TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070052-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: December 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

~e~nds :in Communist h Propaganda
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FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
18 DECEMBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 51)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively oil material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security lnformmtion
Unauthorized disclwure subject to
criminal sanctions
EII~t
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18 DECEMBER 1974
CONTENTS
ENERGY
Moscow Cautious on Ford-Giscard Talks, Hails New OPEC Price. 1
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Podgornyy, RED STAR Register Dissent From Detente Mood . . . . . . . 5
CYPRUS
Moscow Expresses Hope for Successful Intercommunal Talks . . . . . . 9
VIETNAM
DRV Army Anniversary Anticipated in Comment, Events in Hanoi . . . . 12
DRV General Stresses Army's Commitment to Revolutionary Goals. . . . 3.3
PRC-KOREA
Peking Continues Hard Line Toward U.S. Troops in Ko;,ea . . . . . . . 15
PRC-THAILAND
Peking Hails Thai CP Anniversary, Maintains Bangkok Contacts 16
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prague Party Daily Carries New Denunciation cf Dubcek. . . . . . . . 18
AFRICA
Moscow Urges Militant Stand by Liberation Forces in Rhodesia . . . . 20
NOTES
Mansfield in China; Romanian Relations With USSR, PRC;
Portuguese Radio Programs; Turkish-Language Clandestine Radio. . . . 22
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. i
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ENERGY
MOSCG,A CAUTIOUS ON FORD-GISCARD TALKS, HAILS NEW OPEC PRICE
Initial brief Moscow reports on the 14-16 December Martinique
summit meeting between President Ford and French President
Giscard d'Estaing treated factually and circumspectly their
agreements on measures in the energy field. At the same time,
Soviet commentator: hailed as "very fair" the new decisions at
Vienna by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) to unify the price of oil effective 1 January and
increase oil duties for foreign monopolies. Moscow's well-established
aversion to Western initiatives that would lead to unified
groupings of oil-importing states, and Soviet support to the
OPEC members in any "confrontation" that might ensue in negotiations
between OPEC and Western blocs, have been reiterated in comment
on the Vienna OPEC session. Such comment has been aimed at the
United States and its November initiatives to form an international
energy agency.
FORD-GISCARD A 16 December TASS report on the communique
COMMUNIQUE published at the end of the U.S.-French summit
meeting concentrated on the energy aspects of
the document, noting only briefly that the two leaders also
discussed a "wide range" of world problems including East-West
relations, the Middle East and Southeast Asia situations, and
economic and monetary-financial problems. TASS acknowledged
that the two leaders, "in an attempt to reach a compromise
essential for resolving" U.S.-French differences on energy
questions, agreed to hold a conference of oil-importing and
oil-exporting countries "at the earliest possible date."
Tha TASS accounts pointed out that the French-U.S. agreement
calls for preliminary coordination within "existing international
organizations" of energy conservation programs and the develop-
ment of alternative energy sources, followed by "intensive"
consultations to achieve a single position at the conference with
oil exporters.
"Profound differences" between France and the United States on
.the energy issue had been stressed in Soviet reports and comment
on U.S. moves in mid-November to create an international energy
agency. For example, a 17 November PRAVDA dispatch by Rusakov
highlighted French opposition to the U.S.-proposed "bloc" to
"fight the oil-producing countries" and noted disagreements also
among other European and Asian countries. Rusakov added that U.S.
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policy on the issue sought to "overcome the U.S. energy difficulties
at the expense of oil-producing countries," thus retaining a U.S.
"leading role in the capitalist world" under the "pretext of joint
action." Moscow media attributed to Secretary Kissinger the
formulation of the basic propositions for the plan tc create
"a united bloc of capitalist countries." Subsequent Moscow comment
alluding to the International Energy Agency--formed on 15 November--as
the "Club of 16" described it as an "instrument of pressure" on
oil-producing states and, without mentioning Secretary Kissinger,
noted that "a number of American statesmen" have sought a "harder
attitude" toward the Arab countries.
Soviet antipathy toward any ",mitad front" of oil-importing nations
was reaffirmed in an 18 December Melnikov PRAVDA commentary.
According to the TASS summary of his remarks, Melnikov described
the International Energy Agency as a bloc of "developed capitalist
countries opposed to oil-producer countries," adding a veiled
warning that the OPEC members "will not remain indifferent" to
"confrontation" plans being worked out by "imperialist circles."
In what seems implicit criticism of the new U.S.-French coordination
agreement--his comment being timed immediately after the Martinique
summit--Melnikov argued that the attempt "by certain circles of the
West" to secure a solution to the energy issue from "obviously
unilateral positions" is "more than disputable."
Moscow's caution in treating the new U.S.-French agreement is
consistent with its past indifference and even negative reaction
toward earlier Western-led efforts to convene international
conferences on the energy question. For example, Moscow from
the outset disparaged the U.S.-initiated Washington energy
conference in February 1974 as well as smaller follow-up meetings
called by the United States. The sketchy first reports on. the
U.S.-French communique provide no direct evidence of Soviet
criticism or opposition to such a conference, but the thrust of
comment on the OPEC price moves suggests that Moscow prefers to
see bilateral oil agreements between OPEC and oil-importing
countries, rather than conference confrontations between OPEC
and an organized grouping of importing countries.
OPEC VIENNA Soviet commentator Timoshkin told Arab listeners
PRICE MOVES of Moscow radio on 14 December that the 13 December
Vienna OPEC decisions unifying the oil price on
1 January and raising the tax for foreign monopolies were "very
fair," representing an OPEC effort to "weaken the negative effect"
of the capitalist world's inflation upon the national economies
of the oil-producing states. T'imoshkin added that the unified
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oil price would broaden possibilities for "direct trade relations"
between the OPEC and oil-importing countries and thereby heir
greatly to "curb he looting practices of the international oil
monopolies." Ile noted that the Vienna OPEC actions came against
a background of an intensifying "provocative propaganda campaign"
against Arab and other oil producers, "particularly in the
United States," that sought to blame oil producers for capitalist
economic difficulties. Consistent with Moscow's traditional
defense of higher oil prices, Timoshkin described the OPEC
actions as a "just struggle for their legitimate rights" to
achieve a "fair share" of income from their natural resources,
~.aken from the profits of "imperialist cartels which exist
by plunder."
TASS English reports on the OPEC actions on the 13th and 14th
were much less doctrinaire, noting that the increased returns for
OPEC producers "should be viewed as a measure to make good the
damage" .rc,m current inflation, to offset increased spending
by OFFC countries on industrial goods and foodstuffs from
Western nations, and to publicizr_ the "huge profits" by "oil
tycoons" and thereby prevent them from "endlessly forcing up
prices of oil products."
MILITARY ACTION Moscow has exploited, particularly for Middle
AGAINST ARAB OIL Eastern radio audiences, U.S. press speculation
about possible Western military intervention in
Arab oil-producing states as well as CENTO naval maneuvers in
November in the Arabian Sea region. Moscow's ostensibly "unofficial"
Radio Peace and Progress on 3 December told Arab listeners of U.S.
press discussions about a U.S. plan to "occupy oil regions of the
Arab world by force of arms," going as far as specifying the Arab
states targeted for such action and noting that U.S. military
forces have undergone simulated exercises to prepare for desert-region
warfare. The radio added that while the Arab states viewed these
developments with "great vigilance," they continued their "oil
onslaught on the positions of the imperialist monopolies" to gain
control of their oil resources. A 28 November Moscow broadcast
to Iranian listeners discussing mid-November CENTO naval movements
in the Arabian Sea region said their purpose was "to prepare for
the occupation of oil resources," and saw in this a U.S. plan to
"intimidate the progressive Arab states" in the region, which in
turn proved there were "aggressive designs" beyond intimida`-ion.
Moscow's handling of such speculation for domestic audiences, however,
has been much more restrained. A 16 November Russian-language
report, describing U.S. speculation on possible "desperate military
action" against Arab oil fields, optimistically declared that
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"sober-minded politicians of she Western countries" realize
the "hopelessness" of such methods and seek to take account
of the "new realities."
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- 5 -
U.S, -SOVIET R ELATIONS
PODGORNYY, RED STAR REGISTER DISSENT FROM DETENTE MOOD
Discreet demurrals from the prevailing mood of optimism that
has characterized Soviet official attitudes toward U.S.-Soviet
relations have been registered by Podgornyy in a Dushanbe
speech on 29 November, and by RED STAR in a major article on
21 November.* Podgornyy, speaking a few days after the
Vladivostok summit, limited his acknowledgment of the results
to a mere endorsement of the official party-government statement
of approval and stressed instead the need for caution in
assessing the international 'situation and the foreign policy
problems that remain to be settled. RED STAR, writing on the
eve of the summit, whose agenda was widely understood to have
included SALT as one of its subjects, paid barely a word of
deference to detente and stressed instead the need to insure
continued qualitative improvement of Soviet strategic weaponry.
PODGORNYY SPEECH Podgornyy's brief remark on Vladivostok
were limited tc two brief paragraphs which
paraphrased passages from the official party-government statement
of approval which had been issued the day before. They were
sandwiched between two longer passages which presented a darker
picture of the international situation. The first recounted the
history of the emergence of the "peaceful coexistence" principle,
stressing the alleged Dersistence of Western opposition to this
concept, and ascribing the r-cent moderation of Western policy in
this regard to the "strengti,,entng economic and defense Might of
the Soviet Union" and the "vitality of its Leninist foreign policy."
The second warned against overestimating the results of Vladivostok,
stressing the continued activity of opponents in the West, counseling
caution in assessing Western intentions, and noting issues affecting
U.S.-Soviet relations that remain to be settled.
There are several aspects of theses remarks that appear to contradict
prevailing Soviet positions on foreign policy or at least to 'rifer
an alternative perspective on critical points.
+ First, Podgornyy stressed the united nature of detente; he
treated it as though it were still in its infancy, an experiment
* The full impact of Podgornyy's remarks was not reflected in
summaries of the speech carried by TASS and Moscow radio; the full
text of the speech as published in IZVESTIYA on 30 November has just
become available in translation.
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still to be tested. "It goes without saying," he said, "that
we are not establishing cooperation with the capitalist
countries at a stroke, or by any means on all questions."
This, of course, is inconsistent with Soviet rhetoric
of recent years, particularly the repeatedly stressed conviction
that the favorable turn in U.S.-Soviet relations has reached the
point where it can be made "irreversible."
4- Second, he seemed to implicitly criticize the deal under which
the Soviet Union was reported to have agreed to raise quotas on
Jewish emigration in exchange for the U.S. Administration's
support for removing trade restrictions. Although the criticism
was veiled and formally addressed to "certain foreign individuals,"
it seemed to carry an implicit rebuke to those in the Soviet
Government who would contemplate such a deal. Denouncing the
Western pressures in this regard as "overt interference in the
sphere of internal state policy," he concluded with the ringing
declaration that "our internal affairs have never been and will
never be a subject for political bargaining."
This interpretation of Podgornyy's remarks assumes added
plausibility in the light of the TASS statement of 18 December
and the accompanying publication of Gromyko's letter to Secretary
Kissinger which deny that any deal was made on this issue. It
seems safe to assume that these actions were preceded by extensive
debate in the Politburo. Thus Podgornyy's remarks would have been
appropriately timed to affect the outcome of the debate in the
Politburo.
4- 't`hird, he entered a strong caveat on the question of the future
prospects of detente. He insisted that detente was a two-way
street and that further progress would depend on the extent to
which both sides observed the "traffic regulations." In this
connection, he drew attention to various trouble spcts--the Mideast
crisis, the Cyprus situation--which he said were due to the "concern"
of the enemies of detente.
4- Fi.nally, he used phraseology in introducing these cautionary
notes which carried a polemical ring. "It would be intolerably
nearsighted," he said, "to fail to take into account" these
various negative aspects of the international situation. Such
challenging phrases have long been regarded by Kremlinologists as
tell-tale signs of internal controversy.
What factors in the current political situation might have prompted
Podgornyy to distance himself from Brezhnev on foreign policy can,
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of course, only be conjectured. A plausible theory might
be that rumors of Brezhnev's intention to resign in the near
future, which have been reported in the West, have prompted
renewed maneuvering in the Politburo. In this light, Podgornyy's
speech could be seen as an effort to position himself to
arbitrate the succession. Such a role would not be out of
character for Podgornyy, since he has carefully kept his
distance from Brezhnev on policy issues in recent years. Both
on internal economic policy and on foreign policy he has
taken positions which are more traditionaliei- than Brezhnev's.
Such a position would be likely to recommend itself to the Soviet
leaders in a period of transition.
RED STAR ARTICLE Although lacking the polemical overtones of
Podgornyy's speech, the RED STAR art..cle of
21 November was even more jarringly out of tune with the prevailing
need of the pre-summit publicity. Written by two military
professors, and presented under a headina usually reserved for
major theoretical items, the article was wholly devoted to the
theme of military preparedness. It presented an argument which
strongly resembles the views which the Soviets usually ascribe to
the "military-industrial complex" in the West.
Its main themes included the contentions that modern military
technology has greatly increased the importance of the time
factor in modern strategy, that this has led to increasingly
sophisticated weapons, and that this in turn has speeded the
process of obsolescence and renewal. The conclusion derived from
all this is that the Soviet Union must be prepared to keep pace
in the qualitative arms race. As the article puts it: "All
this calls for an increase in the amount of scientific and experimental
design work and for the raising of the technical complexity of
military-technical equipment." In plain terms, more R&D and plenty
of MIRVs.
Although the article does not specifically mention MIRVs (nor any
other specific weapon system), this seems a fair interpretation
of the above statement. Moreover, it is supported by the fact that
the immediately preceding passage had pointed out that one of the
main driving forces of the arms race was the "competition between
defensive and offensive methods of armed warfare." MIRVs were
originally conceived as a means of combating ABMs and are still
rationalized in terms of their presumed effectiveness against
military targets, such as reinforced concrete structures, and so on.
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These features of the article, plus its timing, suggest that it
may have been '_ntended to register the military's interest on
the eve of the summit in retaining a free hand for continued
technical upgrading of the Soviet strategic forces. ThE. fact
that the conclusions were presented as being grounded in Soviet
"military science"--the sphere of So,.iet military theory which
is preeminently the preserve of professional military thought--
tends to reinforce this speculation.
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CYPRUS
MOSCOW EXPRESSES HOPE FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS
With President Makarios' 7 December return to Cyprus following his
stay abroad after the 15 July coup, limited Moscow comment has
looked hopefully toward negotiations between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots while holding in reserve the Soviet proposal for an
international conference on Cyprus. At the same time, comment
has cautioned teat progress will be slow and difficult. Moscow,
which favored the prolonged intercommunal dialog conducted by
Kliridhis and Denktash sine- 1968 as a proper method for seeking
a solution to the Cyprus proolem, has reported without comment
their discussions this fall, limited to humanitarian issues and
suspended since 4 December.
IZVESTIYA commentator Melor Sturua on 15 December, speaking on
Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program for domestic listeners,
viewed Makarios' return as "proof" that Cyprus is already
"becoming more stabilized." He identified three criteria for
"helping to find a correct and positive solution" to the Cyprus
problem: "stabilization of the constitutional order on Cyprus,
withdrawal of all foreign troops, and successful and fruitful
talks between the Greek and Turkish communities." TASS on tho
12th had reported a statement issued by the Cyprus communist
party, A{EL, on the archbishop's return, emphasizing that "a form
of constitutional structure for Cyprus can be found at a
conference table" by Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Moscow has, however, recognized that a negotiated political settle-
ment will not be easy to achieve. A 9 December TASS report pointed
out that "there are still great difficulties and obstacles on the
way to reestablishing constitutional law and order." PRAVDA's
Drobkov, in a foreign-language commentary on the 12th, saw signs of
hope in Makarios' return and the "joint line" adopted by Nicosia
and Athens, but observed that because of Cyprus' "enemies"--the
"North Atlantic bloc" and "imperialist agents" on Cyprus--normalize
tion would "not be easy" and a political settlement would entail a
"tenacious struggle."
SOVIET PROPOSAL, Concurrent with Makarios' return, Moscow has
NATO "SOLUTION" not been pressing its 22 August proposal to
discuss the Cyprus problem within the UN
framework. As recently as 28 November, Moscow had formally reiterated
its call for an "international conference" on Cyprus in the Soviet-
Zambian communique issued that day. The Soviet-French communique on
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Br.ezhnev's talky, Paris, issued on 7 December, the day of
Makar.:i.os' retut the island, advocated that a settlement
be reached through unspecified "negotiations." And the communique
on Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu's talks in Moscow, released
on 13 December, said only that the sides supported Cyprus'
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity "so that the
domestic problems of the Cyprus people" may be settled peacefully.
Soviet delegate Malik did reiterate the call for a conference in the
13 December Security Council debate, which dealt with the six-month
extension of the UN peacekeeping forces' mandate and the General
Assembly's 1 November Cyprus resolution. According to TASS' account
ol the session, Malik said that UN resolutions on Cyprus could be
implemented by "convening an international conference on Cyprus on
a widely representative basis."
The idea of a NATO-sponsored solution has again been rejected by
PRAVDA's Drobkov. As reported by TASS on 17 December, Drobkov
portrayed NATO "proposals" to mediate the Cyprus problem as
carrying an implied promise to "adjust" the Cyprus conflict in
Greece's favor "in return" for Athens' return to the NATO military
ranks. Reiterating a standard theme, Drobkov denied that NATO could
solve the crisis, claiming that it was fully concerned with "imposing
its will on Cyprus, and at the sane time also on Greece." Moscow in
its coverage of the recent NATO ministerial meetings in Brussels did
not report Secretary Kissinger's remark at a news conference on the
13th that he was "more hopeful than before that progress on the
Cyprus crisis is possible" after his talks in Brussels with the
Greek and Turkish foreign ministers.
TURKISH, GREEK ROLES While the major organs of the Soviet central
press continue to criticize Turkey's role only
implicitly, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 6 November and SELSKAYA ZHIZN on
5 December were a shade more outspoken in pointing to Turkish obstinacy
toward a political settlement. The former noted that while Greece
endorsed the Soviet proposal to discuss the Cyprus situation at an
international conference, "Turkey, fearing to remain in isolation,
opposes this." SELSKAYAZI-IIZN, commenting on a Turkish foreign
ministry spokesman's statement that talks between the two communities
would be interrupted if Makarios returned to the island, maintained
that "soberminded individuals, even in Turkey, are beginning to
realize that the situation that has been created on the island cannot
last forever."
Moscow has continued to voice vehement opposition to partitioning
of the island. NEW TIMES observer Vladimir Shmarov, in a 24 November
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Moscow radio commentary, outlined Soviet concern in pointing out
that if the "notorious Attila line" is not abandoned, "two
administrations may take root, which will in turn lead to the
annexation of one part of the island by Greece and the other part
by Turkey."
Soviet media have indicated cautious approval of the new Greek
Government's policy vis-a-vis Cyprus. PRAVDA on 3 December, in a
report on the Athens talks between Karamanlis and Makarios, said
that they confirm the resolve of Greece and Cyprus to find a
solution "in a peaceful way." In further approval of Karamanlis'
policies, Moscow radio on the 10th identified as one of the
"positive changes" being carried out by his government the "pledge
to achieve a solution in Cyprus based on the preservation of its
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity." And Sturua
on the 15 December roundtable program, in an apparent allusion to
Greece's traditional support of enosis--Cyprus' union with Greece--noted
that Athens is now "taking a more realistic stand" on Cyprus.
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v~EIiAi1
DRV ARMY ANNIVERSARY ANTICIPATED IN COMMENT, EVENTS IN HANOI
Vietnamese connnunist media are devoting predictably voluminous
and authoritative attention to the upcoming 30th anniversary of
the North Vietnamese army (VPA). There have been major articles
by Chief of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung and Colonel
General Song 1-lao, Chief of the VPA Genera]. Political Department,
which have been carried by Hanoi. radio as well as by DRV news-
papers and journals. llanoi papers have also published a lengthy
account of the history of the VPA and an article on the communist
military forces in South Vietnam by a southern military commentator
under the pseudonym "Cuu Long." This is the first known article
attributed to Cuu Long since April 1972, when in the midst of the
communist spring offensive he wrote an article stressing the
significant role of guerillas in supporting main force units.
Only the Song I-lao article, discussed below, is available in full
translation at this writing. However, available reports indicate
that Van Tien Dung's article deals with the critical problem of
coordinating the requirements for domestic construction and defense.
Recent North Vietnamese public events--some in connection with the
22 December VPA anniversary--have prompted a series of appearances
by North Vietnamese military leaders. After having been out of
sight since mid-August, Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung reappeared at
a soccer game on 27 November. Dung appeared subsequently on
6 December, along with Defense Minister Senior General Vo Nguyen
Giap and Colonel General Song I-lao, to receive a visiting PLAF
delegation; and on 15 December he attended an army sports
competition marking the forthcoming VPA anniversary. Dung had
appeared fairly regularly during the last half of 1973 and early
1974, taking on some of Giap's traditional functions during the
latter's extended absence from public view from July to September
1973 and from October 1973 to May 1974. Clap made no appearances in
June or July, but has been regularly active since the end of August.
The surfacing of some military leaders who do not regularly attend
public functions revealed some previously unknown promotions. Last
April's official announcement that a series of promotions had been
granted gave no comprehensive list; the information has been gleaned
indirectly with the sporadic mentioning of various officers
identified with a higher rank than previously.* Among these latest
-~ Promotions revealed earlier are discussed in the TRENDS of 1 May
1974 pages 2-3, and 7 August 1974, pages 22-25.
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revelations was the identification of army logistics chief Dinli
Duc Thien as a lieutenant general when he appeared at the
.1.5 December sports event. A 14 December visit by the I'LAF
delegation to the command of the People's Armed Public Security
Force= prompted the appearance of a prev:ously unrevealed major
general--Nguyen The Tung, who represented the police forces.
DRV GENERAL STRESSES ARMY'S COMMITMENT TO REVOLUTIONARY GOALS
The lengthy article by Col. Gen. Song Hao, Chief of the VPA General
Political Department, was given broad dissemination befitting a formal
anniversary treatise; it was broadcast by Hanoi radio in daily
Installments from 8 through 14 December, publish'-id in the army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN 1)AN on the 16th, and printed in the December issues of
the army journal TAP CI-II QUAN D01 NIIAN DAN and the party journal
HOC TAP. The article discussed in conventional terms many subjects
raised by Song Ilao in past articles--praising the army for its
obedience to the party, its determination, discipline, and unity, its
good relations with civilians, and its achievements in study and
training. At the same time, some of the points ma le by Song Ilao could
be read as an argument for a greater North Vietnamese commitment to
achieving victory in the South.
In analyzing the experience of the resistance against the French,
Song Hao indicated that both domestic construction and fighting can
b
11 e undertaken simultaneously, noting that the armed forces and people
conducted the resistance while building the country." Ile again
focused on his priorities in outlining the army's revolutionary virtues,
maintaining that the army "strongly opposed all vile move. to incite it:
to seek materi-1. interests" and vehemently advocating determination to
achieve success:
Our cadres and combatants have always advanced and have
never retreated. All phenomena of half-way revolution,
irresoluteness in coping with the enemy, lack of
revolutionary offensive spirit, lack of determination
to overcome difficulties and hardships, and individualism
are inconsistent with our army's revolutionary nature
and traditions.
Song llao loter returned to this same theme, reiterating that the
Vietnamese army and people have "never retreated" before an enemy
no matter how powerful he has been," and have "always tried by
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18 DECILMBER 1974
all means to advance and have resolutely struggled and achieved victory."
Cle;.ir.l.y indicating his formula for success, he added:
Engaging in revolution means launching offensives.
Only when we launch offensives against the enemy
can we defeat: it, build and develop our strength,
protect the revolutionary gains, and defend the
North.
Song 1-Iao did not go on to indicate that an offensive to drascical?.y
change the situation in the South is likely in the near future. On
the contrary, in his concluding passages he suggested that the army has
many obstacles facing it before it can achieve its ultimate objectives.
lie expressed confidence that the army would advance to "total victory"
but noted that "our combat task. still faces hardships and fierce
challenges" and "ou- undertaking to build our paople's army into a
regular, modern army remains difficult."
Song Ilao dwelt upon the army's tradition of fighting throughout
Vietnam, in effect justifying commitment of North Vietnamese units
in the South. While couched in general. language which''predictably
avoids any explicit mention of the VPA presence in South Vietnam,
Song Iiao's support for their role was clear. He asserted
impassionatel.y that "our country is one" and "each inch of land is
part of the flesh and blood of the Vietnamese country" and is a
"sacred pert of the fatherland that every patriotic Vietnamese must
strive to protect." Repeatedly he pointed out that the armed forces
have fought "on any battlefield, distant or near," have "rushed to
any place the enemy has been," and "have walked thousands of miles to
very distant areas."
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18 DECLMBER 1974
PRC - KOREA
PEKING CONTINUES HARD LINE TOWARD U.S, TROOPS IN KOREA
Recent Peking comment on the UN debate over the Korean question has
further demonstrated the PRC's steadily sharpening criticism of the
continued U.S. troop presence in South Korea. Following the defeat,
with a tie vote, of the North Korean-backed resolution demanding the
withdrawal from South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag, a
12 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article attacked the U.S.
position or, the question as "lies." Commentator further labeled as
"deceit" (wan chuan ship chi jen chili tan) the U.S. argument that its
ti.?oops are in South Korea to defend the Korean Armistice Agreement,
but are not there under UN auspices and are not guilty of any inter-
ference in the South's affairs. Referring to the U.S. backed proposal
which was passed by the General Assembly's First Committee, Commentator
c'iarged the U.S. had "perpetrated various tricks to railroad through .
an indefensible resolution" which "covers up" crimes of U.S. aggression.
and intervention in Korea, creates a "pretext" to prolong the stay
of U.S. troops in the South, and "unduly" refers the question of the
dissoluticn of the UN Command to the Security Council.*
On two previous occasions in the past two ionths the Chinese have used
the UN forum to accuse the United States of deception on the Korean
question. Chiao Kuan-hua, in a 2 October UN speech, used exactly the
same language as Commentator (wan chuan shin chi jen chill tan) in denying
the U.S. assertion that the UN Command cannot be wiL',drawn because of a
threat from North Korea. More recently, on 29 November Chinese UN
representative Huang Hua called the U.S. contention that its troops
were in South Korea to maintain peace a "glaring reversal of the truth."
Commentator echoed other propaganda in demanding that the United States
w-;_tlhdraw its troops, halt military assistance to the South, and end its
"connivance" with the South's provocations against the North,
but put no time frame on withdrawal. A greater sense of urgency
regarding U.S. withdrawal was voiced at a Peking banquet, on the
occasion of the 25 October anniversary of the entry of the Chinese
People's Volunteers into the Korean War, by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien,
who called for U.S. troops "to pull out of South Korea without delay."
* A few days before the vote, a 6 December NCNA correspondent's report
had blasted as "gangster's logic" the U.S. position that its troops
would remain in South Korea regardless of the outcome of the UN vote
because they were there under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The
report dismissed the treaty as a "mere scrap of paper," which had been
signed "illegally."
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18 DECEMBER 1974
PRC - THAILAND
PEKING FAILS THAI CP ANNIVERSARY, MAINTAINS BANGKOK CONTACTS
Peking media's practice this year of giving increased attention to
the Thai Communist Party (CPT), while at the same time according
sustained coverage to relations between the PRC and the Thai
Government, was demonstrated most recently on the 32d anniversary
of the CPT. Peking's report on 9 December of a 1 December CPT
statement on its anniversary, and acknowledgment in August of the
anniversary of the Thai insurrection, contrast with Peking's
ignoring of both anniversaries in 1973.%
NCNA's 9 December summary version of the CPT's 1 December state-
ment on the Thai communists' 32d anniversary included a reference---
omitted in NCNA pickups of other CPT statements earlier this year--
to "drive away the U.S. imperialists" from Thailand; however, the
NCNA report ignored several other more specific CPT references to
U.S. misdeeds as well as all references to the Sanya government.
Peking's selective reporting of the CPT statement also implicitly
indicated approval, for the first time, of political struggle in
Thailand as well as armed struggle, presumably reflecting Peking's
perception of the Sanya administration's weakness. All references
to political struggle had been dropped by Peking in its coverage
of the August Thai insurrection anniversary editorial, originally
carried by the Peking-supported clandestine radio, Voice of the
People of Thailand. NCNA's 9 December pickup of the CPT 1 December
statement included the CPT claim that "our party would like to
cooperate with political parties, organizations and personages who
support and join the people. . ."
The 14CNA report also carried Peking's first mention of the CPT's
ten-point policy statement issued on the party anniversary in
1972. The statement had been issued on ti,,= 30th party anniversary
in 1972, just after Peking had taken its first steps to improve
PRC-Thai state relations by welcoming official Thai envoys to China.
Peking only gradually began to reiterate its support for the CPT
after Thanom's ouster in October 1973, at a moderate pace reflected
in its failure to commemorate the anniversary last December.
* For oackground see the TRENDS of 2 October 1974, page Si, and of
14 August 1974, page 20.
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18 DECEMBER 1974
The NCNA repo.' 's retention of the CPT reference to "U.S.
imperialism" actively operating in Thailand was the first such
Peking media treatment of this issue since September 1973, when
NCNA carried the CPT's message of congratulations on the
10th CCP Congress. Peking has continued to carry factual
accounts of U.S. troop withdrawals from Thailand, and in
January 1974 reported an anti rIA demonstration in Thailand
which noted both U.S. CIA and military roles in Thailand.
PEKING-BANGKOK Peking's somewhat increased attention
RELATIONS COVERAGE to the CPT has not been accompanied by
any reduction in its treatment of rela-
tions between the PRC and Thai governments. A Thai trade
mission is now in China; NCNA on 17 December reported the
unanimous vote of the Thai National Assembly on 6 December to
repeal a decree which banned trade between the two countries.
It quoted the Thai foreign minister as saying that the two
countries "will develop normal trade relations." Peking has
also given considerable coverage to the visit to Thailand of
a Chinese basketball team, with an 8 December NCNA report
quoting Thailand's deputy foreign minister as envisaging that
the development of relations "will lead to the establishment
of diplomatic relations." And a Peking broadcast in Thai on
12 December even quoted the Thai Air Chief Marshal Thawi
Chunlasap as making "an admirable statement" on the permanency
of Thai-Chinese friendship. Recent NCNA accounts have reported
the struggle for better conditions by Thai peasants, but while
noting their call for Thai government departments to take
action, NCNA has carefully avoided reporting any call for the
government's overthrow.
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CONFIDENTIAL Fi31S TRENDS
18 DECEMBER 1974
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PRAGUE PARTY DAILY CARRIES NEW DENUNCIATION OF DUBCEK
A new vitriolic attack on deposed CPCZ First Secretary Alexander
Dubcek, in an 11 December RUDE PRAVO editorial article, marked
the latest episode in the continuing power struggle between
moderates and hardliners in the Czechoslovak regime. The article
was written to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the party
document issued by the December 1970 CPCZ plenum assessing the
events. leading up to the August 1968 Soviet intervention.
Describing Dubcek and his colleagues in language markedly contrasting
with that usually employe-1 by CPCZ General Secretary Husak, the
article further highlights the increased assertiveness of the
Bilak-style hardliners in that it is the first such article to
appear on the anniversary of the 1970 party document. The article
was preceded last month by an 8-22 November Prague radio series
which leveled an unusually extensive attack on .liberal emigrees
who had fled Czechoslovakia in the wake of he intervention.
The December 1970 party document, entitled "Lessons From the Crisis
Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of he
CPCZ," roundly denounced Dubcek and declared for the first time
that the Warsaw Pact intervention had been carried out at the
request of unnamed CPCZ Central. Committee members. It was not mad`
public until mid-January 1971, and the month-long delay in its
release was wic:ely believed to have been due to Moscow's insistence
on inclusion of the thesis that the 1968 invasion was requested
by the Czechoslovaks themselves. Reflecting the continued
sensitivity of the issue, the current RUDE PRAVO article did not
revive the thesis of the alleged invitation, instead praising in
general terms "the timely assistance of our closest socialist
allies. "*
In strident terms, RUDE PRAVO recalled that Dubcek--now working in
a forestry center in the Bratislava area--was put at the head of
the party in January 1968 by "the rightwing opportunist and anti-
socialist forces." He and other "liquidators" of the party, such
The more conservative Slovak CP daily, Bratislava PRAVDA, did
include a reference to the alleged invitation in its 13 December
f ollowup editorial article on the "Lessons" document anniversary,
noting that "the allies came not only on their own decision, but at
the request of thousands of communists and citizens from all strara
of our population."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 DECEMBER 1974
as Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and Spacek, it said, conjured up "socialism
with a human face," unduly stressed national specific features,
and "gravely violated the interests of the party and its inter-
national traditions and principles." In effect conceding the
continued appeal of Dubcek and his associates, th, article added
that they "are directly responsible, both morally and politically,
for making many of our honest people waver."
The article noted that while Dubcek at present "remains in
unenviable isolation," his alleged anticommunism has not slackened
but increased. This fact, it declared, was borne out by "Dubcek's
letter"--a letter of condolence to Smrkovsky's widow, published
in the Rome weekly GIOL'?II-VIE NUOVE in March 1374. RUDE PRAVO
added that this letter, in which Dubcek defended his and Smrkovsky's
leadership, was "a welcome windfall for the blackest and most
inveterate anticommunist reaction." While Dubcek was stripped of
his party membership durng an "exchange of party cards" in 1970,
the Husak regime has so far refrained from bringing him and other
top 1968 leaders to public trial.
The article included only a single reference to Husak, stressing
instead the unfinished work of "cleansing" the party which begun in
April 1969, the date on which Husak replaced Dubcek as party leader.
Similarly, it included only one notable moderate feature--a state-
ment of the regime's intent to continue with a "differentiated"
approach toward those have been expelled from the party.
Internationally, RUDE PRAVO underscored the crucial importance of
Prague's alliance with Moscow, blaming anti-Sovietism for
Czechoslovakia's "bitter" experience in the recent past and equating
the combating of anti-Sovietism with "the defense of socialism
itself."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 DECEMBER 1974
AFRICA
MOSCOW URGES MILITANT STAND BY LIBERATION FORCES IN RHODESIA
Recent Soviet commentaries on Rhodesia have urged the black
Rhodesian liberation groups to adopt a tough, uncompromising
position toward Ian ,smith's white minority government, with
Moscow's calls for militancy continuing even after Smith's
11 December announcement that a cease-fire in the guerrilla
war had been negotiated. The Soviet militant urgings came
after Prime Minister Smith rejected the demand for immediate
black majority rule voiced at an early December conference
in Lusaka attended by leaders of three Rhodesian liberation
groups and the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana.
I~Jhile urging militancy, Moscow radio commentaries to Africa
have blurred the details of events by not distinguishing
between the original Lusaka conference demand on 6 December for
immediate majority rule and the later modification of this
demand which was followed by Smith's cease-fire announcement.
Moscow's first commentary on the Lusaka meeting came two days
after Smith had rejectpO the conference's initial call for
immediate majority rule as a precondition for the cessation of
guerrilla activities. A 9 December Moscow radio broadcast to
Africa credited the "positive changes" in Mozambique and
Angola with influencing other African liberation movements to
"step up their fight," and hailed as a "major decision" the
agreement by the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Front for the
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) to unite under the African
National. Council (ANC). Moscow did not delineate the demands
of the Lusaka participants, noting only that the "racists" in
Salisbury had rejected the "constructive proposals" of the
"African representatives" and had replied with an "ultimatum"
that the Rhodesian Africans cease their fight "against the
pres,nt discriminatory processes in the country." Moscow
recalled that the "Zimbabwe people" had made "no compromises
with I_lie racists in the past" adding that "there is even less
reason for them to compromise today." Moscow's Radio Peace and
Progress program for Africa on the 10th was similarly vague
about the black nationalists' demands, noting only that the
"concrete proposals" of the Lusaka conference were answered by
"undisguised hatred and frustration among Rhodesian racists and
their South African allies" who "intend to continue following
the racist course" in the hope of frustrating the national
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CONFIDETTAT, FBIS TRENDS
18 DECEMBER 1974
liberation movement in Rhodesia. IZVESTIYA commentator
Pilyatskiy's 11 December report on the Lusaka meeting, carried
by TASS, cited the demand for immediate majority rule and
called for the "intensification of the national liberation
struggle" in order to "eradicate" colonialism and racism in
Africa.
After Smith's 11 December announcement that agreement had been
reached to end the guerrilla war immediately in return for the
release of political prisoners and the holding of a constitutional
convention, Moscow continued to obscure the meaning of the
evolving situation. Commenting that events were "unfolding
with unrelenting speed," a Moscow radio broadcast to Africa on
the 12th depicted Smith's announcement as a "concession" motivated
by Salisbury's fear of their "growing solation on the world
scene," while failing to report that the 6 December demand for
immediate majority rule had been dropped by the Lusaka conferees.
Radio Peace and Progress' commentary on the 13th accused Smith
and South African Prime Minister Vorster of "coordinating"
their efforts to preserve racism in Rhodesia, branding Smith's
proposal to settle the Rhodesian issue a "neocolonialist maneuver"
designed to "dampen African vigilance and support for the freedom
struggle." The commentary suggested that the "only possible
response to the racist intrigues is a greater armed liberation
struggle." A 15 December Moscow Domestic Service commentary
further characterized Smith's actions as an attempt "to delude
world public opinion" in order to continue receiving economic ana
military aid from the "NATO patrons of the racists," and accused
the "leading bourgeois mass media" of "collusion" with the Rhodesian
authorities by describing Smith with "rapturous adjectives."
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N 0 T E S
MANSFIELD IN CHINA: Peking treatment of visiting Senate Majority
Leader Mansfield has exceeded some of the protocol norms established
for such visits, including Senator Mansfield's previous trip in
1972 with Senate Minority Leader Scott. NCNA described Mansfield's
meetings with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on the 10th and with
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on the 12th as "friendly and frank."
(Chiao had also met Mansfield and Scott in 1972, before lie was
foreign minister.) A 4 July meeting between Teng and Senator
Jackson had been characterized only as 'frank" and many such dis-
cussions, including the ones last month with Secretary Kissinger,
are not characterized by NCNA at all. (Chiao did term the Kissinger
talks "candid" in a banquet speech.) Other signs of approval
accorded Mansfield included an evening dinner hosted by Teng--
Jackson had been given a meal at noon--and an hour-long meeting
with Chou En-lai, according to AFP. Western press reports of
Secretary Kissinger's recent meeting with Chou and of the Chou-
Jackson meeting reported that they lasted for only about half an
hour.
ROPIANIAN RELATIONS WITH USSR, PRC: The communique on Romanian
Foreign Minister Macovescu's 9-13 December "official, friendly
visit" to the USSR served to reaffirm Bucharest's close ties
to Moscow, the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. The two sides noted "with
satisfaction" that Soviet-Romanian relations are "developing
successfully" and along the lines laid down in the 1970 treaty
of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. _'hey also
pledged "to contribute in every possible way to the further
strengthening of friendship and multilateral links among the
socialist countries", as well as "to the consolidation of unity
and cohesion, and to the development of cooperation among the
Warsaw Pact members and CEIdA members." A similar pledge was
contained in the communique on Kosygin's visit to Bucharest to
sign the 1970 treaty. SCINTEIA, as on that occasion, explained
that its pledge applied to the development of relations with
"all" socialist countries. This latter intention was underscored
by the 6-14 December visit of PRC Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang
to sign a 1975 trade protocol providing for a "significant rise in
exchanges," according to AGERPRES on the 14th. During a reception
held by Ceausescu on the 12th, the two sides, as reported by
Bucharest radio, "stressed with complete satisfaction. . . the
close and traditional relations of friendship, militant solidarity
and all-round cooperation of our parties, countries and people."
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BIS TRENDS
18 DECEMBER 1974
PORTUGUESE RADIO PROGRAMS: Observations on the content of the
evening "political hour" feature at 2105 GMT (2205 local) on
Lisbon's Radio Club Portugues have confirmed a pattern which
ii:cludes 25-minute programs by three political parties plus
the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA). The Monday night
program, sponsored by the Portuguese Communist Party, was
announced on 25 November. The Tuesday program is sponsored by
the center-left Popular Democratic Party, whose first program
was aired on 3 December. The Portuguese Socialist Party has
the Thursday slot, with ti'e first program appc_aring on
5 December. The bFA is spoi,soring two programs a week, on
Wedn asdays and Fri gays . In introducing the first PLFA program
on 29 November, the announcer said that the PIFA broadcast would
be a "program of the armed forces general staff, produced by
the public information service of the armed forces,"and
characterized Radio Club Portugues as "the radio station of
freedom." The Saturday and Sunday programs are devoted to
music and sports, respectively. No right-of-center parties are
represented on the feature, nor is there a program sponsored by
the Portuguese Democratic Movement, which reportedly maintains
a close relationship with the Communist Party.
TURKISH-LANGUAGE CLANDESTINE RAUI(): The Turkish-language communist
clandestine "Our Radio" announced on 14 December that effective the
following day listeners could hLar the "Voice of the Turkish
Communist Party" broadcasting on ch-Irrtwave on Sunday and Tuesday
nights at 0810 GMT (1010 Turkish time). The Voice of the Turkish
Communist Party has been on the air since January 1971 with Thursday
night programs on mediumwave for Turkish workers in Europe. Tile
new shortwave broadcasts make the programs available to listeners
in Turkey. The Voice of the Turkish Communist Party broadcasts
are heard on frequencies used by Our Radio, which operates from
East Germany and has been broadcasting since 1958. Our Radio has
only occasionally carried statements and documents attributed to
the Turkish CP. The new 40-minute shortwave program, monitored
on 17 December, stated that "these broadcasts are eagerly awaited
as much in our country" as by the Turkish workers abroad. Claiming
that interest in the broadcasts was constantly increasing, the
announcer said that all letters from listeners expressed a common
wish for increased broadcasts two or three times a week. A
comment:ary on this program called for basic party organizations
to be cstablished "among the masses in struggle," particularly in
factories, faculties, barracks, and trade unions. Another item
urged communists to penetrate, organize, and lead strike actions.
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A talk on conditions in Turkey asserted that when Turkish
workers returned home from abroad for the holidays they
would find a "deplorable situation"--shortages of many goods,
growing unemployment, black marketeering, steep cost of living
increases and inflation, as well as martial law in some
provinces. As in Our Radio comment, the Turkish CP broadcast
assailed the Justice Party and "reactionary politicians" such
as JP leader Demirel for supporting actions by "fascist commandos"
against "progressive elements."
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- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCGW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9 - 15 DECEMBER 1974
Moscow (2443 items)
Peking (919 items)
Brezhnev Visit to
(23%)
11%
UNGA Session
(17%)
20%
France
[Korea Debate
(7%)
8%]
[tarty-Government
(---)
2%]
[Charter Review
(--)
4%]
"Approval"
Romanian Foreign Minis-
(--)
6%
Debate
[Draft Economic
(--)
3%]
ter Macovescu in USSR
Rights Charter
[Joint Communique
(--)
3%]
Criticism of Lin Piao (3.0%)
China
(5%)
5%
and Confucius
Soyuz 16 Flight
(4%)
4%
Indochina
(8%)
4%
Thailand CP 32d Anni-
(--)
3%
versary
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio serv_des. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party st,, tement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
coufted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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