TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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28
Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Publication Date:
December 11, 1974
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~~TC.P 50
{Treed in .~orrnMunist Propaganda `,Dec.74
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FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
11 DECEMBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 50)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unav-horised disclosure wtject to
aiminalsarctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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15 11 DECEMBER 1974
CONTEi`JTS
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
i.loscow Defends Summit Accords, Notes Western Criticism. . . . . . . . 1
CSCE-2\1BFR
Moscow, Paris Endorse Summit CSCE But Note Outstanding Issues . . . . 3
Warsaw Hints Forward-Based Systems May be Raised at ;IBFR. . . . . . . 4
Agreement Signed on Soviet Economic and Military Aid to DRV . . . . . 5
DRV General Implies ~Iili.tary Solution Best Choice in South. . . . . . 7
Hanoi Condemns U.S. Position on Aid to DRV, Communist Attacks 8
PRG Media Call for iteasures to Insure Adequate Rice Harvest . . . . 9
CHINA
Purged PLA Leaders Return to Power, New Shantung Chief Named. . . . . 11
USSR
Soviet Journalist Challenges Policy of Expanding Grain Sowing 13
Breziinev Mini-Cult Gets Boost at Anniversary Ceremonies . . . . . . . 16
HUNGARY
New Party Congress Guidelines Reflect Orthodox Trend. . . . . . . . . 20
NOTES
Makarios' Return to Cyprus; UN Vote on Korea;
Japanese Leadership Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
I1oscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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11 DECEMBER 1974
U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW DEFENDS SUMMIT ACCORDS, NOTES WESTERN CRITICISM
The unrelieved euphoria which characterized Moscow comment on
the Vladivostok summit during the two weeks following the
meeting has given way recently to a more balanced style of
comment, in which some acknowledgment has been made of the mixed
reactions in the West. Most of the Soviet central newspapers,
as well. as Moscow radio, have carried original Soviet comment over
the past week, pegged in part to Western views on the summit.
While they contain the same positive assessments of the summit
expressed in official documents and leadership speeches, the
self-congratulations aze accompanied by n..,sertions that are somewhat
defensive in tone.
The commentaries that have addressed Western criticisms of the
summit have included an article by Yuriy Yartsev in LITERARY GAZETTE
on 4 December, an article by V. Osipov in IZVESTIYA on 5 December,
an article in LIFE ABROAD reported by TASS on 7 December, and a
Moscow radio commentary to North America by Pozner on 8 December.
All of them reported various criticisms of the summit results by
such Western figures as Senators Jackson and Buckley and journalists
Zorza, Reston, and Kraft. Some commentators went beyond a mere
disparagement of this criticism to offer a reasoned defense of the
summit. V. Osipov, in IZVESTIYA, for example, noting criticism
about the modest nature of the arms limitation accord, defended it
as the "maximum possible under present conditions."
On the substantive aspects of the accords, the recent articles
have continued the trend noted in earlier Soviet comment--foreshortening
the time period provided for reaching a new agreement- on strategic
offensive weapons. An editorial in SOVIET RUSSIA on 2 December said
that the Vladivostok agreement called for completing work on a
new accord in the "near future." A dispatch in PRAVDA on 4 December
compressed the time frame even further, speaking of completing the
agreement in the "immediate future." Moscow continues to avoid
referring to the numerical missile ceilings in the accord, but
PRAVDA on 4 December quoted President Ford as having told his
news conference that the "agreed maximum limits" were substantially
below what would have been reached if the arms race had continued
unabated.
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The aspects of the Vladivostok summit dealing with trade have
come in for increased attention in some of the more recent
commentary. An international review by C. Orestov on 8 December
saw President Ford's remarks to the recent trade conference as
an indication that the summit initiatives were being followed up.
It volunteered the advice, as other Soviet commentaries have, that
an expansion of trade would be particularly helpful for the United
States at this time, in view of the worsening economic conditions
in the world.
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CSCE - H B F R
MOSCOW, PARIS ENDORSE SUMMIT CSCE BUT NOTE OUTSTANDING ISSUES
Moscow comment on Brezhnev's 4-7 December "working visit" to France
has predietabl.y played up the portion of the final joint communique
containing formal French endorsement of a summ:i t?-level CSCE f 1aale,
while all but ignoring the passage In which Paris stipulated that
certain conditions must he met hos ore France would attend such a
summit. The wording on CSCE in the cnnlmunique carefully balanced
Soviet and French interests, Paris in effect saying yes to a summit,
but only after its demands for sat Isfactory progress on outstanding
issues are met. The Soviet leadership approval statement on the
resulLr; of the visit, issued on the 9th by the CPSU Politburo,
Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers, singled
out the passage on the summit and made no mention of the passage
on outstanding questions, and, according to a Moscow radio summary,
PRAVDA followed this lead in an editorial on the 1lth.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE In the first paragraph on CSCE, the joint
communique alluded to the recent movement in
Geneva in formulating the document on reunification of families,
noting that "considerable progress" had been made during the
current second stagc, "particularly in the last weeks." In a
passage reflecting the French demands for progress in the CSCE
"third basket" on expanding human and cultural relations between
West and East Europe, the two sides declared "their determination
to step up efforts in concerting questions which are not yet agreed
upon within the framework of the agenda adopted in Helsinki, so as
to conclude the second stage of the conference." With priority thus
given to the resolution of outstanding questions, the communique
then said that the two sides "state that good prerequisites have
been created for the conclusion of the conference at the earliest
date, for holding its third stage and signing its final documents at
summit level."
SOVIET STATEMENTS Statements by Brezhnev and Soviet spokesmen
during the visit had underscored Soviet
interest in obtaining French endorsement of a summit finale. Thus
in his dinner speech on the 5th Brezhnev reiterate'l the Soviet call
for the "speediest successful conclusion" of the conference "at
the most authoritative level," while French President Giscard
d'Estaing made no reference to CSCE in his speech. IZVESTIYA on
the 6th, according to TASS, noted that "the Soviet side" in the
Paris talks had pointed to the need for an early CSCE conclusion
at summit level.
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11 DECEMBER 1974
Brezhnev's spokesman during the visit, TASS director general
Leonid Zamyatin, in remarks unreported by Moscow media, told
the press on the 6th that he thought the summit would be held
in the first half of 1975. And in a Paris radio interview on
the 6th--:.,.Lso unreported by Soviet media--PRAVDA's senior
political observer Yuriy Zhukev in a response to a question on
CSCE said optimistically that the talks "were going very well."
Preempting the official announcement in the communique, Zhukov
observed that France, the USSR, the United States, and
"several" other countries "are now inclined to hold the last
phase [of the conference] as soon as possible and to have it
crowned by a summit." Moscow did not report a statement by
C:iscard's spokesman on the 7th that French backing for the
summit was dependent on progress in the CSCF "third basket."
WARSAW HINTS FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS MAY BE RAISED AT MBFR
Moscow and other Warsaw Pact comment on the Vladivostok summit
had ignored the fact that "forward-based systems" (FBS), i.e.,
U.S. nuclear armed forces in Europe, had been implicitly
excluded from the SALT agreement. However, a single 10 December
Warsaw PAP dispatch on the winter recess of the MBFR talks
in Vienna broached the issue of FBS when it implied that it
might be raised there when the talks resume next year.
PAP special correspondent Andrzej Rayzacher in his Vienna dispatch
on the 10th incorrectly cited President Ford as having spoken
"in favor of the Possibility of expanding the agenda of the Vienna
negotiations" by introducing the "reduction" of the U.S. forward-
based systems in Europe. It is unclear whether Rayzacher was misled
by an incorrect account of President Ford's 2 December press
conference remarks or was aware of the mistake but consciously
used the erroneous account as a device for raising the issue.
President Ford, when asked at his press conference about the
possibility of including discussion of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons in the MBFR talks, in fact said that U.S. forward-based
systems were not to be included in the delivery-system and
MIRV limitations as outlined in the Vladivostok statement. He
went on to say that reduction of military personnel and arms
reduction were being discussed in the MBFR talks. According to
the Vienna DIE PRESSE on the 5th, the U.S. embassy in Vienna
issued a USIS release attributing to the President the statement
that "he hopes that the tactical nuclear arms of the United States
stationed in Europe can be reduced in the course of the talks" on
MBFR. DIE PRESSE noted that this release was later corrected.
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Rayzacher cited the incorrect Presidential statement after
reviewing r.iie standard Warsaw Pact criticism of NATO's negotiating
position calling for "asymmetrical" rcductionr; between NATO and
the Pact and limiting any reduction to ground troops while
excluding air force units and nuclear-armed weapons. Observing
that "circles close" to the socialist states' delegation, in
Vienna "do not deny that the structures of the military potentials
of both blocs are different, everybody knows," 'ie added, that
these potentials are balanced and provide stability in central
Europe. In this context he noted the alleged Presidential state-
ment, saying that "it must have been the awareness of the need for
keeping up the balance and stability that made President Ford
speak a couple of days ago."
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11 DECEMBER 1974
VIETNA11
AGREEMENT SIGNED ON SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO DRV
Moscow's reluctance since the Paris peace agreement to acknowledge
its military assistance to North Vietnam has been underlined in
its propaganda on the latest USSR-DRV aid agreements which,
according to Hanoi, provide for military as well as economic aid
for 1975. Hanoi's initial report on its economic delegation, led
by Politburo member and Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh, specified
that the group was in the Soviet Union to hold talks and sign
agreements on Soviet "eccnomic and military" aid. While Hanoi's
accounts of the 8 December signing of the agreements did not refer
to military aid, the military aspect of the agreements was noted
again in a 10 December NI-IAN DAN editorial and DRV reports on
Trinh's return to Hanoi on the 9th.
By contrast, Soviet media have claimed that the agreements are
for "economic and technological assistance" to the DRV and have--
as they did last year--specified details of the economic aid
unmentioned by Hanoi. Thus, a TASS Russian--language report on
the 8th stated that the Soviet Union would "help tha DRV to set
up and develop its national economy through the supply of equipment
and materials" and would particularly assist with geological
prospecting and the delivery of road-building machines, tractors,
trucks, rolled ferrous and nonferrous metals, oil products, and
chemical fertilizers.
Moscow's sensitivity on the question of military aid also seemed
reflected in its )mission of the names of the military participants
in the 3-8 December negotiations; Hanoi duly noted the participation
of DRV Lieutenant General 'I'ran Sam and Soviet Colonel General
Sidorovich and Lieutenant General Sakekich. However, Moscow has
reported a planned visit to Hanoi by a high-level Soviet military
official, Chief of Staff Gen. Viktor Kulikov. The 10 December TASS
announcement indicated that he would pay "an official friendly
visit" to the DRV in the second half of December, and it is
possible the trip is related *j North Vietnam's celebration of
the 30th anniversary of its army on 22 December.
Hanoi comment on tho. 1974 USSR-DRV aid agreement signed on 14 August
1,973 had f'illowed the Soviet lea,1 and refrained from mentioning
military assibtance;* but some North Vietnamese discontent on the
* The agreements on Soviet assistance to the DRV for 1974 are
discussed in the TRENDS of 15 August 1973, pages 3-4.
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issue may have accounted for NHAN DAN's failure to print an
editorial on the aid pact. The party paper had editorially
welcomed aid agreements concluded with other countries in 1973,
noting promises of military aid even from Moscow's East European
allies. The only other agreement on both economic and military
assistance announced this year was the DRV pact with China,
signed in Peking on 26 October 1974. In recent months, DRV
agreements for 1.975 with East European states have focused on
"economic, scientific, and technical cooperation" for 1975.
USSR-PRG AID PACT 'LASS announced on 10 December 1974 that an
"agreement on economic aid to the PRG
in 1975" had been signed in Moscow by PRG Minister Nguyen Van Hieu
and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers I. Novikov, who
had also signed the pact with the DRV. The agreement is similar
to the Soviet-PRG .conomic aid program for 1974, signed in
Moscow on 20 December 1973, and provides for Soviet delivery of
industrial. and agricultural equipment, oil products, metals,
medicines, and foodstuffs.
DRV GENERAL IMPLIES MILITARY SOLUTION BEST CHOICE IN SOUTH
An article by Colonel General Song Hao, chief o the North Vietnamese
army (VPA) Political General Department, sets forth an argument
which could be used to justify military action to achieve communist
objectives in South Vietnam. Only a portion of the first two parts
of thF tree-part article have, been broadcast so far, and they have
been coucned in an historical and theoretical framework. However,
a clear position has emerged in these opening installments: Song
Hao cites evidence from the army's experience to demonstrate that
Vietnam is able to fight while building the country, that it is
against the army's tradition to retreat or stop short of success,
that offensives are necessary to achieve victory, and that the army
has always been ready to fight in any part of Vietnam.
Hanoi began broadcasting the article in daily installments on
8 December and was continuing to carry it as late as the 11th.
According to the radio, the article was published in the December
issues of the army's monthly journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and
the party journal HOC TAT to mark the 30th anniversary of the
founding of the VPA. Hanoi similarly marked the 25th anniversary
of the army in 1969 with important articles by its military leaders,
includ:in6 Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, Chief of Staff Van Tien
Dung, and Song Hao. Song Hao's last major pronouncement was a
speech on the army's em>>lation campaign published in the April 1974
TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. His last previous article in that
journal was in February 1972.
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11 DECEMBER 1974
HANOI CONDEMNS U.S. POSITION ON AID TO DRV, COMMUNIST ATTACKS
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements have attacked recent
remarks by Secretary Kissinger on the question of U.S. aid to
North Vietaam and observations by White House press secretary
Ron Nesseu on communist military operations in South Vietnam.
A 5 December spokesman's statement, responding to Kissinger's
remarks during testimony before the Senate Finance Committee
two days earlier, assailed the Secretary for his remarks indicating
that the United States did not plan to provide aid to North Vietnam
in the immediate future. Accusing the United States of systema-
tically violating the Paris agreement, the statement reiterated
standard demands that Washington "fulfill its duty of healing the
wounds of war in the DRV as provided for by Article 21 of the
Paris agreement," stop all "encroachments" upon DRV airspace and
waters, and end U.S. involvement and interference in South Vietnam.
The issue of aid to North Vietnam is not often raised in Hanoi
media, but the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry has been careful
to respond, as in this instance, to statements by Secretary
Kissinger on this and other important aspects of U.S. policy on
Vietnam. Thus, for example, a 9 June 1974 Foreign Ministry spokes-
man's statement assailed the Secretary's attitude toward aid to the
North as reflected in his remarks to Congress and the press.* More
recently, the alleged U.S. failure to meet its "obligation" to
North Vietnam was included in a list of charges against the United
States in an 11 October DRV Government statement demanding Thieu's
ouster. The issue was also touched upon in the 2 December joint
communiciue on ' visit with the French Communist Party by a DRV
party deiegation led by Politburo member Le Duc The, Hanoi's leading
negotiator of the Paris accord.
ALLEGED U.S., DRV A 10 December spokesman's statement rejected
INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH as "brazen slanders" remarks the' previous
day by White House press secretary Ron Nessen
calling upor North Vietnam to refrain from broadening military
attacks in South Vietnam. Hanoi had not given so much weight to a
6 December statement by a State Department spokesman on communist
plans for increased hostilities in the South; it issued no foreign
ministry response, but it did publicize a protest from the spokesman
of the PRG delegation to the La Celle Saint Cloud consultative
conference.
* Hanoi comment on Secretary Kissinger's remarks last June is
discussed in the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 16-18.
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Nessen's remarks were also criticized in a PRG Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement on the 11th which went on to complain
about other alleged evidence of U.S. military involvement in
Vietnam--a recent visit to Saigon by U.S. Assistant Secretary
of Defense Mendolia and Vice Admiral Weschler, and the presence
of the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise off the Vietnamese
coast near Danang. A 10 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary
cited the military visits to Saigon and Senate passage of the
military aid bill in charging that "lord is evidently preparing
for very dangerous new military adventures against. our people
in the South."
PRG MEDIA CALL FOR MEASURES TO INSURE ADEQUATE RICE HARVEST
Vietnamese communist comment has reflected considerable concern
about insuring an adequate rice harvest in PRG-controlled areas
of South Vietnam and opposing alleged GVN efforts to acquire
rice in disputed areas. Action to deal with these problems was
advocated in a 25 November PLAF Command crder, broadcast by
Liberation Radio on the 27th, which called upon communist
military forces to help in the harvest, to frustrate GVN attempts
to gain control of rice, and to "punish" merchants who cooperated
with Saigon.. This is the first such public order from the
central PLAF Command since the 15 October 1973 order, which called
for "counterattacks" against GVN military operations and
coincided with a sharp increase in communist military action.
The current order warns that Saigon will be "appropriately
punished"; the 1973 order had threatened that the communists
would counter Saigon forces at "any place and with appropriate
forms and forces."
Warnings against GVN attempts to control the rice crop or destroy
communist rice appeared in Liberation Radio broadcasts at least
as early as mid-October--a 14 October broadcast charged government
troops with operations to "steal" rice during the previous month.
A 7 November broadcast, urging the proper harvesting and protection
of the 10th-month rice crop, cautio_ied that "famine" must be
prevented in the "liberated areas" and claimed, as have other
commentaries, that many areas under GVN control had been "seriously
affected by starvation." More recently, a 2 December radio
commentary warned that there would be a "considerable decline" in
this year's 10th--month rice production because of adverse weather
conditions and observed that "the grain problem has become a very
important problem in our present struggle against the enemy."
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The commentary advocated that families, military units, and
agencies cultivate short-term potato varieties to help meet
their ne As for grain, and that an effort be made to obtain
more grain from the winter-spring crop to "make up for losses"
sustained in the 10th month season.
Communist media acknowledged recent increased military action
on 10 December in reporting that on the previous day the PRG
delegation to the two-party Joint Military Commission had sent
a protest note to the ICCS. According to VNA, the note
condemned GVN bombing in "liberated reas" of Tay Ninh and Binh
Phuoc provinces and charged that the combing raids, along with
operations to seize PRG territory and rice, demonstrated
Saigon "sabotage" of the Paris accord.
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CHINA
PURGED PIA LEADERS RETURN TO POWER, NEW SHANTUNG CHIEF NAMED
The rehabilitation of two PLA military leaders rurged during the
cultural revolution, indicated by NCNA reportE on tl'cir attendance
at Peking functions on 7 and 9 December, seems intended to sharpen
the image of a united Chinese leadership at at time when Peking is
strongly pressing party leadership and discipline, and to signal
that other leaders may also re-imerge. The latest rehabilitations
may also serve as counterweights, preventing the accumulation
of excessive military power by any one faction.
Former PLA acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu's return to power
was signaled by NCNA on 7 December, when it placed Yang at the
head of a list of PLA leaders attending the funeral of a CCP Central
Committee member. Yang's new placement, directly above two deputy
chiefs of staff, suggests his return to the general staff department,
possibly as chief of staff.
Yang was acting chief of staff from the begi.ning of the cultural
revolution until his purge in March 1968. He reappeared publicly
for Army Day on 1 August this year, but at that time and again on
1 October National Day he was merely listed as "present," with
no indication that he had been given a new post. The chief of
staff position has been vacant since the dismissal of Huang Yung-sheng
in 1971, following Lin Piao's death.
On 9 December NCNA revealed that another military leader purged
during the cultural revolution had been named to the general staff.
Reporting a party hosted by the Peruvian Ambassador in Peking, NCNA
identified Wang Shang-jung, former general staff operations director,
as a deputy chief of staff. Like Yang, Wang had reappeared on Army
Day and National Day listed only as "present." Wang was purged in
1966 after Yang became acting chief of staff. In his March 1968
speech announcing Yang's dismissal, Lin Piao warned that though
Wang had opposed Yang, he should also be criticized. Lin named
Wang as a member of Ho Lung's clique, and Wang's full rehabilitation
is another sign of the posthumous rehabilitation of Ho.
REGIONAL From what is ktown of Yang's purge in the cultural
COr'nANDERS :evolution, his return to power is a further blow
t-) the autonomy of military region commanders.
Speeches by some central leaders following Yang's downfall indicated
that he had offended the powerful regional chiefs by making promotions
from within his own small clique. He was also accused of opposing
Chiang Ching and, to a lesser extent, Chou En-lai.
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The military region commanders were greatly weakened a year ago,
when all who held joint provincial party leadership post,- were
transferred to new regions., None of the commanders has regained
provincial party power in his new post, and in the two cases
where provincial first secretary posts have been filled, the
job has gone to civilian leaders. Most recently, a 6 December
Tsinan report on youth going to the countryside designated
Pai Ju-ping as Shantung first secretary and revolutionary
committee chief. Pai, pre-cultural revolution governor of
Shantung, had been second secretary, and in that post had regularly
appeared in rankings ahead of Tseng Szu-yu, commander of the
Tsinan Military Region. Kwangtung is the only other province
that has named a provincial party chief to replace an outgoing
militELy region commander. Last April Chao Tzu-yang, pre-cultural
revolution first secretary, regained the post instead of Hsu
Shih-?yu, Politburo member and head of the Canton Military Region.
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SOVIET JOURNALIST CHALLENGES POLICY OF EXPANDING GRAIN SOWING
A prominent Soviet journalist specializing in Siberian agriculture
has warned that th current agricultural policy of massive expansion
of grain sowing is causing violations of correct farming techniques
in Siberia and could lead to sharp reductions in future crop yields.
The article by Leonid Ivanov in the November issue of the literary
journal OUR CONTEMPORARY introduced the charge that the current
campaign to oxpand grain sowing is leading to repetition of
Khrushchev-eta mistakes. The present regime, reacting to the
disastrous erosion avid crop failure resulting from Khruslchev's
reckless exploitation of the virgin, lands, has been following a
more conservative policy, observing correct crop rotation methods
and leaving a part of the land fallcw each year to prevent soil
exhaustion. Ivanov's exposure of deviations from this policy may
herald a renewal of the debates over Siberian agrotechniques which
were characteristic of the Khrushchev years.
Ivanov was a sharp critic of agricultural policy under Khrushchev,
defending the practice of resting land by leaving it in clean
fallow, even when Khrushchev denounced clean fallow as wasteful and
ordered it eliminated in the early 1960's. In 1963 Ivanov had
exposed the errors of Khrushchev's scientific experts, who
supposedly had proved that clean fallow was unnecessary, but his
exposures were suppressed until Khrushchev's fall. Ivancv and
other defenders of clean fallow were vindicated by the 1963 virgin
land crop disaster, and following Khrushchev's 1964 ouster, a
system based on clean fallow was endorsed by the leadership.
Khrushchev's successors transferred large areas of farm land to
clean fallow and grasses, reducing the area sown to crops, and
they have repeatedly stressed that grain output must be increased
by raising yield cu the present acreage, rather than by expanding
the sown area at the 2xpe.nse of fallow and grasses. Nevertheless,
Ivanov's article indicates that this policy is not now being
applied consistently and that substantial deviations are h wing
tolerated--a situation due presumably to the 1972 harvest shortfalls,
as well as to the fact, noted by Ivanov, that crop yields in
Siberia have recently stopped rising.
REDUCTION OF Ivanov begins by describing the recent change in
CLEAN FALLOW attitude that has taken place among agricultural
officials on the issue of clean fallow. He noted
that there has been exceptionally good weather the last four years
in West Siberia and North Kazakhstan, where even two good years
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in a row are rare. This, according to ivanov, has "engendered
in some leaders a complacent attitude," and "some people are
already inclined to assert that now there Is no reason to be
especially concerned about the crops." As a result, "in a number
of places they already have begun to neglect: correct crop rotations,
especially clean fallow." In a good year, he complained, farm
leaders have been planting more acreage than. planned, lured by
prospects of a record crop, while in bad years they also have been
sowing more land, striving to make up for an expected poor yield
by planting a larger area. Ivanov wrote that "every time 1 hear
on the radio or read in the papers that such and such a rayon or
such and such an oblast has overfulfilled its spring sowing plan,
1 become depresse,l," because this means clean fallow is being
reduced, land set aside to rest is being exhausted, fields will
become weedy, and future crops will suffer.
Ivanov declared that he felt the need to speak out in defense of
clean fallow oecause in the spring of 1973 many areas, especially
in North Kazakhstan, sharply cut the fallow area in order to over-
fulfill sowing plans. He pointed out that this tactic was actually
counterproductive since "despite expectations," all. oblasts of
this zone produced less grain in 1973 than in 1972. The same
mistake was repeated by many oblasts in 1974, he said, and he
observed ruefully that "one gets the impression that some comrades
do aot wish to notice the high harvests produced by clean fallow."
Ile warned that these areas would be especially vulnerable in the
event of a future drought.
lvanov argued that technological progress--especially increased
production of fertilizer and lier-b:l.cIdes--leas not altered the need
for fallow. He complained of the widespread opinion that clean
fallow is obsolete, based on Ltie ideas that the nutrients in the
soil can be replenished by fertilizers instead of by resting the
land and that weeds can be destroyed by herbicides rather than by
fallowing. lie pointed cut that Siberia is still starved for
fertilizer, that fertilizer does not help if there is drought,
that herbicides damage new protective forest belts and reduce
soil nutrients, and that fallow is indispensable in accumulating
moisture in this frequently drought-ridden area.
EXPANSION OF Although Ivanov's article is the first to reveal
GRAIN SOWING the reduction of fallow in the virgin lands, other
articles have noted the pressures for expanded
grain production which are apparently encouraging this practice.
A number of them have provided statis.:ical indications of the
scale of the polic_? shift that has been taking place since 1972.
They provide an illustrative background to Ivanov's article and a
general confirmation of the substantiality of his complaints.
CUNT IDENTIAL
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Under Khrushchev, the sown area had been vastly expanded to boost
grain production, while clean fallow and grasses were drastically
cut; but this trend was sharply reversed in 1965. The scale of
the post-Khrushchev reversal. was documented by A. Stepanov in
the September 1972 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. He calculated a
6,360,000-hectare reduction in the grain area between 1965 and
1970 and noted that grain sowings dropped from 122,700,000 hectares
in 1969 to 119,300,000 in 1970 and 117,900,000 in 1971. Meanwhile,
lie wrote, clean fallow area had tripled since 1963, growing by
11,400,000 hectares to rearh 17,800,000 by 1970. He predicted
that fallow should reach 23-24 million hectares by 1975.
However, the reduction of grain sowings came under attack in 1972,
and a campaign began to expand the grain area. I. N. Kuznetsov,
deputy head of the Central Committee's agriculture section, wrote
in an April 1972 PARTY LIFE that in 1972 the RSFSR was expanding
its grain area by 1.5 million hectares and that Kazakhstan was
also expanding by one million hectares above the plan. After the
1972 harvest shortfall the campaign accelerated, with articles and
meetings urging reductions of f-i.llow and grasses to provide new
crop land. However, these calls referred to European Russia; no
one mentioned GTach cutbacks in the virgin lands, and in fact PRAVDA
and IZVESTIYA in early 1972 had specifically warned that expansion
of grain must not result in reducing clean fallow and disrupting
crop rotations in Siberia and Kazakhstan.
During 1973, according to an unsigned August 1973 KOMMUNIST article,
grain sowing was expanded by 7.8 million hectares. The RSFSR
added 4.3 million hectares, according to RSFSR First Deputy
Premier 11. F. Vasilyev in the 6 April 1973 SOVIET RUSSIA; the Ukraine
added 1.8 million, according to Ukrainian Agriculture Minister
P. L. Pogrebnyak in the j,,; 7,,a 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE; and
Kazakhstan added 1.5 million, according to Kazakh First Deputy
Premier I. G. Slazhnev in the 29 October 1973 SOVIET RUSSIA.
Benefiting from the increased acreage, RSFSR and Kazakh leaders
were able to boast of huge grain harvests in the fall of 1973.
It was still asserted, however, that this would not reduce clean
tallow in the virgin lands. IZVESTIYA on 18 January 1974 editorially
praised the grain expansion and added that "no one is raising the
question of cutting, say, the fallow area or violating crop rotations."
It declared that the expansion would use idle and abandoned land
and it cited the example of the Ukraine, which had substantially
expanded the grain area even though it supposedly had no unused
land. In addition, in the 12 March 1974 IZVESTIYA, A. Navolotskiy,
deputy chief of the Ministry of Agriculture's main administration for
grain crops, warned that in expanding grain output, clean fallow must
be preserved in arid regions and if necessary even increased.
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Ivanov's article indicates that local authorities, if not higher
officials, are quietly ignoring these admonitions in their urgent
efforts to increase current grain outp'lt.
Although praise of Brezhnev has become a standard feature of
ceremonial protocol at Soviet public functions, the display of
sycophancy presented at some of the recent republic 50th anniversary
ceremonies tops all precedents. In some respects, it recalls the
practices of the Stalin era, with local press acco.ats reporting
that the ceremonies were repeatedly interrupted by shouts of
"glory" to the Politburo "headed" by Brezhnev, and "long live"
the Politburo "headed" by Brezhnev. Speakers were reported as
characterizing Brezhnev not only as head of the Politburo but as
"leader" of the party and state. Moreover, in a form of praise
that implied more about Brezhnev than about the supposed objects
of praise, various leaders were introduced as "very close comrades-in-
arms" of Brezhnev--a formula seldom if ever used since Stalin's
lieutenants vied for this title. None of these extravagances
were reported in the central press.
In contrast to the earlier series of republic 50th anniversary
ceremonies (the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhen,
Armenia and Georgia, from 1967 to 1971) at which Brezhnev was the
star speaker, the present series enlisted the services of four
other top leaders besides Brezhnev. The meetings and the leaders
who addressed them were as follows: Moldavia, 1.1 October--Brezhnev;
Uzbekistan, 22 October--Suslov; Kirgizia, 2 November--Kosygin;
Turkmenia, 15 November--Kirilenko; and Tadzhikistan, 29 November-?-
Podgornyy.
Despite this sharing of protocolary honors, however, Brezhnev's
eminence was repeatedly made known in the symbolism of the oratory
and the press reports of the ceremonies. The other leaders were
cast in varying degrees of subordination, with Suslov getting the
best of the secondary honors and Kosygin definitely shortchanged.
The most important area--Uzbekistan--was assigned to Suslov, rather
than Kosygin or Eodgornyy, even though Suslov ranks below them in
the Politburo. Further, while a number of prominent leaders attended
the Uzbek ceremony addressed by Suslov, few republic leaders and
no CPSU Politburo members attended the Kirgiz and Turkmen ceremonies
addressed by Kosygin and Kirilenko. The local first secretaries
introduced Suslov as an "outstanding figure" of the party, state and
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international communism and Podgernyy as an "outstanding party and
state figure." Kosygin and Kirilenko, however, were introduced
only as "prominent figures."
HONORS FOR BREZHNEV Each of the five ceremonies were reported
as having elected the Politburo "headed by"
Brezhnev as honorary presidium--a practice which has now become
virtually standard. The additional honors lavished on Brezhnev
differed somewhat at each ceremony.
In Moldavia several speaker, recalled that Brezhnev had led the
republic in the early 1950`s and credited Moldavia's successes to
his leadership and inspiration. The formula Politburo "headed by"
(vo glave s) Brezhnev was used by RSFSR Premier M. S. Solomentsev,
Ukrainian First Secretary V. V. Shcherbitskiy, Moldavian First
Secretary I. I. Bodyul, and Estonian First Secretary I. G. Kebin,
while Leningrad First Secretary G. V. Romanov went further,
mentioning the Politburo "directed by" (rukovodimoye) Brezhnev.
Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov spoke of Brezhnev heading
the party, while Bodyul declared that Brezhnev headed the state
as well as the party. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary G. A. Aliyev
praised Brezhnev as the "experienced leader" (lider) of the party,
while Georgian First Secretary E. A. Shevardnadze called him the
"leader" of both party and state. Belorussian First Secretary
P. M. Masherov praised Brezhnev's "big personal contribution"
but referred to him as heading the Central Committee rather than
the Politburo. All others simply praised Brezhnev.
At the Uzbek ceremony, First Secretary Rashidov paid indirect honor
to Brezhnev by introducing Suslov as "a very close comrade-in-arms"
(blizhayshiy soratnik) of Rrezhnev. He also described Brezhnev
as "heading" the CPSU during the last decade. The formula Politburo
"headed by " Brezhnev was used by Leningrad First Secretary Romanov,
Ukrainian President I. S. Grushetskiy, Kirgiz First Secretary
Usubaliyev, and Armenian Secretary K. S. Demirchyan; the formula
Central Committee "headed by" Brezhnev was used by Belorussian
First Secretary Masherov and Kazakh President S. B. Niyazbekov,
while Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul spoke of the party and Central
Committee "headed by" Brezhnev. Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze,
again out in front, called Brezhnev the "worthy and acknowledged
leader of our party" and, referring to the improved atmosphere in
the party since October 1964, said: "Long live this atmosphere and
its creator--the Leninist Central Committee, the wise Politburo
headed by" Brezhnev.
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An especially servile atmosphere prevailed at the Kirgiz ceremony.
When the officials entered the hall, according to SOVIET KIRGIZIA,
the audience responded with the breathtaking shout: "Glory to the
Leninist Central Committee of the party, its Politburo headed by
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade Leonid
Ilich Brezhnev:" The sa.,me shout reportedly greeted tre election
of the Politburo "headed by the tireless fighter for peace and
communism" Brezhnev as honorary presidium. First Secretary
Usubaliyev introduced Kosyg,ir. as "a very close comrade-in-arms"
of Brezhnev and declared "glory to the CPSU, its Leninist Central
Committee headed by" Brezhnev. The formula of the Politburo
"headed by" Brezhnev was used by Ukrainian Secretary A. A. Titarenko,
Uzbek Premier N. D. Khudayberdyyev, Kazakh Premier B. A. Ashimov,
Tadzhik Premier R. N. Nabiyev, and Armenian Premier G. A. Arzumanyan;
Azerbaydzhan Secretary G. N. Seidov spoke of the Central Committee,
Goveizment and Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev; while Estonian
Premier V. I. Klauson stated: "Long live the CPSU--the party of
Lenin and its leading staff--the Politburo headed by" Brezhnev.
Lithuanian First Secretary P. P. Grishl