TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070048-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: November 20, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
20 NOVEMBER 1974
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COME IJENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is haseci ex_lusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
1
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CONTENTS
Moscow Takes Cautious Stance on Heightened Mideast Tension.
"
1
USSR Praises
Constructive Program" Offered by PLO at UNGA. . . . . .
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Rocket Troops Commander Denies SALT Deception. . . . . . . . .
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
4
Bloc's Call for Initial Troop Cut in 1975 Called "Reasonable" .
9
Belgrade Condemns NATO Adriatic Exercise as Threat to Stability . . .
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
12
Bloc Media Convey Moscow's Rebuff of New PRC Border Stance. . . . . .
COM14UNIST RELATIONS
13
Tito-Honecker Joint Statement Stresses Equality, Independence
VIETNAM
16
Le Duc Tho VWP Delegation Leaves for Paris to Visit French CP
CHINA
18
Peking Stresses That Army Must Submit to Party Authority. . . . . . .
USSR
19
Ideology Secretary Demichev Demoted to Culture Minister .
21
Agriculture Ministry Resistance to Links Appears to Continue. . . . .
Ford Visit to Japan; Vladivostok Summit;
22
Abortive Coup in Bolivia.
24
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
i
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
MOSCOW TAKES CAUTIOUS STANCE ON HEIGHTENED MIDEAST TENSION
Soviet media kept a low profile in treating the increased tension
in the Middle East late last week after Western and Arab news
reports of partial Israeli mobilization to face unspecified
Syrian moves. Moscow's behavior suggested a strong element of
Soviet concern about a possible outbreak of hostilities. Thus,
while TASS on the 16th did acknowledge reports of the Israeli
mobilization, reportage was kept to a minimum and Soviet media
refrained from comment until the 18th, as tension was subsiding.
On the other hand, Moscow has reacted to recent Israeli attacks on
Lebanon with the usual routine charges of premeditated aggression,
in effect implicitly suggesting that such raids would not
demonstrably affect the Arab-Israeli status quo.
SOVIET COMMENT Moscow's first comment on the tense situation
last week came in a foreign-language commentary
by Zholkver on the 18th which predictably accused Israel of
heightening tension by mobilizing reserves anc'. "massing troops"
on the Syrian-Israeli cease-fire line. Zholkver claimed that one
Israeli objecti.ve was to use the alleged threat of Syrian attack
as a convenient excuse for its own military preparations. But
the commentator did not directly assert that these moves meant an
Israeli attack, instead professing to see as a second objective
the desire to attract more foreign military aid and to distract
public opinion from the UNGA debate on the Palestinian question
and from the "serious economic and political upheaval at home."
Moscow press comment on the 19th, as reviewed by TASS, took much
the same tack: RED STAR asserted that Israel wished to cover up
"preparations for another war" and to divert attention from domestic
problems, and TRUD saw the latest Israeli "provocations and threats"
as timed for the UNGA debate. IZVESTIYA's Beirut correspondent
attributed to "local political observers" the view that Israeli
leaders had decided to settle external and internal problems through
"tension and war."
The same IZVESTIYA dispatch said that Arab capitals were taking
seriously the possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike, chiefly
against Syria. Going somewhat beyond this, a Timoshkin commentary
broadcast to Arab audiences on the 18th called it important, as
the Arab press put it, "not to allow Israel to take the Arabs by
surprise." Timoshkin said it was necessary to maintain vigilance
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and preparedness "to give a decisive reply" to the "likely
aggression." But at the same time, he urged that the Arabs and
their friends also continue efforts for a peaceful settlement
within the framework of the Geneva conference, and he reiterated
previous Soviet criticism of "so-called quiet diplomacy or
partial solutions."
Moscow responded only at the lowest propaganda level--a Radio
Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on the 18th--to Israeli
Prime Minister Rabin's "accusation that the Soviet Union is
playing with fire" in continuing "comprehensive assistance" to
the Arab countries. The commentary portrayed Israel as concerned
over Soviet support for the Arabs and thus attempting to disrupt
Arab-Soviet friendship, and in turn charged that through the
flow of American arms to Israel "certain U.S. quarters" were
encouraging Israel to new military adventures.
REPORTAGE ON Moscow typically gave no publicity to its diplomatic
DEVELOPMENTS approaches, reported by Egypt's MIDDLE EAST NEWS
AGENCY. MENA reported on the 16th that President
as-Sadat had replied to messages from Brezhnevand from President
Ford, and other MENA dispatches noted chat Syrian President al-Asap'
had received the Soviet ambassador on the 16th and was handed a
message from Brezhnev on the following evening.
Initial TASS and Moscow radio accounts of Secretary Kissinger's
15 November press conference gave no indication that he had
responded to questions about the possibility of new hostilities
in the Middle East, but a subsequent TASS report on the 16th did
note that he said the situation remained serious. TASS cited him
as pointing out that the United States could not agree with the
idea that the problems of the area could be solved by military
means, and that the United States would use its influence to prevent
the increase of military activity. TASS did not report his remark
that the United States expected other countries "that have any
influence" to use it to restrain belligerents in the region. But it
did note that the Secretary expressed the opinion that the forthcoming
Brezhnev-Ford meeting in Vladivostok would have "a favorable influence"
on the Middle East situation.
Events in the area were summed up in a TASS dispatch from Beirut
later on the 16th which was replayed in abbreviated form in Moscow
radio domestic and Arabic-language newscasts. The TASS item picked
up Lebanese press charges of Israeli military actions h;:ightening
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tension on both the Lebanese and Syrian borders.* The same
dispatch, under a New York dateline, attributed to U.S. newt
agencies the report of a partial mobilization in Israel, noted
"threats" by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin against Syria, and
not unexpectedly drew attention to American press reports of
"i+ninterrupted deliveries of offensive armaments" by the United
Scates to Israel.
A broadcast in Arabic the same day claimed that Rabin had said
in a speech that Israel would take preemptive measures against
Syria, but the newscast seemed to soften this somewt.at by citing
"many observers" as believing this "whipping up of military
tysteria" was due to the Palestinian debate in the United Nations.
On the 17th another multi-datelined TASS dispatch--from Damascus,
Beirut, Cairo and New York--rounded up the situation. From
Damascus, TASS noted Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's statement
that Israel in the past 24 hours had unleashed a "vicious campaign"
to cover up its "intended aggression" and that Syria reiterated
its commitment regarding the cease-fire, and would repel any
Israeli aggression. Noting that Egyptian President as-Sadat had
met with top advisers to discuss the situation, TASS said it was
believed in Cairo that Israel's "massive" troop concentrations and
callup of "a great number of reservists" indicated an Israeli
intent to begin a new aggression.
UNDOF MANDATE, Moscow has not touched on the question of Syrian
GENEVA TALKS intentions with regard to renewing the UNDOF--UN
Disengagement Observer Force--mandate on the Golan
Heights at the end of the month, which Israeli spokesmen have made
clear they regard as a critical issue. The Beirut daily AN-NAHAR on
the 18th reported "diplomatic sources" as saying Syria would agree to
UNDOF extension for three to six months under three conditions:
resumption of the Geneva conference with no political negotiations
outside its framework; adoption of a timetable for Israeli
* Since it is not. uncommon for Moscow to pass along Lebanese press
accusations of alleged Israeli actions of aggressive intent, the
appearance of such reports at times of increased tension would not
necessarily constitute indicators of imminent hostilities. As
recently as 9 November TASS was citing the Lebanese press for reports
that Israel was intensifying military preparations on both Lhe
Lebanese and Syrian borders, and had not yet withdrawn reserve
troops which had participated in recent Israeli exercises on the Golan
Heights.
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withdrawal; and guarantee of the Palestinians' legitimate rights.
Moscow has apparently not picked up this report, but TASS on the
18th noted without comment that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi,
in an interview with the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF, reportedly
said that Egypt considered the Geneva conference "the only possible
forum" for discussions and would adhere to this stand "in all its
forthcoming diplomatic contacts."
USSR PRAISES "CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM" OFFERED BY PLO AT UNGA
Soviet comment on the current UNGA debate of the Palestinian
question has stressed the significance of the PLO delegation's
appearance at the United Nations and has been virtually unanimous
in emphasizing that PLO Chairman Iasi;: 'Arafat presented a
"constructive program" for solving the issue in his 13 November
speech opening the scheduled two-week debate. At the same time,
however, Moscow has conveyed its continued reservations on some
points in the PLO "program," principally the advisability of using
terror as a political weapon and the practicality of the nature and
boundaries of a new Palestinian state.*
Soviet media have stressed the general theme that the PLO has gained
increa3ed international prestige and stature through the UNGA
decisions to debate the Palestinian question as a political issue--not
a refugee problem, as in the past--and to invite the PLO to attend
the debate and address the General Assembly in plenary session,
thus breaking with'the precedent. that had limited such appearances
to representatives of recognized governments. Comment has also
pointed out that recent PLO diplomatic successes were made possible
by external political support, primarily from the USSR, and by the
PLO's own development of a "realistic approach" to achieving its
goals.
Typifying this line, a 14 November IZVESTIYA article by V. Shmarov
hailed the UNGA debate as a "portentous event" reflecting a "new
approach" to the Palestinian aspect of a Mideast settlement. Claiming
* Given its current insistence on the PLO's "realistic" approach, and
its past expressions of disapproval of Palestinian "extremist" actions,
Moscow presumably was embarrassed over the Palestinian terrorist
operation in Bet She'an on the 19th. The sole Soviet reference thus far,
a New York-datelined TASS dispatch on the 19th, cited a PLO delegation
spokesman as expressing indignation over "the murder of four Palestine
Arabs by the occupants of Bet She'an," with no explanation of the
circumstances.
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to cite Arab press sources, Shmarov asserted that the Palestinian
question had been included on the UNGA agenda "only" because of
Soviet efforts. In an apparent reference to PLO acceptance of the
UNGA invitation, as well as to increased PLO willingness in recent
months to use diplomatic leverage in its conflict with Israel,
Shma ov praised the PLO for "attentively listening to the voice of
world opinion" and for "formulating a realistic approach to political
solutions," noting in this context that "this inner evolution of
the PLO is contributing" to its growing international prestige and
acceptance.
PLO "PROGRAM" Soviet comment has professed to see the PLO's
new "realistic approach" as being exemplified
by 'Arafat's "constructive program," principally the three major
appeals at the conclusion of his speech, asking for international
support to assure the Palestinians' right "to determine their own
fate," "to return from their compulsory exile" to their homelan~,
and "to establish their independent national authority and found
their national entity on their land." At the same time, however,
Moscow has reiterated its position that a final Mideast settlement
will have to include the satisfaction of the interests of "all the
states and peoples" in this region. Moscow Ii,--is thus not extended
its public support to the PLO's frequently expressed "ultimate
aim"--reiterated implicitly in 'Arafat's speech--of replacing
present-day Israel with a restored Palestine of pre-partition
(November 1947) days and establishing, in 'Arafat's words, a
"single democratic and progressive state" for Moslems, Christians,
and "all the Jews who now live in Palestine."
Indications that Moscow stands by its long-expressed support for
Israel's existence as a state have appeared in remarks by PRAVDA
and IZVESTIYA commentators. On Ifoscow radio's "International
Situation" program on 16 November, PRAVDA political observer
Mayevskiy noted that the Arab countries have been divided over the
questicn of "what sort of administration the territories west of
the Jordan River should have after their liberation from Israeli
occupation," as well as the question of whether Jordan or the PLO
should represent the Palestinians. Citing the "unanimous" decision
of the Rabat Arab summit conference that the Palestinians "have the
right to their own national home on the West Bank of the Jordan
River and in the Gaza Strip," Mayevskiy said the Soviet Union
supported the Rabat decisions. Mayevskiy seemed to be making the
point that the USSR accepts the notion of a Palestinian entity only
within the confines of the West Bank and Gaza. In going on to
discuss 'Arafat's "constructive program," "Iayevskiy pointedly made
no mention of the last point on national authority and national entity,
referring only to the right to self-determination and to return to
their native land.
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Also suggestive was IZVESTIYA commentator Mikhaylov's remark,
on the 17 November Moscow radio observers' roundtable. In the
course of refuting "slander" spread about the character of the
Palestine liberation movement, he cryptically noted that aims had
been attributed to it "which it has not and is not setting
itself"--perhaps an oblique reference to the PLO call for a
democratic and progressive state in all Palestine. Mikhaylov also
complained that the Palestinian movement had been equated with
"tha terrorist actions of extremist groups."
Other comment has also charged Israel with slandering the Palestinians
in the course of pointing up Israel's hostile reaction to the PLO
appearance at the United Nations and Tel Aviv's refusal to talk
with the PLO "except on the battlefield." Soviet media have
accused Israel of failing to accept "the reality" of the Mideast
situation and of doing everything possible to prevent a peaceful
solution. As a result of its unrealis*ic and "aggressive" policies,
Moscow claims that Israel, is locking itself into a state of
political isolation and severe economic difficulties.
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- 7 -
U. S. -SOVI ET RELATI ONS
SC-\%1ET ROCKET TROOPS CONWIANDER DENIES SALT DECEPTION
Asserting that "not a single silo" has been constructed in the Soviet
Union since May 1972, General Ivan Tolubko, Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, has strongly denied that the Soviet
Union has violated the strategic arms limitation agreement. Responding
to charges reportedly made in the United States recently, Tolubko de-
clared, in an interview published in the 11-17 November issue of
NEDELYA, that the Soviet Union has never violated its obligations
and will certainly not do so on such an "important political issue"
as the interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive
arms.
U.S. CHARGES Although the denial was purportedly prompted by
recent statements in the United States, including--
as Tolubko himself specified--a speech by Senator James L. Buckley
to the Overseas Prt..s Club on 31 October, it is clear that broader
considerations were also involved. For some two years now, accord-
ing to an article by Michael Getter in the WASHINGTON POST on
1 November, there has been a controversy among Western experts over
the purpose of certain structures which the Soviets have been in-
stalling at some missile sites. Recently, General George S. Brown,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William Beecher, DOD
press spokesman, took note of this controversy and publicly denied
that the Soviet Union was violating the SALT agreements.
Tolubko referred to this controversy obliquely in a statement which
seemed intended to absolve the U.S. Government of blame for encourag-
ing suspicions of Soviet intentions. Describing such suspicions as
the "fabrications" of the "enemies of detente," he pointed out that
the "representatives of the Pentagon, Brown and Beecher" had specifical-
ly refuted them. He immediately took away whatever magnanimity this
acknowledgement was intended to convey, however, by adding acerbicly
that this was the first time "in over two years" that such a refutation
had been volunteered by U.S. authorities.
OTHER ISSUES Elsewhere Tolubko struck. a generally optimistic note
in his references to U.S.-Soviet relations. Although
he did charge that the purposes of the anti--Soviet accusations being
made in the United States were to undermine the Soviet peace policy
and to justify U.S. arms programs, he ir.dicatLd, by his reference to
the Brown and Beecher statements, that these purposes were not shared
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by the U.S. Government. He went on to refer approvingly to the
forthcoming meeting between President Ford and Brezhnev at
Vladivostok, and he stated that "all the Soviet people" were
behind the detente policy and believed that it should be made
an "irreversible" process.
Tolubko refrained from commenting in detail -on other.specific
charges which he said had been made against the Soviet Union.
Apart from his denial that the Soviet Union had constructed new
silos, he made only one other specific denial--that the Soviet
Union was "conducting any tests of new mobile intercontinental
systems." For the rest, he treated the charges as not worth
dignifying with specific rebuttals.
On other military issues, to which the interview as a whole was
addressed, Tolubko made two rather expansive claims. One was that
the Soviet missile forces were kept in a state of "constant combat
readiness" which enabled them to launch weapons within seconds or
even fractions of a second after receiving a battle order. The
other was that "all" combat training launches over the last few
years had been completed with marks of either "excellent" or "good."
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EAST-NEST RELATIONS
BL.OC'S CALL FOR INITIAL TROOP CUT IN 1975 CALLED "REASONABLE"
In an obvious effcrt to put public pressure on the NATO states at
the Vienna force reduction negotiations, Moscow and its East
European allies have insistently argued that NATu should negotiate
on the basis of the new Warsaw Pact "initial step" force reduction
proposal offered in Vienna on 31 October. Comment has stressed
the reasonableness and readiness for compromise on the part of
the East European states in their attempt to unlock the stalemated
MBFR talks, contrasting this with the announcement by Secretary
Schlesinger during his recent visit to the FRG that the United
States would be increasing the combat strength of its forces in
West Germany.
An article by the chief GDR delegate to the Vienna talks explicitly
pointed out that the new proposal need set no precedent for any
future agreements, and that it allows the NATO states to retain
the basic provisions of their negotiating posir-on. Other authorita-
tive statements, by Moscow and Warsaw spokesmen, have reiterated
the linkage between MBFR and CSCE which Gromyko broached in his
October Revolution anniversary speech on 6 November.
OESER iIORIZONT ARTICLE: NO The article by the head of the GDR
RENUNCIATION OF PRINCIPLES delegation in Vienna, Ingo Oeser,
in the East Berlin weekly HORIZONT
(Nc. 47, signed to press -11. November), included the longest apologia
for the new Fact proposal to date. After a detailed review of the
standing NATO and Pact proposals, Oeser wrote that the Pact, with
its new ;proposal, was suggesting "an independei,t agreement on an
initial step" for reducing forces and arms in 1975, an agreement of
"limited scope" and one that would "make some allowance" for the
negotiating position of the Western states. OeseL? listed only two
conditions for the Pact's limited agreement: first, the vague,
but customary, Pact stipulation that no agreement giving the NATO
states one-sided advantages would be permissible; and second, all
11 negotiating Vienna participants "must" contribute to the mutual
reduction.
Continuing, Oeser pointed out that an initial reduction agreement
would include a commitment by all participants to work toward a
more comprehensive agreement. Appealing to Western proponents of
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immediate force red"-tions, while reassuring them that initial
steps would not p --,:JLce fundamental positions, Oeser declared:
Moreover, it [the limited agreement] must expressly
stipulate that through its provisions no precedent
will be set for future agreements. Thus the
socialist states uphold their just basic positions
on an overall settlement, as contained in their
draft agreement, and do not make it a precondition
for the agreement of an initial step that the
capitalist participating states renounce their
overall position.
Concluding, Oeser observed that the "important" Pact initiative
displayed "great flexibility" and "made allowance--within the
scope of what was feasible--for a number of elements" in the
West's position. He called upon the West now to demonstrate
"an accommodating attitude" toward the new initiative and to
declare its readiness to work out an initial agreement. "The
socialist states are ready for discussion," Oeser rema:-ked,
perhaps implying a Pact willingness for compromise even on the
new proposal.
Notably, in the context of his discussion on the new proposal,
Oeser made no explicit reference to either the inclusion of air
and nuclear-armed forces or to the Pact demand that after any
future reduction all 11 participating states could no longer
exceed the then established strength of their forces and arms in
central Europe--the stipulation which in effect precludes any
future reorganization or regrouping of forces among the NATO
states or in any possible future West European defense organiza-
tion. But as Oeser made clear, these basic elements of the Pact's
original proposal would not be-excluded at this time from the
formal Pact position in working out a more comprehensive agreement.
STRULAK INTERVIEW; In another authoritative assessment of the
MBFR-CSCE LINKAGE new initiative, Warsaw's delegate to
Vienna, Tadeusz Strulak, who has acted in
the past as the chief public spokesman for the East on this issue,
argued in an interview published in the Vienna daily KURIER on
the 9th that the Pact was not trying to sell dead stock under a
new label with its first step proposal; he observed that "we
thought it advisable to now give our consent to first [step]
reductions." But more significantly, Strulak went on to make an
unusual statement on the motives behind the recent Vienna
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initiative. In response to a question on the reciprocal relation-
ship between MBFR and CSCE made by Gromyko on the 6th, Strulak
went beyond Gromyko's remarks in clearly pointing out that the
recent Pact initiative in Vienna was part of an overall strategy.
Strulak said: "Yes. One motive of our proposal was the considera-
tion that progress at the Vienna talks could also lead to a
success in Geneva--just as, in turn, progress in Geneva would
certainly positively affect the negotiations in Vienna." Strulak
added that "both conferences must be viewed in context of the
global efforts of the two great powers."
The Pact's new MBFR proposal and Strulak's remark-, at a mimimum,
clearly set the stage for Moscow to argues that, on the one hand,
the socialist states have made an effort to meet certain i'ATO
demands at Vienna and thus it is now the West 's turn for some
"give" either at MBFR or the Geneva CSCE negotiations; and on the
other, that Moscow has now offered a proposal which can bolster
the policy of detente in the military field.
NATO REACTION "CONDEMNED" As for the NATO reaction to the new
Pact initiative at the MBFR plenary
sessions on the 7th and 14th, Prague media have apparently been
assigned the role of reporting publicly the. West's negative
response. RUDE PRAVO on the 8th, in a CTK dispatch from Vienna,
reported that the British representative had declared that "the
West has not found" in the new proposal "any new elements." The
Czechoslovak delegate, R. Klein, was reported as saying that it
was impossible "to ignore the significant new elements" of the
proposal, that the vJest's reaction demonstrates the lack of
"necessary realism and flexibility," and that the West continues
to insist upon an "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" basis for the
negotiations. The vehemence of the Warsaw Pact's reaction to
the West's response was intensified on the 14th when.Prague radio
reported that the Hungarijn delegate in Vienna, Janos Petran,
"condemned" the rejection by the West of the new initiative as
expressed by the Belgian delegate at that day's plenum. Then on
the 15th, in the first signed commentary in the Soviet central press
on the new Pact proposal, I. Melnikov in PRAVDA wrote that "it has
become known" that the West "has not yet shown any concrete
readiness for an agreement on the basis" of the new initiative.
Melnikov then went on to criticize Secretary Schlesinger's state-
ments in Bonn, saying that they were "cle- ly at variance with a
constrictive approach toward the Vienna talks." Other Soviet and
East European commentators have similarly criticized Schlesinger's
remarks.
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BELGRADE CONDEMNS NATO ADRIATIC EXERCISE AS THREAT TO STABILITY
Yugoslavia has manifested sharp disapproval of the 9-16 November
NATO maneuvers in the Adriatic. According to TANJUG, the ranking
diplomatic envoys of the United States,. Italy, Turkey and Great
Britain were called in to the Foreign Affairs Secretariat on
15 November to receive "firm and sharp" protests. Yugoslav
media, in the meantime, have backed up the protests with strongly
critical continent.
This reaction stands in some contrast to the attitude Yugoslavia
adopted toward the last NATO exercise in the area--the joint
U.S.-Italian maneuvers held from 29 March to 5 April this year.
Although Yugoslavia condemned those maneuvers at the time, it
seemed mainly concerned with their hearing on Yugoslav-Italian
relations, rather than on their implications for general East-
West relations. It portrayed the United States as providing
moral support to Rome in its dispute with Belgrade during a
flare-up over the recurring Trieste issue.. The current maneuvers,
on the other hand, have been depicted as a dangerous escalation of
bloc confrontation, involving for the "first time" a naval
exercise of a "group" of NATO states in the Adriatic. TANJUG
diplomatic editor Budimir, writing on the 16th, scored NATO for
failing to keep its military activities within accepted boundaries
rather than expanding to "new areas."
Predictably, Belgrade assessed the maneuvers as NATO "pressure"
against Yugoslavia's nonalined position. Budimir, however,
introduced a new note in concluding that the maneuvers could also
be interpreted as pressure on Albania as well. This adds to the
evidence that the 4-month old diplomatic flirtation between the
two countries is continuing. In the single monitored Tirana comment
on the maneuvers, ZERI I POPULLIT, according to ATA on the 19th,
leveled a standard attack against both NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
failing to mention Yugoslavia by name but expressing concern for
the "sovereign countries" of the region,
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S I NO - SOVIET R ELATI ONS
BLOC MEDIA CONVEY MOSCOW'S REBUFF OF NEW PRC BORDER STANCE
Moscow itself has not yet acknowledged the PRC's altered public
stand on the Sino-Soviet border issue contained in the 6 November
Chinese greetings messag_ to Moscow on the Soviet October Revolution
anniversary.* But Soviet disapproval has been communicated
indirectly in a recent seriss of reports by Moscow's allies that
publicized refutation of the Chinese position by unnamed Soviet
officials. A half dozen reports in Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and
GDR media from 13 to 16 November noted that "official circles in
Moscow" had found the PRC stand merely a "reiteration" of the
standard Chinese position that has blocked progress in the border
talks for the past five years and that it is "completely unacceptable
from the Soviet point of view." The reports have attacked the
Chinese motives in publicizing the revised border terms and have
endeavored to portray the USSR as the truly forthcoming party in
the border dispute, noting that past Soviet offers were turned
down by Peking. In so doing, they have provided the first public
reference in communist media to a March 1973 Soviet proposal to
adjust border river boundaries on the eastern part of the frontier
in a way advantageous to China.
The bloc reports, denying "sensational" Western press claims that
the 6 November Chinese greetings represented a new demarche on the
border issue, focused on the Soviet officials' objections to the
linkage implied in the Peking message--that the Chinese were willing
to consider a Sino-Soviet nonuse of force and nonaggression pact
together with China's longstanding demand for a withdrawal of
forces from disputed frontier areas.
The reports cited Soviet officials as saying that Peking in effect
was demanding that Pioscow first "give up its present borders"
under terms of the disputed territories question in exchange for
Chinese agreement to conclude a nonaggression and nonuse of force
agreement. The Moscow correspondent of the Hungarian daily
NEPSZABADSAG on the 13th said that "Soviet national territory of
1.5 million square kilometers" would be involved, and tie Moscow
correspondent of the GDR radio said on the 15th that Peking's demand
would mean that the border would be moved into the Soviet interior a
distance of "100 or 200 kilometers."
* The Chinese message and initial. Soviet response are discussed in
the TRENDS of 13 November 1974, pages 3-5.
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The reports have carefully reiterated the Soviet position that
the present frontier is generally valid and subject only to
minor adjustments, and have rejected the Chinese claim that
Kosygin reached an understanding with Chou in SepLember 1969 on
withdrawal from disputed regions. The Moscow correspondent
for the Hungarian news agency MTI reported on the 14th that
"eyewitnesses" to the Sino-Soviet summit told him no such
agreement was reached during the September 1969 meeting, adding
that even though Chou raised a claim in this connection, Kosygin
did not bargain on the issue.
To shore up an image contrasting Moscow reasonableness and Peking
intransigence over the border dispute, the reports have complained
of Chinese refusal to respond pcsitively to Moscow's "Fers of
a nonuse of force pact and nona.gLression agreement, as well as to
? Harch 1973 Soviet offer to adjusc the border river boundary on
the eastern frontier in a way that would give China ownership of
several hundred disputed border river islands. The 14 November
MTI report and a 16 November article in Prague's MLADA FRONTA
said that Moscow offered to adjust the river boundary "in a way
customary in international practice" and "by taking into consideration
the changed river beds" so that the USSR would r1-,-l.re "several
hundred smaller islands as Chinese territory.' The reports suggested
this forthcoming Soviet gesture was "contrary to the treaties
concluded in the last century between China and Tsarist Russia, "which
Moscow has held drew the boundary generally along the Chinese bank
of the river. However, the reports indicate that the Soviet
proposal stopped short of endorsing the PRC claim that the riverine
border should follow the main channel, with MLADA FRONTA asserting
that Moscow's proposal said that "in disputed areas the frontier
should lie along the rivers in those places where the rivers can be
navigated, as usual in international practice." Since there
are stretches in the border rivers with more than one navigable
channel, some islands--including the strategic isle opposite
Khabarovsk--would still be in dispute.
The reports accused the Chinese of publicizing their border stance
at this time as part of an "operation of deceit" brought on by
Peking's increasing international isolation as a result of its
strident opposition to detei:tte and international relaxation. They
also pointed out Peking's inconsistency in not reporting the
message to the Chinese domestic audience. Most of the comment
indicated that Peking should show its good intentions by responding
positively to the tiarious Soviet offers over the border issue, but
the C d radio on the 15th said that Soviet foreign ministry sources
feel that "if Peking really honestly wished to improve relations" i,:
should release the Soviet helicopter crew detained since their capture
in China last March,
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USSR ON PRC Despite official Soviet silence on the altered PRC
PRECEDENT stance, a 15 November Vasilyev commentary broadcast
in Mandarin to China disclosed a past instance in
which Peking had attempted to link its demand for withdrawal from
disputed territories with Moscow's offer of a nonuse of force pact.
Noting that Moscow on 15 January 1971 proposed a nonuse of force
pact, Vasilyev added that Peking countered with an offer that the
provisions be included in an agreement to maintain the status quo
on the border. "To cater to the Chinese side," Vasilyev said,
"the Soviet side agreed to this suggestion and discussed the
wording of corresponding provisions." He alleged that progress
in the talks had thus appeared likely, until the Chinese "suddenly
asked the Soviet side to accept their concept about so-called
'disputed areas,"' which he said amosnted to "putting forward a
prerequisite unacceptable to any sovereign country in order to
hamper settlement of the nonuse of force issue."
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COHMUN I ST RELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
20 NOVEMBER 1974
TITO-HONECKER JOINT STATEMENT STRESSES EQUALITY, INDEPENDENCE
Yugoslav President Tito's 12-??15 November "official friendly" visit
to the GDR was his first visit to East Germany since 1965, and the
first meeting between the top leaders of the LCY and SED since
June 1967, when Ulbricht spent a two-week "vacation" in Yugoslavia
at Tito's invitation. In hosting the Tito visit now, the East
Germans have somewhat belatedly joined the series of meetings
between Tito and Soviec bloc party leaders that followed Brezhnev's
landmark visit to Belgrade in September 1971. Only Bulgaria's
Zhivkov--at odds with the Yugoslavs over the Macedonia issue--?had
failed to meet with Tito since the Brezhnev visit.* groin the
Yugoslav standpoint, Tito's visit to the GDR served to further under-
score Belgrade's nonalinement, coming in the wake of the Yugoslav
leader's visit to the FRG in June. It also served to project an
image of recovered health and vigor for the aging LCY leader, who
since his illness in February has successively visited Hungary,
the FRG, Romania, Denmark, and now the GDR.
The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Tito's visit
underlined the concept of "equality" governing Yugoslav-GDR. state
and party relations, as well as relations among the parties of the
world communist movement--such equality, of course, being a perennial
Yugoslav concern. In noting that cooperation between Yugoslavia
and the GDR had been "successfully developing" in recent years, the
statement declared that this cooperation was based on "respecting
the specific features of their internal development ano the specific
features of the two countries' international positions." The
significance of the GDR's recognition of Yugoslavia's independent
course was stressed on the eve of Tito's visit by Zagreb radio
commentator Sund:ic, who added that while such recognition "does
not mean that Yugoslavia's position is also always supported; this
still represents progress considering some ea_lier views on the
Yugoslav path to socialism."
The tenuous state of Belgrade's support for the conference of
European communist parties, planned for next year, was reflected
in the absence of any reference in the joint statement to the
* Poland's Gierek and Czechoslovakia's Husak visited Belgrade in
1973, followed by Tito's trip to Budapest in April this year. Gierek
return.cd for a Yugoslav vacation this July.
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planned conference or to the "consultarive meeting" of European
CP's last month in Warsaw, which both the LCY and SED had attended.
The omission is the more noteworthy in view of the broad support
voiced at the Warsaw meeting for convening the European CP conclave
soon of te:., the conclusion of the European security conference--a
conference strongly supported in the present document. On the
score of economic cooperation, the joint statement followed the
practice of past joint documents involving the Yugoslavs in omitting
any reference to CEMA, despite Pt1grade's ten-year-long "participa-
tion" in the activities of the Soviet bloc economic organization.
TASS late on the 15th reported the Tito-Honecker statement as
highlighting the contribution of "socialist, nonalined and other
countries," and "all democratic and progressive forces" to the
reduction of international tensions and the promotion of "equal"
international cooperation.
The statement's qualified reference to "agreement or similarity of
views" on major international issues was reflected in the public
statements by Tito and Honeclcer during the visit. Thus, Tito, in
an interview on East German TV on the 15th, said he and Honeclcer
had reached "joint or approaching standpoints" in their talks. The
SED leader, in hi.s dinner toast on. the 12th, similarly noted only
"a high degree of correspondence" of views on international develop-
ments. In his toasts both on the 12th and 14th Honecker reminded
his guest of the GDR's firm identification with the Soviet bloc,
stressing in the latter speech that the GDR was "in an unshakable
alliance with the main force of socialism--the Soviet Union--and
firmly integrated in the community of socialist states."
In his toast on the 12th, Tito included what could be construed as
a veiled reference to Soviet pressures as exemplified in the
Comintormist affair. In noting the progress in relaxation of
tensions "particularly" in Europe, he added that "a great number
of countries, particularly nonalined ones, are subject to various
pressures and crude attacks on their freedom and independence."
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V I ETi Ail
LE DUC THO VWP DELEGATION LEAVES FOR PARIS TO VISIT FRENCH CP
Hanoi reported on 19 November that a Vietnam Workers Party delegation
headed by Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy had left for a visit in Paris
at the invitation of the French Communist Party. The ostensible
purpose of the visit is to reciprocate the 10-1.7 November 1973
visit to the DRV by a French CP delegation headed by Secretary
General Georges Marchais.
Despite speculation by APP that the visit might lead to a meeting
of the DRV officials with Secretary Kissinger, the brief, identical
Hanoi radio and VNA accounts place the visit in a purely party
context, list-ing delegation head Tho and deputy head Thuy only by
their party titles, as member of the VWP Central Committee
Politburo and Central Committee Secretary, respectively. Both Le Duc
Tho and Xuan Thuy figured prominently in the French CP delegation's
1973 DRV visit, with Xuan Thuy accompanying the French on their
visits outside Hanoi, as would be expected of the head of the VWP
Central Committee external relations board. Both he and Le Duc Tho
also participated in discussions with the French delegation that
were led by First Secretary Le Duan. The VWP visit invitation had
been noted in the 19 November 1973 communique on the French party
delegation's visit, which said that Le Duari had accepted Marchais'
invitation on behalf of the French CP.
The only other members of the VWP delegation bound for France announced
by Hanoi media were Tran Quang Huy, alternate member of the Central
Committee, and NHAN DAN deputy chief editor Nguyen Thanh Le. Western
agencies reported the delegation consisted of 10 members. Hanoi media
named only two of the DRV leaders at the airport to say farewell to the
Tho delegation--Politburo member Le Thaiih Nghi (who also is DRV foreign
minister), and VWP Central Committee Secretary Nguyen Van Tran.
DRV DELEGATION TO A DRV party-government delegation which will
ALBANIAN ANNIVERSARY attend the 30th anniversary celebration of
Albania's Liberation Day and revolution
victory, headed by VWP Central Committee member and Vice Premier Tran
Huu Duc, departed Hanoi on 19 November and stopped over in Peking
one night, according to VNA and NCNA reports. No other delegation
members were listed by VNA, which added that the Albanian, PRC, and
Hungarian ambassadors as well as the Soviet charge d'affaires in
Hanoi said farewell to Duc. No special DRV delegation was reported to
have attended the 1973, nondecennial observances in Tirana, but the
25th anniversary in 1969 drew a DRV delegation headed by VWP Politburo
member Hoang Van Hoan.
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CHIN;
PEKING STRESSES THAT ARMY MUST SUBMIT TO PARTY AUTHORITY
A 13 November PEOPLE'S DAILY article indicating that some military
leaders still resist party leadership has warned that "there has
never been any change in the position of the absolute leadership
of the party over the army, and no such change will be permitted."
The article, entitled "The Gun Must Forever Be Kept in the Hands
of the Party and the People," stated that army units must obey
civilian party organs at all levels, and that within the PLA the
party committee must exercise collective leadership.
The article seemed to be aimed especially at military commanders,
poini:edly noting that commanders must share responsibilities
"under the collective leadership of the party committee." The
article argued that "only by exercising collective leadership
can we expose in time the antiparty features of certain individual
careerists" and "smash their criminal acts in.. setting up sects
and forming factions for selfish ends." Lin Piao was the ostensible
target of the piece, which attacked his attempt to wrest "direct
command" of the PLA from Mao and the party and his effort to
assert the principle of individual authority, "ousting the
political commissars."
While using unusually frank language to focus public attention on
Lin's attempt to usurp the military authority of the party, the
article was careful to reaffirm the party loyalty of the PLA as
a whole. The article noted that Mao's principles on army building
have "struck deep roots" among fighters a;id commanders throughout
the country and could "by Rio means be sabotaged" by any conspirator.
It also praised the army's contributions to the cultural revolution
"under the leadership of the party," ascribing to Lin alone attempts
during that period to control the party with the gun. The recent
anti-Lii. campaign was credited with miking the army "even more
united."
PROVINCIAL The'need to improve party-army relations has been a
REPORTS standard theme in the campaign against Lin, and
several provincial radios recently have claimed that
progress has been made in strengthening the party's authority over
the army. 1-luhehot radio on 19 November, for example, reported or
a provincial PLA meeting for exchanging experiences in studying Mao's
works on military affairs and in criticizing Lin's military line.
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Local border defense units were lauded for successfully criticizing
Liii's crime of "undermining the unity between the army and the
government" and for improving "the quality of their military and
political work." The report claimed that commanders and fighters
of border defense units now "consciously submit themselves to the
centralized leadership of local party commit;-~e_." Nanchang radio
on 14 November hailed a local PLA. unit for correctly und_'rstanding
that the army is subordinate tc the party. The broadcast denounced
Lin for failing to ask higher 1,.vel party authorities for prior
instruction and for failing to submit reports after actions had
been taken. And a 9 November Hofei report on a provincial, meeting
on militia work praised local party committees for carrying forward
"the glorious tradition of the party taking care of the armed forces"
by strengthening their leadership over militia work.
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USSR
IDEOLOGY SECRETARY DEMICHEV DENOTED TO CULTURE MINISTER
In a demotion apparently reflecting the ascendancy of the
conservatives in the current ideological crackdown, TASS on
14 November announced the appointment of P.N. Demichev, Central
Committee Secretary in charge of ideology, to the post of
minister of culture, vacant since the death of Ye. A. Furtseva
in late October. This is a clear step down for Demichev, since
Soviet practice requires that he now give up his secretariat
position. Although Demichev may be permitted to retain his
rank as Politburo candidate member (other ministers such as
Polyanskiy, Gromyko and Grechko hold Politburo membership),
he will lose his party position as top administrator of the
Soviet ideological system, becoming the first victim of the
ideological crackdown.
Demichev's demotion in the midst of the current crackdown
suggests that he was regarded as too soft or as responsible
for the shortcomings being criticized. 111s ouster may open
the door for the appointment of a more hardline ideological
supervisor. Although Demichev has helped direct the repressive
Soviet cultural policy over the past nine years, hic infrequent
statements on ideology have not been as strident or extreme
as those of many other ideological leaders. He has been caught
between his conservative superiors, Brezhnev and Suslov, and
his influential hardline subordinates, Brezhnev protege S.P.
Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee's science and
educational institutions section, and Mazurov protege V.F.
Shauro, head of the Central Committee's culture section, who
have advocated more repression.
Demichev has labored under the additional disadvantage of not
being a clear Brezhnev protege, and his demotion fits in with
the recent undercutting of other idependent figures. Conservative
Belorussian and Moscow leaders had been charged with failing to
keep their own bailiwicks ideologically pure in recent Central
Committee decrees which initiated the crackdown.*
See the Supplementary Article "New Moscow Ideological Drive
Appears to Undercut Detente Foes," in the TRENDS of 13 November
1974.
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Demichev' F replacement as ideology ser.retary will probably be
named at a Central Committee plenum in mid-December. A Supreme
Soviet session is to open on 18 December, and such December
sessions on the annual plan and budget are customarily preceded
by a Central Committee plenum.
AGRICULTURE MINISTRY RESISTANCE TO LINKS APPEARS TO CONTINUE
The long-standing controversy over the link system of agricultural
organization has been revived in recent Soviet press articles
arguing that the system is incompatible with the national goal
of increased specialization and mechanization of agriculture.
This renewed criticism comes at a time when opposition to the
system by the Ministry of. Agriculture had seemed to have been
overcome and the links solidly established as an accepted form
of farm organization. Circumstantial evidence suggests that
the Ministry of Agriculture itself, or elements within it, is
encouraging the new criticism.
One critical article, written by Penza Ohkom Secretary V. Ogarev
in the 26 August 1974 SOVIET RUSSIA, argued that while all-purpose
brigades and mechanized links had looked very promising several years
ago, they were losing their importance now with the trend toward
specialization. Although the author has not previously played an
important role in the controversy, the chief editor of SOVIET
RUSSIA, P.F. Alekseyev, had a clear record of opposition to links
while chief editor'of RURAL LIFE in the late 1960's. He declared
in the Lay 1969 ZHURNALIST that links tended to disrupt the work
of brigades, hindered correct use of equipment, and furthermore,
that it was incorrect to recommend one form of labor organization
for all farms.
The most detailed current attack on links appeared in the October 1974
issue of the ministry's organ ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. Entitled
"From Links to Mechanized Units," the article by Bryansk Agricultural
Equipment Association chief A. Illarionov argued that all-purpose
brigades and mechanized links did not use equipment efficiently
and should be replaced with specialized tractor brigades and
mechanized units bigger than links. He wrote that his oblast
already had 1,500 mechanized links which, while they have advantages,
also have important drawbacks. Since links are assigned responsi-
bility for certain fields, the output of which determines their
income, they lack interest in the farm's other fields and resist
being called upon to work other fields. Since the links' fields
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20 NOVEMBER 1974
are zoo small to keep their equipment busy all the time, and
since they resist having their equipment taken away for use on
other fields, equipment is underused and the farm is unable to
maneuver its resources with maximum efficiency. Illarionov
argued that bigger mechanized "units" (otryady), first introduced
in his oblast in 1965, are needed to overcome the links' overly
narrow attitude and to give the farm more control. He explained
that these "units" work areas of 1,200-1,500 hectares, while
links in his oblast usually work under 50-100 hectares.
Although he claimed such units had the same advantages as links--long-
term responsibility for specific sections of land and pay based on
the final result--it seems unlikely that the much larger units could
avoid the loss of personal responsibility and initiative involved
in assigning daily work and maneuvering people about characteristic
of traditional brigades. One of the main and most controversial
features of unregulated mechanized links is their similarity to
private farming--they are very small groups (often only two or three
tractor drivers) with their own equipment, long-term responsibility
for their own section of land, freedom to organize their own work,
and with pay based on their ability to use that land and equipment
most productively.
In recent years links have become wir spread, and articles criticizing
them are rare. Even the Agriculture Ministry's resistance had
appeared broken in 1973. Polyanskiy, whose silence on links had
suggested lack of enthusiasm, had been demoted in early 1973 from
First Deputy Premier in charge of agriculture to agriculture
minister. In June 1973 a.PRAVDA article attacked the Agriculture
Ministry for delay in issuing recommendations on links. The
10 June article complained that V. Zhurikov, chief of the ministry's
administration for organization, norms and wages, had conceded
only to prepare a draft of recommendations by the end of 1973,
whereas the recommendations should have been issued at the beginning
of 1971, the article stated. PRAVDA on 15 August 1973 reported a
reply by Deputy Agriculture Minister A.P. Chubarov, agreeing
with the article's criticisms of Zhurikov's administration and
stating that recommendations had now been finished and would soon
be issued.
Nevertheless, no recommendations have yet appeared, and Zhurikov
cautiously reaffirmed his doubts about the links in a December 1973
article in the ministry journal ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. Although
praising the incentive-oriented mechanized links as efficient, he
pointed out that they do only part of the work, while the rest is
done by brigade workers not working on an incentive basis, thus causing
difficulties. Further, he reasserted that a single form of organiza-
tion cannot be recommended for everyone and must not be forced on farms.
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NOTES
FORD VISIT TO JAPAN: The Japan Communist Party (JCP) greeted
President Ford's 18 November Tokyo arrival with a statement and
an AKAHATA editorial protesting the visit, claiming it was in-
tended to open the way for overt introduction of U.S. nuclear
weapons into Japan and to aid the beleaguered Tanaka government.
The editorial made an "urgent appeal" for the mobilization of
forces to "resolutely oppose" the visit. Nevertheless, the JCP
has been careful to publicly disassociate itself from "Trotskyite"
groups the party claims are plotting violent activities. Soviet
media coverage of the President's Japan visit thus far has been
limited to reports highlighting strains in U.S.-Japanese relations.
On 17 November, before the President's arrival in Tokyo, TASS
carried a dispatch by PRAVDA's Tokyo correspondent noting general
"economic and political contradictions" between the two countries,
as well as specific policies opposed by forces in Japan struggling
against Japan's rearmament and its participation in "U.S. military
blocs." Monitored Soviet media have not acknowledged that there
were demonstrations against the visit; in fact, on 17 November
TASS reported a Tokyo "workers" rally protesting economic condi-
tions but failed to note anti-U.S. speeches and slogans. Peking
media have not yet mentioned the President's visit. Vietnamese
communist media thus far have characterized the President's
visit as an effort to prop up the "extremely reactionary impe-
rialist alliai.re" still dominated by the "Nixon doctrine" in
the face of widespread opposition among Japanese and South Koreans.
Several commentaries by Hanoi and Liberation radios and NHAN DAN
articles stress the large protest demonstrations in Japan, adding
that Prime Ministec Tanaka is expected to resign after the visit.
Thus far both Hanoi and Liberation media have generally treated the
Presidential visit as though it were confined to Japan and Korea,
although Liberation Radio once noted that Ford would visit "a
number of countries," including those two, without mentioning
the planned Vladivostok meeting wi;h Brezhnev.
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VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT: Soviet advance publicity for the forthcoming
summit at Vladivostok has been low-level but constant since the
plans for the meeting were first announced at the conclusion of
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow on 27 October. The media
have provided reports of President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's
press conference remar'hs on the meeting, roundups of J.S. press
comment, reports of cit-'.zens' reactions in Vladivostok, and so
on. The tone of the reportage and comment has been upbeat,
althoug'. there have been occasional references to the opponents
of detente in the West. Except for predictions that the meeting
will contribute to further progress on strategic arms limitation
issues, there has been little attempt to define the substantive
purpose of the meeting beyond vague generalities about detente.
ABORTIVE COUP IN BOLIVIA: Moscow, in commenting on the 7 Novem'3er
unsuccessful coup in. Bolivia and subsequent events, has accused
"extreme right elements" within the armed forces of provoking t'
coup in order to justify the cancellation of elections schedu:
for 1975. In the days '..-mediately following the abortive coup, it
was given scant coverage:, possibly because Moscow media equated as
"rightwing" boti; the government and the coup leaders--the latter
being disaffectee' members of the cabinet and the Bolivian Socialist
Falange, which foxr.sed part of the civilian coalition supporting
President Hugo Baazer's government. Howe\Ter, Soviet media reacted
str )ugly to the 1.0 November La Paz ani.cuncement that a "new" military
government, retaining Banzer as president, would remain in power until
1980, with political and labor activities suspended indefinitely.
TASS commentator Peter Tamarin said on the 18th that the post-coup
measures amounted to a "legalization of military dictatorship" and
reported that a "stormy protest" had been set off in the country--an
apparent reference to student unrest. Moscov radio commentator
Leonid Levchenko asserted that sectors-of the military had planned
the revolt in order to justify their "repressive measures" and
predicted that the government would have to face the "determf.ned
resistance of the Bol ;'an people." Havana, which has shown decreased
interest in the government of Bolivia since the overthrow of the
leftist Torres regime by Banzer forces in 1971, has not commented
on recent events in Bolivia, and PRENSA LATINA did not distribute
a 12 November report submitted by its Lima office on a Bolivian
official's denial that the coup 'as staged.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070048-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070048-6
FBIS TRENDS
20 NOVEMBER 1974
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 11 - 17 NOVEMBER 1974
Moscow (2453 items)
Peking (1092 items)
China
(4%)
6%
South Yemen Chairman
(1%)
Sri Lanka Premier
5%
in PRC
UNGA Session
(6%)
9%
[Kosygin Dinner
(--)
2%]
[Palestine Debate
(--)
37.]
Speech
Criticism of Lin Piao
(10%)
7%
October Revolution
(36%)
3%
and Confucius
Anniversary
Indochina
(8%)
6%
UNGA Palestine Debate
(--)
2%
World Food Conference,
(3%)
4%
Mongolian 50th
(--)
2%
Rome
Anniversary
Trinidad and Tobago
Prime Minister
Communique
Japan
(1%)
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have b._~en covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meetin' with
Rubay'i 'Ali.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070048-6