint operations against a common
enemy. On 18 July 1941, an agreement between the USSR and the Czechoslovak
Republic was signed in which the governments of both countries committed
themselves to rendering aid and mutual support of all kinds in the war
against Hitler's Germany. Specific measures for the formation of a
Czechoslovak military chest' on the territory of the USSR were determined
by a military agreement between the High Command USSR and the CSR, signed
27 September 1941.
The Soviet government, having created all the conditions for a forma-
tion of Czechoslovak trrops, proceeded from the premise in the very begin-
ning that Czechoslovak troops in the USSR were to be an integral part of
the Czechoslovak Axny and this position, consolidated in signed Chech-
Soviet agreements, vas fully and strictly observed. The formation of a
Czechoslovak military chast? was begun in Ihmaluk in the beginning of 1942.
After creation of a Czechoslovak chast' capable of executing a combat
and political mission based on the needs c.f. our national liberation struggle,
it was important that personnel of this chast? understand the political
harm of the London policy and, under the leadership of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia, set a course in common with our whole resistance movement.
-
TlikplialxvexixEctiasstelate2ONItitttgaLtezia-RIDR8.57)1108175R0001300090002-4
Czechoslovak military chast being formed in the USSR occurred after a
visit to Buzuluk, on: 27 May 1942, by representatives of the CPC leader-
ship, who were located in Moscow. Comrade Klement Gottwald's speech,
which dealt with the CPC's position on the basic problems of our resis-
tance movement and. the tasks of the Czechoslovak troops in the USSR,
was of fundamental significance for the correct political orientation
of personnel of the chast'. It strengthened the prestige of the
Communist Party and the progressive forces in it, and weakened the in-
fluence of London.
This was in the period of intensive fighting on. the Volga and was
reflected in the fact that the chast' commander? Ludvik Svoboda, on the
genral wishes of all the servicemen, requested the Soviet Supreme
Command (despite the opposition of the London bourgeois government) to
send Czechoslovak soldiers to the front more quickly. Our request was
approved. At the most difficult time for the Soviet Union, when many
doubted it could. achieve victory, Czechoslovak soldiers in the USSR --
the first foreign military formation -- participated decisively, with
weapons in hand, in the common struggle against Hitler's Germany.
The combat path of the emerging Czechoslovak National Army from
Buzuluk to the captial of the republic --Prague -- was a glorious one.
The 1st Czechoslovak Separate Battalion received its baptism of
fire near the village of Sokolov? as a component of the 25th Soviet
Guards Division of the 3d Guards Tank Armj. In stubborn fighting it
carried out its assigned mission with honor. Sr Lt Otokar JAROS,
commander of the 1st company, was the first foreigner to be awarded the
lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The battalion became the nucleus of the 1st Czechoslovak Separate
Brigade, which was formed in Novokhopersk and; as a component of the
38th Army, participated in battles for the liberation of Kiev, the
capital of the Ukraine, and, as a component of the 40th Army, liberated
Fastov and Belaya Tserkov". The brigade participated in the Korsunl-
Shevchenkovskiy operation and in the course of subsequent battles came
out in an area, west of Lutsk.
For military skill, heroism, and courage displayed in the battles
for Kiev, the brigade was awarded the Order of Survorov 2d Class, and
the Order of Bogdan Khmel'uitskiy 1st Class for participation in battles
for the liberation of Belaya Tserkov'. Three soldiers became bearers of
the Gold Stars of Hero of the Soviet Union.
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CPYRGHT
ApprOVecif gElleke.A%egyMONRiAA-RPIRB?INUARNONOKKKR4usly in
the ranks of Belorussian and Ukrainian partisan detachments. One of
them, the organizer and conmaander of a partisan detachment of Slovak
servicemen, Ian NELEEKk who fell in battles for the liberation of
Ovruchl was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
Battles for the liberation of Kiev were being fought on the eve of
the signing of a treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and postwar coopera-
tion between the USSR and the CSR. This treaty became the foundation of
Czechoslovakia's new foreign policy orientation, aimed at permanent close
cooperation, friendship, alliance, and economic collaboration with. the
Soviet Union, for which the CPC had been fighting for so maw years. The
treaty was a manifestation of the respect and sympathy of our people for
the people of the Soviet Union.
At a time when Soviet forces were approaching the Carpathians after
a successful spring and summer offensive in 1944, hesitant Czechs
voluntarily enlisted in our chest' and together with the Slovaks, who had
shifted to the side of the Soviet Union earlier, multiplied the ranks of
our soldiers. On 10 April 1944, the formation of the 1st Czechoslovak
Army Corps was begun, which gradually included three infantry brigades, a
tank brigade, an airborne brigade, and subsequently, other chasti. A
separate Czechoslovak Air Regiment was also formed.
Resistance to the occupation in Czechoslovakia continued to grow
under the leadership of the CPC, which had endured great hardships, in
the form of sabotage against plants, railroads, and agriculture. Combat
actions of the Czechoslovak partisans were livening up.
In 1944, under effective help from the Soviet Union, the partisan
movement in Slollakia was particularly braodening. The combat operations
of partisans on roads and in the rear of HItler's armies fighting on the
Soviet-German Front caused the fascists great complications. The Slovak
nation answered Hitler's attempt to occupy Slovakia with decisive resis-
tance; with guns in hand they entered the national liberation struggle
against the fascist occupiers. Through a powerful national uprising the
Slovak people demonstrated their resolve to stand together with the peoples
fighting against fascism. The city of BanS10, Bystryca became the center
of the Slovak national uprising. Fierce bloody battles against the German
fascist divisons were fought on 29 August 1944.
The situation arising in Slovakia after the outbreak of the Slovak
national uprising was very difficult. Therefore, at the end of 19441 the
CPC leadership located in MOSCOW asked the Soviet goverment for help.
On 2 September 19441 the Soviet government decided to prepare ezbl conduct
an operation to aid the rebels with part of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian
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Front. When the Karpatsko-Dukelsky Operation began on 8 September 1?44,
the 1st4cpcbuetbFa1r RecipaStergeONOPI9dsCtifitWatigtnigailOgn41.e ? .7 Og2-4
this Front. An airborne brigade and the Czechoslovak Separate Air Regi-
ment operated deep in the rear of the enemy.
The fireceness of the prolonged and serious battles is well known.
Those who fought for the freedom of the Czech and Slovak people will
never forget these battles. At Dukla, Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers
sealed a true fighting friendship with their bloodshed.
It was wonderful and portentious to stand side by side with the
Soviet Army on native soil aftee so many years. If there had been no
USSR, its heroic people, or its invincible army, we could never have had
those unforgettable minutes which will remain forever in the minds of
those who fought in this struggle. In the toughest battles at Dukla a
famous slogan was born which is dear to the hearts of all people of
Czechoslovakia, 'With the Soviet Union for Eternity.' But at the time
the minds of our soldiers were burning with the memories of the Munich
treachery of the Western powers and the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie. At
Dukla, on the newly won piece of native land for which so many had given
their most precious possession -- life, we damned those who committed
and surrendered our native land to the enemy into slavery without even a
fight.
Liberation of Czechoslovakia began with the capture of Dukla Pass
and this was an effective aid to the resistance movement against fascist
occupation. No one doubted for a minute that the Soviet Array, with
mighty strikes of the 1st, 2d, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, would liberate
our whole country and victoriously, end the war. Troops of the 1st
Czechoslovak Array Corps and the 1st Czechoslovak Air Division, together
with Czech and Sloval.. partisans, made a. worthy contribution to the libera-
tion of our native land and complete victory over fascism.
Sokolov?, Kiev, Fastov? Belaya Tserkov', Zhashkov, Lutsk, Dukla
Pass, Jaslo, Povazke? Sliesko, Ostrawa? Prague -- that was the glorious
combat path traversed by Czechoslovak soldiers beginning in the spring of
1943, arm in arm with the Soviet Army.
We observe 6 October, th -aptuxe of Dukla Pass, as Czechoslovak
National Army Day. On that day we marched onto native lnnd and during the
liberation of our fatherland united the two basic streams of the national
liberation struggle -- soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in
the USSR and partisans fighting on the territory of the CSR. The joining
of these two forces was the foundation of the formation of the Czectoslovak
National Army. The battles at Dukla occupy a significant place in the
combat traditions of our nation and its armed forces. The historical
experience of our nation that only close friendship with the Soviet Union,
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66
with its heroic people and army., is the reliable bulwark of our national
ApOibitikinFtlidRe61W61621500/0/99r: MAPROP(815100876R00061000)9000214mc a at
Ukla. The Soviet Union. again. demonstrated with the Karpatsko-Dukelsky
Operation its determilation to fulfill its international obligations
regarding our people, which stem from its humane goals of the liberation
-CPYRGHT struggle, from its mission in the antifascist coalition, and from the
reciprocal Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties. Dukla fully confirmed the
accuracy of the CPC policy in. the struggle against the fascist occupants
-- the policy of joint struggle of Czechs and Slovaks against a common
enemy, both on the land of our native country and on the territory of the
USSR, in close cooperation with the Soviet Union.
ii
The transfer of power into the hands of the people, victory over
fascism and the subsequent democratization of public life, new principles
of social relations for the Czech and Slovak people, final resolution of
the German problem, and support for the Soviet Union in its foreign
policy --- these were the programs of our national and democratic revolu-
tion. This was the historical situation in which was begun a new stage
In the party's struggle for a national, army. Changes in the realm of
building our army were made in close association with our domestic and
foreign policy development. The direction of this development was deter-
mtned by the general political activity of the CPC and this was our
party's basic contribution to resolution of the problems of building
our Czechoslovak National Army.
The Party approached. the task of building a new Czechoslovak army
theoretically and practically well prepared. The experience of the
CPSU clearly showed our party that assurance of a leading role for the
Communist Party in all realms of arpy life must be a basic principle
for building an. army and the determining element of its combat capability.
The party knew that the class composition of the main mass of servicemen,
first of all of command personnel., must reflect the leading role of the
working class in the government. It proceeded from the fact that the
basis of troop education must be a victorious reading of Marxism-Leninism
and that education was an integral part of all troop training. The party
tried to carry out the principle of building the arpy on the basis of
strict centralization in accordance with the re4uirements of modern
military affairs and of equipping of the armed forces With modern equip-
ment.
The successful resolution of these problems in the complex period of
class struggles after 1945 was a victory for the policy of the CPC and
its ability to creatively employ Marxist-Leninist studies and Soviet
App
67
CPYRGHT
ec=iencelkAli
Zrgleiregesti86076184:t&A*MheOgf5 tadi6659a)11-111
The Ko!iice Government Program was a document reflecting the first
stage of our path toward building a socialist army. In analyzing its
positions concerning the army, it is necessary to remember that the CPC
was not oriented directly towards a socialist revolution but was trying to
obtain those radical changes which could in fact be accomplished at that
time and which were needed for strengthening the revolution, those which
could become a reliable foundation and source for the peaceful develop-
ment of our country on the path to socialism.'
In the Kosice Program there was no mention of a socialist-type arm;
the point as to build a new, really democratic army which from its very
beginning could become a part and invincible instrument of a new national
power. Building the army had to be done on a principle whereby it could
gradually acquire the traits of a socialist army in the course of its
development in accordance with the advancement of our society toward
communism.
In the final period of our nations liberation struggle, the party
undertook the task of preventing restoration of the pre-Munich army and of
laying a foundation for an army which could become the bulwark of a demo-
cratic and, subsequently, socialist developmental trend.
The party's main attention was devoted to a new political character
for the Czechoslovak Army and to those factors which to a great degree
influenced its formation. This applied first of all to the political
principle of military building, to logical orientation toward the USSR.
In other words, the party was concerned with a struggle for a new military
ideology, with bringing revolutionary ideals into the conscience of ser-
vicemen and with liquidation of an army indifferent to politics.
It was necessary not only to prevent using the army for anti-national
goals, but first of all to imbue the building of and the life of the army
with the ideas with which our revolutionary people lived and which they
had put into practice in their new national democratic government. In
resolving these problems the party was true to the legacy of Lenin, who
taught that a revolutionary army can become the bulwark of a revolutionary
government only when its personnel thoroughly understand the great task
of the revolution.
A struggle was leunched for a new class and political composition of
command personnel. A large group of enlightened officers joined the a.mied
forces in 1945. This was a noteworthy event in the life of the army. The
course which our party pointed out for staffing the any with command
personnel provided for a sharp increase of workers and peasants in the
AnnrrwrI For RIAPACP 9nnninRing ? riA_RnpRg-mnR7spnnnnnnncinnn9.A.
U1-)YRUHI
officer raus.
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ture. This action was of great importance in building the national army.
The political character of an army is manifested by the alliances
it relies on and by the models it is patterned after. Comprehensive
strengthening of friendship and collaboration with the Soviet liberating
army and socialist armies was an integral part of the party's struggle
for a new army and of its political character0
The party then tried to get a strong hold in the life of the army
with political and educational work so that the army, under th.,_ leadership
of the party, could be imbued with the spirit of the revolutionary
national creative forces and so that the army, just as our whole country,
would rely on the Soviet, Union and its army.
The February victory in 1.948? and the class, political, and state
changes associated with it, created new conditions for further building
the Czechoslovak National. Army. Now the Communist Party could fully use
its influence on the subsequent development of the army to see that it
was built as an. armed fist of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as a
socialist army. After February,, the party undertook the task of more
quickly realizing these changes
The need for rapid development of our army as a socialist army was
dictated by the developing international situation and by changes in
Czechoslovakia's international position. For Czechoslovakia, a government
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, one of the most pressing pro-
blems was the task of protecting newly-won socialism from domestic and.
fcreign enemies. This was in conformity with the natural development
of all countries moving toward. socialism. After February l948? the
Czechoslovak National. Army was confronted with qualitatively new tasks.
A number of factors influenced the execution of these tasks from
the very beginning the formation of the Europeen Economic Community,
the reactionary NATO block, and the Korean War. The signing of the War-
saw Treaty had a great influence on the whole process of the building of
our army.
The building of a socialist arqy in a historical period correspond-
ing essentially to the development of socialism in our country, required
the fulfillment of several basic, urgent tasks.
The orderly weeding out of command personnel was continuing. New
measures, aimed at making the government and army apparatus a worker and
peasant staff, were carried out, This created advantageous possibilities
for strengthening the army further and for staffing it with workers and
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=4104Arillitaiu.:autig" ..,,.
.:.
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nt : i s on
ei e e? .
the basis of Soviet military science became an integral part of the
general line of development of the new socialist am'.
Further strengthening of the army's contacts with the people was a
serious need. It was based on the principle that the socialist inter-
ests of the people were the interests of the any, especially the com-
mand staff.
A constant factor guaranteeing development of our army as a social-
ist army was cooperation with the Soviet Axmy and armies of Other
national democratic countries on the principles of proletarian inter-
nationalism- The Kosice Government Program, which required the new
army to be built on the model of the Soviet Axmy and its experience, WS
strictly adhered to in developing the army.
The leading role of the party was gradually strengthened. Since the
party assumed responsibility for the fate of our country, communists in
the army began to respond to all its activities.
The problem of strengthening conscientious, strong military disci-
pline and exac:t execution of commanders' orders was firmly undertaken.
Strengthening military discipline, aiding commanders, and political
organs, and raising the authority of commanders became the first task of
communists.
The process of building a new national army proceeded not without
complications.
Former Minister of National Defense CHEPICHK attributed to himself
the success achieved by the party in developing the armed forces, thereby
spreading his personality cult in the army. He placed himself above
party organizations in the army and did not recognize the collective wis-
dom of military councils. He had the aspiration of hindering the party
in army leadership and in exercizing control over its activities, and
he also tried to weaken the party's influence on the life of the armed
forces?
Class principles were transgressed in the building of the army. As
a result of shortcomings in the work of the then Main Political Adminis-
tration, the level of party-political work in the army was seriously
lowered and mistakes associated with the personality cult undermined
relations of the army and the people.
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UHYKUI-1 I
prOck-SIERMidi e
OZO.Pctigl
e"
fil-ftWyrtki ibAbtl,g,t)Frlir t
tit an
end to realization of the CPC's general line.
The Central Committee of the CFC resolutely and consistently conduc-
ted a policy in 1956 for eliminating the consequences of the personality
cult in the army and took measures aimed at strengthening the leading
role of the party in the armed forces and at restoring Leninist principles
in the building of the ariny. Because of this, our army achieved remarkable
successes in the years that followed.
III
The problem of war and peace, which profoundly affects every man, is a
basic problem of modern times. The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence
meets the approval of nations and gains more and more supporters all over
the world.
The Moscow treaty partially banning testing of nuclear weapons has
been signed, the treaty on banning the launching of opace objects with
nuclear weapons on board has been signed) and economic and cultural ties
between socialist and capitalist countries are developing.
We well know that limiting tests or curtailing the production of
nuclear weapons do not mean cancellation of production of this terrible
weapon, nor does it prevent its being employed. To achieve the ultimate
goal -- general and total disarmament -- we still have to overcome many
obstacles. The world-wide struggle for peace requires great concentration
of forces fighting to avert war because those forces which unleashed the
second World War have not retracted their delirious plans for revenge and
continue to threaten peace in Europe and throughout the world.
The development of West Germany, a dangerous business for peace,
continues to disturb us. As a result of the resistance of imperialist
circles, particularly West Germany, the German problem has still not been
resolved. A whole complex of problems aimed at disarmament, such as crea-
tion of a nuclear-free zone in Curope, refusal of other countries to agree
not to acquire nuclear weapons or to allow them on their territory, the
signing of a non-agression treaty between Warsaw Treaty countties and NATO
countries, and a number of other problems have also not been resolved.
We took these serious circumstances into consideration when extending
for the next 20 years the treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and postwar
cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which reliably
strengthens our security. It was specified that the military aspect of the
pIWe e 66 0 ektP t 1 Vik DIS(33, Oble1kiRONNIO090002-4
71.
CPYRGHT
The 12-tb.,..Cong,r_ess of
out NIFEWPREEtirr,91MIP g?,00etrAtritztV is; tion,of displaying high political vigilance and of strengthening the defens-
ive capabilities of the country. In fulfilling these tasks, we are
concentrating all efforts of the army on further increasing the constant
combat readiness level of the troops.
Thanks to the tireless concern of the party and the government for
defending the boundaries of the fatherland and to the effective help of
the fraternal Soviet Army, our army has become a modern one, having
reached a level of combat readiness which meets contemporary require-
ments for ensuring fulfillment of missions confronting our army as a
component of Warsaw Treaty Forces.
The principle of a leading role for the party is gradually being
realized in the development of the army. The party is mnstantly con-
cerned for the development of the army, its material and technical
support, its political and moral condition, and the combat training of
personnel. All fundamental problems of building the army and its life
are debated in the Central Committee of the CPC, the decisions of which
are the main directives for the work of commanders, party-political
organs, and party organizations.
Qualitative changes have occurred in the army's command staff. As
early as October 1960, a staffing of command personnel was completed
which by its structure was completely proportionate to the structure of
our socialist society. At the present time almost 70 percent of officers
and generals and 82 percent of ensigns are sons of workers and peasants.
Of the total number of officers almost 75 percent are members or candi-
dates of the party. Higher than 18 percent of officers and generals have
higher educations.
Soldiers educated during the period of socialist construction in
the spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, true to the nation and
solid in their support of the CPC, perform their civic duty for the
duration of their enlistment in the ranks of the armed forces. These
young men have a good political understanding and skills in working with
various equipment. They are highly cultured, have a developed sense of
organization, and have more initiative than previous youths. This
creates advantageous conditions for further raising the level of their
communist education and for successful mastery of combat equipment and
weapons.
Thanks to the rapid development of productive forces, particularly
industrial forces, significant qualitative changes have occurred in
eqUpping the army with the most modern equipment. In connection with
this, the fire power and maneuverability of soyedineniya of ground
fercw_!- air f:nrcaa- and air awe
Approyea-rorxerease-zOoTROOF69f.cdfAERIMARRY8f814r00300090002-4
CPYRGHT
In the field of QIII4WIrkg.ilsOS ?me
P P ralf&cl. WCIRegg?PC2OR.{ V46/65 811116
? ?.,? .1 ?131 1-qg have been
?
equal to the tasks of Warsaw Treaty Forces. In our army there are eight
technical companies, or podrazdelenlya equal to them, in one motorized
rifle company. In accordance with this, the number of technical person-
nal has significantly increased. At. the present time, 32 percent of
conmiand personnel are engineers and technicians, and the nuber is steadi-
Jv Increasing.
Our army is developing in a world socialist system and is constant-
ly strengthening and growing cooperation with brother armies of Warsaw
Treaty Forces. The training and education of troop.; is conducted accord-
ing to new regulations, reflecting those changes which have occurred in
the life of our society and in the field of military affairs, which
generalize the position experience of the Soviet Army and other frater-
nal socialist armies. Training according to the new regulations promotes
the unification of our common efforts in increasing the might of the
Warsaw Treaty forces, which stand on guard of communism and peace.
At the present time, maintenance of high combat readiness, improve-
ment of armament and military equipment, and strengthening of the soli-
darity of the Warsaw Treaty Forces are the main tasks posed by the 12th
Congress of the CPC. The development of Leninist principles for military
construction are manifested in this.
The task of a communist education of army personnel, of forming a
scientific Marxist outlook,, of education of soldiers in the spirit of
caamunist morality) of a systematic struggle against remnants of the past
and against the influence of bourgeois ideology, particularly against
pacifist attitudes, are today moving more and more into the foreground.
Reinforcing communis-t education has become one of the main fields of
work for commanders, party-political organs, and party organizations in
strengthening the leading role of the party.
A basic objective of party-political work is strengtheing and rais-
ing the combat readiness of troops, staffs, and institutions, and
educating army personnel in the spirit of Marxism-aminism, socialist
patriotism, and proletarian internationalism.
In order to raise the quality of ideological-educational work it is
necessary to improve its organization and leadership. To do this it is
necessary to make a. careful account of the situation, know the interests,
attitudes, and opinions of the nen well and coordinate educational work
with the tasks and life of the troops and the whole society. Judicious
selection and training of cadres has a decisive influence on the effect-
ive development of ideological-educational work. Therefore, problems of
educating the educators themselves are now in the center of attention.
71
UFYI-K.i1-1 I
ihiRtaMfAfigeapr4A4C0:
task "?-.IIMOV8?1(46.62P2-4
Party Regulations, approved new instructions fur party-political organi-
zations in the army. We are conducting all work in carrying out these
instructions in accordance with the tasks with which the troops are
confronted and which they must resolve at the present time.
Improvement of troop training and skillful mastery of the most
modern combat equipment are serious tasks for troops and staffs. Rapid
development of combat equipment and weapons is characteristic for our
army. The complexity of this equipment is progressing comparably.
In eKecuting the specified task we pay attention to qualitative
master- of equipment by the masses of servicemen. Keeping in step with
rapid techniuml development and increasing theoretical knowledge are
basic mecms of achieving success. We want all servicemen to skillfully
master moiern equipment, take care of it, and maintain it in constant
combat readiness.
Skilled training of specialists is required for mastering complex
modern equipment. On the other hand, conditions of modern combat require
interchangeability within a crew or team.
In raising the level of combat readiness of troops considerable
importance is given to field training. Our efforts are aimed at training
and educating troops in situatioas as close as possible to actual combat
conditions. This permits training bold and courageous men who are fully
able to use the capabilities of the armament of the troops. It acquaints
servicemen with the effects of enemy weapons and teaches them to find
effective protection against them.
We direct the special attention of commanders, party-political
organs, and party organizations to tactical training. Recently, due to
Improvement of our training and material base and increased attention to
fire training, especially of tanks, the results of fireing have improved.
Executing several complex exercises, some regiments achieved high results.
The experience of winter and summer training periods once again confirmed
the accuracy of the position that where proper attention to field train-
ing is given, better results in strengthening the combat readiness of
troops is achieved..
improving the leadership of troops and organizational work is of
great importance for further raising combat readiness. We are confronted
with serious problems in building our armed forces in accordance with our
economic and manpower capabilities within the framework of the common
development of Warsaw Treaty forces.
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CPYRGHT
Problems of stren hening one-man commandaktg ? lApartici-
ppzrsechFor RalsesiaQ9 GM- ?AMON fg U 111*-1liltttion of
subordinate cadres are fundamental in the field of troop control.
Recently we have done a great deal of work in achieving unity of
idological and organizational work. At the same time a basic require-
ment has been observed 2 it is impossible to mobolize the masses of
servicemen to execute serious missions without persuading them, and, on
the other hand, each persuasion must mobolize servicemen to fulfillment
of practical matters.
Further improvement of troop leadership and increasing the unity of
ideological and organizational work, will continue to be basic problems
of raising the combat readiness of troops.
Achieving a high level of military discipline and organization of
troop life is no less an. important task. We want first of all to achieve
a situation wherein the qualitative changes which have taken place in
the development, of the army and in the life of the troops, and which
demand a high level of military discipline as never before, are taken
into consideration in the struggle for a high level of military disci-
pline and organization of troop life.
At the present time military discipline is the discipline of masses
of servicemen, in the hands of whom are modern weapons and qualitatively
new combat equipment. This significantly broadens the responsibilies of
servicemen and the significance and substance of military discipline
itself are becoming more exteneive and important for fulfilling the tasks
confronting the armed. forces. The more complex equipment and its opera-
tion become and the greater the number- of maintenance personnel needed,
the higher and stronger militaiy discipline must be. Punctuality also
plays an important role in the period of rapid development of nuclear
weapons.
Therefore, we must obtain the maximum responsibility and precision
of fulfillment of the requirements of orders and regulations, constantly
increase exactingness tward personnel and at the same time show tireless
concern for servicemen, improve their education and develop and appreciate
the influence of military surroundings.
The center of education aad training in our army is the company,
battery, and squadron. Questions concerning the quality of execution of
the combat and political training plan are resolved there; servicemen
are educated there in the spirit of the requirements of the military oath
and regulations; their combat mastery takes shape there; and it is there
that their character and discipline are tenpered. We are trying to im-
prove significantly the quality of training of master sergeants and
ill g; I- A ? ;
75
111 III III
UFYI-K..i1-1 I
company and _platoon commanders. We want to
tortirsmomfttAmfigeiga?P bettertra
W
uYg-
oixMN o-s
subordinates, both in discipline and in carrying out all combat training
problems. We are intensively working with them directly in companies
and battalions, and we are effectively aiding them in fulfilling their
assigned tasks. They are our youngest commanders and do not have much
experience yet. We have many possibilities for fulfilling this task.
In connection with the 20th anniversary of the Slovak national up-
rising and the battles at Dukla, and also the 20th anniversary of the
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army, there has been a sharp
increase of activity and initiative among servicemen of our armed force...,
which is reflected in further development of socialist competition.
This makes it possible for us to mcaxdize new forces to resolve basic
problems of further increasing the level of combat and political train-
ing and to conduct an active struggle against several displays of indif-
ference in socialist competiticn.
Servicemen are making every effort to observe this noteworthy date
with high showings in combat and political training. Commanders and
chiefs of all levels are called upon to encourage valuable initiative
in this and to correctly organize work in promoting better fulfillment
of the training year's tasks.
These are some of the main tasks confronting us at the present
time. It must be said that in fulfilling them we have achieved signi-
ficant successes. In honor of Czechoslovak National Army Day and on the
19th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet
Army', several chasti were awarded orders for consitent, good, and excel-
lent results in combat and political training. The government of our
socialist republic highly values their 2ontribution in ensuring the
defensive capability of our coljntry. We are sure that by the example of
these chasti and soyedineniya other chasti and soyedineniya will fight
for high results in combat and political training and thereby enhance
the high combat readiness of our arred forces.
IV
At the very heart of the new traditions of our National Army lie
its firm contact with the peoples of our country, with their vital in-
terests. Here is the source of strength of our army.
Even during the formation of Czechoslovak military chasti and
soyedineniya in the USSR, the leadership of the CPC, which was located
in Moscow, demanded (and its demands were supported by all servicemen)
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